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# INSTRUMENTALIZING PRESSURES, REINVENTING MISSION: INDONESIAN NAVY BATTLES FOR TURF IN THE AGE OF *Reformasi*

Jun Honna\*

The post-Suharto transformation of civil-military relations in Indonesia marked the end of its first decade in 2008. During the past ten years of developing democracy, political leaders and some military officers have worked to reduce the military's political influence and to rein in military adventurism. Under the banner of political reform, or *reformasi*, the military's return to the barracks constituted a top national agenda for civilian political leaders who faced the twin task of eliminating the legacy of Suharto's authoritarian regime and constructing a political system based on democratic principles. Suharto's death in February 2008 provided an opportunity for the media to reflect on the ten years since his ouster, stimulating a debate on the achievements of *reformasi*. Recognizing the symbolic nature of the tenth anniversary, President Susilo Bambang Yuhoyono, in his speech on Armed Forces Day in 2007, ordered the military to produce a report evaluating the first decade of military reforms.<sup>1</sup>

During this decade, scholarship about the Indonesian military has examined the development of military reforms aimed at democratizing civil-military relations. The discourse almost exclusively focuses on the role of the army, because army generals were the most politically influential and active during the thirty-two years of Suharto's presidency and the army is the largest of the armed services. While this focus is

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<sup>1</sup> See "Amanat Presiden RI pada Acara Peringatan HUT ke-62 TNI," October 5, 2007. See, for example: [http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=1038&Itemid=26](http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1038&Itemid=26)

understandable given the institutional importance of the army, reform has also affected the navy and air force. How have these service branches been affected by the end of the Suharto era and the subsequent wave of *reformasi*? How have they influenced civil-military politics regarding military reform and security sector governance? Since the army is not the sole component of the military, these questions merit investigation to enrich our understanding of evolving Indonesian civil-military relations in the age of democracy.

This essay examines the post-Suharto adaptation of the navy, the institution long responsible for the archipelago's maritime security. What follows is an analysis of how the pressures facing the navy differed from those facing the army, how those pressures generated reform incentives for the navy, and how the navy has adapted itself to the changing circumstances. The military response to democratic transformation is not monolithic, as each service has its own agenda, and the case of the navy illustrates the shrewd instrumentalizing of "global" agendas, e.g., international cooperation for a better maritime governance, in order to preserve vested institutional interests vis-à-vis competitors in the age of *reformasi*.

### **Militarization of Maritime Governance during the Suharto Era**

The navy is traditionally the second largest force in the armed forces of Indonesia (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI), with about 57,000 personnel, and is only one-fifth the size of the army.<sup>2</sup> This small navy (Angkatan Laut, or TNI-AL) is tasked with maritime security covering 5.8 million square kilometers—including territorial waters of almost a million square kilometers, a contiguous maritime zone of 2.3 million square kilometres, and an EEZ (exclusive economic zone) of 2.7 million square kilometers. Since independence, defense planners have been concerned about the navy's capacity effectively to provide maritime security for this sprawling archipelago. Despite such professional concerns, budgetary constraints have delayed significantly the pace of naval modernization. Moreover, the Cold War environment—which encouraged the formation of an anti-communist block in Southeast Asia—helped the Suharto administration to concentrate more on domestic security than external defense issues that would require more spending to build up the navy's capacity. In lieu of sufficient budget allocations to bolster the navy's capacity, the government accorded it a large measure of autonomy in carrying out its maritime security mission. This unmonitored autonomy provided the navy with the flexibility and incentive to engage in self-financing to supplement its budget, especially through business activities, both legal and illegal.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> This official account, mentioned in the Defense White Book, dates from 2003. See Departmen Pertahanan, *Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21* (Jakarta: Dephan, 2003), p. 76. The army numbers about 265,000 soldiers.

<sup>3</sup> Like other services, the navy established its own foundation and corporations, and both controlled various enterprises involving shipping, resorts, oil refineries, real estate, cocoa plantations, maritime electronics and telecommunications, transportation, fisheries, construction, and timber. For details, see Danang Widoyoko, et al., *Bisnis Militer Mencari Legitimasi* (Jakarta: Indonesia Corruption Watch and National Democratic Institute, 2003, p. 120. The navy's involvement in illegal business is typified by its protection of smuggling rings, most notoriously in the case of illegal logging. See, for example, a report

## War and the Navy

The genesis of the Indonesian navy can be traced back to 1945, when Sukarno proclaimed independence on August 17, and, on August 22, created the People's Security Body (Badan Keamanan Rakyat, BKR), which included naval units (i.e., BKR-AL). Soon after this, on October 5, 1945, Sukarno, who intended to develop existing guerrilla organizations into a modern military institution, reorganized the BKR into the People's Security Military (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, TKR).<sup>4</sup> At this time, the naval force, TKR-AL, was established with four divisions: Division 1 in West Java, Division 2 in Central Java, Division 3 in East Java, and Division 4 in Kalimantan.<sup>5</sup> As in the army, these naval forces were staffed mainly by voluntary youth organizations, *pemuda*, which established militia groups, or *laskar*.<sup>6</sup> In an attempt to consolidate the identity of a unified, national armed forces operating under the president as the supreme commander, Sukarno decreed the renaming of TKR to TRI (Tentara Republik Indonesia, or the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) in January 1946, with the navy given the new name of ALRI (Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia). ALRI established its headquarters in Jogjakarta and set up twelve command bases—Pangkalan I to XII.<sup>7</sup> This was the embryo of today's navy, which maintained the ALRI name for more than twenty years until it was renamed TNI-AL in 1970, under the Suharto government.

