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Reason and Transition: On the Concept of Transversal Reason
dc.contributor.author | Welsch, Wolfgang | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2003-12-01T20:32:19Z | |
dc.date.available | 2003-12-01T20:32:19Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2003-12-01T20:32:19Z | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/54 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper redefines the notion of reason as a core intellectual capacity, contrasts it with the concept of multiple rationalities, and shows how it is essential for taking a detached view of ones own position. Reason aims to be as neutral as possible, and provides the capacity to move or see across multiple positions ("transversal reason"). Reason does not necessarily lead to final conclusions, but permits the individual to accommodate irreconcilable perspectives. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 84588 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/html | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.subject | reason | en_US |
dc.subject | rationality | en_US |
dc.subject | transversality | en_US |
dc.subject | inconcludability | en_US |
dc.title | Reason and Transition: On the Concept of Transversal Reason | en_US |