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dc.contributor.authorJayaraman, Rajshri
dc.contributor.authorKanbur, Ravi
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-21T17:09:42Z
dc.date.available2018-08-21T17:09:42Z
dc.date.issued1999-03-01
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/57833
dc.descriptionWP 1999-05 March 1999
dc.description.abstractIn the presence of international public goods, donors are faced with two instruments whereby recipient utility may be altered -contributions towards the international public good and direct transfers (conventional foreign aid). The self-interested donor's optimal choice of transfer-contributions combinations will typically depend upon the public goods technology. Some technologies call for a corner solution, with either transfers or contributions set to zero, and others are characterised by interior solutions, where the donor's optimal strategy calls for a positive transfers and positive contributions. Whether or not the presence of an international public good strengthens the case for conventional foreign liid transfers is therefore not always obvious.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherCharles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University
dc.titleInternational Public Goods and the Case for Foreign Aid
dc.typearticle
dcterms.licensehttp://hdl.handle.net/1813/57595


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    Working Papers published by the Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University

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