During the independence war, naval operations were ad hoc; they were designed to maintain security around ports and naval facilities but also played a role in the land-based guerrilla campaign.<sup>8</sup> Soon after independence, the government faced the task of establishing peacetime maritime rules. Replacing Dutch regulations related to maritime affairs, the post-independence government issued an ordinance in 1949 that identified government agencies involved in maritime management.<sup>9</sup> These agencies included the navy (ALRI), the water police (Polisi Air, Polair), customs, the Department of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and the Directorate of Sea Communication in the Department of Transportation. All of them operated vessels used for their respective functions, but a lack of financial and human resources discouraged their functional specialization, resulting in a confusing overlapping of roles among the maritime agencies. Inevitably, maritime management in the early years of independence was chaotic, as competition among stakeholders encouraged a

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published by an international NGO, Environmental Investigation Agency / Telapak, "The Last Frontier: Illegal Logging in Papua and China's Massive Timber Theft," EIA / Telapak, February 2005.

<sup>4</sup> Today, October 5 is celebrated as Armed Forces Day.

<sup>5</sup> For information on the responsibility of each division, see Direktorat Perawatan Personil TNI-AL, *Beberapa Tradisi di Lingkungan TNI-AL* (Jakarta: Dinas Sejarah TNI-AL, 1989), pp. 46–47.

<sup>6</sup> About the role of *pemuda* and *laskar* in the building of the national military, see Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945–1967* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 23–26.

<sup>7</sup> They were, namely, Pangkalan I / ALRI Serang; Pangkalan II / ALRI Krawang; Pangkalan III / ALRI Cirebon; Pangkalan IV / ALRI Tegal; Pangkalan V / ALRI Pemalang; Pangkalan VI / ALRI Djuana; Pangkalan VII / ALRI Lawang; Pangkalan VIII / ALRI Madura; Pangkalan IX / ALRI Probolinggo; Pangkalan X / ALRI Banjuwangi; Pangkalan XI / ALRI Pacitan; and Pangkalan XII / ALRI Cilacap.

<sup>8</sup> See Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p. 95.

<sup>9</sup> The ordinance is Ordonansi No. 113 Lembaran Negara 1949.

“go your own way” mentality and undermined efforts to coordinate missions and visions.

The confusion of peacetime maritime governance was soon overcome by the navy, which succeeded in militarizing maritime administration while the government was suppressing a series of rebellions in the outer islands and consolidating central government authority over disputed territories. In this process, the navy established its dominance vis-à-vis other maritime agencies, and it was accomplished via the following three steps. First, in the mid-1950s, the military suppressed the RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan, or Republic of South Moluccas) revolt, in which a group of Ambonese rejected Indonesian independence.<sup>10</sup> Second, in 1958, another anti-separatist campaign by the military targeted the PRRI/Permesta (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta, or Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia/People’s Total Struggle) rebellion in Sumatra and Sulawesi, where the US-supported rebels—involving local military warlords—challenged Sukarno’s central government.<sup>11</sup> The civil war lasted for three years until government military forces prevailed. Third, in 1962, the military launched a West Irian “liberation” campaign that was coordinated by Brig. Gen. Suharto’s Mandala command. This campaign encouraged diplomatic negotiations in favor of the territory’s incorporation of Indonesia, which was finalized in 1963.<sup>12</sup>

In the scholarship on Indonesia’s civil-military relations, those military campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s are generally discussed in the context of the army’s growing influence in national politics. However, the navy also gained significant advantage in its sphere of maritime administration. The navy participated in these military campaigns by providing logistical support to the army. This provided the navy leadership an opportunity to legitimize the ascendancy of the navy over other peacetime-oriented maritime agencies in dealing with war logistics and information control. The navy had seen the ordinance of 1949—and the consequent overlapping of authority among maritime agencies—as an obstacle to gaining power, but in time it successfully exploited its wartime authority to dominate maritime administration in the territorial waters. In so doing it undermined the role and authority of the water police, customs, and the Department of Transportation, which controlled the Coast and Ocean Guarding Unit (Kesatuan Penjagaan Laut dan Pantai, KPLP). Invoking the threat of national disintegration, the navy advanced its campaign to militarize maritime governance, an agenda that it mostly achieved by 1963.

### ***Dwifungsi, UNCLOS, and Operasi Kamla***

The consolidation of navy authority over maritime administration and security gained further momentum under Suharto’s New Order regime. In the early stages of

<sup>10</sup> About the RMS’s separatist movement, see Richard Chauvel, *Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists: The Ambonese Islands from Colonialism to Revolt 1880–1950* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990).

<sup>11</sup> On the rebellion, see Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (New York, NY: The New Press, 1995); and Barbara S. Harvey, *Permesta: Half a Rebellion* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1977).

<sup>12</sup> John Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969: The Anatomy of Betrayal* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

authoritarian regime-building, Suharto's military institutionalized the practice of dual function, or *dwifungsi*, sending men in uniform to nonmilitary posts in the bureaucracy and parliaments, both national and local.<sup>13</sup> Since *dwifungsi*, symbolizing military repression of regime opposition, mainly involved the army, the largest and most politically influential force within the military, *dwifungsi* involving the navy has largely been overlooked. For the navy, taking part in *dwifungsi* helped maintain its institutional domination of maritime governance via seconding navy officers to high-ranking posts in civilian agencies related to maritime matters. The navy personnel dispatched to nonmilitary posts could act as the navy's eyes and ears and ensure its influence over matters of concern. This arrangement proved valuable and became widespread; by 1977, in fact, the navy sent 926 officers to such posts.<sup>14</sup> With its officers so well placed, the navy was able to fix its authority over all maritime-related agencies. Along with this penetration, in 1972 the New Order military established a body, Bakorkamla (Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut, or the Maritime Security Coordinating Body), to coordinate the policies and activities of maritime-related agencies under the direct control of the military commander-in-chief. Bakorkamla served to sustain the militarization of peacetime maritime administration. In fact, the regional divisions of Bakorkamla were chaired by the navy's Eastern and Western fleet commanders.

