



RESIDENCIES OF CENTRAL SUMATRA

SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON WEST SUMATRA
DURING THE REVOLUTION

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Japanese Impact on Sumatra

At the time of Tokyo's surrender in August 1945 Indonesian nationalists on Sumatra were ill-prepared, politically and militarily, to take over administration from the departing Japanese. During the occupation the island had been governed by the Japanese 25th Army separately from Java and other parts of the Indonesian archipelago.¹ In addition, Japanese administration in Sumatra was far more decentralized than that on Java. Although in April 1943 the Japanese military administration's headquarters (*gunseikanbu*) which had authority over Sumatra was moved from Singapore to Bukittinggi, the ten *shū*² of Sumatra (corresponding to the residency divisions under the Dutch) continued to be governed in practice, as largely autonomous units by their individual governors (*chokan*).³

The inclination of the Japanese occupation forces throughout Southeast Asia towards such a decentralized form of administration was based on the idea of self-sufficiency for each region. In Sumatra this

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1. For the first year of the occupation Sumatra was governed in conjunction with Malaya from the 25th Army Headquarters in Singapore. However, because of the differences in the character of the regions and the economic importance of Sumatra, in April 1943 the 25th Army moved to Sumatra, followed by the Department of the Chief Military Administrator. From this time on, there were separate departments for Malaya and Sumatra, but nevertheless for a considerable period ties between Sumatra and Malaya continued to be regarded as more important than those between Sumatra and Java. Waseda Daigaku, Tokyo, Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Research Center (team led by Nishijima), Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (Washington: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Clearing House for Federal Scientific and Technical Information, Joint Publications Research Service, 1963), pp. 110, 155-56.
 2. George S. Kanahale, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence" (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1967), p. 62. These were divided into *bunshū* (sub-*shū*), *gun* and *son*. The ten *shū* were Atjeh, East Sumatra, Tapanuli, West Sumatra, Riau (excluding the islands), Djambi, Palembang, Bengkulu, Lampung and Bangka-Belitung. See Map 1 for the residency divisions.
 3. In each of the *shū* or "States," a "State Governor, Director of General Affairs, Director of Industrial Affairs, and Director of Police were established," filled by Japanese civilian or military officials. See Nishijima, Japanese Military Administration, pp. 149-50, which also describes the powers of these governors. According to Kanahale, "the Chokan of the West Coast and Palembang *Shuu* were given supervisory authority over neighboring *Shuu* involving matters such as inter-*Shuu* distribution and supply of commodities." ("Japanese Occupation," p. 62.)

general policy was strengthened by the geography of the island, the poor communications between the different areas, and the character of the Japanese administrators who were appointed there.⁴ However, the degree of decentralization led to considerable hardship in parts of Sumatra, particularly the East Coast residency, which was cut off from its traditional sources of rice supply and was hard put to provide basic necessities for its population from its own resources.⁵

The 25th Army on Sumatra was much more reluctant than its counterpart on Java to allow Indonesians any real role in civilian or military administration. Only slowly, partially and with reluctance did it follow initiatives launched by leaders of the Japanese 16th Army on Java towards granting a greater degree of independence to the Indonesian nationalists.⁶ In the early months of the occupation the repressive nature of the Japanese administration on Sumatra was probably a result of initial plans which envisaged including Malaya and Sumatra directly within the Japanese empire,⁷ because "Malaya and especially Sumatra" were seen as "the center of industrial development in the Southern area." As "the nuclear Zone of the Empire's plans for the Southern area" these territories were to be tightly controlled and "a close relationship of mutual interdependence between [them] should be fostered and measures taken so as to provide for their integration."⁸ In the later years of the occupation unwillingness to grant real power to the Sumatrans would have been increased by fears that the Allies planned

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4. For a discussion of the decentralized administration on Sumatra, see ibid., p. 63; also pp. 281-82.
 5. In Deli (East Sumatra) three-quarters of the acreage of land which in 1940 had been used for tobacco cultivation was switched to production of food crops. Throughout Sumatra the Military Administration Department controlled the industries relating to defense, such as rubber, tin and iron, while they encouraged the Indonesians to rehabilitate factories that would contribute to the goal of self-sufficiency and increase the production of basic food supplies. Nishijima, Japanese military Administration, pp. 273, 292.
 6. Anthony Reid, "The Birth of the Republic in Sumatra," Indonesia, No. 12 (October 1971), p. 22.
 7. Kanahale, "Japanese Occupation," p. 57.
 8. All these quotations are from "Instructions on the Administration of Malaya and Sumatra (April 1942)," which is translated as Document 44 in Benda, Irikura, and Kishi (eds.), Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), p. 169. By "industrial development" these instructions must have meant sources of industrial materiel, as in 1942 there was little industry on Sumatra. The record of Japanese negotiations with the Dutch during 1940-41 shows that oil was the most vital product needed by Japan after the United States had moved to limit exports there in July 1940. See H. J. van Mook, The Netherlands Indies and Japan (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1944), pp. 37, 51-63, 86. Two months before negotiations were broken off in July 1941, the Japanese were requesting up to 3,800,000 tons p.a. of mineral oil. Van Mook believed that with regard to rubber and tin Japan's most critical needs had already been met by her control over Thailand and Indochina: "The two countries together produced 130,000 tons of rubber annually as against a Japanese consumption in past years of 50,000 tons; her need for 10,000 tons of tin per annum was exceeded by at least 50 per cent in the production of her new sphere of influence." Ibid., p. 77. See also Kanahale, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 38-39, 265.

landings in Sumatra as the spearhead of their counter-attack against the Japanese.⁹ Thus, certainly until 1945 there was little mention of eventual independence, and the Japanese actively discouraged any nationalist movements on the island.

It is against the background of these factors that one should view such later Japanese statements on the backwardness of the Sumatrans' political consciousness as that of General Shimura:

The demand for independence was not nearly so strong as in Java. The opinion of the Japanese Army officials in Sumatra was that the people of that country were not sufficiently developed, socially and culturally, to take on themselves the responsibilities of self-government.¹⁰

For a short period after they invaded Sumatra the Japanese had fostered the hopes of Indonesian nationalists, particularly the Islamic leaders. Prior to their landings, according to Benda, they had supported the foundation of Islamic anti-Dutch resistance groups both in Atjeh and in West Sumatra which had promoted the idea that the coming of the Japanese would lead to Indonesia's independence.¹¹ During the early months of the occupation they had also permitted Sukarno to establish a "Komite Rakjat" in Padang which spread to other parts of West Sumatra¹² and Chatib Suleiman to form his "Pemuda Nippon Raja."¹³ This freedom, however, apparently lasted only until they consolidated their authority on the island, after which both of these organizations were dissolved

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9. The number of Japanese troops on Sumatra probably exceeded those on Java through much of the occupation. Kanahele notes that on Java their military forces were reduced from 45-50,000 in March 1942 to about 10,000 by November of that year, though in the last year of the war they were again increased to 40-50,000 ("Japanese Occupation," pp. 65, 282). Before their invasion of Sumatra the Allies estimated that there were 71,500 Japanese on Sumatra, though it is unclear how many of these were military men. See Rajendra Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces: Japan and South-East Asia (in the series Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939-45) (New Delhi: Combined Inter-Services Historical Section India & Pakistan, 1958), p. 255. Wehl states that there were totals of approximately 70,000 Japanese on Java and 75,000 on Sumatra at the time of the surrender, but does not break these figures down between civilian and military. David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948), p. 3.
 10. Quoted in Reid, "Birth of the Republic," p. 23.
 11. Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 105-6. According to M. D. Mansoer, et al., Sedjarah Minangkabau (Djakarta: Bhratara, 1970), pp. 216-17, Islamic leaders were favored by the Japanese in contrast with adat and intellectual leaders throughout the occupation, but if this were the case it must have been at the personal level. In general, the Japanese appear to have maintained a balance between adat, Islamic and other groups. See nn. 14 and 15 below.
 12. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 28-29, 259; Kementerian Penerangan, Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Sumatera Tengah (n.p., n.d., c. 1954), p. 457. Sukarno was detained in Padang in the spring of 1942 before returning to Java, after his detention by the Dutch in Bengkulu. (Propinsi Sumatera Tengah will be abbreviated to PST in the footnotes hereafter.)
 13. Ibid., pp. 79, 457.

and the pemuda leaders briefly arrested. The organizations that were allowed to continue were expected to eschew any political activities.¹⁴

In comparison with Java, advisory groups of Indonesians within the local shū were late in being established, with the exception of West Sumatra where Chōkan Yano set up a consultative council as early as July 1942, with 15-20 members drawn from "adat, Islamic and nationalist groups."¹⁵ Elsewhere in Sumatra these regional advisory councils (Shū Sangi-kai) were only set up in November 1943, and no Sumatra-wide central advisory council parallel to that on Java was established until 1945.¹⁶ Attempts by Chatib Suleiman and Mohammad Sjafei in July 1943 to establish a regional Putera, corresponding to the basic organization on Java, were quashed by the Japanese authorities,¹⁷ so that until 1945 Indonesian participation in the government was restricted to the local advisory councils.

There was a more rapid development of the Indonesian military forces on Sumatra than of the civilian organizations, but they shared the same characteristics of decentralization.¹⁸ The Heihō had been formed very shortly after the arrival of the Japanese in March 1942, and in November 1943, a month after establishment of the Peta on Java, its Sumatran equivalent, the Gyūgun (Lasjkar Rakjat) was formed.¹⁹ Members of the Gyūgun were trained and quartered near their home districts, and initially the largest unit was the platoon. Later, however, companies were organized, some under Indonesian commanders, and there was reportedly one battalion in South Sumatra under a Japanese officer.²⁰ Although according to Kanahale, the size of the Gyūgun was smaller than that of the Peta,²¹ it too provided training for many of

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14. They included the Muhammadiyah, Perti, the Madjelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau (MTKAAM), and the Madjelis Islam Tinggi (MIT). *Ibid.*, p. 458.
 15. Kanahale, "Japanese Occupation," p. 68. This council, a successor of the Minangkabau Raad of the Dutch period, apparently met regularly. It was formed and led by Sjafei, Sjech M. Djamil Djambek (representing the ulama) and Chatib Suleiman from the pemuda group. *PST*, p. 79. In the following March, a 56-member institute to study adat problems relating to regional administration was set up under the chairmanship of Datuk Simaradjo (Balai Penjelidikan Masjarakat Minangkabau). Chōkan Yano's sympathy toward ideas of Indonesian independence led to his removal from Sumatra in April 1944. See Kanahale, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 148, 306.
 16. Nishijima, *Japanese Military Administration*, p. 172.
 17. Kanahale, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 86-87.
 18. Apart from the small size and local nature of the units, there were at least three training schools for the Gyūgun, at Padang, Pagar Alam and Siborongborong (West, South, and East Sumatra). *Ibid.*, p. 128. According to the *PST*, p. 79, it was as a result of the arguments of Chatib Suleiman (who became its head in West Sumatra) that the Japanese agreed to form the Gyūgun in Minangkabau.
 19. Kanahale, "Japanese Occupation," p. 128.
 20. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
 21. Kanahale estimates its peak strength in 1945 at 8,000 as compared with 33,000 on Java. *Ibid.*, p. 129. However, Reid puts its size at 30,000 (Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution* [Hawthorn, Victoria: Longman Australia, 1974], p. 14) and the *Propinsi* at 44,000 (*PST*, p. 541).

the young officers who would lead the independence struggle after the war.²² Service Associations (*Kōenkai*) were also organized to raise popular support for these forces, but these too existed on a purely regional basis. In West Sumatra the local *Kōenkai* was headed by Chatib Suleiman and Sjafei.²³

Thus, when the Japanese 25th Army finally agreed in early 1945 to promote Sumatran nationalist organizations²⁴ there was an absence of earlier groups on which to build, and few Sumatrans had been closely involved in the bureaucracy or administration.²⁵ On an unofficial basis the Japanese had recognized the standing of several Sumatran leaders as their advisors: Chatib Suleiman and Sjafei in West Sumatra, A. K. Gani in Palembang, Hamka and Adinegoro in East Sumatra, and Daud Beureuh, Nja Arif, and Mohammad Ali in Atjeh.²⁶ These men, however,

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22. Kanahele lists among its platoon commanders, Achmad Tahir, Sitompul, Ismael Lengah, Bambang Oetojo, Dachlan Ibrahim, Hoesein, Amir Noor, and Gingtings. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 128-29.
 23. Mohammad Sjafei (1897-1969) was born in West Kalimantan and was the adopted son of Marah Soetan. He attended the Sekolah Radja in Bukittinggi from 1908 to 1914. He was a member of Boedi Utomo and later the Indische Partij. During the 1930s he was associated with the PNI-Baru. In 1926 he founded the Indische Nationale School (INS) in Kaju Tanam. It changed its name to Indonesia-Nippon at the time of the Japanese occupation. See Taufik Abdullah, *Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933)* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), p. 127; Reid, "Birth of the Republic," p. 27; Kementerian Pene-rangan, *Kami Perkenalkan* (Djakarta: n.p., n.d.), p. 120.
 Chatib Suleiman (1906-49) was born in Sumpur (on Lake Singkarak) of poor parents. He was educated only at MULO. After leaving school he moved to Padang Pandjang where he became a follower of Hatta and was active in the PNI-Baru. After the party was dissolved he turned to economic activity and was one of the founders of Inkorba (an Indonesian import firm established in Bukittinggi on February 28, 1938) and the National Bank. He was arrested by the Dutch for sus-pected Japanese sympathies and exiled to Atjeh, only returning with the Japa-nese. Hamka writes of him: "If one wishes to define his spirit, there were gathered love for his country, socialist ideas, Islamic religion and a 'Minang' soul." He likens him to Hatta in his social relationships and considers him as being the mind behind most of Sjafei's programs. See Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (Hamka), *Kenang-kenangan Hidup* (2nd ed.; Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1966), pp. 422-25; *Sumatera Tengah*, March 10, 1953; January 25, 1954.
 24. In January 1945 it was announced that a Sumatra Central Advisory Council would be set up, the number of Sumatrans in the administration and the advisory coun-cils would be increased, and that Hōkōkai (Patriotic Service Organizations) would be established. The Hōkōkai were set up as separate, apparently auton-omous, units in the different shū. (Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 180-82.) The leaders of the Hōkōkai of West Sumatra were Sjafei, Chatib Suleiman, R. Datoek Perpatih, and Datuk Madjo Oerang. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
 25. According to Kanahele in the regional administration the highest positions held by Indonesians on Sumatra were those of district head and mayor. There was an Indonesian mayor in Padang (Dr. A. Hakim) and a deputy mayor of Palembang (Radnen Hanan). *Ibid.*, pp. 111, 181, 314.
 26. These were all nominated to the Chuo Sangi-in (Central Advisory Council) of Sumatra, which has its first and only meeting in Bukittinggi in June-July, 1945. Also participating from West Sumatra were Dt. Perpatih Baringek (from the adat group) and A. R. St. Mansur (representing the ulama). An account of this meet-ing appears in Hamka, *Kenang-kenangan*, pp. 261-66.

played no active role in administration, and their advisory positions were restricted to their own region.

