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dc.contributor.authorBacharach, Samuel B.
dc.contributor.authorLawler, Edward J.
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-17T17:29:26Z
dc.date.available2020-11-17T17:29:26Z
dc.date.issued1986-01-01
dc.identifier.other10572465
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/75974
dc.description.abstract[Excerpt] What this article (and our larger program of work) is designed to demonstrate is that these very simple ideas represent a particularly suitable starting point for understanding the power struggle between parties who regularly engage in negotiation. Specifically, in this article we show that the approach contains certain paradoxes regarding the acquisition and use of power in an ongoing bargaining relationship. The dependence framework treats the ongoing relationship as a power struggle in which each party tries to maneuver itself into a favorable power position.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.rightsRequired Publisher Statement: © Wiley. Final version published as: Bacharach, S. B., & Lawler, E. J. (1986). Power dependence and power paradoxes in bargaining [Electronic version]. Negotiation Journal, 2(2), 167-174. doi: 10. 1111/j.1571-9979.1986.tb00349.x Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectdependence theory
dc.subjectpower
dc.subjectbargaining
dc.subjectnegotiation
dc.titlePower Dependence and Power Paradoxes in Bargaining
dc.typearticle
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1986.tb00349.x
dc.description.legacydownloadsLawler46_Power_Dependence.pdf: 325 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationBacharach, Samuel B.: sb22@cornell.edu Cornell University
local.authorAffiliationLawler, Edward J.: ejl3@cornell.edu Cornell University


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