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dc.contributor.authorMesser, Kent D. Poe, Gregory L.
dc.contributor.authorRondeau, Daniel
dc.contributor.authorSchulze, William D.
dc.contributor.authorVossler, Christian A.
dc.descriptionWP 2008-12 March 2008
dc.descriptionJEL Classification Codes: C91; C92; D64; D72; H41
dc.description.abstractPublic referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing programs are implemented.
dc.publisherCharles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University
dc.titleSocial Preferences and Voting: An Exploration Using a Novel Preference Revealing Mechanism

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  • Dyson School Working Papers
    Working Papers published by the Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University

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