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Essays On Optimal Contract Design

Author
Xu, Jin
Abstract
the returns to effort increase with the hierarchical levels, which cannot generate the convex wage structure unless further assumptions added on optimal effort levels and cost functions. The third chapter investigates the underlying assumption in Chapter 1 that people are inequity averse to ex-ante payoff differentials. Specifically, an online survey is conducted to test whether ex ante or ex post fairness views affect people's decision making in a social context. I find that the ex post fairness views do make an important role in people's decision making. The results of the survey data do not support the model of inequity aversion. c 2013 Jin Xu ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Date Issued
2013-08-19Subject
other-regarding preferences; wage compression; tournament
Committee Chair
Benjamin, Daniel
Committee Member
Waldman, Michael; Bodoh-Creed, Aaron; O'Donoghue, Edward Donald
Degree Discipline
Economics
Degree Name
Ph. D., Economics
Degree Level
Doctor of Philosophy
Type
dissertation or thesis