How Does External Debt Servicing Ability Affect The Stability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes?

Fur, Viola

doi:https://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v14i1.558

How Does External Debt Servicing Ability Affect The Stability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes?

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558-13-53-1-2-20210120.pdf (582.91 KB)

Permanent Link(s)

https://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v14i1.558

https://hdl.handle.net/1813/115028

Collections

Cornell International Affairs Review - Volume 14, Number 1 (Fall 2020)

Author

Fur, Viola

Volume & Issue

Vol. 14, Iss. 1 (Fall 2020)

Description

page(s) 4-56

Date Issued

2021-01-20

Publisher

Cornell University Library

Previously Published as

Fur, Viola. "How Does External Debt Servicing Ability Affect The Stability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes?." Cornell International Affairs Review Vol. 14, Iss. 1 (Fall 2020). https://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v14i1.558.

Rights

Attribution 4.0 International

Rights URI

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Type

article