GOVERNING THE COMMONS AROUND URBAN HOMES

An Ecological Study of the Design, Management and Use of Moscow Yards

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Doctor of Philosophy

by
Peter Christian Sigrist
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ABSTRACT

GOVERNING THE COMMONS AROUND URBAN HOMES
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This study focuses on why and how shared territories adjacent to Moscow residential buildings differ from stereotypes of blighted "no-man's land." It begins with a broad history of their formal and informal governance, followed by an overview of their present design, management and use. These sections assist with interpreting the results of structured interviews and a questionnaire survey conducted from March 2012 through July 2013. In Moscow, ensuring attentive management of residential commons is one of many government approaches to building support. While this has effectively controlled blight, it possesses limitations rooted in highly centralized responsibility for decision-making and finance. A convincing majority of respondents expressed satisfaction with not having to engage in managing the territory around their homes, and dissatisfaction with not having a practical way of influencing related decisions of personal importance. This suggests that resident satisfaction is best maintained through attentive management with practical options for substantive influence and fair distribution of costs. Establishing such options also makes investment in design adaptations more efficient by channeling resident motivation and familiarity with specific conditions. Likewise, it allows interested residents to help guide the use of commons around their homes. Governance of this kind may help enhance the appeal of high-density living worldwide.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Peter Sigrist's work revolves around urban ecology, with emphasis on housing, green space, cultural heritage, public health and governing commons. His research is dedicated to supporting initiatives that improve the quality of life in residential areas. He has collaborated with organizations focused on low-income housing, urban horticulture and community development. His education includes a BA in international studies from Trinity College and an MPhil in geography from the University of Cambridge.

DEDICATION

"There is not even a thought, or an invention, which is not common property, born of the past and the present. … Thousands of writers, of poets, of scholars, have laboured to increase knowledge, to dissipate error, and to create that atmosphere of scientific thought, without which the marvels of our century could never have appeared. And these thousands of philosophers, of poets, of scholars, of inventors, have themselves been supported by the labour of past centuries. They have been upheld and nourished through life, both physically and mentally, by legions of workers and craftsmen of all sorts. They have drawn their motive force from the environment."

— Peter Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread*, 1906

I dedicate this project to all those of the past and present who have nourished it.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

All translation from Russian to English is my own unless otherwise cited. I use the BGN/PCGN transliteration system without accent marks except in cases when a different spelling is more established. For ease of reference, I fully transliterate addresses. Organization names are translated and followed by their transliterated acronyms in parentheses.

INTRODUCTION

Commons around residential buildings significantly influence the quality of urban living. Although this shared space is often associated with blight (general neglect resulting in unattractive, inhospitable or even dangerous living conditions), it can also be a comfortable extension of the home.[1] The present study sheds light on commons in high-density residential areas by focusing on their governance in Russia's capital.

To varying extents, almost every Moscow resident shares the territory adjacent to their home.[2] This provides an opportunity to analyze the formal and informal governance of commons through planning, finance, construction, regulation, maintenance and everyday activity. I explore the historical development of these processes as well as the experience of current residents, focusing primarily on design, management and use. For the purposes of this study, design refers broadly to decisions on shaping land, vegetation and additional structures. Management includes regulations and maintenance carried out by public, private and semi-private organizations at citywide and district scales. Use involves actions at a given site by people who live in adjacent buildings and people who live elsewhere. Design, management and use overlap in many ways but can also be examined separately, with careful attention to their influence on representations and perceptions of shared space.

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[1] Patsy Healey has described city planning as the management of "co-existence in shared space" (1997: 3), inspiring research by Leonie Sandercock on urban governance and housing (2000). I use "shared space" instead of "public space" in order to include gated communities. I also use it interchangeably with "commons" while keeping in mind Elizabeth Blackmar's point that commons have often been associated with bounded territories owned by a private group as opposed to public space owned by a city or state (2006). Most of the landscapes I discuss here are not clearly bounded and are owned by the municipal government, but they are also commons in the sense of being shared by many households.

[2] In the 2010 census, less than 0.3 percent of Muscovites reported living in a single-unit home with a private yard (Rosstat 2010: 15, Rosstat 2012: 166).

Moscow is at an important crossroads after the replacement of longtime Mayor Yuri Luzhkov in 2010, the protests following parliamentary election a year later, and the annexation of 148,000 hectares of land on July 1, 2012, which increased the city's area by more than two and a half times (Figure 1). The decision to expand — promoted as a measure to resolve severe traffic congestion — coincided with federal support for single-unit housing as a more economical alternative to apartments (Russian Federal Government 2011). Many buildings from the Soviet mass-housing drive have been demolished as part of a long-term redevelopment plan; regardless of whether they are worth preserving, the park-like spaces in between are not easily replaced. This study documents and analyzes the shared space around residential buildings from different eras within Moscow's former borders.

Latin origins of the Russian word for house or home, *dom*, evoke relationships with domesticity and domination.[3] The traditional word for territory beside the home is *dvor*, which means courtyard or yard. It is related to the words *dvoryanstvo* (nobility, as in a member of the royal court), *dver'* (door) and *vorota* (gates), which suggest historical links with protective walls around centers of power. A sense of intimate enclosure is important (Figure 2), such that some of my interview participants said that they would not use *dvor* for predominantly unbounded territories (Figure 3) — even if there were other common features like benches, playgrounds, greenery, parking, utility sheds and athletic facilities. While many people do use *dvor* for such territories, this is more likely when there is a clearer sense of enclosure or association with at least one home. People also use the words *uchastok* (site, plot of land) — which shares roots with *chast'* (part) and *chastnyy* (private) — and *territoriya* (territory) when it is clear that they mean land connected with housing. The legal term is *pridomovaya territoriya* (territory adjacent to the home), based on cadastral surveys that have become a source of controversy in Moscow. I

[3] For more on the meaning of *dom*, see Lebina 1999: 178-9.

use the word "yard" for any territory frequented mainly by residents of at least one adjacent building, and sometimes "courtyard" if the area is surrounded by walls on more than one consecutive side. Yards are the main focus of this study, but I also examine the entire area within 50 meters of a given home — including major streets, walkways, commercial areas, construction sites, parks and other settings that are not part of residents' figurative domain (Figure 4). This adds precision to my analysis of territories connected with different housing models and allows me to evaluate a full range of common features. Some yards extend beyond 50 meters, but my focus remains on the area closer to home.

As sites of shared daily experience, Moscow yards are culturally significant but mundane to the point that their sociopolitical dimensions are largely overlooked. These dimensions include the private and public, attentive and indifferent, cooperative and contentious, autocratic and democratic, independent and paternalistic. Yards can be sites for grassroots initiative and open governance, but there are many impediments. They are highly visible at a micro scale — marginal in comparison with public squares in the city center but an unavoidable presence for surrounding residents. Their functions tend to change for people based on their age, dwelling space, number of cohabitants and whether or not they have young children, a dog, a car or a summer cottage (dacha).[4]

Housing management — which includes upkeep of yards — has received positive feedback in resident surveys by the City of Moscow Department of Residential-Communal Management and Improvement (DZhKKhBGM 2010a, 2010b) and the Public Opinion

[4] A reported 33 percent of Russian citizens own a dacha (Newman 2012), and this is especially common among people who live in major cities. While "cottage" is an accurate translation, its Russian transliteration (*kottedzh*) means a suburban or rural house that is generally newer, larger and less agriculturally oriented than most dachas. A *kottedzh* is also more likely to be equipped for year-round inhabitance. For details on different kinds of dacha, see Vysokovsky 1993, Ioffe and Nefedova 1998 and Zavisca 2003. For historical background on the *kottedzh*, see Humphrey 2002.



Figure 1. City of Moscow. The callout shows (in light gray) the sections of Moscow Oblast annexed on July 1, 2012.

Figure 2. Relatively bounded yards.[5]

[5] I used Google Earth to capture the satellite images in this document.



Figure 3. Relatively unbounded yards.



Figure 4. Common sights within 50 meters of Moscow homes but not considered part of the yard, including construction areas, bodies of water, parks, streets, walkways and other places frequented by a population that outnumbers residents of adjacent buildings.

Foundation (FOM 2011).[6] This is noteworthy because similar commons worldwide are known for decline when ownership and access rights are unclear.[7] Is this actually not happening in Moscow or have people just become accustomed? How do resident perspectives differ? What kinds of problems arise and how are they resolved? Do significant patterns exist? Which influences are particularly strong and how do they operate? Could this residential "no-man's land" offer useful insights for people in other cities? I engage with such questions by focusing on why and how the commons around Moscow homes are now free of serious blight. The "why" aims for a historically informed explanation while the "how" explores specific ways that participants experience and transform these landscapes.

In sharing the results of this research, I have adopted a five-part structure. The Introduction chapter includes my conceptual foundations, review of literature and methodology. The following Historical Influences chapter traces the development of commons around Moscow housing with a focus on governance. The Contemporary Focal Points chapter then concentrates on present governance through design, management and use. The Resident Perspectives chapter follows with an analysis of these processes based on interviews, focus groups and an experimental survey. The Conclusion chapter then highlights key findings and implications for governing commons around urban housing.

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[6] For DZhKKhBGM, the Russian words that I translated as "management" (*khozyaystvo*) and "improvement" (*blagoustroystvo*) do not have precise English counterparts. In this case, I wanted to show their identical structure as nouns based on verbs and clearly represent their function as municipal services. The former can also be translated as "economy" in the sense of managing a system that meets human needs (for example, a home, farm, enterprise or city). I translate the latter as "shared amenities" in most other cases. DZhKKhBGM is responsible for operations associated with homes, roads, utilities and sanitation. FOM is an independent nonprofit with origins in the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM). It now works for major government and business clients in Russia (including the presidential administration) along with a variety of international organizations. See the Contemporary Focal Points chapter for more on the DZhKKhBGM and FOM surveys.

[7] For analysis of this phenomenon in post-Soviet cities, see Vihavainen 2009: 11-15, Marcuse 1996: 143-4.

Conceptual Foundations

This study is ecological in its concentration on habitats in relation with their inhabitants (Keller and Golley 2000: 7-9, Odom and Barrett 2005: 2-3),[8] drawing upon ecology's roots in the concept of "home" (*oikos*, the Greek word for house, habitation, dwelling). In this sense, ecology can shed light on places of residence and other environments at different scales. Despite my human focus, nonhuman elements — such as building materials, land relief, vegetation, design ideas, management procedures and policy documents — also play important roles.

Research of this kind is closely associated with human geography and specifically urban geography (Barrows 1923: 10). Although there are obvious etymological differences between ecology and geography, in practice their urban subfields share theory and methods drawn from a variety of disciplines. Based on the centrality of dwelling to the current project, I see it as closer to ecology. I do not attempt to apply concepts from the study of nature to explain society, for which the Chicago School of Sociology has been criticized (e.g., Davis 1998: 363-4) despite its many valuable contributions to urban ecology during the early 20th century. I examine the contingent political, economic and cultural processes that shape urban ecosystems over time.

Erik Swyngedouw (1996) is widely considered the first to integrate political ecology — which emerged in the 1970s as a political-economic approach to the analysis of social relations concerning environmental resources — with critical urban studies (Wachter 2012, Heynen

[8] German zoologist Ernst Haeckel coined the term "ecology" in a textbook (1866), further defining it two years later in a lecture: "By ecology we mean the body of knowledge concerning the economy of nature — the investigation of the total relations of the animal both to its inorganic and to its organic environment; including, above all, its friendly and inimical relations with those animals and plants with which it comes directly or indirectly into contact — in a word, ecology is the study of all those complex interrelations referred to by Darwin as the conditions of the struggle for existence. This science of ecology, often inaccurately referred to as 'biology' in a narrow sense, has thus far formed the principal component of what is commonly referred to as 'Natural History'" (Haeckel 1879, via Keller and Golley 2000: 9). In light of Stan Rowe's convincing argument that the accuracy of terms like "organic and inorganic, biotic and abiotic, animate and inanimate, living and dead" depends on perspective (1992: 394), ecology could include the study of anything in relation with its spatial context.

2013).[9] Urban political ecology has since given rise to diverse forms of socio-environmental research on cities. According to Swyngedouw, Nik Heynen and Maria Kaika in their definitive collection *In the Nature of Cities*, "urban political ecology provides an integrated and relational approach that helps untangle the interconnected economic, political, social and ecological processes that together form highly uneven urban sociophysical landscapes" (2006: 15). They adopt Swyngedouw's Marxian "historical-geographical materialist ontology" to theorize the production of urban nature[10] as a process of metabolic circulation (Swyngedouw 2006: 32). In this case, metabolic circulation refers to dialectical interactions (i.e., processes of change through the synthesis of contrasting elements) among human and nonhuman entities that transform nature over time. The nonhuman includes materials as well as representations and perceptions. Metabolic circulation is frequently applied in urban political ecology to describe, analyze and critique socio-environmental injustices at multiple scales. Although a focus on capitalism is dominant throughout *In the Nature of Cities* — reflecting the influence of critical social theory and political economy (Brenner et al. 2011: 232) — it is not prescribed in the introductory "'Manifesto' for Urban Political Ecology" (Heynen et al. 2006: 11-12). Questions of "why" and "how" behind the production of urban nature are the fundamental epistemological concerns (Swyngedouw 2006: 33). Despite sharing these concerns, I depart in significant ways from Swyngedouw's ontology for urban political ecology.

Swyngedouw draws upon the ontological thinking of Donna Haraway (1991) and Bruno Latour (1993, 2004) to explain how infinite "hybrids" of human and nonhuman elements

[9] For more on the development of urban political ecology, see Keil 2003, 2005.
[10] With roots in the thinking of Karl Marx (1971 [1867]) and Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]), the "production of nature" concept emerged through the work of Neil Smith (2008 [1984]).

constitute reality.[11] He suggests parallels between these ideas and Karl Marx's view of humans as part of nature while constantly transforming it through labor.[12] Yet he criticizes Latour for portraying the world as a "democratic republic of heterogeneous associations" instead of questioning and critiquing the reasons behind uneven power relations (2006: 33). This point comes up often in reference to actor-network theory and the closely related notion of assemblage;[13] critics also point to an evasion of causal explanation and transformative politics in Latourian ontology (e.g., Mitchell and Kirsch 2004, Madden 2010, Brenner et al. 2011). While these perspectives are understandable given Latour's criticism of critical social theory as assumptive and ineffective (1993, 2004), they overlook the constructive political orientation in his thinking. More surprisingly, Swyngedouw does not address Latour's rejection of dialectical ontology, which applies even to the inclusive and insightful form associated with urban political ecology.[14] According to Latour, the use of dialectics to explain historical processes actually perpetuates deceptive binaries (2004). Building upon fixed categories — such as nature and society, subject and object, fact and value, constructivist and realist, local and global, idealist and materialist — is thus an unjustified manipulation of reality, which should instead be negotiated and developed collectively through politics. In this sense, Swyngedouw's "metabolic circulation"

[11] A great deal has been written about these ideas, but see Gandy 2005 for an especially valuable perspective on their role in urban studies.

[12] See also Swyngedouw 1996, Castree 2002, 2006, Luke 1999, Kirsch and Mitchell 2004. For more on Marx's thinking on nature, see Marx 1971 [1867], 1973 [1858], 1982 [1844], Schmidt 1971, Benton 1989, Harvey 1996, Luke 1999, Burkett 1999, Foster 2000, Castree 2000, Elden 2004, Balibar 2007 [1993], Smith 2006: xiv, 2008 [1984].

[13] While somewhat reluctantly providing a structured explanation of actor-network theory in *Reassembling the Social* (2005), Latour has expressed dissatisfaction with the name and the way it perpetuates misunderstandings (for example, that it refers to the Internet). He has recently discussed its limited capacity for defining differences between multiple entities within each network, yet he affirms its value for transcending the notion of purified entities and for tracing connections among heterogeneous elements (Tresch 2013: 304-8). In his book on political ecology, *Politics of Nature* (2004), he does not mention actor-network theory but maintains a perspective based on its tenets. I similarly adopt these tenets but not the label. For more on assemblage in urban studies, see Farías and Bender 2010, McFarlane 2011a, 2011c.

[14] Swyngedouw's dialectics are based on Marx's adaptation of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's version. Marx honed his dialectics over time in response to alternative ideas, historic events and political engagement (Balibar 2007 [1993]). Latour concedes that "Marx's own definition of material explanation … [is] infinitely more subtle than what his successors made of it" (2007: 138), and Swyngedouw retains this subtlety.

is akin to a supposed law of nature that explains capitalist globalization as well as any other historical phenomenon instead of allowing the nature of reality to emerge through participatory and transformative ontology.

Despite the influential ontological dimensions of Latour's thinking,[15] he refrains from designating a fixed ontology for political ecology. He instead adopts an "experimental metaphysics" for the purpose of collectively discerning and prioritizing matters of concern in a progressive composition of the common world — a politics of forming a shared *oikos*, habitat, dwelling place (2004: 136, 180, 192, 224). This is a normative vision of good governance in contrast to the abuse of power. It is also a flexible approach to ecological research through careful description of topics in all their historical complexity — not ignoring injustices but examining them inside and out so that causal links become apparent. Latour views these accounts as "falsifiable" in practice based on the extent to which they accurately resemble and reassemble concerned parties in a way that is acceptable to those involved (2005: 127-8, 249-50, 256-7, 261). The research and researcher become part of this assembly if they succeed in establishing a coherent and thus transformative link. Such experiments in scientific understanding and political relevance often fail, but, if carefully documented, they offer valuable lessons for later attempts (2004: 196, Latour 2005: 251).

Latour's approach to description is based on an epistemology that does not attempt to claim for the sciences a false objectivity or detachment from politics, instead encouraging their involvement in assembling a shared reality. It can be used to trace how power works, how entities form and how distinct elements influence them over time. This is essential to my study of

[15] Key influences on these dimensions include Tarde 2012 [1895], Whitehead 1920, Deleuze and Guattari 1987 [1980], Stengers 2010. See Latour 2013 for others. His ontological thinking has inspired parallel explorations (De Landa 2006, Bennett 2010) and serious critique (Brassier 2011, Wolfendale 2012) in contemporary philosophy. See Harman 2010 for an extensive philosophical discussion of Latourian metaphysics.

how human habitats come into being, how their constituent parts mutually affect each other and how they might reassemble for the benefit of inhabitants. It is also in keeping with the primary objective of urban political ecology, articulated by Heynen, Kaika and Swyngedouw as "acquiring the power to produce urban environments in line with the aspirations, needs, and desires of those inhabiting these spaces, the capacity to produce the physical and social environment in which one dwells" (Heynen et al. 2006: 15).

Review of Literature

Having defined the conceptual foundations of this project, I now situate it in relation to the issues of public and academic concern to which it responds (Figure 5). I start broadly by making a case for its relevance to literature on simultaneously global and local ecological problems. I then discuss research on commons, with emphasis on governance, perception and representation. This is followed by a review of studies on Russia that I have drawn from and added to through the current project. In closing, I further explain my research questions in preparation for the Methodology section that follows.

This study offers empirical evidence of how broad concepts such as reflexive modernization (Giddens 1990, Beck 1992, Beck et al. 1994), globalization (Elden 2005, Nancy 2007 [2002], Madden 2012) and neoliberalism (Harvey 2005, Collier 2011) relate to specific sites and vice versa. I draw upon Swyngedouw's thinking on "glocalization" (1992a, 1992b, 1997, 2004)[16] as the historical production of continuously shifting scales through political relations. He uses this term to represent specific characteristics of post-Fordist capitalism, but it

[16] For more on relationships between global and local, see Luke 1994, Peck and Tickell 1994, Brenner 1998.



Figure 5. At left, interrelated global and local ecological concerns at the nexus of housing, public space and governance. At right, this project's focus on the design, management and use of Moscow yards.

is rooted in the insight that nothing is purely "global" or "local" from any point of view. Latour's notion of associations between elements across space and time also captures the relativity and dynamic production of scale (2005: 184-5). This is particularly useful for the present study, which identifies links between Moscow yards and political, economic and ecological issues at other scales. The impacts of climate and privatization, for example, are evident in these settings, which can also exert influence in return through future planning decisions (Oosterman 2009).

I contribute to literature on housing, public space and governance by focusing on their nexus. This coincides with recent appraisals of "towers in the park" (Genevro 2011, Shepard and Wade 2013)[17] and other forms of high-density residential development (Kubey 2012, Spertus and Schindler 2013) as conducive to environmental and economic sustainability (Teng Chye 2012). Making such housing an attractive option depends in large part on governing commons between dwellings. To an extent these are "liminal spaces" (Hajer and Reijndorp 2001: 128)[18] at the cusp of private and public life, and many people experience them mainly in passing. Yet they are also destinations, hosting a variety of activities and often vested with a "sense of place" (Tuan 2001 [1977]).[19] Both liminality and place offer insight into commons, but I touch upon them only to the extent that they relate to governance.

Research on "governing the commons" emerged with a focus on management of rural resources (Ostrom 1990, Baden and Noonan 1998),[20] but scholars have since examined it in relation to gated housing developments (Blackmar 2006) and urban public space (Amin 2008, Federici 2010, Németh 2012). Still, the "life between buildings" in residential areas is rarely the

[17] Chad Freidrichs's documentary film *The Pruitt-Igoe Myth* has played an important role in sparking this interest, as evident in online comments accompanying reviews in *The New York Times* (Kimmelman 2012) and *The Guardian* (Moore 2012).
[18] In public space literature, liminality generally refers to interstitial areas between functional zones, neighborhoods and other relatively distinct places. See also Carmona 2010, Sennett 1990, Zukin 1991, Shields 1991.
[19] For more on place, see Heidegger 2001 [1951], de Certeau 1984, Sack 1986, Casey 1997, Malpas 2004, Thrift 2006, Schmidt and Németh 2010.
[20] These studies are, to a large extent, responses to Garret Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968).

focus of studies on commons (Gehl 2011 [1971]). Rosa Vihavainen draws upon closely related theory on common-pool resources (Ostrom 1994, 2003) and community-based social capital (Putnam et al. 1993, 2007) to examine homeowners' associations in St. Petersburg, Russia, through historical study, direct observation and interviews (Vihavainen 2009). Although my analysis is not based on theoretical approaches to governance, and it has led to a different conclusion on property rights, I similarly incorporate historical study to help understand the experience of current residents.

My survey sample and analysis are not extensive enough to enter the robust field of mainly quantitative literature on resident experience (Lu 1999, Roberts 2007, Gifford 2007).[21] However, the full project could serve as a useful starting point for research of this kind in Moscow. Given the impact of societal norms on perception (Rapoport 1975: 148-9), a familiarity with the evolution of present conditions is an important foundation. The present study of commons in relation to human experience best corresponds with historically informed qualitative literature on urban housing, public space and governance (e.g., Low 2006, Robbins and Sharp 2006, Brownlow 2006, Vihavainen 2009).[22] It adds to this literature by concentrating on a city with ubiquitous residential commons in diverse forms.

Although my focus is on urban ecology and governance, this project brings literature on Russian history into dialog with recent events. To my knowledge, commons around Moscow housing — which appear in similar forms throughout the former Soviet Union and beyond — have not yet been the main subject of academic research in English. Publications on Russian and

[21] These three references are reviews of literature. For resident-experience studies in specific locations, see Bonaiuto et al. 1999 (Rome, Italy), Liu 1999 (Hong Kong, PRC), Buys and Miller 2012 (Brisbane, Australia), Lee et al. 2008 (College Station, Texas, USA), Adriaanse 2007 (neighborhoods throughout the Netherlands), Lovejoy et al. 2009 (eight communities in northern California, USA), Howley et al. 2009 (Dublin, Ireland), Lewicka 2010 (cities in Poland and Ukraine), Jupp 1999, Thompson-Fawcett 2003, Dempsey 2009 (communities in the UK).

[22] Vihavainan 2009 is the best example due to the integration of housing, public space and governance. It is also part of an edited collection (Kharkhordin and Alapuro 2010) that addresses post-Soviet housing infrastructure and governance in light of Latour's thinking on human-nonhuman publics.

Soviet cities (e.g., Frolic 1964, Hamm 1976, Bater 1980, 1986, French 1995, Andrusz et al. 1996) dedicate a great deal of attention to housing issues, providing strong background for studying related landscapes. Timothy Colton's history of Soviet governance in Moscow (1995) — which also touches upon the years before and immediately after the Soviet era — contains a wealth of information on housing but has been criticized justifiably for overlooking important points on architecture (Cooke 1997: 140-1). I supplement this history with research that sheds light on Moscow housing design from different eras,[23] along with related studies of governance, activism and everyday life.[24] Some are completely (Frolov 2011, Ivanov 2011, Zakirova 2006) or substantially (Shomina 1999, Gorlov 2005, Humphrey 2005, Vihavainen 2009) focused on territory around residential buildings. Sociologist Petr Ivanov (2011) has concentrated directly on yards in Moscow's outer rings. In light of these studies as well as nonacademic research and public discourse, I compare the space around prevalent housing models throughout the city.[25] Tracing human and nonhuman elements of these landscapes — with emphasis on their

[23] Those I have found most useful include Berton 1977, Cracraft 1988, Schmidt 1989, Brumfield 1991, 1993, 1997, 2004, Aruin and Rezvin 1998, Cracraft and Rowland 2003, Cheredina 2004, Shvidkovsky 2007, Latour 2009, Bronovitskaya 2009a (on the pre-Soviet period); Khazanova 1970, Kopp 1970, Bliznakov 1976, Starr 1976, 1978, Hudson 1986, 1993, Stites 1989, Cooke 1995, Khan-Magomedov 1996a, 1996b, 1997 (on the early Soviet years); Sutin 1958, Tarkhanov and Kavtaradze 1992, Groys 1992, Cooke 1993, 1997, Paperny 2002, Dobrenko and Naiman 2003, Bronovitskaya and Bronovitskaya 2006 (on the Stalinist Soviet period); Frolic 1964, 1976, Bliznakov 1976, Ruble 1993, Buchli 1997, Bronovitskaya 2009c, Zadorin 2009, Smith 2010, Harris 2013 (on the post-Stalinist Soviet period); Shvidkovsky 1997, Humphrey 2002, Alden et al. 1998, Boym 2001, Goldhoorn 2009, Muratov et al. 2010, Frolov 2011, Paramonova 2013 (on the post-Soviet years).

[24] For governance, see Hamm 1976, Thurston 1987, Morton 1980, Andrusz 1992, Ruble 1993, Kosareva and Struyk 1993, Colton 1999, Jensen 1999, Hosking 2000, Osokina 2000, Meerovich 2003, Gorlov 2005, Carnaghan 2007, Höjdestrand 2009, Vihavainen 2009, Collier 2010, Smith 2010, Polishchuk and Borisova 2010, Kharkhordin and Alapuro 2010, Zaviska 2012. For activism, see Yanitsky 1991, Shomina 1999, Zakirova 2006, Clément 2008. For everyday life, see Boym 1994, Lebina 1999, Utekhin 2001, Humphrey 2002, 2005, Gorlov 2005, Shevchenko 2009, Atwood 2010, Ivanov 2011. For relevant historical studies with less emphasis on housing issues, see Dunlop 1986, Lentini 1991, Lahusen and Kuperman 1993, Maslovski 1996, Urban et al. 1997, Fitzpatrick 1999, Kulavig 2002, Remington 2002, Viola 2002, Hosking 2004, Garcelon 2005, Horvath 2005, Lewin 2005, Dobrenko 2007, Elkner 2009, Harris and Cecil 2009, Hoffman 2011, Sakwa 2011, 2014, Hill and Gaddy 2013, Hornsby 2013.

[25] I incorporate recent nonacademic studies by government (DZhKKhBGM 2010a, 2010b) and nongovernment (Sosedi 2009, FOM 2011, Levada-Center 2011, Grigorian et al. 2011) organizations along with crowdsourced material (e.g., historical images attached to a map of Moscow at http://pastvu.ru, Moscow district blogs at http://bg.ru/blogs).

relationships with different forms of governance today — is a modest contribution to literature on Russian history.[26]

Worldwide need for ecologically and economically sound housing makes the governance of residential commons an important concern. In contrast to neglected "no-man's land," shared space around Moscow housing is generally well maintained in higher- and lower-income areas. This gives rise to increasingly specific questions: Why have these territories remained free of blight that so often arises when ownership is unclear? And how is this manifested in different parts of the city today? Answering these questions may help with developing solutions to ecological problems at local and global scales. Residents have important perspectives on space around their homes, and the quality of urban living can be evaluated on these grounds. I have adopted an experimental and politically engaged approach centered on reassembly of a shared world. The following Methodology section explains my research process.

Methodology

This project is a mixed-methods case study that integrates historiography, discourse analysis, direct observation, interviews, focus groups and an experimental survey.[27] Fieldwork spanned from November 2011 through July 2013. As noted in the introduction, Moscow is a fitting location due to the prevalence of distinctive commons between residential buildings.

Michel Foucault's genealogy has been my guide to historical analysis (1975). Thus I have studied power-infused "discursive formations" (Foucault 1969: 29) that conditioned actions

[26] The sources of inspiration behind my historical study are Cronon 1992, Holston 1998, Gandy 2002. However, my account does not approach their depth.
[27] Sources on research design, particularly case studies, that I have found helpful include Yin 2003, Lincoln and Guba 1985, Tashakkori and Teddlie 1989, Maxwell 2009, Flyvbjerg 2013.

during specific periods, as well as the contingent processes through which they formed and transformed. Clifford Geertz once summarized Foucault's view of history in a sentence: "The past is not prologue; like the discrete strata of Schliemann's site, it is a mere succession of buried presents" (1978). Despite my use of genealogy, I have remained open to continuity between discursive formations — each a palimpsest of not fully discrete and buried presents. The influence of past formations on the present has been unmistakable. Still, inline with Foucault, historical continuities never appeared inevitable or inherently progressive. I tried to analyze each period on its own terms, with the help of primary and especially secondary sources in English and Russian. Primary sources included policy documents, press reports, books, journals, atlases and images from different eras. Most of the secondary sources are books and peer-reviewed articles, but unpublished research — mainly dissertations — also played an important role. While viewing all material critically, often reading between the lines, I avoided presenting my interpretations as facts or forcing a coherent narrative. Instead I attempted to provide enough information for human and nonhuman participants to speak for themselves.

Discourse analysis continued from past to present. In addition to primary sources mentioned above, I drew upon contemporary published data, journalism, interviews (with specialists and other Moscow residents), advertisements, movies, television shows, websites and events. I collected diverse material, as opposed to specific evidence confirming initial hypotheses, and coded it with the following keywords: government, business, design, construction, ownership, management, vegetation, use, preservation, activism, perceptions, representations, ideas. I then arranged this material chronologically for analysis and integration into the report.

Direct observation played an essential role in grounding my discourse analysis, recalling de Certeau's playful comment that Durkheim and Freud "never went to see for themselves, any more than Marx ever went to a factory" (1984: 64). I focused on systematic visits to yards throughout the city. To identify starting points, I used a municipal database with detailed Bureau of Technical Inventory (BTI) records on building types, completion dates and management organizations (Moscow City Government 2013a). Maps, satellite pictures and other images offered useful perspectives for comparison with observations on the ground. I took pictures instead of field notes to record impressions, writing about them when I could sit and reflect on the experience. Although I lived in rented rooms throughout Moscow over the past five years and worked with people who are researching, developing and managing territory around residential buildings, for this project I avoided the role of participant observer. Being an inconspicuous wanderer through many different settings helped me focus on details that would have otherwise escaped my attention.

According to Georg Simmel, "[i]f wandering is the liberation from every given point in space, and thus the conceptual opposite to fixation at such a point, the sociological form of the 'stranger' presents the unity, as it were, of these two characteristics" (1950 [1908]: 402). He described the stranger as a synthesis of distance and proximity in relation to a certain group — an outsider presence with the unique potential to move on. Maintaining the position of relatively detached stranger was useful for interviews, as it prompted detailed explanations of things that may have seemed too obvious to share with a friend or too personal to share with a colleague.[28] I started out talking informally with experts on housing, public space and governance, as well as with people I met while observing yards. These unstructured conversations gave me a grasp of

[28] At the same time, participants understood that I was a student from the United States researching the territory around their homes. Although this knowledge surely influenced different people in different ways, making it impossible to accurately estimate how or to what extent, it should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.

present conditions and important themes. Friends helped me understand more thoroughly, sometimes bringing me on tours of their current or former yards. The stories they told and our conversations with neighbors were extraordinarily valuable.[29]

Focus groups played a vital role in fine-tuning my interview questions. People ranging in age from 18 to 87 participated in response to announcements that I planned to discuss my research followed by a conversation. Nearly all were current or former students in higher education — a far less diverse group than the one for interviews. These semi-structured discussions (2 in Russian, 6 in English) took place from November 2011 to March 2013 at Moscow State University (3), the Strelka Institute (2), the Language Guru Learning Center (2) and the National Higher School of Economics (1). I introduced my project and then posed questions. I also asked participants for feedback and answered their questions, allowing for digression to uncover additional topics of concern.

In preparation for structured interviews I studied Post-Occupancy Evaluation (POE), a means of assessing the performance of buildings over time from the perspective of inhabitants, operators and developers (Preiser 2002). POE has also been used to evaluate outdoor areas (Malkoc and Ozkan 2010), and it helped me develop questions, frame discussions and process data. I adopted POE Likert Scales to quickly record answers while talking with residents, and added open-ended questions at the end for elaboration. As often as possible I interviewed people in their own yards, another method derived from POE. From March 2012 to March 2013 I conducted 134 structured interviews with people selected randomly in public spaces throughout the city — primarily in yards, parks, squares and shopping centers. I entered the results into a database with sections for each response, including demographic information, precise address and BTI statistics on building model, number of stories, material of walls, date of construction

[29] These accounts were similar in many ways to Michel de Certeau's "spatial stories" (1984: 115).

and management organization. I coded responses to open-ended questions with the same keywords used for discourse analysis, adding specifics like facades, graffiti, playgrounds, trees, parking, safety, repairs, advertisements and legal issues. The structured interviews were very useful for qualitative analysis but did not yield much quantitative data, as the questions were evolving.

In developing the structured-interview form into a questionnaire survey, I discussed the questions with geographer Vladimir Kalutskov, political scientist Elena Shomina and other advisors, colleagues and friends.[30] I also tested it online to figure out whether it was clear enough to function without additional explanation. When it was ready, I conducted a survey of 56 residents from districts throughout the city's pre-2012 borders. This proceeded from March to the end of July 2013, through the same collection process used for structured interviews. I entered the results into a new database with the same additional categories for municipal data. Consistent questions allowed for quantitative analysis despite the limited sample size.[31] For future surveys I would make the questionnaire less comprehensive. The number of questions often proved dissuasive, and when people agreed to participate there was a long wait before moving on. However, the questionnaire provided a solid framework to which I added qualitative analysis from interviews.

Geertz's writing on phenomenology — particularly in search of "a method for describing and analyzing the meaningful structure of experience" (1972: 364) — was an important reference for my site observations and interactions with residents.[32] While Latour has taken issue with phenomenologists who ignore or deny nonhuman agency, he conceded that "[t]his does not mean that we should deprive ourselves of the rich descriptive vocabulary of phenomenology,

[30] This prompted many revisions, especially in cases when my Russian translation was ambiguous. Discussing translation was often as informative as interview responses.
[31] It should have been closer to 400 for a confidence level of 95 percent with an interval of 5.
[32] See Merleau-Ponty 2002 [1945] and Ingold 2000 for influential phenomenological approaches to studying human-environment relations.

simply that we have to extend it to 'non-intentional' entities" (2005: 61). I adopted Geertz's "thick description" (1973: 6) to document significant elements of shared space around Moscow housing.[33] Although he developed it for ethnography (whereas my project is intentionally more ecological than anthropological), I found it useful for portraying the mutual influences between Moscow habitats and inhabitants. It helped me take up Latour's call for thoroughly describing social connections among human and nonhuman participants in specific cases (2005: 136-7, 2007: 140-2, 2013: 294).[34] Historiography is essential to my thick description, providing readers with as much useful information as possible for interpreting the results of direct observation. Likewise, historical and contemporary description makes resident perspectives more intelligible in the final chapter. Katharine Rankin has pointed to the value in thick description for analyzing "everyday urban life" (2011: 564),[35] and Colin McFarlane used it to portray human-nonhuman interactions in the development of informal settlements (2011c). McFarlane's work mobilizes observations from the past and present toward future-oriented practices (2011a, 2011b), as I have also tried to do through this project.

Completion of a mixed-methods case study has added detail and perspective to my understanding of governance as it pertains to commons around urban homes. In this report, I

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[33] Geertz credits Gilbert Ryle with introducing this term in "Thinking and Reflecting" and "The Thinking of Thoughts: What is 'le Penseur' Doing?" (2009 [1968]). Geertz assigned it to his context-inclusive and rigorously interpretive form of ethnography.

[34] See also 2005: 11-12, 30-1, 41-2. Latour has referred to his work as "comparative anthropology" (2004: 42-3, 2013: 290-91), and mentioned exposure to ethnography in Africa as one of his methodological influences for science studies (Tresch 2013: 304-5). So it seems fitting that his methods coincide in many ways with Geertz's thick description (Latour 2005: 136). Interesting differences between their perspectives on description include the notions of "culture" and "context." Whereas Geertz portrayed culture as an important context in which things can be "intelligibly — that is, thickly — described" (1971: 14), Latour has criticized the tendency to evoke culture and context as background abstractions rather than uncovering key elements through perceptive and extensive description (2005: 147-8, 167-8, 175). Yet Geertz uses these terms with careful reflection and I think Latour would agree that his thick description involves tracing related influences to better document and understand human behavior as particular instances of culture in action.

