In the 1970s, between the oil crisis (1973) and the debt crisis (1982), housing became the primary strategy pushed by international agencies and economists looking to promote national development and manage rural-urban migration. Despite what seemed to be the perfect outlet for architectural expertise, architects were largely excluded from international debates on housing, such as at the United Nations Habitat Conference (1976). At the same time, by 1978, a quarter of the world's architects were unemployed. This dissertation argues that the architect's loss of relevancy in housing was caused by a shift in scientific and technical expertise, in general. Through archival research on three projects funded by national governments (Mexico, Argentina, and Spain), I demonstrate that expertise related to housing shifted from professional architects to aggregate experts working in consultancy groups, governmental research institutions, and international development aid agencies. Rather than emphasizing episodes that explain how architects were excluded from the production of housing, this dissertation looks at exceptions when some architects recognized their loss of agency and tried to resolve the situation by creatively engaging in the newly emerging information systems. In three interrelated sections, I highlight three systems projects where architects took on managerial and bureaucratic roles and hired their own research teams filled with sociologists, computer scientists, and data analysts.