

**FASHION: THE *SINE QUA NON* OF MODERNITY**

A Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of Cornell University

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Eun Jung Kang

August 2012

© 2012 Eun Jung Kang

## FASHION: THE *SINE QUA NON* OF MODERNITY

Eun Jung Kang, Ph. D.

Cornell University 2012

The purpose of this dissertation is to respond to the question—What is fashion? Although significant efforts have been made to identify the meaning and implications of fashion in our times, no term of explanatory reference has satisfied scholars from different fields. The contribution I claim to make is to provide one way to analyze fashion through philosophical discourse as well as sociopolitical observation. The reason for the difficulty in grappling with fashion in a simpler manner is that fashion is essentially twofold; that is, it is both a concept and a phenomenon. It is by virtue of Immanuel Kant's *schematism* that I attempt to prove the fundamental difference between the concept and the phenomenon, thereby illuminating the attributes of fashion as a whole. This analysis also provides the rationale for the conceptualization of fashion as *newness* par excellence, *the* motor of modernity. Not only is fashion to be construed in the purview of the dialectical image set forth by Walter Benjamin but also it is to be probed by way of dialectics by G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx, demonstrating the lineage between fashion and modernity and between fashion history and history in general. The *zeitgeist* with which fashion is often coupled together will finally find its justification as indispensable to fashion history, as the link between fashion and subjectivity, individuality, and self-consciousness is brought to light.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Prior to coming to Cornell, Eun Jung Kang received a master's degree from NYU in Visual Culture. Her current research interests are Fashion Theory, Visual Culture, Theories in Representation and the Body, and Sexuality and Gender Identity. While matriculating at NYU, she worked as a curatorial intern at The Brooklyn Museum (Asian Art, fall/ winter 2004). She is a recipient of The Mary E. Purchase, Evelyn E. Stout, and Flora Rose Fellowships for the academic year 2010-2011 at Cornell.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It would not have been possible to write this doctoral dissertation without the help and support of many people. First of all, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my dissertation committee members, Charlotte Jirousek, Susan Buck-Morss, Juan Hinestroza, and Susan Ashdown. I am also grateful to the loving support provided by my dear friend Fatma Baytar. Her understanding, sympathy, and encouragement gave me the strength and perseverance to complete this dissertation. I would like to acknowledge the financial and academic support of Cornell University. The Department of Fiber Science and Apparel Design has provided the support I have needed to produce and complete my dissertation. I also would like to thank my family and all my colleagues and friends. They have given me their unequivocal support throughout my journey of writing my dissertation, for which my mere expression of thanks does not suffice.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction .....	1
2. What Immanuel Kant Would Say about Fashion: Metaphysics of Pursuit of the Self by Way of Fashion.....	25
3. Dialectics in Fashion History.....	47
4. The Dialectical Image: The Redemption of Fashion.....	106
5. Summary and Conclusions.....	133
Bibliography.....	143

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration 1 .....	62
Illustration 2 .....	62
Illustration 3 .....	62
Illustration 4 .....	63
Illustration 5 .....	63
Illustration 6 .....	63
Illustration 7 .....	64
Illustration 8 .....	76
Illustration 9 .....	79
Illustration 10 .....	81
Illustration 11 .....	83

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

This dissertation aims to find out how fashion is related to the mind as well as to the body, pointing up that fashion is deeply entrenched with the development of modernity, in the context of philosophy. In this chapter, I will discuss, first, three objectives of this project; second, the origin of fashion and its etymology; and, third, the concept of dialectical image by Walter Benjamin, which requires an understanding of the difference between truth and knowledge, and, finally, the issues between fashion and the mind/body relations, which explains up why fashion studies needs to have a balance between object-oriented analysis and theoretical discourse. In this dissertation fashion pertains, first, to both *la mode* (fashion) & *le mode* (way of thinking),<sup>1</sup> second, to a means by which individuals relate to society and differentiate themselves from others, and, third, to a phenomenon itself that surges on the basis of the pursuit of newness as a form of eternal return.