[35] Other reflections concerning the study of everyday life that I have found useful include Dewey 1958: 104, Garfinkle 1967: vii, Lefebvre 2002 [1961]: 42, 44, de Certeau 1984: 205, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 120, 274, Barnett 2005: 11, Hardt and Negri 2009: 353, 362, Shevchenko 2009: 4-5.

attempt to illuminate the production of shared space in Moscow residential districts from multiple points of view before concluding with key implications. The following Historical Influences chapter examines past development of these landscapes for insight into why and how they are now free of serious blight.

HISTORICAL INFLUENCES

In tracing significant influences on the emergence and evolution of Moscow yards, I have focused on their governance broadly conceived. My scope includes the related activity of participants inside and outside government institutions, integrating political, social, economic, cultural and physical dimensions. Some factors exert greater influence than others, but even the apparently minor or loosely related help form a thorough basis for analyzing present conditions and resident perceptions in later chapters. After a brief introduction to past forms of housing now mainly converted to other uses, this historical account proceeds with the rise of buildings that are still residential.

For nearly eight centuries after the first known reference to Moscow, in 1147, the majority of its homes were made of wood — solid but prone to the ravages of invasion and the elements (Colton 1995: 25). During the 15th century, as Russia emerged from 200 years of Mongol subjugation, Moscow boyars, religious functionaries and wealthy merchants lived in sturdier *palaty* (Rakhmatullin 2007: 32-5, Bronovitskaya 2009a: 50, Figure 6).[36] These buildings often had thick walls of stucco-covered brick or stone. They were normally 2-3 stories high with modest vernacular designs known for sloping roofs, occasional turrets, slender chimneys and irregular windows.[37] Arched openings and delicate handcrafted trimmings were also common. By the late 1600s, Tsar Peter I (later named Emperor Peter the Great) was actively engaged in replacing many Slavic traditions with reforms derived from Western Europe. This included building a new capital — St. Petersburg — on the Baltic, with a plan based on the latest

[36] The word *palaty* translates as "dwellings," "chambers" or "wards."
[37] Moscow's vernacular architecture was fundamentally Slavic, but also incorporated Byzantine, Turkish, Persian, Gothic, Renaissance and baroque influences (Cracraft 1988: 19, 79, Cracraft and Rowland 2003: 9).

technology and distinctive northern baroque architecture (Cracraft and Rowland 2003: 10).[38] For over a century after Peter's rule, prominent Russian buildings remained closely aligned with European styles. Baroque gave way to spare neoclassicism under Empress Catherine II (Catherine the Great) during the late 1700s (Brumfield 1997: 5, Shvidkovsky 2007: 291).[39] Moscow's ample space and low building-density was conducive to "urban country manors" (*gorodskiye usad'by*), many of which had central courtyards facing the sidewalk (Cooke 1997: 155). Vladimir Frolov has described this neoclassical *cour d'honneur* layout as "a stretch of street that seems to have been brought inside a house," adding that "residents of the house regarded it as their own territory, but it was also possible for passers-by to glance inside and sit for a while on a bench" (2011: 31). A more imposing "Russian Empire" (*russkiy ampir*) neoclassicism developed through the patronage of Emperor Alexander I — particularly after the French invasion of 1812, when an estimated two-thirds of Moscow buildings were lost to fire (Colton 1995: 32). Historical eclecticism arose in the 1830s under Emperor Nicholas I, including renewed interest in local architectural traditions that led to the Russian Revival or "pseudorussian style" (*psevdorusskiy stil'*) (Riasanovsky 1959: 198-9, Brumfield 1997: 5).[40]

The liberal reforms of Emperor Alexander II, including abolition of serfdom in 1861, brought a period of accelerated capitalist development that saw Moscow's population rise from 364,000 in 1862 to well over a million by the century's end (Colton 1995: 757). As the prosperous bourgeoisie and nobility gained influence in comparison with the imperial court, construction of brick and stone apartment houses — known as "income-generating residences"

[38] Development of St. Petersburg occasioned a ban on stone construction in other Russian cities, which lasted from 1714 to 1728 but was not consistently enforced (Colton 1995: 28). For more on St. Petersburg's design, see Cracraft 1988: 6-7, 147.
[39] Gothic Revival also found expression at the time, especially around Moscow, but it was much less common. For more on the architecture of this period, see Schmidt 1989, Brumfield 2004: 303-47.
[40] Details on the rise of eclecticism appear in Brumfield 2004: 393-424.

(*dokhodnyye doma)* — provided new outlets for architectural eclecticism (Cheredina 2004: 3-25, RM 2008). William Craft Brumfield has explained that "financial considerations determined the form of housing, which was in effect a commercial product, directed toward pleasing a 'public' rather than a patron of art" (1991: 6). Yet apartment houses were expensive to build and maintain, rendering them inaccessible for less-affluent populations (Brumfield 1991: 85).[41] Some philanthropists and cooperatives managed to construct lower-cost versions, but most people working in Moscow — often seasonally — lived in crowded dormitories, barracks and other forms of lodging outside the city center (Bradley 1985: 55, Bater and French 1983b: 305).[42] A passport system regulated each citizen's permanent residence (Matthews 1993: 1-14). In wealthier parts of town, building managers delegated yard work to a custodian (*dvornik*) whose responsibilities included sweeping, removing garbage and handling minor repairs (Zakirova 2006: 17). With the rise of social unrest in the 1800s, the Okhrana secret police made use of yard custodians — often immigrants who lacked secure residency permits — to obtain information on subversive activity (Colton 1995: 38).[43]

New apartment houses in Russian cities reflected growing political divisions at the turn of the century. They lined the streets of St. Petersburg with eclectic motifs from architectural history, as was fashionable in Europe at the time. Usually attached or closely positioned, such buildings formed a small "courtyard-well" (*dvor-kolodets*) inside the block (Brumfield 1991: 4).

[41] Insurance companies were among the few institutions capable of financing large apartment houses, which had to be equipped with their own infrastructure for water, heat and electricity (Brumfield 1991: 70-1). Other wealthy businesspeople and aristocrats built apartment houses as well, but usually at smaller scales.

[42] Remarkable examples of lower-cost housing include the 1906 Solodovnikov at 65 Vtoraya Meshchanskaya Ulitsa (now Ulitsa Gilyarovskogo) and the 1912 Nirnzee at 10 Bol'shoy Gnezdnikovskiy Pereulok (Brumfield 1991: 77-8, Cheredina 2004: 19-23). The 1910 Tretyakov refuge at 3/8 Lavrushinskiy Pereulok was a communal house for artists' widows and orphans (Brumfield 1991: 83-4). For details on workers' housing on the outskirts of the city, see Colton 1995: 47.

[43] The name "Okhrana" (Security) referred to secret police and intelligence agencies charged with protecting imperial order after the Third Section — which played a comparable role since the reign of Nicholas I — disbanded in 1880 and Emperor Alexander II was assassinated in 1881 (Lauchlan 2005: 44-7). The Okhrana were officially within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which also encompassed normal policing and a variety of other municipal services (Colton 1995: 59).

Moscow also had architecture of this kind, but it was known for detached buildings in bold adaptations of traditional and contemporary styles from Russia and abroad (Brumfield 1991: 10, Colton 1995: 39). Russian Revival was especially popular in Moscow, where it featured prominently in the State Historical Museum and the Upper Trading Rows (now GUM) on Red Square, along with some brick apartment houses (Figure 7).[44] However, it did not replace eclecticism: practitioners drew upon a variety of influences associated with Russian culture and sometimes combined them with other historical styles (Figure 8). Russian traditions even found their way into the progressive "style moderne" (*stil' modern*), a unique adaptation of art nouveau, the Vienna Secession and the Arts and Crafts Movement that aimed to synthesize visual expression of all kinds with new construction technologies (Brumfield 1991: 77-85, Figures 9-10).[45] The style moderne was also more influential in Moscow than St. Petersburg. At the threshold of a new century, it briefly accommodated interests as divergent as promoting modernization, embodying spiritual values, articulating national identity, cultivating the arts, projecting sophistication, generating capital and even inspiring social democracy (Brumfield 1991: xix-xxi, 48-50).

After Russia's ill-fated war with Japan and domestic uprisings of 1905, many citizens rejected the style moderne as superficial and turned to neoclassicism in search of a "unifying idea" (Brumfield 1991: 240-2).[46] This movement was stronger in St. Petersburg, but it also influenced government buildings, cultural institutions and mansions in the former capital — for Moscow apartment houses, neoclassicism remained a source of decorative elements aside from a

[44] Artists and designers experimented with vernacular forms through small projects — including distinctive wooden buildings — at the Abramtsevo workshops near Moscow. For more on Abramtsevo, see Brumfield 1991: 33.
[45] For evidence of the Russian Revival in style moderne apartment buildings, see 3 Kursovoy Pereulok (1907), 14 Chistoprudnyy Bul'var (1909) and 3/8 Lavrushinskiy Pereulok (1910) (Brumfield 1991: 81-4).
[46] According to William Craft Brumfield, between 1905 and 1915 neoclassicism "developed as an extension of modernism [in some cases an adaptation rather than a rejection of the style moderne], an expression of nostalgia for bygone cultural values, and a reformulated sense of imperial monumentality on a modern urban scale" (1991: 242).

few comprehensive designs (Brumfield 1991: 259, 270, Figure 11). As evident in architectural contrasts between Russia's leading cities, apprehension over national identity motivated searches for a common future in the past.

Specialists in local history (*krayevedy)*, along with fellow travelers, started the Old Moscow Society in 1909 to promote understanding and appreciation of Russian cultural heritage (Colton 1995: 39). One of the most energetic members — artist Igor Grabar (see Figure 12 for one of his paintings of a Moscow yard) — researched, taught and wrote extensively on the history of Russian architecture. He also became a respected advocate and practitioner of architectural conservation. In 1910, he helped establish the Society for the Defense and Preservation in Russia of Monuments and Ancient Times (Berton 1977: 198). This group was similar to William Morris's Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (French 1996: 179), but its approach was closer to that of the Cambridge Camden Society in applying rigorous historical study and current technologies to recapture the original beauty of aging structures (French 1995: 179-80).[47]

Along with protecting cultural heritage, Moscow intellectuals were actively involved in environmental conservation. Eminent poet Alexander Blok translated Ebenezer Howard's *Garden Cities of To-Morrow* (1902 [1898]) to Russian in 1911. Partially inspired by the work of Russian scientist-activist Peter Kropotkin, Garden City ideas included collective land tenure in transit-linked settlements of limited size to prevent extreme concentrations of wealth and power

[47] A passage in *The Ecclesiologist*, the Camden Society journal, explained: "To restore is to revive the original appearance … lost by decay, accident or ill judged alteration" (as quoted in White 1962: 159, French 1995: 191). In contrast: "Morris subscribed to John Ruskin's view that later generations shouldn't try to restore or improve upon 'monuments of a bygone art, created by bygone manners that modern art cannot meddle with without destroying' (Morris's *Manifesto for the Society of the Preservation of Ancient Buildings*), instead simply preserving them from destruction" (French 1995: 179-80). According to Grabar, "[o]ne must not forget that there is restoration and restoration, and if Morris struggled against 'restoration' in inverted commas, against unfounded and undocumented reconstructions, then scientifically based restoration does not meet opposition" (1969: 379). This approach became dominant in Moscow (French 1995: 180), resulting in "sham replicas" (*mulyazhi*) of historic architecture when misapplied after the Soviet era (Cecil and Harris 2007: 2, 78-82, Harris 2009: 227-36).

Figure 6. Old *palaty* repurposed as shops along the right side of Ulitsa Petrovka (top). At 26 Ulitsa Petrokva, an 1876 apartment house (bottom, in the central background) incorporates Renaissance forms (MKN 2011). Image sources: Woolwich 2013 (top), Mikhlin 2010 (bottom)[48]

[48] Sources are included for all images that I did not produce myself. See the References section for details.

Figure 7. An example of Russian Revival architecture from 1883 at 11 Stoleshnikov Pereulok. Ivan Bogomolov designed this building to serve as both storefront and apartment house (Brumfield 1991: 2-3). Its small interior courtyard is accessible by tunnel from the sidewalk. Image source: Makarevich 1998



Figure 8. The Rossiya Insurance Company apartment house at 2 and 6 Sretenskiy Bul'var, constructed from 1899 to 1902 based on a design by Nikolay Proskurnin (Brumfield 1991: 70-1, Cheredina 2004: 16-7). Image sources: MPMB 2013 (top), Tsarin 2014 (bottom)



Figure 9. A style moderne apartment house at 23 Sadovaya-Kudrinskaya Ulitsa on the Garden Ring. It was designed by Anatoliy Chizhikov and built in 1901 (Brumfield 1991: 71-2). Image source: Seakonst 2009



Figure 10. The Stroganov School apartment house at 24 Myasnitskaya Ulitsa, a subtle manifestation of the style moderne by Fedor Shekhtel (Cheredina 2004: 11-4). Upon realization in 1904, this building's unique courtyard (visible in the plan above), shops and modest clinic were among its many innovative features (Brumfield 1991: 158-60). Image source: Brumfield 1991



Figure 11. The neoclassical Shcherbatov apartment house at 11 Novinskiy Bul'var, designed by Alexander Tamanian and constructed from 1912 to 1913. Image source: Geynike et al. 1917

Figure 12. *Small Moscow Courtyard* by Igor Grabar. Image source: State Russian Museum 2013

(Starr 1976: 231, Fishman 1982: 36-7).[49] Architect Vladimir Semenov met Howard and worked for Raymond Unwin in England before returning to promote Garden Cities in Russia (French 1996: 32).[50] In 1912, he planned a settlement called Prozorovka (now Kratovo) for railroad employees 40 kilometers east of Moscow (Starr 1976: 234). A Garden City Society formed in St. Petersburg the following year (Starr 1976: 232, Kargon and Molella 2008: 25-6), and Moscow's City Duma (parliament) approved a plan to house 40,000 families in 20 municipal garden settlements around the city limits. Rubber workers began collecting dues for a similar community called Druzhba (Friendship) in 1914 (Colton 1995: 63). However, these attempts to relieve the housing crisis went unrealized as World War I and ensuing domestic upheaval took center stage.

Wartime losses and acute socio-economic problems brought workers' strikes to a crux in Petrograd on February 23, 1917 (Service 2009: 32).[51] As opposition to the imperial regime became uncontrollable, Emperor Nicholas II abdicated on March 2 (Wade 2005: 52). Revolutionary leaders promptly established the Russian Republic and, on the following day, formed a liberal-socialist Provisional Government to make way for an elected Constituent Assembly (Service 2009: 33-5). They were heavily reliant on the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and efforts to cooperate on solutions to immediate problems did not alleviate social unrest (Wade 2005: 53-8).[52] Following the All-Russia Congress of Soviets in

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[49] Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921) was born a prince but abnegated the title at an early age, eventually pursuing socio-ecological research along with political activity in support of anarcho-communist mutual aid (Bookchin 1982: 361). According to Paul Robbins, he pioneered what is now known as political ecology (2012: 27-8). He befriended William Morris (French 1995: 179), and Ebenezer Howard called him "the greatest democrat ever born to wealth and power" (as quoted in Fishman 1982: 37). Kropotkin published housing-related articles in *The Nineteenth Century* (an influential London journal) from 1888 to 1890, and later in his book *Fields, Factories and Workshops* (1901 [1899]). They envisioned collectively owned rural settlements — modeled after craftsmen's villages — with electric power, light industry and homes with small garden plots.

[50] Semënov published a book called *Beautification of Cities* (*Blagoustroystvo Gorodov*) in 1912. The word *blagoustroystvo* — also discussed in the Introduction chapter — is a concatenation of the words for "benefit" (as in a "good" or "blessing") and "apparatus" (or "arrangement"); it is still used frequently in reference to adding (or added) greenery, benches, playgrounds and other shared amenities.

[51] St. Petersburg was officially renamed Petrograd after the outbreak of war in 1914 (Service 2009: 27).

[52] The Russian word "soviet" (*sovet*) means "council" — in this case, an advisory or administrative body.

June, the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (RSDLP) Bolshevik faction mobilized powerful support outside the government and allied with sympathetic deputies to consummate a new revolution at the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets on October 25 (Fitzpatrick 2008: 52-65). The next day ended with bold decrees on withdrawing from the war, nationalizing land and establishing a governing Council of People's Commissars (SNK or Sovnarkom) chaired by Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin (Service 2009: 62-8). On October 30, the new People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) issued a resolution allowing municipalities to use available buildings for workers' housing (Andrusz 1984: 13-4).[53] In light of manifold threats to Bolshevik authority, NKVD official Feliks Dzerzhinsky secured approval from Sovnarkom on December 7 to found and direct the All-Russia Emergency Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage (VChK or Cheka) (Ryan 2012: 88-9).[54] With many years of experience fomenting revolution against the Okhrana, he began enforcing government mandates through predominantly (but not exclusively) clandestine, extralegal and violent operations.

Nationalization transformed the distribution, management and use of urban housing (Andrusz 1984: 13, Marcuse 1996: 127). A reported 20,000 low-income workers moved to buildings in central Moscow by the end of 1917 (Colton 1995: 120). Resettlement (*pereseleniye*) campaigns brought people from precarious living conditions into partitioned homes of the former aristocracy and bourgeoisie (Lebina 1999: 179, Hosking 2004: 57). Citizens of diverse backgrounds acquired shared rooms in communal flats (*kommunalki*), and yards once inaccessible to nonresidents became more and more public (Staub 2005: 342, Gorlov 2005:

[53] Along with municipal legislation, the NKVD was in charge of law enforcement and other public services (Colton 1995: 138, Chistyakov 2003).
[54] For more on sources of opposition to Bolshevik rule, see Wade 2005: 247-57. On the Cheka, see Colton 1995: 88-90, Andrew and Mitrokhin 1999: 24, Wade 2005: 278, Fitzpatrick 2008: 76, Service 2009: 69.

41).[55] Municipal authorities were responsible for housing administration (Andrusz 1984: 14-5). House directorates (*domoupravleniya*) supervised committees (*domkomy*) assigned to each building (Meerovich 2004b: 35-8, Vihavainen 2009: 38-9). In addition to maintaining order and collecting payments, these management organizations often collaborated with the Cheka to monitor resident activity (Colton 1995: 119).[56]

The first three months of 1918 brought more controversial government action — from abandoning the Constituent Assembly after its meeting on January 5 to confirming withdrawal from World War I through the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on March 3 to reinstating Moscow as capital city at the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on March 16 (Colton 1995: 97-8, Ryan 2012: 89-92). In April, the Moscow City Council (Mossovet) established an architecture studio to begin planning for socialist reconstruction (Kazus' 2009: 36). Esteemed classicist Ivan Zholtovsky served as senior architect, while his teaching colleague — virtuoso Alexey Shchusev — managed a group of younger designers that included Nikolai Kolli, Sergey Chernyshev, Nikolai Ladovsky, Konstantin Melnikov and Pantaleimon Golosov (Khan-Magomedov 1996a: 65-8).[57] As they worked, rapid escalation of the Civil War in May served as justification for an official policy of War Communism announced the following month; this intensified the conscription of labor, nationalization of industry, requisition of grain and establishment of discipline (including suppression of dissent) by force (Andrusz 1984: 14-5, Colton 1995: 128, Ryan 2012: 97-102).[58] At the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on July 10, delegates ratified a Constitution for the newly christened Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) (Feldbrugge 1993: 89). Despite vigorous work to consolidate power, the government remained

[55] For more on urban resettlement into communal apartments, see Sosnovy 1959: 17, Boym 1994: 123-4, Colton 1995: 119-22, Fitzpatrick 1999: 47-9.
[56] See also Meerovich 2003: 172-3, Vihavainen 2009: 45-6.
[57] Details on Shchusev's life and work are compiled in Afanas'yev 1978.
[58] For more on War Communism, see Malle 1985, Sakwa 1988, Gatrelle 1994, Borisova 2001.

under attack from many sides. On August 30, Lenin was shot in a failed assassination attempt outside a Moscow factory, prompting Sovnarkom to issue a decree six days later on the Red Terror (Service 2009: 107-8, Ryan 2012: 111-9).[59] This authorized overwhelming retributive and preemptive measures against "enemies of the revolution" and spurred aggressive housing expropriation in the capital (Colton 1995: 88-90, 120-1).

As the new government battled for sovereignty, Zholtovsky's Mossovet studio issued a report after four months of work. It advocated investment in street cleaning, public bathrooms, bridge construction, removal of smoke-emitting factories and "blocks of hygienic, beautiful housing for the needy" (Colton 1995: 106). Mark Yelizarov, commissar of fire protection (and Lenin's brother-in-law), proposed replacing substandard central housing with government offices and resettling people to Garden Cities linked by subway (Colton 1995: 113). He commissioned plans for a settlement called Privol'e (Free Space) that featured amenities such as cooperative gardens beside cottages and apartment buildings for 100,000 residents. In October, architect-surveyor Boris Sakulin showed Zholtovsky his City of the Future proposal for vast regional coordination beyond Moscow's borders — including a greenbelt and satellite towns connected by rail (Colton 1995: 113-5). These early ideas were to reappear in many future plans for the capital.[60]

On the initiative of Lenin and Commissar of Enlightenment Anatoly Lunacharsky — Sovnarkom passed an October 5, 1918, decree on registering and preserving cultural heritage (Potapova 1988: 142, French 1995: 178). Announcements urged citizens to "protect the monuments, the old buildings … all this is your history, your pride" (Ratiya and Dogina 1952: 177, French 1995: 179). The Commissariat of Enlightenment (Narkompros) backed Igor

[59] The shooting was attributed to Fanya Kaplan in support of the Constituent Assembly and Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (SR) (Service 2009: 107).
[60] For more on Moscow planning history, see Khazanova 1970, Moscow City Government 2010, Romodin 2011, NIiPIGM 2013.

Grabar's efforts to found the Commission on Detection and Preservation of Ancient Artistic Monuments, which assembled *krayevedy*, technicians and other enthusiasts to repair historic landmarks (VKhNRTs 2011). Architect-archaeologist Petr Baranovsky, who had travelled around the country photographing old churches and manors during his student years, was among the specialists who assisted Grabar (Colton 1995: 111). Lunacharsky also reorganized the prerevolution Collegium for Museum Affairs into the Department of Museums and Preservation of Ancient Monuments, placing it under the leadership of architect-restorationist Nikolay Vinogradov (Berton 1977: 199).

Zholtovsky's studio presented a schematic plan to the national Department of City Planning in December 1918, recommending a historically sensitive adaptation of the capital's radial layout.[61] Department representatives generally praised its ideas for restoration, overcrowding and traffic flow but sought more ambitious development. Some proposed adding a greenbelt that penetrated into the urban core through a series of wedges, along with 1- and 2-story homes, small garden plots, subway links to the periphery, and nodal satellite towns connected by a new radial railway (Khazanova 1970). With these updates, the plan was officially approved in February 1919 but not published or implemented; it instead served as a basis for expanded studies under Shchusev's direction with assistance from Garden City specialist Vladimir Semenov (Colton 1995: 107).

In March 1919, Feliks Dzerzhinsky became Commissar of Internal Affairs in addition to leading the Cheka (Ryan 2012: 121). The secret police was thus closely related to normal law enforcement and other forms of maintaining order — including finance and supervision of public services like street cleaning (Chistyakov 2003). The first Soviet spring-cleaning day (*subbotnik*)

[61] The new Department of City Planning was part of the Supreme Economic Council (VSNKh) Chief Committee of State Building (Komgosoor) (Colton 1995: 106).

took place in Moscow on May 10, but political and economic instability hindered efforts to rebuild (Colton 1995: 126). The People's Commissariat for Healthcare (Narkomvzdrav) set dwelling space (as opposed to total space, which included closets, bathrooms, kitchens and corridors) at a "sanitary norm" of 8.25 square meters per capita on July 17 (Bater 1980: 98, Strembelev 2010: 169).[62] Citizens whose dwelling space exceeded this norm were subject to "densification" (*uplotneniye*) through resettlement of new tenants into their apartments. Svetlana Boym has evocatively rendered Lenin's influence on this policy as well as its consequences:

> In his memoirs Joseph Brodsky [the poet and Nobel laureate] calls his family's living quarters, poetically and quite literally, "a room and a half." What appears striking in Lenin's decree is that it suggests a different understanding of home and space than one is used to in Western Europe or in the United States. A person, or rather a statistical unit (in Lenin's expression, "the soul of the population"), was not entitled to a room or to a private space but only to a number of square meters. The space is divided mathematically or bureaucratically as if it were an abstract problem in geometry, not the real space of existing apartments. As a result, most of the apartments in the major cities were partitioned in an incredible and often unfunctional manner, creating strange spaces, long corridors, and so-called black entrances through labyrinthine inner courtyards. (Boym 1994: 125)

Government leaders, military officers, Cheka agents, valued scientists and other prestigious groups were far less susceptible to densification (Colton 1995: 159, 821).

[62] According to B. Michael Frolic, dwelling space averaged roughly 65 percent of total space (1964: 305). For more on this policy, see Andrusz 1984: 15, 297.

As the Civil War raged and urban populations declined, more than 25 percent of Moscow's 231,000 housing units were destroyed or rendered otherwise uninhabitable between 1919 and 1921 (Colton 1995: 126). Mossovet called upon Dzerzhinsky to lead a Commission for the Improvement of Workers' Living Conditions, which employed the Cheka to help move a reported 11,000 workers to house-communes, secure building materials, reestablish needed services (e.g., laundry and pharmacies), improve the tram system and redistribute clothing (Colton 1995: 149). On March 21, 1921, as the Civil War came to an end, War Communism gave way to Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), which allowed limited private enterprise to provide goods and services as a temporary means of hastening recovery (Ryan 2012: 159-61).[63] This included support for economic cooperatives, which had existed in Russia since at least 1865 and expanded considerably since 1905 (Andrusz 1992: 138-9, Vihavainen 2009: 53). House-renting and house-building partnerships (ZhAKT and ZhSKT, respectively) refurbished homes, and ZhSKT began constructing new ones (Lebina 2003: 36).

With the decline of urgent threats to government control, reconstruction took center stage in 1922. The Cheka further institutionalized on February 6 as the State Political Directorate (GPU) — still within the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Siegelbaum 1992: 15, Andrew and Mitrokhin 1999: xv). Mossovet established the Moscow Communal Management (MKKh) department to clean and repair buildings, roads, walkways and yards (Colton 1995: 159). Early residential construction involved adding floors to prerevolution homes (Figure 13), but more-ambitious projects soon gained momentum. The Garden Cities Society reconvened in Moscow with a focus on socialist regional planning (Kargon and Molella 2008: 26). Many viewed the Garden City as a step toward relieving overcrowded cities in keeping with Marxian visions of uniting town and country (Starr 1978: 217-8). Boris Sakulin completed an updated

[63] For a detailed account of the NEP transition and its influence on development in Moscow, see Colton 1995: 153-74.

City of the Future plan, adding detail to his projections for regional development with transit links between nodal cities. His ideas were similar in many ways to those of Patrick Geddes (1915), whose support for historic preservation was shared by influential Soviet planners. Establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (SSSR) and a new Constitution — ratified at the first All-Union Congress of Soviets on December 31, 1922 — encouraged optimism that innovative urban development was in store (Service 2009: 132).

Alexey Shchusev released a plan in 1923 called New Moscow, which built upon Ivan Zholtovsky's initial sketches (French 1995: 178). It maintained the city's pattern of radial and concentric roadways, with careful adaptations to facilitate mobility. Green "corridors" spanned from center to outskirts along major roadways. Central buildings were limited to 6 stories, gradually descending to 1- and 2-story homes around Moscow's expanded borders. The Kremlin was to become a museum as government offices moved north to Khodynka Field. Other historic buildings served as focal points throughout the city, with churches and monasteries preserved within parks (Bronovitskaya 2009: 134).

In the spirit of early Soviet plans for Moscow, Igor Grabar pursued a selective approach to historic preservation. He explained: "Without tearing down, the town cannot grow, it is necessary to remove the old and give place to the new, but all this must follow a strictly worked out plan, accompanied by maximum guarantees with the aim of saving everything historically and artistically valuable" (1969: 359, French 1995: 180). Grabar travelled to London in 1923 to address the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Buildings, where he tactfully avoided the word "restoration" but maintained that it was possible and often necessary to "repair" architecture of the past (French 1995: 179-80).

While teaching at the innovative Higher Artistic-Technical Studios (Vkhutemas),[64] Shchusev collaborated with restorationist-architect Nikolai Markovnikov on a cooperative settlement called Sokol, which featured small cottages, winding streets and ample commons (Colton 1995: 221, French 1996: 36). As Sokol took shape on Moscow's northwest periphery in 1923, prominent architects involved with its design saw their work realized in other parts of the city as well. Leonid Vesnin's residential development at Simonova Sloboda — on a 2.5-hectare plot south of Moscow's Garden Ring (Sadovoye Kol'tso) — has been described as a "garden court apartment complex" made up of 12 multi-unit buildings with communal services that included a cafeteria, a nursery, a kindergarten, playgrounds, a washhouse and a repair shop (Stites 1989: 200).[65] Nikolai Kolli and Sergey Chernyshev reportedly designed another complex of this kind on an 8-hectare plot near Bol'shaya Serpukhovskaya Ulitsa in the industrial Zamoskvarech'e district (Bunin and Savarenskaya 1979).

Workers' settlements, dormitories and cooperatives were opportunities for architects to experiment with new designs for collective living (Cecil 2009: 70-3). Although cooperatives' share of total investment in housing rose to 17 percent nationwide between 1921 and 1924, participation remained unaffordable for the vast majority of people (Shomina 1999). The "house-commune" (*dom-kommuna*) — a multi-unit residential building with emphasis on shared amenities — played an important role in visions of socialist cities (Stites 1989: 200, Humphrey

[64] Following the revolution, Lenin's administration began restructuring art and design education into State-Sponsored Free Artistic Studios (GSKhM). Moscow's Stroganov School of Applied Arts became the First GSKhM and the Moscow School of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture became the Second GSKhM (Khan-Magomedov 1996a: 140). During their second year in operation, students called for participation in updating the curriculum and selecting instructors; this prompted the two studios' integration to form Vkhutemas in 1920, quickly gaining world renown as a center of avant-garde design (Colton 1995: 105-6). For richly illustrated background on Vkhutemas, see Ivanova-Veen et al. 2005.

[65] Leonid Vesnin worked with his brother Victor on a rustic log house at 23/2 Surikova Ulitsa in Sokol, where Victor ended up living. Before the revolution, Victor and their brother Alexander worked on a striking neoclassical apartment house built in 1910 at 15 Myasnitskaya Ulitsa (Brumfield 1991: 259); the three brothers also designed mansions, businesses and churches inspired by the style moderne (Brumfield 1991: 91-5, 99, 110-1, 227, 295). For more on Leonid's housing complex at Simonova Sloboda, see Bunin and Savarenskaya 1979.

2005: 39, Figure 14). Most of the housing completed during the 1920s was modest, practical and compatible with the New Moscow plan. Some architects designed workers' settlements to coexist harmoniously with nearby landmarks: the open courtyards of Usachëvskiy, for example, face Novodevichy Convent, and the lateral avenues of Khavsko-Shabolovsky (Figure 15) point toward Donskoy Monastery. This offered aesthetic and utilitarian benefits as church facilities became museums, community centers and hostels (Bronovitskaya 2009: 135). Several monasteries, however, remained part of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs following their adaptation into "concentration camps" during the Civil War; these operations transferred to the Unified State Political Directorate (OGPU, formerly GPU) established to cover all Soviet republics in 1923 (Colton 1995: 90, 159).

Despite widespread support for preserving cultural heritage, there were also strong movements in favor of eliminating symbols of the old regime and thoroughly modernizing the Soviet capital (French 1995: 178-9).[66] With backing from some public officials, the League of Militant Atheists zealously promoted demolition of religious art and architecture (Colton 1995: 228). After Lenin's death, Ivan Zholtovsky and Alexey Shchusev met with growing resistance in their attempts to save Moscow landmarks and realize their city plans.[67] Igor Grabar's Commission on Detection and Preservation of Ancient Artistic Monuments joined with other Soviet conservation groups to form the Central State Restoration Workshops (TsGRM) in 1924, working intensively despite a steady withdrawal of government support (VKhNRTs 2011). In the same year, architect-engineer Moisei Ginzburg published *Style and Epoch*, a treatise on modernist architecture that corresponded with the writings of Le Corbusier (Khan-Magomedov 1972: 18). Ginzburg also collaborated with Leonid Vesnin's brother Alexander to form the

[66] See Khazanova 1970 for a detailed account of competing perspectives on cultural heritage during the 1920s.
[67] For more on the participation of Zholtovsky and Shchusev in conflicts over architectural preservation, as well as government reception of their plans for Moscow, see Colton 1995: 227-33.

Organization of Contemporary Architects (OSA) in 1925, which soon became a highly influential source of theory, methods, research, experimentation and discourse focused on socialist design (Hudson 1986: 558).[68]

Mossovet engineer Sergei Shestakov led a planning commission that formed in 1925 to coordinate regional development. The resulting Greater Moscow plan comprised 1,800 square meters — 8 times Moscow's size during the 1920s — with concentric zoning, a freight railway, Garden Cities and a greenbelt (Colton 1995: 233-6). Garden Cities were to relieve overcrowding in compliance with a 1926 increase of the sanitary norm to 9 square meters; actual dwelling space per capita ranged from 4.3 to 7.5 square meters (Colton 1995: 173). The Greater Moscow commission recommended placing factories in a special zone to reduce exposure to pollution. Architectural preservation received little concern. Government backing for the plan was strong in comparison with New Moscow, but it proved even less viable due to required costs. Practical needs of this kind led to changes in urban design training. Architect Pavel Novitsky took over as rector of Vkutemas in 1926, changing the name to Vkhutein ("institute" replaced "studios") and developing ties with industry to guide student experimentation (Cooke 1996: 168-73).

Despite the need for solutions to immediate problems, intense debate over the future of socialist cities found expression in publications, exhibitions and design contests of the late 1920s. Participants developed and promoted movements such as constructivism, rationalism, suprematism, urbanism, disurbanism and proletarianism.[69] The most avant-garde ideas were almost indistinguishable from science fiction (Stites 1989: 190-200), while those on the opposite

[68] This translation of Ob"yedineniye Sovremennykh Arkhitektorov (OSA) reflects the group's differentiation from the Association of New Architects (ASNOVA). Both groups were made up primarily of avant-garde instructors and students from Vkhutemas, but their perspectives on architectural form differed. In general, OSA identified with constructivism in placing emphasis on function while ASNOVA promoted a distinctive rationalism that embraced the psychological influence of form itself. See Khazanova 1970 and Khan-Magomedov 1996a for details on these organizations.

[69] For more on these movements, see Hudson 1986, Stites 1989, Starr 1978, Khan-Magomedov 1996a, 1996b.

extreme synthesized traditional motifs to inspire the working masses (French 1996: 38). All shared bold visions of a future in which advanced technology, guided by socialist principles, drastically improved living conditions worldwide. Moscow architects and planners also collaborated with luminaries from other countries, including Le Corbusier, Hannes Meyer, Bruno Taut, Ernst May and Clarence Stein.[70]

The prevailing way of life (*byt*) became a target of reform in the Soviet Union, and many architects sought to influence social consciousness through housing design (Buchli 1999: 24, 63, Humphrey 2005: 40). Proponents of urbanism envisioned 7-story house-communes nestled in a "living zone" with open parks (Hudson 1986: 566). Radical versions of the house-commune (with separate quarters for children, "industrial" operations for domestic tasks, and a bare minimum of private space) did not catch on, but approximations began to appear during the late 1920s. Moisei Ginzburg and Ignaty Milinis designed a famous house-commune for the Commissariat of Finance (Narkomfin), which was partially realized from 1928 to 1930 (Buchli 1999: 67, Figure 16).[71] This 8-story apartment building — set in a small park and linked by enclosed bridge to a wing for communal services — exemplified groundbreaking modernist residential designs of the 1920s. It fulfilled each of Le Corbusier's Five Points of a New Architecture and influenced the Swiss modernist's later work (Buchli 1998: 180, Sherwood 2001: 120). However, it did not fulfill communitarian and egalitarian visions of Soviet architecture. Commissar of Finance Nikolai Miliutin (also known for his Sotsgorod and Lineal City plans) designed a penthouse for his family on the building's roof (Buchli 1999: 74).[72]

[70] Nikolai Kolli, for example, ended up working closely with Le Corbusier on the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives (Tsentrosoyuz) building in Moscow.
[71] See Buchli 1998 for a detailed article on the design of Narkomfin and its historical milieu.
[72] For more on Nikolai Miliutin, see Bocharev and Khan-Magomedov 2007.

During construction of Narkomfin, Ginzburg collaborated with Mikhail Barshch in a competition to design a recreational hamlet called Zelënyy Gorod (Green City) on the outskirts of Moscow (Colton 1995: 241). Other avant-garde architects, including Nikolai Ladovsky and Konstantin Melnikov, also submitted influential proposals. Ginzburg and Barshch published their disurbanist Ribbon City plan in 1930, which featured self-assembled housing units spaced along transnational motorways (Hudson 1986: 572). They proposed turning Moscow into a park as institutions of governance, culture, education and commerce dispersed across the Soviet Union. This plan reflected the influence of sociologist Mikhail Okhitovich, who advocated eliminating disparities between town and country, placing limits on centralized government and safeguarding individual freedoms (Stites 1989: 194-6). Although disurbanism also contained elements of technological utopianism against the "idiocy of rural life," its embrace by Ginzburg and Barshch — after much debate in the OSA journal *Sovremennaya Arkhitektura* (*Contemporary Architecture*) — was grounded in research on human experience and preferences related to early communal housing (Hudson 1986: 571-4, Stites 1989: 48, 203).

