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dc.contributor.authorBanker, Rajiv D.
dc.contributor.authorLee, Seok-Young
dc.contributor.authorPotter, Gordon S.
dc.contributor.authorSrinivasan, Dhinu
dc.description.abstractPerformance improvements subsequent to the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan can result because more productive employees self-select into the firm (selection effect) and/or because employees allocate effort to become more effective (effort effect). We analyze individual performance data for 3,776 sales employees of a retail firm to evaluate these alternative sources of continuing performance improvement. The incentive plan helps the firm attract and retain more productive sales employees, and motivates these employees to further improve their productivity. In contrast, the less productive sales employees’ performance declines before they leave the firm.
dc.rightsRequired Publisher Statement: © Elsevier . Final version published as: Banker, R. D., Lee, S., Potter, G., & Srinivasan, D. (2000). An empirical analysis of continuing improvements following the implementation of a performance-based compensation plan. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(3), 315-350. doi:10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00016-7 Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectsalesforce compensation
dc.subjectincentive plans
dc.subjectmoral hazard
dc.subjectproductivity improvement
dc.titleAn Empirical Analysis of Continuing Improvements Following the Implementation of a Performance-Based Compensation Plan
dc.description.legacydownloadsPotter6_An_empirical_analysis_continuing_improvement.pdf: 621 downloads, before Aug. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationBanker, Rajiv D.: University of Texas at Dallas
local.authorAffiliationLee, Seok-Young: Sungshin Women's University
local.authorAffiliationPotter, Gordon S.: Cornell University School of Hotel Administration
local.authorAffiliationSrinivasan, Dhinu: University of Pittsburgh

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