Setting themselves apart from the European humanistic tradition, some scholars from the Frankfurt school considered fashion as a timely subject of modernity at the turn of the twentieth century. Most notably, Georg Simmel and, later, Walter Benjamin linked fashion with modernity and its attributes by trying to incorporate fashion into a philosophical arena. Owing to their insight, fashion was brought to light as a new topic apropos to the time when numerous new products began to be introduced and consumed at an unprecedented rate. What prompted sociologists, philosophers and critics to heed a serious attention to fashion was the Marxist materialist conception of history in a broad sense, let alone the explicit manifestation of the *Zeitgeist* exerted by fashions of the time. Marxist historical materialism in the continuum of social development signals the transition in the Western value system from the intangible to the



tangible, elucidating the way social beings gain their identity in modern society, in which an individual as part of the sum is construed by the material reality, not by one's thoughts about oneself. Self-consciousness and the thinking mind, which had been regarded as the unique faculty of human beings under the umbrella of the Cartesian dictum, "Cogito ergo sum," no longer had the same potency as before with the advent of industrialization and its aftermath—consumerism. Indeed, Cartesian dualism along with Platonism has been a dominant ideology, and its influence is still so prevalent in many schools of social sciences that some sociologists and anthropologists in the recent decades lament the absent theories concerning the body, for example.<sup>2</sup> However, the emphasis on reason, objective science and empiricism during the Enlightenment, in which absolutism in sciences as well as in religion was called into question, paradoxically helped gradually absolve from the fetter the idea that the divine mind rules over the earthly body. In aesthetics, likewise, the absolute, Platonic logic of beauty was shattered with the idea of universal validity and common sense (*sensus communis*), which harbingers the beginning of the humanistic hermeneutics of beauty by Kant who emphasized such emotional values as pleasure/displeasure as a barometer for the judgment of taste.<sup>3</sup>

Why are a series of metamorphoses in the Western belief system important in fashion studies? That is because it is through this process that fashion lays its foundation as one of the disciplines that center upon the body and its embodiment. In the meantime, few have tried to identify the fundamentals of fashion that are directed from the mind. On that account, in this dissertation I aim to offer some clues about the ontology of fashion through the prism of the philosophical and sociopolitical discourses of *newness* as well as of modernity. Drawing mainly upon Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx, and Walter Benjamin, the essential elements of fashion such as *newness* and an adjustment between the individual and the collective are to be

successfully discussed. Thus, fashion will be successfully incorporated among the main concerns of the mind as well as those of the body.

### ***Three Major Undertakings of This Dissertation***

One big task in order to establish fashion as the quintessence of modernity as well as a pure concept that is separate from empirical fashion is to theoretically prove fashion as both a concept and a phenomenon. Since fashion today is heavily laden with the attributes of the female dress, it is important to demonstrate the difference between the conceptual and the material of fashion. For this end I propose Immanuel Kant's *schematism* as a methodology, by means of which fashion is to be dissected into an *a priori* concept of the understanding and a phenomenal *a posteriori* appearance. This is also in an attempt to evidence that fashion that is cognized mainly through empirical experience is, in fact, a mode/a style with numerous examples that are often confined to the body, while fashion that is part of the nature of human beings that originate in the mind itself requires another kind of intuition, *a priori* schemata. Thus, fashion of the second implication as *newness* par excellence cannot be identified without the consideration of time and space, *a priori* intuitions, whereas the former needs synthesis of the presentation of numerous examples by means of which to put together the manifold images to get the unity of apperception under the concept of a style of an object. Therefore, fashion, bound with the temporal and spatial law, *a priori* intuitions, will be analyzed by virtue of the transcendental schema in order to be separated from empirical fashion.

