MORAL REACTIONS AS MORAL SIGNALS

Abstract

The work presented here encompasses two lines of research broadly concernedwith understanding the inferences people make from observing the moral reactions of others. The first line of research is concerned with the role that moral praise may play in signaling normative boundaries. I examined two foundational questions about moral praise. First, what makes an action praiseworthy? One possibility is the normative exceptionality, or supererogatory nature, is what makes certain actions praiseworthy. I found that participants reported actions that exceed duties (compared to duties) deserve greater praise, are less likely to happen, and are more likely to be directed at social targets. Second, what do observers infer from praise? Praise may communicate information about both the norms of a society (e.g., the action is uncommon) and about the person giving the praise (e.g., the person thinks that the action is uncommon). I found that participants inferred that praised moral behavior is less common in society, is less required and expected of people, and that the praise-giver would want to be friends with the praised agent. These studies provide insight into the process of giving praise and how praise can signal moral norms regarding duties and expectations. The second line of research is concerned with inferences made from others’ emotional expressions. People often feel guilt for accidents—negative events that they did not intend or have any control over. Why might this be the case? Are there reputational benefits to doing so? Across six studies, I found support for the hypothesis that observers expect “false positive” emotions from agents during a moral encounter – emotions that are not normatively appropriate for the situation but still trigger in response to that situation. For example, if a person accidentally spills coffee on someone, most normative accounts of blame would hold that the person is not blameworthy, as the spill was accidental. Self-blame (and guilt that accompanies it) would thus be an inappropriate response. I found that observers rate an agent who feels guilt, compared to a control agent, as a better person, less blameworthy for the accident, and less likely to commit moral offenses.