State Planning Committee (Gosplan) economist Leonid Sabsovich championed urbanist schemes for massive house-communes, which Ginzburg eventually rejected for lacking variety, adaptability and efficient scale (Hudson 1986: 570, 573). Sabsovich also called for distributing cities throughout the country, limiting their size and equipping them with communal services (Sabsovich 1930: 41-53, Stites 1989: 198-200). These ideas were taken up by Gosplan Chief Economist Stanislav Strumilin, who reportedly introduced the microdistrict (*mikrorayon*) concept in 1930 to represent an urban community with shared services planned for a given population size (Bunin and Savarenskaya 1979).[73]

[73] Urban historians Vyacheslav Glazychev (2008) and Vladimir Gorlov (2005: 187) have written that early Soviet planners equated the term "microdistrict" with "neighborhood" in Clarence Perry's work on the Neighborhood Unit

Planning debates and new construction occurred amid "wholesale destruction of architectural treasures" in Moscow, prompting Igor Grabar's resignation from the Central State Restoration Workshops in 1930 (French 1995: 180). The Old Moscow Society, the Garden Cities Society and the Department for Museum Affairs and Protection of Landmarks came to an end around the same time (Colton 1995: 233, 307). Vkhutein also closed as its integrated disciplines became separate institutes in 1930; architecture merged with the engineering-focused Moscow Higher Technical School (MVTU) to form the Institute for Architecture and Construction (ASI) (Ivanova-Veen 2005: 8). Two years into the first Five-Year Plan, spearheaded by increasingly powerful Communist Party General Secretary Joseph Stalin, Moscow was in the throes of chaotic growth. Although the nationwide plan — which focused on heavy industry, defense and agriculture — ended the less controlled development of the NEP years, there was still no legally binding plan for the Soviet capital (Colton 1995: 237, 247).

In May 1930, planners from Moscow Communal Management sent a 30-section questionnaire to influential architects and other experts from around the world. Boris Sakulin and Vladimir Semenov used this opportunity to expand upon their plans from the early 1920s, while Nikolai Ladovsky, Le Corbusier and Pantaleimon Golosov presented remarkably innovative schemes (Colton 1995: 239). Ladovsky's Dynamic City proposal involved breaking with Moscow's radial structure and allowing northwest expansion along the vectors of a parabola. Le Corbusier called for almost total redevelopment (sparing only the Kremlin and a few other

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(1929). According to Donald Johnson (2002), Perry appropriated the concept from a proposal developed between 1913 and 1916 by architect William Drummond, based partly on the work of sociologist Charles Cooley (1909). Early Soviet planners were aware of Perry's Neighborhood Unit, but the extent to which it influenced their thinking is unclear. Superblocks planned and constructed in Moscow before Perry's publication embodied fundamental principles of microdistricts, which are similar to those promoted by Nikolai Miliutin in *The Problem of Building Socialist Cities* (1974 [1930], French 1995: 37-41, 81, Collier 2011: 33). Although Miliutin's ideas were clearly influenced by Ebenezer Howard (especially their emphasis on industry buffered with green space from nearby residential areas), he considered the Garden City a capitalist utopian illusion (1974 [1930]: 54). For more on Stanislav Strumilin and the microdistrict, see Strumilin 1930, 1961: 16, Frolic 1964: 285-7, French 1995: 38, 81. For comparative analysis of Strumilin's approach to planning, see Collier 2011: 56.

historic landmarks) in the form of rectangular administrative, industrial and residential zones; people were to live in skyscrapers surrounded by green space at a population density of 1,000 per hectare (Colton 1995: 243). Submissions from planning officials and engineers — notably Genrikh Puzis, German Krasin, Stanislav Strumilin and Leonid Sabsovich — were no less bold (Khan-Magomedov 1996b: 269). Sabsovich proposed capping Moscow's population at 1.5 million and gradually reducing it to 800,000 — a level not seen since the 1880s (Colton 1995: 245). His plan envisioned relocating people to "new socialist towns" 30 to 70 kilometers outside the city, each with 50,000 to 70,000 residents in groups of 1,400 to 2,000 per building (Stites 1988: 199). Many ideas from the questionnaires appeared in future plans despite an unfavorable government response at the time.

On May 29, 1930, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (TsK KPSS) published a decree titled "On Work at the Reconstruction of the Way of Life" in the state newspaper *Pravda* (*Truth*) denouncing "utopian" plans for socialist cities (Hudson 1986: 569, Colton 1995: 245-6, French 1995: 42). Lazar Kaganovich, a staunch ally of Stalin, led this initiative as first secretary of the Communist Party's Moscow Oblast Committee (Mosobkom) and its subordinate Moscow City Committee (Mosgorkom).[74] Moscow's top building trusts merged to form Mosproyekt in 1930, which soon established a department of municipal architecture and planning studios (Kazus' 2009: 137, 143-5, Mosproyekt 2011).[75] On June 15 of the following year, Kaganovich addressed the Central Committee plenum with definitive objectives for reconstruction of the Soviet capital (Colton 1995: 254). These objectives included reducing population density (without extreme decentralization), building apartments for 500,000 people within three years, expanding and straightening major roadways, and investing in sewage

[74] Mosobkom and Mosgorkom shared a first secretary until 1949 (Colton 1995: 253).
[75] Detailed information on the rise of Mosproyekt is available in Kazus' 2009: 157, 161-2.

removal, heating, electricity, parks, bridges and tram lines (French 1995: 62-3, Cooke 1997: 155). Kaganovich challenged designers to formulate a "serious Marxist theoretical basis" for giving cities "necessary beauty" (as quoted in Cooke 1993: 94). More specifically, he announced that work would begin the following year on a subway system and a canal with reservoirs along its nearly 200-kilometer path from Moscow to the Volga River. Despite his pronouncement that Soviet cities became socialist in 1917, he portrayed new construction projects as a "great war" for socialism and expressed the importance of coordinating public works through a unified plan (Colton 1995: 254).[76]

In October 1931, an invitational planning competition for the Soviet capital drew submissions from Nikolai Ladovsky, German Krasin, architect Vladimir Kratyuk, the League of Proletarian Architects (VOPRA), and a Bauhaus contingent that included Hannes Meyer, Ernst May and Kurt Mayer (Khan-Magomedov 1996b: 278-9).[77] Most of these plans, though generally more practical than the questionnaire submissions of the previous year, reflected a decentralization trend that was out-of-step with the objectives established by Kaganovich. The Stalin administration lacked resources to build geographically distributed Garden Cities or radically transform Moscow's existing layout, and its stability hinged partially on showing the benefits of loyalty through impressive central housing (Vihavainen 2009: 48). Despite the many groundbreaking ideas that emerged following the revolution, change had yet to register substantively in the urban fabric. According to a 1931 inventory, 87 percent of the 51,282 residential buildings in Moscow were of 1 or 2 stories, 2.6 percent were over 3 stories, 70.7 percent were made of wood or mixed materials and 29.3 percent were brick (Goldenberg 1935). This composition began to change dramatically, starting from the center.

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[76] For more on the discourse of socialist reconstruction as war, see Colton 1995: 280, Paperny 2002: 250-7.
[77] See also Colton 1995: 273-5, French 1995: 36.

A massive 12-story apartment complex for high-ranking officials opened across the river from the Kremlin in 1931 (Figure 17). Known as the "House of the Government" (Dom Pravitel'stva) or House on the Embankment (Dom na Naberezhnoy), it became infamously linked with the imprisonment and execution of residents during Stalin's purges (Colton 1995: 168).[78] Despite many avant-garde design elements, its stately visage and exclusive amenities for prominent residents augured a new direction in Soviet housing. In 1932, the Central Committee issued a decree to restructure independent architectural associations into the Union of Soviet Architects under government control (Shvidkovsky 1971: 181, French 1995: 43). Yet despite Stalin's obvious impact on urban design, the process was not as homogeneous and bluntly autocratic as often portrayed (Paperny 2002: xviii). Socialist Realism — the concept behind official restructuring of artistic production during the early Stalin years — was more than a rejection of "bourgeois" modernism by authoritarian means. Through reflection and debate, it developed into a complex approach to integrating the arts with daily life. For architects, as Catherine Cooke has emphasized:

> Socialist Realism demanded that they 'critically assimilate' the total design heritage of the world's preceding cultures, as Marxist-Leninism decreed that this legacy of human knowledge and experience was the foundation on which the proletariat would build its new society. Henceforth all cultural products must be 'socialist in content' but the 'realism' meant they must be 'national in form'. Whilst being Soviet they must work with local traditions to build new languages and new common myths. For building design as

[78] Boris Iofan, architect of the House of the Government, won the series of international competitions to design a "Palace of the Soviets" to replace the Cathedral of Christ the Savior across the river from this exclusive residence. His proposal, selected over those by Le Corbusier and many other famous designers, evolved (with input from prominent Soviet architects and Stalin himself) into a grandiose pseudo-classical tower crowned with a 90-meter, 6,000-ton statue of Lenin (Colton 1995: 260).

> for literature or the other arts this was no small task in the multi-national Soviet Union. It required all their resources of inventiveness and subtlety if the results were not to fall short of the profession's own historically established standards of what was 'architecture'. (Cooke 1997: 138)[79]

Modernist architects who managed to align with government priorities remained in active practice. Moisei Ginzburg and Mikhail Barshch joined the new State Urban Planning Institute (Giprogor), and Nikolai Ladovsky headed Mosproyekt Studio № 5 (Kazus' 2009: 107, 153-7, 170).[80] Victor Vesnin, who shared his brother Alexander's dedication to constructivism, designed for heavy industry while leading both the Union of Architects and the Academy of Architecture (Cheredina 2007: 347-9). The academy, founded in 1933 along with the Moscow Architectural Institute (MAI, now MArkhI), cultivated research, innovation, dialog and expertise with a focus on meeting the practical needs of state building (Kazhdan 2006). Despite a shift toward incorporating traditional motifs in prominent architecture, streamlined forms characteristic of the modernist avant-garde remained popular through most of the 1930s (Khan-Magomedov 1996b: 642, Figure 18). According to Anatoly Lunacharsky, Socialist Realism was a method — not a style — that involved drawing upon many styles to link cultural heritage with visions of a radiant future (Cooke 1993: 86). Practitioners selectively adopted elements from throughout the Soviet Union and other parts of the world, integrating visual arts with new technologies to form architectural ensembles capable of inspiring the populace. Lightness and utility were essential qualities, particularly for new homes that offered spacious private apartments for people of higher status (Cooke 1997: 142, 151-2).

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[79] For more on Socialist Realism, see Groys 1992, Cooke 1993, Lahusen and Dobrenko 1997, Clark 2003, Dobrenko and Neiman 2003, Dobrenko 2007.

[80] Giprogor was part of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Kazus' 2009: 148).

Mosgorkom established an Architecture-Planning Directorate (APU) in February 1932, and Vladimir Semenov — now chief architect of Moscow — led a group of 250 specialists in drawing up a general plan (genplan) for the capital (Kazus' 2009: 166-7).[81] In July, Kaganovich reiterated Stalin's position on Moscow's future to a group of officials and experts, calling for centralized development based on the city's radial layout (Colton 1995: 274). The "great war" for socialism had already begun with accelerated demolition of old buildings — from dilapidated to divine — over the persistent objections of Aleksey Shchusev, Ivan Zholtovsky and other concerned citizens. Moscow's state-protected buildings decreased from 474 in 1928 to 117 in 1932 (Colton 1995: 267). Clearing space became a priority in efforts to realize Stalinist visions of a bright, spacious and technologically advanced capital city. Kaganovich appointed Nikita Khrushchev — a Moscow Communist Party district representative with whom he had worked closely in Ukraine — as second secretary of Mosgorkom in January 1932. Khrushchev began working tirelessly to carry out the genplan and infrastructure projects announced by his patron, drawing manpower from the Chief Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies (Gulag) under the Unified State Political Directorate secret police (Colton 1995: 257-9).

Semenov's planning team attempted to integrate green space, housing and employment in accordance with Garden City principles. However, government priorities such as expanded streets and monumental ensembles dominated the genplan model released in February 1933 (Colton 1995: 275-6). Yet it did feature a greenbelt, parks around the city center, and spacious yards within residential blocks. In September, Mosgorkom and Mossovet started the Architectural Planning Committee (Arkhplan), with Kaganovich as chair, to eliminate impediments surrounding land use, construction and approval (Bliznakov 1976: 253, Kazus'

[81] For more on the origins of Mosgorkom's Architecture-Planning Directorate, see Colton 1995: 272-3.



Figure 13. A prerevolution apartment house at 13 Golikovskiy Pereulok that gained four extra stories (top) in 1923. See Figure 50, Number 5, for pictures of this building today. Image source: Sergeev 1961



Figure 14. A house-commune built from 1926 to 1927 on Khavskiy Pereulok (now 18 Ulitsa Lesteva) for the First Zamoskvarech'e cooperative of "technical intelligentsia and factory managers" (Oparin 2011).[82] It was designed by Georgy Vol'fenzon and Samuil Ayzikovich. Image source: Larin 2010

[82] The word "intelligentsia" referred to citizens with higher education in fields such as journalism, medicine, the arts, design and the sciences; it sometimes implied privilege along with critical views of the government and masses (Hill and Gaddy 2013: 40).



Figure 15. A view of Donskoy Monastery from the Khavsko-Shabolovsky workers' settlement (top). Built at Khavskiy Pereulok (now Ulitsa Lesteva) and Ulitsa Shabolovka from 1928 to 1930, the settlement (bottom) combines ideas generated in a design competition among members of the Association of New Architects (Kazus' 2009: 124, Docomomo 2014). Image sources: Arkhnadzor 2012 (top), Latour 2009 (bottom)



Figure 16. The Narkomfin house-commune at 25 Novinskiy Bul'var along the Garden Ring. It was constructed from 1928 to 1930 based on a design by Moisei Ginzburg and Ignaty Milinis (Buchli 1999: 2, 67). See Figure 50, Number 7, for pictures of its current state. Image source: Lenta 2013b

Figure 17. House of the Government (Dom Pravitel'stva), a residential building designed by Boris Iofan, realized from 1928 to 1931 at Vsekhsvyatskaya Ulitsa (now 2 Ulitsa Serafimovicha). The plan shows its three almost fully enclosed courtyards. Image sources: Danushka 2012 (left), MONRF 2013 (right)



Figure 18. A home at 22/12 Aviamotornaya Ulitsa that opened in 1932 as part of a workers' settlement (top). Its yard is a spacious quadrangle formed in combination with another home that is more Stalinist in appearance (bottom). See Figure 50, Number 8, for current pictures of the site. Image sources: Mosgorkomstat 1997 (top), Turchinskaya 1954 (bottom)

2009: 169-70).[83] Disbandment of the politically active Garden City Society notwithstanding, green space remained highly valued within the Stalin administration. Mosgorkom approved a proposal by Petr Smidovich (former head of Mossovet) to start the Moscow Society of Friends of Greenery in 1933, but such initiatives held little sway over the course of new development (Colton 1995: 846). Protection of the built environment was even more tenuous. Semenov lobbied ardently for historic preservation while developing the genplan, but he ended up replaced with Sergey Chernyshev a year after releasing the model (Colton 1995: 276-7). Meanwhile, Khrushchev took over as first secretary of Mosgorkom and second secretary of Mosobkom in 1934, raising his status as Kaganovich's "right-hand man" in the capital (Colton 1995: 282). In the same year, the Unified State Political Directorate secret service became the Chief Directorate for State Security (GUGB), regaining its position within the now union-wide People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Lenoe 2013: 199).

Even as government repression intensified in Moscow, the urban development process included debates encompassing a variety of perspectives. Ivan Zholtovsky's expressive Palladian design for a residential building across from the Kremlin — redirected to serve as the US Embassy after construction in 1934 — received negative reviews as an indiscriminate copy of historic architecture without the critical assimilation essential to Socialist Realism (Cooke 1997: 142, Figure 19). It also became emblematic of reactions against modernist design, or, in the words of Victor Vesnin, "the nail in the coffin of constructivism" (Khan-Magomedov 1996a: 658). At the same time, four years after the opening of Narkomfin, Ginsburg published a book called *Zhilishche* (*Dwelling*) that featured traditional and contemporary housing from around the world (Buchli 1999: 66-7). Socialist Realism oriented a wide variety of creative individuals toward a collective endeavor by attractive and coercive means.

[83] For more on the founding of Arkhplan, see French 1995: 43, Colton 1995: 255, Clark 2011: 102.

On July 10, 1935, the Central Committee and Sovnarkom approved the General Plan for the Reconstruction of Moscow.[84] It incorporated elements of many proposals ventured over the past 20 years, presenting an ambitious but not radical vision for the coming decade. While forecasting staged expansion from 285 to 600 square meters in area (with a target population of 5 million), the plan retained Moscow's concentric pattern as the basis for development of 16 major thoroughfares: 3 rings, 5 radials, 3 avenues through the center and 5 boulevards connecting public squares (Colton 1995: 278-80).[85] It also included the subway and canal along with streetcars, trolleybuses, normal buses, taxis and railways. Functional zoning placed 15 million square meters of new housing in southwestern, northwestern and eastern districts (away from industry in the southeast), and a 10-kilometer "forest-park protective belt" extended from the city limits (Colton 1995: 278).[86] A limit on population density of 400 residents per hectare meant bringing Moscow's center — with over 1,000 per hectare at the time — closer to the citywide average of 350. New homes were to be "examples of the finest classical and contemporary architecture" at no less than 6 stories, and 7-14 stories along prominent roadways, squares and embankments (SNK SSSR and TsK VKP(b) 1935). Major streets would be widened and side streets filled in to create "superblocks" (*kvartaly*), increasing the size of average blocks from 1.5-2 hectares (with 50-60 relatively small buildings) to 9-15 hectares (with several large buildings around the perimeter of a spacious yard) (French 1995: 37-8).[87] A network of clinics, nurseries,

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[84] Sovnarkom became the Soviet Union's official executive and administrative government. Its representatives from each republic were accountable to the Congress of Soviets. Yet the Central Committee of the Communist Party was more powerful than these bodies. Sovnarkom and the Central Committee issued joint declarations on important legislation. After adoption of the 1936 Constitution, the Congress of Soviets became the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of the Soviet Union; each republic also had its own Supreme Soviet.

[85] To read the genplan in full, see SNK SSSR and TsK VKP(b) 1935. For related analysis, see French 1995: 64-5.

[86] Of the 15 million square meters of housing (approximately 2,500 buildings), 800,000 were to be constructed in 1936, 1 million in 1937 and 1.2 million in 1938, with no less than 25 percent funded by Mossovet. Unhealthy and fire-prone industrial operations were to be removed from the city.

[87] Although the Russian word for these blocks did not include an equivalent of "super," Soviet planners were familiar with superblocks through the work of Clarence Perry, Henry Wright and Le Corbusier (Khan-Magomedov

kindergartens, schools, cafeterias, stores, athletic facilities and other services would be assigned to groups of about 10 homes (SNK SSSR and TsK VKP(b) 1935). Journalists lauded the plan as "an offensive on the old Moscow," and Nikolai Bukharin — editor of the newspaper *Izvestia* (*Reports*) — called its vision "almost a fairy tale, almost magical … a new Mecca to which fighters for the happiness of mankind will stream from all ends of the earth" (as quoted in Colton 1995: 280).[88]

Although the 1935 genplan was not fully implemented, substantial development took place before World War II. Intensive work on the subway and canal began well before the plan's approval, and other initiatives proceeded briskly: the width of Ulitsa Gorky (now Tverskaya) increased from 17.5 to 60 meters, rows of lime trees were removed to expand the Garden Ring motorways, and 35 kilometers of granite embankments were built along the Moscow and Yauza Rivers (French 1995: 65). Stately new apartment buildings for the *nomenklatura* (Communist Party appointees in a variety of fields) and other elevated citizens appeared in prominent locations (Sosnovy 1959: 9-11, Figures 20-22).[89] These projects represented the ostensive future of Soviet housing, as Lazar Kaganovich proclaimed:

> The proletariat does not just want buildings. It does not simply want to live comfortably. It wants its buildings to be beautiful. And it wants its housing, its architecture, its towns, to be more beautiful than in all the countries of Europe and America. (Kaganovich 1937, as quoted in Cooke 1997: 147)

1975: 25). Moscow workers' settlements and cooperatives of the 1920s often formed quadrangles akin to the superblocks designed by Wright and Clarence Stein during the same period (see Stein 1949 for comparison).

[88] Bukharin was a senior member of the Communist Party who opposed Stalin's moves to end the New Economic Policy and enforce collective agriculture, for which he lost his place on the Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo) in 1929. *Izvestia* was short for *Reports of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Councils of Worker, Peasant, Red Army and Cossack Deputies* (*Izvestiya TsIK SSSR i VTsIK Sovetov Rabochikh, Krest'yanskikh, Krasnoarmeyskikh i Kazach'ikh Deputatov*).

[89] For more on the *nomenklatura*, see Voslensky 1984.

Actual living conditions for "the proletariat" never came close to Kaganovich's vision (Osokino 2000: 92-3), which masked a crescendo of mortal repression. Most architects were spared, though an estimated 800-1000 of their comrades from other countries — many working on "housing brigades" — left the Soviet Union by the end of 1937 (Kopp 1990: 177, Colton 1995: 307). During the same year, cooperatives became illegal in a move to further consolidate Stalin's "carrot and stick" system of governance (Vihavainen 2009: 48-9, 56, French 1995: 58). Geoffrey Hosking has referred to this approach as part of the centralization of longstanding clientelist relations based on patronage and alliances with varying degrees of loyalty (Hosking 2000: 314-7).[90] Land was controlled by government agencies dominated by the Communist Party, and state enterprises distributed the majority of urban housing (Andrusz 1992: 140).[91] Communal apartments were still the norm, but there were also lavish non-communal possibilities for Soviet elites (Smith 2010: 44, Vihavainen 2009: 42).[92] Despite Ginzburg's influential presentation "On the Industrialization of Housing Construction" at the 1937 Congress of Soviet Architects (Khan-Magomedov 1972:14, 105), where VOPRA cofounder Arkady Mordvinov criticized "formalism" and indifference to comfortable mass housing (Smith 2010: 41), national

[90] Many scholars have found evidence of patrimonialism in Russian history (e.g., Weber 1978 [1922], Pipes 1995 [1974], Gill 1989, 1990, Jowitt 1992, Maslovski 1996, Jensen 1999, Hosking 2000, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002, Garcelon 2005, Sakwa 2011, 2014), but Geoffrey Hosking's use of "clientelism" to capture its reciprocity — the mutual responsibilities between clients and patrons — strikes me as especially discerning (2000: 303). Instead of analyzing Max Weber's forms of patrimonialism to determine the extent to which they apply to different regimes (as done admirably in Maslovski 1996), Hosking focuses on specific examples of patron-client relations. He explains that their consolidation under Stalin into a far-reaching administrative hierarchy was still too personal, informal and intractable to be called purely authoritarian. For more on patron-client relations in Russia, see Rigby 1981, Orlovsky 1983, Afanas'yev 2000, Hale 2015 (the latter is particularly interesting for introducing the term "patronalism" to encompass clientelism, paternalism, neopaternalism and other forms of governance based on patron-client relations). For related studies focused on other parts of the world, see Gellner 1977, Clapham 1982, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984.
[91] See also Colton 1995: 308-11, Meerovich 2004b: 27-31, Vihavainen 2009: 13, 48-9, 56, Pozdnyakova 2012.
[92] According to Timothy Colton, Soviet elites "comprised the pith of the national establishment: the supreme leadership and senior apparatchiks of the [Communist] Party, executives in the military-industrial complex and other government branches, army and police generals, scientists in thriving disciplines, cultural luminaries" (1995: 497).

defense was a much higher government priority at the time.[93] Scholars have proposed that extreme shortages of housing were an intentional means of facilitating surveillance and control (Morton 1980: 254, Meerovich 2003: 172-3), but have yet to produce solid evidence that it was official policy (Smith 2010: 43).[94]

Housing management contributed to government control through practices that existed before the Soviet era. Newcomers to Moscow often worked as yard custodians and kept authorities informed in exchange for residence permits (*propiski*) in their domestic passports.[95] The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs — presumably through the Chief Directorate for State Security — infiltrated house committees with loyal managers and informants (Meerovich 2004b: 35-8). A resident supervisor (*kvartupolnomochennyy*) for each building collected service payments and reported problems to the house committee (Hosking 2004: 57, Lebina 2003: 44-5). Informants also lived in communal flats, where people sometimes incriminated cohabitants out of vengeance or for rewards like better housing (Boym 1994: 129, Vihavainen 2009: 45). As expressed by Mikhail Bulgakov's Woland in *The Master and Margarita*, the "apartment question" (*kvartirnyy vopros*) corrupted Muscovites of the 1930s (2006: 200).[96] Students and temporary workers lived in dormitories where "activists" (*starosty*) responsible for keeping order served as informants in some cases (Humphrey 2005: 46-7). By 1938, work documents (*trudovyye knizhki*) supplemented residence permits in controlling where people lived (Meerovich 2003: 35, Vihavainen 2009: 50). Social "misfits" received the label BOMZh (an

[93] Mordvinov worked at Mosproyekt Studio № 3 under Ivan Fomin before taking over as director in 1937 (Mladkovskaya 2011).
[94] For more on Soviet housing policy as a form of social control during the 1930s, see Meerovich 2004a, 2004b.
[95] This pre-Soviet policy was reintroduced in 1932 (Boym 1994: 129).
[96] In *A Treatise on Housing*, Bulgakov semi-ironically proclaimed: "Let us agree once and for all: the dwelling is the foundation stone of human life" (2003 [1926]: 4). For more on housing-related themes in his work, see Boym 1994, Lakshin 1995, Singleton 1997, Brooke 2006.

acronym for Without a Specific Place of Residence) in their passports, which disqualified them from housing provision and kept them out of major cities (Höjdestrand 2009: 5, 26).

In Aleksandr Medvedkin's 1938 comedic film *The New Moscow*, a young architect from a small town goes to the capital to present an animated model of Stalinist redevelopment. His rival in love, an urban-landscape painter, is tormented by constant destruction of old buildings. The model accidentally reverses during a melodramatic presentation, which may explain the film's censorship after its first screening (Marker 1993). Stalin's battle for control extended deep into the realms of cultural production, communicating a narrative that disruptive modernization was a necessary step toward a radiant future. This tactic helped curb unrest over miserable living conditions (Colton 1995: 325). Despite continued experimentation with lower-cost construction,[97] most housing completed just before the war was too expensive to build on a mass scale. Living conditions plummeted even further during the German invasion, which brought troops within 29 kilometers of the Kremlin in 1941 (Colton 1995: 250).[98] New housing construction immediately slowed to a virtual halt.

World War II (or the Great Patriotic War, as it became known domestically) altered the dominant position on cultural heritage, impelling measures to restore historic landmarks and even tolerate religious practices (French 1995: 181). A Chief Directorate for the Protection of Architectural Monuments formed in 1942 during the siege of Leningrad (St. Petersburg), where linguist and art historian Dmitry Likhachev worked on his book *Defense of Old Russian Towns* (Ratiya and Dogina 1952: 185).[99] The Central State Restoration Workshops reopened the

[97] Prewar mass-housing prototypes include Arkady Mordvinov's "rapid production-line construction" (*potochno-skorostnoye stroitel'stvo*) along Ulitsa Gorky (1937-1939) (Odoplamskaya 2014), Bolshaya Kaluzhskaya Ulitsa (1939-1940) and Ulitsa Bolshaya Polyanka (1940) (Smith 2010: 41) as well as use of prefabricated panels by Andrey Burov — former translator for Le Corbusier — in his Lace Building at 27 Leningradskiy Prospekt (1940). For earlier examples, see Bylinkina and Ryabushina 1985.
[98] German forces reached the village of Khimki, which is adjacent to Moscow's current northwest border.
[99] Leningrad was the official name of St. Petersburg for most of the Soviet era.

following year, with Igor Grabar as scientific director at age 73 (French 1995: 181). In 1944, archaeologist Petr Baranovsky — who worked in Grabar's earlier restoration workshops — returned to Moscow after doing time in a Siberian labor camp and joined the national board tasked with restoring historic landmarks (Colton 1995: 351).[100]

Destruction and reduced construction of homes during the war brought dwelling space in Soviet cities to new lows.[101] People slept in lofts, cellars, dormitories, barracks and abandoned factories as lack of sanitation infrastructure fueled the spread of rickets and dysentery (Vihavainen 2009: 60). Sheila Fitzpatrick has identified ways in which they attempted to improve their living conditions through everyday practices such as connections (*blat*), petitions and complaints (1999: 175).[102] The Moscow Society of Friends of Greenery was one of few official channels for citizen engagement: after regrouping as the Society for Assistance to Tree Planting in 1945, it gained a reported 30,000 members but drew criticism for inactivity (Colton 1995: 846). The central government placed strict limitations on political mobilization, which made letter writing — "parochial contacting" in the words of Thomas Remington (2002: 89) — the main form of protest (Fitzpatrick 1999: 176). Following the war, Communist Party officials received an onslaught of letters about housing conditions (Kulavig 2002: 41-51) while restoration and new construction of elite homes proceeded vigorously in central Moscow (Smith 2010: 40).

In 1945, Sovnarkom distributed a request for proposals focusing on mass residential development (Gorlov 2005: 186, Smith 2010: 46). A year later, Stalin restructured Sovnarkom to

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[100] Baranovsky once threatened suicide and wired a message directly to Stalin upon hearing of a plan to demolish St. Basil's Cathedral in Red Square (Colton 1995: 306).

[101] According to exiled economist Sergei Prokopovich's *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR* (*National Economy of the USSR*), dwelling space per capita in Soviet cities fell from 4 to 3.1 square meters between 1941 and 1945 (Khmel'nitskiy 2009).

[102] While not an everyday practice, suicide was a relatively common form of moral protest that the Stalin administration worked actively to discredit (Fitzpatrick 1999: 174-5). For more on protest during this period, see Viola 2002.

form the Council of Ministers (SM or Sovmin), staying on as chairman in addition to his role as general secretary of the Communist Party.[103] The expanded Soviet Union faced a pressing need to accelerate postwar reconstruction. Returning veterans shared information about social housing in other countries, some of which reflected the influence of prewar industrial towns developed in the Soviet Giprogor (RSFSR) and Giprograd (Ukraine) planning departments. According to historian Vladimir Gorlov, planners at Giprograd used "microdistrict" as a surrogate for the "Anglo-American" neighborhood unit, and its association with Clarence Perry's work made it an unwelcome presence in debates over housing development at the Union of Soviet Architects plenum in 1947 (2005: 186-7).

Vitaly Lagutenko, a respected engineer who worked for Aleksey Shchusev during the early 1920s, joined Mosproyekt after the war and began developing efficient housing models. He became chief engineer of the Mosproyekt Research Institute in 1949, and his team built several prototypes out of ferroconcrete panels near the Polezhaevskaya subway station (Romodin 2013b). Even architects known for intricate detailing experimented with less costly designs, such as Ivan Zholtovsky's prize-winning 1949 apartment house on Bol'shaya Kaluzhskaya Ulitsa (now 11 Leninskiy Prospekt).[104] Experiments during this period yielded high-quality, relatively low-scale buildings that formed quadrangles of comfortable green space (Figure 23). However, they proved too expensive to produce in large quantities (Cooke 1997: 156-8). With mass housing a top priority, Stalin appointed Khrushchev to his former position as first secretary of Mosgorkom in 1949.[105]

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[103] Stalin had been chairman of Sovnarkom since 1941. The 1946 restructuring divided the NKVD into the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Ministry of State Security (MGB); the latter was responsible for Gulag labor (Colton 1995: 297).

[104] References to Zholtovsky's promotion of efficient housing production with standardized panels appear in Cooke 1997: 156, Gorlov 2005: 97, 130.

[105] Khrushchev was head of the Communist Party in Ukraine at the time, first appointed to the position by Stalin in 1937 (Taubman 2004: 114).

The Council of Ministers established the State Committee for Construction (Gosstroy) in 1950 to promote mass housing, and Khrushchev met with construction professionals to discuss measures for efficiently increasing output (Gorlov 2005: 95). Within the following year, the Council of Ministers formed the Moscow Genplan Research Institute (NIiPIGM), the Chief Architecture-Planning Directorate (GlavAPU) and the Special Architecture-Construction Bureau (SAKB) to prepare for new housing development (Ruble 1993: 239).[106] The council passed a groundbreaking decree against "excesses" (*izlishestva*) in new construction on January 26, 1952 (SM SSSR 1952), followed by a pragmatic 10-year plan for the capital less than a week later (NIiPIGM 2013). Despite rapid preparation for expanded housing production during Stalin's last few years, the seven elaborate high-rises (*vysotki*) appearing on the skyline — two of which were fully residential — contrasted sharply with the dire living conditions of most Soviet citizens. At points of high visibility, each tower cascaded to its extensive base from a central spire crowned with a star (Figure 24).[107] In June 1952, the Council of Ministers established a Directorate of Tall Houses and Hotels (UVDG), through which Mossovet distributed elite residences at the behest of high-ranking Communist Party officials (Colton 1995: 499-500).[108]

After Stalin's death, in March 1953, Khrushchev left Mosgorkom and was elected first secretary (newly adopted name for "general secretary") of the Communist Party six months later. The execution of Internal Affairs Minister Lavrenty Beria — orchestrated within the Central Committee Presidium to prevent his bid to lead the Soviet Union — made way for reforms that included restructuring the Ministry of Internal Affairs into the Committee for State Security (KGB) in 1954 and dismissing more than 46,000 security officers over a 10-year period (Elkner

[106] For more on these organizations, see Gorlov 2005: 94, MNIITEP 2012, NIiPIGM 2013.
[107] Vladimir Paperny has pointed out that Stalin's high-rises embody the hierarchical order of his regime in idealized form (2002: 89-90, 116, 170-1).
[108] The UVDG was presumably under the Ministry of Internal Affairs before transferring to the Mossovet Executive Committee (Mosgorispolkom) in June 1953 (Colton 1995: 499).

2009: 146).[109] The year after Stalin's death also brought important changes in urban development. Mossovet established the Chief Directorate for Moscow Housing and Civil Construction (Glavmosstroy), consolidating resources from building-related trusts, ministries, departments and Gulag operations (Colton 1995: 368-9, Gorlov 2005: 141-3).[110] On November 16, 1954, Gosstroy approved the first Construction Standards and Regulations (SNiP) document, which contained instructions for planning residential districts (Gosstroy 1954). Khrushchev lambasted architectural excesses at the Congress of Soviet Builders in December (Cooke 1997: 138), paving the way for more transformative policy.[111] In the following year, the Central Committee and Council of Ministers passed the resolution "On the Elimination of Excesses in Design and Construction" (TsK KPSS and SM SSSR 1955) and replaced the Academy of Architecture with the Academy of Construction and Architecture; experienced builder Nikolai Bekhtin was to head the updated research institute (Gorlov 2005: 104). Industrialization, standardization and cost reduction were paramount as the Soviet Union embarked on a prodigious housing drive in 1956 (Buchli 1997: 162).

Amid continuing power struggles in the Presidium, Khrushchev launched his famous thaw (*ottepel'*) with a "secret speech" denouncing Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in February 1956. By autumn, insurrection in Hungary met with a crushing Soviet invasion at the urging of Soviet Ambassador Yuri Andropov (Hill and Gaddy 2013: 186). New forms of

[109] The Politburo was officially known as the Presidium from 1952 to 1966.
[110] Glavmosstroy took over local Gulag construction subsidiaries in 1954 as Khrushchev brought an end to the directorate and freed victims of Stalinist repression (Colton 1995: 361, 370).
[111] Khrushchev singled out Arkady Mordvinov, who was president of the Academy of Architecture at the time and one of many who used murals, statues, porticos and other decorative elements in their work. Mordvinov would not have seen these features as inconsistent with his longstanding criticism of "formalist" design or his efforts to improve construction efficiency. It appears that, for him and other proponents, they were transparent means of inspiring people and could be produced quickly with a sufficient workforce at the level of quality necessary to look impressive from the ground.

