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dc.contributor.authorHartzell, Jay C.
dc.contributor.authorKallberg, Jarl G.
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Crocker H.
dc.description.abstractThis study analyzes the impact of corporate governance structures at the initial public offering (IPO) date. We test hypotheses that firms with more shareholder-oriented governance structures receive higher valuations at the IPO stage and have better long-term performance. Our sample is a set of 107 IPOs of real estate investment trusts (REITs) between 1991 and 1998. Using a single industry and REITs in particular reduces potentially confounding effects due to differences in risk, transparency, and growth potential. We believe this—combined with our use of IPOs—mitigates the endogeneity problem present in studies of the impact of governance on seasoned firms’ valuation. Our analysis indicates that firms with stronger governance structures have higher IPO valuations and better long-term operating performance than their peers.
dc.rightsRequired Publisher Statement: © University of Chicago Press. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectcorporate governance
dc.subjectinitial public offerings
dc.subjectreal estate investment trusts
dc.titleThe Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts
dc.description.legacydownloadsLiu4_The_Role_of_Corporate_Governance.pdf: 1038 downloads, before Aug. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationHartzell, Jay C.: University of Texas at Austin
local.authorAffiliationKallberg, Jarl G.: Thunderbird - The Garvin School of International Management
local.authorAffiliationLiu, Crocker H.: Cornell University

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