
CRISIS, CITIZENSHIP, AND COSMOPOLITANISM: LIVING IN A LOCAL AND GLOBAL RISK SOCIETY IN BALI

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What are the possibilities, the boundaries, and the constraints by which individuals and groups negotiate their roles and statuses with states, institutionalized collectivities, and transnational networks? In this paper we argue that Indonesians position themselves in a world of images, power relations, and commodity flows through forms of group-belonging which range from loose identification to formal ascribed roles. Citizenship is one of these forms of participation, but the contradictions between cosmopolitan membership of a loosely defined global society, nationally oriented legal identity, and more restricted local civil obligations are revealed on Bali through the context of a "multidimensional crisis."

In exploring these contradictions, we draw on examples of people who define themselves as, amongst other things, "Balinese," a definition that has been sharpened by the advent of mass tourism since the 1970s. By looking at the situation of Balinese, we are seeking to identify ways in which transnational practices—economic, cultural, and social—are incorporated into debates over forms of social and political change in Indonesia. The authority to determine who speaks and who defines "Indonesia," in a country seeing itself as in crisis or at least transition, has increasingly come under challenge since the fall of Suharto in 1998.

The contest over "reality" in a situation of crisis may be one that is assumed by Western media commentators to have overtaken the world since the events of September 11, 2001. However, to adopt such a view would be to blind ourselves to the situation outside a few of the richer countries in the world prior to those events. As

theorists of modernity and globalization, Marshall Berman¹ and Ulrich Beck² have argued, a sense of crisis is an outcome of rapid social transformations that have been going on since the Industrial Revolution but which accelerated towards the end of the twentieth century—the period generally referred to as characterized by “globalization.”³ Both authors link the proliferation of postmodern forms of cultural representation to the intensification of modernity in globalization. “Crisis” is one of the key modern ideas employed in creating a hierarchy of realities linked to institutional power. In the case of Indonesia since the Asian economic crisis of 1997, specific versions of that sense of crisis linked to regional, national, and local identities provide the major means for participants in Indonesian society to reconceptualize their realities.

Beck restates a fundamental premise of the sociology of knowledge that can readily be applied to dominant understandings of politics in Indonesia, as produced by those seeking to control the processes of government, and in Indonesian media institutions: proximity to institutional power makes a representation more “real.” One of the problems here is that national governments are struggling to control that reality. He goes on in his “Cosmopolitan Manifesto”⁴ to declare a new agenda for studying the dialectic of local and global power realities that do not fit national politics. Beck addresses the power realities of an internationalized society where “incalculable risk” is a dominant category of discourse, and posits the possibility of a “cosmopolitan democracy.” The new cosmopolitanism envisaged by Beck is one of enhanced global awareness and affiliation. In this condition, there is an “individualization” (rather than individualism) that privileges diversity, as well as collective responsibility for transnational institutions that address new forms of risk. Beck and others⁵ argue that people have multiple memberships in overlapping communities whose institutions exert control beyond the boundaries of the nation state. Some of these institutions are formal international bodies such as ASEAN and the United Nations, others include multi-national companies, non-government organizations, and criminal networks. The sense of collective responsibility mentioned by Beck, in combination with internationalized discourses of human rights and law, is the basis of his argument that the forms of globalized membership add up to a type of “citizenship,” through which a “transnational subject” feels that she or he has the right to engage in political action. Given the institutional and discursive weaknesses of state citizenship in Indonesia, this notion is worth examining in the light of recent pressures on the Indonesian state.

¹ Marshall Berman, *All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (London: Verso, 1982).

² Ulrich Beck, *World Risk Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 30.

³ We recognize the contested nature of this term, which if anything probably should refer to the intensification of a process that has been going on since the imperial era. Our position is similar to that adopted by Kevin Hewison, “Resisting Globalization: A Study of Localism in Thailand,” *The Pacific Review* 13,2 (2000): 279-96, who accepts that “old, renewed or new, the processes and ideologies identified with globalization have real impacts. . . .” (280). Likewise much of what is called postmodernism is not new, but an excessive form of modernity.

⁴ Beck, *World Risk Society*, pp. 1-18.

⁵ David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 449.

Beck's and others' visions of new global modernities challenge Suharto-era analyses of Indonesian politics and economics that assumed the country's unity—social and political—over its diversity. Such analyses reinforced the centralizing aspirations of the New Order regime, but could not deal with the varieties of social life, nor with the mechanisms by which hierarchies of regions versus center were created.⁶ Alternative perspectives are found in the work of a number of anthropologists who have looked in out-of-the-way places: the Aru islands to the East, the Meratus mountains in Kalimantan, or the Batak highlands.⁷ These writers are all concerned with narrating place and change, especially in terms of the experience of relating to the state and being simultaneously enmeshed in local worlds and transnational commodity relations.

A critique from the margins avoids too much focus on the doings of politicians in Jakarta, but can too easily be construed as concerned with something outside Indonesia, exterior to the state and in which Indonesian-ness is foreign. In the studies cited above, citizenship in Indonesia is a formal concept, exploited by the state in its attempts to exercise power over social groups. In their examples, the sense of citizenship involving juridical rights and access to political representation is completely absent—that absence being a formal basis of the marginalization of the groups under discussion. Analyses contrasting the center and the periphery accept these top-down terms of the former government, Suharto's New Order. This was a regime concerned with giving the appearance of a strong, centralized state, promoting a view where the provinces were cultural variations on Indonesian identity, but only in a way that was controlled by the center.

In this centralized view of Indonesia, Bali is a kind of semi-periphery, although this term belies Bali's national significance. Bali is a major tourist destination for Indonesians, visitors ranging from students on package tours to Kuta Beach to wealthy Indonesians who regularly visit for social events. Bali is also a major center of Indonesian arts. Expatriates working in Jakarta have holiday houses in Bali (as do members of the Indonesian *haute bourgeoisie*), or may even commute from Bali. Balinese have played various roles in the national government since independence, providing the country with a number of cabinet ministers (including one foreign minister, A. A. Gde Agung, and one army chief-of-staff, Ida Bagus Sujana—later a cabinet minister). Bali may have only provided three of Indonesia's most famous writers—Putu Wijaya, Putu oka Sukanta, and A. A. Panji Tisna—but it remains the source of leading visual artists—Nyoman Gunarsa, Nyoman Erawan, and Nyoman Masriadi, to name just

⁶ For further discussion, see Simon Philpott, *Rethinking Indonesia: Postcolonial Theory, Authoritarianism, and Identity* (London: Macmillan, 2000). See also Adrian Vickers with Lyn Fisher, "Asian Values in Indonesia? National and Regional Identities," *Sojourn* 14,2 (October 1999): 382-401; cf. Christine Drake, *National Integration in Indonesia: Patterns and Policies* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1989) for one of the few detailed analyses of the institutions linking Indonesians under the New Order in the 1980s.

⁷ Respectively Patricia Spyer, *The Memory of Trade: Modernity's Entanglements on an Eastern Indonesian Island* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000); Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality in an Out-of-the-Way Place* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Mary Margaret Steedly, *Hanging without a Rope: Narrative Experience in Colonial and Postcolonial Karoland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also Janet Hoskins, *The Play of Time: Kodi Perspectives on Calendars, History, and Exchange* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1993).

three—and for other Indonesian painters. The story for music and dance-drama is similar, although in these branches of the arts the emphasis is more on traditional than modern forms. What is said and done on Bali is important for the rest of Indonesia, not least because Bali's tourist industry revenue makes a significant contribution to the national budget (on different listings it consistently holds a place as one of the top four non-oil-and-gas sources of national revenue). However, tourism-related income has combined with Bali's religious difference to produce very particular circumstances of economic integration and cultural difference. So Bali is at once typical and exceptional.

Leading Balinese political commentator, Putu Suasta, with one of the present authors, wrote about democratic mobilization and national politics in the 1990s in Bali.⁸ They documented the ways in which national and local politics in the 1990s were linked in Bali as the pro-democracy (*Reformasi*) forces gained momentum. A broadly based coalition of political interests mobilized against the rampant and destructive tourist developments taking place under the protection of New Order influence-peddlers and corruption. Academics, journalists, students, and activists found that religious issues, especially the defiling of holy sites, were a way to activate farmers and workers. Protest movements under middle-class leadership succeeded in defining the common interests of a "Balinese community" against a weak and corrupt provincial government identified with New Order repression and greed.

Things seemed much easier to define under the New Order: Bali could be constructed as "Jakarta's Colony,"⁹ and the anti-development movement could gain wide acceptance. Activists of the 1990s adopted a mixture of rhetorical strategies, especially invoking a simplistic contrast between the state and civil society. Much of this terminology remains in the public discourse, but whereas once the political situation could be reduced to this simple dichotomy (regime/state/hegemony versus civil society/the oppressed), now there is no clear political map. Suasta and colleagues, such as Dewa Palguna, have attempted to provide such a map through their journalistic writings, but as yet their views have not crystallized into a coherent political platform.¹⁰ Instead the strategy of blaming everything on "the (national) elite" (*golongan elit*) still has general currency, but little explanatory power. The term replaces "Jakarta" in popular rhetoric as the source of all problems. This helps avoid acknowledgment of local responsibility.¹¹

However the New Order's attempts at cultural and social engineering have left a mixed legacy in Bali. Concepts of national citizenship are very weak, and involve little

⁸ Putu Suasta and Linda H. Connor, "Democratic Mobilization and Political Authoritarianism: Tourism Developments in Bali," in *Staying Local in the Global Village: Bali in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Raechelle Rubinstein and Linda H. Connor (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), pp. 91-122.

⁹ George Aditjondro, "Bali, Jakarta's Colony: Social and Ecological Impacts of Jakarta-Based Conglomerates in Bali's Tourism Industry," Working Paper 58 (Perth: Asia Research Centre on Social, Political, and Economic Change, Murdoch University, 1995).

¹⁰ Putu Suasta, *Kembara Budaya. Antologi Pemikiran* (Denpasar: Bali Mangsi, 2001); see also Dewa Palguna, *Parlemen Literer. Antologi Pemikiran* (Denpasar: Bali Mangsi, 2000).

