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dc.contributor.authorSlater, Dan
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-10T14:27:15Z
dc.date.available2017-11-10T14:27:15Z
dc.date.issued2004-10
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/54328
dc.descriptionPage range: 61-92
dc.description.abstractThe fall of Indonesia’s New Order regime set the stage for more competitive elections, but not necessarily for more competitive elites. Party and military leaders have primarily responded to democratic transition by sharing power rather than competing for it, especially by ensuring that all major political groupings enjoy lucrative and powerful positions in the cabinet. The recent introduction of direct presidential elections has inadvertently threatened to unsettle this cozy and collusive elite arrangement—but only at the risk of restoring dangerous patterns of presidential domination.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherCornell University Southeast Asia Program
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIndonesia
dc.titleIndonesia's Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition
dc.typearticle
schema.issueNumberVol. 78


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