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dc.contributor.authorHallock, Kevin F.
dc.contributor.authorOyer, Paul
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-17T17:15:41Z
dc.date.available2020-11-17T17:15:41Z
dc.date.issued1999-12-01
dc.identifier.other759393
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/75101
dc.description.abstractWe study whether boards of directors concentrate on performance near compensation decision times rather than providing consistent incentives for chief executive officers (CEO). throughout the fiscal year. We show empirically that managers can profit by moving sales revenue among fiscal quarters. Though this may suggest that boards use short-term trends when determining rewards, we find evidence consistent with boards tying pay to recent sales growth so as to use the best information about future performance. We also find that the timing of profits throughout the year does not affect CEO pay, which may suggest that smoothing firm income is important to CEOs.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.rightsRequired Publisher Statement: Copyright by Elsevier. Final article published as Hallock, K. F. & Oyer, P. (1999). The timeliness of performance information in determining executive compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance 5(4), 303-321.
dc.subjectexecutive compensation
dc.subjectperformance timing
dc.subjectmanagerial contracts
dc.subjectboards of directors
dc.titleThe Timeliness of Performance Information in Determining Executive Compensation
dc.typearticle
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(99)00011-5
dc.description.legacydownloadsHallock21_The_timeliness_of_performance.pdf: 490 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationHallock, Kevin F.: kfh7@cornell.edu Cornell University
local.authorAffiliationOyer, Paul: Northwestern University


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