Another important development that buttressed the navy's role occurred in 1982 when the military formalized *dwifungsi* by passing the national defense and security law.<sup>15</sup> The law provided a legal basis for the navy to consolidate its authority in maritime law enforcement, as part of its security activities. This arrangement helped the navy to subordinate the police—a component of the four-services New Order military that controlled the water police—and the Department of Transportation, which supervised KPLP in the field of maritime security. Moreover, the law legalized the military doctrine of Hankamneg (pertahanan dan keamanan negara, or national defense and security), which mandated military professionalism in the management of internal security.<sup>16</sup> The navy, in adapting itself to the new law, developed the concept of *Hankamneg di Laut* (Hankamneg at Sea) and started to conduct routine maritime policing under the flag of Operasi Keamanan Laut (Kamla), or Maritime Security Operations.

Operasi Kamla of the navy gained further sanction in 1985 when Indonesia ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The ratification provided Indonesia with a right and responsibility to ensure the security and safety of its territorial waters and EEZs. The navy used this opportunity to further expand its role in law enforcement at sea. This development was favorable to the Suharto government,

<sup>13</sup> About *dwifungsi* and military intervention in politics during the early period of Suharto regime see, for example, David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975–1983* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984).

<sup>14</sup> Nugroho Notosusanto, ed., *Pejuang dan Prajurit: Konsepsi dan Implementasi Dwifungsi ABRI* (Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1984), p. 379.

<sup>15</sup> The law is UU No. 20 Tahun 1982 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Pertahanan dan Keamanan Negara RI.

<sup>16</sup> About Hankamneg and military professionalism, see Jun Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia* (London and New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), chapter 2.

which had been unable to allocate a sufficient national budget for naval modernization aimed at countering hypothetical external military threats; the navy's policing role instead provided it with lucrative opportunities to supplement its budget. Thus, it should be noted that UNCLOS effectively provided a new rationale and momentum for the navy to strengthen its maritime authority by asserting the need for bolstering Indonesia's maritime security capacity to meet "international demands." By invoking the responsibilities "imposed" under the auspices of UNCLOS, the navy created a security *raison d'être* that had not existed in terms of a credible external threat. In the case of the army, it could more easily instrumentalize threats from within and without in order to justify its paramount political and security roles. The navy faced a different situation, as its role in maritime security involved international concerns and monitoring, providing it with a trump card in institutional haggling and turf wars.

Operasi Kamla served as an important ritual to assert naval ascendancy over other maritime agencies. The periodic patrols of Operasi Kamla were under the command of the Western Fleet Command (Armada RI Kawasan Barat, or Armabar) in Jakarta and the Eastern Fleet Command (Armada RI Kawasan Timur, or Armatim) in Surabaya.<sup>17</sup> They were supported by civilian institutions linked with Bakorkamla. The patrols promoted the image of Operasi Kamla by making some high-profile arrests and impounding some illegal fishing boats and vessels smuggling goods and people during the periodic operations every year.<sup>18</sup> Regardless of the successes and failures of Operasi Kamla, in the context of navy politics under the New Order, these institutionalized operations at sea helped sustain militarized management of maritime affairs for more than three decades following the West Irian campaign. Thus, it is clear that *dwifungsi*, UNCLOS, and Operasi Kamla were three major factors enabling the navy to extend and maintain its power during the Suharto era.

### Post-Suharto Challenges to the Navy

#### The End of *Dwifungsi*

How did the collapse of the New Order regime influence the navy? It appears that the end of *dwifungsi* undermined the navy's role in maritime security. In fact, there were several significant developments that pressured the navy to adapt to the new environment. First, soon after the fall of Suharto, powerful political demands to democratize the authoritarian polity forced the military to embrace reforms aimed at attenuating its political role and influence. The military lost its New Order-sanctioned political hegemony, and the legitimacy of *dwifungsi* was no longer sacrosanct or a compelling justification for a pervasive military role in politics. In response, the military introduced several reforms under the slogan "new paradigm" (*paradigma baru*) in September 1998. The new paradigm's reform projects brought about visible

<sup>17</sup> The navy implemented reorganization in 1985, replacing old territorial commands with two operational commands—Western Fleet and Eastern Fleet Armadas.

<sup>18</sup> For details of Operasi Kamla in the 1980s and 1990s, see Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, *Sejarah TNI Jilid V (1984–2000)* (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, 2000), pp. 52–62.

changes.<sup>19</sup> The military eliminated its sociopolitical section—which had overseen everyday political intervention—from its organizational structure. In addition, it was declared that military officers would no longer side automatically with Golkar, a government party under the New Order, and that the military would refrain from interfering with or supporting political parties during electoral campaigns. Moreover, the number of military representatives in the parliament, or DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Assembly), was reduced from seventy-five to thirty-eight. The military also decided to stop the practice of dispatching active officers to civilian bureaucratic posts. This last development—which affected all services within the military—led to the withdrawal of uniformed navy personnel from other maritime agencies, and it contributed to the process of civilianizing and demilitarizing Indonesia's maritime administration.

Second, as a result of the new paradigm reforms, the police became independent from the military. Thus, in terms of institutional organization, in April 1999 the military returned to the pre-Suharto structure of three service branches—army, navy, and air force—and renamed itself Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). This functional separation was inevitably accompanied by the redefinition of responsibilities between the police and the TNI, a process fraught with conflict and turf battles. The TNI was assigned responsibility for national “defense,” and the police was given the role of maintaining domestic “security” and “order.”<sup>20</sup> Political elites in the parliament and civil society in general expected that the new division of responsibilities would lead the military to professionalize its capacities regarding external defense matters. As a result of this reform, however, there was growing dissatisfaction among TNI officers, who found promotions more difficult to secure given the reduced posts within the military and the shifting of domestic security functions to the police, an organization that enjoyed far less capacity, influence, and status relative to TNI. In addition, many lucrative side businesses involving protection faced intensified competition.<sup>21</sup> Resulting frustrations fanned TNI personnel's distrust and resentment against the police. In the context of naval dominance of maritime administration, the enhanced role of the police in domestic security and order indicated a more powerful role for Polair in dealing with coastal “security” issues. That growing rivalry between the navy and water police over the division of authority and responsibility for maritime security has significantly undermined the function of Bakorkamla and led to confusion in post-Suharto maritime administration.

