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dc.contributor.authorKallberg, Jarl G.
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Crocker H.
dc.contributor.authorSrinivasan, Anand
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-12T21:03:32Z
dc.date.available2020-09-12T21:03:32Z
dc.date.issued2004-09-01
dc.identifier.other4746692
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/71583
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the optimal quality decision of a producer in a multi-period setting with reputation effects. Using a unique database of returns on real estate limited partnerships (RELPs), we empirically examine alternative theoretical predictions of optimal producer strategy. In particular, we test whether the producers in our market invest in reputation building by initially selling high quality goods and then lowering quality. Using a variety of statistical tests, we find evidence consistent with reputation building, both in the aggregate and for individual developers.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.rightsRequired Publisher Statement: © Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectreal estate limited partnerships
dc.subjectRELPs
dc.subjectreputation
dc.subjectquality
dc.titleLimited Partnerships and Reputation Formation
dc.typearticle
dc.description.legacydownloadsLiu9_Limited_Partnerships_and_Reputation_Formation.pdf: 529 downloads, before Aug. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationKallberg, Jarl G.: New York University
local.authorAffiliationLiu, Crocker H.: chl62@cornell.edu Cornell University
local.authorAffiliationSrinivasan, Anand: University of Georgia


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