Figure 19. A famous residential design by Ivan Zholtovsky, built in 1934 facing the Kremlin at 13 Mokhovaya Ulitsa. Instead of becoming a home, it served as the US embassy until 1953. Image source: Dedushkin 2009



Figure 20. A gigantic apartment house that opened in 1934 along Yaroslavskoye Shosse (now 124 Prospekt Mira). See Figure 50, Number 9, for pictures of this building today. Image source: Stroitel'stvo Moskvy 1939

Figure 21. A housing complex designed by Arkady Mordvinov and built at 32 Frunzenskaya Naberezhnaya in 1940. See Figure 50, Number 10, for recent pictures. Image source: IZOGIZ 1956

Figure 22. An elite residence on Mozhayskoye Shosse (now 26 Kutuzovskiy Prospekt) by architect Zinoviy Rozenfel'd. Its construction date is 1944 according to municipal inventory data (Moscow City Government 2013a), but the top picture shows a man working on it in 1947, which is probably closer to when it opened (Romodin 2013a). See Figure 50, Number 11, to view this building today. Image sources: Medvedev 2009 (top), Granovskiy 1951 (bottom)

Figure 23. Experimental designs for efficient housing constructed along Vtoraya Peschanaya Ulitsa from 1949 to 1951. Zinoviy Rozenfel'd (architect of the stately building pictured above) led the planning team for these blocks (Sytin 1958: 730-1, Gusev 2014). Image source: AG84 2013a

Figure 24. "Glory to the Great Stalin – Architect of Communism!" The residential high-rise in the background was built in 1952 at 1/15 Kotel'nicheskaya Naberezhnaya. It is one of seven unique towers completed in Moscow within a decade after World War II. See Figure 50, Number 12, for current pictures. Image source: Flavoristka 2014

dissent and repression were taking shape in Moscow at the same time (Hornsby 2009: 167).[112] Still, the thaw represented an official break with Stalinism and an explicitly renewed focus on building a communist society (Taubman 2003: 508). A corresponding movement for *byt* reform sought "legitimacy for the socialist project" through a return to Leninist principles ostensibly distorted under Stalin (Buchli 1997: 162, 175).[113] However, despite support for reviving collective consciousness through participatory — as well as regulatory — house committees and several incomplete attempts to establish semi-communal Houses of the New Byt (Buchli 1997: 172-4, Buchli 1999: 166-172), Khrushchev's housing revolution hinged upon the promise of "a separate apartment for every family" (Gorlov 2005: 170).[114]

Moscow and its suburbs continued to serve as laboratories for new residential designs. Construction of a famous prototype began in 1956 near the small town of Cheremushki, just southwest of the capital.[115] Testing had been underway for several years, with Khrushchev reportedly visiting often to review progress and make suggestions (Gorlov 2005: 168-9). The resulting 4-story shoebox-like buildings (Figure 25) gave rise to thousands of homes throughout the former Soviet Union known as *khrushchevki*.[116] The norm became 5 stories, with only a 1-meter increase in height due to lower ceilings (Frolic 1964: 297). This was the maximum for which builders could avoid the time and cost of installing elevators (Colton 1995: 372), but

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[112] Critical articles on environmental conditions and public services were appearing in the Moscow press by the mid-1950s, as scholars published increasingly unmediated research on the city's history and geography (Colton 1995: 419). International exchange and urban statistics also became more open, and in 1959 the Soviet Union conducted a census for the first time in 20 years. Unsanctioned public events, however, such as the poetry readings at Mayakovsky Square during the late 1950s (which often had political dimensions), eventually faced regulatory measures (Hornsby 2009: 175-6).

[113] According to Victor Buchli, "[i]n rhetorical terms, the discourse on *byt* in 1959 was virtually indistinguishable from that of 1929" (1997: 162).

[114] For more on Houses of the New Byt, see Gorlov 2005: 302, Bronovitskaya 2009b: 92.

[115] Experimental construction also took place near Izmailovsky Park, in northeast Moscow, at record speeds of two 5-story buildings in thirty days (Gorlov 2005: 115).

[116] The basic design of *khrushchëvki* has been traced to a French housing model (Revzin 2010). Yet it also resembles domestic barracks (e.g., Colton 1995: 343, Bocharov and Khan-Magomedov 2007: 58), and Soviet experiments appear to have been the most influential factor in their development.

residential quarters also included several taller models to serve as "hostels" for singles and young families without children (Frolic 1964: 288-9). Ochre brick facades soon gave way to hastily sealed ferroconcrete panels and blocks (French 1995: 77). Buildings were arranged closely, often along parallel lines. While sometimes forming quadrangles, *khrushchevki* were increasingly set apart from streets instead of lining the perimeter of a city block.

On July 31, 1957, the Central Committee and Council of Ministers issued a decree mandating a separate apartment for each family in housing based on standard models (TsK KPSS and SM SSSR 1957, Vihavainan 2009: 61). The focus was officially on mass production to resolve the housing crisis as quickly as possible. Mossovet and Gosstroy began planning a series of satellite towns to relieve overpopulation in the capital and, by some accounts, to reduce its vulnerability in case of nuclear war (Gorlov 2005: 229-33).[117] A prototype called Zelenograd (Green City) began taking shape in 1958 on the wooded site of a former labor camp at Kryukovo railway station, 37 kilometers northwest of Moscow's center (Colton 1995: 446-7, Frolov 1964: 288-92).[118] The plan integrated housing with employment for high-technology research and development professionals. Stigma concerning the microdistrict concept evaporated with Khrushchev's thaw, and it became the standard for new residential areas outside the Garden Ring.

As codified in a 1958 update to the Construction Standards and Regulations document of 1954, microdistricts consisted of multiple residential complexes with a combined population of 10,000-12,000 (Gosstroy 1958: 58-9). Their total area comprised one or more superblocks with housing separated from major roadways.[119] Several microdistricts formed a residential district

[117] For parallel advocacy and examples of New Towns in the United States, see Stein 1966.
[118] See also French 1995: 88-9.
[119] Total area was based on a recommended density of 33-36 square meters per resident for buildings of 4-5 stories. There was to be per capita totals of 9 square meters of dwelling space (with territorial reserves up to 12 square

with a population of 30,000-50,000. Residential districts were grouped into eight city districts with populations of 50,000-100,000 based on the city's size.[120] Each level was to provide rationally distributed infrastructure, employment and amenities within a specified zone. For urban microdistricts, a nursery (in central locations between residential buildings), schools, gardens, public transit, shops and cafeterias were to be placed within a half-kilometer radius of residential buildings; laundry services, polyclinics, libraries, athletic facilities, movie theaters and community centers were to be within .75 to 1.5 kilometers (Gosstroy 1958: 58).

Lagutenko's Mosproyekt studio released the "epochal" K-7 building model in 1958, and within two years it was being produced and assembled in units of 60 apartments over an average of 30 days (Gorlov 2005: 137-8). Construction became more and more standardized for efficiency, as Timothy Colton noted: "[T]he genotype of the new approach [Glavmosstroy] … explicitly aped the Soviet factory. A placard on its hoardings proclaimed, 'Here We Assemble Homes Like Others Assemble Cars!'" (1995: 486).[121] Space for housing development opened in 1960 when the RSFSR Council of Ministers expanded Moscow's borders to the edge of the 109-kilometer-long Moscow Ring Road (MKAD).[122] This coincided with intensive work on an update to the genplan led by newly appointed Chief Architect Mikhail V. Posokhin (French 1995: 103).[123]

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meters), 8-12 square meters of green space and 12-17 square meters of "cultural-community services" like athletic facilities (Gosstroy 1958: 25).

[120] City districts planned for Moscow in the 1960s loosely coincide with today's core administrative okrugs. The 125 pre-2012 residential districts now have an average population of about 92,000, with a few exceeding 240,000; average population of the 10 pre-2012 administrative okrugs is just over 1 million, ranging approximately from 700,000 to 1.6 million with the exception of Zelenograd at 217,000 (Moscow City Government 2013).

[121] For a history of the housing industry's rapid development, including establishment of House-Building Combine № 1 (DSK-1) in 1961, see Gorlov 2005: 139.

[122] The MKAD was under construction at the time (1956-1962) along a former military road encircling the city (Colton 1995: 373). For perspective on how urban expansion impacted people with individual homes on annexed land, see Vysokovsky 1993: 275.

[123] Posokhin studied under Aleksey Shchusev in the 1930s and co-designed the Stalinist residential high-rise at Vosstaniya (now Kudrinskaya) Square in the 1940s. His work took a modernist turn after the Stalin era.

In 1961, at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party, Khrushchev proclaimed that according to "rigorous scientific calculations" the Soviet Union would "construct a basically communist society in 20 years" (Tompson 1997: 238, Taubman 2003: 507). This roughly corresponded with the lifespan attributed to early *khrushchevki* (Gorlov 2005: 139). Industry was not yet equipped to produce high quality along with quantity at the pace required, and experimental designs required modification.[124] Some called these rapidly proliferating homes *khrushchebi* — an adaptation of the Russian word for slum — as they became infamous for discomfort and disrepair (Ruble 1993: 240, Boym 1994: 125). Yards provided outlets from small quarters packed with several generations of family members. Still, receiving a separate apartment was cause for celebration among the many people living in communal flats, barracks, dormitories and precarious conditions at the time (Shomina 1999). Gerbert Rappaport's 1962 film *Cheremushki* (based on an opera by Dmitri Shostakovich) presents a glossy hyperbole of this sensation, with young couples dancing and singing around a new building model.

In addition to industrial production and urban design, Khrushchev addressed the residential crisis with limited decentralization policies. A 1962 resolution "On Individual and Cooperative Housing Construction" (TsK KPSS and SM SSSR 1962) extended access to state loans to cooperatives for up to 60 percent of building costs, with 10-15-year repayment periods (Vihavainen 2009: 56, Andrusz 1992: 143). New cooperatives were not as independent as their counterparts from the NEP years, as they had to rely on state construction agencies and fulfill daunting bureaucratic requirements (Colton 1995: 487). They were also ineligible for management subsidies, making them too expensive for most people to afford (Shomina 1995: 80-1).

[124] Several local experts on *khrushchëvki* mentioned in interviews that design and construction professionals inspected the first generation of K-7 buildings in Cherëmushki within a year of completion to improve later models.

As mass housing expanded in Moscow's outer rings (Figure 26), historic architecture in the center reached a critical state of disrepair (French 1995: 183, 186). Many old buildings were still partitioned as communal apartments, and their restoration was not a government priority. They were more often demolished to make way for new development. The Khrushchev administration funded outwardly modest apartment buildings with custom designs (*individual'nyye proyekty*) in prime locations for officials and other favored citizens (Figure 27). These homes stood out from standard models (*tipovye proyekty*) — for their higher quality and original forms usually of light brick. The Directorate of Tall Houses and Hotels was responsible for their management (Colton 1995: 504). As Mosproyekt focused on economy housing, a new department called Mosproyekt-2 opened in 1962 to handle design projects in the city center (Mosproyekt-2 2012).[125] Within the same year, large-scale redevelopment plans such as the modernist towers along Prospekt Kalinina (now Novyy Arbat, Figure 28) sparked public protests, and Petr Baranovsky started an independent group called Rodina (Motherland) for young people interested in preserving Russian art and architecture (Colton 1995: 406-7).[126]

An excoriation of Moscow planning — written by architecture professor Petr Revyakin and several colleagues after a roundtable on the issue — appeared in a 1962 edition of the literary magazine *Moskva* (*Moscow*), provoking an official condemnation in *Pravda* signed by prominent urban designers (Colton 1995: 419-20). Along with arbitrary decision-making, Revyakin and his coauthors criticized insensitivity to architectural and ecological preservation for making the city less comfortable, unique and attractive. Rodina and *Moskva* were known for conservative patriotism based on Russian nationalism in the sense of ethnic identity (O'Connor

[125] Even 71-year-old Boris Iofan and his Mosproyekt Studio № 6 worked on mass housing at the time, as evident in their 1962 high-rises at 7, 9 and 10 Shcherbakovskaya Ulitsa (Kazakova 2013: 28).
[126] For more on the Moscow protest movement surrounding development projects of the early 1960s, see Colton 1995: 554, Bronovitskaya 2009a: 97. Other versions of Rodina's origins, which do not mention Baranovsky, can be found in Dunlop 1986: 65, O'Connor 2006: 49.

2006: 49). Yet preservation also gained support among the liberal intelligentsia, high-raking officials and a variety of others who found common ground in concern over the externalities of rapid industrialization and urban renewal (Dunlop 1983: 63-5, 87).

Separate apartments in microdistricts led to significant changes in the design and management of commons in residential areas. Enclosed yards gave way to open "landscaping" between homes (Humphrey 2005: 53), which played an important role in *byt* reform. According to Mark Smith, this was at least as transformative as mass distribution of apartments:

> Only during the window of 1958-1964 did the authorities in Moscow switch emphasis and invest considerable resources and pride in creating microdistricts as arenas for the refashioning of consciousness. Under Khrushchev, this and not the separateness of the separate apartment was the crucial ideological innovation in the sphere of housing, though its practical impact was less sure than its expressed intention. (Smith 2010: 43)

"Refashioning consciousness" included attempts at resident mobilization to help establish and maintain shared amenities (Buchli 1997: 173). At the peak of this activity in the 1960s, approximately 50,000 Moscow residents (just under 1 percent of the population) took part in house, street and division committees, while housing "repair detachments" claimed about 16,600 participants (Colton 1995: 404). At the same time, upkeep became more centralized as close to 2,000 house directorates merged into 500 house-management offices (ZhEK) (Colton 1995: 864).[127] A consequent reduction in yard custodians, along with inconsistent resident participation, led to widespread maintenance decline (Lebina 2003:190-1, Vihavainen 2009: 64).

[127] House directorates continued to serve buildings that were not under municipal government jurisdiction (Colton 1995: 404). For more on ZhEK, see Andrusz 1986: 57.

Annual housing production in Moscow, which remained below 350,000 square meters during Stalin's rule and reached a low of 8,000 in 1942, rose to an unprecedented 3.4 million on average from 1961 to 1964 (Colton 1995: Appendices table D-1). Although people joked that *khrushchevki* were provisional buildings to be replaced upon arrival of communism in three decades, Khrushchev reportedly expected them to last a century (Taranov 2002: 86, Vihaveinen 2009: 62). Later versions showed evidence of successful efforts to resolve early problems, reaching a higher level of quality and comfort. Yet Khrushchev's accomplishments in housing and other spheres did not save him from the consequences of unrealistic promises, ill-fated policy experiments and recurrent power struggles within his administration. On October 14, 1964, he was underhandedly "retired" by the Presidium.

Leonid Brezhnev — a Khrushchev protégé and key participant in removing him from office — became the new first secretary of the Communist Party. While scaling back on many liberal reforms, Brezhnev adopted a consultative approach to leadership with emphasis on stability and social welfare (Thatcher 2003: 24). He promoted a symbolic, almost pedagogic, role for Moscow as "a model Communist city" (Colton 1995: 392) and continued the mass housing drive with taller apartment buildings in microdistricts. He also presided over an increase in housing quality and inequality with a decrease in output. Brezhnev lived in a large suite at 26 Kutuzovskiy Prospekt (Colton 1995: 498) — a luxury building from the Stalin era — and spent much of his time at a mansion-like dacha in Zarech'e (Colton 1995: 498).[128]

Although taller housing models were predominant in Moscow by the mid-1960s, these 9- and 12-story boxes (*korobki*) were lightly derided as *khrushchevki* turned on their sides (Ruble 1993: 240, Figure 29). Problems with new homes generated intense discussion at a 1965

[128] See Figure 22 and Figure 50, Number 11, for pictures of Brezhnev's apartment house on Kutuzovskiy Prospekt. According to a plaque on its facade, he lived there from 1952 to 1982.

Mosgorkom plenum, underscoring the need for measures to improve quality without increasing costs or decreasing output (Gorlov 2005: 153). Before year's end, the Special Architecture-Construction Bureau reorganized as the Moscow Research-Design Institute for Standardization and Experimental Design (MNIITEP) in order meet this need (MNIITEP 2012).

Along with low-quality buildings, the residents of new microdistricts often faced long waits for subway access, grocery stores and other resources (Frolic 1964: 301, French 1995: 81, Smith 2010: 51). Despite the emphasis on green space in official planning documents, construction teams were known to omit landscaping in their rush to meet production quotas (Vihavainen 2009: 61). Citizen participation in maintaining, improving and even building residential areas coincided with Soviet ideals and received government support but did not reduce the need for professional services (Smith 2010: 43-50).[129] Many residents organized informally to maintain and enhance the commons around their homes (Gorlov 2005: 41-4). Some planted trees, bushes and flowers brought from dachas or nearby forests.[130] People also joined official groups like the Moscow City Society for Environmental Protection, which evolved from the limited Moscow Society of Friends of Greenery to claim over 500,000 members by the mid-1960s (Colton 1995: 406).

Following the protests against Moscow redevelopment projects under Khrushchev, preservationists gained nominal support during the Brezhnev years (Dunlop 1983: 65). This occurred in a climate of increasingly bold dissident activity that crystallized in the "rally for transparency" (*miting glasnosti*) at Pushkin Square on Constitution Day, December 5, 1965 (Horvath 2005: 46, 74). Participants expressed opposition to the arrest of two writers for publishing "anti-Soviet" fiction outside the country (Service 2009: 381). Government officials —

[129] For more on citizen participation in municipal initiatives, see Buchli 1997: 172-4, Buchli 1999: 166-171, Gorlov 2005: 44, Collier 2012: 106, DeHaan 2013: 147-62.
[130] Stories of planting and transplanting came up frequently in my interviews with older residents.

primarily through the KGB — deployed proactive counter-subversion methods against domestic activists supposedly collaborating with a Western "fifth column" (Fedor 2013: 102). In addition to establishing a credible threat of repercussions, government officials tried to understand, mollify and co-opt popular movements so that direct repression would be unnecessary (Lewin 2005: 191-2). Soviet traditions of mass-mobilization for sanctioned causes became channels for activism. The Council of Ministers established the All-Russia Society for the Preservation of Historic and Cultural Landmarks (VOOPIK) in 1965, through which thousands of people volunteered on weekends to identify and refurbish cultural landmarks (Harris and Cecil 2009: 196).[131] VOOPIK absorbed the 500-member Rodina group and attracted a wide range of citizens, including high-ranking officials (Dunlop 1983: 65-9). Yet its main impetus came from below, and members were known to engage in public protest (Dunlop 1983: 67, Colton 1995: 406-7, 559, 864).

Along with grassroots activism, the late 1960s brought important changes in city planning. Gosstroy updated the Construction Standards and Regulations document on January 1, 1967, making space between residential buildings dependent upon model, position and height — with 30 meters between the long sides for 5 stories, 48 meters for 9 stories and 80 meters for 16 stories (Gosstroy 1967: 170). These spaces were lower by approximately half for the ends of buildings. Walls without windows could be closer together as long as they maintained fire-prevention breaks that ranged from 6-10 meters based on degree of resistance. Buildings of the "tower" variety (i.e., greater in height than in length or width) could be 75 percent closer together if positioned along a single axis.

[131] For more on the founding of VOOPIK, see Daniloff 1983: 67, Dunlop 1986: 66-7, French 1995: 183, Colton 1995: 555-7, O'Connor 2006: 49.

Green space was required in proportions of 3 square meters per resident, with room for expansion of up to 5 square meters, and with buffer zones around buildings, paths, railways, utility infrastructure and industrial areas (Gosstroy 1967: 97-100). There were also specifications for community gardens, landscaped strips and nurseries for trees, shrubs and flowers (Gosstroy 1967: 97-100).[132] This space was part of a larger network of greenery intended to weave through the city in continuous pathways. According to the 1967 Construction Standards and Regulations document, "[p]arks, gardens, and public areas should form a single, unified system which interconnects internally as well as with the greenbelt in the suburban zones" (Gosstroy 1967: 5).

Housing was to be distributed based on proportions consisting of 33-38 percent "primary workers" (also known as "city shapers") in enterprises or institutions of greater-than-local relevance; 23-26 percent "secondary workers" focused on social, cultural and consumer services for the city where they lived; and the remainder "nonproductive members" — kids, retirees, the disabled and housewives (Gosstroy 1967: 2, 7-9, 165-70, Collier 2012: 89-90). Timothy Colton has identified parts of Moscow with a high percentage of buildings for privileged citizens (disproportionately in the most convenient, green and well-ventilated areas rather than, for example, the massive industrial zones in the southeast), but he added that more- and less-desirable homes were also interspersed throughout the city (1995: 502-17). Since recipients had little or no choice of location and it was relatively difficult to change residences (Morton 1980: 242, 253-6), population quotas may have limited extreme segregation.

Despite limited options for influencing government decisions, Moscow residents found ways to protect valued cultural and environmental heritage. Architectural preservation, for example, inspired activism that sometimes changed the course of policy. By 1967, in light of the

[132] See Gosstroy Construction Standards and Regulations (SNiP) II-K.2-62 for standards on green space per resident (1967: 96, Table 24), buffer zones (1967: 100, Table 26) and landscaped strips (1967: 99, Table 27).

protests over urban development that emerged during Khrushchev's last two years in office, Communist Party leaders did not pursue modernist plans for reconstructing central Moscow (Colton 1995: 555). This coincided with a "prophylactic" approach to managing public dissent, carried out with increasing sophistication by the KGB Fifth Directorate for the Struggle Against Subversive Ideological Activity (Lewin 2005: 191-3, Hill and Gaddy 2013: 185-7).[133] Established in 1967 by newly appointed Chairman Yuri Andropov, the Fifth Directorate undertook surveillance and incarceration as well as direct communication with influential dissidents, analysis of the problems that motivated them, and proposals for reform (Lewin 2005: 255-9).[134] Architectural and ecological conservationists were often deeply patriotic, and thus amenable to many government leaders as long as they did not let criticism and divisive nationalism get out of hand (Dunlop 1983: 65). VOOPIK leaders managed to protect and reclaim pre-Soviet cultural heritage but developed a paradoxical reputation for being too closely linked with Soviet authorities and too resistant to Soviet ideals (O'Connor 2006: 51-7, Dunlop 1983: 69-70, 77). A 1968 edition of the popular journal *Dekorativnoye Iskusstvo* (*Decorative Art*) centered on historic preservation, and Grabar's writings on restoration were published the following year (French 1995: 180). Dmitry Likhachev played a vital role in protecting art and architecture by linking it with morality and patriotism (Reid 1993: 162) — values that could be interpreted as for or against the Soviet regime.[135]

By the late 1960s, mass-produced apartments in microdistricts were objects of desire and

[133] The name Fifth Directorate was an intentional allusion to the "fifth column" — signaling an emphasis on dissidents linked with outside enemies (Fedor 2013: 102, Lewin 2005: 258-60). For more on the Fifth Directorate, see Elkner 2009: 148-9, Soldatov and Borogan 2010: 55, 92-3, Hill and Gaddy 2013: 263.

[134] After the Stalin years, execution and Gulag operations gave way to exile and psychiatric clinics as preventive consequences for those deemed "enemies of the people" (Lewin 2005: 193-6, 256). Forced labor in correctional facilities did not end with the Gulag and was likely the most common form of "rehabilitation" (Service 2009: 380-2).

[135] As Likhachëv contended: "Memory is the basis of conscience and morality, memory is the basis of culture. … To preserve memory, to cherish memory is our moral duty before ourselves and before our descendents" (as quoted in Reid 1993: 161).

satire. A play by Eldar Ryazanov and Emil Braginsky became a runaway hit in 1969 with a storyline that hinged on the nearly realistic premise that the same locks on the same doors of the same buildings with the same addresses could be found in any Soviet city. Ryazanov turned the play into a film called *The Irony of Fate, or Enjoy Your Bath!* that ran on the main Soviet television channel on New Year's Day and became an instant classic. The opening sequence by Vitaly Peskov added brilliantly to the film's parody of Soviet mass housing.

Despite voluminous construction of new apartments during the 1960s, supply remained far below demand. The wait proved especially long for people whose dwelling space was officially above the priority threshold of 3 square meters — upgraded to 5 square meters in 1969 (Bater 1984: 96).[136] Cooperatives were still a faster track for those with the money and connections to participate, comprising 20 percent of Moscow housing construction in 1970 (Colton 1995: 487). However, their dependence on government production capacity limited further expansion (Gorlov 2005: 219-20). Despite the need for more homes, criticism of early models underscored a more immediate need for improving quality. In 1970, MNIITEP issued a Unified Catalog of Standardized Concrete Products and Structures — based on four years of research — with specifications aimed at making new buildings more comfortable, durable and adaptable (Gorlov 2005: 248). During the same year, Mosgorkom investigated problems with K-7-2 and K-7-3 models built from 1960 through 1967, and construction of *khrushchevki* in Moscow soon came to an end (Gorlov 2005: 153, 253).

After more than a decade, the new genplan initiated under Khrushchev was finally released in 1971. To guide Moscow's future development over a 20-year period, it organized the city into eight zones separated by green "wedges" connecting the center to an expanded

[136] For more on Soviet housing queues during this period, see Morton 1980: 235, Zaviska 2012: 33.

Figure 25. The Ninth Block of Novyye Cheremushki, an experimental mass-housing quarter at the intersection of Profsoyuznaya Ulitsa and Pervaya Cherëmushkinskaya Ulitsa (now Prospekt 60-Letiya Oktyabrya and Ulitsa Dmitriya Ulyanova). Natan Osterman led the design team, and construction proceeded from 1956 to 1958 (Gorlov 2005: 141, 168). See Figure 50, Number 14, for current pictures of the area. Image source: AG84 2012a


Figure 26. Construction of 5-story models (I-515-5M) with prefabricated concrete panels along Novoryazanskoye Shosse (now Volgogradskiy Prospekt) in the early 1960s. See Figure 50, Number 15, for images of this site today. Image source: AG84 2012b

Figure 27. Based on a design by Mikhail Kruglov, this building opened at Ulitsa Stanislavskogo (now 15 Leont'yevskiy Pereulok) in 1964 to house top Communist Party leaders. Its famous residents included Khrushchev, who reportedly planted a tree on its gated premises (Gorbushina 2011).[137] See Figure 50, Number 16, for current pictures of this site. Image source: AG84 2013b

[137] The information above is from Nadezhda Gorbushina's conversations with residents. According to Timothy Colton, Khrushchev's son Sergei lived in this building and it opened in 1961 or 1962 (1995: 504).

Figure 28. Modernist redevelopment of Prospekt Kalinina (now Novyy Arbat), designed in the early 1960s under the direction of Moscow's Chief Architect Mikhail V. Posokhin. The new buildings were largely residential, but also included offices, shops and other establishments. Image source: Alyoschin 2010

Figure 29. A new microdistrict at Yasnyy Proyezd and Proyezd Dezhnëva photographed by Lev Polikashin for RIA Novosti in the late 1960s. Image source: Pipeeva 2013

greenbelt beyond the MKAD (Moscow City Government 2010).[138] Construction of 9- to 16-story housing was to raise per capita dwelling space from under 9 to over 13 square meters (Gorlov 2005: 252, Colton 1995: 458). Other notable features included new radial and orbital thoroughfares, regional development beyond the greenbelt, replacement of decayed building stock and emphasis on preserving cultural heritage (French 1995: 83, 192). Preservation became, at least nominally, part of the Brezhnev administration's efforts to make Moscow a "model city" for the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

Model projects were not limited to the historic center. Zelenograd became a testing ground for new development, including Moscow's first 22-story home assembled out of prefabricated ferroconcrete panels (Gorlov 2005: 231). Along with standard residential buildings (Figure 30), experimental designs appeared throughout the capital. Multi-unit homes grew larger and more spread-out, often in creative arrangements only visible from above. At ground level, the longer models created inconvenient barriers penetrated infrequently by tunnels. A particularly dramatic ring-shaped building opened at 13 Ulitsa Nezhinskaya in 1972, featuring an enormous central yard (Figure 31). During the same year, Mosgorkom First Secretary Viktor Grishin held a groundbreaking for the experimental Severnoye Chertanovo microdistrict on an 80-hectare plot 15 kilometers south of the Kremlin (Figure 32). Just as Moscow was supposed to be the shining example for other cities, Severnoye Chertanovo was an example for other districts — a self-sufficient "city within a city" featuring underground infrastructure and amenities (Colton 1995: 392-5). Projects like these appeared frequently in the press, glittering among headlines like "Our Model City Deserves Clean Yards!" (Colton 1995: 392).

[138] Along with French 1995, Colton 1995 and Gorlov 2005 (which reference the June 10, 1971, edition of *Pravda* and the July-August 1971 edition of *Stroitel'stvo i Arkhitektura Moskvy*), see Ikonnikov 1975, Frolic 1976, Lappo et al. 1976 for additional information on the 1971 Genplan.

In the early-1970s, the Directorate of Tall Houses and Hotels took over management of all Moscow housing stock assigned to the Communist Party (Colton 1995: 499). In addition to the residential high-rises and other prominent Stalin-era buildings, these included a growing collection of high-modernist and inconspicuous-brick designs for the *nomenklatura*. Scale was closely associated with comfort at the time. In 1974, Mosgorkom instituted a minimum height of 12 stories for apartment buildings in the capital (French 1995: 79). Gosstroy released an update to the Construction Standards and Regulations document a year later, formalizing new design, quality and efficiency standards as well as reducing norms for green space per capita in residential areas (Gosstroy 1985: 31, Taberko 2010). In spite of efforts to comfortably house more people through efficient use of space, economic stagnation (*zastoy*) began to slow the pace of housing construction (Gorlov 2005: 154) and render much of the genplan unattainable (French 1995: 198, Colton 2005: 396).

As recession made patronage more difficult, government leaders addressed popular concerns through new policy. A 1976 made "respect for historic monuments the moral duty of every citizen," which featured prominently in the new Soviet Constitution released the following year (Reid 1993: 162).[139] This broadly shared value was to become an early rallying cry and eventual bane for Yuri Luzhkov, a resourceful manager in the chemical industry who joined Mossovet in 1977 (Colton 1999: 15, Hoffman 2011: 59).[140] Under Grishin, historic preservation played an important role in preparations for the Olympic Games (Colton 1995: 392). Landscaping initiatives drew volunteers from the Moscow City Society for Environmental

[139] As stated in Article 68 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution: "Concern for the preservation of historical monuments and other cultural values is the duty and obligation of citizens of the USSR." For more on preservation policy under Brezhnev, see French 1995: 183, 193.

[140] After graduating from the Gubkin Institute of Oil and Gas in 1958, Luzhkov sought a position in the oil industry but ended up assigned to plastics and other petrochemicals. He served on a Moscow district council for two years before joining Mossovet. For details on his early career, see Hoffman 2011: 58-9.

Protection, which reported 1.9 million members in the late 1970s (Colton 1995: 406). Yet government support for ecological and architectural conservation proved erratic, and exclusive residences in central Moscow continued to replace historic architecture (Colton 1995: 506, 559-64).[141] The KGB's expanding Fifth Directorate kept protest under control (Colton 1995: 387, Hill and Gaddy 2013: 185), but heterogeneous undercurrents of dissent persisted in other forms. Self-publication (*samizdat*) at risk of arrest played an important role in spreading unsanctioned content — from creative writing to government criticism and calls for change (Hornsby 2009: 176, Service 2009: 380-1). While many political texts documented abuses of power, with the aim of promoting human rights and democracy, some were xenophobic (especially anti-Semitic) or even monarchist (Horvath 2005: 145, 151). The self-published almanac *Pamyat'* (*Memory*) contained historical studies inspired by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago*, but extreme nationalist groups appropriated this name in defending Russian heritage — including historic architecture — against "corrupt Soviet officials and the 'Zionists' and 'Masons'" allegedly in collusion with them (Colton 1995: 562).[142]

Economic stagnation continued to plague the Soviet Union as aging industry proved slow to keep pace with growing welfare and defense commitments (Collier 2011: 113). Disenchantment was especially high among the urban intelligentsia. According to nationwide poll conducted in 1981, citizens were less satisfied with their living conditions in Moscow than in any other major city except Leningrad, a result attributed largely to housing conditions (Colton

[141] See Voskresenskiy 2011, Danilov 2014, Skyscraper City 2013 for more on these custom designs, sometimes referred to as *tsekovki* (from TsK, the Russian acronym for Central Committee). They were among the most valued forms of patronage during the late Soviet years (e.g., Colton 1995: 508-11). Grishin's gated apartment house, for example, was built in 1972 near Patriarch's Ponds at 19 Ulitsa Alekseya Tolstogo (now Ulitsa Spiridonovka). Though intentionally understated, some of these buildings were strikingly original.
[142] For more on Pamyat', see Horvath 2005: 24-5, O'Connor 2006: 138-42.

1995: 396).[143] Housing accounted for a reported 46 percent of written petitions to the Mossovet Executive Committee (Mosgorispolkom), 61 percent of verbal complaints and 55 percent of letters to district authorities in 1981 (Colton 1995: 491). Victor Buchli points to further decline in housing management during the 1980s (1999: 180), which exacerbated discontent in crowded, poorly maintained residential areas. Economic stagnation also contributed to delays in the completion of new housing and related infrastructure. The model Severnoye Chertanovo microdistrict was a case in point: lacking needed amenities when finally opened in the early 1980s, it highlighted a litany of unfulfilled promises by Communist Party officials. Similar versions of its long curving forms with a dash of color had already appeared in other parts of the city, and expansive yards were starting to give way to closely bounded quadrangles.[144]

In January 1982, eight years before the 1971 genplan's expiration date, Mosgorkom called for a Technical and Economic Foundations (TEO) report in preparation for a new plan. GlavAPU, under the leadership of new Chief Architect Gleb Makarevich, announced that its main objective was successful implementation of the existing plan (Colton 1995: 718). Brezhnev passed away that November, and 68-year-old Yuri Andropov took over as general secretary until his own death in February 1984.[145] Andropov's replacement, Konstantin Chernenko, was even older and in rapidly deteriorating health. Viktor Grishin remained first secretary of Mosgorkom, approving the draft TEO in October 1984. Titled "Prospectus for Greater Moscow," it projected a population of 9.5 million by 2010 and a territorial annexation of 110 square kilometers (Colton 1995: 718-9). Another eight planning zones would cover greenbelt land as Moscow finally,

[143] The number of construction cooperatives, for example, declined by 66.7 percent from 1970 to 1981 as benefits for the *nomenklatura* became more extravagant (Colton 1995: 493, 497).
[144] See the Olympic Village microdistrict for an early example of these yards (Mikez 2010, Radomanov 2012).
[145] The "first secretary" position reacquired its former name "general secretary" in 1966.

though very unrealistically, managed to establish a system of new satellite towns linked by rail and remove polluting factories. Housing targets were conspicuously absent.

The popularity of historic preservation endured despite its appropriation by an unjust, repressive and economically troubled regime. According to R. Anthony French: "The [VOOPIK] Moscow branch alone claimed 800,000 members, or one in ten of the entire population. … In 1984 the Moscow branch organized 180 days of voluntary work on Saturdays and Sundays, a total of 11,500 man-days, on 52 projects" (1995: 183).[146] However, state and municipal authorities continued to demolish historic buildings to make way for special projects that often entailed luxury housing (Colton 1995: 504, 559-62). Conservation of green space also remained inconsistent. Between 1974 and 1984, new development spread across 600 hectares designated for protection in the 1971 genplan (French 1995: 103-4). Annexations a year later reduced the greenbelt to 1,720 square kilometers, bringing its wooded area from 1,095 to 720 square kilometers (Colton 1995: 469, 482).

Abuses of power by Communist Party officials became intolerable as economic decline slowed housing provision. In 1984, over 56 percent of Moscow's young families (i.e., both husband and wife under 31 years old) lived in the same apartment as their parents or other relatives (Colton 1995: 494-5). New residential construction had dropped steadily from 3.5 million square meters of dwelling space in 1973 to 2 million square meters in 1985, despite population growth of well over a million (Colton 1995: 460, 492). Average time on the municipal queue was six to nine years during the mid-1980s, as favored citizens waited half as long for the most comfortable and prestigious apartments (Colton 1995: 496-7, 501). Despite

[146] VOOPIK's Moscow branch was reportedly closed for some time in 1972 during a Kremlin "campaign against nationalism" (O'Connor 2006: 73), which coincided with protest over the destruction of old buildings in advance of US President Richard Nixon's visit to Moscow (Glendinning 2013: 381).

improvements in the quality of mass housing over the past two decades, residential architecture still elicited sharp criticism:

> For all its imposing quantitative accumulations, our construction colossus has not achieved the change in qualitative characteristics expected of it. Worse than that, it does not see the need for change. The big-paneled houses it puts up, although a lot higher than their predecessors, are every bit as drab and monotone. The bigger they get, the more distressing the impression they give off. Attempts by designers to introduce new series of homes or upgrade existing ones crack up against factory *val* [gross output targets]. (Sergei Suyetin, as quoted in Colton 1995: 492)

In response to limited options for creative employment, young architects in Moscow developed a unique form of "paper architecture" that blossomed in the 1980s (Figure 33). They often included diverse historical references and intricate detailing absent in built projects at the time. Their whimsical, erudite, often ironic drawings were successful in international design competitions, but efforts to show them in Moscow met with censorship (Giovannini 1989).

Mikhail Gorbachev, the youngest member of the Central Committee Politburo at 54, succeeded Chernenko as general secretary in 1985. After studying law at Moscow State University during Stalin's final years, he returned to his native Stavropol, where he ascended quickly in the Communist Party with support from Yuri Andropov and Second Secretary Mikhail Suslov (Brown 1996: 50).[147] As general secretary, Gorbachev initiated a period of restructuring (perestroika) to spur economic growth through decentralization of power accompanied by a new

[147] Andropov — who prepared Gorbachev to become first secretary — was also from Stavropol Krai. Suslov was first secretary of its Communist Party committee during World War II (Brown 1997: 50, 67, Lewin 2005: 232).

transparency (glasnost) in governance, media and the arts (Figure 34).[148] On December 24, 1985, he promoted Boris Yeltsin — recently appointed secretary of the Central Committee for Construction and Capital Investment — to replace Viktor Grishin as first secretary of Mosgorkom (Colton 2008: 112-6, Service 2009: 442).[149] In February of the following year, Yeltsin became a candidate (nonvoting) member of the Politburo. During his Mosgorkom tenure, he gained a reputation for populist moves like riding streetcars, standing in lines and denouncing unjust allocation of luxury apartments, dachas and other privileges to the *nomenklatura* (Hoffman 2011: 56, Garcelon 2005: 44-5).

Yeltsin criticized metropolitan planning in Moscow and convinced the Council of Ministers to subject the 1984 Technical and Economic Foundations (TEO) report to a thorough evaluation (Colton 1995: 719). Chaired by liberal economist Stanislav Shatalin, the review committee assessed the TEO's practicality and correspondence with present reforms, proposing to replace it with a set of benchmarks titled "Integrated Socioeconomic Development of Moscow to the Year 2000." The Council of Ministers added a provision to control population growth by placing stricter limits on residence permits for temporary workers (*limitchiki*), and the Politburo approved the proposal in September 1986 (Colton 1995: 720, Brooke 2006: 234). This coincided with Yuri Luzhkov's ascension to deputy chair of Mosgorispolkom and head of its commission on consumer services. Charged with promoting "individual labor activity" (self-employment), he formed a bureau that licensed cooperatives to earn income through approved enterprises like catering and recycling (Colton 1999: 15-6). Gorbachev was encouraging such cooperatives —

[148] Victor Buchli compares perestroika with *byt* reform following the Stalin era, calling Gorbachev's policies "the final gasp of socialist reformist fervour" (1997: 161).
[149] Yeltsin had just moved to Moscow to begin a new position as head of the Central Committee Construction Department on April 12, 1985. He had been a construction manager focused mainly on housing in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) from the late 1950s to 1976, when he became first secretary of the Communist Party committee for Sverdlovsk Oblast (Colton 2008: 65-77).

based on Soviet experience with Lenin's New Economic Policy — to activate personal initiative toward efficient provision of goods and services (Hoffman 2011: 39).

