I study how contracts and organizational structures shape decision-making in financial markets. Back of the envelope, I research through empirical analysis guided by novel theoretical models to explore how to design financial contracts and institutions from the beginning to enhance market efficiency. The first essay examines the distributional consequences of financial benchmarks, specifically the transition from LIBOR to SOFR. Using difference-in-differences empirical analysis and structural calibration, I show that this transition was a lobbying outcome driven by large banks' incentives to hedge repo-based funding. This benchmark replacement created an interest rate mismatch for smaller banks, which led to wider interest spreads, market share losses, and reduced growth and employment opportunities for their borrowers. Model-based estimates suggest the chosen rate was suboptimal compared to a hybrid benchmark that balances both secured and unsecured market conditions. The second essay investigates contractual innovation and the evolution of corporate credit agreements from 1996 to 2019. Utilizing natural language processing to parse contract terms and definitions, I document a tension between standardization and innovation in traded contracts. The findings reveal that large lenders leverage their vast deal flow to consistently reproduce market-standard boilerplate. In contrast, smaller banks face higher uncertainty about latent market standards and therefore introduce off-market language. Consequently, it is these smaller banks that provide the necessary contractual variation and experimentation that ultimately drives future market standards. The final essay explores the power and influence of institutional rating agencies, using the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index as a primary context. Through a game-theoretic model of focal points and empirical evaluations of stock market returns, I demonstrate that even when ratings are fundamentally contested or partially spurious, they serve as crucial coordination devices for investors facing strategic complementarity. This self-fulfilling dynamic explains the immense power rating agencies hold, highlighting how such influence can be susceptible to manipulation. Together, these chapters demonstrate how the design of financial benchmarks, the evolution of debt contracts, and the coordination power of rating agencies profoundly influence market dynamics, institutional competition, and real economic outcomes.