¹¹ The discourse of "responsibility" in Indonesia is particularly fraught. See Elizabeth Jackson, "The Politics of Pertanggungjawaban: Contesting Meaning of Accountability in Two New Order Texts," *RIMA (Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs)* 34,2 (Summer 2000): 29-60.

if any sense of mutual responsibility between citizen and state. Only in the last few years, in cases involving Indonesians working overseas, has the term *warga negara*, citizen, been invoked to argue that the Indonesian state has a duty to look after those with citizenship.¹² One of the authors has argued elsewhere¹³ that after the fall of Suharto, the independence referendum in East Timor and reactions to it on Bali drew attention to the lack of a clear meaning of "citizenship" in action. In the Balinese media, Timorese were not represented as real citizens (*warga*) of Indonesia, but only as relatives (*saudara*), yet at the same time the destruction and murder that followed the vote for independence was justified by Indonesians as being caused by East Timorese ingratitude for the "gift" of "development" bestowed by Indonesia.¹⁴ In another contradiction, the reality of *warga*-hood as described in the main newspaper of Bali was not defined as an inclusive membership in the Indonesian state, but as an exclusive attachment to one's local village.¹⁵ The "Mass Amuk" of October 20-21, 1999, which erupted in Bali after Megawati failed to be made President—where shopping centers and government offices were looted and burned, roads blockaded, and Balinese battled Balinese in the streets in displays which particularly targeted the Golkar party and the other symbols of the New Order regime—led to public agonizing, as people asked whether Balinese could possibly do such things (with minimal reference to the fact that much worse had occurred once before, in 1965-1966). Clearly they had, although a few public commentators wanted to see "outsiders" (i.e. other Indonesians) as the main agents of the violence, or to blame them as the cause. The events contradicted the public construction of the ideal Balinese as a peaceful follower of Hindusim.¹⁶ They also were at odds with the perception of Balinese as sophisticated players on the international stage of tourism.

Analyses of some of the major flashpoints in Indonesia, such as Ambon, Kalimantan, Papua, Aceh, and Poso, have looked both at the possible roles of national political groups and at the roles of local ruling elites mobilizing communalism.¹⁷ In such

¹² As Benedict Anderson (personal communication) reminded us, until recently "Warga Negara Indonesia" or "Indonesian citizen" was a code term for "Chinese." This usage changed in the mid-1990s in response to New Order authoritarianism: see "Giliran Anda—Tahun Emas," "Kesadaran Politik Ditingkatkan," *Bali Post* August 16, 1995 where citizenship is discussed as involving civil rights. Old Order nation-building discourse seems to have been freer with the term, e.g., W. D. "Pergunakan Tiap2 Kesempatan Untuk Turut Menyumbang Pembangunan," *Damai* 1,1 (1953), pp. 18-20. In cases involving overseas maids in Saudi Arabia and Singapore, the Indonesian state's failure to intervene to protect its citizens was compared with the Philippines' lax protection of Filipinas working outside the country.

¹³ Adrian Vickers, "Being Modern in Bali after Suharto," in *Inequality, Crisis, and Social Change in Indonesia: The Muted Worlds of Bali*, ed. Thomas Reuter (London: Curzon/Routledge, 2002), pp. 17-29.

¹⁴ A very detailed analysis of the Indonesian media's handling of East Timor is presented in Hotman M. Siahaan et al., *Pers yang Gamang. Studi Pemberitaan Jajak Pendapat Timor Timur* (Surabaya: Lembaga Studi Perubahan Sosial, 2001).

¹⁵ A. Vickers, "Being Modern in Bali after Suharto."

¹⁶ For a full analysis issuing from a local forum on the events, see Nyoman Wijaya, *Amuk Masa. Bali 20-21 Oktober 1999* (Denpasar: Forum Independen Pemantau Pembangunan Bali/Forum Penyadaran Dharma, 2000).

¹⁷ Gerry van Klinken, "The Maluku Wars: Bringing Society Back In," *Indonesia* 71 (April 2001): 1-126; and "Indonesia's New Ethnic Elites," in *Indonesia in Search of Transition*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002), pp. 67-105. The first of these two articles takes a more

cases, control over material resources, especially land, is crucial.¹⁸ In Bali, tourist income draws focus away from the physical resources so crucial in these other cases, and directs it to the more nebulous economic realm of "service." For that reason, an alternative understanding of the changes taking place in Bali since the fall of Suharto may be gained from shifting the focus away from the sphere of national politics to constructions of self on an everyday level. The idea that Indonesia has been through a "crisis" in recent years involves a sense that economic and political catastrophes affect or create forms of subjectivity. In Bali it is not just the state that trains its passive subjects into new forms of modernity, as some of the cruder analyses of the New Order assume.¹⁹ Our purpose here is to examine how Balinese may be learning to fit into new social domains created out of the changes going on in Indonesia, rather than merely creating a new version of top-down operations which shifts agency from national to local elites.²⁰ These are issues relating to Beck's hierarchies of reality that include a global world of consumption in which Balinese, along with other Indonesians, feel they have a share, a world where Balinese can recognize themselves in the constructed reality of globalized consumer culture and its local variations.

If questions of social transformation in relation to personal transformation have entered the study of politics in Indonesia, it has been in a limited way: political scientists studying Indonesia have noted expressions of resistance to the New Order encapsulated in popular songs, art, or the mass media. New apprehensions of power in a commoditized cultural universe have not been explored in political science writing on Indonesia. Consumption has been studied in the context of "the New Rich,"²¹ and "affluent Asia";²² such studies tend to ignore large sections of the population, however. It is not as if the un-rich consume nothing, and covet nothing. They also want to hang around shopping malls, desiring the new (*yang baru*) and buying cheaper copies of the internationally branded goods they see in these malls.²³ Solvey Gerke's "Global Lifestyles under Local Conditions: the New Indonesian Middle Class,"²⁴ is an

equivocal view of local elites than the second, although we would also contend that the term "elites" is problematic, both because of its mixed heritage in political science, and because popular usage has devalued it (not only in Indonesia, but also in Australian politics, where the term is applied pejoratively by right-wing political leaders to any who espouse liberal views). See H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought 1890-1930* (St. Albans: Paladin, 1974), pp. 248-277 on the combination of right-wing leanings and Left pessimism in the formulations of theories of elites.

¹⁸ Greg Acciaoli "Grounds of Conflict, Idioms of Harmony: Custom, Religion, and Nationalism in Violence Avoidance of the Lindu Plain, Central Sulawesi," *Indonesia* 72 (October 2001): 81-114. See also Lorraine V. Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish Eat People," *Indonesia* 72 (October 2001): 45-79.

¹⁹ Philpott, *Rethinking Indonesia*, pp. 154-164.

²⁰ Ibid.; see also Mary Beth Mills, *Thai Women in the Global Labor Force: Consuming Desires, Contested Selves* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1999).

²¹ Michael Pinches, ed., *Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).

²² Krishna Sen and Maila Stivens, eds., *Gender and Power in Affluent Asia* (London: Routledge, 1998). For a pre-Crisis ethnography of the New Rich in Indonesia, see Lizzy van Leeuwen, *Airconditioned Lifestyles: Nieuwe Rijken in Jakarta* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1997).

²³ See also Mary Beth Mills, *Thai Women in the Global Labour Force*.

²⁴ Solvey Gerke "Global Lifestyles under Local Conditions: The New Indonesian Middle Class," in *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities*, ed. Chua Beng-Huat (London and New York: Routledge,

important contribution to analysis of consumption. Gerke differentiates forms of consumption and "lifestyle" according to class. This analysis uses a "consumption line" to distinguish between the Low Class, which exists on subsistence level, and the Lower Middle Class, which can consume. Gerke argues that this class lacks the full ability to consume, and so practices forms of pseudo- or group-consumption, where resources are pooled in order to maintain the appearance of consumption, the pretence of a "lifestyle." The categories suggested here begin with a sociological quest for objective structural criteria for class, but seek to incorporate subjective categories in which people classify others as "new rich" (*orang kaya baru*) and themselves as "middle class" (*klas menengah*) or "*cukupan*," "having just enough."²⁵ While Gerke's schema depends on the notion of fixed class boundaries, her point that some people simply cannot afford McDonalds, whatever their aspirations, is a reminder of the impoverished state of the majority of Indonesians.²⁶

Indonesians generally see Bali as more prosperous, and as a more expensive place to live, compared to most other parts of the archipelago. The government classifies Bali as one of the most expensive areas in Indonesia in terms of its cost of living. Civil servants from other areas dread being posted there because they will not be able to afford housing and food prices. Because Bali is a site for Indonesian as well as foreign tourism, it is also consumed as an experience, and so one way Balinese engage with other Indonesians is through a matrix of consumption.²⁷ This imagining of "tourist Bali" in Indonesia involves a mutual sense of cosmopolitanism as the outward sign of sophisticated consumer-oriented lifestyles.

Being cosmopolitan has changed rapidly as globalization provides access to the once-highly-exclusive "jet-setting" modes of life for larger numbers of people, as well as creating new kinds of expatriate communities. On Bali, the expatriate community has merged with the nascent Balinese middle class. There are many examples of Balinese married to expatriates who have become successful in the garment or tourist industries through the new kinds of networks, strengthened by shared knowledge, that such marriages facilitate. Other Balinese have established close business partnerships with foreigners, and some of these partnerships have endured since the 1970s.

2000), pp. 135-58. Interestingly few Balinese with whom we have discussed the subject want to see themselves as "*klas menengah*," which they often interpret as a form of "*orang kaya*." See also Hans Antlöv, "The New Rich and Cultural Tensions in Rural Indonesia," in *Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia*, pp. 188-207.

²⁵ This raises the issue of "discretionary purchases" versus "necessities" that has been problematized by Jean Baudrillard. See his "The Ideological Generation of Needs," in Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* (St. Louis: Telos, 1981), pp. 63-87, and *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures* (London: Sage, 1998).

²⁶ A nice reminder of the relationship between consumption and status is the call by State Minister of Administrative Reforms, Feisal Tamin, for parliamentarians and high officials not to wear suits and ties, part of a drive for "modest lifestyles." *Jakarta Post*, January 5, 2002.

²⁷ On Indonesian tourists to Bali consuming the experience of Western tourism and being looked down upon by Balinese, see Bodrek Arsana and Gedeliva D. Sari, "To Be a Tourist, To See a Tourist," *Latitudes* 2 (May 2001): 27-29. On Balinese as cosmopolitan tourists to other parts of Indonesia, see Kathleen M. Adams, "Touting Touristic 'Primadonas': Tourism, Ethnicity, and National Integration in Sulawesi, Indonesia," in *Tourism, Ethnicity, and the State in Asian and Pacific Societies*, ed. Michel Picard and Robert E. Wood (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), pp. 155-180.