Government reform opened new possibilities for activism in Moscow. Gorbachev's wife, Raisa, helped establish the Soviet Cultural Foundation in November 1986 and joined its independent board (Schmidt 1990: 345). Led by Dmitry Likhachev, the foundation's work included protecting historic architecture (French 1995: 193, Billington 2004: 61). Effective removal of bans on "amateur associations and hobby clubs" in 1986 gave rise to myriad informal groups, some of which engaged in political mobilization (Garcelon 2005: 46-9). Moscow citizens organized to divert the Third Transport Ring thoroughfare from sacrificing homes and landmarks in the Lefortovo district (Colton 1995: 593-4). After documenting their intervention, eco-sociologist Oleg Yanitsky concluded: "It was becoming ever clearer that the local population were not just the passive objects of urban planning but active subjects in shaping their immediate environment" (1991: 371).

In January 1987, Gorbachev proposed reviving the long-defunct All-Union Conferences of the Communist Party to discuss current policies and new ideas for democratization (Service 2009: 460).[150] The Central Committee approved his proposal, setting a date and process for electing delegates. They also rolled back laws on anti-Soviet propaganda that limited independent political activity, resulting in thousands of voluntary associations within months; however, access to resources such as meeting rooms and printing presses remained prohibitively dependent on local authorities (Garcelon 2005: 47-50, Colton 1995: 580-1).[151] Meanwhile,

[150] The previous All-Union Conference of the Communist Party took place in 1941. These meetings provided an opportunity for dialog on pressing issues between congresses.

[151] While most political groups focused on practical concerns, people sometimes congregated around shared positions along continuums such as europhile/slavophile, autocratic/democratic, internationalist/statist, communist/capitalist and liberal/conservative. At times, high-ranking officials supported associations that represented their values (O'Connor 2006: 125-6, 140-1).

Luzhkov registered new cooperatives in droves, bringing their total for the year from 4 to 1000 by May (Colton 1999: 16). Yeltsin appreciated his flexibility and effective drive, appointing him first deputy chair of Mosgorispolkom and director of Moscow Agricultural Production (Mosagroprom) — the struggling agency in charge of the capital's food supply (Hoffman 2011: 56, 65-7). Communist Party officials who resisted perestroika met with strong criticism from Moscow's new leader. At the Central Committee plenum on October 21, Yeltsin announced his resignation from the Politburo in frustration. Gorbachev then demoted him to first deputy chairman of Gosstroy, which only strengthened his political profile (Colton 1995: 581). Yeltsin's successor at Mossovet, Lev Zaikov, launched a series of reforms that included converting GlavAPU into Glavmosarkhitektura and combining Glavmosstroy with other development operations to form the Moscow Construction Committee (Mosstroykomitet) in 1988. Despite a whirlwind of activity, resulting changes were mainly superficial (Colton 1995: 584-5). Yeltsin's bold confrontations, on the other hand, publicly associated conservative leadership with growing economic problems.

Leonid Vavakin replaced Gleb Makarevich as lead architect of GlavAPU in 1987, and a 400-member Public Council on Planning began meeting once a month to evaluate Yeltsin's revised TEO (renamed Technical and Economic Indicators, TEP). Yeltsin participated actively in the council, as did Vavakin, who also headed a Consultative Council of Experts. This approach to planning contrasted sharply with those of the past; it even allowed for discussion in the press and input from citizen groups (Colton 1995: 720).

As stagnation gave way to crisis, housing production slowed drastically. Moscow was also racked with shortages of food and other essentials. In 1988, almost 20 percent of its 8.5 million documented residents lived in joint-occupancy conditions (primarily communal

apartments, with just under 3.5 percent in dormitories), and over 4 million still had less than 9 square meters of dwelling space (Colton 1995: 493-4). By contrast, elite apartments — managed by the Directorate of Tall Houses and Hotels — reached a baseline estimate of 1.25 to 1.5 million square meters for 50,000 to 60,000 recipients, averaging 25 square meters per capita during the late 1980s (Colton 1995: 499). With the 1988 Law on Measures to Accelerate the Development of Housing Cooperatives, Soviet leaders sought to channel discontent toward construction and management of new homes, reducing bureaucratic hurdles as well as "supply side" problems linked with site preparation (Andrusz 1992: 149). It also allowed for greater resident autonomy over design, management and tenure (Andrusz 1992: 150-1, Kosareva et al. 2000: 168). The May 26 Law on Cooperation in the SSSR allowed resident organizations to safeguard their rights by forming coalitions, and the Moscow Union of Cooperatives held its first meeting in August (Supreme Soviet of the SSSR 1988, Slider 1991: 146-8). It also confirmed Gorbachev's support for income-generating cooperatives and extended the range of options. Yuri Luzhkov's Mosgorispolkom bureau for registering cooperatives became a hub for ambitious entrepreneurs. Yelena Baturina worked for Luzhkov, her future husband, in this bureau and joined the Russian Union of Cooperatives before embarking on her career as a development mogul (Hoffman 2011: 41, 61, RIA Novosti 2013). Future oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky befriended Luzhkov while selling individual metal garages — known as "shells" (*rakushki*) — through his Metal cooperative (Hoffman 2011: 162-3, Figure 35). Although economic conditions made it extremely difficult to realize new construction projects at the time, cooperatives became important vehicles for political and economic mobilization.

At the 19th All-Union Conference of the Communist Party, held in Moscow from June 28 to July 1, 1988, Gorbachev secured approval for a Constitutional amendment establishing the

Soviet Congress of People's Deputies (SND SSSR) to provide a more democratic means of participation in governance (Garcelon 2005: 42). Its 2,250 members would comprise representatives in equal proportions from the Council of the Union (Sovet Soyuza), the Council of Nationalities (Sovet Natsional'nostey) and "public organizations" (*obshchestvennyye organizatsii*) (O'Connor 2006: 144).[152] Members from the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities would be elected by councils (*sovety*) at lower scales, while those from public organizations would be nominated to fill specific quotas. The SND SSSR was to elect a Supreme Soviet (parliament) of 542 deputies in charge of normal legislation and appointing the Council of Ministers. There would also be a Russian Congress of People's Deputies (SND RSFSR) with a Presidium chaired by an elected member. Despite the Communist Party's disproportionate influence in "filtering" electoral candidates and authorizing public organizations (Urban 1997: 70-1), SND authority extended well beyond carrying out Politburo decisions, and its establishment was an important step toward fostering substantive democratic participation in governance (Garcelon 2005: 42-3). The televised All-Union Conference also provided Yeltsin with a platform for challenging conservative officials on the pace of reform (Colton 1995: 587). He ran in the SND SSSR election on March 26, 1989, as representative for the City of Moscow and received almost 90 percent of the vote (Colton 1995: 601, Paxton 2004: 139).

Government transparency proceeded in fits and starts. Initial reforms opened floodgates in the Moscow press, and prominent journalists experienced repercussions for going too far (Garcelon 2005: 100). Gorbachev met with leading editors and informed Vladislav Starkov of the newspaper *Argumenty i Fakty* (*Arguments and Facts*) that he could loose his job for

[152] Public organizations included the Central Council of Trade Unions, the Communist Union of Youth, the Committee of Soviet Women, the Organization of Veterans of War and Labor, the Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party itself. Dmitry Likhachëv was nominated by the Academy of Sciences, but its executive committee decided not to register him and other activists such as nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov (Garcelon 2005: 63).

publishing a letter from 50 construction workers expressing frustration with the allocation of luxury housing to Communist Party officials (Urban 1997: 80). Still, tolerance far exceeded the pre-glasnost norm. Public discourse included sharply critical perspectives on housing conditions, environmental quality, architecture, planning and construction. In March 1989, residents of Moscow's Pervomayskiy district began publishing a biweekly dispatch that incorporated unflinching political commentary. Mosgorkom First Secretary Lev Zaikov supported their initiative, and 26 districts followed suit by year's end (Colton 1995: 587). Along with greater freedom of speech, volumes of previously classified social, economic and geographical data became public during the late 1980s, animating grassroots efforts to address the problems they revealed.

In spite of the many plans to remove polluting factories from Moscow, their presence had increased over time. Industrial operations benefited from the city's massive workforce (including highly educated specialists) without prohibitive real estate costs. Powerful ministries and enterprises managed to evade controls on toxic emissions and make use of green space without consulting nearby residents. As the Soviet government adopted a more tolerant stance toward public dissent, environmental activism expanded rapidly in Moscow (Kagarlitsky 2002: 162, Colton 1995: 475-6, 592, 730). Several thousand people assembled to prevent an oil and gas refinery from encroaching on homes in the Brateyevo district (Garcelon 2005: 49). Members of the Sparrow Hills (Vorob'yëvy Gory) neighborhood association dressed up trees in formal attire with invitations to their "funeral" — a rally on the date when city officials planned to cut them down (Shomina 1999).[153] A reported 72 Moscow-based production lines closed during the late 1980s for noncompliance with environmental regulations, and Gorbachev lauded the green

[153] Sparrow Hills was the pre-Soviet name of a riverside park known officially as Lenin Hills at the time. The name has since been restored.

movement as key to perestroika's democratization aims (Peterson 1993: 193, 197). Yet activists still faced deep structural challenges. Zaikov estimated that the defense industry was responsible for a third of manufacturing output in Moscow as of 1989, not counting its operations in Moscow Oblast or other producers of military equipment in the city (Colton 1995: 441-8). Due to the secrecy and influence of such operations at the highest levels of government, they were apparently the least subject to regulation. Steady expansion of automobile ownership (Table 1) also contributed substantially to environmental problems (French 1995: 170-1, 200, Colton 1995: 523, 598). According to a 1989 ecological study, motor vehicles accounted for two-thirds of total air pollution in Moscow — including 70 percent of carbon monoxide and 90 percent of hydroxides (French 1995: 119).

Table 1. Ratio of Private Cars to Citizens in Moscow, 1960-1989

Year	Cars	Population	Ratio
1960	55,260	6,140,000	1:111
1980	307,762	8,099,000	1:26
1985	380,864	8,656,000	1:23
1986	465,022	8,774,000	1:19
1989	538,020	8,967,000	1:17

Source: Assembled based on data in French 1995: 166

In April 1989, Chief Architect Vavakin released a condensed version of the new General Plan for the Development of Moscow and Moscow Oblast to the Year 2010, based on two years of review and development. It was a significant departure from the 1984 draft TEO, especially in terms of housing. Approximately 60 percent of new residential development was to be on

annexed territory beyond the MKAD. The projected 12 square meters of dwelling space per person was only slightly above the existing average of 11.4 square meters, and below the 13-13.5 square meters called for in the 1971 plan. Early *khrushchevki* were to be refurbished or demolished and new housing made "psychologically comfortable" with greenery, closely bounded yards and accessible amenities (Colton 1995: 721). The plan also called for increasing construction density within the MKAD by repurposing underused plots such as garbage dumps, aeration fields and gullies. Some of the less feasible aspects of the 1971 plan remained, but in modified form: four satellite towns for research and production (each with a population of 100,000) were to help relieve overpopulation, while 21 "specialized centers" and 4 "regional multifunctional centers" would serve residents' commercial and leisure needs (Colton 1995: 721). Gosstroy released a parallel replacement of the 1975 Construction Standards and Regulations document, reducing standard green space per resident from 7 to 6 square meters — down from 12 in 1954 (Gosstroy 1989, Taberko 2010).

After more than 30 years of streamlined construction in the Soviet Union, William Craft Brumfield noted that "[t]he 'superficial aesthetic' of early twentieth-century architecture—and above all, the style moderne — has regained a certain luster, not as an active architectural principle but as a reminder of discarded values whose individualism and unprogrammed variety seem all the more valuable for their absence in contemporary architecture" (1991: 295). Given the style moderne's association with late-19th- and early-20th-century capitalism, its popularity during the late Soviet years — especially among disaffected professionals — reflected a growing rejection of Communist Party ideology (Weir 2009: 2). Cooperatives were a case in point: along with housing construction, refurbishment and management, they could now provide goods and services for shared profit (Slider 1991: 146). During perestroika, the term "cooperative"

represented economic and political activity with relative independence from government control. Although the role of cooperatives in housing production declined with the economy, from 20 percent of total production in 1970 to 10 percent in 1989, their options and impact on society expanded (Colton 1995: 487).

Amid growing discontent with Gorbachev's attempts to compromise with conservative officials, Yeltsin championed deeper and more immediate reforms. As a member of the SND SSSR, he won election to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union with effective support from the new Democratic Russia (Demokraticheskaya Rossiya, DR) coalition of voluntary associations, small parties, opposition candidates and other activists from district councils (*raysovety*) who sought to counter Communist Party dominance. Democratic Russia helped organize a massive rally in Moscow on February 4, 1990, along with follow-up events across the country on February 25.[154] Yeltsin was elected to the SND RSFSR on March 4, and Gorbachev became president of the SND SSSR 11 days later. Gavriil Popov, an influential SND SSSR deputy and dean of the economics department at Moscow State University, was elected chairman of Mossovet (which had become a division of the SND) on April 20.[155] He retained Luzhkov as head of Mosgorispolkom, and took the lead in advancing privatization of housing, land and other public assets (Garcelon 2005: 104-5, Bater 1994: 203). One of Popov's first legislative decisions was to annul a pre-election move by Mosgorkom to appropriate 34 buildings from Mossovet. Communist Party officials refused to comply, instead fighting to retain their control over 80 percent of city property (Garcelon 2005: 105). Popov also ran into conflict with activists over discipline and effectiveness, which prompted him to marginalize district councils. Advocates of

[154] With an estimated 250,000 participants, the February 4 protest rally was reportedly the largest in Moscow since 1917 (Garcelon 2005: 90).
[155] On the same day, Gorbachev issued a decree "transferring the right to issue permits for public demonstrations from Mossovet to himself" (Garcelon 2005: 104).

the "cultural intelligentsia" berated him for neglecting their interests and he developed a reputation for striking opaque deals with "businessmen" to accelerate privatization (Garcelon 2005: 105-6, 148). Meanwhile, declining public services left yards throughout the city in a depressing state (Figure 36).

After joining the SND RSFSR, Yeltsin was elected to chair its Presidium over Gorbachev's strong objections. Yeltsin's close victory hinged upon securing enough votes from the Communist Party to supplement those from the Democratic Russia bloc. Many Communist Party delegates voted for him in response to "grassroots pressure and the threat of a dangerous public backlash if another candidate were chosen" (Dobbs 1990). On June 12, 1990, the SND RSFSR declared full sovereignty from the Soviet Union. Yeltsin and Popov resigned from the Communist Party a month later at the 28th Congress,[156] where Gorbachev was reelected general secretary despite his efforts to limit Party dominance through the SND SSSR.[157] In response to pressure from the Baltic republics for independence, Gorbachev called for a referendum on preserving the Soviet Union. He also permitted local referendums on whether to hold elections for president of the RSFSR and mayor of Moscow. Each of these propositions received a majority of "yes" votes on March 17, 1991, although 6 of the 15 Soviet republics did not participate.

Yeltsin ran for president of the RSFSR, and Popov for mayor of Moscow, both winning in the first round on June 12, 1991. Luzhkov joined Popov's ticket as "vice-mayor" (Colton 1999: 16). With a mandate for rapid change, Yeltsin passed the momentous Law on Housing

[156] Yeltsin suspended his membership in Democratic Russia as well (Urban et al. 184). For more on the 28th Congress of the Communist Party, along with the mass demonstrations surrounding it, see Garcelon 2005: 101-2.
[157] Soon after the 28th Congress, Gorbachev initiated a law on freedom of the press (Brown 1996: 283).

Privatization on July 4 (Russian President and Supreme Soviet 1991).[158] This made it possible for citizens to become official owners of their apartments but not of the shared technical equipment, indoor spaces and adjacent territory (UNECE 2004: 29-30, Vihavainen 2009: 88). Partially in response to privatization, conservative party leaders — known as the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP) — launched an attempt to replace Gorbachev on August 19 while he was vacationing in Crimea (Bater 1994: 203). Yeltsin acted quickly to prevent a return of Communist Party rule, famously addressing the crowd from atop a tank in front of the parliament building. Vice-mayor Luzhkov and Yelena Baturina — now married and expecting their first child — joined Yeltsin in a firm show of support (Jensen 1999: 92, Colton 1999: 17).[159] The military also ended up siding with Yeltsin, and the GKChP proved unsuccessful (Service 2009: 500-2). Gorbachev returned to Moscow and resigned as general secretary. Yeltsin took advantage of the "state of emergency" to strengthen presidential powers and suspend Communist Party activity in Russia. Luzhkov completed the transformation of Glavmosarkhitektura into Moskomarkhitektura on November 28, consolidating municipal development organizations such as the Genplan Research Institute, top Mosproyekt studios and GlavAPU — the latter now focused on land use permits (Emmanuilov 2002).[160] As Communist Party influence diminished in Moscow and throughout the republics, Gorbachev announced his resignation on December 25 followed by dissolution of the Soviet Union at year's end (Service 2009: 506-7).

After the economic and political upheaval of 1991, apartment privatization slowly gained momentum (Daniell and Struyk 1994: 510). Civic engagement spread quickly as the threats and

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[158] Lazar Kaganovich died three weeks later, on July 25. After moving out of his Kremlin flat in 1957, he lived out his days at 50 Frunzenskaya Naberezhnaya — a majestic Stalinist apartment house overlooking the Moscow River (Colton 1995: 364, 505).

[159] Baturina also started Inteco in 1991, the firm through which she would become a billionaire.

[160] Restructuring of Glavmosarkhitektura began on June 28, 1991, with Luzhkov's order (*rasporyazheniye*) "On the Structural Formation and Distribution of Powers of the City of Moscow Executive Authorities" (Moscow City Government 1991).

rewards of housing patronage lost sway. Resident groups began organizing social services — including garbage collection — to compensate for government instability (Shomina 1999). The Moscow Union of Housing Cooperatives (Moskovskiy Soyuz ZhK i ZhSK) brought over 1,900 resident organizations together to protect members' rights and promote their interests. They assembled a database of all cooperative buildings in the city, developed a unified maintenance agreement and won several court cases over substandard municipal services and illegal construction in yards (Shomina 1999). However, citizen groups — especially district councils — still met with resistance from the Popov administration (Colton 1995: 679, 683, 689). The mayor sought to replace these organizations with a professional "American-style division between legislative and executive arms of governance" (Garcelon 2005: 109).[161] Rather than channel their activity in an organized way, he and Luzhkov worked against them in an attempt to restore order through centralized control.

After an excruciating year of food shortages and dysfunctional public services, Popov stepped down and Luzhkov took over as mayor in June 1992.[162] He calculated that Moscow's reeling economy accounted for 75 percent of Russia's military-industrial research and 25 percent of its defense-related manufacturing at the time (Colton 1995: 447).[163] As this juggernaut collapsed along with essential production and distribution systems, even people who still had income and savings were left struggling due to extreme currency devaluation; survival depended on bartering, growing vegetables and other informal activity. Soviet-era dissident Roy Medvedev

[161] Proponents of this policy claimed that district councils were made up of "procedural democrats" (incapable of getting anything done) and extreme "populists" (who wanted to divide resources equally and persecute the *nomenklatura*) impeding economic reform (Garcelon 2005: 109). For more on Popov's relationship with district councils, see Garcelon 2005: 151-2.

[162] The Law on the Fundamentals of Federal Housing Policy came into effect in 1992, defining key policy on ownership and management. For more on this and related housing policy of the 1990s, see Vihavainen 2009: 88-9.

[163] According to a 1989 estimate from Lev Zaikov, the defense industry was responsible for half of applied research and development along with a third of manufacturing output in Moscow — employing 25 percent of the workforce (Colton 1995: 447). By the early 1990s, a reported 90 percent of economic activity in Zelenograd involved developing military technology (Colton 1995: 447, 870).

recalled a city beset with "famine and the destruction of life-sustaining systems," explaining that "streets and neighborhoods were not cleaned; traces of neglect, dirt, and poverty could be seen everywhere" (2005: 51, 55). The movie *Nastya* — a gritty fairytale set in 1992 Moscow — showed potholed walkways, residents negotiating with corrupt officials to have them repaired, power outages, lines for produce, rampant crime and even a streetcar being pulled by a tank. While the latter may have been invented for effect, actual conditions facing Luzhkov were no less chaotic and often more difficult to believe.[164]

Power struggles confounded government action to resolve the economic crisis and provide badly needed services. The SND of the Russian Federation voted against reconfirming Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar — proponent of "shock therapy" market reforms — and worked to limit Yeltsin's prolonged "extraordinary authority" following the attempted coup (Garcelon 2005: 198-9). In frustration, Yeltsin attempted to bring the SND parliament under control by adopting a new Constitution (Weir 2009). Encountering still greater resistance, he opted to dissolve the parliament on September 21, 1993 (Shapiro 1993, Garcelon 2005: 200). In response, congressional deputies — led by Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov — voted to impeach the president and replace him with Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi.[165] Yeltsin authorized Luzhkov to barricade the parliament building (known as the White House) and cut off its electricity, phones and hot water (Jensen 1999: 92). Thousands of people took to the streets. The deputies' supporters, some of them armed, descended on the parliament building — as well as the mayor's

[164] Despite the surfeit of urgent problems, one of Luzhkov's early decrees kicked off a procession of ineffective measures against individual garages (Moscow City Government 1992, Hoffman 2011: 163, Reznik 2013).
[165] While the patriotic conservative Rutskoi criticized Gaidar's reforms as "economic genocide" (Bohlen 1992), Khasbulatov became known for grandstanding and reportedly used his position to secure a massive residential suite originally for Brezhnev at 10 Ulitsa Shchuseva (now Granatnyy Pereulok) (Colton 1995: 713-4).

Figure 30. Children in front of a standard housing model (II-49) built in 1972 at 26 Kosinskaya Ulitsa near the MKAD. Image source: Mfyorova 2014

Figure 31. A gigantic ring-shaped apartment building that opened in 1972 at 13 Nezhinskaya Ulitsa (Sidik 2012). See Figure 50, Number 19, for pictures of this site today. Image source: Zlobina 2009



Figure 32. Severnoye Chertanovo microdistrict, designed in the early 1970s under Moscow's Chief Architect Mikhail V. Posokhin and built from 1974 to 1983 (Bronovitskaya 2009b). See Figure 50, Number 22, for current pictures. Image sources: ASDMOChS 2010 (top), Gudkov 1979 (bottom)



Figure 33. *Columbarium Habitabile* (1989) and *Villa Nautilus* (1990), collaborative "paper architecture" by Alexander Brodsky and Ilya Utkin. These etchings offer unusual perspectives on domesticity: in the first, old homes on the shelves of an archive face demolition by a central wrecking ball; in the second, a closet on an eye-shaped pedestal in the middle of a city street opens into an underground retreat with a spiral staircase that leads to an identical closet. Image source: Morrison 2003

Figure 34. Mikhail and Raisa Gorbachev visiting a yard on Ulitsa Marshala Ustinova (now 6 Osenniy Bul'var) in 1988. The homes are recently constructed P-44 models. Image source: Alexba 2012a

Figure 35. Metal garages around a playground at 43 Ulitsa Lyusinovskaya. Image source: Stroganov 2011

Figure 36. A yard at 4 Ulitsa Marshala Fedorenko during the early 1990s. In this case, maintenance problems compound the normal exposure of mud and debris at winter's end. Image source: Alexba 2012b

office and the Ostankino Television Tower — in a bid to prevent Yeltsin from usurping power unconstitutionally; Rutskoi appointed Aleksandr Krasnov — chairman of the Krasnopresnenskiy district — to replace Luzhkov and called for supporters to "take the Kremlin by storm" (Colton 1995: 669). On October 3, Yeltsin ordered the military to restore order, and soldiers in tanks fired on the upper stories of the White House the next morning. By day's end, 300 deputies and many of their supporters were in prison after nearly two weeks of sporadic violence that cost 145 people their lives and left 733 wounded (Colton 1995: 669). Yeltsin used this "state of emergency" to consolidate power, granting Luzhkov exceptional authority under martial law and suspending local councils. Two days later, the mayor permanently disbanded the councils and announced a December 12 election to fill a new Moscow City Duma (Colton 1995: 670-1).[166] This would coincide with parliamentary elections for a State Duma, replacing the Congress of People's Deputies, and a referendum on a new Constitution.

Luzhkov benefited in many ways from the crises of the early 1990s, as the return of basic services like garbage removal coincided with his active and highly visible leadership (Colton 1999: 18, Figure 37). He lived up to his self-description as much less concerned with ideology than with being an effective manager (*khozyaystvennik*) (Hoffman 2011: 70-2, 245).[167] The new mayor continued to advance privatization and centralization initiated under Popov but with a more clientelist orientation, which drew praise for uniting advantages of socialism and capitalism to satisfy a broad spectrum of constituents (Medvedev 2004: 57). Luzhkov sought to avoid ceding ownership of city assets to independent citizens and firms, instead granting temporary

[166] As the name for city and state legislative bodies before the Soviet era, "Duma" became nostalgically popular in the early 1990s (Colton 1995: 897).

[167] Stephen Collier has provided useful insight on this concept: "[T]he Russian root *khoz* originally referred to the household, and is closely linked to problems of management: a *khoziain* [*sic*] is the head of a household or of some other substantive economy; the verb *khoziaistvovat'* is the activity of managing and transforming a *khoziaistvo*. *Khoziastvo*, as a noun, can refer to a farm, a household, or virtually any nexus of production and need fulfillment — that is, to almost any unit of substantive economy" (2011: 81). The word *khozyaystvennik* is a somewhat diminutive form of *khozyain*, which can refer more broadly to an owner, master, boss or host.

rights to use them under his direct or indirect control (Hoffman 2011: 246-8). He began leasing out property — including bomb shelters in residential areas — to finance reconstruction, earning the image of not only an effective manager but also Moscow's overarching boss, proprietor or "head of household" (*khozyain*) (Colton 1995: 700, Colton 1999: 16-9). With Yeltsin's support in 1994, the municipal government secured control over most property in the capital, proceeding to assign leases for up to 49 years "at high rates to carefully chosen investors" (Jensen 1999: 97).[168] Mayor Luzhkov became popular for using street smarts to get things done. He spoke of growing up in a Moscow barrack, where his family shared a single room and he earned his stripes in the "hooligan courtyard … a small, self-organized community in opposition to the city and the state" (as quoted in Hoffman 2011: 58). His wife, Yelena Baturina, showed similar moxie as she built Inteco into a successful plastics firm that began developing technology for cleaning and weatherproofing architectural facades in 1995 (Inteco 2013).

The Law on Homeowners' Associations came into effect in 1996, formalizing provisions for collective ownership and management not fully defined in the 1991 Law on Housing Privatization and the 1992 Law on the Fundamentals of Federal Housing Policy (Vihavainen 2009: 89-90). It clarified the legal status of a homeowners' association (TSZh) and officially made residents of privatized apartments collective owners of shared resources like stairwells, elevators, hallways and adjacent land within established borders. As introduced in Article 24 of the Law on Housing Privatization, each apartment owner's financial obligation for managing these assets corresponded with the size of his or her dwelling space (Russian President and Supreme Soviet 1991).

Mayor Luzhkov's approach to privatization became a source of contention with the Yeltsin administration (Hoffman 2011: 248). He frequently criticized economic reforms

[168] For more on this leasing policy, see Colton 1995: 727, Golubchikov 2004: 238-9.

promoted by Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais, which were closely linked with Gaidar's privatization policies (Hoffman 1997, Medvedev 2004: 61). Meanwhile, Yeltsin developed a reputation for economic mismanagement and corruption. His popularity sharply declined, along with his health, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) made substantial gains in campaigning for the 1996 presidential election (Hoffman 2011: 323, Figure 38). Yeltsin's acquiescence to a poorly executed invasion of Chechnya — covered in unflinching detail on Vladimir Gusinsky's NTV (Channel 4) — heightened public discontent, and the president seriously considered postponing the election (Hoffman 2011: 287).[169] Luzhkov was closely aligned with Gusinsky, whose rival oligarch Boris Berezovsky — having recently exploited connections with Yeltsin's inner circle to establish ORT (Channel 1) — fanned the president's suspicion that Moscow's popular mayor sought to undermine and succeed him (Jensen 1999: 92).[170] Nevertheless, Yeltsin refused to postpone the June 16 election. Berezovsky organized a coalition of highly influential business leaders, including Gusinsky, in a public relations onslaught to prevent Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov from becoming president (Hoffman 2011: 285-8, Sakwa 2011: 95).[171] Luzhkov also ended up supporting Yeltsin,

[169] Since Gusinsky's cooperative days selling metal garages and refurbishing old buildings, he founded the Most Holding Company that included Most Bank and Most Media. His NTV television channel, *Segodnya* (*Today*) newspaper and Ekho Moskvy (Echo of Moscow) radio station were particularly influential and known for independence from the federal government (Colton 1995: 744, Hoffman 2011: 204, 284).

[170] Berezovsky, who made billions selling automobiles and orchestrating other ventures, was strongly opposed to Luzhkov in heated competition with Gusinsky (Hoffman 2011: 458-60). He managed to influence Yeltsin and obtain Channel 1 (now Channel One Russia) through the president's small group of public and private confidants known as "the family" (Sakwa 2011: 7, 91-4, Hoffman 2011: 463).

[171] The main oligarchs who helped Yeltsin defeat Zyuganov were among the "seven bankers" (*semibankirshchina*) who became astronomically rich after starting out with economic cooperatives in the late Soviet years (Hoffman 2011: 328, 368). Luzhkov held most of these financiers in mutual contempt, but his senior aid Vasily Shakhnovsky brought them together — excluding the mayor's ally Gusinsky — for a series of negotiations aimed unsuccessfully at taming illegal and often violent business activity (Hoffman 2011: 271). For more on the seven bankers, see Tavernise 2003: 2, Kotz and Weir 2007: 216-7, 260-1, Sakwa 2011: 6-7, 95. Zyuganov's apartment was reportedly in the same place where Yeltsin lived upon moving to the capital — a custom design built in 1986 at 54 Vtoraya Tverskaya-Yamskaya Ulitsa (Danilov 2014).

who prevailed in a close election marred by allegations of fraud, and winning his mayoral race on the same day with 89.6 percent of the vote (Colton 1999: 19-20).

After the 1996 elections, Luzhkov emphasized the need for a post-Soviet genplan to prepare for the next 20-25 years. Yet he focused mainly on organizing a lavish celebration for Moscow's 850th anniversary, which took place in September 1997 (Pagonis and Thornley 2000: 753, Hoffman 2011: 240). With two-thirds of Russia's foreign investment concentrated in Moscow at the time, Luzhkov secured contributions from businesses under threat of tax audits and other forms of leverage (Jensen 1999: 104, Kolosov and O'Loughlin 2004: 421). He also returned favors with lucrative business opportunities rooted in personal connections (Hoffman 2011: 242-3). Gusinsky refurbished prime real estate in exchange for authorization to market a percentage of the site (Hoffman 2011: 163). As such practices expanded, many residents of old buildings in the center faced relocation to high-rises around the perimeter, their former homes demolished or retrofitted into "sham replicas" (*mulyazhi*) (Weir 2004, Harris 2009: 230, Bronovitskaya 2009a: 57, Figure 39). Yelena Baturina's Inteco won municipal contracts to supply plastic goods at low cost (Stanley 1997, Shulyakovskaya 1999). Luzhkov collaborated with his friend Vladimir Yevtushenkov, founder of the Sistema business conglomerate, to convert a former Soviet television station on Moscow affairs into TV Center (Channel 3) in 1997 (Hoffman 2011: 457).[172] Along with loyal periodicals like *Rossiya* (*Russia*), TV Center helped Luzhkov build his local and national standing (Sakwa 2011: 95, Zasurskii 2004: 212-5).

Russia's August 1998 loan default and currency devaluation brought a new wave of economic hardship, but Moscow rebounded quickly under Luzhkov's management (Jensen 1999: 116). In open defiance of the Yeltsin administration, he started a political party called

[172] Sistema is located in Ivan Zholtovsky's iconic building across from the Kremlin at 13 Mokhovya Ulitsa (Figure 19). For more on the company's ties with Luzhkov, see Hoffman 1997, Jensen 1999, Colton 1999, Beyrle 2010.

Fatherland (Otechestvo) and worked to build support among regional leaders (Hoffman 2011: 457-8).[173] Oligarchs took sides, and the mayor faced a bitter smear campaign (Treisman 2011: 92, Hale 2015: 267-9). This intensified his efforts to make the capital a shining example of effective government. The 1998 Urban Development Code of the Russian Federation — which established planning standards but did not prevent "arbitrary rule" by city and state officials (Golubchikov 2004: 234) — provided Luzhkov with enough leeway to advance his interests through a new genplan.

The Moscow City Duma ratified Genplan 2020 on June 20, 1999. This "Plan of Possibilities" applied old and new ideas toward the challenges of market-oriented development. Less prescriptive than the plans of 1935 and 1971, it set guidelines for public-private partnerships through a new system of zoning (Kuzmin 1999, Golubchikov 2004: 240). Authors from the Moscow Committee for Architecture and Urban Development (Moskomarkhitektura) and the Genplan Research Institute advocated building primarily within city limits, repurposing 16 of 66 abandoned industrial sites along the Small Ring Railway and reducing the territory of another 20 — with reclaimed land slated for parks, commerce and housing (Moskomarkhitektura and NIiPIGM 1999). Mass-produced residential buildings from before 1980 were to be replaced with new designs that formed sheltered courtyards and played elegant roles in "urban ensembles" (Baevsky 2004). Based on the recommendations of a commission charged with inspecting 10,000 5-story apartment buildings from the Khrushchev years, city officials resolved to demolish 1,722 homes deemed beyond repair due to "moral and physical decay" (DGPGM 2011a: 15).[174] Although Moscow residents generally welcomed the promise of receiving a brand-

[173] Otechestvo was the name of a conservative organization with support among nationalist intellectuals and government officials during perestroika; the first Otechestvo conference was held in the facilities of VOOPIK's Moscow branch, which served as the group's headquarters in 1989 (O'Connor 2006: 141-2).
[174] The specified building models were K-7, II-32, II-35, 1605-AM and 1-MG-300.

new apartment in the same area as their present home, some viewed relocation as a means of freeing valuable land near subway stations for elite housing (Bulin 2013, Figure 40). Even in less convenient locations, many people valued the rustic park-like settings that developed in early microdistricts as they filled with mature trees.[175]

Corruption, economic crisis, serious health problems and a reputation for alcoholism beleaguered Yeltsin as the next election loomed. Luzhkov allied with Yevgeny Primakov, a respected moderate who served briefly as prime minister before declining to prevent a corruption investigation and an impeachment campaign (Kotz and Weir 2007: 266-7). The Luzhkov-Primakov alliance was a formidable threat for Yeltsin and his supporters — without a loyal successor, their vulnerability to dispossession and prosecution would likely spiral out of control (Hoffman 2011: 460-1). The challengers were popular with voters, well funded, regionally connected, and positioned to enlist support from key figures responsible for internal affairs, national security and the military (Jensen 1999: 93-4).[176] On August 9, 1999, Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin as prime minister. At the time, Putin was serving as director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and permanent member of the Security Council.[177] Presidential Chief of Staff Alexander Voloshin — along with Boris Berezovsky and his business partner Roman Abramovich — reportedly played important roles in Putin's ascension (Sakwa 2011: 135, Hoffman 2011: 473), and Anatoly Chubais considered him an "ideal candidate" (Gessen 2012:

[175] See Logvinov 2014 for a picture of the *khrushchevki* in Figure 29 surrounded by trees 31 years later.
[176] Business and media players supporting Luzhkov included Vladimir Yevtushenkov (Sistema), Vladimir Gusinsky (Most) and Rem Vyakhirev (Gazprom) (Sakwa 2008: 97, Hoffman 2011: 457).
[177] After the KGB's temporary closure and restructuring, the newly established FSB took over most of its responsibilities in 1995. Since the early 1990s, Putin had been working for Anatoly Sobchak — a congressional deputy and the first democratically elected mayor of St. Petersburg (Sakwa 2011: 55). After Sobchak left office, in 1996, Putin served as deputy chief of the Presidential Property Management Department and deputy chief of staff under Yeltsin (Gessen 2012: 140). Alexei Kudrin, another former deputy to Sobchak, recommended Putin upon relocating to work for the president in Moscow (Hill and Gaddy 2013: 89, Sakwa 2014: 94). For details on allegations linking Putin with corruption under Sobchak and Yeltsin, see Dawisha 2014.

21).[178] Television programs on Berezovsky's ORT relentlessly promoted the new prime minister, and a consulting firm known as the Foundation for Effective Politics (FEP) crafted his image (Gessen 2012: 27). Luzhkov's street-smart *khozyain* reputation was an obvious model despite the parallel campaign to discredit him (Colton 1999: 23, Hoffman 2011: 458-68). Putin emerged as the disciplined strongman who grew up in a communal flat in Leningrad where he fought with "thugs" in his rundown courtyard (Gessen 2012: 46-8). He was sober and plain, acute and unyielding, intentionally unlike Yeltsin, which played well in light of the chaotic past decade (Service 2009: 547).