The lack of a Sumatra-wide leadership or indigenous administration embracing the whole island had a considerable bearing on the way in which the independence struggle developed in Sumatra. The nationalist movements on the island grew into largely autonomous local organizations and never achieved the degree of coordination necessary to build up a unified Sumatran structure.²⁷

West Sumatra after the Independence Proclamation

The surrender of the Japanese on August 14 occurred at a time when the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI) [Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence] was gathering in Djakarta,²⁸ the first occasion on which there had been direct Sumatran communication with the nationalist forces on Java since the beginning of the occupation. The Japanese had appointed three delegates from Sumatra to this conference:²⁹ Abdul Abbas, Dr. Mohammad Amir, and Teuku Mohammad Hasan.³⁰ The choice appears a strange one, for although representing three of the main ethnic groups on the island, the men were not as widely known as, for example, Gani, Sjafei and Adinegoro. It has been argued that they were possibly not so committed to the idea of a Sumatran state as were some of the other leaders favored by the 25th Army,³¹ but it appears probable that the opposite was in fact the case; and that these men were stronger supporters of autonomy from Java than were Sjafei, Adinegoro, Gani, who all had close ties with the nationalist leaders on Java.³² In the first session of the PPKI, Dr. Amir in par-

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27. With regard to relations with Java, however, the ban imposed by the 25th Army on any visits to Sumatra by nationalist leaders from there does not seem to have affected Sumatran recognition of Sukarno-Hatta as the supreme leaders of the nationalist movement in Indonesia. See B. R. O'G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961), p. 12; Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," p. 223; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 263; Reid, "Birth of the Republic," pp. 39-40.
 28. A Sumatran "Committee to Investigate Preparations for Independence" had been announced on July 25, under the chairmanship of Sjafei, and with Adinegoro as head of the secretariat. It consisted of 24 members (including 15 from the Central Advisory Council). Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 231-32.
 29. They were taken first to Singapore, where they saw Hatta and Sukarno returning from Saigon. According to Hatta, the two groups had separate meetings with the Japanese there. See Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1970), pp. 23-25.
 30. Abbas was a Mandailing Batak, Dr. Amir a Minangkabau and Hasan an Atjehnese. For biographical notes see Reid, "Birth of the Republic," pp. 27, 30.
 31. Reid states: "It seems possible that the Japanese planners in Singapore or Djakarta distrusted the leadership developed by the intransigent 25th Army as too distinctly Sumatran, or too much the creatures of the Gunseikan." Ibid., p. 30.
 32. Adran Kapau Gani, for example, in January 1946, was asserting that South Sumatra's lack of leaders demanded a flood of Javanese pemuda and military men to

ticular was arguing for considerable Sumatran autonomy.³³ Over the objections of Hatta, the committee decided that Sumatra as a whole would constitute a single province, with its capital in Medan and with Hasan as its governor.³⁴

While these decisions were being reached in Djakarta, however, in West Sumatra the pemuda were already moving to take over control from the occupation forces. Although news of the Japanese surrender did not reach Medan until August 22,³⁵ reports of the Independence Proclamation had reached Padang and Bukittinggi at least by August 18.³⁶ It is reported that on that day Ismael Lengah organized a meeting in Padang of former members of the Heihō and Gyūgun³⁷ and by August 25 this group had formed a Balai Penerangan Pemuda Indonesia (BPPI) under his leadership.³⁸ At about the same time the pemuda in Bukittinggi were also holding meetings, and by August 25 had formed their own organization,

the island. G. W. Overdijking, Het Indonesische Probleem: De Feiten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1946), p. 84. Adinegoro was the only "resident Sumatran in a potential Indonesian Cabinet presented to the Japanese in March 1942 by the leading nationalist parties." Reid, "Birth of the Republic," pp. 27-28; Nishijima, Japanese Military Administration, pp. 342-43. Sjafei's stance in favor of Sumatran autonomy (see Gerald S. Maryanov, Decentralization as a Political Problem [Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958], p. 41) appears to have developed later, and was partly a result of the centralization policies of Djakarta after the transfer of sovereignty. He was to have been a representative to the PPKI, but his departure was forbidden by the Japanese. (PST, p. 83.)

33. Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang2 Dasar 1945 (Djakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1959), I, p. 410. Amir later claimed that the selection of delegates was named by Java behind the backs of the Sumatrans (see Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," n. 126, p. 321b), but this seems unlikely.
34. Yamin, Naskah, pp. 451-52. Hatta was arguing for the division of Sumatra into three provinces, as were several other members on the committee. Hasan was the strongest proponent of a single Sumatran province, and he was also opposed to the idea of subprovinces. His reasoning is not very clear. See also Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi, pp. 71-72.
35. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 272. Hamka was then in Medan, but immediately set off for Bukittinggi to find out what the Sumatran attitude towards the changed situation might be. He arrived there on August 27, meeting with Chatib Suleiman, Mr. Nasroen, and Aziz Chan. Sjafei was then at his home village of Kajutanam, proceeding to Padang on the night of August 28. (*Ibid.*, pp. 278-79.)
36. PST, p. 542; Departemen P.D. dan K., Biro Pemuda, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Pemuda Indonesia (Djakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1965), p. 155. News of the Japanese surrender did not apparently reach West Sumatra either until August 21.
37. Dates are unclear as to when the Japanese disarmed the Heihō and Gyūgun. According to PST, p. 83, this took place in Bukittinggi on August 15, while Reid states that the Gyūgun was disarmed between August 19 and 21. (Reid, "Birth of the Republic," p. 37.)
38. Headed by Ismael Lengah and Suleiman, the Propinsi lists other leaders of the BPPI as: Nasrun A.S., Jahja Djalil, Dahlan J. St. Mangkuto, Iljas Jacub, Burhanuddin, Dr. Nazaruddin, Rusdi, Kasim Dt. Malilit Alam, Sjarif Usman, BGD. Aziz Chan, Chatib Suleiman. (PST, p. 87.) This cannot be exact for at least Iljas Jacub and Burhanuddin had not yet returned from their exile in Digul.

the Pemuda Indonesia (PI), whose name a few weeks later was changed to Pemuda Republik Indonesia (PRI).³⁹

Toward the end of the month two of the Sumatran delegates to the PPKI, Hasan and Dr. Amir, passed through Bukittinggi on their way from Palembang to Medan, and conveyed the instructions of the committee regarding formation of a KNI (Komité Nasional Indonesia), a defense force (Badan Keamanan Rakjat, BKR) and the state PNI party. At a meeting in Padang on August 29, Sjafei read the Independence Proclamation and expressed the loyalty of the Indonesian people on Sumatra to the Sukarno-Hatta leadership.⁴⁰ The Hōkōkai in West Sumatra formed itself into a KNI, with Sjafei at its head, Dt. Perpatih Baringek and M. Djamil as his deputies, and St. Mohd. Rasjid as treasurer.⁴¹

Although Sumatra was now officially unified as one province within the Republic of Indonesia, this fact had little influence on the course of events on the island. From the beginning the new Governor Hasan was handicapped in attempting to assert leadership because he was relatively unknown outside of Atjeh and Medan.⁴² Neither Palembang nor West Sumatra was likely to welcome a lead from Medan, even if it could be asserted, as both regions felt they had better qualifications to assume such a role. The fact that Bukittinggi had during the Japanese occupation been the official center of Sumatra clearly influenced the attitude of the people in West Sumatra. Throughout the revolution events in that region tended to be viewed in the context of those occurring on Java rather than of those in other parts of Sumatra. The kinship of the Minangkabau with their representative in the Dwitunggal, Hatta, was closer than with the Sumatran governor; and, of course, several other Minangkabau were prominent in the republican central leadership on Java.

The tendency to autonomous development in West Sumatra was further increased by the pattern of Allied landings and Dutch plans for gaining control over the different parts of the island. As early as the end of August small units of Dutch officers were beginning to arrive in Medan,⁴³

39. On August 21 a meeting was held at the office of the Madjelis Islam Tinggi at the initiative of the following pemuda: Chaidir Gazali, Nasrul, Noesjirwan Aminuddin Junus, Zainul, R. Hadjimar Bermawi, Marakarma, Sjoefjan Kamal, Sjahbuddin; at a further meeting four days later the PI was formed. Also present at that meeting were Iskandar Tedjasukmana and Sjarif Usman. (*Ibid.*, p. 88.) In a later part of the *Propinsi*, however, it is stated that the PRI was formed in Bukittinggi on August 29. In this account Nuzirwan (a pemuda newly arrived from Java) was present and he was named head of the PRI for Bukittinggi. (*Ibid.*, p. 544.)

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 84-86.

41. These men were successively to hold the post of resident of West Sumatra. For the full membership of the first KNI Sumatera Barat, see *ibid.*, pp. 380-81.

42. Governor Hasan attempted to strengthen feelings of unity by visiting all the regions of the island. However, his first tour around Sumatra in the early spring of 1946 was probably occasioned largely by the events in East Sumatra during those months. See *ibid.*, p. 100; *Semangat Merdeka*, January 25, 1945; March 20, 29, 1946; Osman Raliby, *Documenta Historica*, I (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1953), p. 224.

43. Reid, "Birth of the Republic," p. 32; Singh, *Post-War Occupation Forces*, p. 180. This was a party from RAPWI ALFSEA, who collected some of the more important

and from early October it was the springboard from which they hoped to reestablish their authority over Sumatra. From October 9, British forces, chiefly the 26th Indian Division,⁴⁴ began landing in Medan, Padang and Palembang, but they concentrated on the more important strategic and economic areas round Medan and Palembang, after the end of 1945 never controlling any territory in West Sumatra beyond the boundaries of Padang.⁴⁵ Thus, from the beginning the capital of the republican government on Sumatra, Medan, was also the center of Dutch power, while until the end of 1948 the republican forces in West Sumatra were able to organize and run their own administration, only peripherally affected by the Dutch forces around the port city of Padang.⁴⁶

In both military and civilian matters, then, the struggle against the Dutch in West Sumatra was essentially a local one, little coordinated with actions in other parts of the island and only fitfully meshed in with the overall plans being formulated by the central government on Java. At the very outset, although the PPKI in Djakarta had sent out orders for a KNI, a PNI,⁴⁷ and a paramilitary group to be formed in all regions of Indonesia, no specific instructions were given, and it was left to the initiative of the local leaders as to how such groups were to be set up.

As noted above, the KNI in West Sumatra was established on August 31, but as with the organizations during the Japanese period it would be inaccurate to assume that because the name and outward form of the organization paralleled that on Java, its content and character were also similar. While the local KNI on Java were usually little more than figureheads, with their working committees being the active bodies,

Dutch internees to discuss the evacuation of Dutch prisoners of war via three of the principal towns on Sumatra: Medan, Padang and Palembang. See also Raymond Westerling, Challenge to Terror (London: W. Kimber, 1952), pp. 37-38.

44. Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, p. 240. He states that of the division's three brigades earmarked for service in Sumatra (the 4th, 36th, and 71st), the 36th was diverted to Java.
45. Padang became the headquarters of the 26th Indian Division and its 71st Infantry Brigade. The Allies initially planned to occupy Bukittinggi, and the 8/8 Punjab Regiment reportedly arrived there from Medan on October 10. However, after the death of Brig. Maj. Anderson in Padang on December 3 (see n. 56 below) this regiment was moved from Bukittinggi to strengthen the forces on the coast. It appears that control even over Padang was always tenuous, for according to Singh, the arrival of extra forces from Java on August 5, 1946, "enabled the whole of Padang town to be brought under effective control." Ibid., pp. 239, 243-44.
46. This, of course, did not apply to economic matters which I have not the data to explore in this article. It is, however, clear that the Dutch control of Padang did mean that the West Sumatrans were cut off from their principal trading port except for a short period during the spring of 1947. The difficulties caused by this were aggravated by the economic blockade carried out by the Dutch from late 1947. Although this was by no means totally successful throughout the revolutionary years the West Sumatrans apparently experienced considerable economic hardship as a result of it.
47. The plans for the PNI were almost immediately cancelled (B. R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972], p. 95), and the state party appears never to have been formed in West Sumatra.

in West Sumatra the functioning organization was the KNI itself, and it was the movements both within this body and in its interaction with other groups in the region that shaped many of the political developments in West Sumatra during the first three years of the revolution.

It took longer to organize the military Badan Keamanan Rakjat (BKR)⁴⁸ than the civilian KNI. The KNI took the first steps on September 2 towards setting up a BKR organization at the district level under control of Ismael Lengah, but throughout that month the two pemuda groups in West Sumatra, the BPPI in Padang and the PRI in Bukittinggi, retained their independence,⁴⁹ with the PRI in particular also establishing branches in the towns and villages of the region. Only when the Allies began to land in Padang did the two groups decide that their members with military training should join the official TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakjat) while the remainder would act as local defense forces outside of the official military structure. The BPPI in Padang disbanded itself on October 10, with the majority of its members joining the TKR, and on October 13 the PRI in Bukittinggi also moved to amalgamate with the TKR.⁵⁰ Non-military members of both groups joined together in the PRI organization.⁵¹

The West Sumatrans initially cooperated with the Allied forces.⁵² However, as it gradually became clear that under their protection the NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) was being re-introduced incidents soon began to multiply.⁵³ These came to a head after Novem-

48. The name was changed on October 5 to TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakjat).

49. They also could not agree to unite with each other, though a meeting was held on September 15, primarily at the initiative of Dt. Radjo Mangkuto, to attempt to achieve this. At this meeting Dahlan Djambek proposed recalling all former members of the Gyūgun, Heihō and Kaigun to form a reserve military force. PST, pp. 544-45.

50. Ibid., pp. 547-48. Local battalions were set up as follows: Padang (Jazid Abidin); Air Hadji Sungei Penuh (Thalib); Sp. Gaung Air Hadji (Alwi St. Maradjjo); Pariaman (Mahjudin Tonek); Padang Pandjang (Anas); Solok (Sjarif Usman); Batu Sangkar (Dahlan Ibrahim); Bukittinggi (Dahlan Djambek); Pajakumbuh (Makinuddin); Bakan Baru (Hasan Basri); and Djambi (Abun Djani). See also A. H. Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (2nd ed.; Bandung: Ganaco, 1963), I, p. 113.

