In this dissertation, I explore how divisions in business interests influence labor policies and shape national responses to global market pressures and financial crises. Looking beyond a general preference for lower labor costs, I advance the theory that business positions on liberalization are shaped by sector and firm-size production strategies, as well as binding associational commitments. Specifically, labor market reform will advance further where there is a leading industrial export sector that benefits from it and provides a powerful domestic social partner for technocrats and European institutions recommending those policies. Instead, labor market reform will fail where there is no such an industrial export sector—i.e. there is no strong business “champion” for policy change—and diversified business interests prefer the stability and protection offered by more traditional corporatist bargaining relationships. I empirically test my argument in Portugal and Spain during the 2011-2015 European financial crisis, exploiting a “most-similar systems” design. I accomplish this through in-depth qualitative analysis of interview data collected during 12 months of fieldwork in Lisbon and Madrid, where I conducted 133 interviews with politicians, policymakers, bureaucrats, members of business associations and labor confederations, representatives from international institutions, and country-experts.