Being international, or, more strictly speaking, transnational, remains the defining feature of the cosmopolitan subject. The characteristics of cosmopolitan people include aspirations towards an identity that is "worldly," "urbane," and "sophisticated"²⁸ (despite the fact that, as Thompson and Tambyah show in their study of expatriates in Singapore, this ideal is not necessarily realized). Their eclectic methodology notwithstanding, Thompson and Tambiah's rich interview data are particularly relevant to Bali, which, as we will show below, shares common expatriate themes, and even personnel, with Singapore. The direct experience of Singapore has produced Balinese who would like to see Bali become another version of this paragon of Southeast Asian development.²⁹ The globalized modernity on display in their interviews is one in which Balinese, along with other Indonesians, feel they have a share.³⁰

The various forms of "*krisis*" manifested on Bali have highlighted that cosmopolitanism and, also, questioned it. They have generated new levels of complexity in the engagement of Balinese with Indonesian consumer culture and with membership in Indonesian state and society, as well as provoking processes of scapegoating and questioning of the causes of the problems that seemed newly to beset Bali.

Krisis Multidimensional

Male opinion leaders, pictured speaking into microphones at the numerous seminars and workshops held with great regularity in Bali, form the mainstay of much local journalism. In recent times, they have been talking about Bali sharing in the national "*krisis multidimensional*."³¹ In everyday conversation, women as well as men do not use this term so much as, simply, "*krisis*." The term replaced "*krismon*" (short for *krisis moneter*, or "monetary crisis"), which was in common usage between 1997 and 1999. "*Krisis*" and *krismon* are the obverse of the characterization of the post-Suharto period as one of reform, or "*Reformasi*," a term associated with democratization and the end of corrupt authoritarian rule. The term *masa transisi*—transition period—has also come into vogue, although nobody is able to answer the question "transition to what?" No one seems to be offering a positive vision of what kind of state should replace the New Order's.³²

²⁸ Craig J. Thompson and Siok Kuan Tambyah, "Trying to Be Cosmopolitan," *Journal of Consumer Research* 26, 13 (Dec 1999): 214-54, p. 220.

²⁹ Interview with Balinese businesswoman Yani in the film "Done Bali," Negara Film and Television Productions, 1992.

³⁰ For another view of Indonesian cosmopolitanism, see Christoph Antweiler, "Interkulturalität und Kosmopolitismus in Indonesien? Ethnische Grenzen und ethnienübergreifende Identität in Makassar," *Anthropos* 96 (2001): 433-474.

³¹ See, for example, H. R. Abdulgani, "Konflik Bangsa Makin Menajam," *Bali Post*, June 8, 2001, p. 7.

³² Thanks to journalist Zamira Loebis for these observations. Some Balinese one of the authors met in Ubud during July 2002 considered the "crisis" to be over because American and Japanese tourists had returned in good numbers, but other Indonesians who attended a conference presentation of a version of this article expressed their opinion that the crisis was well and truly alive. The Kuta bomb attacks of October 2002 have added a new and terrible immediacy to Balinese notions of crisis. On putting the study of crisis in

As the original term *krismon* indicated, the initial problem was one of the declining value of the rupiah and consequent high inflation. The *krismon* is seen by most commentators as the cause of—or at least the catalyst for—the fall of Suharto: economic chaos led to social unrest and political instability.³³ As Indonesian discussions of the crisis show, however, there is an ambiguous social dimension to the interpretation of social change in times of great economic instability.

The works of popular cartoonists Benny Rachmadi and Muhammad Misrad³⁴ depict the pre-*Krisis* world of profligate consumption as one in which women bring back shopping trophies from Singapore, Bangkok, Australia, the USA, and Paris, and new Real Estate Complexes sell out their expensive condominiums, while fathers buy their sons BMWs for succeeding in exams. Rich women feed bejeweled, plump cats imported cat food before going to aerobics with their personal trainers, and hamburgers, mobile phones, and chic “Full Moon Parties” are all the rage.³⁵ These indulgences are supported by systems of corruption wherein employees and civil servants attempt to gain a share of cash “commissions” by licking the feet of the boss’s chair. A cockroach exclaims that “the fundamentals of our economy are strong,”³⁶ the latter having been the contemporary catch-cry both of Indonesian technocrats and of foreign experts, such as the economists of the Australian National University. This happy picture is disturbed by the shock of discovering the huge cavern of debt just beneath the surface of the economic indicators.³⁷ The process of crisis, in this commentary, begins with the personified Rupiah becoming weaker and weaker, spawning a new language of everyday life, including terms such as: *likuidasi*, *merger*, *perampingan* (“downsizing”), *PHK* (“redundancy letter”), *Reformasi*, *Operasi Pasar* (“Market Forces”), and *Spekulan*. Following the initial shortage of consumer goods,³⁸ Indonesians are depicted in these cartoons as improvising: cutting their *tempé* thinner, rolling their own cigarettes, doing without imported foods, making their own coconut oil, cutting text books into three to make them go around, and living in their offices because they have to sell their houses.³⁹ The causes of the crisis are identified as KKN (*Kolusi*, *Korupsi*, dan *Nepotisme*—“Collusion, Corruption and Nepotism”).⁴⁰ General cynicism is expressed about politicians, who are depicted as distant and anonymous, ignoring the real needs of the people; such scenes illustrate a *krisis kepercayaan* or “crisis of trust” (in government). One cartoon, for example, depicts a man ignoring a

historical perspective, see Ben White, Milan Titus, and Peter Boomgaard, “The Experience of Crisis in Indonesia: Comparative, Local, and Historical Dimensions,” in *Indonesia in Search of Transition*, pp. 149-176.

³³ Thee Kian Wie, “Reflections on the New Order ‘Miracle,’” in *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History*, ed. Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 163-180.

³⁴ Lagak Jakarta, *Krisis...Oh...Krisis* (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 1998).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-26.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-59.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

government health warning on a cigarette packet and smoking the whole packet at once.⁴¹

Concerns reflected in these cartoons are typical of the concerns expressed both in newspapers and public discourse throughout Indonesia. Melanie Budianta has shown how these concerns were articulated in other parts of Indonesia through plays on a range of Indonesian and foreign cultural symbols that pushed at the "imagined boundaries of national culture."⁴² The loci of concerns have shifted over the period—national attention has focused, at different times, on geographical conflict zones, the state of the *rupiah*, and the events which have made and unmade recent Presidents. While some economists have suggested that the economy began to turn the corner in 2000, with increases in general consumption and imports, as well as in exports,⁴³ the popular perception of a continuing crisis remained, even prior to the Kuta bomb attacks. In Bali, the problems seem to proliferate rather than diminish. Media and everyday discussions have focused on unemployed immigrant laborers, *kriminalitas* ("criminality"), environmental destruction, prostitution, issues facing youth, and drugs. Some of these were topics of concern before 1997, especially the issue of migrants from Java and Lombok—these themes were associated with a broader threat posed by Islam, which many feared might swamp Bali's Hindu culture—but they could not be publicly expressed. Most recently, concerns have focused on global terrorism and Indonesian responses to it, especially the increasing aggression of neo-fascist groups such as the *Laskar Jihad* or "Warriors of the Crusade," whose passionate advocacy of Islamic expansion is a salient threat to Hindu Balinese. These topics have a familiar ring about them.

In the mid-1990s the main point of discussion was "*globalisasi*," or, more specifically, "Bali in the Era of Globalization." Signs of Bali having "gone global" were identified from time to time in the island's leading newspapers. Similarly, mass media in other parts of Indonesia situated each region within this temporal and spatial continuum, but attempted to link this continuum to a broader region of Asia, or at least Southeast Asia. One of the paradoxes of globalization is that the West and the non-West, or developed and developing societies, have converged, while at the same time an increased sense of unified "Asian-ness" has been brought into play in Asian political and media discourse.⁴⁴ For Indonesians this has meant that Japan and Singapore provide alternative futures to visions of Western modernity. As we have discussed elsewhere, the discourses on "globalization" were a way of criticizing the Suharto regime by conjuring up forces of change and exploitation, but they also shifted

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁴² Melani Budianta, "Discourse of cultural identity in Indonesia during the 1997-1998 monetary crisis," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 1,1 (2000): 109-128.

⁴³ Kelly Bird, "The Economy in 2000: Still Flat on Its Back?," in *Indonesia Today*, pp. 45-66.

⁴⁴ Antweiler, "Interkulturalität." Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999), p. 80, notes that in the case of China and transnational Chinese networks, this involves a dimension of "self-Orientalising," and for this reason she deliberately does not use the term "alternative modernities."

consciousness about Balinese and Indonesian identity-politics to trans-Asian and global levels.⁴⁵

The shift from preoccupation with *globalisasi* to the sense of *krisis* is linked in Balinese discourse to the Balinese people's growing awareness that they are part of a "world risk society." The discussions of globalization had already involved Balinese in various non-governmental organizations concerned with the environment, AIDS, and other global preoccupations. The *krismon* created a focus of attention on international money markets and speculation, institutions and activities involving intense convergence between Southeast Asia and the West. On Bali, the *krisis* was manifested in two contradictory ways. First of all, many Balinese and expatriate businessmen and women were able to make large amounts of money because they continued to receive US dollars. Currency speculators were reported to have made the equivalent of tens of thousands of dollars in 1997-98 across the counters of money changers in Kuta and Denpasar.⁴⁶ But the second manifestation of crisis, felt during the period stretching from the political unrest of 1998 to George W. Bush's "War on Terrorism," was the sudden disappearance of tourists.⁴⁷ Balinese commentators on the street—taxi drivers, shop sellers and waiters—displayed a close familiarity with when and why various governments issued consular warnings, and other issues affecting the tourist market. The *krisis* was real enough for those who were suddenly unemployed or whose *rupiah* incomes fell below poverty levels. The effect of the *krisis* was to magnify class differences.

Another side-effect of the crisis has been to shift more attention to non-governmental organizations. These organizations were often subject to threats and close surveillance under the New Order, which increased their international legitimacy as the regime's credibility diminished. During the crisis, international agencies, including the World Bank, directed funding through such organizations because the levels of corruption in the Indonesian bureaucracy could no longer be ignored. These organizations depend not just on awareness of the general terms of international aid discourse such as "rights" and "sustainable development," but also the ability to participate in specific discourses concerning "alleviation of poverty," "capacity building," and the other buzz-terms of the funding agencies.

