In this dissertation I argue against some popular arguments for the compatibilism of moral responsibility and determinism, and for a compatibilist account of moral responsibility and agency of my own. In the first chapter I argue against Strawsonian inspired accounts of moral responsibility that would, if accurate, provide reason to reject incompatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. In the second chapter I argue that Quality of Will accounts of moral responsibility, while likely correct, do not provide reason to rejection incompatibilism. In the third chapter I provide and argument for incomaptibilism that relies on none of the controversial assumptions about control and the ability to do otherwise which have presented problems for arguments for incompatibilism in the past. Thus, this argument is immune to the criticisms of traditionally incompatibilist accounts of control and ability. In the last chapter I present a compatibilist account of moral agency that I endorse. This accoutn is a combination of two popular accounts of moral agency that I show fail, when taken on their own.