51. Until the end of 1945 this remained the principal pemuda organization, but as early as October 1, the Muhammadiyah was organizing young members into the Hizbullah. (PST, p. 553.)

52. In general, the repatriation of the Japanese went smoothly, though there were some frictions over the release of Dutch prisoners of war. Raliby reports a battle between pemuda groups and former Dutch soldiers as early as October 15. Documenta, p. 57. See also Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, pp. 180-81, 256-57.

53. PST, pp. 96-98. On November 8 the BBC was reporting clashes at Padang between Indonesian nationalists and Indian forces. Raliby, Documenta, p. 85. See also Departemen P.D. dan K., Sedjarah Perdjuangan Pemuda, p. 172, which reports that many of these clashes were then with remnants of the Japanese forces, during which a considerable number of arms were seized. Nasution (TNI, I, p. 155) speculates that in East Sumatra there were sufficient arms for one or two infantry regiments, and in both Central and South Sumatra sufficient for several battalions, most of which had presumably been seized from the Japanese.

ber 25 when the British command ceded the Technical School of Simpang Haru in Padang to the NICA despite an earlier agreement that the Dutch would not be allowed to occupy any part of the city without the Indonesians' permission.⁵⁴ Pemuda forces almost immediately launched attacks against the school complex, and in early December an English brigade major and a "lady worker" were assassinated.⁵⁵ After this occurrence a strict civilian curfew was imposed, and by the end of the year Padang was in a state of considerable tension, with Indian troops from Bukittinggi being brought in to strengthen Allied control over the town.⁵⁶

Upheaval and Reorganization

Administratively the province of Sumatra was divided into residencies, each with its local KNI. The first resident of West Sumatra, Sjafei, was appointed on October 1, and initially he also headed the residency KNI. At its third plenary session, held in mid-October, however, the KNI decided to separate the two positions, with Dr. Djamil assuming the KNI leadership.⁵⁷ Officially because of ill-health Sjafei was replaced as resident by Dt. Perpatih Baringek in the middle of November.⁵⁸ Under the new resident there were major personnel changes at the *demang* (district) level and above.⁵⁹ This reshuffle appears to have caused considerable dissatisfaction, with several of the new officials, notably in Painan, Solok, Pajakumbuh and Kerintji being rejected by the local KNI and by communist groups.⁶⁰

54. PST, p. 99.

55. See Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, p. 244; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 234-35; PST, p. 100, which suggests that it was the NICA who were responsible. The victims were Brig. Maj. Anderson and Miss Allingham of the Red Cross.

56. Mountbatten states that "by December, the situation was so satisfactory that it was possible to divert to Java a brigade of 26 Indian Division intended for Sumatra." It seems likely that this diversion occurred before the death of Major Anderson. Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Post Surrender Tasks: Section E of the Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, by the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia, 1943-1945 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1969), p. 299.

57. PST, pp. 382-83. At this same meeting the membership of the KNI was increased to 97, and attempts were made to include representatives of all groups, organizations and districts of the region. See also ibid., pp. 90-92.

58. Ibid., p. 112.

59. The PST states that these changes were instituted "with the aim of imbuing the administrative organization with revolutionary spirit" (PST, p. 108). In view of the character and record of Perpatih Baringek and the groups which protested the appointments this appears unlikely. But I have been unable to establish the reasons for and character of the reorganization. For the officeholders as of October 1, see ibid., pp. 89-91; and for the new administrative officers, ibid., pp. 108-10.

60. Nefis Publicatie no. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289 in the Indies Collection of the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (hereafter IC-RVO), Amsterdam, p. 25.

Up to April 1946 there appears to have been practically no attempt on the civilian level by the central republican leadership to assert control over developments on Sumatra. No representatives of the central government visited the island until that month, and most of the initiatives either to follow Java's example or to organize independent organizations appear to have originated from the Sumatran side.⁶¹

In the military field, however, attempts to coordinate the Sumatran armed forces and tie them into a TKR organization⁶² covering both Java and Sumatra began before the end of 1945, and were to continue throughout the revolution. In early November, Dr. Gani was appointed the first coordinator of the TKR on Sumatra, which was to consist of a total of six divisions. After setting up a general headquarters (*markas besar umum*) for the Sumatra command, Gani transferred authority to Suhardjo Hardjowardojo, appointing him a major general.⁶³ In this initial organization Divisions I and II were responsible for South Sumatra (with their headquarters at Lahat and Palembang), Division III for Central Sumatra (Bukittinggi), Division IV for East Sumatra (Medan), Division V for Atjeh (Bireuen), and Division VI for Tapanuli and Nias (Sibolga).⁶⁴

The Banteng division (Division III)'s area of control was West Sumatra, Riau and the islands, while Djambi was attached to the Gadjah division of South Sumatra.⁶⁵ The Banteng division's principal commanders were former members of the Gyūgun forces, Dahlan Djambek and Ismael Lengah, assisted by Sjarif Usman.⁶⁶ It consisted of four regi-

61. There were two principal groups which visited Java before the end of 1945. The first consisted of pemuda who attended the Pemuda Congress in November. Clearly, however, many of the 166 Sumatrans who were reported to have attended the conference were residents of Java. (Departemen P.D. dan K., Sedjarah Perdjuangan Pemuda, p. 165.) The Atjehnese delegation consisted of four Atjehnese students who were then studying on Java. Semangat Merdeka, November 17, 1945. The second group was a delegation from the provincial government of Sumatra consisting of Dr. Amir, Mr. Luat Siregar, Dr. Djamil, and Adinegoro, who traveled around Java and had a meeting with Sukarno and Hatta on December 29. Raliby, Documenta, pp. 170-71; PST, p. 102.

62. On January 25, 1946, the TKR became the Tentara Republik Indonesia (TRI), and on May 5, 1947, its name was again changed to Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). Pusat Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, Peranan TNI Angkatan Darat dalam Perang Kemerdekaan (Revolusi Pisik 1945-1950) (Bandung: Pussemad, 1965), p. 210.

63. Nasution, TNI, I, pp. 159-61; Pusat Sedjarah Militer, Peranan TNI, pp. 207-8; PST, pp. 550-51. Gani was appointed on November 5, 1945 (*ibid.*, p. 567). Suhardjo was born in Surakarta in 1901, and received military training in the Mangkunegaran Legion. Just before the war he moved to Lampung, and during the Japanese occupation was chief of police for Tandjung Karang. T. B. Simatupang, Report from Banaran (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), pp. 66-67.

64. Nasution, TNI, I, pp. 159-60.

65. PST, p. 550.

66. Dahlan Djambek, son of the famous West Sumatran Muslim scholar, was born in 1917 and studied at a Christian high school in Djakarta for three years. He became an army officer in West Sumatra during the Japanese occupation. Sjarif Usman was born in 1919 at Muara Panas, Solok. He was educated in an Islamic college in Padang, and finally studied economics at the National Academy. He taught first in Djakarta, then in Padang. He gained the rank of Lt. I. under the

ments⁶⁷ under the overall leadership of the division commander, Dahlan Djambek.

In addition, however, paramilitary or people's security forces were developing outside of the TKR structure. The earliest of these groups was made up of the members of the PRI of Bukittinggi and Padang who continued their organization at a local defense level.⁶⁸ The importance of the PRI declined after the establishment of other irregular units directly tied to the political parties, particularly the Islamic organizations, which began reestablishing themselves from early November 1945.⁶⁹ The two largest Islamic military organizations were the Hizbullah, which was formed at the inaugural meeting of the Madjelis Islam Tinggi (MIT) as a political party in December 1945. The MIT in February of the following year was fused with the Masjumi.⁷⁰ Less

Japanese in Central Sumatra. I can find no information on Ismael Lengah before he entered Gyūgun. Simatupang, Report, p. 100; Parlaungan, Tokoh² Parlemen (Jakarta: C. V. Gita, 1956), pp. 187-88.

67. Regiments I, II and III under Lt. Col. Sjarif Usman, Lt. Col. Dahlan Djambek, and Lt. Col. Ismael Lengah were responsible for West Sumatra. Each was divided into three battalions. Regiment IV under Lt. Col. Hasan Basri was responsible for Riau and was divided into five battalions. (PST, p. 551.) At a meeting in mid-January Dahlan Djambek was appointed panglima of the Banteng division (with Lt. Col. Jazid Abidin as his chief of staff), and his position as commander of Regiment II was taken by Lt. Col. Dahlan Ibrahim. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 210; O. G. Roeder, Who's Who in Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971), p. 149, for biographical details on Ibrahim.
68. PST, p. 468. The PRI was incorporated into the Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo) in 1946. Under the auspices of Amir Sjarifuddin then Minister of Information, a group of pemuda had been sent from Java to Sumatra at the end of October 1945. Kamal and Karim Halim headed an 80-man contingent which came to West Sumatra. (Ibid., pp. 94-95.) Kamal attended the Pemuda Congress in 1945 at Jogja, and he headed the Kongres Rakjat of West Sumatra held in Padang Pandjang on November 2. PST, pp. 103-4; Semangat Merdeka, October 27, 1945.
69. Several of these organizations were strengthened by the return in December of prewar Minangkabau leaders who had been exiled to Digul and had spent most of the war in Australia. These included H. Iljas Jacub and Djalaluddin Thaib, former leaders of Permi (Persatuan Muslim Indonesia), the radical modernist Islamic party which had emerged in West Sumatra in the late 1920s; Hadji Datuk Batuah, the Islamic communist leader of the 1920s who became one of the leaders of the PKI; and Dt. Singo Maradjo of the PSII. Other Sumatrans returning from exile included Burhanoeddin and Datuk Bendaro. PST, pp. 106, 459; Tamar Djaja, Pusaka Indonesia (Bandung: Kementerian Pendidikan Pengadjaran dan Kebudayaan Republik Indonesia, 1952), pp. 370-72; Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 78, 156; Semangat Merdeka, November 3, 1945.
70. The Hizbullah was headed by Abdul Rasjid Sutan Mansur and was formed on November 25, 1945. The Sabilillah, which was half its size, according to Hamka, was under the nominal leadership of Mohammad Djamil Djambek and Daud Rasjidi (respectively eighty-five and sixty-five years old at the time). A. R. St. Mansur was born in 1895 at Manindjau of an ulama family. He had been a follower of Hadji Rusul and had taught in his school at Padang Pandjang. He became head of the Muhammadiyah in Minangkabau in 1930, and pursued a policy of making the organization increasingly nonpolitical. (See Abdullah, Schools and Politics,

important were the communist military groups, the Barisan Merah, tied to the PKI, and the Saifullah, allied with the PKI Lokal Islam.⁷¹

The first half of 1946 was marked by armed disturbances in East and North Sumatra, where uprisings against the local rajahs led to considerable bloodshed and breakdown of authority. The violence spread as far as Tapanuli,⁷² but in West Sumatra the main repercussions were in the political field. The reasons for this divergence are perhaps obvious, but are probably worth restating. The two principal differences were that, first, as has been noted above, Indonesians in West Sumatra were under far less pressure from the Allied forces; and the return of Dutch administrators outside of the immediate coastal enclave of Padang seemed much less imminent.⁷³ Thus, although there was considerable dissatisfaction over the European presence and the compromises with the Dutch being made by the leadership of the republic, both on Sumatra and Java, there was as yet no sense of strong pressure that demanded an immediate response. More important at this stage was the different economic and social environment in West Sumatra, where individual large-scale landownership was rare and social inequalities less pronounced, and where there were few obvious targets on whom hungry and displaced people could vent their wrath.⁷⁴ Moreover, in contrast to East Sumatra the Minangkabau population was ethnically homogeneous and the system of social organization in West Sumatra tended to make it easier for dissatisfactions to find channels through nonviolent means.

Dissatisfaction and pressure for change were nevertheless there but it was within the residency's legislative body, the KNI Sumatera Barat, that moves were made to meet the demands. At its meeting on March 14, 1946, the KNI set up a Volksfront, modeled on the Persatuan

pp. 65-69, 165-66.) He was one of the organizers of the Hizbullah as a military arm of the Muhammadiyah and was its first commander. (Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 334-35.) He was to become head of the Muhammadiyah during the 1950s. By 1946 both the Hizbullah and Sabilillah were tied organizationally to the Masjumi party. Ibid., pp. 334, 360; PST, pp. 474-75; Djaja, Pusaka Indonesia, pp. 285, 290, 308, 312; Raliby, Documenta, pp. 136-37; Abdullah, Schools and Politics, p. 166; Semangat Merdeka, December 1, 1945.

71. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 335. The leader of the Saifullah was Abdul Gani Sjarif.

72. Semangat Merdeka, March 13, 1946.

73. See, however, Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution, pp. 66-67, where he stresses the relative weakness of the Dutch in East Sumatra at this period.

74. This does not mean that poverty and hunger were not widespread in West Sumatra during the early months of the revolution. There was a severe rice shortage there, which caused increasing dissatisfaction from the end of 1945 (Nefis Publicatie, No. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289 [IC-RV0], p. 24). In his travels around the region in the early part of 1946 Hamka noted that the most hard-hit areas were near Solok and Alahan Pandjang, where many died of hunger, and from his own observations he estimated that about 75 percent of the population wore clothes of tree bark (baju kulit kayu) as often occurred in Java. (Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 314.) The extent of the hardship can be seen from the deficits in rice production from 1943-47. After a surplus in 1942, there was a deficit of 28,815 tons in 1943; 47,539 tons in 1944; 160,468 in 1945; 154,475 tons in 1946, and 108,723 tons in 1947. There are no figures for the later years. PST, p. 651.

