This dissertation examines how the relationship between rideshare drivers and platforms (Uber, Lyft, etc.) is shaped by conflict, such as wage reductions, passenger arguments, or deactivations. Drawing on survey data from more than 488 rideshare drivers and 75 interviews, this dissertation suggests that the relationship between workers in the gig economy and their platforms has manifest impact on their work behaviors. Drivers who reported higher levels of conflict were less likely to spend time on platforms, often recruit passengers (and other drivers) to their preferred services, and "drop" platforms that are unable (or unwilling) to resolve their workplace disputes. This research demonstrates that, while gig work lacks the directive control found in a traditional workplace, the management of conflict and workplace disputes plays a central role in cultivating dense platform network effects. This result blends the theoretical work of platform economics with the organizational dispute resolution literature. In doing so, these findings extend the exit-voice-loyalty framework into the digital 1099 economy and suggests that the interplay between workers and organizations is a central strategic concern for platform managers and developers.