In April 2005, during the national election campaign in Germany, the Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party, Franz Müntefering, likened private equity firms and hedge funds to swarms of locusts sucking out firms and laying off employees. His remarks were among the shrillest in an increasingly intense international debate on thebetter regulation of international financial markets. New forms of private capital have amassed such huge amounts of financial resources that state regulators not only in Germany increasingly fear risks for global financial stability. However, Germany is particularly active in this regard. During its presidency of the G-8 in 2007, Germany has made the tighter regulation of global financial industries one of its core objectives. These initiatives lead directly into some of the core controversies of the literature on global economic governance: what is the extent of state capacity in regulating global financial markets, which forms of regulation are achieved, and what are the theoretical instruments allowing us to explain cooperation and non-cooperation among states and between states and private actors? This paper looks at the reasons and prospects of Global Economic Governance initiatives under the new financial (non)architecture, using Germany as empirical example