The element of "risk" is not new to older Indonesians, but what is different is the sense of "world risk." Those Balinese whose only experience was of the appearance of the New Order and concomitant prosperity in the 1980s and early 1990s did not feel the same sense of uncertainty familiar to their parents and grandparents, although the mid-1980s world recession and the Gulf War had brought less drastic declines in the tourist industry. The growing intensity of popular access to, and interest in, the electronic media from the 1990s onwards has heightened the sense of connectedness to a world society that Ulrich Beck has characterized as pervaded by heightened awareness of "ecological crisis and the crash of global financial markets."⁴⁸ Cartoonist

⁴⁵ Linda Connor and Raechelle Rubinstein, "Introduction," in *Staying Local in the Global Village*, p. 4-6. See further Vickers, "Asian Values in Indonesia?"

⁴⁶ Confidential interviews by Adrian Vickers with some of the participants.

⁴⁷ This has been greatly exacerbated by the Kuta bomb attacks of October 2002.

⁴⁸ Beck, *World Risk Society*, p. 2.

Ida Bagus Surya Darma's image of a Balinese market vendor looking glumly at the *Wall Street Journal's* reports on the Dow Jones index is not much of an exaggeration of how pervasive the media's internationalization of certain forms of information has been.⁴⁹ A world risk society lacks the confidence of control over circumstances that Beck sees as an attribute of an earlier industrial modernity, what he calls the "first modernity."⁵⁰ This risk society is a world of "manufactured uncertainties," of "dangers and risks" that arise from the social and technological developments of "industrial modernity." It is a world where it is no longer possible to dichotomize "society" and "nature" in order for the former to control the latter. It is a world where risks are socially and materially located in global systems that are not amenable to local or national regulatory regimes.

The open future that many scholars saw as a key feature of earlier modernity is no longer credible; now people perceive a future characterized by threat, but also of opportunities, as indicated by the pro-democracy mobilization in Indonesia or the profits realizable by speculation on exchange rates. Most in Bali are not hankering for a return of the apparent stability of the Suharto regime, particularly people like the clove farmers in Negara, whose return on their crop shot up from around Rupiah 2,000 per kilo (then approximately US\$1), where it was frozen at the height of Tommy Suharto's clove monopoly, to more than Rp. 70,000 (approximately US\$7) per kilo in 2001. Similar prosperity has been reaped by the *salak* fruit farmers of East Bali, who also had until recently been amongst the poorest farmers of the island.

An extremely optimistic reading of cosmopolitanism is that, with prosperity and transnational experiences, people in Bali will tear themselves free from the shackles of the mythology of essentialized "Balineseness." However this mutual construction of foreigners and locals has deep historical roots, so well documented by Michel Picard in his work on tourism in Bali. Picard argues that the discourse of cultural tourism, dominant during the New Order period, integrated "the 'we' of the Balinese community" with "the 'we' of the Indonesian nation" by hypostatizing Hindu Balinese culture.⁵¹ It did so by constructing a "them," the Other of the West. Globalization was discursively constituted as an external force to be variously embraced or repudiated.⁵² By the 1990s, Jakarta's involvement in over-development and exploitation of the island had threatened the ideological underpinnings of this discourse.⁵³ From a cosmopolitan perspective, paradise turns out to be just like the rest of the world after all, so that the Balinese must learn to confront the same problems—at least partly of their own making—as everybody else. In the Indonesian elections of 1999, the first evidence of Balinese attempts to reconstruct a positive participatory social action was the popular involvement in support for Megawati's PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan). In Beck's terms, this action had the potential to provide an

⁴⁹ *Bogbog Magazine* 8 (2002).

⁵⁰ Like Anthony Giddens, he strives to avoid the construct of post-modernism—a world risk society is a society of the "second modernity."

⁵¹ Michel Picard, *Bali: Cultural Tourism and Touristic Culture* (Singapore: Archipelago Press, 1996), p. 185.

⁵² L. Connor and R. Rubinstein, "Introduction," in *Staying Local in the Global Village*.

⁵³ Picard, *Bali*, pp. 190-195. Picard does not explore this development, although it can be inferred from Suasta and Connor, "Democratic Mobilisation" and Aditjondro, "Jakarta's Colony."

emergent strong construction of social reality beyond the authorizing, state-based center of institutionalized social practices. This particular path proved something of a dead-end, leading first to the violence of October 1999, when Megawati's vote was not translated into the presidency, but more importantly, in 2001 and 2002, into disillusionment, as Balinese have expressed skepticism towards the PDI-P politicians' promises concerning popular democracy, which have turned into corrupt pillaging of national resources in the style of the New Order.

The authorized center's power has diminished as a source of explanation; people have found that the greed, individualism, and egoism they attributed to external forces like "the West" and "globalization" were embedded deeply within their own society, and neither have they disappeared with the New Order—if anything the new regional autonomy laws have spread the intensity of corruption down to lower levels of government. Constructions of nationalism emanating from an authorizing center have lost their legitimacy, creating discursive space for new ideas. Public intellectuals in Bali—the academics, activists, journalists, religious, business, and administrative leaders who make policy and contribute to media debates and public fora—are exploring the possibilities of a nationalism informed by the local and concerned for the local.⁵⁴ Balinese cultural values are being put forward in the context of *Reformasi* as a way to combine local autonomy with the good of the nation. For example, an article in the *Bali Post*,⁵⁵ titled "Resurrecting the Spirit of Togetherness," suggested that the theme for the 2001 Bali Arts Festival (held in June/July) might provide a model for a new nationalism at this time of crisis. The theme for 2001 was Rwa Bhineda—a Hindu Balinese concept denoting the cosmic integrity of sky and earth as a metaphor for the unity of difference. This term was translated by Bali Arts Festival speechmakers as the need for and acceptance of difference as a positive and energizing element of all forms of life, including national life. Such an ideal was explicitly contrasted to the current situation in Indonesia where national integrity was deeply compromised by the disruptive elements of difference—greed, competition, and egoism. To emphasize the significance of this Bali Arts Festival for rebuilding Indonesia from the bottom up, the opening ceremony was held at Bali's Monument to the Revolutionary Nationalist Struggle, the Niti Mandala Monument, in Renon.⁵⁶

It is not surprising that "culture" (*kebudayaan*) has become central to local initiatives in dealing with *krisis*. Culture has for many years figured largely in Balinese characterizations of themselves as a unified collectivity within the Indonesian state, but this unified collectivity can directly interact with the rest of the world without requiring the mediation of the state. Picard's study of the discourses of tourism shows that the reification of notions of "culture" has been crucial for the ongoing maintenance

⁵⁴ These ideas surfaced in mid-June 2001, stimulated by the centenary of first President Sukarno's birthday. See also A. Vickers "Bali Merdeka? Internal Migration, Tourism and Hindu Revivalism" in *Beyond Jawa: Regional Autonomy and Local Societies in Indonesia*, ed. Minako Sakai (Adelaide: Crawford, 2002), pp. 80-101.

⁵⁵ Made Subrata, "Bangkitkan Semangat Kebersamaan," *Bali Post*, June 16, 2001, pp. 8-9.

⁵⁶ See also "Gubernur: Elite Bangsa Lebih Mementingkan Politik," *Bali Post*, June 7, 2001, p. 2. This continues a critique of existing models of nationalism that began in the mid-1990s, see Vickers, "Asian Values in Indonesia?," pp. 397-398.

of a distinctive "Bali." As Brett Hough has shown, the refinement of a national government-authorized Balinese cultural identity has been fostered through the state-sponsored higher education training of performers and the use of the annual Bali Arts Festival (PKB—*Pesta Kesenian Bali*) as a showcase of Balinese identity-through-art.⁵⁷ The Festival was initiated by the well-remembered Balinese Governor of the island, Ida Bagus Mantra (term of office 1969-1978). The Festival became routinized as a cultural display of Bali to Balinese (and thus, implicitly, the rest of the world, including the rest of Indonesia) under his—also Balinese—successor, the Suharto crony Ida Bagus Oka (1979-1999; like Suharto's, his trial for corruption was aborted because of supposed ill-health). During the Oka term, the Festival added the dimension of a televised opening display.⁵⁸

Another characterization of "Balineseness," related to "culture," is Hinduism. This was not available as a topic of cultural mobilization under the New Order, where inflaming communal sentiments was part of a constellation of illegal acts summarized as SARA (*Suku, Agama, dan Ras*—"Ethnic Group, Religion, and Tribe"). The creation of an Islamic Intellectuals' Association (*Ikatan Cendekiawan, Muslim Indonesia*) in the 1990s, allowed for some assertion of difference through the creation of a parallel Hindu Intellectuals Association (*ICH—Ikatan Cendekiawan Hindu*).⁵⁹ The stated purpose of the Association was to serve as a national voice for Hindus involved in the process of democratic reform. The most sustained efforts to continue discussion of Hinduism have come through Balinese magazines, for example the Hindu monthly *Raditya*. *Raditya* mainly focuses on social and religious issues, and the writers associated with it, notably Made Titib and Ketut Wiana, are recognized religious leaders who are also important in the Parisada Hindu Dharma, Indonesia's quasi-government Hindu Council. These and other Hindu leaders have studied in, or at least visited, India and attended international Hindu forums, thus emphasizing the transnational dimension of their religion.⁶⁰ Intellectuals associated with the ICH and *Raditya* were active in the campaign against commercialization of Hindu symbols in 1997, which came to a head when the karaoke bar "Planet Bali" attempted to use temple symbolism in its architecture. This was particularly distressing for Hindu leaders, given that karaoke bars in Bali are associated with commercialized sex.⁶¹

⁵⁷ B. Hough, "Education for the Performing Arts: Contesting and Mediating Identity in Contemporary Bali," in *Staying Local in the Global Village*, pp. 231-264.

⁵⁸ The PKB has been the subject of a recent PhD dissertation by Laura Noszlopy. See the discussions in Wayan Supartha, ed., *10 Tahun Bersama I. B. Oka* (Denpasar: Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia Cabang Bali, 1998), a volume that displays all the ambiguities of his term of office. For more on the New Order Balinese discussions of Balinese culture, see further Adrian Vickers "Asian Values in Indonesia?"

⁵⁹ Albeit short-lived, unlike ICMI. Its key publication was Putu Setia, ed., *Cendekiawan Hindu Bicara* (Jakarta: Yayasan Dharma Naradha, 1992).

