Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorHintz, Lisel
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-12T16:55:42Z
dc.date.available2017-12-12T16:55:42Z
dc.date.issued2016-05
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/55056
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the case of US President George W. Bush’s unwavering support for the Republic of Georgia in its aggressive engagement with Russia during the 2008 August War, a nearly universally acknowledged judgment error that puzzled Bush’s own team as much as it did foreign policy analysts. Finding explanations grounded in alliance behavior, audience costs, and resource security inadequate, the paper offers a cognitive heuristics account that focuses on the fundamental attribution error (FAE). Examining how the FAE can function in terms of assessing the actions of perceived friends reveals Bush’s failure to update his beliefs about the increasingly erratic behavior of Georgian President and Bush confidante Mikhail Saakashvili. In presenting an explanation for this empirical puzzle, the paper contributes a new perspective on the FAE of use in the burgeoning literature employing psychological approaches to foreign policy outcomes.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMario Einaudi Center for International Studies
dc.subjectGeorgia
dc.subjectBush
dc.subjectDecision-Making
dc.subjectCognition
dc.subjectRussia
dc.subjectForeign Policy
dc.subjectFundamental Attibution Error
dc.subjectPsychological Approaches, Monetary Policy
dc.titleGeorgia in His Mind: A Cognitive Explanation for George W. Bush’s Decision-Making in the 2008 August War
dc.typereport


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Statistics