After a bombing in the new underground mall next to Moscow's Kremlin on August 31, 1999, four explosions in residential areas — two in the capital — took place from September 4 to 16 (Dunlop 2014: 78).[179] Reports of defused bombs at other homes over the following week spread terror through Russian cities. Demand for gated yards sharply increased among Moscow housing organizations and developers (Gorlov 2005: 43). Attributed to Chechen separatists, the bombings prompted a swift and crushing invasion of Chechnya on Putin's command (Service 2009: 545-6, Gessen 2012: 26). In a nation still reeling from economic and political dissolution, the new prime minister's national profile began to rise (Kotz and Weir 2007: 271-2). Even Luzhkov and Primakov decided to support Putin after their Fatherland – All Russia (Otechestvo – Vsya Rossiya, OVR) bloc came in a weak third behind the Communist Party and the pro-Putin Unity (Edinstvo) Party in the December 19 parliamentary elections (OSCE 2000: 7).[180] Yeltsin

[178] Abramovich had been a key player in business and government since at least 1996, at age 30, when Yeltsin allegedly gave him an apartment in the Kremlin (Levy and Scott-Clark 2004).
[179] The Moscow house bombings took place at 19 Ulitsa Guryanova (just after midnight on September 9) and 6 k.3 Kashirskoye Shosse (shortly before dawn on September 13) in the southeastern and southern administrative okrugs, respectively (Dunlop 2012: 78). See also Knight 2012.
[180] Establishment of the United Party has been attributed to Berezovsky (Hoffman 2011: 473) and Voloshin (Sakwa 2011: 123). Like Fatherland (Otechestvo), the name Unity (Edinstvo) had roots in conservative activism during perestroika — that is, Nina Andreeva's Unity movement "for Leninism and Communist Ideals" (see O'Connor

announced his resignation on December 31, making Putin interim president and moving the 2000 election forward to March from June. Berezovsky gave Putin relentless media support and enlisted three of his journalists to dash off a flattering biography (Gessen 2012: 31, 43, Hoffman 2011: 485). On March 26, 2000, Putin won in the first round with 53 percent of the vote.

Luzhkov helped combine OVR with Unity to form the party United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) on December 1, 2001, which provided a centrist bulwark against uncooperative communist, social-democratic and nationalist candidates (Sakwa 2011: 8, 62). In contrast with post-Soviet ideologists, consultants, technocrats and oligarchs, he made a constant show of using business to effectively meet citizens' needs (Medvedev 2004: 57). Luzhkov was ultimately more populist and less pliant than Yeltsin, proving adept at making private enterprises — from legal to illegal — contribute to rebuilding Moscow (Jensen 2000: 84, Pagonis and Thornley 2000: 760, Hoffman 2011: 243-7). He also made sure that pensions and other public services were adequately fulfilled (Medvedev 2004: 60). Putin's leadership was similar in many ways. He quickly replaced or obtained leverage over Yeltsin-era oligarchs — even those who helped bring him to power — along with other business and government leaders (Kagilarsky 2002: 270-2, Carnaghan 2007: 1, Hoffman 2011: 105). Following early attempts to reign in or eventually replace the new president, Berezovsky and former Luzhkov ally Vladimir Gusinsky ended up fleeing the country; this opened their influential media holdings to state control (Hoffman 2011: 470-90). As prices for oil, gas, timber, metals and other raw materials increased, Putin ensured that much of the proceeds helped stabilize the country (Popov 2007: 38, Taylor 2011: 4). He secured his image as a trusted manager with the

2006: 118-32). Luzhkov's decision to support Putin may also have been influenced by a Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) investigative committee request for documents related to Moscow housing construction (OSCE 2000: 7).

ability to keep different factions satisfied but not dominant, and a firm commitment to restoring state power and prestige (Glazychev 2009: 11, Sakwa 2011: 342).

Political and economic stabilization during Putin's first term coincided with a rise in new housing construction. Luzhkov's wife, Yelena Baturina, played an integral role. In 2001, Inteco acquired controlling shares in DSK-3 — one of three Glavmosstroy "house-building combines" established under Khrushchev (Colton 1995: 487). Yelena Baturina revived and updated the plant's operations, bringing its annual capacity to 500,000 square meters of dwelling space (Inteco 2013). She founded the Strategiya Construction Company, an Inteco affiliate focused on monolithic building with ferroconcrete, and purchased two cement factories in 2002. Over the following year, she bought another cement factory along with a producer of construction vehicles and technical equipment; she also launched a 1,100,000-square-meter development campaign in Moscow Oblast, which included 200,000 square meters of municipal housing and four immense residential complexes (Inteco 2013). Her husband won his third mayoral election by a landslide on December 7, 2003. Inteco partnered with a German design firm in 2004 to start an in-house architecture studio and began mass-producing a new series of 23-story apartment buildings with decorated facades.[181] Baturina's firm was allegedly involved with a quarter of Moscow residential projects at the time (Cecil 2010). Along with high-end projects in central districts, new development frequently involved tearing down *khrushchevki* and replacing them with newer models like the ubiquitous P-44T (Figure 41). These massive homes — their variegated pseudo-historical facades enclosing compact yards — began spreading throughout the middle and outer rings.

New housing became closely associated with Mayor Luzhkov, radically breaking from the image of monotonous Soviet apartment blocks. Economy models in Moscow's outer rings

[181] See Figure 44 for a picture of this PZMI-7/23 model.

and beyond gradually acquired more color, detailing and variations in scale, but the most striking examples of the "Luzhkov Style" were among burgeoning luxury developments (Revzin 2002, Paramonova 2013). Known for extravagance and scale, adventure and whimsy, they encompassed a practically unlimited range of influences: eclecticism, style moderne, neoclassicism, modernism, postmodernism. Some were modeled after the most grandiose Stalinist architecture while others were historic buildings with recent additions, modifications or complete makeovers. Developers also invested in subtler architecture to attract high-income buyers and renters (Paramonova 2013). Key municipal design studios became "public corporations" (OAO) while retaining their government connections, through which they took on high-profile residential projects in the capital.[182] Yards became more diverse in form: along with closely bounded quadrangles there were sophisticated landscape designs between low-rise condominiums, gated parking lots around skyscrapers, luxury parcels attached to infill development (*tochechnaya postroika*) and many other new possibilities.

Despite Luzhkov's power in Moscow and persistent work to influence state politics, he posed no threat to Putin leading up to the March 14, 2004, presidential election; the popular incumbent won in the first round with 71 percent of the vote (Service 2009: 553). However, longstanding criticism of the Luzhkov administration — much of it concerning loss of historic architecture through unscrupulous real estate development — reached broad audiences through state-controlled media. As Putin consolidated power, rumors circulated of plans to replace the mayor (Weir 2004). With strong backing from United Russia's majority in the State Duma, a September 13 Constitutional amendment replaced direct elections for regional governors with

[182] Mosproyekt-4 was founded in 1968 to concentrate on integrated research, planning and design for major public works such as museums, stadiums, medical facilities and parks. The studio became known for commercial projects in the 1990s, including many housing complexes associated with Luzhkov. See, for example, the mixed-use development at Khodynskiy Field in Figure 44 and Figure 50, Number 28 (Mosproyekt-4 2003).

presidential selections (Sakwa 2014: 112).[183] Putin justified this by citing a need to strengthen "national unity" in response to the September 1-3 hostage tragedy at a school in Beslan (Baker 2004). Based on Moscow's status as a federal city, Mayor Luzhkov was also a regional leader. With the new law, he officially served at the president's discretion.

The flurry of legislation in 2004 included a new Housing Code to go into effect at the beginning of 2005 (Russian President and Federal Assembly 2004). Article 36 reiterated the list of common property in the 1996 Law on Homeowners' Associations and stated clearly that homeowners share responsibility for its management (Vihavainen 2009: 89). Article 161 gave them three options: 1) direct administration without a proxy organization, 2) forming a homeowners' association or cooperative, 3) administration by a hired organization (homeowners' associations and cooperatives could also select this option).[184] Apartment owners had to choose a form of management for their building by January 1, 2007, through a referendum; if they missed the deadline, local authorities were to appoint a service provider by May of the following year (Vihavainen 2009: 86). This generally meant staying with the "directorate for a unified client" (DEZ) in charge of their building. With origins in the consolidation of house-management offices during the 1980s (Colton 1995: 864), DEZ were originally public (run by the municipal government) but many have since privatized (Vihavainen 2009: 99). Since homeowners' associations, cooperatives and private management companies were already legal options, reportedly adopted in 40 percent of Moscow homes, the most noticeable change turned out to be higher rates for public DEZ without commensurate improvements in service; resident complaints prompted the city to keep subsidizing management and consider fully privatizing it (Okuneva 2012).

[183] At the time there were 89 of these regional governors representing oblasts, krais, autonomous okrugs and federal cities like Moscow (Zlotnik 1997: 195, Bransten 2004).
[184] For details on these options, see the Management section of the Contemporary Focal Points chapter below.

On September 5, 2005, Putin announced a series of Priority National Projects (PNP) aimed at improvements in housing, education, healthcare and agriculture (Sakwa 2011: 48). He promoted Presidential Chief of Staff Dmitry Medvedev to serve as first deputy prime minister in charge of managing the projects (Sakwa 2011: 142, 162-3, Hale 2015: 278).[185] He took an open stance toward learning from "Western experience" (*zapadnyy opyt*) to link economic and social policy. The housing component — titled "Comfortable and Affordable Housing for the Citizens of Russia" — provided government subsidies for mortgage lending (Zavisca 2012: 61). Medvedev lauded its progress and potential at a 2006 banking conference:

> [Housing is becoming more accessible due to] a revolution in consciousness — our citizens are learning to live on credit. And there is nothing wrong with that. It is the civilized path to development, which many other states have followed. … The words "credit" and "creditor" come from the Latin "credo" — trust. If trust will exist between the citizens of the Russian Federation and the banking system, then everything will be fine. (as quoted in Zavisca 2012: 1-2)

The following year, he launched a PNP initiative called "maternity capital" — which offered mortgage vouchers of 250,000 rubles (about $10,000 at the time) to women who gave birth to a second child — and cited "optimistic projections on mortgage lending as evidence that housing would become more affordable" (Zavisca 2012: 1). The aim was to stimulate accessible

[185] Medvedev was promoted on November 14, 2005. A lawyer by training, he managed Anatoly Sobchak's 1991 mayoral campaign and became a consultant to the St. Petersburg mayor's Committee on International Relations headed by Putin; he also managed Putin's 2000 presidential campaign, taking over as chief of staff after the election (Black 2015: 5-6). Medvedev served concurrently as chairman of the board for Gazprom, Russia's largest oil and gas company, from 2000 to 2008 with a brief hiatus in 2001 (Sakwa 2011: 162).

residential development while reversing population decline.[186] In comparison with Yuri Luzhkov's methods for directing business activity to satisfy his constituents, including pensioners and others in need of assistance, PNP housing policy was more transparent but also more theoretical. In practice, the construction boom in Moscow was resulting mainly in elite homes (Figures 42-44).

Luzhkov continued to support Putin and United Russia as needed to secure reappointment or assurance of a loyal successor. The mayor's relatively autonomous leadership, which placed him at odds with the federal government at times, had not eclipsed his value for securing votes as the parliamentary and presidential elections approached (Knight 2010, Sakwa 2014: 89). Putin nominated him to a fifth term in June 2007, publicly citing the need "to provide young families with affordable housing and deal with defrauded homebuyers [people who lost money to fictitious building cooperatives and other housing scams]" (Krainova 2007). Yet opposition to Luzhkov continued to grow within the presidential administration and many sectors of Moscow's population.

Liberal business leaders and professionals — generally aligned with Medvedev — called for "modernization" by promoting technological innovation, economic diversification, merit-based competition and the rule of law. Their global mobility provided frequent opportunities to compare Moscow with other cities, fueling discontent with the quality of life at home. Public concern over demolition and indiscriminate remodeling of historic buildings gave rise to organizations like Arkhnadzor (Archobserver), Moskva, Kotoroy Net (Moscow That Is No More, MKN) and the Moscow Architectural Preservation Society (MAPS). Today's equivalent of the Soviet-era intelligentsia — with broad support among the young "creative class" (*kreativnyy klass*) as well as older progressive and conservative Muscovites — led a resurgent preservation

[186] For more on maternity capital and the related Federal Program for Young Families, see Zaviska 2012: 62-4.

movement, encouraging supporters at home and abroad to help bring an end to the mismanagement of cultural heritage (Cecil 2010). MAPS published an influential collection of essays in 2007 titled *Moscow Heritage at Crisis Point*, which documented the city's architectural legacy and its transformation under Luzhkov. Creative groups like Voina (War) and Chto Delat (What to Do) organized radical interventions to raise awareness of corruption and injustice. Despite Putin's show of confidence in the mayor's ability to solve housing problems, they became another source of discontent. Construction of elite homes proceeded with assistance from the municipal government in clearing space and suppressing protest.[187] Experienced activists helped residents fight real estate fraud, demolition of their homes, and new construction in their yards (Clément 2007a, 2008: 76-7, Vihavainen 2009: 112). Sergei Udaltsov — a young leader of the Left Front social-democratic coalition — accumulated over 100 detentions by the end of the decade (Azar 2012). In response to criticism over exploitative urban development, Moscow Chief Architect Alexander Kuzmin announced an initiative to update Genplan 2020 from a "Plan of Possibilities" to a "Plan of Necessities" (Kulikov 2008). This meant placing limitations on commercial projects, focusing instead on neglected transportation infrastructure and social services like playgrounds, green space, daycare centers and clinics (Lenta 2009).

Public criticism of the Luzhkov administration occurred in parallel with behind-the-scenes competition among factions — delineated broadly by Richard Sakwa as liberal technocrats versus conservative security affiliates (*siloviki*) — to secure influence after Putin's second term (Sakwa 2011: 116-30). In backing Medvedev and agreeing to serve as prime minister, Putin managed to balance the interests of liberals and conservatives who trusted his ability to protect stability, geopolitical influence, economic growth and public services through

[187] This is based on interviews with activists and other Moscow residents who closely followed housing-related protest during the Luzhkov era. For more on this subject, see Clément 2007b, Schwirtz 2009.

modernization (Hoffman 2011: xvi, Sakwa 2011: 268-71). Medvedev benefited from Putin's successes while pledging to advance entrepreneurship, technological innovation, efficient governance, a fair legal system and effective measures against corruption. He easily won the 2008 election and began launching model projects. Development of the Skolkovo Business School, Innovation Center and Smart City soon began in an area just west of the MKAD known as "oligarch alley" (Wainwright 2010).[188] Prominent billionaires — including Roman Abramovich — signed on to help fund these projects (Petrova 2013). Skolkovo was to be a "Russian Silicon Valley" with technologically advanced housing and other amenities for its new community (Kuzmin 2010).

In August 2008, Medvedev established the Federal Fund for the Promotion of Housing Development. Its director was Alexander Braverman, former chairman of the PNP Commission for Affordable Housing and first deputy of property relations under Putin. In explaining the fund's mandate, Braverman used language reminiscent of Medvedev's optimistic projections for mortgage lending:

> The government will have to change the way people think about housing. … For a long time our people were trained to live in high-rise apartment buildings, and we have to admit openly that this habit remains. … We'll have to create a program to stimulate demand, and we'll begin this work in the near future. Call it the Russian dream. I think we can make this dream come true. (as quoted in Ustinova 2010)

[188] The Skolkovo territory is also near Leonid Brezhnev's former dacha in Zarech'e.

Billionaires Mikhail Gutseriev (owner of Mospromstroy)[189] and Alexander Lebedev (founder of the National Housing Corporation, NZhK) prepared to meet this demand. In keeping with the new president's use of development tactics similar to those of Mayor Luzhkov, overtures to liberal reform proved superficial. On December 30, 2008, Medvedev extended future presidential term limits from four to six years. Members of the State Duma received a one-year extension to five years, along with authorization to review the performance of regional governors — including Luzhkov (Sakwa 2011: 343, 352).

In Moscow, growing tensions between the president and mayor opened new possibilities to effect change. In public discourse, Luzhkov's detractors referred to making the capital more "open," "livable," "attractive," "like European cities." Reports emerged that Medvedev, while in London for the G20 Summit in 2009, decided to turn Moscow's rundown Gorky Park into an updated version of Hyde Park (Osborn 2011). During an informal conversation at the Venice Biennale later that year, a small group of design, media and business leaders — including Alexander Mamut, once known as "the Yeltsin family banker" — decided to start an urban design institute (Forbes 2010). They enlisted starchitect Rem Koolhaas and his firm, OMA/AMO, to develop a post-graduate institute aimed at training designers to propose research-based solutions to local, national and international problems. Setting up in a repurposed chocolate factory at the center of town, they adopted the name "Strelka" (Arrow) from a contemporary art gallery that formerly occupied the space and began taking applications.

In May 2010, Moscow's City Duma ratified an update to Genplan 2020 after two years of work by Moskomarkhitektura and the Genplan Research Institute (Kulikov 2008, Lenta 2009). In keeping with Chief Architect Kuzmin's emphasis on necessities, the revised Genplan 2025

[189] The Chief Directorate for Industrial Construction in Moscow (Glavmospromstroy), founded in 1972, was "reorganized as a closed (non-public) joint-stock company and renamed 'Mospromstroy'" in 1990 (Mospromstroy 2014).

prioritized quality-of-life issues and proposed zoning regulations to manage "unrestrained economic activity" (Kulokov 2008). It included new measures for decreasing traffic congestion, expanding social services and reversing the disproportionate construction of high-income over low-income housing. Public-private partnerships remained the favored means of repurposing industrial sites (Figure 45), upgrading run-down homes, establishing shared amenities and building roadways (Moscow Mayor and City Duma 2010). Projections for housing redevelopment were so ambitious that a reported 1.7 million Muscovites — 20 percent of the population — faced relocation (Kulikov 2008). Despite the plan's focus on solving problems associated with Luzhkov, it did little to constrain his options or satisfy his critics.

Luzhkov found himself at the center of another barrage of media attacks following the August 2010 wildfires that left Moscow engulfed in a thick haze for two weeks as he vacationed in Austria (Sakwa 2014: 88). Allegations of corruption flooded the press, including resident dispossession to make way for exclusive real estate development (Schwirtz 2009). Inteco's many lucrative projects appeared to validate such claims (Knight 2010). Luzhkov was portrayed as a mafia boss neglecting serious problems while displacing citizens, squandering cultural heritage and allowing shady enterprises to build monstrosities with cheap immigrant labor (Savelyeva 2010, Schwirtz 2010). This campaign was apparently part of a bid to remove him from office. Medvedev had already replaced other regional leaders elected during the 1990s (Black 2015: 47), but Luzhkov considered his position secure enough to publically criticize him and demand an end to the attacks (Levy 2010, Sakwa 2014: 88-90). In response, Medvedev dismissed him from office, citing "loss of confidence" — giving credence to reports that blamed Luzhkov for problems with corruption, housing, social services and traffic congestion but firing him for insubordination (Knight 2010, Sakwa 2014: 90). Regardless of whether Luzhkov deserved these



Figure 37. At left, a sculpture by Zurab Tsereteli of Mayor Luzhkov as a yard custodian (*dvornik*). At right, an apartment house built from 1992 to 1995 based on a design by Andrey Meerson of the Mosproyekt-2 studio responsible for many examples of the "Luzhkov Style" (Paramonova 2013). See Figure 50, Number 25, for current pictures of the building. Image sources: Savelyeva 2010 (left), Aridova 2013 (right)

Figure 38. A Communist Party (KPRF) rally in Moscow's remote Solntsevo district before the 1996 presidential election. See Figure 50, Number 23, for pictures of this site today. Image source: Potsman-Mukhosranskiy 2012

Figure 39. Redevelopment projects in central Moscow (top) often transferred residents to economy models in remote microdistricts (bottom) (Weir 2004). Image sources: Ivanov 2009 (top), Bogomolov 2011 (bottom)



Figure 40. Custom designs by Mosproyekt-2. The building at center is by Mikhail M. Posokhin, son of longstanding (1960-1982) Chief Architect Mikhail V. Posokhin. Gated luxury homes spread throughout Moscow in the early 2000s, sometimes enveloping the facades of historic landmarks. Image source: Mosproyekt-2 2011

Figure 41. During the 2000s, many *khrushchevki* were replaced with towering P-44T models.



Figure 42. Elite housing became remarkably diverse in the 2000s. Image source: Malinin et al. 2009



Figure 43. Bold turrets and scale are closely associated with the Luzhkov Style, as seen in the Edel'veys (Edelweiss, top) and Alyye Parusa (Scarlet Sails, bottom) housing complexes of the early 2000s. Image sources: Mosprogulka 2013 (top), GED 2012 (bottom)

Figure 44. The Grand Park Housing Complex, part of an integrated design project led by Moscow Chief Architect Alexander Kuzmin and Andrey Bokov of Mosproyekt-4. It was built from 2005 to 2007 on Khodynskiy Bul'var, which borders a former airfield (Chesnokov 2012). See Figure 50, Number 28, for recent pictures of the four towers and their premises. Image source: Monakhov 2011 (bottom)

Figure 45. An abandoned industrial zone at Okskaya Ulitsa (top) and Inteco's Volsky housing complex (bottom), which opened there in 2008. Image source: Kvartira Obzor 2011

charges, his removal strengthened control over Moscow for the federal government. He and Baturina "moved their daughters to London" and began a futile attempt to protect her most valuable business operations (Stewart 2011). Their experience recalled that of former oligarchs, like Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, who fell into disfavor with the federal government and lost much of their assets.

On October 15, 2010, Medvedev nominated Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Sobyanin to succeed Luzhkov. Sobyanin had been governor of Tyumen Oblast — in western Siberia — as well as chief of staff for Putin and campaign manager for Medvedev (Sakwa 2014: 91, Black 2015: 23-4). The City Duma confirmed his appointment within a week, and Sobyanin announced his intentions to root out corruption and ameliorate living conditions in the capital, with emphasis on resolving traffic problems (Cecil 2011). He also called for preserving architectural heritage, banning new construction in the city center and improving public parks (RIA Novosti 2010).

In heroic performances reminiscent of the former mayor, Putin appeared on television solving problems linked to the summer wildfires. He visited the city of Ryazan on October 26 to call for immediate construction of single-unit homes for those in need (Razmakhnin 2010, Figure 46). On the following day, an event called "Moscow: Economics of Reincarnation" (M:ER, a play on the Russian word for mayor) took place at the new Skolkovo School of Management.[190] Arkhnadzor organized this informal conference with assistance from Strelka, MAPS, MKN, the Shchusev Museum of Architecture, and the Moscow Architectural Institute. It included presentations by activists, economists, philosophers, historians, entrepreneurs, journalists and designers (including Rem Koolhaas via live video). Strelka's first year of instruction was already

[190] Architect David Adjaye found inspiration for the design in Russian suprematism — especially the work of El Lissitzky and Kazimir Malevich — as well as Rwandan basket patterns (Wainwright 2010).

underway, featuring a dynamic program attuned to the latest trends in urbanism. Staff and students were energetically cultivating international ties, generating ideas and sparking public dialog. Shared space and historic preservation were among the main themes. Reports began to appear in the local and international press that Moscow officials were seeking investors for the redevelopment of Gorky Park. Sergei Kapkov, one of Abramovich's closest associates and a member of the State Duma for United Russia, began consulting with Strelka on plans for Gorky Park.[191] The institute dedicated research studios to themes such as public space, historic preservation and sprawl. Several projects addressed land ownership and use in Moscow residential areas, making cases for preserving controversial architecture, assessing the value of open space, and developing online governance.[192]

In March 2011, Mayor Sobyanin pledged 12 billion rubles (about $420 million) to improve the entranceways of apartment buildings, add signs with parking rules, and install 30 new parking spaces for each yard in Moscow (Channel One Russia 2011). In light of a report from the Organization for Administrative and Technical Inspections (OATI) that many yards were in unsatisfactory condition, he stressed the importance of maintenance at a June 3 meeting with the heads of each prefecture (administrative okrug) and ordered them to devise a normative act by which all plots of land would be assigned to a specific management organization (RMNT 2011). He also visited a yard near the Begovaya subway station, where local residents told him about problems with illegal parking that convinced their homeowners' association to install gates around the premises (RIA Novosti 2011). They also recounted new plans to install video surveillance and a security station, which the mayor called a good example for other resident

[191] Kapkov was part of Roman Abramovich's gubernatorial staff in the Chukotka autonomous region. As governor, Abramovich raised investment to revive the economy and improve living conditions — serving from 2000 to 2004 and then agreeing to a second four-year term at Putin's request (RT 2008).
[192] Unconventional preservation sites included an early Soviet workers' settlement (Muradova 2011, Groznyy 2012), a Brezhnev-era microdistrict (Snopek 2013) and signature projects from the Luzhkov years (Paramonova 2013).

groups. In response to concern over the possibility of replacing homes around their yard with high-rises, Sobyanin promised that new construction would not take place in the area. He also underscored his commitment to upgrading entranceways and equipping yards with playgrounds, athletic facilities and parking spaces. In addition to holding well-publicized meetings with officials and citizens during his first year in office, Sobyanin ordered a review of public management agencies that left 18 of 145 directors unemployed (Okuneva 2012).

The Moscow Department of Urban Policy (DGPGM) began updating a program called Zhilishche (Dwelling) to publicly assess housing policy and present objectives for the next five years (DGPGM 2011a). Parts of the 218-page document were summarized in a colorful promotional brochure, part of a series titled *Moscow. For Life, For People* (DGPGM 2011b). The brochure was clearly designed to convince residents that the municipal government actively supported quality residential-communal services (*zhilishchno-kommunal'nyye uslugi*). Yards, building facades and public safety featured prominently along with the amount of public funding in comparison with other cities (DGPGM 2011b: 23-7) — it explained that the average Moscow resident paid 10 percent of the actual cost while the nationwide average was 22 percent. This included 10 rubles per square meter of dwelling space for maintaining common property, compared to 40 rubles in Kazan, while the municipal government added 12 rubles per square meter as well as 8 rubles for heat and 3 rubles for garbage services.[193] According to the brochure, the city assumed full responsibility for the condition of yards at a total cost of 5.1 billion rubles a year. It also reported municipal investment of 11.3 billion rubles to exempt 6.3 million people — including veterans, the disabled and "families with many children" — from paying for residential-communal services. An additional 911,000 people (77 percent retirees) received partial subsidies. Eligibility for subsidies also extended to

[193] The RUB/USD exchange rate averaged 0.0335 from 2010 through 2011 (OANDA 2014).

people with income less than half the average monthly earnings per capita in Moscow.[194] Total expenditure on subsidies was 9.8 billion rubles. Spending on housing and public works came to 245.5 billion rubles, or approximately 19 percent of the city budget of 1.3 trillion rubles in 2011 (Moscow Mayor and City Duma 2012a: 3, 131).

Although management services in the capital were of high quality and low cost in comparison with other Russian cities, ownership rights to land adjacent to the home were more ambiguous and prohibitive. Based on the Law on Land Use in the City of Moscow, if apartment owners collectively decided to pursue official ownership of their building's adjacent territory, they had to first obtain registration documents from the municipal government (Moscow Mayor and City Duma 2007).[195] This included the cadastral plan based on an official land survey. Although these plots were already registered and documented in city archives since the Soviet era, many have been reorganized through land surveys conducted since 2002 (Korchmarek and Verkhovskaya 2012). Applying for official ownership was thus an opaque process with erratic results, sometimes leaving residents with a plot scarcely larger than the building itself or stalled indefinitely due to missing documents.[196] After receiving the necessary papers, residents could submit a privatization application and — if approved — assume their property rights with the consequent tax liability; otherwise the land remained city property (Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 2010). This policy drew criticism as prone to abuse by officials willing to allow developers and other enterprises to use yards without consent from residents.[197] At the

[194] For Moscow, the average nominal wage per month was 41,400 rubles ($1,400) in 2011 (DEPRGM and ATsGM 2013: 24).
[195] Article 16 of the Law Instating the Russian Housing Code addresses the general process for securing ownership rights to land connected with multi-unit homes (Russian President and Federal Assembly 2005). Chapter 31, Article 389, Point 6, of the Tax Code specifies the owners' tax obligation (Russian President and Federal Assembly 2000).
[196] For an account of similar problems associated with privatizing yards in St. Petersburg, see Vihavainen 2009: 186-9, 214-5, 227.
[197] See Molodykh 2010 and ZhKKhGO 2011 for examples of resident criticism, keeping in mind that the government often used genuine and deceptive activists to influence public opinion.

same time, it deprived the city of tax revenues from much of the land around multi-unit homes. Unclear property rights were highly controversial under Yuri Luzhkov, and solving this problem was a priority for Mayor Sobyanin (Feifer 2010). He set out to address resident concerns over unjust land use by establishing a transparent legal basis for taxation and maintenance fees (Korchmarek and Verkhovskaya 2012).

Sobyanin's work on restructuring the management and ownership of yards coincided with President Medvedev's order for a joint proposal — issued on July 11, 2011, by the City of Moscow and Moscow Oblast — on expanding the capital's area (Moscow City Government 2011). Instead of a larger concentric ring, the initial plan entailed annexing 144 hectares of territory extending like the trail of a comet to the oblast's southwest border. At a meeting with regional governors on July 22, Putin referred to the proposal as an opportunity to promote low-rise homes:

> [W]e have almost reached the limit of large projects within the city limits. Infill projects will only worsen traffic and the environment in cities and towns. The first — and the worst — example that comes to mind is, of course, Moscow, where infill development has become a nightmare for people. But the situation is only deteriorating. A decision was made recently to expand Moscow's boundaries. I say, at last! …
>
> [L]ow-rise houses can be built quickly, within a month to six months thanks to modern technology, and you know why — because they use prefab blocks that are 90 percent factory built. This also explains their high quality, because the homes are built under factory conditions. And third, the market cost of such homes is comparable with, and is even sometimes lower than, the price of housing in economy-class flat blocks. ...

> The advantages of low-rise homes are indisputable. First of all, these low-impact homes conform to the latest requirements and are energy efficient, which means that maintenance expenses can be cut by about 70 percent. Other important features are a location away from heavy traffic, industrial facilities and city bustle, and the additional benefit of a small land plot the owners of such homes will enjoy. ...
>
> According to the polls, most Russians would like to live in a low-rise home. This is why we are highlighting the idea of low-rise developments, as I have said before. We plan to increase their share in housing construction to 60 percent, or about 54 million square meters, by 2015. (Russian Federal Government 2011)

Besides the reputed construction savings, low-rise homes with separate yards would place less responsibility on municipalities for providing residential-communal services. However, infrastructure would be expensive and new roads would likely increase congestion as more people relied on private automobiles. These factors seemed to outweigh the "low-impact" homes' energy efficiency. The proposal's ambiguous benefits called the motivation behind it into question.

Despite promotion of the border expansion as a technocratic solution to problems with traffic, its arbitrary nature underscored the ineffectiveness of Medvedev's calls for transparent democratic governance. Official politics were stage-managed to give legitimacy to decrees rooted in behind-the-scenes wrangling between powerful factions (Sakwa 2011: 362-5). Significant cracks appeared in the facade as parliamentary and presidential elections drew near. On September 15, 2011, billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov announced that Putin's deputy chief of staff, Vladislav Surkov, had been trying to manipulate his leadership of the opposition party Right Cause (Pravoye Delo) — an implication that Surkov wanted him to follow orders aimed at

fragmenting votes against United Russia (Sakwa 2014: 99-100). Surkov was known for developing the concept of "sovereign democracy" (generally synonymous with "managed democracy") to help Putin consolidate power (Taylor 2011: 109, Sakwa 2011: 24, 124, Pomerantsev 2014).[198] Proponents of this strategy acknowledged the need for modernization but held that liberal reforms could go too far, opening the door to instability that hindered progress. Tactics included co-opting popular movements and cultivating representative organizations to "divide and conquer" opposition while generating a simulacrum of civil society (Elder 2013). Like Yuri Andropov's innovative means of controlling dissent in the Brezhnev years, they bolstered government control while avoiding open repression (Sakwa 2014: 31). Liberal activists — generally aware of Surkov's machinations but not immune to all their protean forms — were energetically working to improve living conditions in Moscow, with emphasis on public space. Mayor Sobyanin encouraged their work, appointing Sergei Kapkov to head the Department of Culture and involving progressive reformers in well-funded municipal projects. In this atmosphere of rapid change, Medvedev addressed the United Russia congress on September 24 with a long-anticipated confirmation that Putin sought their nomination (Sakwa 2014: 5, 154).[199] The former two-term president later added that, if elected, Medvedev would be his prime minister. Liberal Muscovites reacted with exasperation that cascaded through online and offline social networks.

In a November 2011 resident survey on problems of greatest concern in Moscow, poorly maintained yards were rated 32 of 36 — selected by only 6 percent of participants (Levada-Center 2011). By comparison, high prices for essential commodities were number one (61

[198] According to Surkov's official biography, he served as director of public relations and deputy general director for Boris Berezovsky's ORT television channel from 1998 to 1999 (Surkov 2006). He also reportedly drafted the plan for extending presidential and parliamentary term limits (Sakwa 2011: 352).
[199] For more on the events surrounding this decision, see Black 2015: 115, Hale 2015: 113.

percent), followed by higher utility bills (45 percent), traffic congestion (42 percent), prevalence of immigrants from the southern republics (39 percent) and low salaries (31 percent). A poorly functioning system of communal management (*kommunal'noye khozyaystvo*) — including services like indoor and outdoor repairs, garbage removal, electricity, gas and plumbing for residential buildings — came in twelfth at 15 percent. This indicates a rise in dissatisfaction with aspects of the system as a whole — especially costs — that do not pertain directly to maintenance of territory around the home. Managing resident expectations has been a key challenge for the municipal government in transitioning from the late-Soviet housing management system to full privatization (Stanley 1997).

The City Duma approved Moscow's border expansion on December 7, 2011, three days after the parliamentary election that saw United Russia keep its majority, sparking widespread claims of fraud and unexpectedly strong public protest. Approval of the expansion plan coincided with the first day of the Moscow Urban Forum, a government-backed meeting of local and global specialists to discuss the city's future. Attendees included business people, government officials, designers, academics, cultural activists and members of the press. Border expansion was a major theme, along with tourism, foreign investment, conservation and "livability" (Figure 47). Mayor Sobyanin and other authorities gave speeches emphasizing the need to improve living conditions and market the capital as a "global city." An Urban Land Institute (ULI) Advisory Services team presented recommendations after touring the city and meeting with local experts. Their most urgent recommendation — to maintain population density by using land more intensively rather than proceeding with the annexation — had no apparent effect on the decision to expand.

A day after the Urban Forum, an estimated 80,000 people gathered in Moscow's Bolotnaya Square to voice discontent with the parliamentary elections (Sakwa 2014: 120).[200] They cited evidence of fraud, demanding a new vote along with release of those imprisoned during nonviolent street protests that arose upon release of the outcome. Jailed activists included Sergei Udaltsov of the Left Front and anti-corruption blogger Alexei Navalny.[201] The demonstration at Bolotnaya Square was reportedly Moscow's largest since the 1990s, an unexpected development for the leadership team who had so effectively limited democratic participation in governance over the past decade.

State and municipal authorities immediately responded to defuse the movement (Hale 2015: 286). On December 21, Medvedev promised to reinstate direct elections for regional governors (including the mayor of Moscow) and reduce the number of signatures needed to run in a presidential election from 2 million to 100,000 (Sakwa 2014: 129).[202] Mikhail Prokhorov announced a last-minute presidential bid, allegedly to divide opposition votes in atonement for publicly criticizing the regime (Ioffe 2012). In January, Putin magnanimously instructed Sobyanin to build a park beside the Kremlin on a giant lot where the Soviet-era Hotel Rossiya once stood (Latukhina 2012). The municipal government sponsored a design competition to help guide the territorial expansion, with emphasis on relieving traffic congestion and turning Moscow into a "global city" with attractive living conditions (Makhrova et al. 2012: 28-31, KGPSGM 2013). The request for proposals called for polynucleated development that would bring housing closer to employment, yet dissuaded participants from making "radical changes"

[200] Bolotnaya Square was once a swamp and a site of public executions. Located across the street from Boris Iofan's House of the Government, and across the river from the Kremlin, it was one of Yuri Luzhkov's pet projects; a nearby pedestrian bridge still bears his name.
[201] For more on Navalny's background and political activity, see Ioffe 2011, Black 2015.
[202] For candidates from parties represented in the State Duma, the number of signatures would be 300,000; to register a political party, the required number of members would change from 40,000 to 500 (Hale 2015: 286).

to the existing settlement pattern of single-unit homes and dachas (Moscow City Government 2012b: 8). Of the projected 7 trillion ruble ($221.2 billion) investment, the largest segment — 40 percent, or 2.8 trillion rubles ($88.5 billion) — was dedicated to housing (KGPSGM 2014). Eminent architects from Russia and abroad submitted proposals. Meanwhile, Sobyanin kept expanding urban development projects and keeping the protest movement under control.[203] Although there was no real threat to Putin's victory in the March 4 election, consolidating authority in Moscow would encounter vigorous resistance.

Putin's election in the first round provoked another historic rally at Bolotnaya Square a day before the inauguration, ending in violence that became a pretext for legal action against opposition leaders (Sakwa 2014: 154). A protest march led by influential writers (Barry 2012), along with "Occupy" gatherings around the statue of poet Abai Qunanbayuli (Elder 2012), led to an extreme curtailment of rights to assemble in public space (Russian President and Federal Assembly 2012). The municipal government ended Occupy Abai in response to a lawsuit purportedly filed by surrounding residents who claimed that participants were "behaving like gypsies, singing loudly at night and sleeping in courtyards"; officials also cited a threat to lime trees along the Boulevard Ring and made a show of thoroughly "disinfecting" the area after its evacuation (Ponomareva 2012).