<sup>19</sup> About post-Suharto military reform, see, for example, Marcus Mietzner, *The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance*, Policy Studies 23 (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2006).

<sup>20</sup> The legal basis for this functional separation was prepared in 2000 when parliamentarians passed two decrees in the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly), the country's highest decision-making body. The two MPR decrees are (1) Ketetapan MPR No. VI/2000 Tentang Pemisahan Tentara Nasional Indonesia dan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia and (2) Ketetapan MPR No. VII/2000 Tentang Peran Tentara Nasional Indonesia dan Peran Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia.

<sup>21</sup> Turf battles for illicit income-generating jobs frequently escalated to armed clashes between the army and the police. For a discussion of such events, see The Editors, “Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite,” *Indonesia* 80 (October 2005): 123–59.

## Redefining Mission

In coping with those new developments, the navy initially attempted to reassert itself to maintain its turf in maritime security. This took place under the leadership of Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto, Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, Admiral Slamet Soebijanto, Vice Admiral Djoko Sumaryono, and Vice Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijanto.<sup>22</sup> As we will see below, these officers developed the navy's strategies for survival in the age of democracy. Soon after the rivalry with Polair became institutionalized in 1999, naval headquarter's leaders expressed their new vision for strengthening the navy's role and presence in maritime administration. In its mission statement entitled "The Posture of Naval Power toward Twenty-First Century,"<sup>23</sup> delivered at the 1999 TNI seminar, navy leadership stressed that the international community, as notably seen in the stance of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), expected Indonesia to improve security and safety in Indonesian waters. The navy officers further argued that a failure to do so would provide foreign governments a pretext—that of protecting their vessels and crews—to intervene in the sovereign territory of Indonesia.<sup>24</sup> To avoid infringements on Indonesian sovereignty, and to meet the security demands of the international community, the navy called for an overhaul of its defense system by establishing Regional Maritime Commands (Komando Daerah Maritim, Kodamar) that would serve as bases for the navy's regular patrolling of Indonesian territorial waters.<sup>25</sup> This proposal to establish a territorial defense system, resembling the army structure of Kodam (Komando Daerah Militer, or Regional Military Commands), constituted an initial vision of the post-Suharto navy aimed at securing its institutional ascendancy over other maritime agencies.

The greatest obstacle blocking the navy's agenda, however, was the budgetary constraints affecting the government amidst the economic crisis. During the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), the TNI had its first commander-in-chief from the navy—Admiral Widodo—and the agenda of strengthening and modernizing the navy was emphasized within the TNI, as part of overall military reform to review the tradition of army-centric defense planning and to develop the strategic significance of Wawasan Nusantara, or the Archipelagic Concept, put forth by the navy. Nevertheless, the Widodo leadership soon realized that the government's financial woes not only blocked costly modernization projects and organizational restructuring, but also

<sup>22</sup> Widodo was the first TNI commander with a navy background. He held the post from November 1999 to June 2002. Sondakh, as TNI's inspector general, served under Widodo and was later promoted to navy chief-of-staff (May 2002–February 2005). Soebijanto also served Widodo, as deputy assistant for general planning to the TNI commander, and later replaced Sondakh as the navy chief-of-staff, leading the organization until October 2007. As Soebijanto's successor as deputy assistant for general planning, Sumaryono also served under Widodo. During Sondakh's navy leadership, Sumaryono was entrusted to be Western Fleet commander and was later promoted to chief executive of Bakorkamla. Purdijanto served as Western Fleet commander under Soebijanto's navy leadership and in 2008 became navy chief-of-staff.

<sup>23</sup> Markas Besar Angkatan Laut Tentara Nasional Indonesia, "Postur Kekuatan TNI AL Menyongsong Abad 21," paper prepared for TNI Seminar, Bandung, May 12, 1999.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>25</sup> The navy suggested establishing nine Kodamars throughout the archipelago: Kodamar I/Belawan; Kodamar II/Tanjung Pinang; Kodamar III/Teluk Ratai; Kodamar IV/Surabaya; Kodamar V/Banjarmasin; Kodamar VI/Ujung Pandang; Kodamar VII/Manado; Kodamar VIII/Ambon; and Kodamar IX/Jayapura. See *ibid.*, pp. 24–26.



hindered basic fleet maintenance.<sup>26</sup> As a result, the navy had no choice but to shrink its defense activities, reforming its patrol style into the “waiting system,” in which naval operations were conducted only “on demand.”<sup>27</sup> In 2002, under the leadership of navy chief-of-staff Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, the navy was finally forced to revise its defense outlook to meet the reality of funding constraints. Sondakh produced a new ten-year development plan for the navy, entitled *Cetak Biru TNI-AL 2013*, or Navy Blueprint for 2013. The blueprint insisted that the justification for naval modernization was not based on any new threat, but rather was urgently needed because the navy’s fleet was antiquated and dilapidated.<sup>28</sup> Thus, the blueprint argued, naval modernization was imperative and critical to both national security and professionalism. The navy called for an increase in the number of naval ships from the current 113 to 190 by 2013, claiming that 190 ships were needed to meet the ideal level of national defense in Asia’s largest archipelagic country. However, recognizing the difficulty of securing a sufficient budget, the navy also provided two additional options, one suggesting that 170 ships would enable it to provide an adequate level of naval defense, while 138 vessels would be the minimum requirement for the navy to carry out its basic duties.<sup>29</sup> With those plans on the table, the navy gradually asserted its long-term goal for 190 ships to establish a “green-water navy” by 2020. According to Admiral Slamet Soebijanto, Sondakh’s successor as navy chief-of-staff, the newly defined green-water navy represented a level of sea power higher than that of a brown-water (coastal) navy, but below that of a fully operational, go-anywhere blue-water navy.<sup>30</sup>

These developments all illustrate how the post-Suharto navy asserted its interests in responding to the initial period of *reformasi*. Confronted with the end of *dwifungsi* and the rise of Polair, which significantly undermined the navy’s dominance, the navy leadership first tried to regain influence by establishing a territorial command presence throughout the archipelago with a Kodamar structure. However, due to the government’s financial woes, the navy had to scale back its ambitions and adopt the “on demand” patrol system. Responding to this setback, the navy promoted its need for modernization with the blueprint initiative, and redefined its mission as a green-water navy. The official abandonment of a blue-water capability carried implications for the rivalry between the navy and Polair, intensifying the turf battle over their overlapping jurisdictions. Despite the navy’s new assertiveness, it faced difficulties in recovering ascendancy in maritime security governance, if only because of the fact that most of its fleet was not operational. In addition, the changing regional maritime security environment bolstered the significance of nonmilitary responses, as discussed below.