⁶⁰ Aspects of the consumption of transnational Hinduism in Bali include the presence of cults such as Hari Krishna and Sai Baba, and the popularity of Indian television programs and movies. See Leo Howe, "Sai Baba in Bali: Identity, Social Conflict and the Politics of Religious Truth," *RIMA* 33, 1 (1999): 115-145.

⁶¹ See the special edition of *Raditya*, II,12 (1997) (note that on the cover the magazine is identified as *Pustaka Hindu* and *Jurnal untuk Mencerdaskan Umat*). In more recent times, the editors have become involved in a power play for control of the organization. See I Wayan Juniarta, "Balinese Hinduism on the Brink of Violent Conflict," *Jakarta Post*, December 27, 2001.

The third discursive element of Balinese self-identity is the valorization of customary villages (*desa adat*). As Carol Warren has shown, renewed recognition of the *desa adat* took place in the context of resistance to uncontrolled development during the New Order period, as they were perceived to offer an institutional bulwark against exploitation in the absence of credible state institutions. Paradoxically, then, the *desa adat* can be interpreted as a resurgent institution of Balinese modernity.⁶² However, this status has become more problematic in the context of *krisis*, as will be discussed below.

The discourses discussed above can be seen as constituting the ambiguities of Balinese self-identification. They are different from discourses emanating from Jakarta, but the difference is one of focus, not kind. Jakarta media and public discussions are oriented towards the doings of political power groups, and the workings of the national economy. Bali's concerns rotate around the state of the tourist industry as it affects the local economy, and to discuss this means paying attention to the attitudes and ideas of foreigners. On the one hand, self-identity is open to discursive shifts stimulated by a globalized world present to Bali through mass tourism, new claims to universal status for their religion, and reformed tradition,⁶³ while on the other hand Balinese identity is also inclined to resist intrusion, as sensitivities about outward threats to an increasingly inward-looking group identity tend to be heightened in recent years. The outward directionality of self-identity is promoted by the material relations of modernity that are manifest in Balinese participation in a transnational flow of consumer goods.

Material Relations of Modernity

In 1963, Hildred Geertz identified a distinctive form of linking culture in Indonesia, characterized by "political ideology, artistic styles, and material culture," which she referred to as the "metropolitan superculture."⁶⁴ Outward-looking Bali's participation in cosmopolitan culture is linked with the "metropolitan superculture" of the nation, but of course predates it through participation in international trade over hundreds of years. In the forty years since Geertz's article was published, the metropolitan superculture has metamorphosed. The New Order's control of culture was focused on the regions. Thus, the metropolitan superculture evolved without government intervention.⁶⁵ This superculture does not have a single center, although its particular Indonesian identity revolves around a set of trendsetters in Jakarta. Lizzy van Leeuwen's ethnographic work on the "airconditioned lifestyles" illuminates the most

⁶² See esp. Carol Warren, "Adat and the Discourses of Modernity in Bali," in *To Change Bali: Essays in Honour of I Gusti Ngurah Bagus*, ed. A. Vickers, N. Darma Putra with Michele Ford (Denpasar: Bali Post), pp. 1-14.

⁶³ On the latter, see especially I. B. Wyasa Putra, *Bali dalam Perspektif Global* (Denpasar: Upada Sastra, 1998).

⁶⁴ Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities," in *Indonesia*, ed. Ruth T. McVey (New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1967 [1963]), pp. 34-41.

⁶⁵ See Vickers, "Asian Values in Indonesia?"

elaborate cultural forms of this superculture.⁶⁶ Her description intersects with the satiric depictions of the *Krisis...Oh...Krisis* collection.

Although it is easy to satirize the *nouveau riche* pretensions of the *Orang Kaya Baru* ("New Rich") in Jakarta, aspects of their practices need to be considered as part of a spectrum of consumption to which a much broader group of Indonesians aspires. The *Krisis...Oh...Krisis* cartoons described above show how specific forms of consumption have become hallmarks of this modernity, just as earlier forms of consumption were identified by Hildred Geertz as features of 1950s and 1960s Indonesian modernity.

What has changed is that the location of the superculture is now transnational. Its specific location can be identified within what McGee calls an urban corridor, an agglomeration of interlinked urban centers that is more than the sum of its parts. McGee has suggested that along with the growth of "world cities" or "mega-cities"—entities that transcend their national locations through being regional hubs of capital, production, and distribution—has come these metropolitan corridors, that link smaller cities to the larger entities. The surrounding areas become satellite or hinterland feeder zones.⁶⁷ The corridors are defined by traffic (human, capital, and commodity) that passes backwards and forwards along them.

The main mega-city to which Indonesians look is Singapore, where billions of dollars in capital circulate on a daily basis, and where efficient infrastructure systems are combined with political authoritarianism to provide an apparent guarantee of security for international capital. Jakarta cannot measure up to Singapore's advantages, particularly in terms of efficiency of infrastructure and guarantees to international capital, as shown by the recent Jakarta "bankrupting" of multi-national Manulife by a failed Indonesian subsidiary which manipulated Indonesia's dubious legal processes. Singapore continues the role for which it was founded, as regional entrepôt, but is sustained by the access to raw materials and manufacturing coming both from Malaysia's high technology production and Indonesia's cheap labor. Thus as well as Singapore being linked to Batam through participation in the SIJORI (Singapore, Johor, Riau) Growth Triangle and the movement of legal and illegal Indonesian workers, the satellite role of manufacturing and capital in Jakarta binds this, the largest city of Southeast Asia, to the richest. These cities share a managerial and expert class, based around expatriates and their distinctive lifestyles. Expatriate culture was once predominately that of English-speaking white people, but in recent years other Europeans and people of Chinese and South Asian descent have provided a significant contribution to the expatriate world.

Bali too is part of this urban corridor that stretches from the new electronic manufacturing zones around Kuala Lumpur, through Singapore and Batam to Jakarta and Surabaya. The expatriate bourgeoisie and their Indonesian partners and associates not only take their holidays in Bali, but they have made it the "relaxation center" of the corridor. Members of the Jakarta upper and middle classes have their holiday and

⁶⁶ Van Leeuwen, *Airconditioned Lifestyles*.

⁶⁷ Terry G. McGee, "Globalisation, Urbanisation and the Emergence of Sub-Global Regions: A Case Study of the Asia-Pacific Region," in *New Geographies of the Pacific Rim*, ed. R. F. Watters and T. G. McGee (Bathurst: Crawford, 1997), pp. 29-45.

second houses in Bali, while the expatriate traffic between Bali, Jakarta, and Singapore is constant, feeding off a core of expatriates continuing the romantic idyll of Europeans and Americans living there since the 1930s, participating in the tourist industry and establishing businesses in garment manufacturing, handicrafts, and more generalized "lifestyle" creation. Singapore Airlines, one of the many companies flying between Singapore and Bali, at the end of 2001 reduced its number of flights between the two islands to twenty per week because of the post-September 11 downturn, but this number of flights still indicates a high level of movement.

The "tropical style" luxury houses and imported foods of the expatriates and their Balinese business and domestic partners do not mean that movement in the corridor is only an upper- or middle-class prerogative. While the poor may not be able to consume the luxury markers of distinction, they are part of the traffic. So, for example, through government-to-government links, Indonesians are recruited to work in Singapore and Malaysia, beyond the "illegal" migration that occurs on a large scale.⁶⁸ For example in the "Positions Vacant" section of the *Bali Post* in recent times there have been jobs from outside the island advertised, such as an advertisement in 1998 for "600 experienced females to sew garments for the garment industry in Malaysia, wage [Rupiah] 1 to 1.5 million per month before overtime. 120 mobile workers (male) for Malaysia for factory work (aluminium, office supplies, textile, garment) wage of [Rupiah] 1.5 to 2.5 million per month."⁶⁹ This situation has been affected by the Malaysian government's expulsion of Indonesian workers in 2002, but most of those involved feel that this is only a temporary problem, since there have been similar crack-downs against illegal migrants over the last decade, and these have been only temporary. Such mobile workers are exposed to other consumer lifestyles, bringing such experiences back to their villages of origin when their contracts are up. Bali itself draws in the poor from East Java and Lombok. Until recently, they could be seen in large numbers on a daily basis waiting near the main cross-roads at Jalan By-Pass to be hired as building laborers, or working as the itinerant beach sellers at the tourist center of Kuta, or as street vendors or prostitutes in Denpasar and South Sanur.⁷⁰

This movement of people to Bali and then from Bali to Malaysia or places in between marks Bali as a smaller node within the corridor. Denpasar is a small town in international terms, but an urban attraction for those from the poorer islands around it. Demographers and geographers have observed over the last decade how the distinction between "urban" and "rural" has broken down in Java and Bali, both of which are islands with urban population density. While many Balinese still live in villages as cultivators of rice or cash crops, seeing themselves as closely linked with the land,

⁶⁸ On labor migration, see for example M. Arif Nasution, *Orang Indonesia di Malaysia: Mejual Kemiskinan, Membangun Identitas* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2001).

⁶⁹ *Bali Post*, September 16, 1998.

⁷⁰ During 2002, the poor immigrant workers were progressively driven out of Bali; this has intensified since the Kuta bomb attacks. The labor side of Bali's consumption deserves more comprehensive study. For a preliminary analysis, see Adrian Vickers, "Tourist Work and Balinese Transformations," Paper given at the Social Transformations in the Asia Pacific Region 2000 Conference, University of Wollongong <<http://www.capstrans.edu.au/conference.htm>>.

these cultural values are not in alignment with the relevant socio-demographic indicators.⁷¹

Those living on Bali whom Gerke would situate below the "consumption" level still have access to knowledge about consumer goods and consumer lifestyles and to the dream of upward social mobility as a means to achieve both. The dream of the middle-class and upper-class lifestyles is depicted in the Indonesian, South American, and East Asian soap operas on television. For those not able to afford their own televisions, access is still available through relatives and employers.⁷² Newspapers and magazines are circulated far beyond the use of individual purchasers, and these sources give a shared sense of aspirations and assumptions of prestige.⁷³ Balinese share in or know about consumer lifestyles at all levels, and competitive consumption orients them outside the borders of Indonesia, even when the competition is only with other Balinese or Jakartans.

Besides new forms of transport (especially the Four-Wheel-Drive), many of the consumer symbols of prestige for Balinese are international ones: mobile phones,⁷⁴ McDonalds,⁷⁵ and shopping malls. The development of shopping malls in Bali has come about mainly through the growth of Indonesian chains such as Matahari, based on such international models as the Japanese Sogo.⁷⁶ One mechanism that helps provide access to this consumer world is the easy access to credit available throughout Indonesia, but particularly rife in Bali. As well as easy bank loans, which our Balinese friends report seem to be available to anybody neatly dressed with an identity card, there are any number of purveyors of credit who will come around to your house to lend you money. The lenders can frequently reclaim the motorbikes, cars, or other goods from defaulters, and are quickly able to resell or loan these items out at a handsome profit.

