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dc.contributor.authorFarber, Henry S.
dc.contributor.authorKatz, Harry C.
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-12T19:32:41Z
dc.date.available2020-11-12T19:32:41Z
dc.date.issued1979-10-01
dc.identifier.other146034
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/73155
dc.description.abstract"This study develops a model of bargaining that demonstrates that an interest arbitration procedure will encourage negotiated settlements to the extent that risk aversion dominates the preferences of the parties and there is uncertainty regarding the arbitrator's behavior. The authors conclude that it is likely that risk aversion does dominate preferences, but the evidence is not conclusive. They also argue that uncertainty may be reduced over time for various reasons, leading to increased use of arbitration and a convergence between the terms of negotiated and arbitrated agreements."
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.rightsRequired Publisher Statement: Copyright by Cornell University.
dc.subjectarbitration
dc.subjectoutcome
dc.subjectincentive
dc.subjectbargain
dc.subjectsettlement
dc.subjectagreement
dc.subjectdispute
dc.subjectarbitrator
dc.subjectunion
dc.subjectlabor
dc.titleInterest Arbitration, Outcomes, and the Incentive to Bargain
dc.typearticle
dc.description.legacydownloadsKatz53_Interest_arbitration_outcomes_and_the_incentive_to_bargain.pdf: 2943 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationFarber, Henry S.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
local.authorAffiliationKatz, Harry C.: hck2@cornell.edu Cornell University


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