<sup>26</sup> During a DPR hearing in February 2008, the navy chief-of-staff, Admiral Sumardjono, revealed that out of 143 warships, only eleven were operational. See Abdul Khalik, “Blame Game Erupts on Aging Weapons,” *The Jakarta Post*, February 8, 2008.

<sup>27</sup> “The Western Fleet Naval Aviation: Flying for 4 Billion Dollars,” *Angkasa 7* (April 2000).

<sup>28</sup> See “TNI AL Buat Cetak Biru: Pembangunan Kekuatan Sampai 2013,” *Media Indonesia*, October 7, 2003; and Alman Helvas Ali, “Cetak Biru TNI AL 2013,” *Sinar Harapan*, December 4, 2004.

<sup>29</sup> “Perlengkapan Senjata TNI AL Baru Terpenuhi Tahun 2013,” *Sinar Harapan*, November 27, 2004. The navy successfully increased the number of warships to 138 as of 2008.

<sup>30</sup> Cited by Riefqi Muna in “Indonesia Aims for ‘Green Water Navy’ Capability,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, June 29, 2005.

### Nonmilitary Issues in Maritime Security

Indonesia has been facing new challenges in maritime security since the economic crisis in 1997. The economic crisis, which led to the fall of Suharto, proved a boon to the underworld economy, most notably for the businesses of illegal logging and fishing, human trafficking, illicit-drug trading, and armed robbery (or piracy) at sea. These transnational crimes quickly became major concerns for the government as they posed serious threats to both the national economy and human security.<sup>31</sup> For example, timber exports to the US, EU, Japan, and China increased almost tenfold since 1997, but smuggling and illegal logging cost Indonesia an estimated US\$4 billion in revenues annually, approximately five times the yearly budget for the Ministry of Health.<sup>32</sup> Illegal fishing has also increased and caused between US\$2 and \$3 billion annually in state losses.<sup>33</sup> Regarding human trafficking, an estimated 100,000 Indonesian women and children are trafficked every year, according to UNICEF, but the police handle less than 200 cases annually.<sup>34</sup> The abrupt increase of the illicit-drug trade also posed a national threat, as the national narcotics agency (Badan Narkotika Nasional, BNN) estimated that the country's drug trade was worth almost US\$4 billion a year, and that as many as four million people used illegal drugs.<sup>35</sup> Violence at sea has also become more conspicuous after 1997, as reflected in the number of piracy incidents and armed robberies in Indonesian waters—from 47 in 1997 to 119 in 2000—and in the Straits of Malacca, from zero in 1997 to 75 in 2000.<sup>36</sup> These developments all show that the economic crisis and political confusion in 1997–98 contributed to the expansion of the underground economy led by cross-border criminal networks.

Since criminal rings were notably active in Indonesian waters, the international community strongly pressured the government to strengthen its law enforcement capacity to combat transnational crime. Donor countries, such as the US, Australia, and Japan, as well as ASEAN countries, all made commitments to promote regional and bilateral cooperation to fight cross-border organized crime. It is in this arena that the role of the navy as a stakeholder in maritime security has been neutralized vis-à-vis "civilian" law enforcement agencies that can institutionally promote closer cooperation

<sup>31</sup> For the development of transnational crime since 1997, see Jun Honna, "Transnational Crime and Human Insecurity in Southeast Asia," *Protecting Human Security in a Post-9/11 World: Critical and Global Insights*, ed. Giorgio Shani, et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 97–114.

<sup>32</sup> See Bambang Setiono and Yunus Husein, "Fighting Forest Crime and Promoting Prudent Banking for Sustainable Forest Management: The Anti-Money Laundering Approach," CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 44 (Bogor: Center for International Forest Research, 2005), p. 4; and the EIA/Telapak report, *The Thousand-Headed Snake: Forest Crimes, Corruption, and Injustice in Indonesia* (London: Environmental Investigation Agency, March 2007), p. 3.

<sup>33</sup> See "RI Forms New Courts to Fight Illegal Fishing," *The Jakarta Post*, October 18, 2007; and Brian Fegan, "Plundering the Sea: Regulating Trawling Companies is Difficult When the Navy is in Business with them," *Inside Indonesia* (January–March 2003).

<sup>34</sup> UNICEF, "Children Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Out of Reach," press release, Jakarta, January 12, 2006, p. 4; *Penghapusan Perdagangan Orang (Trafficking in Persons) di Indonesia Tahun 2004–2005* (Jakarta: Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat, 2005), p. 19.

<sup>35</sup> "Empat Juta Penduduk Indonesia Pencandu Narkoba," *Sinar Harapan*, June 7, 2006.

<sup>36</sup> ICC International Maritime Bureau, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report, 1 January–31 December 2005," January 31, 2006, p. 5.

with other countries and operate in a manner less threatening than that of the military.<sup>37</sup>

Clearly the navy faced several obstacles in promoting international cooperation against transnational crime. First, the navy has been the subject of a US ban on military aid since 1999.<sup>38</sup> This sanction effectively helped police agencies, rather than the navy, gain US assistance in developing capacity to deal with maritime security related to terrorism and crime. Without US cooperation, the navy was left behind Polair, which enjoyed various offers of grants, including the provision of patrol vessels and training, under the US International Criminal Investigative Assistance Program (ICITAP).