Next, it is dialectics over the contradictory forces between the individual and the collective that is to be adopted as a methodology to identify fashion as part of the social arena away from the pure or Kantian metaphysical domain. To put it differently, fashion as a concept on a par with *newness* remains abstract unless the mediation between individuality and

universality found in the formation of a fashion system is taken into serious consideration. The relay between the individual and the collective is significant not just because it constitutes fashion as an outcome of dialectical mediation, but also because, from this platform, it can be said that fashion history progresses by going through a series of sublations just as history does, as Hegel sets forth, illustrating the evolving relation between subject and object. While in the deliberations of the pre-fashion system and the fashion system, the distinctive dialectical evolutions of fashion styles spurred by different historical forces are to be brought to light, such that one can make out how fashion history in conjunction with modernity is hardly irrelevant to the evolution of history itself. That is to say, vestiary styles under the pre-fashion system transform in tandem with politico-religious struggles, demonstrating the Hegelian domination of ideology; on the other hand, during the time in which the fashion system exerts its full-scale potency along with capitalism, the evolution of fashion takes on the mode of Marxist materialist dialectics, prevailing over the Hegelian ideological superstructure, such as political power structures and religious or conventional institutions and beliefs.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, by means of the concept of the dialectical image put forward by Walter Benjamin, fashion is redeemed to be a realm of Platonic ideas leaving behind the world of commodity fetishism to which Marx would attribute the essential quality of fashion. In an attempt to venture into the link between fashion and the dialectical image, I will delve into Benjamin's epistemology that distances truth from knowledge, from the theoretical foundation of which fashion can be reckoned as a dialectical image that flashes an "unintentional" truth.

### ***Genesis of Fashion and Its Etymology***

There is an ongoing dispute among scholars over when fashion began to germinate. While their arguments are mainly grounded in the different forms of dress and nature of changes

in dress, this study looks into the evolution of discourses over the relation between the individual and the collective and into the concept of *newness* in search of the ontology of fashion. Although today fashion is often used synonymously with dress and clothing without clear distinctions,<sup>5</sup> it is not just something that adorns the body but also a concept that is communicated in our mind. And yet fashion is not universal diachronically over the course of human history as it did not exist until the turn of the seventeenth century during which individualism vying against collectivism made its appearance for the first time. This is based on the postulation that fashion is a medium by which individuals exercise their humanist volition, the will to find a position in their society by making a choice, by means of which they show how they relate to society and at the same time, in no less degree, differentiate themselves from each other in an increasingly homogenized society disclosing what Georg Simmel says of contradictory forces, that is, socialism and individualism.<sup>6</sup>

Next, taking into account contentious debates over when fashion emerged in history and over when modernity first glimpsed its existence, I argue that the birth of fashion virtually signals the arrival of modernity and they share the same genealogy in history. Thus, any effort to date the genesis of fashion is the same as that to trace the beginning of modernity. It is only Elizabeth Wilson and Ulrich Lehmann who have addressed the link between the two within fashion studies while many authors “have paid lip service” to the relation between fashion and modernity, say Christopher Breward and Caroline Evans.<sup>7</sup> Lehmann, for example, views *la mode* as critical to understanding modernity arguing, “The hallmarks of *la modernité* found their most immediate reflection in *la mode*.”<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, my hypothesis in regard with the relation between modernity and fashion is that *le mode* is as significant as *la mode* because the fundamental of fashion is not simply about different styles of female dress<sup>9</sup> but about the way *le*

*mode* is reflected through *la mode* in Western societies. This is to say, *la mode* alone cannot fully encompass the spirit of modernity while *le mode* without *la mode* in modernity is out of the question.

