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dc.contributor.authorRIddiough, Timothy
dc.contributor.authorSteiner, Eva
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-12T21:03:38Z
dc.date.available2020-09-12T21:03:38Z
dc.date.issued2017-10-24
dc.identifier.other14959053
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/71602
dc.description.abstractUsing equity REIT data, we show empirically that the use of unsecured debt, which contains standardized covenants that place limits on total leverage and the use of secured debt, is associated with lower leverage outcomes. We then show that firm value is sensitive to leverage levels, where lower leverage is associated with higher firm value. In the presence of weak managerial governance, our results suggest that unsecured debt covenants function as a managerial commitment device that preserves the firm’s debt capacity to enhance financial flexibility.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.rightsRequired Publisher Statement: © Wiley. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. Final version published as: Riddiough, T., & Steiner, E. (2017). Financial flexibility and manager-shareholder conflict: Evidence from REITs. Real Estate Economics. Advanced Online Publication. doi: 10.1111/1540-6229.12226.
dc.subjectreal estate investment
dc.subjectunsecured debt
dc.subjectleverage
dc.subjectfirm value
dc.subjectfinancial flexibility
dc.titleFinancial Flexibility and Manager-Shareholder Confict: Evidence from REITs
dc.typearticle
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12226
dc.description.legacydownloadsSteiner28_Financial_flexibility.pdf: 37 downloads, before Aug. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationRIddiough, Timothy: University of Wisconsin-Madison
local.authorAffiliationSteiner, Eva: ems457@cornell.edu Cornell University School of Hotel Administration


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