Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorClarkson, Michael R.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMyers, Andrew C.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Fred B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-04T19:40:19Z
dc.date.available2007-04-04T19:40:19Z
dc.date.issued2005-02-10en_US
dc.identifier.citationhttp://techreports.library.cornell.edu:8081/Dienst/UI/1.0/Display/cul.cis/TR2005-1976en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/5676
dc.description.abstractMeasurement of information flow requires a definition of leakage, which traditionally has been defined to occur when an attacker's uncertainty about secret data is reduced. We show that this uncertainty-based approach is inadequate for measuring information flow when an attacker is making assumptions about secret inputs and these assumptions might be incorrect. Moreover, we show that such attacker beliefs are an unavoidable aspect of any satisfactory definition of leakage. To reason about information flow based on beliefs, we develop a model that describes how an attacker's belief changes due to the attacker's observation of the execution of a probabilistic (or deterministic) program. The model leads to a new metric for quantitative information flow that measures accuracy rather than uncertainty of beliefs.en_US
dc.format.extent211280 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherCornell Universityen_US
dc.subjectcomputer scienceen_US
dc.subjecttechnical reporten_US
dc.titleBelief in Information Flowen_US
dc.typetechnical reporten_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Statistics