Perdjuangan formed by Tan Malaka on Java in January of that year.⁷⁵ Although the front's leaders were mostly drawn from the KNI itself, they were all from the more radical component, consisting of members of the youth and labor groups, and socialist and communist parties.⁷⁶ The organization was divided into a series of councils representing the different *luhak* (the traditional Minangkabau divisions) and districts of West Sumatra. Control over the "Fonds Kemerdekaan" and over the region's economy was transferred from the KNI to the Volksfront.⁷⁷

In the political field, the Volksfront's actions were immediately marked by an intransigent stance toward the Allied forces. Demands voiced by the body on March 24 paralleled those being issued by fronts in other parts of Indonesia, particularly in East Sumatra,⁷⁸ namely: (1) that all Dutchmen under protection of the British should be surrendered to the TRI; (2) all Indonesians arrested by the British should be surrendered to the republican police force; (3) the British must request from the Indonesian resident in Padang any supplies they needed from West Sumatra; (4) the office building of the resident of the Republic of Indonesia in Padang should be returned by the British; (5) the safety of British soldiers and vehicles outside of Padang could no longer be guaranteed; and (6) the resident should issue an order that all accomplices and helpers of the NICA be removed.⁷⁹

The Volksfront's principal actions, however, were in the economic field, in a drastic attempt to curb the inflation that was raging in the region. But the chaos resulting from these steps led the resident to override their orders and dissolve the front little more than a month after it had been established. The inflation in West Sumatra was being exacerbated by the number of 100 rupiah Japanese notes which the Dutch were reportedly flooding into the area, and it was around the problem of this paper currency that the Volksfront centered its actions. On April 1 it declared that within a month the 100 rupiah note would no longer be legal currency, and that before the end of that period all 100 rupiah notes should be exchanged at the banks for notes of smaller denominations. As republican currency had not yet been circulated, this led to an insupportable demand for the smaller denominational notes, which the banks could not meet. The situation was further aggravated by two other factors: news of the regulation reached the towns before the countryside, so that many of the unwanted notes got deposited in rural areas; the regulation applied only to West Sumatra so that speculators from other areas, particularly the southern part of Tapanuli, capitalized on the situation. This led to a further regu-

75. Sumatran Governor Hasan was present at the meeting. Semangat Merdeka, March 20, 1946.

76. The seven-man leadership council was made up of Barium A.S. (PBI), Bachtaruddin (PKI), Chatib Suleiman (Partai Sosialis), Iskandar Tedjasukmana (Partai Sosialis), Suleiman (PRI), Basjrah Lubis (SOBSI), and a high official whose name was not published. PST, pp. 113, 479.

77. Their first action was to forbid the collection of taxes by any body other than the Volksfront.

78. Nefis Publicatie no. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289 in IC-RVO, p. 10.

79. PST, pp. 115-16.

lation, banning all traffic with Tapanuli, and a law by which no one could possess more than 500 rupiah in cash.⁸⁰

The immediate economic chaos resulting from these measures led the resident to overrule the Volksfront, issuing a regulation as early as April 5 that the 100 rupiah note was still legal currency. Conflicting orders were issued by the resident and the front through most of April, with the population unsure which of the two had legal authority.⁸¹ Finally after a meeting of all the Sumatran residents, attended by a delegation from the central government in Jogja, the leaders of the Volksfront were arrested on April 24.⁸²

This severe action, however, appears to have had little in the way of repercussions, possibly because of the homogeneity between the leaders of the Volksfront and the KNI. The six men were released a month later on May 22, were given an opportunity to air their grievances before the full KNI, and were reincorporated into its leadership.⁸³

The variegated disturbances in the different parts of Sumatra did, however, have long-term effects on the administrative organization of the island, alerting the provincial and central governments to the dangers of the situation there. They led to the first visit by a central government delegation to the island⁸⁴ and to attempts to restructure the Sumatran administration in a way better suited to the realities of the local situation on the island. These changes were made at all levels from the province down to the negeri. In an attempt to institutionalize ties between Sumatra and Java, the central government

80. A full account of the economic situation in March-April 1946 can be found in ibid., pp. 116-21, 125.

81. On the influence of the Volksfront, see ibid., pp. 479-80; Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, Sedjarah Revolusi Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., n.d.), II, p. 97. He does not, however, mention the arrest of the front's leaders and attributes its failure to differences amongst its members. See also Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 337; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 235-37.

82. The central government delegation arrived in Bukittinggi on April 17 and attended the inaugural meeting of the KNI Sumatera April 17-20. (Raliy, Documenta, pp. 296-99.) At a meeting with the governor, the residents and the central government delegation, the Volksfront, on April 21, promised to stand behind the government and take no steps without its agreement. However, "the conflict and problem of prestige between the government and the Volksfront" led the West Sumatran government on April 24 to arrest all six of its leaders. (The "high official whose name was not published" was apparently not arrested.) PST, p. 125. To meet the problems of the military's food supplies, a 10 percent tax was imposed on all crop yields. In addition, the central government promised development money, providing initially 250 million rupiah to Sumatra as a whole, and later 500 million rupiah. Ibid., p. 127.

83. Ibid., pp. 386-88, 481.

84. The delegation (including Minister of Defense Amir Sjarifuddin, Minister of Information M. Natsir, Minister of Religion H. Rasjidi, and Mr. Hermani, representing the Ministry of Internal Affairs) went first to East Sumatra, and arrived in Bukittinggi on April 17, leaving there probably on April 21. Ibid., p. 121; Raliy, Documenta, pp. 296-97; Semangat Merdeka, April 10, 1946.

delegation oversaw establishment of a Sumatran KNI, whose delegates would represent the island in the KNI Pusat on Java.⁸⁵

At the province level a 100-member Dewan Perwakilan Sumatera was created, made up of KNI representatives from each of the residencies.⁸⁶ At the same time Governor Hasan, finally recognizing the impossibility of effectively administering Sumatra as a single unit, agreed to the establishment of three subprovinces, North, Central and South Sumatra, each with a deputy governor. The subprovince of Central Sumatra incorporated the residencies of West Sumatra, Djambi and Riau.⁸⁷ Creation of the subprovince of Central Sumatra led to the fourth change of resident in West Sumatra since the Independence Proclamation. Dr. Djamil (who had replaced Perpatih Baringek on March 18 when the latter was recalled to Medan to take over an administrative post there) was appointed deputy governor of Central Sumatra, and his place as resident of West Sumatra was taken by Mr. St. M. Rasjid on July 20.⁸⁸

Together with these changes, Dewan Pertahanan Daerah (Regional Defense Councils) were created in each of the residencies. These councils complemented the Dewan Pertahanan Negara at the national level, and their aim was to consolidate the leadership of the civil administration, the army, and the "people" into a single body. In West Sumatra the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah was headed by Resident Rasjid, with Army Divisional Commander Dahlan Djambek as his deputy.⁸⁹

85. Raliby, Documenta, pp. 297-98; G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 181-83.

86. Representatives from West Sumatra were: Chatib Suleiman, Aziz Chan, Darwis Ma'roef, Rangkajo Rasuna Said, Barium A.S., Sidi Bakaruddin, Bagindo M. Tahir, Abdullah, Dt. Simaradjo, Bachtaruddin, Mr. M. Nasroen, Jacob Rasjid, Sjarif Said, Sultani St. Malako, Mr. Nazaruddin, Marzuki Jatim, H. M. Joenoes, Roestam Thaib, A. Gafar Djambek. (PST, pp. 122-23.) The body met only three times before it was dissolved in the reorganization of 1948.

87. Governor Hasan had decided to move the Sumatra capital from Medan to Pematang Siantar on March 22. Semangat Merdeka, March 29, 1946. The levels below the residency were kabupaten (luhak); kewedanaan; ketjamatan (demang muda); and desa (negeri). Raliby, Documenta, pp. 296-99; PST, p. 123.

88. On the succession of residents of West Sumatra, Hamka writes that "the government first appointed Sjafei, but apparently the violent situation caused by the Allied landing and the kepanasan ra'ayat could not be overcome by that gentle soul. Then the Komite Nasional decided to appoint Dt. Perpatih Baringek. An old man who during the Dutch period had only the soul of a clerk (mengenal jiwa kantor), he was also unable to deal with the situation. He then was replaced by Dr. M. Djamil. Then Dr. Djamil was appointed subgovernor of Central Sumatra, and Mr. St. Mohd. Rasjid was named resident. He lasted a long time." Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 337. Rasjid was born in 1911 in Pariaman, finally graduating from the Sekolah Hakim Tinggi in Djakarta in 1938. From 1939-41 he was a lawyer in Bukittinggi and Padang. He was in Djakarta from 1942 until 1944 when he again returned to West Sumatra. Kementerian Penerangan, Kami Perkenalkan. p. 59.

89. PST, pp. 131-32. Its other members were Dr. A. Rahim Usman, Duski Samad, Bachtaruddin (formerly of the Volksfront) and Abdullah. (On Duski Samad, who was a younger brother of A. R. Sutan Mansur and had been a Permi leader in the early 1930s, see Abdullah, Schools and Politics, pp. 124, 168; Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 156; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 313.

Plans for establishing Dewan Perwakilan (Representative Councils) at the negeri level were first put forward at the mid-March session of the KNI after the decision to form the Volksfront. The move was aimed at removing local power from the sole hands of the traditional adat group and reapportioning it among representatives of various organizations and parties.⁹⁰ Elections were held in West Sumatra on June 25 for the Dewan Perwakilan Negeri and on July 10 for the wali negeri.⁹¹ It is with respect to these elections that the account in the *Propinsi* states:

In these fifteen historic days there were great efforts in the direction of democratizing the administration of the negeri, so that autonomy reached down in West Sumatra, connecting directly with the people. And with this great step, that was carried out without any instructions from the Central Government, R.I., clashes and spilling of blood were prevented, and the great revolution went forward safely and peacefully.⁹²

However, in an administrative sense these negeri were too small to assume the roles envisaged for them: of controlling their own economy and dealing with their own affairs. Over the next year, they were gradually grouped into *wilajah autonom*, and by November 1948, the original 542 negeri formed 21 autonomous negeri besar.⁹³

There was also a reorganization of the Sumatran military command published on July 3, 1946, whereby Sumatra was divided into three subcommands: Subcommand I for South Sumatra, headed by A. K. Gani; Subcommand II for Central Sumatra under Dahlan Djambek; and Subcommand III for North Sumatra under Teuku Mohd. Daud Sjah.⁹⁴ Subcommand I consisted of Garuda Division I under Barlian, and Garuda Division II under Bambang Utojo.⁹⁵ (In December 1946 Simbolon replaced Gani as head of

90. One-fifth of the candidates for election were to be nominated from each of the following five groups: (1) the penhulu and alim ulama; (2) the negeri branch of the KNI (mostly adat leaders); (3) a meeting of the local branch of the KNI that was to be attended by at least 100 male members of the electorate; (4) a meeting of at least 100 female electors; (5) the political parties. PST, p. 339. The MTKAAM at its congress of April 15 objected to the resident about the new measures, but he supported the KNI decision. *Ibid.*, p. 330.

91. The election law of May 21 appears in PST, pp. 331-36. There were to be nine representatives for the first thousand members of a negeri and two representatives for each additional thousand. Thus a negeri with a population of 7,000 would have a DPN of twenty-one members. These DPNs were then to nominate four candidates for the position of wali negeri to be voted on in the July 10 elections. *Ibid.*, pp. 338-40.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 340. It should be remembered that this was written in the early 1950s when there was considerable tension between West Sumatra and the central government over the matter of local autonomy.

93. *Ibid.*, pp. 340-42.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 568. The reorganization was apparently not completed until February 1947 (Pusat Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, *Sedjarah TNI Angkatan Darat 1945-1965* [Bandung: Pussemad, 1965], p. 25), but the subcommands in at least Central and South Sumatra came into existence by mid-1946.

95. Nasution, *TNI*, I, p. 319.

Subcommand I.)⁹⁶ Subcommand III was divided into Gadjah I (Atjeh under Husin Jusuf) and Gadjah II (East Sumatra under Ahmad Tahir). Subcommand II was divided into Banteng I (Tapanuli under Pandapotan Sitompul) and Banteng II (West Sumatra) under Ismael Lengah.⁹⁷ The Banteng division itself now became Division IX Banteng TRI Sumatra Command.⁹⁸

The Return of the Dutch and the March 3 Affair

These organizational changes were taking place against a background of the gradual displacement of British and Indian forces in and around the town of Padang by those of the Dutch.⁹⁹ Clashes between the Indonesians and Allied forces increased sharply in July, reaching a peak after the takeover of republican administrative offices in the city by British and Dutch forces.¹⁰⁰ This violent Indonesian reaction caused the Allies to arrest the West Sumatra resident Mr. Rasjid, and the head of the Padang police, Johnny Anwar, releasing them only in response to the protests of Deputy Governor Djamil.¹⁰¹ From the middle of March British forces in Padang had consisted of only one small brigade, and their military position, particularly around the airfield and the port of Teluk Bajur, was extremely tenuous.¹⁰² However, the Indone-

96. Ibid., p. 321.

97. Ismael Lengah replaced Djambek, who was promoted to head Subcommand II (Nasution, TNI, I, p. 327). There was a reorganization within the Banteng division during 1946. The headquarters of Regiment II was moved from Sawah Lunto to Sungai Penuh, later under command of Lt. Col. Thalib who replaced Dahlan Ibrahim who now became the Banteng division chief of staff. Its responsibility was for the southern front, with battalions at Sungai Penuh and Painan. The headquarters of Regiment III was moved from Lubuk Alung to Solok, under Lt. Col. A. Husein, with responsibility for the eastern front. Its battalions were at Indarung, Bukit Kompong and Pajakumbuh. Regiment I maintained its headquarters at Bukittinggi, with responsibility for the northern front. It was now under A. Halim, as Sjarif Usman had been named to a staff position with the central command. Its battalions were at Bukittinggi, Padang Pandjang and Pariaman. A battalion "Teras" was formed from elements of the lasjkar rakjat around Padang and it became Battalion 4 of Regiment III (East) under command of Maj. Sjuib in November 1946. Ibid., p. 323; PST, pp. 564, 568; Tokoh² Parlemen, p. 188; Simbolon, Report, p. 162.

98. PST, p. 569.

99. The first two months of 1946 were relatively quiet in Padang, so some of the Allied forces were transferred to Palembang. On a visit to Sumatra in April 1946, Adm. Mountbatten ordered all SEAC forces to be withdrawn as soon as Allied prisoners of war and the remaining Japanese could be evacuated. It was estimated that this would take about two months, with authority to be transferred to the Dutch in both Java and Sumatra by July 1. (Mountbatten, Post Surrender, pp. 300, 309.) The transfer, however, took over four months longer.

100. Raliby, Documenta, p. 367.

101. PST, pp. 133-34. According to Raliby (Documenta, p. 370), they were released on August 9 after several days' detention.

102. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 322. He states that the airfield was pock-marked by fire from Indonesian arms, and that both it and the port could have been overrun had

sian attacks were apparently generally spontaneous and uncoordinated, being launched largely by the non-TNI forces, with the exception of one major battle in Padang at the end of August, led by Dahlan Djambek.¹⁰³

In response to the takeover of the Padang administration offices by the Dutch, most of the remaining leaders of the residency administration, together with their offices were withdrawn to Kajutanam and Bukittinggi. A republican presence was, however, maintained in the town, with Aziz Chan assuming the post of mayor in the middle of August.¹⁰⁴ At the beginning of September the Allies announced that SEAC forces would finally be withdrawn from Indonesia by November 30 and that authority would be handed over to the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.¹⁰⁵

The month following the initialling of the Linggadjati Agreement on November 15, a central government delegation consisting of Amir Sjarifuddin, A. K. Gani and Lt. Gen. Oerip Soemohardjo came to West Sumatra to work out its implementation there.¹⁰⁶ A series of meetings were held from December 11 to 31, between this delegation, West Sumatra military and civilian leaders, and representatives from the Dutch side, concerning the modalities of a cease-fire and establishment of a demarcation line between Dutch and Indonesian forces. Major disagreement arose over the issue of Dutch refusal to return Indonesian prisoners, and over the Indonesian insistence on maintaining a republican town administration in Padang supported by a sizeable Indonesian police force to maintain security.¹⁰⁷ Negotiations broke down over these issues on December 31, and hostilities were briefly resumed, but agreement was finally reached in the middle of January with the Dutch accepting the presence of 500 armed republican police within the town. From this point relations between the Dutch and the residency administration appear to have improved, with many elements of the government together with armed police returning from Bukittinggi to Padang by April.¹⁰⁸

However, there was evident dissatisfaction in West Sumatra with the local and national leadership and the compromises they were reaching

there been an organized attack by the combined lasjkar and TRI forces. After the departure of the 71 Indian Brigade and 1 Lincolns, the main SEAC force in Padang until August appears to have been the 8/8 Punjab Regiment. Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, pp. 243-44.

103. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 323; PST, pp. 136-37. With his assumption of command of the Banteng division Ismael Lengah attempted to coordinate and direct the scattered attacks. Some had clearly been directed against the Chinese community which had formed a Barisan Poh An Tui to safeguard its security (PST, p. 138). It appears that the Poh An Tui had been formed in Padang during the early spring of 1946. Nefis Publicatie no. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289 in IC-RVO, p. 28.

104. PST, pp. 132-35.

105. Ibid., p. 137.

106. Ibid., p. 139. Mansoer, Sedjarah, p. 240. On interpretations of the Linggadjati Agreement see Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 28-34.

107. PST, pp. 144-46.

108. Ibid., pp. 150-51. Cease-fire lines were only finally agreed on in May.

with the Dutch. An atmosphere of suspicion apparently grew up in the early months of 1947, with charges launched that leading members of the residency were acting as *anjing NICA*.¹⁰⁹ At the beginning of March while a stormy KNIP was meeting at Malang, with a number of the West Sumatran leaders present,¹¹⁰ and was finally agreeing to ratify the Linggadjati Agreement, a group calling itself the Pembanteras Anti Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PAKI) launched an attempted coup in Bukittinggi.

This action, which became known as the March 3 Affair, aimed at kidnapping the West Sumatra resident and Banteng division commander; but the attacks on both their residences were repelled by guards. The PAKI did, however, succeed in kidnapping Eni Karim, A. Gaffar Djambek and Anwar St. Saidi,¹¹¹ together with several other members of the administration and armed forces, and in the attacks one government soldier was killed and one of the attackers wounded. The government reasserted control the following day, freeing the prisoners and arresting the PAKI leaders. Principal among these were Saalah Jusuf St. Mangkuto and Dt. Radjo Mangkuto, and the group included elements from the Hizbullah and Sabilillah forces, as well as some young members of the Sumatra Military Command Secretariat.¹¹²

109. Mansoer, *Sedjarah*, p. 243. Hamka, *Kenang-kenangan*, p. 338. He writes: "Members of the administration accused party leaders of being NICA. Party leaders accused government officials of being NICA. Mr. Rasjid, NICA; Ismael Lengah, Divisional Commander, NICA. Aziz Chan who had become Mayor of Padang, which was occupied by the Dutch military, NICA; Johnny Anwar, Head of Padang police, because his father was formerly a Demang, NICA. And those who made these accusations were themselves accused by others as NICA."

110. There was a total delegation from Sumatra of 50, which included 15 representatives from West Sumatra. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, p. 97; *PST*, p. 388. The five Sumatran delegates elected at Malang to the KNIP working committee on March 3 were I. Tedjasukmana (PSI), Zainal Baharudin (PSI), Luat Siregar (PKI), Njonja Rasuna Said, and Zainal Abidin Achman. Kahin, *Nationalism*, pp. 205-6. (Rasuna Said had been a member of the women's branch of Permi in the 1930s, Abdullah, *Schools and Politics*, pp. 194, 196-98.)

111. *PST*, p. 148; Mansoer, *Sedjarah*, p. 244; Hamka, *Kenang-kenangan*, p. 343. Eni Karim was a member of the residency secretariat; A. Gaffar Djambek was bupati of Pajakumbuh and a leading member of the KNI, and Anwar St. Saidi a former director of the National Bank in Bukittinggi and a member of the KNI.

112. Amongst others arrested in the affair Hamka names: Guru Adam, BB; Sjamsuddin Ahmad; Hadji Marusin; Kapten Anwar; Sersan Mayor Julius (military police); Saibi Ismail; Burhanuddin St. Larangan; Tarok; a military policeman from Pajakumbuh; and Harun Rajo Sampono, a member of the PKI from Silungkang. *Ibid.*, pp. 339, 363. S. J. Sutan Mangkuto, who is referred to in all accounts as a former bupati of Solok, was a leading member of the Muhammadiyah in the 1920s and 1930s, and of the KNI Sumatera Barat since its formation. He must therefore have been a member of the Hōkōkai during the Japanese period. On the importance of his role during the 1920s and 1930s see Abdullah, *Schools and Politics*, pp. 60, 66, 84-85, 90-95. Datu Radjo Mangkuto was a member of the BPPI in Padang at the end of August 1945, and had led efforts to merge this group with the PRI. Sjamsuddin Ahmad was one of the founders of the Hizbullah in 1945, and was commander of its Central Sumatra division in February 1946. (*PST*, pp. 553-54.) Captain Anwar was possibly the Muhammad Anwar who commanded Regiment IV of this division. H. Marusin appears later in Hamka's memoirs as a member of a dissatisfied Hizbullah group in a village outside of Padang Pandjang during the second Dutch action. (Hamka, *Kenang-kenangan*, p. 409.) I have been unable to find references to the others.

This affair raised alarm particularly amongst the Masjumi and army leaders. It may also have reinforced the disposition of Sumatra leaders to follow the initiative launched on Java to bring military elements outside of the TNI into its official structure.¹¹³ Early news reaching the KNIP in Malang on the incident reported that it had been the West Sumatra Masjumi leadership which had initiated the coup, so that Natsir immediately ordered Masjumi leaders Marzuki Jatim, A. R. St. Mansur (head of the Hizbullah) and Udin back to Bukittinggi to investigate, and himself led a delegation to the area on March 23.¹¹⁴ Despite, or because of, this concern there seems to have been considerable understanding of the motives of the PAKI, and because the investigation dragged out into the summer the leaders' misgivings regarding Linggadjati appeared borne out by the first Dutch "police action" launched on July 21. When they were finally sentenced at the end of August, only Dt. Radjo Mangkuto was sent to jail for a year, with the other receiving either suspended sentences or being freed directly.¹¹⁵

Attempts to Unify Sumatran Resistance: 1947

Whatever impetus they received from the March 3 Affair, there were major attempts on Sumatra beginning in the spring of 1947 to establish unified organizations--both military and civilian--which would incorporate the disparate groups and parties that had proliferated since the latter part of 1945. It appears clear that the prime mission of Vice-President Hatta during his extended stay in Sumatra beginning in June of that year, was to unify the diverse anti-Dutch movements on the island, and to bring the struggle in Sumatra as a whole in line with the policies of the republican government on Java. Although these unification steps began during the spring, it was the first Dutch "police action" of July 21 which provided the needed stimulus for the local groups themselves to cooperate with the government and army leadership towards such an end.

In their attack the Dutch employed smaller forces on Sumatra than on Java,¹¹⁶ and in West Sumatra it was their Brigade U which moved out from Padang attacking along the three main roads to the north, east and south of the city.¹¹⁷ All these operations were either notably limited

113. A decision had already been reached on November 26, 1946, between the Hizbullah and Sabilillah to unify their forces. PST, p. 560.


114. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 338-39. They decided that the Masjumi leadership had not initiated the affair. Natsir's stated opinion of the attempted coup was that it was a mixture of good and bad. PST, p. 149.




115. Hamka was appointed to defend all the accused leaders. Their trial was to have begun on July 17, but Hamka gained a postponement because the fasting month was to start on July 20. The defendants were on bail until their trial at the end of August. Hamka's account of the affair is found in Kenang-kenangan, pp. 338-45, 362-69.

116. Three Dutch brigades were employed on Sumatra as opposed to three divisions on Java. (Nasution, TNI, II [Djakarta: Seruling Masa, 1968], p. 89.) Brigade Z attacked from Medan, and Brigade Y from Palembang. (*Ibid.*, p. 90.) See also Charles Wolf, The Indonesian Story (New York: The John Day Co., 1948), p. 132.


117. Two days before the attack the mayor of Padang, Aziz Chan, was killed, apparently by the Dutch, though they blamed an Indonesian "extremist group." It is

RESULTS OF THE FIRST DUTCH MILITARY ACTION



-  Territory controlled by the Dutch before July 21, 1947.
-  Territory occupied by the Dutch after the first military action (July 21, 1947).
-  Territory held by the Republic up to the second military action (December 18, 1948).

THE WEST SUMATRA RESIDENCY



or unsuccessful. The Dutch advanced furthest on the northern front, where they were initially halted about forty kilometers from the city and finally retired to establish positions at Lubuk Alung, 23 kilometers north of Padang. On the eastern front they advanced only as far as Indarung (retreating by the end of the month to Padang's eastern boundaries), and to the south they were stopped short of Siguntur Tua, both towns within fifteen kilometers of Padang.¹¹⁸

It is possible that the Dutch command did not employ as large a force in West Sumatra as it did in East and South, and that its aim there was merely to secure control over the Padang plain.¹¹⁹ The lack of economic prizes, such as the plantation area around Medan and the oil fields near Palembang, that could be gained by a wider occupation would argue for this. Clearly, the geography of the area played a role in their limited advance, with the Dutch forces being halted as soon as they approached the mountains, this probably accounting for the greater extent of their progress to the north.¹²⁰ Whatever the reasons, the fact that after this action the Dutch occupation forces were still confined to an area of about 15 kilometers around the town of Padang, and particularly that all other towns, notably Bukittinggi, remained in republican hands, must have had an effect on the attitudes of the people of West Sumatra. These feelings would have been accentuated by the fact that the Dutch forces in North Sumatra had occupied Pematang Siantar, until then capital of the Sumatran administration. This forced Governor Hasan and his chief officials to evacuate to Bukittinggi where they established the Sumatran capital on August 6. With Vice-President Hatta's presence there from just after the Dutch attack, Bukittinggi came to be termed, at least among the Minangkabau, "the second capital" of Indonesia.¹²¹

An agreement had apparently been reached between Sukarno and Hatta in the spring of 1947 whereby there was a separation of command, with

unclear whether this had any connection with their imminent attack. See Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 347-49; Sumatera Tengah Special Number August 10, 1954, pp. 34-35, 37; PST, pp. 155-56.

118. Ibid., pp. 575-76; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 246-47; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 351. Hamka, who emphasizes the gains of the Dutch in the face of the disunity and retreat of the Indonesian forces, appears to agree with the extent of the advance, but observes that to the east the Dutch were not far from Solok, and to the south not far from Tarusan. Siguntur Tua is not marked on Map 3, but it is north of Kota Sungeipinang, against which the Dutch launched an unsuccessful attack. For a comparison with their advances elsewhere in Sumatra and Java, see Map 2.
119. However, I have seen no indication that the Dutch U Brigade was smaller than Y or Z. It is also clear that they were hoping to occupy Bukittinggi and Solok. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 351.
120. Because of the vulnerability and breadth of this northern front, TNI forces there were augmented by three battalions of the Legium Sjahid in early 1948 (see below, p. 102). Its headquarters was at Padang Pandjang. The region around Pariaman came under command of the navy. PST, pp. 575-76.
121. From the Isana in Bukittinggi Hatta directed both the military and political affairs of Sumatra, through constant meetings with the governor and panglima of Sumatra. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 373.

Sukarno to lead the struggle on Java and Hatta that on Sumatra.¹²² From June 10 when he arrived in Medan Hatta had been exhorting Sumatran leaders on the need for unity in their common struggle against the Dutch, and immediately after the Dutch attack he encouraged formation of a Front Pertahanan Nasional (national Defense Front), incorporating the diverse military and civilian organizations on the island. This body was to work closely with the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah established a year previously. Both civilian and military leaders were present at a meeting in Bukittinggi on July 29 in which a total of 56 groups agreed to join together into the front under the leadership of Hamka, and with Chatib Suleiman as secretary.¹²³ This front was to set up a local defense organization with BPNK (Barisan Pengawal Negeri dan Kota), which was to mobilize all young men between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five.¹²⁴

At the same time moves were underway to implement the President's May 5 order that all lasjkar groups should be incorporated into the TNI.¹²⁵ The first step toward that objective was the creation on July 1 of a Dewan Kelasjkan Sumatera Tengah under Col. Sjarif Usman.¹²⁶ In August the lasjkar groups were consolidated into a Legiun Sjahid, again under Sjarif Usman.¹²⁷ The following month Hatta named the Hizbullah commander, A. R. St. Mansur, as titular major general in charge of steps to incorporate this force into the TNI, and in November its name was changed to TNI Resimen Istimewa Komandemen Sumatera, this regiment being fused into Division IX Banteng on February 2 of 1948.¹²⁸ These moves, however, raised resentment among the lasjkar forces, many of whom sent demands and requests for a degree of autonomy to the Sumatran panglima. After discussions with Division IX, they were allowed to form three battalions, but not their own regiment within the division. Particularly difficult for the lasjkar groups to accept was the replace-

122. Ibid., p. 353; PST, p. 157; Kami Perkenalkan, p. 43; Wolf states that "At the mountain stronghold of Bukit Tinggi in the Menangkabau area of West Sumatra Vice-President Hatta was commissioned by the Indonesian Cabinet and the KNIP to set up a new capital in the event of an attack on Djokja. Hatta himself was delegated to assume formal leadership of both the civil government and the armed forces in case President Soekarno and Prime Minister Sjarifoeddin should be unable to leave Djokja." Indonesia Story, pp. 139-40.

123. The 56 component groups included the Masjumi, Partai Sosialis, PNI, PKI, Pesindo, Perti, Muhammadiyah, PSII, MTKAAM, Barisan Hizbullah and Barisan Sabilillah. Other leaders were Karim Halim, Rasuna Said, and Udin. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 359-60.

124. PST, p. 158.

125. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 83.