⁷¹ See Ken Young, "The Urbanisation of the Rural: A New Political Context," in *Democracy in Indonesia: The 1950s and the 1990s*, ed. D. Bouchier and J. D. Legge (Clayton: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies 1994), pp. 248-257.

⁷² Pam Nilan, "Representing Culture and Politics (Or is it just Entertainment?): Watching Indonesian TV on Bali," *RIMA* 34, 1 (2000): 119-154, records that those working as servants are loathe to take employment if it does not involve access to television.

⁷³ The main daily papers in Bali are the *Bali Post*, *Nusa*, and *Denpost*. The *Bali Post* attracts a more affluent, educated, and urban readership; it is the main print media forum for Bali's public intellectuals, and it assiduously reports their workshops, seminars, speeches, and celebrations. *Nusa* has a more downmarket and rural readership, and has lost popularity in recent years. The *Bali Post* offshoot *Denpost*, proclaiming itself as "Harian Warga Kota," the "Daily Paper of the Townspeople," addresses itself to wage workers in the urban agglomerate of Badung. Taxi drivers and ordinary villagers display detailed knowledge of the content of the daily papers.

⁷⁴ Nuraini Juliastuti, "The Mobile Phone: A Small Source of Pride," *Latitudes* 6 (July 2001): 74-78.

⁷⁵ See the essays in James L. Watson, ed., *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); and Chua Beng-Huat, "Singaporeans Ingesting McDonald's," in *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities*, ed. Chua Beng-Huat (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 183-201.

⁷⁶ On Indonesian shopping malls in general, see Ayu Utami, "God and the Seasons Drop in at the Mall (As Well as Someone from Another Planet)," *Latitudes* 2 (March 2001): 6-15. Concern about the decline in the numbers of previous forms of shops was being expressed in the early 1990s in Bali; see for example *Bali Post*, October 30, 1993: "Toko, Swalayan dan Persaingan: Berebut Konsumen Menengah ke Bawah, Gusur Pasar Tradisional."

The ways that consumption is discussed in the island's largest newspaper, *Bali Post*, and other Indonesian media demonstrate the creation of linkages between Bali and the world outside the island, and new definitions of the sophisticated consuming self. Some of the items highlighted by these discussions of consumption are different from those that might be expected in Western descriptions of prestige goods. One item of importance in Bali's climate is tinted windscreens, and so a consumer feature item in the *Bali Post* described the latest Ray-Ban product, "V-Kool," being marketed by an Indonesian distributor based in Surabaya. The cost of fitting a new *Kijang*—the popular diesel car—with this glass was given as Rp 5.5 million (approx. US\$550 at the time).⁷⁷

For a long time, Balinese consumers have regarded goods made abroad as automatically of higher quality than those made in Indonesia, usually an accurate assessment given that Indonesian wages are the lowest in Southeast Asia, hardly a guarantee of quality. This trend continues, despite the sense of "crisis," according to the *Bali Post*'s report of the "Megabali furnicraft" exhibition of 2001, where imported accessories such as handbags were not excessively expensive compared to local products, and so were in great demand.⁷⁸ "European style" is one aspect of Balinese consumption discussed here, seen as attracting consumers, so that Balinese craftsmen copy overseas work.⁷⁹

In such descriptions of consumer interest, we also see that Bali's future is not defined only in terms of Euro-America, but also of Japan, and Singapore after that. This is explicit in one report on how "Bali Nowadays is the Same as Japan 40 Years Ago,"⁸⁰ actually a report on a Balinese and Japanese dialogue on pollution. The report argues that Bali needs to catch up with the methods used by Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—three paradigmatic locations of Asian modernity—for handling plastic and other forms of pollution. It is no coincidence that these are also the sources of the majority of larger consumer items in Bali, for example white goods and electronic goods.

Like other Indonesians, Balinese read the variety of glossy magazines that have proliferated in Indonesia since the late 1980s. Of particular interest are the youth magazines that seek to cultivate a sense of local "cool" that fits in with the Singapore-based version of MTV available to some in Indonesia via satellite television. Such magazines include *Kawanku*, *Aneka*, *Gadis*, and *Hai*. The image of "cool" we can reconstruct from looking at these publications locates Singapore, Bandung, and Surabaya as linked places from which pop singers and models originate and where things happen. These locations, along with Jakarta and sometimes Bali, are where fashion shows, along with performances of bands, and premiers of movies from further exotic locations such as Los Angeles, take place. Visiting Americans may consider themselves in the boondocks, but their impact on their audiences is one of conferring sophistication.

⁷⁷ *Bali Post*, August 18, 2001.

⁷⁸ "Kini jadi perburuan masyarakat," *Bali Post*, July 26, 2001.

⁷⁹ "Kerajinan Gaya Eropa Cukup Dimintai" (Mega Expo BaliFurnicraft 2001), *Bali Post*, July 25, 2001.

⁸⁰ "Bali Nowadays is the Same as Japan 40 Years Ago," *Bali Post*, August 18, 1999.

Middle-class Balinese can add to such experience of cosmopolitanism direct encounters with fashionable and famous tourists through the regular party scene that operates on the island. There are now a variety of magazines which serve as guides for the aspiring expatriate or Indonesian partygoer.⁸¹ Class does not limit such experiences. Those who work in the tourist industry, especially in hospitality, get to view these lifestyles up close. They have to learn the languages of exchange with foreigners, notably but not exclusively English, and come to know a certain kind of tourist taste in food and entertainment and the kinds of accommodation those from overseas would prefer, in terms of decor, furniture, and amenities. Likewise, those who work in the garment industry learn about clothing and fashion. There are many stories of struggling sellers and workers who befriended or fell in love with tourists in Kuta, and were sponsored for travel to Australia, New Zealand, or other locales. Those who return enjoy the special status of having lived overseas. Degung Santikarma and Lesley Dwyer argue that what is most highly valued by many Balinese involved in sexual relationships with foreigners is the experience of cultural alternatives.⁸²

Is this cosmopolitanism all-pervasive? A report on tourism in the village of Sangeh, where the Monkey Forest tourist site is located, would indicate that contact with tourists and tourist income works on all levels of society, at least in the Badung-Gianyar area of South Bali where the majority of the population lives and where the ubiquity of tourism is marked by the art shops that line every major road. The report gives a sense of how tourism is reconstructed and de-historicized in recent discourse. In the report, Sangeh is said to have been "introduced" to the world by tourists through word of mouth (ignoring the fact that Sangeh was already listed on 1930s tourist itineraries⁸³): "Those foreign tourists who live in Ubud help in the job of making Sangeh known in the four corners of the globe, said I Gusti Putu Kirab Suardana, B.A., one of the leaders of the traditional village [*Desa Adat*]." Twice in the article it is pointed out that over eight hundred people, out of a village of 2,100, are employed around the tourist site, so that, the title of the story tells us "Sangeh villagers are used to buying ducks with dollars."⁸⁴ Transactions in dollars here and in other Balinese media images are metonyms of worldliness. The report emphasizes the strength of the *desa adat* in brokering tourist influence and income, yet the *desa adat* is here, and in other newspaper reports, represented as the defining institution of Balinese tradition that embodies active citizenship in a way that the state cannot. Reports of other manifestations of the *desa adat* reveal it as an ambiguous vehicle of belonging.

⁸¹ For example *The Beat: Bali & Jakarta's Free Entertainment Gig Guide* 40 (Nov. 2001), published in Kuta with a Jakarta office, describes fashion events on Bali, the latest parties, and a visiting Malaysian DJ who ran the "XXX Paranoia" event at Taman Ria Senayan, Jakarta. Related publications include *Balio!* and *Bali Advertiser*, and, more directly, advertisement magazines, the latter directed at the expatriate community, while the former tend to be slightly more broad and include reports of such political events as discussions by the well-known Teater Utan Kayu. Aspects of this lifestyle are satirized by Degung Santikarma, "How to be a Balinese Yuppy: A Practical, Twelve-Step Handbook," *Latitudes* 5 (July 2001): 58-59.

⁸² See Degung Santikarma and Lesley Dwyer, "Intimate Exchanges: Selling Lust and Love in Bali," *Latitudes* 7 (August 2001): 10-17.

⁸³ See Soe Lie Piet, *Melantjong ke Bali* (Soerabaia: Tan's Drukkerij, 1935). Soe Lie Piet was the father of Soe Hock Gie and Arief Budiman—thanks to John Maxwell for the loan of this important book.

⁸⁴ *Bali Post*, November 26, 1997.

Autonomy and the *Desa Adat*

In the current debates about Bali's present and future, one of the most pervasive topics is the autonomy process whereby many aspects of governance, including financial responsibility, are being relocated to local institutions. The possibility of autonomy for regions was still deeply contested just a few years ago, and provided a further rallying point to mobilize pro-democracy parties and local political coalitions, after the heady days of Suharto's resignation. The autonomy laws passed in 1999 may have appeased pro-democracy forces and averted the splintering of the nation. These laws were a compromise between those who argued for federalism and those who associated it with regional separatism. But the laws themselves provide no clear implementation guidelines for the devolution of finances and associated decision-making responsibilities. The autonomy laws allocate primary resources to the Kabupaten (district) level of administration, not the province, but the details are still working themselves out. This situation is provoking much speculation and debate in Bali, as people are keenly confronted with the inequalities of wealth of Bali's eight district governments, with the two South Bali districts, Badung and Gianyar, having income vastly disproportionate to the others.

There is also much debate over the role of the *desa adat* (or "customary village") in the autonomy process. The *desa adat* is the key institution of civil society for Hindu Balinese. Its constitution (*awig-awig*) governs many areas of communal and private life, especially death rituals. The variously idealized and demonized *desa adat* seems to stand in metonymic relationship to "*budaya Bali*" ("Balinese culture") itself.

A few examples, taken from local daily newspapers in Bali, will provide some flavor of the debates about the *desa adat*'s role in the autonomy process.

