This dissertation consists of four papers on the morality and the law of antidiscrimination. The first paper considers whether the harm that discrimination causes is the only wrong-making feature of discrimination by analyzing cases of putatively harmless yet wrongful discrimination. The second paper develops an interpretation of antidiscrimination law’s main features according to which the law’s purpose is not to reflect the private interpersonal morality of antidiscrimination but to function as an instrument for pursuing valuable public objectives, such as reducing social inequality. The third paper argues that the justification for the objective of reducing social status hierarchies between marginalized and privileged social groups is to prevent harm to members of marginalized groups. The fourth paper critiques the view that in pursuing its objectives antidiscrimination law aims to promote a particular conception of the good for human beings. A distinctive picture of antidiscrimination law emerges from these four papers. Even if discrimination is sometimes made morally wrong by how it manifests or expresses disrespect for its victims, antidiscrimination law has an exclusively instrumental purpose of preventing harms suffered by members of subordinated groups in social status hierarchies. In pursuit of this objective, the law is not required to abjure state neutrality between conceptions of the good.