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Signaling in Secret: Pay-for-Performance and the Incentive and Sorting Effects of Pay Secrecy
dc.contributor.author | Belogolovsky, Elena | |
dc.contributor.author | Bamberger, Peter A. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-12T21:16:57Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-12T21:16:57Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-03-01 | |
dc.identifier.other | 5319391 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/73672 | |
dc.description.abstract | Key Findings: Pay secrecy adversely impacts individual task performance because it weakens the perception that an increase in performance will be accompanied by increase in pay; Pay secrecy is associated with a decrease in employee performance and retention in pay-for-performance systems, which measure performance using relative (i.e., peer-ranked) criteria rather than an absolute scale (see Figure 2 on page 5); High performing employees tend to be most sensitive to negative pay-for- performance perceptions; There are many signals embedded within HR policies and practices, which can influence employees’ perception of workplace uncertainty/inequity and impact their performance and turnover intentions; and When pay transparency is impractical, organizations may benefit from introducing partial pay openness to mitigate these effects on employee performance and retention. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.subject | pay-for-performance | |
dc.subject | incentives | |
dc.subject | job performance | |
dc.subject | pay secrecy | |
dc.title | Signaling in Secret: Pay-for-Performance and the Incentive and Sorting Effects of Pay Secrecy | |
dc.type | article | |
dc.description.legacydownloads | No1_14_ResearchLink_Belogolovsky_031014b.pdf: 3488 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020. | |
local.authorAffiliation | Belogolovsky, Elena: eb582@cornell.edu Cornell University | |
local.authorAffiliation | Bamberger, Peter A.: Israel Institute of Technology |