126. Former commander of Regiment I of the Banteng division. Its deputy head was Agus Salim Murai (commander of Hizbullah), its secretary Anwar Mulin (commander of Sabilillah), and its members Sofjan Siradj (commander of Lasjmi), Gazali Ismy (commander of Barisan Hulubalang), and Rasroel (commander of Kesatria Pesindo). PST, p. 154.

127. This included the Hizbullah, Lasjmi, Barisan GPII, Sabilillah, Barisan Merah, Sjaifullah, Tentera Allah, Barisan Hulubalang, Barisan Istimewa and others. Ibid., p. 577.

128. On the formation of the Resimen Istimewa see ibid., pp. 161, 577-78; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 250-51; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 376-77.

ment of most of their officers by TNI commanders from the Banteng division.¹²⁹

After this incorporation the Banteng division consisted of six regiments, for in August Hasan Basri's Regiment IV in Riau had been re-organized into two regiments. Basri continued to command Regiment IV and Regiment V was under Major Toha Hanafi. The new Regiment VI was commanded by Major Kemal Mustafa, and it assisted Regiment I on the northern front.¹³⁰

Whatever chance existed of an actual integration of the military and political forces on Sumatra disappeared in early 1948. By that time the TNI's heavy-handed approach had already alienated many of the lasjkar groups. But it was the Renville Agreement and the departure of Hatta to Java,¹³¹ which led to the fragmentation of the FPN. The Renville Agreement again brought to the surface the dissension between many of the FPN's component groups with regard to the path being pursued by the central government, and during the first months of 1948 the organization was no longer pretending to the function of unifying the struggle in West Sumatra. The individual parties increased in strength, drawing away many of the leaders from a body which no longer represented their views.¹³² The only role which the FPN retained was its assignment to conduct the prebiscite in the Dutch-occupied regions around Padang, as stipulated in the Renville Agreement. The disaffected members of the lasjkar groups withdrew from the TNI, returning to their homes, with many of them joining the local security forces of the BPNK or reforming their old units.¹³³

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129. PST, pp. 477-78. Another reason for dissatisfaction could well have been the distribution of arms which was on the ratio of 1:4 to the number of soldiers. Apparently the Mizbullah in particular had previously been well equipped with arms because they had been able to capture many during the time of the British occupation. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 377.
130. Regiments I, II and III were still under A. Halim, Thalib and A. Husein. See above footnote 97. The TNI commands on Sumatra at the time were Division VIII, South Sumatra; Division IX, Central Sumatra; and Division X, Atjeh and East Sumatra, with several autonomous brigades. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 158.
131. After leaving the "Renville" on January 9, 1948, Sjarifuddin went first to Singapore to consult with Sjahrir, and then proceeded to Bukittinggi. He and Hatta traveled on to Java for discussions with the government concerning the Dutch demands that appeared to them to be an ultimatum. After the fall of the Sjarifuddin cabinet on January 23 as a result of the Renville Agreement, Hatta was appointed to lead the new government. Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 88-90; Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 231-32; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 378.
132. Ibid., pp. 386-88. According to him the communists and some socialists joined Sjarifuddin's Front Demokrasi Ra'ayat. The Masjumi strengthened its organization. The opposition to Sjarifuddin in the socialist group followed Sjahrir into his Partai Sosialis Indonesia. Amongst the leaders of the FPN who joined this latter party were Chatib Suleiman, Juir Muhammad and several Pesindo pemuda. Both Sjarifuddin and Sjahrir accompanied Hatta on a trip to Bukittinggi on February 5. PST, p. 164.
133. Ibid., p. 579. According to Nasution, there were reports from the Sumatra command of former lasjkar groups in West Sumatra, Tapanuli, and Atjeh attacking and disarming TNI units in these regions. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 235.

Rationalization and Decentralization

The Renville Agreement, apart from the dissatisfaction it caused the central republican leadership, did not have as great an impact on Sumatra as it did on Java. Dutch authority remained limited to an area of only about one-fifth of the island, control being most extensive on the east and southeastern coasts, with only a pocket around Padang.¹³⁴ Thus, at least in West Sumatra, there was no need for any substantial withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the Dutch-occupied territory.¹³⁵

On taking over control of the central government, Hatta inaugurated a basic reorganization of both military and civilian affairs aimed at achieving greater coherence of the republican forces in the more limited areas they now controlled. He attempted to carry out policies of rationalization and reconstruction of the armed forces, and decentralization of the civilian administrative organization.

In the military field, the aim of rationalization was to streamline the army structure by massive demobilization, and to create "'mobile offensive systems' of shifting pockets" of highly trained, more fully armed regular forces, supported by territorial militias.¹³⁶ In Sumatra Nasution envisaged four subterritories (corresponding to the four projected autonomous administrative regions), South Sumatra, Central Sumatra, Tapanuli-East Sumatra, and Atjeh. Each of these subterritories would have an infantry brigade made up of several mobile battalions, and territorial units distributed amongst the kabupaten.¹³⁷

To convey these instructions, Nasution accompanied Hatta to West Sumatra in April 1948. Their plans were coldly received by the Sumatran panglima, with Major General Suhardjo stating that the commanders who had been fighting in their own regions would not be willing to be moved nor their units to be reorganized. The army in Sumatra, he stated, was essentially an army dependent on the local population, and in those circumstances the government on Java was in no position to impose its wishes.¹³⁸ It was thus not until November when Colonel Hidajat was sent to replace Major General Suhardjo as PPTS (Panglima Tentara dan Territorium Sumatera) that any effort was made to implement the rationalization orders for Sumatra.¹³⁹ It was possibly because of this delay that there appear to have been no echoes of the Madiun rebellion in West Sumatra.¹⁴⁰ Immediately after the rebellion Sumatran

134. Of the three Dutch brigades on Sumatra, Brigade Y controlled the residency of Palembang, U Padang and its surroundings, and Z East Sumatra, with an additional force at Tandjung Pinang for the islands of Bangka, Belitung and Riau. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

135. This contrasted with the situation in East Sumatra, where the republican forces had to retreat into Tapanuli from the plantation area around Medan. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, p. 134.

136. Kahin, *Nationalism*, p. 263.

137. Nasution, *TNI*, II, p. 158.

138. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

139. After taking over command, Col. Hidajat sent Lt. Col. Askari to Atjeh, Maj. Akil to Riau, Lt. Col. Kawilarang to Tapanuli, and Maj. S. Tjakradipura to West Sumatra. *Ibid.*, pp. 159, 256.

140. There was clearly suspicion that the armed clashes between TNI and lasjkar

branches of the PKI met with the governor to state their firm support of the republican government.¹⁴¹

Shortly after Suhardjo was transferred to army headquarters in Jogja, Ismael Lengah was also removed from his command to become an instructor at the Jogja Military Academy,¹⁴² his place as head of the Banteng division being taken by Lt. Col. Dahlan Ibrahim, who had been serving as division chief of staff.¹⁴³ The Banteng division was then divided into subterritories, with the Banteng brigade stationed at Bukittinggi responsible for the West Sumatra subterritory, and a unit (undefined) under Hasan Basri for the subterritory of Riau/Indragiri, with headquarters at Pekanbaru.¹⁴⁴ Division IX forces were divided into a territorial section and mobile troops, with the trained soldiers entering the latter group. Colonel Hidayat's attempts at rationalization, however, were only in their preliminary stages when they were overturned by the second Dutch military action of December 19, 1948.

Also during 1948 a basic reorganization of the administrative structure of government on Sumatra was instituted. The province of Sumatra was dissolved under Law No. 10 of April 15, and it was replaced by the provinces of North Sumatra (incorporating the residencies of Atjeh, East Sumatra and Tapanuli), and South Sumatra (incorporating Bengkulu, Palembang, Lampung, and Bangka-Belitung).¹⁴⁵ The deputy

forces in Tapanuli were tied in with the Madiun rebellion. The clashes were between Tapanuli TNI units and regular and lasjkar forces withdrawn from East Sumatra. In a further visit to the area at the beginning of December Hatta helped bring the clashes to an end, and Kawilarang took over command there, with Ibrahim Adjie as his deputy. The southern part of East Sumatra and Tapanuli became Subterritory VII. See "Pengalaman Gerilja di Sumatera (Tapanuli Utara)" in Madjalah Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, No. 22 (1965), pp. 14-19.

141. Suripno and Musso had stopped over for two days in Bukittinggi on their way to Java. Although the two held meetings in Bukittinggi, the identity of Musso does not seem to have been revealed until after he arrived in Java. PST, p. 166.
142. In April 1948, at the request apparently of Suhardjo, the Siliwangi had agreed to send Lt. Col. Kawilarang and Lt. Col. Daan Jahja (a Minangkabau) to Sumatra. The defense minister had planned that Kawilarang would become brigade commander of Tapanuli/East Sumatra, and Daan Jahja head of the operations staff of the Sumatra command. However, Ismael Lengah had already been appointed by Suhardjo to the latter position, his appointment being confirmed by the panglima besar. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 159. It was possibly because of this that Ismael Lengah was removed to Java after Hidayat's assumption of command. His transfer took place on December 3. Iwa Kusuma Sumantri implies that it was a matter of personal dislike on Hatta's side. Sedjarah Revolusi, II, p. 191.
143. PST, p. 582; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 404.
144. The head of the Banteng brigade, Dahlan Ibrahim, had A. Halim as his chief of staff. Regiments IV and V of the Riau command were reformed into three battalions. There does not seem to have been similar reorganization of the West Sumatra regiments. PST, p. 583.
145. Such a division had been advocated by Hatta as early as 1945, see above, n. 34. His view of this appears to have been strengthened by his stay in Sumatra during 1947, for in his report on the situation there after he returned to Jogja he

governor of Central Sumatra, Mr. Nasrun, was appointed governor of the new province.¹⁴⁶ The Dewan Perwakilan Sumatera was replaced by a Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat in each of the three provinces.¹⁴⁷

The Republic of Indonesia Law No. 22 of August 1948 envisaged a greater degree of decentralization for Indonesia, with considerable autonomy being assumed by local administrative units. It laid out three levels of local government: the province, the kabupaten and the desa, which were "to become 'self-governing regions' (*daerah swatantra*) possessing wide powers of autonomy over their own affairs."¹⁴⁸

This law was welcomed in Central Sumatra, with the DPR on September 30 appointing a committee to speed moves toward decentralization.¹⁴⁹ The Decentralization Committee proposed that the three residencies of Central Sumatra be replaced by eleven kabupaten made up of 118 wilajah (which corresponded to the desa level envisaged in the central government law).¹⁵⁰ Until new elections could be held, the DPR for the

stated: "In the two years after the proclamation the Central Government seemed to neglect Sumatra and many powers were given to the Governor, so that he became the so-called small President (his position is considered higher than that of a minister). However in practice the Governor of Sumatra is only the Governor of Pematang Siantar, because of the lack of communication with the Residents. The Residents continue to function like their predecessors in the Japanese period. The position of the Sub-Governor is not clear. The regencies have been established, but nobody knows what their duties are." English translation made available to the Committee of Good Offices of an "Outline of Vice President's Statement on the Situation in Sumatra" at a meeting in Jogjakarta, January 17, 1948.

146. Mr. Djamil had been appointed to head a Committee on Higher Education on April 29, 1947, when Mr. Nasrun had replaced him as deputy governor of Central Sumatra. PST, p. 151.
147. Members from West Sumatra in this body were H. Iljas Jacob (Masjumi), Marzoeqi Jatim (Masjumi), Sultani St. Malaka (Murba), A. Gaffar Djambek (no party), Saadoeddin Djambek (n.p.), Usman Keadilan (PKI), Anwar St. Saidi (n.p.), Dt. Simaradjo (MTKAAM), S. J. St. Mangkuto (Masjumi), Ahmad Sjuib (Murba), Abdullah (Murba), Bachtaroeddin (PKI), R. S. Suriapradja (PKI), Zainal Zainur (Pemuda), Dr. A. Rahim Usman (Partai Sosialis), Damanhoeri Djamil (PSII), Tan Tuah Bagindo Ratu (PBI), H. Siradjudin Abbas (Perti), Chatib Suleiman (SPI), and H. Mahmud Janus (n.p.). Members of the first executive were Dt. Mangku (PKI) from Riau, Dr. Sjagaf Jahja (PBI) from Djambi, and A. Rahim Usman, S. J. St. Mangkuto, and Abdullah from West Sumatra. H. Iljas Jacob headed the body. Ibid., p. 394.
148. John D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 28. He examines the law on pp. 28-40.
149. PST, pp. 347-48.
150. There would be five kabupaten formed in West Sumatra, four in Riau, and two in Djambi, with correspondingly 76, 28, and 14 wilajah. The former seven kabupaten of West Sumatra would become: (1) Singgalang Pasaman (formerly Agam) with its capital at Bukittinggi (16 wilajah); (2) Sinamar (formerly Limapuluh Kota), capital at Pajakumbuh (14 wilajah); (3) Talang (Tanah Datar), capital at Solok (19 wilajah); (4) Samudera (Padang Pariaman), capital at Pariaman (17 wilajah); (5) Pesisir Selatan and Kerintji (Balai Selasa), capital at Sungai Penuh (10 wilajah). Details of the proposals can be found in ibid., pp. 346-60, 363-66.

wilajah of West Sumatra would consist of the members of the DPN set up two years previously.¹⁵¹ This proposal was accepted by the government of Central Sumatra, and on November 30 it ordered that the reorganization be carried out by the end of December.¹⁵² The second Dutch military action of December 21, however, brought those plans to a halt, and compelled the governor to revive the residencies of Djambi, Riau and West Sumatra.

Impact of the Second Dutch Action

The character and scope of the second Dutch "police action" in Sumatra, which was launched at dawn on December 19, 1948, far exceeded that of the offensive eighteen months previously. Again Dutch troops moved out from Padang to the north, east and south, but this time they apparently commanded much greater forces and firepower, mounting amphibious landings and large-scale bombing and artillery attacks. To the north their forces divided at Lubuk Alung, with one group moving up the coast to Pariaman, and the other pressing on to Padang Pandjang, and from there to Bukittinggi. From Bukittinggi they launched offensives against the republican forces which finally set up their northern front subcommand at Matur. To the east, the Dutch coordinated infantry attacks with an amphibious landing on Lake Singkarak from where they advanced to occupy Solok on December 20. To the south they moved more slowly, launching their main assault on January 6 after landing troops at Painan. Throughout the spring they extended their control, making further landings down the coast and advancing into the interior.¹⁵³

By early 1949 they had occupied most of the towns and major villages of West Sumatra, and from these outposts dispatched units to patrol the surrounding countryside and attack suspect villages. During the Dutch advance the republican forces appear to have put up little resistance, in general evacuating the towns as the Dutch approached, and retreating, sometimes in disorder, to more defensible positions chiefly in the foothills and on the mountain slopes.