Second, it has gradually become common practice for the regional security community to build up civilian coast guard agencies both to deal professionally with maritime crime in the sovereign territory and to promote regional cooperation.<sup>39</sup> Combating crime at sea mostly depends on an organization's ability to police the seas with speedy patrol boats, but these are not professionally associated with the navy, an institution that is geared toward "killing the enemy—rather than capturing evidence—and eager to have large-scale naval vessels with high-tech war abilities."<sup>40</sup> The navy's warships are not suitable for handling transnational crime; instead, smaller, speedier patrol boats are most appropriate for the mission and cost far less to purchase, run, and maintain. In recognition of the rising threat of crime at sea, the Philippines established its coast guard (PCG) in 1998 and Malaysia established the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency, or MMEA, in 2004. As noted above, Indonesia has KPLP under the Directorate of Maritime Transportation in the Department of Transportation. KPLP is a civilian organization in charge of patrolling maritime waters, but it is not granted judicial authority by the national law regarding maritime law enforcement. Thus, the role and authority of KPLP have long been limited to technical matters related to the Department of Transportation. It is against this backdrop that both the Philippines and Malaysia have expected Indonesia—the biggest maritime state in Southeast Asia—to follow their lead in establishing an effective coast guard and play a more active role in promoting regional cooperation among regional law enforcement agencies.<sup>41</sup> Clearly, the navy found itself out of the loop in the region's newly emerging maritime strategic environment.

This trend has been significantly accelerated by international pressure orchestrated by the US in the wake of 9/11. The US strongly pressured the international community, in the name of a global "war on terrorism," to review the existing ISPS (International Ship and Port Facility Security) Code, resulting in the adoption of an amended version by the IMO in December 2002, and its implementation in July 2004.

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<sup>37</sup> This view was emphasized during my July 2007 interviews with police officers, both in the Transnational Crime Center (TNCC) of the National Police and in the narcotics agency, BNN.

<sup>38</sup> The ban was to protest human rights abuses by TNI in East Timor. This ban was mostly lifted in 2005 under the G. W. Bush administration, which saw Indonesia as a partner in its "war against terrorism."

<sup>39</sup> About this trend, see Sam Bateman, "Coast Guards: New Forces for Regional Order and Security," *Asia Pacific Issues* 65 (January 2003).

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Captain Joel S. Garcia, Communications and Information System Command, Philippine Coast Guard, August 15, 2007.

<sup>41</sup> Interviews with Vice Admiral Danilo A. Abinoja, Deputy Commandant for Operations, PCG (August 13, 2007) and Rear Admiral Dato' Noor Aziz Yunan, Deputy Director General of MMEA (August 17, 2007).

The amended ISPS Code had two key revisions: (1) all countries that signed the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)—including Indonesia—are obliged to provide appropriate security measures in their ports, and (2) those countries are allowed formally to exercise control over foreign ships in their territorial waters, including the denial of port entry. Those revisions came as a big shock for the Indonesian shipping industry, since the country's maritime waters were identified by the international community as a "black spot," or dangerous zone,<sup>42</sup> and therefore ships from Indonesia to the US could be stopped and denied access in accordance with the amended ISPS Code.<sup>43</sup> For Indonesia's maritime industry, it became apparent that Indonesia's weak governance at sea could prove a huge economic liability. The improvement of port security soon became a major concern for the government in dealing with the new security regime at sea, but the agenda of strengthening law enforcement in the ports was not a navy matter. Again, the navy was left bobbing in the wake of new developments in maritime security.

Having assessed the changing strategic environment in the age of transnational crime, and the limited ability of the navy to deal with it, the Yudhoyono government issued a presidential decree in 2005 to transfer Bakorkamla's authority from the military headquarters to the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam). The new Bakorkamla is charged with formulating national maritime policy and coordinating the activities of twelve maritime-related institutions, including the navy, Polair, and KPLP. Bakorkamla does not have any operational capacity, so that actual law-enforcement activities are conducted by other agencies, but this is the first attempt at reorganizing the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in maritime governance in post-Suharto Indonesia. Despite considerable domestic skepticism that the new Bakorkamla will enhance maritime security management, this reorganization is largely welcomed by the international community. Overseas, in the IMO in particular, there is concern about Indonesia's unclear structure of authority in the maritime sector involving various agencies without efficient coordination.<sup>44</sup> Drawing on this international support in its domestic turf battles, Bakorkamla is establishing its presence, according to its chief executive, Vice Admiral Djoko Sumaryono.<sup>45</sup> Bakorkamla primarily serves as a forum for political battles among stakeholders in maritime security, notably the navy, police, and KPLP, which are conscious and wary about losing jurisdiction, authority, and politico-economic interests associated with maritime governance.

Since maritime issues are not directly related to the army, a symbol of the authoritarian past, the media has paid little attention to this security-sector turf battle. Nevertheless, the emergence of a rejuvenated Bakorkamla has significant implications for navy politics. When the idea of a new Bakorkamla first emerged in 2004, it was the navy that expressed the strongest resistance, fearing the possible loss of maritime

<sup>42</sup> See, for example, "Indonesia Piracy Black Spot as Attacks Rise," *Lloyd's List*, November 7, 2000, p. 18.

<sup>43</sup> About the ISPS Code concerns, see Hengky Supit, *Teropong Kajian Tata Kelautan Indonesia* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pendidikan Maritim Indonesia, 2004), pp. 13–14.

<sup>44</sup> IMO produced a report of recommendations to the Indonesian government in November 2002, which emphasized the need for clarifying the roles of the overlapping maritime authorities. For the IMO recommendations, see *ibid.*, pp. 14–18.

