Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBenabou, Roland
dc.contributor.authorTirole, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-12T16:34:59Z
dc.date.available2017-12-12T16:34:59Z
dc.date.issued2006-04
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/55020
dc.description.abstractWe develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or imagerelated) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and more generally those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMario Einaudi Center for International Studies
dc.subjectAltruism
dc.subjectRewards
dc.subjectMotivation
dc.subjectEsteem
dc.subjectCrowding Out
dc.subjectOverjustification Effect
dc.subjectIdentity
dc.subjectSocial Norms
dc.subjectMorals
dc.subjectGreed
dc.subjectPsychology
dc.subjectFrance
dc.titleIncentives and Prosocial Behavior
dc.typereport


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Statistics