Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBjorndahl, Adamen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-07T20:56:53Z
dc.date.available2019-08-19T06:01:12Z
dc.date.issued2014-08-18en_US
dc.identifier.otherbibid: 8793232
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/38745
dc.description.abstractWe introduce language-based games, in which utility is defined over descriptions in a given language. By choosing the right language, we can capture psychological games [9] and reference-dependent preference [15]. Of special interest are languages that can express only coarse beliefs (e.g., the probability of an event is "high" or "low", rather than "the probability is .628"): by assuming that a player's preferences depend only on what is true in a coarse language, we can resolve a number of well-known paradoxes in the literature, including the Allais paradox. Despite the expressive power of this approach, we show that it can describe games in a simple, natural way. Nash equilibrium and rationalizability are generalized to this setting; Nash equilibrium is shown not to exist in general, while the existence of rationalizable strategies is proved under mild conditions on the language.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectgame theoryen_US
dc.subjectmodal logicen_US
dc.titleLanguage-Based Gamesen_US
dc.typedissertation or thesisen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineMathematics
thesis.degree.grantorCornell Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctor of Philosophy
thesis.degree.namePh. D., Mathematics
dc.contributor.chairNerode, Anilen_US
dc.contributor.coChairHalpern, Joseph Yehudaen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberShore, Richard Aen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberPass, Rafael N.en_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Statistics