<sup>45</sup> Interview with Vice Admiral Djoko Sumaryono, chief executive of Bakorkamla, August 22, 2007.

authority it had enjoyed since the Sukarno era. Significantly, however, the navy quickly recognized that its resistance would not change the situation, given that—unlike the army—it had no strong political resources to shape the direction of government discourse. The navy—whose past involvement in *dwifungsi* was limited—had less experience in political bargaining and manipulation compared to the army, and considerably less clout. Thus, it is understandable that the navy chose to adapt itself to the new environment rather than alter or challenge the government decision. How to take the initiative in developing Bakorkamla soon dominated the agenda in the navy's top circles. Naval leaders found an answer in proposing the establishment of the Sea and Coast Guard of Indonesia (SCGI).

### Civilianizing the Navy, Militarizing the Coast Guard?

In formulating the idea of SCGI, the role of the business sector was significant. Indonesia's Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia, KADIN) was concerned about the new ISPS Code and the worsening security and safety of Indonesia's territorial waters resulting from the growing number of armed robberies and other transnational crimes at sea. Maritime insecurity led to dramatic hikes in insurance fees for the maritime industry and otherwise damaged the country's shipping businesses.<sup>46</sup> KADIN lobbied the navy to address this problem by strengthening its capacity to maintain maritime security and ensure the safety of merchant ships operating in Indonesian waters. This led to the navy and KADIN reaching an official agreement regarding maritime security and administration in February 2006.<sup>47</sup> Accordingly, the navy developed a security paradigm based on patrol boats, not warships, in dealing with maritime crime. The business sector seems to have played a significant role in promoting a perception that "national security" in the age of a global economy is no longer a monopoly of the military. By weighing in with economic concerns, KADIN drew on its expertise and influence and in doing so threw a lifeline to the navy, an institution that was trying to adapt to a rapidly shifting political and institutional environment. The navy astutely asserted and expanded its institutional interest by mobilizing this powerful "external" actor, KADIN, in security affairs, gaining crucial political backing. In December 2006, the navy headquarters, under the leadership of Admiral Slamet Soebijanto, submitted to the president its initial plan to establish SCGI as Indonesia's "main" organization to deal with maritime crime and to promote regional maritime security cooperation.<sup>48</sup>

"It is difficult for the navy to fully respond to the changing demands of maritime security, therefore we encourage Bakorkamla to take further steps to build SCGI and streamline the inefficient structure of maritime authority today," according to Vice

<sup>46</sup> Interview with Oentoro Surya, chairman of the Indonesian National Shipowners' Association, August 29, 2006.

<sup>47</sup> The official document is "Piagam Kesepakatan Bersama antara Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia dengan Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut tentang Pembangunan Ekonomi Maritim dan Pembinaan Sumber Daya Manusia Maritim," Nomor: PKB/2/II/2006.

<sup>48</sup> The official document is Markas Besar Angkatan Laut, "Pendirian Sea and Coast Guard Indonesia (SCGI) Sebagai Upaya Penajaman Fungsi Penegakan Keamanan di Laut," Jakarta, December 2006.

Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijanto.<sup>49</sup> In the eyes of navy elites, Bakorkamla, the role of which is still limited to the coordination of inter-agency activities, is not sufficient to restructure Indonesia's maritime governance. According to the navy proposal, many democratic countries have professional civilian paramilitary organizations called coast guards that are responsible for maritime law enforcement. Also, according to the proposal, responsibility for Indonesia's coast guard function is unclear because overlapping authority and legal responsibilities are spread across twelve institutions, as already discussed. To meet global expectations, the proposal argues, it is time to streamline maritime authority and establish a unified representative in the global community of coast guards.<sup>50</sup> The navy insists that the new coast guard, or SCGI, should be given a clear legal status as the maritime law-enforcement agency—a status that is not currently given to KPLP. The new coast guard is to be staffed by former KPLP members and navy officers. The navy also proposes that the SCGI should be placed under the department of transportation in order to comply with international standards, and it suggests that SCGI should have the following primary roles: maritime law enforcement, customs, aid to navigation (ATON) and shipping safety, fishery protection, search and rescue (SAR) at sea, and assistance to the navy in times of war, such as with port security and coastal patrols. With this new organization, the navy is proposing to eliminate the overlapping functions of other related agencies, including the navy itself. In this way, the navy, which was originally very reluctant to reorganize maritime security management, has actually become a prime mover of reform.

What were the calculations behind this shifting attitude? There is no doubt that the navy has been influenced by KADIN's economic concerns related to maritime security, and by international demands to promote law-enforcement cooperation at sea under the new regime of the amended ISPS Code. However, in the process of responding to these pressures, the navy seems to have found more compelling reasons to sell the idea of establishing SCGI. First, the new organization can absorb some of the officers in the top-heavy navy. "The navy will be more professional if SCGI is established and staffed with our friends," according to a navy officer.<sup>51</sup> It is expected that the transfer of high level officers to SCGI may encourage promotion of younger generation officers within the navy.<sup>52</sup> In addition, if SCGI recruits personnel from the navy—as do the coast guards of the Philippines and Malaysia—it may contribute to confidence-building between the two institutions and nurture respect for each others' jurisdictions. In the cases of the Philippines and Malaysia, many naval officers wished to move to the new

<sup>49</sup> Interview with Vice Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijanto, director-general of defense planning, at the Defense Ministry, August 24, 2007. Purdijanto was promoted to TNI's chief of the general staff (Kasum) in December 2007 and to the navy chief-of-staff in June 2008. The promotion helped him to have more influence within the TNI in disseminating the idea of SCGI.

<sup>50</sup> Markas Besar Angkatan Laut, "Pendirian Sea and Coast Guard Indonesia (SCGI) Sebagai Upaya Penajaman Fungsi Penegakan Keamanan di Laut," p. 11.

<sup>51</sup> Interview with Col. Desi A. Mamahit, assistant for operations to the Western Fleet Commander of the Indonesian Navy, December 16, 2007.

