Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorØdegaard, Fredrik
dc.contributor.authorAnderson, Chris K.
dc.description.abstractMotivated by the emergence of online penny or pay-to-bid auctions, in this study, we analyze the operational consequences of all-pay auctions competing with fixed list price stores. In all-pay auctions, bidders place bids, and highest bidder wins. Depending on the auction format, the winner pays either the amount of their bid or that of the second-highest bid. All losing bidders forfeit their bids, regardless of the auction format. Bidders may visit the store, both before and after bidding, and buy the item at the fixed list price. In a modified version, we consider a setting where bidders can use their sunk bid as a credit towards buying the item from the auctioneer at a fixed price (different from the list price). We characterize a symmetric equilibrium in the bidding/buying strategy and derive optimal list prices for both the seller and auctioneer to maximize expected revenue. We consider two situations: (1) one firm operating both channels (i.e. fixed list price store and all-pay auction), and (2) two competing firms, each operating one of the two channels.
dc.rightsRequired Publisher Statement: © Elsevier. Final version published as: Ødegaard, F., & Anderson, C. K. (2014). All-pay auctions with pre- and post-bidding options. European Journal of Operational Research, 239(2), 579-592. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectall-pay auction
dc.subjectequilibrium bidding
dc.subjectsales competition
dc.subjectdual sales channels
dc.titleAll-Pay Auctions with Pre- and Post-Bidding Options
dc.description.legacydownloadsAnderson38_All_pay_auction.pdf: 740 downloads, before Aug. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationØdegaard, Fredrik: Western University
local.authorAffiliationAnderson, Chris K.: Cornell University School of Hotel Administration

Files in this item


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record