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dc.contributor.authorWang, Solen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-13T20:28:23Z
dc.date.available2014-10-13T06:27:56Z
dc.date.issued2009-10-13T20:28:23Z
dc.identifier.otherbibid: 6714358
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/13945
dc.description.abstractI analyze the price informativeness of three informed parties' actions from 1994-2006. Consistent with their disparate environments, I find that insiders are more informative at longer (12-month) versus shorter (6-month) horizons, while analysts and transient institutions are only informative at shorter horizons. When inter-party disagreement exists, a party's informativeness is not only a function of its own strength, but also the collective weakness of its counterparts. Using FERC, PIN, synchronicity and industry delay measures as proxies for a firm's informational environment, I find that while insider signals are unconditionally most informative, they are only predictive of future returns when prices are inefficient with respect to firm-specific information. Conversely, analysts appear unable to take additional advantage of inefficient firm-specific environments, and only appear to be predictive of future returns when stock prices are uninformed with respect to industryspecific information. Finally, I find that the mandate of Reg FD appears to increase the power of insiders' actions, while decreasing those of their informed counterparts. This evidence suggests a decreased level of information asymmetry between individuals and professional investors, but not a lower aggregate of level of information asymmetry across the firm's informational environment.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectInvestiment Strategiesen_US
dc.titleWhen Informed Agents Disagreeen_US
dc.typedissertation or thesisen_US


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