An article in *Denpost*⁸⁵ dealt with the allocation of Badung funds: According to Autonomy Law 34, 1999, the pre-existing 10 percent tax from all hotels and restaurant bills is to be allocated to villages or *desa*. But the Badung Local Government decided to allocate this to customary villages (*desa adat*), not administrative villages (*desa dinas*). This is a particularly significant move, given that the national Village Government Law of 1979 removed the *desa adat* from any meaningful formal governance role in local communities.⁸⁶

The Badung Local Government's reasoning, as expressed by the Deputy Leader of the District Parliament, is that the *desa adat* is "the basis of the *adat* and religion that is the backbone of tourism in Bali." In the role of protecting Balinese culture, he argued, the *desa adat* needs support, including monetary support. The Local Government Assembly upheld the principle of equality, so that all *desa adat* would be given the same amount. This decision had been made as part of the planning process that the Local Government was said to have been currently engaged in; they were planning a study tour to other provinces which had incorporated the *desa adat* into their funding

⁸⁵ "Tiap Tahun, Desa Adat di Badung Terima Minimal Rp 100 Juta," *Denpost*, June 6, 2001, p. 3

⁸⁶ The implementation of the 1979 law, and its effects, has been well documented by Carol Warren, *Adat and Dinas: Balinese Communities in the Indonesian State* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993).

models, in order to learn from others' example. The report makes no comment on the way the decisions were reached before the "fact-finding tour."

Around the same time, the newspapers reported that the Governor of Bali was going to provide each *desa adat* with a motorbike, a Rp. 10 million donation, and wages for *desa adat* officials. This announcement was received with widespread derision in the letters columns and on the streets. People saw it as a cynical act of political patronage, and a waste of public resources. It came on top of news that members of the provincial parliament were quietly given new Soluna cars as part of their entitlements, occasioning more public outrage, and a carnival for cartoonists.⁸⁷

In a critical vein, the *Bali Post* featured a report on speeches at the launch of a book on *adat* and tourism, at which the speakers warned that contributions to the *desa adat* from local government may undermine the spirit of voluntarism that was the foundation of the *desa adat* (an interesting perspective, given the *desa adat's* ascribed membership and coercive powers, including excommunication).⁸⁸ Various speakers worried that *desa adat* office holders might become paid officials, a development that would undermine values of community participation. It was the government's responsibility to provide facilities so that the *desa adat* could function properly, but not to reward individuals in ways that would give rise to social jealousy.

In the same issue of the *Bali Post*, an even more cautionary feature article appeared, written by a Balinese academic, I Wayan Artika.⁸⁹ This article recalled the specter of the "G30S" killings in Bali during 1965-66.⁹⁰ Artika reminds the reader that the intensity of the conflict and the many lives lost in Bali can be related to the accumulation of intraethnic conflicts, many of which are nurtured by the exclusive institutions of the *desa adat*. Artika discusses the ways in which these institutions can perpetuate and exacerbate inequalities. He warns that the current rejection of the national political system in Bali, and the embracing of autonomy, will perpetuate intraethnic conflict. He argues that the national political system has an important mediating role that can help reduce this potential for conflict.

This other, potentially divisive, aspect of the *desa adat* alluded to by Wayan Artika, the conflict that is the obverse of collective cooperation, is readily apparent in contemporary Bali. "*Kasus adat*" form another mainstay of local journalists. Unfolding events of particular cases are avidly consumed by newspaper readers, stimulate many letters to the editor, and form a staple of daily conversation, particularly among those who are active members of a *desa adat*.

A typical story featured in the inside pages of all three local papers in June 2001 was the story of a group of households in Blungbang, Bangli, who refused to participate in a collective cremation organized by the *desa adat*, and were subsequently threatened with excommunication from the community: the severest sanction, a form of

⁸⁷ See for example, "Anggota Dewan Dapat Mobil, Rakyat Resah BBM Masih Langka," *Denpost*, June 15, 2001, p. 5.

⁸⁸ See for example, "Desa Adat Harus Hati-Hati Terima Bantuan Gubernur," *Bali Post*, June 16, 2001, p. 2.

⁸⁹ "Api dalam Sekam Sejarah: Konflik Intraetnis di Bali," *Bali Post*, June 16, 2001, p. 7.

⁹⁰ G30S is an abbreviation of "Gerakan 30 September" (30 September Movement), which refers to the attempted coup that precipitated mass killings of suspected communist supporters.

"social death."⁹¹ Spokesmen from the households concerned stated that they were "not yet ready" to cremate their dead; *desa adat* representatives asserted that they were abnegating their responsibilities to the community, as this was the third time they had declined to join in. Full details of the case were never revealed, but the underlying inter-group antagonisms that were no doubt at the root of the problem were alluded to by the Bupati of Bangli, who was called in to mediate. In a statement to the media, he warned that *adat* disputes should not be the vehicle of inter-group conflicts, a comment that connects nicely with Wayan Artika's arguments about intraethnic conflict, which coincidentally appeared in the same issue of the paper.⁹²

Some of these *adat* conflicts can directly lead to violence, as in the case of attempts by the *banjar* ("hamlet") of Kebon in Karangasem to secede from the *desa adat* of Culik. In this case, hundreds of Culik residents launched a joint attack on Kebon, killing one man and severely injuring five others. Security forces had to be reinforced by the Mobile Brigade from Denpasar before they were able to enter Kebon.⁹³

The exercise of violence, not just between factions of the *desa adat*, but also directed at outsiders, is a much-discussed issue. As was often pointed out to us in conversation, violence has always been part of the repertoire of sanctions imposed by the *desa adat*, but the media attention has created a sense of heightened conflict since 1998. Current stories concern the role of the *desa adat*'s security watch, or *pacalangan* (*ronda malam* in Indonesian), a rostered group of male adult members of the *desa adat* that patrols the environs, particularly at night. The *Denpost* in particular keeps up a steady coverage of incidents where thieves or suspicious outsiders were beaten or killed by *desa adat* members, in small groups or en masse ("*massa*").⁹⁴ The police, if they are at the scene, rarely manage to control this violence; often, they do not arrive until after the event. An example:

The murder of three car thieves by a mass of villagers near Tabanan was reported extensively in all three local papers.⁹⁵ The following is summarized from the *Denpost*'s typically graphic coverage: A twenty-four-year-old Balinese man and two of his friends, from East Java, rented a car around dusk from a small Car Rental business in Mengwi, and also paid for the driver, who was the owner of the business and the car in question. The stated purpose of the rental was for the Balinese youth to make a trip

⁹¹ See for example, "10KK Warga Blungbang Terancam Dikucilkan," *Bali Post*, June 14, 2001, p. 3; "Tak Ikut Ngaben Massal, 6 Warga Dinonaktifkan," *Nusa*, June 14, 2001.

⁹² "Adat Jangan Dijadikan Bemper Kepentingan Pribadi," *Bali Post*, June 16, 2001, p. 3.

⁹³ "Man Dies in Violent Attack in Bali," *Jakarta Post*, April 6, 2002. This may be one of the reasons that a Brimob base is mooted for Karangasem Regency.

⁹⁴ On the dangerous tendencies to grant authority to local thugs under the guise of *pacalangan*, see Degung Santikarma, "Guarding Culture: Pecalangan and Communal Violence in Bali," Paper given at the Journal Antropolgi Indonesia Symposium, "Rebuilding Indonesia, a Nation of 'Unity in Diversity': Towards a Multicultural Society," Udayana University, July 16-19, 2002. For a broader study of post-Suharto institutionalizations of violence, see Philip King, "Securing the 1999 Indonesian Elections: SATGAS PARPOL and the State" CAPSTRANS working paper <<http://www.capstrans.edu.au/workingpapers/PhilKing1.pdf>>

⁹⁵ See for example, "Rampas Mobil, Tiga Pemuda Tewas Dihajar Massa," *Bali Post*, June 12, 2001, p. 3; "Tiga Perampok Mobil Tewas Dikeroyok Massa," *Nusa*, June 12, 2001, p. 10; "Tiga Perampok Tewas Dihajar Massa," *Denpost*, June 12, 2001, p. 4.

home to Seririt near Singaraja. Part way through the journey (near Pupuan), the passengers looped a plastic cord around the driver's neck; he braked, they threatened him with a knife and sliced his cheek. The victim escaped from the car, and started yelling for help. The three men drove off in the stolen car.

Local residents came to the victim's aid, some guiding him to the local Police Station to make a report while others took off in pursuit of the stolen car. The police joined the chase and found the abandoned car at the end of a dead-end road where the thieves had apparently taken a wrong turn and got lost. The police and the locals set off across the countryside and followed the trail of the thieves for five kilometers until two of them were found. The mob (*massa*) angrily set upon the two and beat them "black and blue" (*babak belur*) until they were dead. Others set off in pursuit of the third thief, and when they found his hiding place, killed him in the same manner. The emotions of the mob were still not quenched, and after "*menghabisi nyawa para pelaku*," they threw the bodies into the river, where they were swept downstream to the boundary of Pupuan Selemadeg village.

When officers (*petugas*) went to the river to retrieve the corpses, they tried to calm down the mob who obstructed their operation, and it was not until the middle of the next day that things calmed down enough for officers to retrieve the corpses. The story ended by stating that investigations concerning the possible involvement of others, and the motivations for the act, were difficult to pursue because the three accused were already dead.

This story defies any easy analysis, but there are some points that are worthy of note in the light of the earlier discussion of Balinese politics, and also in the light of analyses by scholars such as James T. Siegel of violence and "criminality" in Indonesia.⁹⁶ The victim was not from the *desa adat* concerned; he was a stranger whose car was stolen in the *desa adat* environs. This circumstance did not however mitigate the violence of the reprisals, nor did the fact that the thieves included a Balinese man as well as two others reportedly from East Java. The local police did not act effectively to prevent the killings, and it appears they did not try; indeed, as reported in other incidents, it appears that the police were intimidated by the emotions of the mob. Estimates of the numbers of people involved were (perhaps deliberately) not given in the reportage, but it may have been quite a small group. The right of the mob to kill the men goes unquestioned in the reportage, and in the police statements.

Stories of *desa adat*, or other loosely affiliated local groups, which stage violent reprisals against alleged criminals in their own environs, appear frequently in the local media. Various Indonesian commentaries have been built up around this tendency to "*main hakim sendiri*" (take the law into one's own hands) as a phenomenon produced by the disenchantment with the institutions of justice in present-day Indonesia, combined with the current vacuum of political legitimacy.⁹⁷ These types of actions can

⁹⁶ James T. Siegel, *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998).