<sup>52</sup> Since 2004, the pace of generational change within the TNI has slowed, mainly due to the fact that retirement age was extended from fifty-five to fifty-eight, as regulated in the armed forces law (Law No. 34/2004), which made it possible for the older generation officers to hold onto their posts. On the broader impact on TNI, see The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite, September 2005-March 2008," *Indonesia* 85 (April 2008): 79–122.

agencies, motivated by higher salaries and the relatively “clean” image of the new organizations.

Second, emphasizing the global trend of international coast guard cooperation is a very effective way for the navy to neutralize the role of the police in maritime security. With the creation of SCGI, the navy expects donor countries to provide both financial and technical assistance to develop SCGI’s capacity, which, in turn, may help constrain the ascendancy of the police in security sector governance. If a significant number of SCGI personnel is drawn from among former navy officers, and Polair is sidelined in maritime security, TNI’s institutional interests would benefit in its rivalry with the police. However, the prospects for establishing SCGI are uncertain pending final approval by the president. “The police, which are the most corrupt institution in the country, may try to derail the plan by providing negative input to the president. But we are optimistic about the wisdom of SBY [President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono],” claimed retired navy officers involved in the SCGI planning.<sup>53</sup> However, the police agency is directly responsible to the president, while the navy needs to go through the channel of TNI headquarters to lobby the president. It can be anticipated that the police will challenge the SCGI proposal by highlighting the cost of establishing a new organization and the merit of preserving the “independent” KPLP. The police may also lobby parliamentarians against the SCGI bill, while the navy will conduct its own lobbying, drawing on TNI networks. In this sense, the political dogfight between the navy and police will probably escalate in the coming years.

## Conclusion

The navy is navigating the uncharted waters of *reformasi* in the post-Suharto era, trying to respond to domestic demands for military reform and international pressures to improve maritime security while maintaining its institutional interests. The police have successfully encroached on the previously unchallenged authority of the navy over maritime affairs, drawing on domestic support for reorienting the military to focus on national defense and international support for improved policing aimed at curtailing crimes at sea. The navy tried to counter Polair’s emergence by calling for a modernization of the navy and asserting the need for a green-water capability, one that would combine coastal and sea security duties. However, it is apparent that Polair retains the initiative, and naval modernization is not an effective strategy for regaining the high ground in maritime security. By invoking international pressures and enlisting powerful domestic actors, however, the navy may have found its trump card in the security sector turf battles. By mobilizing KADIN support for its proposal to establish a coast guard (SCGI), and by justifying this as a response to international expectations and norms in maritime security, the navy may manage to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. This strategy for protecting the navy’s institutional interests benefits from being couched in terms of protecting national economic interests, i.e., the KADIN angle, and has the appearance of being an altruistic proposal in that the navy cedes some of its existing authority to the SCGI and accords it a central role in maritime security. The major benefit of doing so is to ensure that the police and Polair also cede their authority in maritime affairs. The navy is confident that it will retain

<sup>53</sup> Interviews with Captain (ret.) Henky Lumenta and Captain (ret.) Henky Supit, December 18, 2007.

significant influence in SCGI because many of its officers would be natural recruits to the coast guard and such transfers carry the added benefit of solving its promotion logjam, a problem caused by the postponement of the retirement age from fifty-five to fifty-eight. In this sense, the navy hopes to shape the SCGI into a "second navy." When making this argument, the navy points to Malaysia and the Philippines, where coast guards were established recently with significant assistance from the respective navies, especially in terms of human resources. Here we see how the navy attempts to mobilize what it calls international pressures, global norms, and regional standards, and transform them into a breakthrough strategy in its *realpolitik* battle with the police.

Instrumentalizing external pressures provides the navy with a powerful weapon in asserting its role in the changing regional maritime security environment, where terrorism and the growing threat of transnational crime at sea are the main threats, unlike during the Cold War. Paradoxically, the emergence of "nonmilitary" security issues has opened a window of opportunity for the navy to regain influence in maritime governance. The SCGI proposal is not yet approved, but, given the vigorous lobbying of TNI, KADIN, and skillful deployment of "international pressures and expectations," it is very likely that Yudhoyono will endorse the plan by the end of his presidential term in 2009. Then there will be a new stage in the turf battle between the Polair-police and SCGI-navy coalitions.

In comparison with the army's response to an independent police in the post-Suharto era, the turf battles of the navy attract little public attention. It is a quiet battle, as compared with the attention given to the army. The army has taken the lead in defending military interests by asserting that the police are incapable of handling domestic security on their own. The army leadership points to the enduring communal conflicts in various parts of the country as justification for the army to remain involved in domestic security affairs. Significantly, the army's territorial commands give it extensive and autonomous power to manipulate security conditions in the archipelago, endowing it with the ability to stir up trouble in order to convince the public that the police are not up to the task. Unlike the army, the navy does not have sufficient autonomy or power to manipulate security at sea; rather, what is most obvious is its insufficient capacity to control Indonesian territorial waters. Against this backdrop, the navy is more reliant on the international angle in protecting its turf and has had to be more flexible in redefining its mission and trying to protect its interests by promoting the establishment of a competing institution, the coast guard, as a last ditch attempt to counter the rise of Polair in maritime security.

The scholarly debate on the TNI in the age of *reformasi* has largely neglected the development of non-army services since they are not considered to be main players in national politics. As we have seen in the case of the navy, however, the non-army services also have their own vested interests to protect and have developed strategies to survive in the era of democracy. In this regard, further studies on the non-army services will provide us with more comprehensive insights into the problems facing the Indonesian military as it has adapted to democratic reforms implemented during *reformasi*. Since this article primarily attempts to address the newly emerging "institutional" rivalry between the navy and the police, as a case of non-army reform politics, my analytical scope is largely limited to the level of organization. Consequently, internal politics and personal power struggles within the navy are not



discussed in detail. In the study of the Indonesian army, data for which has been accumulated since the 1950s, such an impersonal approach may not be acceptable. This is perhaps where the scholarly inquiry is further needed for developing the study of the military in democratizing Indonesia.