Many authoritarian regimes are implementing data sharing policies to exploit data as an economic resource for digital economy development. However, conventional political science literature notes that increased information flow can destabilize authoritarian regimes by facilitating collective action and strengthening government accountability. Recognizing this tension, this dissertation asks: What strategies do authoritarian regimes employ to regulate information under conditions of increased data openness? I argue that authoritarian regimes regulate information by differentiating between sensitive information that are malleable and that are immutable. They then use three distinct information control strategies; the preemptive strategies of ‘suggestion’ and ‘censorship’, and the retroactive strategy of ‘correction’. I test my theory on the case study of Malaysia, an upper-middle-income electoral authoritarian regime that has embraced data sharing policies for economic transformation. I draw on an original dataset of 45000 parliamentary exchanges from Malaysia’s parliament between 2014 to 2023. I demonstrate that Malaysia’s regime disclosed more data the more a parliamentary question discussed the topic of Race (evidence of suggestion), and less data the more a question addressed the topic of Corruption (evidence of censorship). I supplement this analysis with interview data to show how these strategies support regime goals of managing public interpretation and public knowledge of data. I also leverage Malaysia’s democratization in 2018 to show that data transparency does not improve under new democracies. Second, I use evidence from an original vignette survey experiment fielded in Malaysia to investigate the efficacy of correction in shaping public beliefs against sensitive information. While I find no evidence that corrections are effective in influencing the beliefs of regime supporters, the results show modest evidence that corrections can backfire among regime opposers and drive them to lean into their beliefs in the sensitive information. This dissertation contributes to the scholarship on authoritarian information control by identifying a novel control strategy and by analyzing the control of numerical data, rather than text-based information. It also interrogates the tensions between liberalization and control that authoritarian regimes face when developing their digital economies.