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dc.contributor.authorFreedman, Matthew
dc.contributor.authorKosova, Renata
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-12T19:47:55Z
dc.date.available2020-11-12T19:47:55Z
dc.date.issued2010-07-01
dc.identifier.other1723020
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/73185
dc.description.abstractWe examine the relationship between employee supervision and compensation by taking advantage of the structure of the hotel industry, in which many chains have both company managed and franchised properties. Given that supervision is less rigorous at company managed establishments, we estimate differences in wages and human resource practices not only across company managed and franchised hotels within chains, but also within individual hotels as they change organizational form. While we cannot rule out the use of efficiency wages, our results suggest that agency problems affect the timing of pay and employers’ propensity to use performance-based incentives.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.titleAgency and Compensation: Evidence from the Hotel Industry
dc.typepreprint
dc.description.legacydownloadsAgency_and_Compensation_Evidence_from_the_Hotel_Industry.pdf: 3518 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationFreedman, Matthew: mf439@cornell.edu Cornell University
local.authorAffiliationKosova, Renata: rk373@cornell.edu Cornell University


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