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dc.contributor.authorRubineau, Brian
dc.contributor.authorFernandez, Roberto
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-17T17:26:47Z
dc.date.available2020-11-17T17:26:47Z
dc.date.issued2013-01-01
dc.identifier.other4149953
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/75861
dc.description.abstractThe importance of networks in labor markets is well-known, and their job segregating effects in organizations taken as granted. Conventional wisdom attributes this segregation to the homophilous nature of contact networks, and leaves little role for organizational influences. But employee referrals are necessarily initiated within a firm by employee referrers subject to organizational policies. We build theory regarding the role of referrers in the segregating effects of network recruitment. Using mathematical and computational models, we investigate how empirically-documented referrer behaviors affect job segregation. We show that referrer behaviors can segregate jobs beyond the effects of homophilous network recruitment. Further, and contrary to past understandings, we show that referrer behaviors can also mitigate most if not all of the segregating effects of network recruitment. Although largely neglected in previous labor market network scholarship, referrers are the missing links revealing opportunities for organizations to influence the effects of network recruitment.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.rightsRequired Publisher Statement: © INFORMS. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectjob segregation
dc.subjectnetworking
dc.subjectreferrals
dc.subjectrecruitment
dc.subjectlabor markets
dc.titleMissing Links: Referrer Behavior and Job Segregation
dc.typeunassigned
dc.description.legacydownloadsRubineau1_Missing_links.pdf: 647 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationRubineau, Brian: br263@cornell.edu Cornell University
local.authorAffiliationFernandez, Roberto: Massachusetts Institute of Technology


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