The shock of the Dutch attack, particularly the bombing of Bukittinggi and other towns, seems to have thrown the Indonesians into complete disorder. A group from the central government, including the Republican Minister of Economic Affairs, Sjafriddin Prawiranegara, was gathered in Bukittinggi from December 18 together with local military and civilian leaders, awaiting the arrival of Sukarno's plane which was scheduled to stop over there on its way to India.¹⁵⁴ Panic seems to have been widespread as news arrived of the fall of Jogjakarta and ultimately of the arrests of Sukarno and Hatta and others of the republican leadership.¹⁵⁵ In a series of hurried meetings Sjafruddin arranged to

151. See above, p. 94.

152. PST, p. 359.

153. Ibid., pp. 169-70, 585-91; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 254-57.

154. PST, p. 169; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 403. Hamka writes that when they heard the sound of a plane they thought it was carrying Sukarno, only to discover that it was the beginning of the Dutch attack.

155. Ibid., pp. 403-404. The Propinsi states that before withdrawing from Bukittinggi, the Banteng division issued a bulletin that the presidential party had arrived safely in India, "which even though it was not true, had a great influence in dispelling the panic caused by the Dutch broadcasts concerning the arrests of Sukarno-Hatta." PST, p. 169.

set up and lead a Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia (PDRI)¹⁵⁶ which was proclaimed on December 22 after official news was received of the arrests on Java. By this time members of the Emergency Government had evacuated to a "place in Sumatra."¹⁵⁷ Shortly before the arrival of the Dutch forces the West Sumatran leadership had also retired to establish themselves in Kototinggi.¹⁵⁸

The disorder in the armed forces was doubtlessly largely the result of the scale of the Dutch operations, and the widespread use of tanks, bombing, strafing and artillery in their advance. In addition, however, it was apparently the strategy of the new Sumatran commander, Colonel Hidajat, not to engage the Dutch directly but to withdraw and prepare for guerrilla warfare. As this retreat followed so closely on Colonel Hidajat's assumption of command, and the transfer of Suhardjo and Lengah, it can have done little to enhance the position of the new commander.¹⁵⁹ There was apparently considerable dissatisfaction with the policy, particularly among the younger members of the former independent units.¹⁶⁰ The fact that Hamka reports Dahlan Djambek, one of the highest-ranking of the early local commanders, as being the last person to leave Bukittinggi, suggests that there may have been disagreement even among the upper echelons of the Banteng command with regard to the policy being pursued by Hidajat.¹⁶¹

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156. Sjafruddin had accompanied Hatta to Sumatra earlier in the year to organize a revolutionary leadership there that could function in case the Dutch attacked Jogja. (Interview, February 21, 1971.) Apart from this general mandate from Hatta, he apparently did not receive specific instructions from Java at the time of the Dutch attack. (See Kahin, Nationalism, p. 392; Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 154.) Members of the Emergency Government were Sjafruddin, Mr. A. A. Maramis, Mr. Teuku Moh. Hasan, Mr. Lukman Hakim, Mr. S. Md Rasjid, Ir. Sitompul, and Ir. Inderatjaja. PST, pp. 170-71.
157. Ibid. The seat of the PDRI moved principally between Muara Labuh and Sungai Dareh. Ibid., p. 589.
158. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 414; PST, p. 171.
159. Reid writes: "Another competent young Dutch-trained officer from Java, Colonel Hidajat, had earlier taken overall command of Sumatra from the ageing and ineffective General Suhardjo." Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 151. But it seems unlikely that the local commanders in West Sumatra viewed the changeover in this light. The Sumatran command headquarters divided into sections with several of them in pockets between Padang Sidempuan and Bukittinggi. Hidajat, however, left West Sumatra almost immediately for Atjeh and appears to have spent most of his time at Kota Radja. Nasution, TNI, III (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971), pp. 41-42.
160. Hamka reports a confrontation between members of the Hizbullah and Maj. Kemal Mustafa (deputy commander of Subcommand A [see n. 162 below]) at a small village outside of Padang Pandjang, where they accused him of cowardice and neglect of duty, and urged immediate attacks on the Dutch positions in Padang Pandjang. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 409-412. Hamka also recalls that immediately before the Dutch attacked Padang Pandjang they gathered there with several others to listen to Tan Malaka's speech from Kediri. Ibid., p. 405.
161. According to Hamka, Djambek destroyed the radio station before he left, and later personally led attacks on Dutch forces in Bukittinggi from his positions just outside the city. Ibid., pp. 420, 428-29.

After the initial trauma of the retreat when communications were broken between most of the armed units, the command structure was slowly built up, but it was now essentially both flexible and mobile. Dahlan Djambek soon replaced Lt. Col. M. Dahlan Ibrahim as head of the Banteng command, and he was also principally responsible for military operations in the regions of Agam and Lima Puluh Kota, with Major Thalib as his chief of staff. Under the central command there were three subcommands, corresponding to the earlier north, east and south fronts, but with their headquarters usually far into the mountains.¹⁶²

The leadership of West Sumatra sustained severe blows during the early part of 1949. A few days after they had set up their headquarters in Kototinggi, the Dutch overran the village on January 10, inflicting considerable damage though not finding the transmitter by which Rasjid maintained contact with the Sjafruddin government.¹⁶³ More disastrous was the incident at Situdjuh Batur, where a meeting had been arranged for January 14 between many of the top West Sumatra leaders to attempt to work out a strategy for confronting the drastically changed situation in the region. Many of the participants had traveled long distances on foot to reach the small village at the foot of Mt. Sigung, about twelve kilometers from the Dutch outpost at the town of Pajakumbuh. The Dutch, however, had obtained intelligence of the meeting, and they attacked the village before dawn on the 15th, killing 49 of the participants, including Chatib Suleiman.¹⁶⁴

* * *

Immediately following the launching of the Dutch attack on December 19, the Sumatran leaders then meeting in Bukittinggi had decided to dissolve the province of Central Sumatra and its government. Power was to be transferred to the residency level, where the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah (DPD) was given full authority to lead the military and civil administration. The current Central Sumatra governor, Nasrun, was to

162. Subcommand A (formerly Regiments I and VI) which covered the northern front and which had retreated to Matur, was commanded by Lt. Col. A. Halim, supported by Maj. Kemal Mustafa. On the eastern front after the Dutch occupied Solok, Subcommand B (former Regiment III) divided, with one section under Dep. Cmdr. Anwar Badu at Sidjundjung, and Cmdr. A. Husein at Alahan Pandjang. When the Dutch overran both these towns, the headquarters was transferred to Muara Labuh, until it too was occupied by the Dutch in April, after which it was mobile. Fighting in this region continued until August 1949. Subcommand C (on the southern front, formerly Regiment II) was now under the command of Maj. Alwi St. Maradjo. Its former commander Maj. Thalib had been put in charge of personnel and organization in the Banteng central command during the 1948 rationalization, and in 1949 was Djambek's chief of staff. This subcommand established its headquarters at Sungei Penuh on December 24; after the Dutch attacked there on April 22, its headquarters moved several times until the fighting ceased in September. PST, pp. 582-90.

163. Ibid., p. 191; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 416, 420.

164. Among the others killed were Bupati Arisun St. Alamsjah of Lima Puluh Kota, Capt. Zainuddin and Maj. Munir Latif. Lt. Col. Dahlan Ibrahim and Lt. Col. Thalib managed to escape, though Thalib was wounded. The fullest account of the incident appears in Sumatera Tengah No. 123/4, January 25, 1954, pp. 37-40. Other accounts are in PST, pp. 196-97; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 421, 426; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 262-64.

coordinate these DPD of West Sumatra, Riau and Djambi.¹⁶⁵ The resident was to head the DPD with his deputy to be appointed by the military commander of the region. Thus in West Sumatra, S. Mohd. Rasjid headed the DPD, with Dahlan Ibrahim as his initial deputy.¹⁶⁶ On January 2, 1949, each residency became a military region, with the resident now appointed its military governor.¹⁶⁷ It was stressed that this move was an emergency measure, and most of the bupati and lower officials retained their positions, though they were now classed as "military bupati."¹⁶⁸

At the beginning of May there was a further reorganization whereby West Sumatra and Riau were again joined into the province of Central Sumatra, with Rasjid as its military governor,¹⁶⁹ while the residency of Djambi came under the authority of the South Sumatra military governor.¹⁷⁰ This arrangement continued until the beginning of the following year, when after the transfer of sovereignty the province of Central Sumatra (now also to include Djambi and the Riau archipelago) was reactivated under a civilian government.¹⁷¹ When S. Mohd. Rasjid was transferred to the Local Joint Committee in October of 1949, his place as military governor was taken by Mr. Nasrun, who retained the position of governor after the transfer of sovereignty.¹⁷²

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In the early part of 1949, having occupied all the major towns of West Sumatra, the Dutch made moves towards creating a "Negara Minangkabau" which they hoped would become one of the federated states outside of the republic. As early as December, just after they launched their attack, they had sent contacts to Sjafei, then in hiding in Padang Lawas, inviting him to lead the projected state.¹⁷³ He refused.

Any earlier attempts to detach elements in West Sumatra from the republic had been limited by the fact that Dutch control extended only to the immediate area around Padang. Nevertheless in 1946 they had created in the town a political organization, the Persatuan Umum, with

165. PST, p. 170.

166. Ibid., p. 172. In the West Sumatra DPD the members from the executive were Dr. Ali Akbar and Orangkajo Ganto Suaro, and from the peoples' organizations, Abdullah, Bachtaruddin, and Hadji Siradjuddin Abbas.

167. Ibid., pp. 180-81.

168. Ibid., pp. 181, 196, 204-5. In a few cases, military officers were appointed district heads, particularly on the eastern front, where they led the local administrations for Muara Labuh, Solok, Sawah Lunto and Sulit Air. (Ibid., p. 589.) See also Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, pp. 154-55, where he contrasts the form of military government on Sumatra with that on Java.

169. This was apparently because of uncertain lines of authority, caused by the head of the DPD also being the military governor. Under the new system, the DPD of West Sumatra was headed by Eni Karim and that of Riau by R. M. Utojo (the former military governor). PST, p. 211.

170. Ibid., p. 181.

171. Ibid., p. 229.

172. Ibid., p. 223.

173. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 413.

a military arm, the Serikat Kutjing Hitam.¹⁷⁴ In 1947 the Persatuan Umum formed itself into a Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Barat (DISBA) in Padang,¹⁷⁵ and after the second Dutch military action branches of this organization were set up in other towns, such as Padang Pandjang and Bukittinggi, under the name Balai Permusjawaratan Sementara (BPS).¹⁷⁶

From these organizations grew a movement, weak and short-lived, to create a Negara Minangkabau (Minangkabau State) as part of the impending Federal Republic of Indonesia. The first step was the establishment on March 20, 1949, of a "committee to determine the status of the Minangkabau" which advocated separation from the republic so that West Sumatra would become one of the federated states.¹⁷⁷ Briefly it attracted to its side the former resident, Dt. Perpatih Baringek, who together with Mr. Harun A. Rasjid, broadcast the view that continuation of the struggle would only further hurt the people of West Sumatra, and that in order to achieve independence it was necessary to cooperate with the Dutch.¹⁷⁸ Baringek also organized a meeting in late April to "reach complete unity to face the current situation in the Minangkabau," at which speakers from DISBA were prominent. At this meeting he disclaimed any ambition to head a "Negara Minangkabau."¹⁷⁹

The republican leaders in West Sumatra combatted the movement by sending letters to Bangka and Djakarta, stating that the voices of the DISBA did not represent the Minangkabau people, and demanding that elections be held in those parts of West Sumatra under Dutch control.¹⁸⁰ By June Perpatih Baringek had distanced himself from the DISBA, not appearing at a meeting it held in Padang, and sending a letter stating that the movement was sowing discord.¹⁸¹ Most of its other leaders had accommodated with the republic by the summer, and the BPS branch in Bukittinggi passed a resolution on August 29 recognizing that West Sumatra was part of the republic.¹⁸²

174. PST, pp. 229-30. The Persatuan Umum was headed by Sidi Nan Putih and Arif Lubis. It published a newspaper called Suara Umum. The Serikat Kutjing Hitam was headed by Sidi Sjamsuddin. According to Mansoer, Sedjarah, p. 266, members of the Chinese community of Padang who had formed the "Poh An-tui" defense force in 1946 joined the Persatuan Umum.

175. Waspada, May 9, 1949.

176. PST, pp. 230-31.

177. Waspada, May 24, 1949. This committee consisted of: Dr. Rusma (who resigned on March 23); Amadin glr. Dt. Berbangso; Daud glr. Dt. Bagindo Sati; Zakir glr. St. Maharadjo Lelo; Dr. Iljas Amirudin; Sjahfiri glr. Sutan Pangerang; Adnan, and Bermawi Glr. St. Radja Mas.

178. PST, p. 231. This account and also Merdeka, March 25, 1949, cite these two men as the promoters of the movement.

179. Waspada, May 9, 1949.

180. Waspada, May 24, 1949. They stated their opinion that, while awaiting results of the discussions between the Dutch and the republic, West Sumatra should become a daerah otonomi within the republic.

181. Waspada, June 2, 1949. The journalist contrasted this meeting (with fifteen people present) with a concurrent meeting of the Muhammadiyah attended by 2,000.

182. PST, p. 232.

From then until the transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949 only the area immediately surrounding the town of Padang still remained as a *daerah istimewa*.¹⁸³ In December the resident of Padang surrendered his authority to the governor of Central Sumatra. This de facto control was confirmed in March 1950 when Padang was officially incorporated within the residency of West Sumatra.¹⁸⁴

After the Transfer of Sovereignty

The reconstitution of a civilian-administered province of Central Sumatra, now including the Riau archipelago and Djambi, was completed by the middle of 1950.¹⁸⁵ It was to be headed by a governor who would share authority with a Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Sumatera Tengah, consisting of twenty members from West Sumatra, five from Riau and four from Djambi.¹⁸⁶ Almost immediately it became clear that there was a fundamental conflict between the view of this local administration, particularly its West Sumatra component, and that of the central government over the amount of power to be delegated to the regions making up independent Indonesia. The central republican government, particularly after formation of the unitary state in August 1950, appeared no longer willing to allow any real measure of local autonomy such as had been granted most explicitly in Law No. 22 of 1948. In contrast, decentralization of authority had been an assumption basic to the continuum of political developments in West Sumatra during the revolution, where there had grown up a clear expectation that the region would be largely autonomous in conducting its internal affairs under an overall central administration.

