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dc.contributor.authorOtto, Steven
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-23T13:33:01Z
dc.date.available2019-02-22T07:00:32Z
dc.date.issued2018-08-30
dc.identifier.otherOtto_cornellgrad_0058F_10942
dc.identifier.otherhttp://dissertations.umi.com/cornellgrad:10942
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/59517
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation includes two chapters. The first presents a new auction mechanism designed for conservation programs. Individuals compensated for conserving their land often extract substantial profits from the government or non-governmental agency funding the conservation program. These rents limit the amount of land which can be conserved, which decreases total surplus for society. The new auction mechanism, the Provision Point Reverse Auction, was designed to mitigate this rent-seeking behavior. This paper presents both theoretical and experimental evidence to substantiate the efficacy of the mechanism. The second chapter considers the effect that preference uncertainty may have on two commonly observed behavioral anomalies: exchange asymmetries and the willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparity. This paper provides both theoretical and experimental evidence which suggests that uncertainty in preferences can explain at least part of these behavioral anomalies. The experiments rely on chocolate and a ``taste'' treatment, where individuals in a treatment group are allowed to taste a small amount of chocolate before making their trade or valuation decisions.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectAgriculture economics
dc.subjectAuction
dc.subjectExperimental
dc.subjectconservation
dc.subjectuncertainty
dc.titleEssays on Conservation Auctions and Uncertainty in Preferences
dc.typedissertation or thesis
thesis.degree.disciplineApplied Economics and Management
thesis.degree.grantorCornell University
thesis.degree.levelDoctor of Philosophy
thesis.degree.namePh. D., Applied Economics and Management
dc.contributor.chairJust, David R.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberSchulze, William D.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberOrtiz Bobea, Ariel
dc.contributor.committeeMemberMesser, Kent Donald
dcterms.licensehttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/59810
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.7298/X4H993D2


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