Banks lie at the heart of the financial system, and their behavior is driven by the confluenceof public and private interests. In three essays, I analyze the dynamic interplay between U.S. financial regulators and corporate governance mechanisms in the banking industry. The first essay empirically evaluates the impact of hedge fund activism in banks through the lens of a change in Federal Reserve Board regulatory guidance. A 2020 shift in the FRB’s policies increased flexibility for hedge funds to engage in campaigns at publicly traded banks, and hedge funds responded with intensified activity in the community banking sector. I find that increased exposure to hedge fund pressure produces positive results for shareholders, but raises the possibility of increased risk on affected banks’ balance sheets. The second essay addresses climate controversies in banking, analyzing commitments by banks to align their lending with net-zero initiatives. I find that climate commitments by banks only result in changed behavior when they are made jointly with peer banks. I also find mixed evidence for the proposition that bank climate alliances resemble cartellike behavior. The third chapter discusses government efforts to regulate executive compensation at banks. I show that while regulators primarily focus on short-termism as a source of excessive risk taking, a bigger problem is the convexity of executive payoffs due to stock-based pay and excessive leverage.