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dc.contributor.authorBhattacharya, Utpal
dc.contributor.authorDaouk, Hazem
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-21T17:10:26Z
dc.date.available2018-08-21T17:10:26Z
dc.date.issued2009-06-01
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/57968
dc.descriptionWP 2009-24 June 2009
dc.descriptionJEL Classification Codes: G15; G18; K22; K42
dc.description.abstractThis paper argues, both theoretically and empirically, that sometimes no securities law may be better than a good securities law that is not enforced. The first part of the paper formalizes the sufficient conditions under which this happens for any law. The second part of the paper shows that a specific securities law - the law prohibiting insider trading - may satisfy these conditions. The third part of the paper takes this prediction to the data. We find that the cost of equity actually rises when some countries enact an insider trading law, but do not enforce it.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherCharles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University
dc.subjectinsider trading
dc.subjectcost of capital
dc.subjectemerging markets
dc.subjectsecurities law
dc.subjectenforcement
dc.titleWhen No Law is Better than a Good Law
dc.typearticle
dcterms.licensehttp://hdl.handle.net/1813/57595


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  • Dyson School Working Papers
    Working Papers published by the Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University

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