⁹⁷ See for example the commentaries by a sociologist, a psychologist, a criminologist, a human rights lawyer, and a police officer in the special issue of the magazine *Tokoh*, 1-7 Mei, 2000, devoted to "*Hukum Rakyat bagi Penjahat*" ("People's Justice for Evildoers"). *Tokoh* is an off-shoot of the *Bali Post*, but for a national audience.

be traced back a long way to sanctions that are enshrined in *adat* constitutions (the *awig-awig*).⁹⁸ What may be new is their combination with a concern over “criminality” which developed, as Seigel shows in Javanese cases of which Balinese are very much aware, in the New Order’s demonstration of its powers to inscribe itself on local areas in the form of the corpses of criminals. The conflation of political power with the ability to kill the criminal body in the 1980s and 1990s results in *desa adat* members interpreting the post-Suharto localization of political authority through their own democratization of murder.⁹⁹

Public criticism of specific incidents of local community violence, by police or citizens, is rare because of this ambivalence about authority. Some maintain that the *desa adat* is too tolerant of outsiders. Such an opinion was expressed by a leading public intellectual in Bali, Professor Luh Ketut Suryani, in comments reported in *Nusa*.¹⁰⁰ Addressing the question of whether the death penalty was appropriate for major drug offences such as the alleged dealing of Isaac Thayeb (a pusher whose arrest was a major story at the time), Prof. Suryani said it would not solve the problem. However she then went on to add that Balinese were too tolerant of outsiders who often befriend them for their own ends. Undesirable outsiders can be driven out of the community by exercising existing provisions of *adat* law (*hukum adat*), she wrote. She seemed to be implying—while arguing against killing—that Balinese are too friendly and trusting and needed to circumscribe the boundaries of their society, presumably through non-violent means. In practice, the enforcement has been violent, as villages such as Kuta have nightly patrols by vigilantes called *pacalang*—allegedly authorized by the *desa adat*—who question any non-Balinese Indonesians they find and readily attack if any of those questioned are under suspicion of being thieves. Foreigners are not only left alone, but positively welcomed, as one of our students found when he was on holiday.¹⁰¹

The *desa adat* notion of membership is an exclusive one. Warren has shown that this notion is a strong form of citizenship, in that it enforces participatory duties through sets of sanctions.¹⁰² As the recent examples cited here show, *desa adat* citizenship is not easily reconciled with citizenship shared with other Indonesians, and sometimes not with other Balinese. In these discussions, there is a slide between intraethnic and interethnic conflicts, and nowhere is this ambiguity addressed. A further ambiguity is that the challenge to “outsiders” is usually concerned with poor, not rich, non-Balinese. This is a notable silence in these discussions concerning expatriates.

Local support for *adat* is an important element of the autonomy process as it is occurring in Bali, but as yet Bali’s public intellectuals have not been able to unravel the contradictions involved. There is considerable concern amongst journalists, activists,

⁹⁸ Campbell and Connor found the same processes at work in East Java when analyzing the wave of *dukun santet* killings in the late 1990s. Caroline Campbell and Linda H. Connor, “Sorcery, Modernity and Social Transformation in Banyuwangi, East Java,” *RIMA* 34,2 (2000): 61-98.

⁹⁹ Siegel, *A New Criminal Type*.

¹⁰⁰ “Luh Suryani: Hukuman Mati Bukan Penyelesaian,” *Nusa*, June 14, 2001, p. 6.

¹⁰¹ Santikarma, “Guarding Culture.” Adrian Vickers wishes to thank Ed Dwyer for an account of going on patrol with the *pacalang*.

¹⁰² Warren, *Adat and Dinas*, pp. 58-61.

and community leaders about the application of summary justice administered by the citizenry at large. This view was expressed by most of the contributors—ordinary Balinese not just from the middle class—whose opinions were reported in the *Bali Post's* column for its radio talk-back program, *Kini Jani* ("Right Now").¹⁰³ While supportive of the concept of a "People's Court" (*Pengadilan Rakyat*), in the current situation of failure of law enforcement, most expressed concern about the potential for "anarchy" if this Court were not properly managed. Dewa Palguna, one of Bali's leading progressive politicians, has warned of institutionalizing weaknesses in the village system.¹⁰⁴ Rather than providing a solution to the sense of crisis, a focus on the *desa adat* as a reified form of tradition that promises to by-pass problems created by the state has produced an impasse in the search for an institution that will manage Bali's relationship with the "outside." Where the "outside" is a conflation of everything beyond the village, such solutions will remain problematic.

Citizenship, Democracy, and Civil Society

In the first part of this paper, we focused on the impetus outward from Bali to the world beyond the nation. Despite the ways in which people on Bali see themselves taking a part in healing the nation in crisis, and in promoting a democratic polity, there is as yet no clear vision being articulated on Bali of how popular democratic citizenship can be enacted. In the second part, we focused on the ways in which the potential for a deterritorialized cosmopolitanism is created through the flow of people, commodities, and ideas through and beyond the nation-state. In the third part of the paper, we discussed the countervailing pressures towards parochialism, exerted by *desa adat* which are becoming politically and financially strengthened in the post-Suharto era of autonomy.

The violence described here may be taken as indications of the strengthening of local anti-democratic tendencies.¹⁰⁵ However, the *adat* institutions are at the same time interacting with pro-democracy processes included in the movement towards local government autonomy. These contradictory tendencies raise the question of who is a citizen—the universal subject of the nation-state, a transnational subject, or a member of a social collectivity whose membership is ascribed? Different rationalities inform these definitions, and these rationalities have long co-existed in Bali, if on competing terms. The question of relative rights and powers is being brought to the forefront by the autonomy process. Particularistic definitions of citizenship—those that, for instance, define it as coterminous with ethnic and religious affiliation such as Hindu Balinese, and connect it to membership of institutions such as the *desa adat*—deny the rights of those who do not fit essentialized definitions of Hindu Balinese or *desa adat*. This denial applies to a rather large number of people living in Bali.

Until recently, the rights of *desa adat* citizens (the *krama desa*) were highly circumscribed by the nation-state. Understandings of "multidimensional crisis"

¹⁰³ "Hukum tak Jalan, Pengadilan Rakyat Harus Dilaksanakan," *Bali Post*, June 16, 2001, p. 14.

¹⁰⁴ Dewa Palguna, *Parlemen Literer*, pp. 114-120.

¹⁰⁵ See Van Klinken, "Indonesia's New Ethnic Elites."

mediate potential new forms of political life in Indonesia, forms in which reworked communal institutions may again be legitimized. As part of this process, "old" forms of violence acquire new salience as they are liberated from the repressive manipulation of the Suharto era. But that era defined the terms in which violence operates in relation to criminality, at the same time undermining attempts to create a positive vision of Indonesian "society."¹⁰⁶

Herein lie intimations of new Balinese versions of nationalism that embody many of problems social theorists are currently identifying with the "old" nationalism. David Held and his colleagues, in outlining possibilities for new forms of cosmopolitan democracy, have pointed to the temptations of new territorialism, that is a reterritorialization that counteracts global tendencies towards deterritorialization.¹⁰⁷ Essentialized cultural collectivities (such as "Hindu Balinese"), when defined as coterminous with political boundaries, create tensions with more pluralist values and the notion of overlapping, open-ended citizenships with rights and responsibilities at many levels.

Critiques of Balinese localism as a narrow form of nationalism, and endorsements of more inclusive and open-ended political models, are also emerging within society, despite the intense pressures people are experiencing in the midst of the "multidimensional crisis." Activists affiliated with non-government organizations and other more globally focused intellectuals, from academics to entrepreneurs, have taken their place at the forefront of the group voicing such criticisms. Indications that people are striving for more open-ended models of citizenship and civil society are evident in discussions about the limitations of *hukum adat* and people's justice; the shortcomings of old nationalism; acceptance that local people do have agency in coping with the social and material realities of a risk society; and many other topics. If the Balinese are, indeed, now situated in a global risk society, this means that single authority figures, such as Suharto, can no longer claim some kind of state monopoly on explaining or mediating the contradictions arising from the experiences of different realities. In the cases examined here, cosmopolitan lifestyles and village-oriented reality have not been reconciled in a new Balinese identity, indeed such a singular identity disappears the moment political actors attempt to define it. While the strength of the village institutions shows up the weaknesses of more vaguely defined cosmopolitanism, what is interesting is that the nation state is only sometimes foregrounded in these debates. The opponents of parochialism see the Indonesian state as just as much of a problem.

Theorists of cosmopolitan democracy, such as Beck, and Held and colleagues, are exploring new models of political action, and new understandings of civil society for the twenty-first century. The processes of autonomy and possible disintegration in Indonesia draw attention to the problems of trying to universalize from the European and American cases on which these theorists base their work. The study of local action and local understandings—however the local is defined—is the best way to ground, test, and develop these theories. New values and forms of social action are part of a

¹⁰⁶ This problem of defining the *rakyat* and *masyarakat* is one of the points of Siegel's *A New Criminal Type*, but also of James T. Siegel, *Fetish, Recognition, Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

¹⁰⁷ Held et al., *Global Transformations*, pp. 444-452.

critical praxis in Bali. These are contributing to potential new social constellations that are cosmopolitan (incorporating the global, regional, national, and local) and multi-layered, while struggling against hierarchical, exploitative, or authoritarian tendencies formed as part of Indonesia's historical experiences. As the tendencies towards violence illustrated here show, that struggle has only just begun. However, even in a situation such as Indonesia's, where national citizenship relies on a minimal recognition of formal rights and very little responsibility, the sense of "crisis" does not automatically lead towards a global civil society. Its effects are contradictory.

Postscript

While this article was going to press, the terrible events of October 12 rocked Bali. Besides the devastation to those who had family and friends killed or injured in the blasts, the bombings at Kuta have left Bali's tourist industry in ruins. The reactions to the aftermath by the Indonesian political and business leadership demonstrate their recognition of the importance of Bali's tourism to the nation's economy. Residents of the island perceive little prospects of a recovery, in view of the war on Iraq.

Thankfully predictions of mob violence by Balinese Hindus against Muslims have not been fulfilled. There has been a general tightening of the requirements for immigrant workers, including sponsorship by employers and a registration fee. Many poor workers from East Java and Lombok were not able to re-enter the island after returning home for the Idul Fitri religious holiday in December. Many thousands of workers have been laid off, or in the case of the big hotels and resorts, are working reduced shifts. Small businesses have folded, and large numbers of workers have returned to their villages of origin. Crisis has become, in recent parlance, "chronic" or "absolute."