Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAkresh, Richard
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-12T16:34:58Z
dc.date.available2017-12-12T16:34:58Z
dc.date.issued2006-04
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/55017
dc.description.abstractUdry (1996) uses household survey data and finds that the allocation of resources within households is Pareto inefficient, contradicting the main assumption of most collective models of intrahousehold bargaining. He finds that among plots planted with the same crop in the same year, within a given household, those controlled by women produce lower yields than the men’s plots. This paper challenges that finding. Using an alternative nationally representative dataset, I find that only households in regions geographically proximate to those studied by Udry exhibit Pareto inefficient intrahousehold allocations, while the rest of the country reveals no evidence of Pareto inefficiencies. Households in regions experiencing negative rainfall shocks are on average less likely to exhibit Pareto inefficient intrahousehold allocations, and these negative rainfall shocks are correlated with increases in labor resources allocated to the wife’s plots, further confirming that in bad years, households try to avoid losses from Pareto inefficiency.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMario Einaudi Center for International Studies
dc.subjectIntrahousehold Allocation
dc.subjectCollective Household Models
dc.subjectPareto Efficiency
dc.subjectAfrica
dc.subjectResource Economics
dc.titleUnderstanding Pareto Inefficient Intrahousehold Allocations
dc.typereport


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Statistics