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dc.contributor.authorBelogolovsky, Elena
dc.contributor.authorBamberger, Peter A.
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-12T21:16:57Z
dc.date.available2020-11-12T21:16:57Z
dc.date.issued2014-03-01
dc.identifier.other5319391
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/73672
dc.description.abstractKey Findings: Pay secrecy adversely impacts individual task performance because it weakens the perception that an increase in performance will be accompanied by increase in pay; Pay secrecy is associated with a decrease in employee performance and retention in pay-for-performance systems, which measure performance using relative (i.e., peer-ranked) criteria rather than an absolute scale (see Figure 2 on page 5); High performing employees tend to be most sensitive to negative pay-for- performance perceptions; There are many signals embedded within HR policies and practices, which can influence employees’ perception of workplace uncertainty/inequity and impact their performance and turnover intentions; and When pay transparency is impractical, organizations may benefit from introducing partial pay openness to mitigate these effects on employee performance and retention.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectpay-for-performance
dc.subjectincentives
dc.subjectjob performance
dc.subjectpay secrecy
dc.titleSignaling in Secret: Pay-for-Performance and the Incentive and Sorting Effects of Pay Secrecy
dc.typearticle
dc.description.legacydownloadsNo1_14_ResearchLink_Belogolovsky_031014b.pdf: 3488 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationBelogolovsky, Elena: eb582@cornell.edu Cornell University
local.authorAffiliationBamberger, Peter A.: Israel Institute of Technology


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