The protest movement coincided with a bounty of citizen initiatives aimed at livability in Moscow (Figure 48). The School of Urban Studies and Planning at the National Higher School of Economics (HSE) held a conference in February that brought seasoned urban planners together with young activists to discuss best practices. A young graduate of the HSE department of sociology, Petr Ivanov, organized a thorough survey of residents near his home to guide the redesign of their yard. Strelka, whose consulting work had expanded beyond Gorky Park,

[203] Development projects included equipping more yards with solar-powered lighting (Lazarev 2012).

continued to advance urban development from a position closely linked with government and business leaders. Students from the institute focused on re-envisioning microdistricts, and staff hosted public lectures by a variety of young activists — several of whom focused on yards. The Dom, Dvor, Dorogi (House, Yard, Streets) team, for example, discussed a website they built to help people submit complaints and improve housing management. Alexei Navalny, who had become one of the most influential leaders of the protest movement, helped them expand the site's reach (Mukhametshina 2012). Ilya Varlamov, a popular blogger, and Maxim Katz, a former poker champion turned municipal deputy, produced a website called Gorodskiye Proyekty *(*Urban Projects) focused on generating practical improvements to the quality of life in Moscow. They used photographs from the past and present, along with other forms of media, to expose problems with the design and management of public space. The artist-activist collective Partizaning teamed up with Strelka to bring international experts together with students to plan research-based interventions such as DIY Neighborhood Olympics in Moscow's "sleeping districts" (*spal'nye rayony*) — microdistricts in the outer rings from which residents commute to the center on a regular basis. These activists were highly attuned to urban trends in other parts of the world, calling Moscow officials to task for corruption, traffic-choked streets, inhospitable public space and other chronic problems.

Distrust of the municipal government did not abate under Sobyanin, especially with regard to land ownership and use in residential areas. A new campaign to register the territory around apartment buildings generated concern among activists who saw it as a means of appropriating valuable sections originally assigned to residents and imposing new tax obligations (Korchmarek and Verkhovskaya 2012, Pozdnyakova 2012). In February 2013, Sobyanin combined the Department of Land Resources with the Department of Property to form the

Department of City Property (Tkachenko 2013, Moscow City Government 2013b).[204] While expressly aimed at making the department more efficient, it also facilitated control over surveying and registering plots. After substantial investment over the past decade, government authorities sought to finally resolve problems with land tenure and taxation.

The protest movement subsided as government countermeasures became more severe, including a widespread crackdown on independent media (Sakwa 2014: 163-89). Irreconcilable differences between opposition groups led to disunity and parameters for success clouded. However, Moscow residents stayed active close to home — successfully fighting infill development, harmful factories and destruction of cultural heritage (Kogan and Gubin 2013: 16-19). On April 21, 2013, about 1,000 people in the Mitino district gathered to protest construction of a Commercial-Entertainment Center (TRT) and "ice palace" near their homes; participants expressed fear that it would encroach upon a nearby park and become a magnet for illegal construction workers, threatening the area's "cultural, ecological and criminogenic environment" (Lenta 2013a). Some called for the police to prevent municipal deputy Artëm Mitin from speaking in defense of the project.

Mayor Sobyanin unexpectedly resigned on June 4, announcing that a new election would take place in three months and that he planned to run for a complete term (Waller 2013: 6). He had spent the past two and a half years publicly administering large-scale government investment. In Moscow residential areas, new parking lots, walkways, benches, athletic facilities, playgrounds, roller parks and other amenities popped up daily. Special care rained down on green space. Graffiti-coated walls received new coats of paint, and unsightly facades were resurfaced. These changes accompanied park renovations, bicycle rentals, outdoor cafes and

[204] The Department of Land Resources (formerly known as the Moscow Land Committee when first convened in 1991) monitored GlavAPU land surveys and handled cadastral registration.

pedestrian zones in central districts, as well as construction of roads and subway extensions in the periphery. Sobyanin's initiatives were especially visible over the summer of 2013, prompting Gleb Vitkov — a young architect and Strelka graduate working at the HSE School of Urban Studies and Planning — to call them part of the electoral campaign (Vitkov 2013).

Alexei Navalny decided to enter the imbalanced mayoral race in hopes of forcing a second round that would give him a stronger position. A day after registering his candidacy, he was arrested on a dubious embezzlement charge and released soon after to proceed with the campaign (Black 2015: 165). He held a constant stream of open "town hall meetings" throughout the city, often near subway stations (Ortung 2013: 4). Municipal deputies like Maxim Katz were among his strongest supporters. Yards served as frequent campaign backdrops for the leading candidates (Figure 49). Despite overwhelming odds in Sobyanin's favor, he barely avoided a runoff in an election marred by allegations of last-minute fraud and a 32-percent turnout (Hale 2015: 288-9).[205]

At present, blight is consistently rare in Moscow residential areas. A basic level of order prevails regardless of a building's location, design or management. Graffiti is common but not pervasive, and not limited to yards in lower income areas. Maintenance people — usually migrant workers (*gastarbaytery*) from the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia — are constantly sweeping walkways, tending greenery, painting fences, repairing playgrounds, shoveling snow or completing other forms of manual labor. Luzhkov improved these services but faced blame when costs increased and enterprises received permission to operate or build in yards without consent from nearby residents (Golubchikov 2004: 241). Sobyanin has worked to quickly show (through a constant public relations campaign) that he is able to maintain orderly services while solving problems associated with his predecessor. In many ways, his businesslike and relatively

[205] For more on the 2013 mayoral election, see Ortung 2013: 2, Waller 2013: 9, Black 2015: 213.



Figure 46. Prime Minister Putin visits the city of Ryazan to call for immediate construction of single-unit homes for victims of the 2010 wildfires. Image source: Razmakhnin 2010

Figure 47. Winning entry by EDDEA S.L.P. in the "A101 Block City Masterplan Competition" for an area south of Moscow, presented by architect Bart Goldhoorn at the Moscow Urban Forum in December 2011. Image source: Verlags GmbH 2010

Figure 48. At top, Dmitriy Levenets of Dom, Dvor, Dorogi (House, Yard, Roads) presenting at the Strelka Institute in June 2012 (top). At bottom, Partizaning's "Sobyanin, Baby Come On!" exhibition in December 2012.


Figure 49. Yards played significant roles in the mayoral campaigns of Sergey Sobyanin (addressing residents at left) and Alexei Navalny (in the campaign banner at right). Image sources: Moscow City Government 2014 (left), O'Flynn 2013 (right)

cosmopolitan approach is reminiscent of Medvedev's presidency: fundamentally no less clientelist than the previous administration but much less autonomous.

As evident in Moscow, public yards are orderly when authorities take responsibility for management quality by funding and monitoring service provision. Yet priorities may shift elsewhere, economic crises may reduce municipal budgets, and residents may become accustomed to services that are not sustainable without their involvement or unsubsidized financial support (Hopkin 2006: 3-4). Deep government patronage appears to have generated shallow political support in Moscow, which explains Mayor Sobyanin's lackluster showing in the 2013 election. Public investment can be highly effective but it is not a substitute for democratic accountability. Decisions with broad impact on the lives of residents still issue from above with few checks or balances. Arbitrary exploitation and neglect remain unabated. Narkomfin, still inhabited, is in ruins but its small park with a bright new playground is as orderly as other commons attached to Moscow homes.

In this chapter I have attempted to — in Foucault's terms — present a genealogy of power relations through which significant transitions occurred in Moscow's housing landscape, examining the discursive formations that gave rise to unique forms of development. In keeping with Latour's descriptive approach, I have traced connections between a broad range of human and nonhuman participants in the adaptation of urban ecosystems. The result is a chronicle of how present conditions arose over time, which points to the centrality of design, management and use in governing residential commons. I now focus on these processes today, adding context to resident perspectives analyzed in the last two chapters.

CONTEMPORARY FOCAL POINTS

In light of the history presented above, I now concentrate on aspects of governance that most directly influence commons around Moscow homes today: design, management and use. For each I provide an overview with examples and illustrations. This will be useful for interpreting resident views in the next chapter.

Design

Designers give shape to Moscow yards through buildings, land, vegetation, infrastructure and amenities. The resulting spaces have general characteristics found throughout the city as well as specific forms associated with different housing types. The present section offers an illustrated briefing on these characteristics and forms, moving from general to specific.

Common design features are based — to varying extents — on government policies, architectural conventions, resident input and daily use. It is rare to find apartment buildings without at least one playground within 50 meters, along with familiar arrangements of trees, walkways, streets, parking areas, utility sheds, pipelines, electricity wires, garbage bins, information boards, benches and athletic facilities. Within several hundred meters there are grocery stores, hair salons, transit stops, libraries, schools and nurseries. Yet housing policy obviously changed over the years, and even identical guidelines have not led to identical yards. Resident input and daily use — from planting flowers to vandalizing walls — also vary considerably throughout the city. Thus, design subcategories and eccentricities accentuate widespread patterns.

The most evident subcategories are based on dominant approaches to housing development. Many buildings associated with these approaches are identified with the head of state during their construction (i.e., *stalinki*, *khrushchevki*, *brezhnevki*). While these names provide useful information about corresponding yards, they do not cover all housing types or illuminate variations among designs from the same era. General names linked to status — elite versus economy housing, for example — also tell only part of the story. Even more-precise features (like building model, architectural style or landscape plan) do not indicate how each territory evolves in different ways after construction. Still, basic awareness of diverse characteristics is necessary for evaluating the influence of design on resident experience.

Figure 50 shows examples of homes from different periods. Each example is numbered chronologically by year of completion. Their locations are mapped and accompanied by a timeline, which is divided into color-coded sections based on substantial turning points in Moscow housing design. The names of leaders below the timeline show a direct but not immediate correlation between their terms in office and the residential development associated with their policies; this relationship is much stronger for some (Stalin, Khrushchev) than others (Gorbachev, Putin). In selecting examples, I aimed for a balanced mix of common building types, significant landmarks and representative locations for each period. Layers of housing construction share qualities introduced in the Historical Influences chapter and summarized in Table 2. Following the map and table there are pictures of each site; the featured address is circled in aerial perspective above eight views of its surroundings at ground level. I tried to give an impression of what it feels like to walk through these places while comparing them with the view from above.

Table 2. Key design eras with approximate percentages of current housing stock and example sites			
1860-1922 6%	Apartment houses of stucco-coated or exposed brick; early use of ferroconcrete at turn of century; eclectic, Russian Revival, style moderne, neoclassical designs; yards formed by buildings within city blocks, accessible from street through narrow tunnels and allies.	1 2 3 4	1874: 9 Stoleshnikov Pereulok 1883: 17 Savvinskaya Naberezhnaya 1905: 18/5 Podsosenskiy Pereulok 1914: 67 Ulitsa Bol'shaya Ordynka
1923-1933 5%	Additions to older buildings; cooperatives and workers' settlements of varying styles; experiments with communal housing by modernist avant-garde; mainly coated or exposed brick walls; Garden City influence on superblocks with central commons.	5 6 7 8	1923: 13 Golikovskiy Pereulok 1926: 7 Rusakovskaya Ulitsa 1930: 25 Novinskiy Bul'var 1932: 22/12 Aviamotornaya Ulitsa
1934-1957 14%	Socialist Realist architecture in prominent locations; brick and stone facades with ornamentation on sides visible from streets; general transition from spare to dainty to grandiose designs; efficiency gains momentum by 1950s; buildings line spacious quadrangles in superblocks with shared amenities.	9 10 11 12 13	1934: 124 Prospekt Mira 1940: 32 Frunzenskaya Naberezhnaya 1944: 26 Kutuzovskiy Prospekt 1952: 1/15 Kotel'nicheskaya Naberezhnaya 1955: 15/10 Ulitsa Svobody
1958-1970 33%	Box-shaped mass housing, often with balconies; brick to concrete blocks and panels; 5 stories most common; taller models originally for people without children; open yards in microdistricts and infill development buffered from streets by greenery; modest-brick and high-modernist custom designs for VIPs.	14 15 16 17 18	1958: 14 Ulitsa Grimau 1962: 113 Volgogradskiy Prospekt 1964: 15 Leont'yevskiy Pereulok 1967: 451 Berezovaya Alleya (Zelenograd) 1970: 8 Pervyy Likhachëvskiy Pereulok
1971-1994 25%	Models assembled out of prefab ferroconcrete panels; increasing quality, comfort and scale; development of curving forms that loosely border spacious yards; custom designs in desirable locations for privileged citizens; by 1980s, mass housing equipped with token color and detailing, variegated facades and yards more closely bounded on all sides.	19 20 21 22 23 24	1972: 13 Nezhinskaya Ulitsa 1976: 21 Ulitsa Menzhinskogo 1980: 1 Krasnoyarskaya Ulitsa 1982: 4 Severnoye Chertanovo 1988: 47 Borovskoye Shosse 1991: 118 Lyublinskaya Ulitsa
1995-2012 17%	Manifold custom designs for exclusive market (often infill); economy homes in microdistricts generically colorful and decorative, recurrent faux-historical detailing; varied materials include monolithic ferroconcrete; buildings range from extreme high- to low-rise; many gated yards; expansive parking lots, attached or nearby garage a key selling point.	25 26 27 28 29 30	1995: 2 Veskovskiy Pereulok 2000: 68 Ulitsa Admirala Lazareva 2004: 16 Ulitsa Rudnëvka 2006: 5 Khodynskiy Bul'var 2010: 25 Lomonosovskiy Prospekt 2012: 122D Dmitrovskoye Shosse

Figure 50 (following page). Moscow district map with example sites color-coded to represent key design periods and their approximate share of current housing stock. Following the map, there are pictures of each site today.


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Alexander II
Alexander III
Nicholas II
Lenin
Stalin
Khrushchev
Brezhnev
Gorbachev
Yeltsin
Putin
Medvedev
Putin

Figure 50, Number 1. A former mansion at 9 Stoleshnikov Pereulok. It is 4 stories tall with a brick frame converted into an apartment house in 1874 based on a design by Vasiliy Karneyev (Dedushkin 2014).



Figure 50, Number 2. A 3-story brick residence at 17 Savvinskaya Naberezhnaya built in 1883. It may have initially served as workers' housing for a factory along the river.

Figure 50, Number 3. A brick apartment house at 18/5 Podsosenskiy Pereulok designed by Georgiy Makayev and built in 1905 (Brumfield 1991: 73-4). This unique 4-story building is one of the most famous examples of the style moderne in Moscow today.

Figure 50, Number 4. A 6-story brick apartment house at 67 Ulitsa Bol’shaya Ordynka that opened in 1914.

Figure 50, Number 5. In 1923, this prerevolution brick apartment building at 13 Golikovskiy Pereulok doubled in height to 8 stories in order to accommodate more residents — a common practice during the early Soviet years.

Figure 50, Number 6. Boris Iofan's first built project in Moscow, constructed with stucco-covered brick in 1926 at 7 Rusakovskaya Ulitsa. It was the winning entry in a competition to design a workers' settlement but ended up occupied mainly by Communist Party officials (Osipovskaya 2009).

Figure 50, Number 7. The world-renowned Narkomfin residential building at 25 Novinskiy Bul'var, which opened in 1930 (Buchli 1999). Although it is 8-stories high, this includes the base (initially open via *pilotis*) and rooftop penthouse. Its walls are of coated brick with steel reinforcements in the columns.

Figure 50, Number 8. A 6-story workers' settlement built with cinder blocks at 22/12 Aviamotornaya Ulitsa in 1932.

Figure 50, Number 9. A residential building with 20 units (*korpusy*) at 124 Prospekt Mira. The first units — which form a continuous bracket along Prospekt Mira and two side streets — were built in 1934, followed by the two internal divisions two years later. The courtyards between these buildings became quadrangles with the 1953 addition of three smaller buildings that run parallel to Prospekt Mira.



Figure 50, Number 10. An 8-story Socialist Realist design by Arkady Mordvinov. It opened in 1940 beside the Moscow River at 32 Frunzenskaya Naberezhnaya. Like most buildings from this period, its brick and stone facade is less decorative on sides oriented toward the inner yard.

Figure 50, Number 11. The former home of Brezhnev, Andropov and other prominent Soviet officials at 26 Kutuzovskiy Prospekt. This 12-story "Stalinist Empire" (*Stalinskiy ampir*) design by Zinoviy Rozenfel'd was constructed between 1941 and 1947 (Romodin 2013a). It lines a very wide and busy street, thus enclosing part of a spacious quadrangle.








Figure 50, Number 12. An iconic 33-story residential building (one of "Stalin's Seven Sisters") constructed from 1947 to 1952 at 1/15 Kotel'nicheskaya Naberezhnaya based on a design by Dmitriy Chechulin and Andrey Rostkovskiy. Chechulin was Moscow's chief architect at the time.





Figure 50, Number 13. This 5-story brick apartment building opened in 1955 at 15/10 Ulitsa Svobody, near the Tushino Machine-Building Plant (TMZ).[206] It features economy versions of the Stalinist detailing that soon after disappeared from new housing as industrial construction took off.

[206] TMZ produced equipment for the defense and space industries, including jets, missiles and spacecraft (Colton 1995: 349, 444, 711).

Figure 50, Number 14. An early mass-housing design at 14 Ulitsa Grimau built in 1958 as part of the experimental Ninth Block of Novyye Cheremushki. While many of the low-rise buildings in this development have ochre-brick facades characteristic of older and higher-quality economy homes, this 4-story version is made of prefabricated concrete panels covered with small tiles. It is one of the few remaining K-7 *khrushchevki* in Moscow today.



Figure 50, Number 15. A 5-story apartment building at 113 Volgogradskiy Prospekt in Moscow's industrial southeast. This common I-515 panel model opened in 1962.

Figure 50, Number 16. The 7-story former home of Khrushchev and other high-ranking members of the Communist Party, constructed between 1962 and 1964 at 15 Leont'yevskiy Pereulok within the Boulevard Ring. It is likely the first of many light-brick apartment buildings designed for Soviet elites from the 1960s through 1980s.





Figure 50, Number 17. A 16-story MG-601 model constructed in 1967 at 451 Zelenograd along Berezovaya Alleya.

Figure 50, Number 18. One of many II-18/22 block (*blochnyye*) models in Moscow today, this 12-story residence was built in 1970 at 8 Pervyy Likhachëvskiy Pereulok.

Figure 50, Number 19. A massive home at 13 Nezhinskaya Ulitsa that opened in 1972. It is a rare I-515 model with 9 stories and a facade of concrete panels covered with pool tiles.



Figure 50, Number 20. A 12-story brick residence based on a custom design at 21 Ulitsa Menzhinskogo in 1974. The subway station across the street opened four years later.





Figure 50, Number 21. This 16-story P-3/16 panel model, built in 1980 at 1 Krasnoyarskaya Ulitsa, has a curved-bracket form that shelters its yard from the MKAD.



Figure 50, Number 22. A 15-story home at 4 Severnoye Chertanovo completed in 1982. Although made of prefabricated concrete panels, it was based on a custom design from a decade earlier.

Figure 50, Number 23. A 17-story P-3/17 panel model at 47 Borovskoye Shosse, built in 1988 southeast of the MKAD.





Figure 50, Number 24. A 17-story P3M-2/16 panel model constructed at 118 Lyublinskaya Ulitsa in 1991.





Figure 50, Number 25. A 10-story brick apartment house built in 1995 at 2 Veskovskiy Pereulok just north of the Garden Ring. Its custom design is a postmodern take on the style moderne.



Figure 50, Number 26. A 7-story P-46M panel model (at bottom-right in the circled section of the satellite image) assembled in 2000 south of the MKAD at 68 Ulitsa Admirala Lazareva.

Figure 50, Number 27. A 10-story P-44T panel model built east of the MKAD at 16 Ulitsa Rudnëvka in 2004.

Figure 50, Number 28. Four 32-story homes built with monolithic ferroconcrete (*monolitnyy zhelezobeton*) northeast of the Garden Ring at 5 Khodynskiy Bul'var in 2006.

Figure 50, Number 29. The neostalinist Dominion Housing Complex at 25 Lomonosovskiy Prospekt, across from Moscow State University. Built in 2010 by Inteco, its 19-story carcass is made of monolithic ferroconcrete.

Figure 50, Number 30. This residence at 122D Dmitrovskoye Shosse is part of Severnaya Sloboda, a gated housing complex that opened in 2012 just north of the MKAD. Its low-rise apartments, townhouses and detached homes border a forest reserve. Source of second-row images: Stolichnyy Zodchiy 2014

To accompany the results of my structured interviews and surveys, I gathered the following design-related information on each participant's home: address, year of construction, type (from custom design to standard models), number of stories and primary building material. The data are publicly available from the municipal government (Moscow City Government 2013a). They also coincide with a citywide inventory released in 2011, which groups housing stock primarily by decade of completion (Appendix 1). This information made it possible to analyze resident perspectives associated with different forms of housing and compare my demographic sample with that of the more extensive survey. Knowing the address of each building allowed me to examine the surrounding territory in Google Earth and on location. The remainder of this section offers additional information on the design characteristics associated with each historical period identified in Figure 50.

In popular and professional discourse, the general term for pre-Soviet housing stock is "prerevolution residences" (*dorevolyutsionnyye doma*). When specifying apartment buildings, as opposed to separate homes, the term is "income-generating residences" (*dokhodnyye doma*). Due to the scarcity of new construction during the civil war, significant changes did not appear until after the Communist Party established control in 1922. Buildings constructed before 1922 account for roughly 6 percent of current housing stock. Most are located inside or nearby the Garden Ring and include eclectic (i.e., incorporating classical, gothic, renaissance, baroque, rococo and other historical styles in a manner similar to Beaux-Arts architecture), Russian Revival, style moderne and neoclassical designs. Most are former apartment houses from the period of rapid capitalist development that began in the 1860s (Brumfield 1991: 1). They were built mainly of stucco-coated or exposed brick, as well as ferroconcrete toward the end of the century (Cecil and Harris 2009: 32). In today's dense central Moscow, yards are closely

surrounded by one or more buildings. They are insulated from the bustling streets — accessible only through narrow tunnels and alleyways — and usually include trees, playgrounds, benches and parking. Many have detached buildings on their premises, which range from homes to businesses to abandoned ruins. Although some prerevolution homes are officially protected as cultural landmarks, nearly all are closely integrated with more recent development. Walking through the intimate and irregular landscapes within central blocks is like exploring hidden caverns in the fabric of a megacity.

Scattered throughout Moscow's center and inner rings, buildings from 1923 through 1933 make up about 5 percent of present housing stock. They are often called "constructivist" if their designs show evidence of simplified geometric forms associated with the 1920s avant-garde. However, many are not of this kind, and the earliest are vertical additions to older structures. Buildings by NEP-era cooperatives reflect constructivist as well as neoclassical, art deco and other influences. Yet they are rarely ornate or eclectic.[207] Some experiments with communal living (especially Narkomfin) have earned international acclaim, but many nameless buildings from this period are just as remarkable for their yards. Remaining workers' settlements usually consist of 4- to 6-story buildings with external balconies. They take a variety of forms — including brackets — that create sheltered quadrangles between homes sometimes buffered from the street with greenery. These residential blocks are similar to those designed by Clarence Stein for Phipps Gardens and Hillside Homes, in contrast to the widely spaced towers of Le Corbusier. The Genplan Research Institute has inventoried 100 houses of "socialized living" (*kommunalnyy*

[207] For an exception, see the idiosyncratic home at 8 Trëkhprudnyy Pereulok designed by Mikhail Priyëmyshev and built in 1926 for the Tvorchestvo (Creation or Creative Work) Cooperative. Priyëmyshev worked for Fëdor Shekhtel during the late 1800s and designed apartment houses in Moscow in the early 1900s (Aruin and Rezvin 1998). Dmitry Bulgakov supervised an addition to 8 Trëkhprudnyy Pereulok from 1946 to 1948. Bulgakov studied and worked under Aleksey Shchusev in the 1920s before joining Ilya Golosov's Mosproyekt Studio № 4 in the 1930s (Kazus' 2009: 210, Mladkovskaya 2011). He also designed the renderings and models for Aleksandr Medvedkin's film *The New Moscow*. A specialist in exterior detailing, he went on to lead a variety of design projects from the 1930s through 1960s.

byt) — including workers' settlements, dormitories and house-communes — still in use: 27 housing complexes of several blocks and 10-30 buildings total, 20 complexes of single blocks and 3-4 buildings total, as well as 50 single buildings (Yegorova 2012). Although many homes from the 1920s are falling apart today, others have been carefully maintained. They face a high risk of demolition attributed to the cost of repairs and to the profit in replacing them with luxury high-rises (Bollerey and Föhl 2007: 45).[208]

Buildings from 1934 through 1957, generally known as *stalinki*, comprise about 9 percent of current housing stock. Characteristic examples have facades of sturdy masonry with detailing more-or-less in keeping with Socialist Realist design principles. Earlier versions are usually more streamlined,[209] giving way to sharper contrast between grandiose and economy buildings after World War II. Different types correspond with the status of original residents in the hierarchy of Stalin's rule, exemplifying the use of architecture to impress and inspire. They are located mainly inside Moscow's pre-1960 borders, with taller and grander buildings at major thoroughfares, embankments and other focal points. Yards from this era are widely considered the most desirable (i.e., beautiful, comfortable, serene) in the city. Many have bracket-shaped layouts that shelter their yards from the street, with later versions forming planned quadrangles within city blocks. Postwar housing complexes located outside the city center are especially spacious, and it is not uncommon to find well-kept gardens, benches, playgrounds, athletic facilities and even fountains on their premises. Although most *stalinki* have limited space for parking, some have covered lots that were extremely rare when built — another privilege linked to status.

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[208] For an account of similar issues in St. Petersburg, see Vihavainen 2009: 107.

[209] See Dmitry Bulgakov's 1935 addition of decorative cornices, arches and columns to a constructivist residential building at 14 Bol'shaya Sukharevskaya Ploshchad' (Anonymous 2014). He faced criticism at times for superfluous facades (Selivanova 2007). Other "post-constructivist" buildings — such as the apartment house designed by Mikhail Barshch and G. A. Zundblat at 17a Pervyy Samotechnyy Pereulok next to El Lissitzky's Ogonyok Printing Plant — incorporated decorative elements more subtly (Vasil'yev 2014).

An estimated 38 percent of current housing stock is from 1958 through 1970, the most active phase of Soviet mass housing. As mentioned earlier, low-rise versions (of 4-5 stories) are widely referred to as *khrushchevki* — modest shoebox-like buildings throughout the city and especially in microdistricts beyond the Garden Ring. Their walls vary from ochre-colored brick to concrete panels and blocks. Some are decorated with pool tiles, broken ceramics or unique paint jobs. Exposed panels and blocks are sealed at the edges with a plaster spread evoking gingerbread houses. These buildings tend to be grouped closely but not attached — each parallel or perpendicular to the others and surrounded by commons with grass, trees, recreation facilities and narrow roads. Such density gives their yards a sense of comfortable enclosure. *Khrushchevki* are now classified as "disposable models" (*snosimyye serii)* or "non-disposable models" (*nesnosimyye serii*) based officially on the level of damage versus the estimated cost of repair. Disposable versions are slated for redevelopment, which is not always a welcome change for residents despite the prospect of a new apartment in return: many are ensconced among tranquil wooded settings in convenient locations near subway stations. Box models of 8-12 stories became dominant under Brezhnev (and are thus known as *brezhnevki*), but they first appeared during the Khrushchev years. While they originally served as temporary residences for singles and young families, they are now full of long-term inhabitants. They have less-enclosed yards, as their layouts are nearly square and positioned further apart or corner-to-corner. However, they are likewise surrounded by mature trees and offer expansive views from large windows and balconies. Their yards, while open, are still usually sheltered from major streets by green space. Other high-rises from this period include custom designs — of light-brick and high-modernist varieties — built for Soviet VIPs in prized locations.

Housing from 1971 through 1994 makes up approximately 25 percent of Moscow's present total. It is mainly in the outer rings, although custom designs occupy attractive sites throughout the city (Colton 1995: 504). Buildings from this period are rarely less than 9 stories high, with expansive loosely bounded space between earlier models. Their plans are often highly creative, but at ground level it is clear why they came to epitomize monotonous and imposing Soviet apartment blocks. They tend not to age gracefully, creating expansive walls of decay around yards. Groves of mature trees, however, reduce their visibility. Like many non-disposable *khrushchevki* and towers from the 1960s, their walls are being resurfaced with paint, plaster or granite-tempered ceramic tiles (*keramogranitnyye plitki*) of around 100 square centimeters — such cases also involve covering each balcony with colored siding. Common models from the early 1980s, such as P-44 and KOPE, are generally 16-26 stories high with minor detailing (typically limited to basic patterns of a single color) on facades that loom over small quadrangles.[210] They are not closely associated with Brezhnev despite their origins under his administration. The decade of radical economic and political upheaval that began in 1985 brought realization of innovative housing design to a standstill.

Development from 1995 to present constitutes about 18 percent of Moscow housing stock. It is rarely if ever identified with a head of state, as former Mayor Luzhkov dominated this sphere (giving rise to the name *luzhkovki*). There is an extremely diverse range from mildly decorated iterations on late Soviet models to flashy status symbols for wealthy clientele, all conscious departures from the image of dreary social housing. The chief structural element is ferroconcrete — including prefabricated panels and monolithic carcasses (*monolitnyye karkasy*) — while brick, stone, metal, glazing and various synthetic materials adorn facades. Brick and stone are often in tiled form, the latter added to ceramic mixtures. Buildings from roughly the

[210] KOPE is a transliterated acronym for Composite Volumetric Planning Elements.

past 5-10 years are called "new constructions" (*novostroyki*) and come in elite, business and economy class. As a general rule, elite- and business-class homes are more likely to have custom designs that set them apart from standard models. Their prestige is also due to location and amenities. Many have alluring names like "Italian Quarter" (Ital'yanskiy Kvartal) or "O_2XYGEN." Elite development — from "premium-class" (*premium-klass*) to "deluxe-class" (*delyuks-klass*) — is in the center and other attractive settings; deluxe forms are more exclusive in terms of building size, resident filters, autonomous services and public access. Business-class residences are in central and remote locations. Those outside the city limits are normally more family-oriented, with promotions that feature upwardly mobile neighbors in yards "close to nature" or "in the woods." Elite- and business-class options are increasingly billed as selective "club homes" (*klubnyye doma*). Their yards are usually gated. Economy refers to social housing (*sotsial'noye zhil'ye*) as well as normal economy-class (*ekonom-klass*) and "comfort-class" (*komfort-klass*) residences. Social housing is public while comfort-class stands out from other economy-class private development based on quality, location and amenities. New microdistricts with economy homes are mainly in Moscow's outer rings and beyond. Recent construction inside the MKAD occupies land freed through removal of mass housing, industrial operations and occasionally green space. Yards are heterogeneous, including closely bounded quadrangles, precious gardens, tiny wedges in the city center, and parking lots that surround high towers. Parking has expanded considerably over the past two decades. The more expensive complexes tend to have regulated lots underground or in nearby garages. As motor vehicles and sprawl increase, apartment buildings with commons have lost some ground to single-unit houses with private yards.[211]

This section introduced the design of shared space around Moscow homes as manifest in buildings, land, vegetation, infrastructure and amenities. It informs my analysis of resident

[211] See, for example, the American Dream subdivision (http://www.amdream.ru).

perceptions shared through interviews, focus groups and surveys. The following section plays a similar role for housing management.

Management

Yard management in Moscow includes upkeep, improvements, rules and safety. The current section begins with an overview of these responsibilities and then focuses on common approaches to fulfilling them. Like the design section, it facilitates a thorough understanding of resident perspectives in the following chapter.

Along with maintenance of land, vegetation, buildings, infrastructure, rules and safety, I touch upon allocation of funds for these services and shared amenities (*blagoustroystvo*). Although measures to ensure safety and enforce rules are not necessarily management responsibilities, I take note of those exceeding normal law-enforcement provided by the municipal government. The city provides management services through public agencies but also monitors all management providers through the City of Moscow Department of Residential-Communal Management and Improvement (DZhKKhBGM), the Organization for Administrative and Technical Inspections (OATI) and local engineering services (IS). Management agencies pay workers — often migrants, but not always — low wages to conduct maintenance and install additions (Figure 51).

Based on a 2011 nationwide survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), 38 percent of people who lived in multi-unit buildings considered management of their home and yard satisfactory; cities with over 1 million people registered 49 percent satisfaction, and for Moscow the figure was 57 percent (Table 3). While this is a product of unbalanced resource



Figure 51. From dawn until dusk (and often later), workers sweep, paint, remove garbage, shovel snow, plant flowers, make repairs and build new additions to Moscow residential areas.

allocation toward urban citizens with greater income and political influence, it sheds light on specific factors that influence resident satisfaction. A DZhKKhBGM survey from late fall 2010 shows general satisfaction with management services (Table 4) — 14 percent higher than in the FOM survey conducted less than a year later. Although the majority of respondents (51 percent) rated their management service average, positive assessments (33 percent) were more than double negative assessments (15 percent) (Table 5). Whether or not the DZhKKhBGM survey results are reliable, it is worth closely examining their distinctions between management types. They also indicate whether respondents self-identified as participants or nonparticipants in the management of their buildings and yards. Although the responses of participants and nonparticipants are not radically different, the latter were slightly more likely to express dissatisfaction. For both groups, the main reasons for dissatisfaction were declining quality of service and failure to carry out promised work (Table 6). Increased fees, along with lack of information about service responsibilities and costs, were also significant — but much less common.

Only 11 percent of participants reported contacting management about territory adjacent to their homes — number 7 of 12 reasons given (Table 7). Yet this generated the largest discrepancy between participants and nonparticipants (17 versus 4 percent). Other reasons pertained to indoor utilities; the most common were hot and cold water (26 percent), heating (19 percent), elevators (18 percent), electricity (17 percent) and plumbing (13 percent). Over 40 percent of respondents had not contacted building management over the past year. In my interviews and focus groups, people explained that they avoided contacting management if problems were not bad enough to face the difficulty, if they did not know whom to contact, and if they were not officially registered for their apartment. Many renters have no legally binding contract or proper residence documents, making them wary of attention. One factor not reported

Table 3. Satisfaction with housing management, Moscow and nationwide (%)



Source: Public Opinion Foundation survey of 1,500 people throughout the Russian Federation, completed on January 16, 2011 (FOM 2011)

Table 4. Satisfaction with housing management, Moscow (%)



Note: The term "participants" indicates residents who self-identified as actively involved in the management of their apartment building and its premises. Source: City of Moscow Department of Residential-Communal Management and Improvement (DZhKKhBGM 2010a)

Table 5. Quality of housing management, Moscow (%)



Note: The term "participants" indicates residents who self-identified as actively involved in the management of their apartment building and its premises. Source: City of Moscow Department of Residential-Communal Management and Improvement (DZhKKhBGM 2010a)

Table 6. Reasons for dissatisfaction with housing management, Moscow (%)

Note: The term "participants" indicates residents who self-identified as actively involved in the management of their apartment building and its premises. Source: City of Moscow Department of Residential-Communal Management and Improvement (DZhKKhBGM 2010a)

Table 7. Reasons for contacting management within the past year, Moscow (%)



Note: The term "participants" indicates residents who self-identified as actively involved in the management of their apartment building and its premises. Source: City of Moscow Department of Residential-Communal Management and Improvement (DZhKKhBGM 2010a)

in the DZhKKhBGM survey is whether there were disparities in resident perceptions of management quality in different parts of the city. I did not find significant evidence of this in my site visits, interviews or survey responses — even among gated versus non-gated communities and higher- versus lower-income areas.

The DZhKKhBGM survey listed six management possibilities and asked residents to indicate the one that covers their building (Table 8). Each corresponds with one of the three options specified in Article 161 of the Housing Code: 1) heads of household fulfill management responsibilities without forming a resident organization (i.e., homeowners' association or cooperative) or delegating them to a single agency, 2) a resident organization fulfills management responsibilities without delegating them to a single agency, 3) heads of household or a resident organization hire a single agency (Russian President and Federal Assembly 2004). If residents start an official organization, each head of household pays dues (based on apartment size), and elected representatives assure that management responsibilities are fulfilled; if not, residents can make individual contracts with service providers and coordinate among themselves for shared services (Vihaveinen 2009: 86-92). All-purpose management agencies can be public — known as "state" (*gosudarstvennyy*) — or private. Thus, the six possibilities are 1) heads of household contract a public management agency, 2) heads of household contract a private management agency, 3) heads of household agree to fulfill management responsibilities without forming an organization or hiring an all-purpose agency, 4) organization representatives contract a public management agency, 5) organization representatives contract a private management agency, 6) organization representatives fulfill management responsibilities without hiring an all-purpose agency.

The most common form of management in the DZhKKhBGM survey (indicated by 70 percent of respondents) is hiring a public management agency directly rather than through a resident organization. This is partly because it is often very complicated to start and run an official organization, which requires a majority vote among owners who are then obligated to attend meetings.[212] It is especially challenging if not all units are privatized — as is sometimes the case in buildings constructed before the 1991 Law on Housing Privatization — or when owners rent out their apartments (Vihavainen 2009: 74-5, 137). Most public management services are called "DEZ" — based on the "directorate for a unified client" organizations formed in the 1980s through consolidation of house-management offices. Although DEZ have a general reputation for poor service and corruption, private management companies (UK) are widely considered a greater risk (Okuneva 2012). DEZ require less participation and have long been the default for homes in which residents have not formed an organization or hired a full-service management company. Thus it is not surprising that survey respondents who self-identified as nonparticipants were far more likely than participants (81 versus 59 percent) to have this form of management.