These contrary views found expression in a fundamental conflict between the DPRST (with its executive body, the Dewan Pemerintah Daerah [DPD]) and the central government which was conducted throughout 1950. The dispute focused on the issue of the degree of power possessed by the regional authority with regard to appointment of the governor (*kepala daerah*). In April, the DPR demanded the removal of Governor Nasrun, and submitted names of its own nominees for his replacement.¹⁸⁷

183. There were also daerah istimewa in Riau (particularly the islands) and Djambi. *Ibid.*, pp. 302-3.

184. *Ibid.*, p. 304.

185. The Riau archipelago which had been under Dutch authority during much of the revolution was incorporated into the province of Central Sumatra at the beginning of May 1950. *PST*, pp. 305-6. There were several meetings concerning the status of Djambi during the first half of 1950, for since the second Dutch military action, it had been officially tied to South Sumatra. It was finally, reincorporated into the province of Central Sumatra in the middle of the year. *Ibid.*, pp. 306-8.

186. Most of the membership of this body was the same as in 1948 (see above, p. 108, n. 167). The two changes were that Thaher Samad had taken Chatib Suleiman's place, and H. Rusli A. Wahid replaced H. Siradjudin Abbas who had become a member of parliament. Abdullah was also in Java. H. Iljas Jacob headed the executive (DPD), with Gulmat Siregar as his deputy. (R. S. Suria Pradja and Marzoekei Jatim were acting members.) *PST*, p. 395.

187. It is unclear why the DPR wanted Nasrun's removal, the only reason given being that he had lost the confidence of the people of West Sumatra. The demand was

While his position was being debated Nasrun took a month's leave from office, with the DPD asserting its right to assume his duties in the interim.¹⁸⁸ After considerable delay, the Hatta government finally agreed to Nasrun's removal, recalling him to Djakarta on August 1, 1950.¹⁸⁹

With his departure, the conflict shifted to the selection of his replacement.¹⁹⁰ A decision on this was initially delayed by a change of government in Djakarta, with Natsir replacing Hatta as prime minister of the new unitary government. The Interior Minister, Mr. Assaat, himself a Minangkabau, visited Central Sumatra on September 29 to attempt to reach an agreement, while Deputy Governor, S. J. Sutan Mangkuto, acted as provisional head of the province. Apparently unable to come to a compromise with the regional administration, the Interior Ministry on November 9 appointed Ruslan Muljohardjo as acting governor, ignoring the names put forward by the DPR.¹⁹¹ The DPR refused to accept the government's appointee and resubmitted their own candidates for consideration. Djakarta, however, insisted that Ruslan return as governor to Central Sumatra at the end of December. The deadlock was finally broken only when in Law No. 1 of 1951, which applied exclusively to this province, the Natsir government on January 5 suspended both the DPR and DPD of Central Sumatra.¹⁹² Authority in the province was transferred from these bodies to the governor and a six-man committee appointed by the Interior Ministry on his recommendation. Although it was declared that this committee would be replaced within six months by a new DPR formed in accordance with Law 22 of 1948, this did not

part of many resolutions aimed at greater autonomy for Central Sumatra passed at the third plenary session of the DPRST which was held April 3-12, 1950. Ibid., pp. 395-97.

188. Ibid., pp. 312, 400-402. Contradictory orders regarding who held legitimate authority were issued during this period by the Interior Ministry.

189. Ibid., p. 407.

190. The initial choice for his replacement was H. Iljas Jacob, head of the DPR. He refused to be considered for the post, and during a visit of the Interior Minister Susanto to West Sumatra July 7-11, a list of four candidates for governor was submitted by the DPR. This was in accordance with Paragraph 1, Article 18 of the Law of 1948 which stated: "The Regional Head of a province is appointed by the President from at least two, and at the most four, candidates nominated by the Provincial Representative Council." Legge, Central Authority, p. 256. The names submitted were H. Iljas Jacob, Mr. St. M. Rasjid, Dr. M. Djamil, and Dr. A. Rahim Usman. PST, pp. 403-4.

191. In their official explanation of the selection, the Interior Ministry stated: "To consolidate and develop the administration, it is necessary to have a man who has sufficient general knowledge of government. After we weighed the four candidates from the DPRST we were compelled to go outside of those candidates, on the basis of Paragraph 4, Section 26 of Law No. 22, and in addition Mr. S. M. Rasjid was not willing to become Governor of Central Sumatra." Ibid., p. 417.

192. For a full text of this law, see ibid., pp. 418-20. With the exception of Central Sumatra, the provisional legislatures in the other provinces continued to function until July 1, 1956. G. S. Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia: Legislative Aspects (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957), p. 50.

happen, and the governor and his committee continued as the functioning provincial authority of Central Sumatra.¹⁹³

There were several ironies in this situation, principally that the policy of imposing Djakarta's own choice of governor on Central Sumatra was formulated and implemented by cabinets headed by two prime ministers of Minangkabau origin, Hatta and Natsir. Moreover, Hatta had long been a strong proponent of autonomy for the regions, advocating considerable decentralization of authority. It is also notable that this move was taken against one of the strongest bases of republican power throughout the struggle with the Dutch, rather than against a region with a record of collaboration with the colonial authority.

It is difficult to establish the rights and wrongs of the case. Clearly the local authorities were acting in an intransigent manner vis-à-vis Djakarta. In addition, there are hints that both the opposition to Nasrun and the refusal to accept Muljohardjo may well have been confined to the Minangkabau elements of the Central Sumatran DPR, and there was clearly considerable tension between them and those from other regions represented in the council. It may well have been that Djakarta felt that only by appointing a non-Minangkabau as the governor of Central Sumatra could they minimize the fears of Djambi and Riau that the province would be completely West-Sumatra dominated. At this time also the central government was trying to establish uniform policies for the whole of Indonesia. Acceptance of those policies elsewhere in the country might have been threatened had a Minangkabau prime minister and minister of interior appeared to be yielding to Minangkabau opposition. It is possible too that within his own Masjumi party Natsir did not wish to be called parochial by appearing to indulge in favoritism towards people from his own home area.

Nevertheless, the lack of any representative legislative authority in the province during the early 1950s was a constant source of dissatisfaction and recrimination. This was at least partly held in check by the policies and attitudes of the new governor, Muljohardjo, who, although a Javanese, attempted to reach accommodations with the local leaders and strongly represented his province's economic grievances to Djakarta.

Although many of the broad lines of the independence movement in West Sumatra paralleled those on Java, it would be misleading to view the pattern of the revolution there as a mere copy of the Javanese model. In fact, not only was there little similarity between the events in Sumatra and those in Java, but in Sumatra itself events assumed autonomous and diverse forms within different regions. There were a number of factors responsible for this. Upon the base of Sumatra's considerable ethnic and geographical diversity the Japanese established a decentralized administration. This situation was sustained throughout the revolution, especially during its first months, as a consequence of the republican capital's lack of control over actions pursued by revolutionary leaders on that island. Thus, despite the fact that in 1945 Sumatra was designated as a single province within the new Republic of Indonesia, with a governor responsible for the whole of the island, events in the different regions were in fact largely autonomous of each other, and their direction was determined predominantly by regional rather than provincial factors.

193. A summary of the chronology of the dispute is set out in PST, pp. 421-24.

While West Sumatra's ties with the central government were closer than with the provincial government in Medan, the Minangkabau saw the relationship as one between equal partners in the struggle rather than as one between subordinate and leader. This feeling in part stemmed from the important role of a large number of Minangkabau leaders in the central republican government and was symbolized by the place of a West Sumatran in the Sukarno/Hatta duumvirate at the end of the Indonesian state. This was, however, only part of the dual role which the Minangkabau people saw themselves playing in the revolution. The region of West Sumatra itself they perceived as an area of integral importance to the revolutionary struggle, making a major contribution to its final success. Relevant to this perception was the status of Bukittinggi as the second capital of Indonesia, ready to become the seat of the republican government should Jogjakarta fall to the Dutch. During 1947 Bukittinggi did, in fact, re-emerge as the capital of Sumatra where Hatta directed the island's affairs; and from December 1948, although Bukittinggi itself was occupied by the Dutch, the Emergency Government of the republic was established in West Sumatra after the fall of Jogjakarta and the capture of most of the top republican leadership.

The role which the West Sumatrans saw themselves playing after the Independence Proclamation was also consistent with the importance of the region as one of the major centers of revolt against Dutch authority during the earlier part of the century. The number of Minangkabau leaders exiled by the Dutch as a result of anticolonial movements there had probably combined with the generally authoritarian nature of Japanese rule on Sumatra to leave an apparent vacuum of nationalist leadership in West Sumatra during the occupation years, with the old-time educator Sjafei and the more dynamic younger Chatib Suleiman apparently holding a virtual monopoly of the top positions during this period. But this situation was an artificial one and changed immediately after the constraints imposed by the Japanese were removed. From the latter months of 1945 political life in the region again assumed an active character, with a diverse group of men taking up roles of leadership. These included political leaders of the 1920s and early 1930s who returned from their exile in late 1945, prewar party leaders and minor officials of the colonial administration whose role had been minimal during the Japanese occupation, and a group of younger men, notably junior military officers who had received military training in the Gyugun. Although Sjafei's role diminished in importance after the early months of the republic, Chatib Suleiman continued as one of the most active younger leaders in the Minangkabau until his death at the beginning of 1949.

A notable characteristic of this leadership group was that despite the apparent heterogeneity of its political orientation and experience, it remained remarkably stable throughout the revolutionary years. Although there was a broad range of views represented within it there was apparently a sufficient common denominator of attitudes on social, economic and political matters to permit cohesion and continuity among its membership. This cannot be explained merely by internal solidarity imposed by outside pressures, for this factor was also operative in other parts of Indonesia without resulting in the same degree of cohesion and continuity. More likely this characteristic owed much to the ethnic homogeneity of West Sumatra and the long Minangkabau tradition of balancing apparently conflicting beliefs and ideas among their members in a way that avoided upsetting the central cohesion of their society.

This characteristic is in part obscured by the number and diversity of the political parties and religious and social groups, together

with their independent military units, which sprang up and multiplied within West Sumatra from the end of 1945. But despite the diversity of their political and social orientations and their inability to coalesce these into any unified front for more than a few months in the face of a common danger, the representatives of these groups were able to work together effectively in the KNI and later the DPR, and none of them was ever excluded from representation there.

Thus, with very few exceptions, the men who stood at the head of the West Sumatra KNI at the end of 1945 retained their leadership positions right through until the transfer of sovereignty; and although internal tensions developed, these apparently did not result in the deep political cleavages that were manifested in other parts of Sumatra and Java. Although the widespread opposition to republican policies of compromise with the Dutch found their expression through the Volksfront of 1946 and the March 3 Affair of 1947, neither of these movements developed into the armed confrontations between opposing forces such as occurred in several other parts of the island, and neither had any major long-term effects in alienating sections of the leadership. Rather, both movements were ended through some degree of compromise and reintegration of the dissatisfied groups within the ruling bodies. A partial exception to this appears to have occurred with regard to the most conservative section of the adat leadership, a group which saw its power being undermined by attempts at representative government wherein political and religious groups would also exercise authority at the negeri level. In the last year of the revolution, then, some of the adat leaders were willing to reach an accommodation with the Dutch in an attempt to shore up their traditional power and positions within the society. Here again, however, the people involved were few, and most of them seem to have been able to make their peace with the republic as soon as it became clear that the Dutch efforts would fail.

The dynamic character of political life in West Sumatra during the revolution owed much to the fact that between 1945 and the end of 1948 most of the region stood outside the area of strong Dutch pressure. (The only close parallel to this situation was that obtaining in Atjeh, which maintained its independence from Dutch control throughout the revolution.) The political leaders thus had a free hand to experiment with administrative and legislative forms and develop systems of government which they felt were attuned to Minangkabau society. In this process they grew from a relatively inexperienced group of officials into a body with a high degree of political self-consciousness, taking for granted their ability to exercise an effective governmental control over the affairs of their region.

One of the major themes in the political field was the continuing effort to reach a more representative form of government within the region. The aim was in part to end the complete domination of local affairs by the traditional penghulu group and to put them into the hands of a wider spectrum of leaders. As early as 1946 elections for representative councils at the negeri level were held to accomplish this. Essential to these concepts was the idea of autonomy and self-sufficiency at each level of government, and for this reason there were considerable efforts during the next two years to make the village administrations large enough and to train their officials sufficiently for these units to retain a considerable degree of independence from the higher levels of the administration. It was for this reason too that the Central Sumatran KNI moved so rapidly in 1948 to implement the decentralization law passed by the Jogjakarta government with regard to

autonomous levels of administration at the provincial, kabupaten and wilayah levels. And it is notable that in combatting the Dutch attempts to set up a Minangkabau state in early 1949, the republican leaders in West Sumatra, while laying stress on their loyalty to the republic, advocated an autonomous status for the Minangkabau region within the Republic of Indonesia rather than its complete and unqualified incorporation.

At the provincial level the division of Sumatra into three separate provinces in 1948 merely acknowledged the failure of efforts to create a single province on the island and ratified the broad lines of the situation which had existed there since 1945. However, the grouping of the three residencies of West Sumatra, Riau and Djambi into the province of Central Sumatra held the distinct possibility that the more cohesive political leadership and ethnic homogeneity of West Sumatra would lead to its dominating the new province.

The actions of the central government in 1950-51 appeared to negate much of the progress which had been achieved in West Sumatra during the revolutionary years towards autonomy in local affairs and some form of representative government. It must have appeared to many of the Minangkabau that their position in the Indonesian state had now not merely reverted to that of 1945 but in some ways closely resembled that of the last year of Dutch rule. In 1950 Sumatra was divided militarily into two regions with headquarters respectively at Medan and Palembang and the civilian government of the province of Central Sumatra was removed from the hands of local representatives to those of appointees of the Interior Ministry in Djakarta.

The loyalty of West Sumatra to the republican government throughout the revolution had clearly been strengthened by the presence of so many Minangkabau in its central leadership. However, the men whom the West Sumatrans had regarded as their representatives on Java clearly did not view their region of origin as having claims on their loyalty that could be permitted to influence their approach to national policies arrived at in Djakarta. It is possible that they were, in fact, willing to move the more resolutely against West Sumatra because of their certainty of its adherence to the republic and because they wished to set an example for other regions on whom they could not so completely rely. The important role which the Minangkabau in West Sumatra saw themselves playing in the struggle with the Dutch was never recognized by the central government as having such major relevance to the outcome of the revolutionary struggle as to warrant their being permitted a degree of autonomy which if granted to other regions might threaten the cohesion of the new unitary state.