Unemployment Insurance and Strikes
Hutchens, Robert M.; Lipsky, David B.; Stern, Robert
In several states workers who are unemployed because of a labor dispute can collect unemployment benefits. Due to imperfect experience rating, such policies can create a public subsidy to strikes. This study examines whether these policies affect strike activity. In particular, both cross-sectional and fixed effects models are employed to test whether an increase in the public subsidy inherent in unemployment insurance leads to an increase in strike frequency.
unemployment insurance; bargaining unit; innocent bystander; labor dispute; strike activity
Required Publisher Statement: © Springer. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. Final version published as: Hutchens, R., Lipsky, D. B., & Stern, R. (1992). Unemployment insurance and strikes. Journal of Labor Research, 13(4), 337-354. doi: 10.1007/BF02685525