Contracting a public agency through a resident organization is the second most prevalent form of management in the DZhKKhBGM survey. This was far less common overall (by 54 percentage points) than public management without a resident organization, even though city officials have reportedly set up these organizations to bring service provision under their control (Vihavainen 2009: 99-100). In my interviews, local experts noted that homeowners' associations often exist only on paper; in this case, the management agency takes over and residents are left with few channels for participation and oversight. The advantages of establishing a legal entity for resident claims and deciding what kind of agency to hire apparently do not outweigh the

[212] A resident organization's elected representatives must handle collection, safekeeping and allocation of dues, which is particularly difficult in large buildings with residents of divergent means (Vihavainen 2009: 90-7).

complications associated with official organizations or the distrust of private companies (Vihavainen 2009: 90, 94). In the DZhKKhBGM survey, public management with a resident organization is naturally more common among participants than nonparticipants (21 versus 11 percent). However, even participants were more likely to contract a public agency (80 percent) than manage independently (13 percent) or choose a private company (6 percent).

The DZhKKhBGM survey lists independent management with a resident organization as the third most common option. In this case, the organization's elected representatives must assure that members or contractors provide necessary services. Since most residents do not have the time, expertise, tools or desire to carry out all these tasks, organization representatives usually pay specialists with fees collected from members. Non-owners are not eligible and owners are not required to join; although heads of household are legally obligated to pay their share of management costs, members of homeowners' associations must cover for other members who miss their payments (Vihavainen 2009: 86, 118). This has caused homeowners' associations to go into debt rather than pay for "free-riders" (Vihavainen 2009: 93). Independent management is less expensive than hiring a full-service agency, but it requires more work — especially for residents in administrative roles (Vihavainen 2009: 94-5). Considering the added difficulty of running an official organization, it makes sense that this is less common than relying solely on a public management agency (7 versus 70 percent). Although more participants indicated this management option than nonparticipants, they were still a minority at 12 percent.

Survey results on hiring a private agency were identical for buildings with and without a homeowners' association or cooperative, together placing fourth in the DZhKKhBGM survey. In each case, the management company takes charge of executing or subcontracting all services. Private agencies were far less common than their public counterparts (4 versus 86 percent overall:

6 versus 80 percent for participants and 2 versus 92 percent for nonparticipants). This is likely due to the aforementioned distrust of management companies. The complications associated with official resident organizations may be counterbalanced by their advantages in terms of cost savings and autonomy when resorting to a private agency — hence the identical results. Developers have also registered homeowners' associations with little or no resident participation in order to fulfill legal obligations while retaining control over management (UNECE 2004: 85, Vihavainen 2009: 97, 100). However, it is clear that private companies had not established a strong presence in Moscow when the survey took place.

Direct management without a resident organization or all-purpose agency was the least common option in the DZhKKhBGM survey, with minimal percentages ranging from 0 for nonparticipants to less than 1 for participants. With this arrangement, heads of household contract individual services (like apartment utilities) separately but must still coordinate shared services (like yard maintenance) collectively; this places the administrative burden on volunteers or city officials (Vihavainen 2009: 86-7). Resident advocates and policymakers recommend independent management only for small buildings with relatively homogenous populations, as it is very difficult to organize large groups of people who for the most part do not know each other well, have different priorities and face unequal capabilities (Vihavainen 2009: 94).

Relatively high satisfaction with housing management — especially maintenance of yards — in Moscow raises questions as to how different people view different approaches and why. A striking 78 percent of those with resident organizations at the time indicated adequate building management, compared to 69 percent for public agencies (Table 9). The survey results did not include a parallel question on private management companies or distinguish between participants and nonparticipants. Resident perceptions of optimal management types (Table 10) coincided with

Table 8. Housing management types, Moscow (%)



Note: The term "participants" indicates residents who self-identified as actively involved in the management of their apartment building and its premises. Source: City of Moscow Department of Residential-Communal Management and Improvement (DZhKKhBGM 2010a)

Table 9. Resident satisfaction by management type, Moscow (%)



Source: City of Moscow Department of Residential-Communal Management and Improvement (DZhKKhBGM 2010a)

Table 10. Resident perceptions of optimal management type, Moscow (%)



Note: The term "participants" indicates residents who self-identified as actively involved in the management of their apartment building and its premises. Source: City of Moscow Department of Residential-Communal Management and Improvement (DZhKKhBGM 2010a)

order of prevalence except in the cases of private and independent options without an official organization. The former registered slightly higher overall at 2 percent while the latter came in last at 1 percent. Uncertainty was particularly high in response to the question about optimal management, at 24 percent (19 for participants and 29 for nonparticipants).

The DZhKKhBGM survey results point to somewhat greater satisfaction with independent management by resident organizations than with public management (although both registered near 70 percent), and low demand for private alternatives. Participants were more open to collective and private management than nonparticipants, who gravitated toward public agencies without resident management (54 percent) or expressed uncertainty (29 percent). Although resident organizations were the second most preferred option among participants and nonparticipants, the majority of respondents still contracted services to a public enterprise. Only 12 percent indicated that measures had been taken to start a homeowners' association for their building, 4 percent planned to start one in the coming year and 78 percent were not aware of any plans to change management organizations (DZhKKhBGM 2010a). While the survey generally confirms that residents prefer management that does not require their direct involvement, it also suggests that this has not outweighed distrust of private companies or aversion to their cost.

The actual line between public and private management is increasingly blurred. Originally public DEZ agencies can now be state unitary enterprises (GUP) or even fully privatized companies; management companies, normally private, can also be publicly owned and operated.[213] The citywide Organization for Administrative and Technical Inspections (OATI) and local engineering services (IS) monitor public and private management agencies to maintain quality standards. Documented residents can notify integrated dispatching services (ODS), which

[213] In Russia, GUP are nominally independent companies whose assets and profits belong to the federal or municipal government (Sakwa 2011: 153).

have operators who contact the organization responsible for solving a given problem (PSAOGM 2009). However, as evident in the next chapter, many people are not aware of this option.

In light of this introduction to the management of commons around Moscow homes, I now focus on their use. My intent is to provide context for interpreting and analyzing data presented in the Resident Perspectives chapter that follows.

Use

The interview and survey questions for this study address who uses the land adjacent to residential buildings, how it is used and the effects of this activity. Common uses (Table 11) are closely related to demographics (Columns 2-4) and time (Columns 5-6). They cover a wide variety of actions that do not necessarily depend on the user's continuous presence on the territory (Figures 52-53). Some are ubiquitous while others are limited to certain populations or conditions. Design and management of commons influence the way they are used — from the formal organization of space to the informal practices of inhabitants. Sharing space gives rise to problems and solutions that improve upon future design, management and use. This section provides examples and illustrations of how people use the commons around Moscow homes. Although different forms of design and management establish specific parameters for use, there are also patterns that transcend these differences. At certain times of day, people can be found walking dogs, sitting on benches, watching children, socializing, exercising, planting flowers, decorating, posting advertisements or simply passing through. Some hang laundry or

Although different forms of design and management establish specific parameters for use, there are also patterns that transcend these differences. At certain times of day, people can

Table 11. Common uses in descending order of frequency among different groups at different times					
Use	**Age** **C: child (-12)** **T: teenager (13-19)** **Y: younger adult (20-34)** **M: middle-aged adult (35-54)** **O: older adult (55-)**	**Gender** **M: male** **F: female**	**Residence** **A: adjacent** **N: nonadjacent**	**Season** **SP: spring** **SU: summer** **F: fall** **W: winter**	**Time of day** **M: morning** **A: afternoon** **E: evening** **N: night**
Passing through	T, Y, M C, O	M, F	A N	SP, SU, F, W	M, E A N
Parking*	Y, M T O	M, F	A N	SP, SU, F, W	E, N M, A
Walking dogs	M, O C, T, Y	M, F	A N	SP, SU, F, W	E M A N
Childcare	Y, M, O T	F M	A N	SP, SU F, W	A E M
Conversation	O M T Y	F M	A N	SP, SU F, W	A, E M N
Running, jumping, climbing in the playground	C	M, F	A N	SP, SU F, W	M, A, E
Sports	C, T Y M	M F	A N	SP, SU F, W	A, E M
Sedentary games	O	M	A N	SP, SU	A, E
Working out on fitness equipment	T, Y M	M	A N	SP, SU F, W	M, E A
Feeding animals*	O C, M	F M	A	SP, SU, F, W	M A, E

Table 11. Common uses in descending order of frequency among different groups at different times

Use	Age C: child (-12) T: teenager (13-19) Y: younger adult (20-34) M: middle-aged adult (35-54) O: older adult (55-)	Gender M: male F: female	Residence A: adjacent N: nonadjacent	Season SP: spring SU: summer F: fall W: winter	Time of day M: morning A: afternoon E: evening N: night
Business (including advertisements)*	Y, M O	M, F	N	SP, SU, F, W	M, A E, N
Sitting alone	O M Y	M, F	A	SP, SU F, W	A M, E
Drinking and/or smoking	T, Y, M, O	M F	A N	SP, SU	A, E N
Drying laundry*	O M	F	A	SP, SU F, W	M, A E
Noncommercial postings*	M, O	F M	N A	SP, SU, F, W	M, A, E N
Storage*	M, O	M F	A N	SP, SU, F, W	M, A, E N
Gardening*	O M	F	A	SP SU	M, A E N
Auto-work	Y, M O, T	M	A	SP, SU F W	E A M
Visual expression*	T, Y (paint) C (chalk) O (decorations)	M, F	A, N	SP, SU F, W	A (chalk, decorations) M, E (chalk, deco.) N (paint)
Temporary residence in shipping container	Y, M (construction workers)	M	N	SU SP, F W	N, E M, A

* Uses that do not require continuous presence of a user.



Figure 52. Common uses of territory around the home.



Figure 53. Common uses that do not require a user's continuous presence.

be found walking dogs, sitting on benches, watching children, socializing, exercising, planting flowers, decorating, posting advertisements or simply passing through. Some hang laundry or park and go inside. There are kiosks, convenience stores, beauty salons, auto salons and other small businesses around the premises.[214] Although use of open yards by people who do not live nearby attracts little attention, those who act discourteously may face a scolding by local elders. This is more common in smaller territories bounded closely by lower buildings with inhabitants who know each other relatively well. Sometimes fences, parking barriers or security guards control the use of yards. Certain uses correlate with seasonal changes: long summer days allow people to linger for hours, while a cold rain in late fall dissuades everyone but the hardiest dog-walkers from staying outside. People use commons in ways associated with their age, gender, profession, transportation options and household composition (especially whether they have children or pets). Age is especially significant, as daily activities coincide with interests and capabilities at different stages of life. I found the clearest similarities within the following age groups: children (up to 12 years old), teenagers (13-19), younger adults (20-34), middle-aged adults (35-54) and older adults (55 and over).[215]

Children (Figure 54) can be further grouped into infants, preschoolers and school kids. Infants are usually in strollers under the supervision of a parent or grandparent. They inhabit playgrounds, squares and walkways in daylight hours — almost regardless of weather conditions. Once a child is able to walk, play areas become their main outdoor attractions. Children also spend time in nearby nurseries and preschools, which occupy large gated territories in residential settings throughout the city. School kids eventually move from playgrounds to recreation facilities (such as football fields, basketball courts and ping-pong tables) which are

[214] The term "auto salon" refers to carwashes, mechanics, tire shops and other businesses that work on automobiles.
[215] Average ages for marriage, parenthood, retirement and death are relatively low in Russia. The retirement age is 55 for women and 60 for men, with many options for going on pension earlier (Wilmington 2014).

similarly located at the center of a group of houses or within close walking distance. Kids can also be found using bicycles, roller skates, skateboards and other equipment on parking lots, walkways and streets. At this stage, they are less likely to be supervised by a parent or grandparent when playing or walking a dog near home. They also tend to walk to school and local stores independently or with friends.

With greater independence and range of movement, teenagers (Figure 55) are less likely than children to be present in the territory around their homes during the day. They are often on their way to or from school and other destinations. Yet they also play sports, exercise, walk dogs and hang out around benches, playgrounds, gazebos (*besedki*) and ping-pong tables. When hanging out, they may play computer games, listen to music, vandalize, smoke or drink. However, much of this activity occurs in places farther from home — sometimes in the yard of a friend with less parental supervision or in out-of-the-way areas without familiar adults.[216] Based on my findings through this study, youth delinquency in Moscow yards is not a chronic problem. Teens are more often engaged in athletics, quiet socializing and looking after younger siblings. Some visit yards at night to write messages of love on the pavement beneath certain windows.

Younger adults (Figure 56) without children or pets tend to spend the least time in their yards, just passing through quickly or parking their cars. Certain amenities, like a football (soccer) field or exercise equipment, will attract men from nearby buildings and other areas. They may stay for a while — talking, smoking, drinking — or visit at night to write messages on the pavement. Younger adults who work in maintenance, construction, retail and other enterprises are a common presence around the yards of others. If they are not working, they may be having lunch or resting in the shade. Young parents are often in yards with their children. It is

[216] Moscow architect Gleb Vitkov advocates research, funding and urban design based on youth participation (Vitkov 2013). He asserts that municipal funds are currently going to waste on projects ill-suited for teenagers, who instead choose relatively isolated — and often dangerous — places to hang out.

not unusual to see fathers pushing strollers or accompanying kids at the playground, but women more often play this role. When passing through quickly, young adults often carry large bags of groceries or other purchases. Those without children normally appear too busy for spending time in their yards.

Middle-aged adults (Figure 57), like their younger counterparts, rarely spend time in their yards if they work fulltime and do not have a dependent child or pet. They are, however, among the local workers who spend their breaks in other peoples' yards. Older parents whose kids are not yet school-aged tend to use the space around their homes in the same ways as younger parents. The main use-related difference I have found between middle-aged and younger adults comes down to presence over time: the former are more likely to garden, hang laundry, feed animals, keep a shed, chat with neighbors or engage in other activities rather than just passing through. They are also less subject to the needs of dependent children and more rooted in the local community.

Older adults (Figure 58) are frequently in yards watching grandchildren, sitting on benches, meeting with friends and walking for exercise or to run errands. Some hang laundry, plant flowers or decorate the premises with lawn ornaments and found objects. When sitting alone they may read, sleep or pensively observe the activity going on around them; in groups they chat or play games. Sometimes men drink surreptitiously with friends. In almost any weather, elderly residents can be found sitting together for a long time each day. Their presence appears to help discourage inconsiderate behavior, as they keep an eye on local activity and are relatively familiar with other residents. Older women may even berate people for "hooliganism" (*khuliganstvo*), but their presence alone is enough to create a general sense of order.



Figure 54. Children.



Figure 55. Teenagers.

Figure 56. Younger adults.

Figure 57. Middle-aged adults.

Figure 58. Older adults.

Although Moscow yards function surprisingly well on the whole, they are not immune to problems associated with sharing space. People drink excessively, play loud music, yell or barbecue so that smoke permeates nearby buildings. They vandalize, litter and neglect to clean up after their dogs. Businesses occupy space — physically and by way of advertisements — without consent from local residents. Car alarms go off at all hours, audible from hundreds of apartments. People add storage sheds, park inconsiderately, leave dilapidated cars in much-needed spaces. Private car shelters (*rakushki*, *penaly*) have proliferated since the mid-1980s despite perpetual declarations of war against them (Shumskiy 2012). Ethnic minorities face discrimination and even violence in some Moscow districts. According to Alexey Levinson of Levada-Center, migrant workers and other low-income noncitizens often live in outlying districts without convenient transportation infrastructure. Some live in shipping containers set up temporarily on construction sites, which is viewed with consternation by many nearby residents.

The municipal government, management agencies, resident organizations and a variety of individuals work to solve use-related problems. The city holds public hearings where people can voice complaints, and periodically removes graffiti, neglected cars, problematic businesses and private sheds. Management organizations post signs and carry out government orders for improvements. Resident groups sometimes retrofit their yards — installing underground parking, for instance, covered by a grassy plateau. In such cases, design and management combine through new forms of land use that resolve conflicts between people with different priorities. Individuals address use-related issues by appealing to resident organizations, filing complaints with municipal authorities, organizing demonstrations or asking people directly to refrain from annoying behavior. There are also subtler ways, like simply not doing things that could negatively affect others.

Design and management influence use, though less consistently than temporal and demographic factors. This is easily observed in Moscow residential areas. Human perspectives on using commons — and how others use them — are more difficult to ascertain but essential for a thorough analysis. The next chapter builds upon my overview of past and present influences by closely examining resident impressions of shared space around their homes.

RESIDENT PERSPECTIVES

This chapter addresses how Moscow residents perceive the commons around their homes, with a focus on governance through design, management and use. I analyze the results of interviews, focus groups and a questionnaire survey to assess whether my observations coincide with the perspectives of other inhabitants: Do people consider the land around their homes free of blight? Are there correlations between opinions on certain forms of design, management and use? In answering these questions, I link my historical analysis with contemporary findings to inform a series of reflections discussed in the final chapter.

Resident perspectives communicated through this study coincide with the results of state and municipal surveys while adding new dimensions. As conveyed in the Methodology section, the 8 focus groups and 134 structured interviews I carried out between November 2011 and March 2013 helped me develop questions for an experimental survey conducted from March through July 2013. I requested basic demographic information (Table 12) along with the address of each respondent. This allowed me to access information on building design (Table 13) and management (Table 14) in a municipal database.[217] These data include date of construction, number of stories, structural material, building type, management organization and homeowners' association (if present). My analysis is structured around the survey questions (see Tables 15-17, or Appendix 2 for the translated questionnaire) but also includes relevant findings from interviews, focus groups and site observations.

[217] For the address of this online database, see Moscow City Government 2003a.

Table 12. Population characteristics

%	Gender
61	Female
39	Male

%	Age
4	Under 18
38	18 to 25
25	26 to 35
13	36 to 45
4	46 to 55
5	56 to 65
11	Over 65

%	Annual income ($)
21	Under 6,733
20	6,733 to 13,452
27	13,453 to 20,184
5	20,185 to 26,928
4	26,929 to 33,660
0	Over 33,660
23	No answer

%	Other
18	Child(ren) under 18
82	No child(ren) under 18
30	Automobile
70	No automobile
34	Renter
66	Nonrenter
2	Participant
98	Nonparticipant

Table 13. Building characteristics

%	Administrative okrug
9	Central
13	North
14	Northeast
11	East
5	Southeast
13	South
13	Southwest
15	West
7	Northwest
0	Zelenograd

%	Year of construction
2	Before 1918
2	1918 to 1928
4	1929 to 1945
2	1946 to 1955
18	1956 to 1965
31	1966 to 1975
16	1976 to 1985
11	1986 to 1995
7	1996 to 2005
7	2006 to 2012

%	Type
77	Standard model
23	Custom design

%	Stories
5	1 to 4
14	5
25	6 to 9
27	10 to 15
29	16 to 22
0	Over 22

%	Material
0	Wood
23	Brick
16	Block
2	Reinforced concrete
59	Panel
0	Other

Table 14. Management characteristics

%	Management type
70	Directorate for a Unified Client (DEZ)
14	Management company (UK)
7	Resident management
9	Other

%	Resident organization
14	Homeowners' association (TSZh)
11	Construction cooperative (ZhSK)
0	Housing cooperative (ZhK)
75	None

%	Other
23	Locked gate
77	No locked gate
18	Parking bar
82	No parking bar
43	Video surveillance
57	No video surveillance
12	Guard
88	No guard

A remarkable 75 percent of survey participants expressed satisfaction when asked to give their overall impression of the territory within 50 meters of their home. Although over 70 percent lived in buildings constructed between 1956 and 1991 — during the mass housing campaign and late Soviet years known for drab apartment blocks — 66 percent expressed satisfaction with the territory's appearance. Building facades and infrastructure (e.g., recreation equipment, benches, flowerbeds, paving, utilities) did not strongly influence this perception on the whole, as they received negative assessments from 59 and 57 percent of participants, respectively.

Green space received the highest overall positive response at 75 percent, with over a third of respondents answering "very satisfied." Only 18 percent indicated too few trees on the premises in a yes-or-no question. This may account for the apparently marginal effect of facades, since older buildings are partially obscured by mature trees for much of the year. Time of year actually made a difference, as there were noticeably fewer positive assessments of the territory in early spring, just before trees started to fill in and maintenance workers finished removing trash embedded in melting snow.

Management received positive assessments overall, including maintenance of order (cleanliness, repairs, conduct, safety) that has eluded many housing projects in other parts of the world. A convincing 61 percent of respondents considered green space around their homes well maintained, 59 percent had not seen much graffiti on the premises and 81 percent found the territory generally clean. However, maintenance of infrastructure was an exception, with a majority reporting dissatisfaction.[218] Residents who expressed general discontent with the territory predominantly referred to management-related problems with infrastructure:

[218] There was a higher than usual number of uncertain responses to this question, likely due to its combination of too many elements; for example, benches may be well maintained but parking lots neglected. I was interested in overall impressions, so the question serves the purposes of this survey. But it does not show which forms of infrastructure are well maintained and which are not. I compensated for this by asking people to elaborate.

> Repairs are always in progress but the work is hardly connected with real needs. The paint on fencing never dries but construction materials are low quality. There are too few plantings and no consequences for people who abuse equipment. This makes the place depressing overall. (Female, 41-year-old parent, 24 Novokosinskaya Ulitsa, April 11, 2013)[219]

A substantial majority evaluated rule enforcement and overall safety positively. This is especially interesting because 79 percent reported not having seen any rules for using the territory, 88 percent did not have a security guard and it is rare to see police officers on patrol in residential areas. Gated communities, though on the rise, were likewise not pervasive. Video surveillance was more common, at 43 percent, but many interview participants expressed doubt that the cameras were running.

Despite overall satisfaction with management, 80 percent of participants reported that it was not possible to call and quickly resolve problems with the territory or that they were not sure. A larger majority (89 percent) indicated that it was not easy enough to participate in management decisions or that they were not sure. Uncertainty was the most common response in this case, at 39 percent. Even given these results, it is surprising that only 2 percent of respondents reported participating in management decisions — this holds true across all management types, including homeowners' associations. These findings suggest that apartment ownership (66 percent of respondents were non-renters) does not necessarily engender responsibility for taking care of the premises. They also indicate that most management

[219] In attributing the quotes in this section, "parent" refers to people who indicated that they have children under 18 years old. Detailed information on each building and management type is available upon request.

organizations — heavily subsidized and increasingly monitored by the government — are adequately fulfilling their responsibilities with regard to the territory around residential buildings. A compelling 75 percent of participants considered the area around their home improving, as one resident confirmed:

> My yard has been getting better. It has always been a safe place with pretty green space, but now it's cleaner and there's more lighting. I would only remove the fencing around lawns and do something with the cars. It wouldn't be bad to participate in management when it comes to these kinds of decisions. (Female, 63-year-old pensioner, 10 Michurinskiy Prospekt, May 14, 2013)

The majority of respondents did not have strong positive or negative feelings about use of the territory around their homes. In open-ended survey responses and interviews, most people indicated that they do not use it at all. The most common uses were playing with children, walking dogs and parking a car. Prevalent sources of discontent included littering, drunkenness and automobiles (e.g., dangerous speed, inconsiderate parking, individual garages, blocking spaces, alarms). Even though 70 percent of participants reported not having a car, 60 percent agreed that there should be more parking on the premises. This question generated the most polarized and impassioned responses, visible in the number of "fully agree" and "fully disagree" selections — only 5 percent expressed uncertainty. Land use was often mentioned as something in need of improvement:

> There's a lot of space that can't be used in any way, so the area that can be used is overflowing with people. This area has a sandbox, a small gazebo, benches, a ping-pong table — basically the whole yard. But that's only about one-seventh of the territory. The rest is either an empty wasteland or full of densely planted willows and other bushes that are impossible to wade through. And there are cars everywhere. In early spring, or whenever it rains, you have to somehow make it past all the deep puddles and parked cars. (Male, 26-year-old nonparent, 13 k. 1, Ulitsa Vasiliya Petushkova, July 21, 2013)

While 79 percent of participants indicated that there are generally a lot of people on the territory throughout the day, this did not tend to provoke hostility or discomfort. A 62 percent majority felt that people usually do not behave discourteously, and 64 percent considered interpersonal relations on the territory positive on the whole — negative evaluations registered at 38 and 18 percent, respectively. Based on these responses as well as overall satisfaction with maintenance, appearance and safety, it is consistent that 68 percent of respondents felt comfortable on the territory. At the same time, 77 percent indicated that they would rather live in a single-unit home with their own private yard. In structured interviews, however, very few participants said that they would choose such a home if it required moving outside the city and loosing access to their present apartment.

Overall, people's satisfaction with the territory around their home coincided with their assessment of management functions like maintenance, safety and improvements. The presence of mature trees also proved an important factor in mitigating dissatisfaction with building facades and infrastructure. Satisfaction did not depend on the ease of contacting a responsible

Table 15. Level of satisfaction with specific aspects of the territory within 50 meters of home (%)



Table 16. Level of agreement or disagreement with given statements about the territory (%)



Table 17. Additional observations and opinions regarding the territory (%)



party to resolve problems, or on taking part in management decisions: few people indicated that these were viable options, implying that even minor improvements were appreciated simply because they happened without having to go through the process of requesting them. However, interview participants were very critical of "false improvements" (cheap fountains, for example) bestowed by city officials in place of needed improvements.

Given the poorly lit walkways that many residents have to pass through on their way to and from home, overall satisfaction with safety is one of the most surprising results. Population density may play a key role, as there are normally people around who would notice a crime in progress or respond to a call for help. Moscow's history of apartment distribution and privatization (Morton 1980: 238, Hosking 2000: 316) may also help explain this safety: most residents are established homeowners, often elderly, or working long hours to pay rent. Even though buildings from the 1960s through 1990s often look like rundown housing projects, Moscow remains a city of privilege.[220] Despite the existence of elite housing in desirable locations throughout the city, apartment allocation during the Soviet era did not result in concentrations of extreme poverty and blight.[221]

The results of my structured interviews, focus groups and questionnaire survey underscore the importance of attentive management in shaping resident perceptions. This is well understood among municipal and federal authorities in Moscow. Soviet ascendance after the civil war, recurrent power struggles within the Communist Party, massive protests unleashed through perestroika, violent states of emergency during the 1990s — this history is an ever-present reminder that administrations are especially vulnerable to unrest among citizens of the

[220] The average nominal wage in Moscow was 57,300 rubles per month ($21,600 per year) in 2013, up from 45,600 rubles per month ($17,600 per year) in 2012 (DEPRGM and ATsGM 2013: 24). The nationwide average was 30,000 rubles per month ($11,300 per year), up from 26,600 rubles per month ($10,200 per year) in 2012 (Rosstat 2013).
[221] For more on residential inequalities in Moscow, see Colton 1995: 502.

capital. Moscow residents are part of an enormous concentration of political, economic and cultural influence. Even those who are not directly involved benefit from the efforts of top leaders to keep them satisfied. At the same time, leaders are investing in the places where they live and work, perpetuating a tradition of model projects aimed at impressing the city, country and world.

Beyond general satisfaction, impressions that territory around the home is improving show that government investment over the past three years has been noticed. Even before this period, former Mayor Luzhkov made it a priority to assure that housing management was reliable and affordable (Medvedev 2004: 55, Carnaghan 2007: 93). Problems arose during the rocky transition from public to private ownership. Interview and focus group participants expressed frustration with the semi-legal advertisements, businesses and construction projects that appeared around their homes over the past two decades. Still, most who lived through the economic recession and restructuring of the late Soviet years acknowledged that maintenance improved substantially under Luzhkov. Mayor Sobyanin's constantly publicized initiatives to add parking spaces, carry out repairs, introduce amenities and ensure management quality appear to have bolstered the perception of improvement achieved under his predecessor.

Patronage helps sustain authoritarian regimes if it effectively meets people's needs. However, discontent rises uncontrollably when the benefits decline. Between 1987 and 1993, Moscow residents gathered in protest, organized basic services and held the municipal government accountable for fulfilling its responsibilities (Shomina 1999). In curtailing this activity, Luzhkov chose centralized control over participatory democracy. Or, as his supporters might claim, he did what was necessary to end the instability of the early 1990s so that democratic governance could function effectively. Yet after stability returned he continued to suppress resident initiatives that conflicted with his own. Sobyanin has adopted more progressive

means of citizen engagement (notably through Internet technology), but his administration is no less immune to opposition.

Resident interviews, focus groups and surveys confirm that blight is not a major problem in Moscow residential areas. At the same time, I did not find consistent patterns associated with specific forms of design, management or use. The presence of mature trees was the only factor that strongly coincided with resident satisfaction, but even trees drew occasional criticism for blocking sunlight, reducing perceptions of safety or preventing certain recreational activities. Evaluations of management correlated most reliably with those of the territory as a whole. It is clear that "no-man's land" can be comfortable and attractive if managed attentively. At the same time, people expressed interest in having more influence on management decisions they feel strongly about. This suggests that the option to participate would allow them to help improve conditions that influence their experience most directly. Allocation of funds would thus be more discerning and authorities might even face less resistance to calibrating monthly payments with actual costs. Resident perspectives alerted me to diverse positive and negative aspects of urban commons, as well as new ideas for expanding their appeal through democratic governance. The following section addresses these issues in more detail.

CONCLUSION

Returning to the questions behind this study, why and how have the commons between Moscow homes not become blighted "no-man's land" in the absence of clear property rights? Throughout the city — from the center to the outer rings — these territories are surprisingly orderly and safe. While my explanation is unique to Moscow, its implications are relevant for any community intent on establishing comfortable shared space in residential areas.

This research called for an ecological approach focused on the processes through which habitats form in relation with their inhabitants. Due to my concentration on governance, political dimensions were especially important. However, in keeping with urban political ecology, I also paid attention to the roles of social, cultural and economic processes. This was useful because of the disparate factors that influence shared space around urban homes — including policy, business, media, activism and everyday activities. The interactions among these factors in Moscow show why and how commons in residential districts are so widely free of blight. I also found guidance in Bruno Latour's thinking on political ecology as a form of governance that incorporates research on manifold connections between human and nonhuman participants — analyzing how they assemble and considering how they might reassemble in ways that are more democratic, responsible and beneficial to those involved.

This report was structured in three parts: the first a historical study, the second an introduction to present focal points and the third an analysis of resident perceptions. The Historical Influences chapter examined broad influences on the emergence and evolution of Moscow yards, with a focus on governance. The Contemporary Focal Points chapter addressed

the design, management and use of these spaces today. The Resident Perspectives chapter provided analysis of data from interviews, focus groups and surveys.

My historical research suggests that careful management of yards in Moscow has long been an important display of government competence. As such, it helps preserve stability and consolidate authority. Mayor Sobyanin plays the role of an "effective manager" constantly launching popular initiatives, checking the work of municipal officials, solving problems and even rallying citizen participation.[222] His administration orchestrates a constant flow of high-profile events, meetings with experts, model projects and largely symbolic public hearings. However, institutional channels through which residents can place limits on arbitrary decisions remain practically nonexistent. With yards, the approach is straightforward: establish, monitor and subsidize attentive maintenance; invest in visible improvements; support citizen autonomy and activism to the extent that it does not threaten government prerogative. On the whole, this has been well received. It keeps housing premises orderly without demanding involvement or even full payment of the costs. However, it is based on a level of public funding that is not equitable in comparison with other Russian cities, and it leaves the administration highly vulnerable to economic turbulence.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Moscow residents organized to address problems when reduction of patronage and other forms of control left the government in disarray. Since then, inevitable frustrations with top-down measures have prevented this capacity from dissipating. Still, official attempts to institutionalize it have stopped at ceding the real influence necessary for development. In light of recent events, a more democratic

[222] The popular term "effective manager" (*effektivnyy menedzher*) often carries authoritarian connotations attributed to Putin, Stalin and other leaders known for accomplishing their objectives by any means necessary (Pomerantsev 2014). In the case of Sobyanin and many contemporary professionals, it refers more to a particularly loyal and capable subordinate or *khozyaystvennik* who, unlike Yuri Luzhkov, does not become the *khozyain*.

process — thoroughly aware of positive and negative aspects of past experience with autonomous resident mobilization — is necessary for continuous dynamism in governing the commons around urban homes. If this actually decentralizes responsibility, it should prove less susceptible to the extremes of paternalistic chaos and order.

Based on the present study, I recommend assuring that residents have substantive options to participate in governance while maintaining transparent payment requirements with subsidies limited to those in need of assistance. People should be able to influence the design of their yards if they are interested. They should be able to evaluate management agencies and replace them if necessary. They should also have the option of helping to decide on rules for using their yards. Residents could thus participate when faced with issues of importance to them but also rest assured that their monthly investment upholds agreeable standards over time.

Intersections between design, management and use occur frequently, as when people plant flowers or combine their resources to pay for a parking garage covered by a field of grass. Problems with design and use can often be resolved through management decisions like concealing garbage containers, removing unnecessary fencing, updating recreational facilities, cleaning or resurfacing building facades, improving public art, establishing neighborhood patrols and enforcing consequences for inconsiderate behavior. One person's solution may be someone else's problem, so the most enduring results are based on careful attention to as many cohabitants as possible. Initial design and everyday use can be optimized through management that is directly accountable to residents. It is especially important to establish mechanisms for resolving problems as they arise. Management agencies have the potential to be effective

arbitrators, especially when their decisions are based on fair standards that residents have agreed upon and can influence.

Quality governance of commons in residential areas is based on carefully integrating design, management and use. This process begins at the earliest planning stage and only ends when adjacent homes are no longer inhabited. Housing in Moscow and other cities is rarely integrative: the developer hires a designer or simply uses an existing model; contractors assemble buildings as the developer sells or rents them; owners hire management agencies to keep order, too often just responding to the most urgent complaints from residents. Each of these processes is largely compartmentalized or fully separate from the rest. Sometimes adequate management is nearly impossible for lack of planning, investment or communication.

An integrative process brings government officials, developers, designers, contractors, managers, owners and renters into dialog as early as possible; it then keeps these lines of communication open to avert or quickly resolve problems. Residents with specific concerns — from reducing noise to selecting a swing-set — can help address them in consultation with specialists. They can inform managers of structural elements that cause injury, for example, or materials that need frequent repair. Designers can recommend alternatives. Of course, this requires a level of funding that residents may be unwilling or unable to provide. Benefits associated with sharing the costs of attentive management, such as not having to mow the lawn or shovel the driveway, must be clear and compelling.

Moscow's experience offers valuable insight into making shared space a comfortable extension of the home. This study shows that commons in residential areas can remain free of blight when attentively managed, and that government patronage is not a substitute for democratic accountability. Sound and innovative governance of residential commons involves

practical mechanisms for ongoing communication and mutual influence among public officials, developers, designers, owners, managers and residents. If people have a realistic option to help solve problems with shared space around their homes, this may strengthen the appeal of high-density living in other places as well.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Moscow Housing Stock

Dates of construction	Buildings		Square meters (x 1,000)			
			Total space		*Dwelling space*	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
-1917	2183	5.5	3144.1	1.5	1971.0	1.5
1918-1928	1043	2.6	1334.3	0.6	863.0	0.7
1929-1940	2124	5.3	3878.0	1.8	2547.3	1.9
1941-1945	250	0.6	448.1	0.2	288.2	0.2
1946-1955	2795	7.0	5519.6	2.6	3387.4	2.6
1956-1965	11697	29.3	37240.0	17.3	24178.8	18.2
1966-1975	7597	19.1	50578.6	23.5	32742.2	24.7
1976-1985	3721	9.3	37184.1	17.3	22622.3	17.1
1986-1995	2278	5.7	24736.5	11.5	14490.7	10.9
1996-2005	4355	10.9	34496.3	16.0	19851.0	15.0
2006-2009	1592	4.0	14803.8	6.9	8359.1	6.3
2010	234	0.6	2097.4	1.0	1239.5	0.9

Source: City of Moscow Department of Residential-Communal Management and Improvement, based on data from the Moscow Bureau of Technical Inventory up to January 1, 2011 (DZhKKhBGM 2011)

Appendix 2: Translated Survey Form

A survey for residents of multi-unit buildings located in the City of Moscow before the 2012 expansion, on the territory within a 50-meter radius of the home

Please indicate your general impression of the following:	**very dissatisfied**	**dissatisfied**	**unsure**	**satisfied**	**very satisfied**
Overall impression					
General appearance of the territory as a whole					
Building facades					
Greenery					
Upkeep of greenery					
Enforcement of rules concerning the territory					
Quality of shared amenities (*blagoustroystvo*)					
Maintenance of infrastructure					

Please indicate your general opinion:	**strongly disagree**	**disagree**	**unsure**	**agree**	**strongly agree**
I can contact someone to quickly resolve problems concerning the territory.					
I wish there were more parking spaces on the territory.					
The territory is generally safe for nearby residents.					
It is not too difficult to participate in management decisions.					
People often behave inconsiderately on the territory.					
The territory is sufficiently clean.					
Crime significantly threatens the safety of people on the territory.					
Interactions between people on the territory are mostly positive.					

Please answer the following questions:	**yes**	**no**	**Please answer the following questions:**	**yes**	**no**
In your opinion, are there too few trees on the territory?			Do you feel comfortable enough on the territory?		
Is there a closed gate around your yard?			Would you prefer that there were fewer trees on the territory?		
Is there a parking bar?			Do you participate in management decisions?		
Have you noticed any rules posted for using the territory?			Have you noticed video surveilance on the territory?		
Are there generally a lot of people on the territory during the day?			Do you have an automobile?		
Is there a security guard?			Do you rent the apartment in which you live?		
Would you say that the territory is improving?			Would you rather live in a detached home with a private yard?		
Have you seen a lot of graffiti on buildings and other structures?			Do you have children who are less than 18 years old?		

What do you like about the territory?

……

What do you not like about the territory?

……

How do you use the territory?

……

What other comments do you have about the territory?

……

Address: ..... **Age:** ..... **Gender:** ..... **Income:** .....

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