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dc.contributor.authorChapman, Duane
dc.contributor.authorVossler, Christian A.
dc.contributor.authorMount, Timothy D.
dc.contributor.authorBarboni, V.
dc.contributor.authorThomas, Robert J.
dc.contributor.authorZimmerman, Ray D.
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-21T17:09:15Z
dc.date.available2018-08-21T17:09:15Z
dc.date.issued2002-09
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/57721
dc.descriptionWP 2002-29 September 2002
dc.descriptionJEL Classification Codes: Q4; L11; L94
dc.description.abstractEconomic theory gives no clear indication of the minimum number of producers necessary for a market to define competitive price-quantity equilibria which approximate price equal to marginal cost. Previous work and FERC Guidelines generally suggest that 6 to 10 generators may be workably competitive. Our experiments with PowerWeb suggest that a higher number of suppliers may be necessary to approximate competitive market solutions, this in the absence of any communication among producers. As communications rules are altered to parallel differing types of antitrust enforcement, market results with 24 participants approach pure monopoly values.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherCharles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University
dc.subjectelectricity
dc.subjectrestructured markets
dc.subjectcompetition
dc.subjectmarket power
dc.subjectantitrust
dc.titleMarket Efficiency, Competition, and Communication in Electric Power Markets: Experimental Results
dc.typearticle
dcterms.licensehttp://hdl.handle.net/1813/57595


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    Working Papers published by the Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University

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