Fashion is an anglicized French word originating from old French *façon, fazon*<sup>10</sup> whose Latin root is *factio* and *facere*, both implying making or doing something without a specific connotation of its activity.<sup>11</sup> Fashion in a broad context such as architecture, plate, jewelry, face, and form as opposed to matter first appeared as early as 1300s, according to *OED*.<sup>12</sup> Around 1489, fashion had the meaning of a prevailing custom, especially one characteristic of a particular place or period of time.<sup>13</sup> However, it is from the sixteenth century that fashion had reference to attire, adornment, or a particular ‘cut’ or style.<sup>14</sup> One good example of this is the quote from *Lear* III. vi. (1605) by Shakespeare, “I do not like the fashion of your garments,”<sup>15</sup> in which the meaning of fashion is confined to clothing itself. Quotes from *OED* also disclose that fashion as the mode of dress, etiquette, furniture, or style of speech adopted in society for the time being and as an example to lead or set the fashion for others follow is recorded to first have occurred in 1568, while conventional usage in dress or mode of life especially as observed in the upper circles of society and conformity to this usage first appeared in 1602.<sup>16</sup> Hence, fashion as a prominent social concept arose no earlier than the second half of the sixteenth century, which is some decades later than the dating claimed by Yuniya Kawamura who sees the sense of ‘a special manner of making clothes’ as critical to the social characteristic of fashion citing Brennkmeier.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, taking into account the diverse implications of fashion, it is impossible not only to gauge when fashion came into being but also to define fashion “as long as the focus is on the material objects,” to borrow Kawamura’s words.<sup>18</sup> As Malcolm Barnard points out, the exact circumstance under which the word fashion has been used is not crystal

clear. To illustrate, while fashion is often regarded as a synonym of the terms “adornment,” “style,” and “dress” in a contemporary Western world, “clothes” or “clothing” is also considered as a synonym of the word fashion by some people.<sup>19</sup> Added to this complication, he goes on to say that there are other possibilities in which the word fashion is used to denote “other, different words.”<sup>20</sup> Although he does not specify, it is not difficult to come up with some other objects or certain “booms” or “upsurges” that are called “a fashion” even in academia.<sup>21</sup> The conclusion Barnard has made in the discussion of fashion in relation to other words—clothing, dress and adornment is that nothing is common to things that are called fashion and that it is only through the context that a garment is deemed as fashion or non-fashion.<sup>22</sup>

Whereas fashion is ambiguous in its meaning, its French counterpart, *la mode* seems more concrete and palpable due mainly to its association with modernity as spelled out in sociological and philosophical discourse about the relation between the two concepts. In a strictly etymological sense, they are even more closely related: *mode* and modernity share the same Latin base *modus* meaning “measure,” “manner” or “way of doing something,” according to *Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English*.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, it is fallacious that Matei Călinescu adds his commentary in the parenthesis to the relationship between modernity/modernism and *la mode* put forward by Renato Poggioli: “both modernity and modernism go back etymologically to the concept of *la mode* [this etymology, suggestive as it may be, is erroneous]”<sup>24</sup> To be precise, however, the English word modern, is derived from the ablative of *modus*, *modo* meaning “recently, just now,”<sup>25</sup> while *mode* is not, and was first recorded in 1585; hence, something modern pertains to “present times,” “new,” and “not old-fashioned.”<sup>26</sup> The word modernity as a noun of quality or condition from *modernus* was also first found in 1627.<sup>27</sup> And yet, it should be noted that, although the etymological sense of *mode* itself has no direct

connection with the Latin *modo*,<sup>28</sup> *la mode* is not simply a style or manner of any time but something that is closely linked with the sense of keeping abreast of the time, in particular of modern times. For example, *à la mode* still stands for up-to-date and contemporary in dictionaries of our time. *OED* also provides an earlier example of this too: “1655 FULLER *Ch. Hist.* I. 14 With Bands, Cuffs, Hats and Caps, ‘al a mode’ to the Times.” Not only does *la mode* have reference to the sense of being aware of the time, which is the quintessence of modernity, but also it is in the same period of time that the word *la mode* came into existence as did the words modern and modernity. Although the word *mode* developed the sense of ‘fashion’ in the sixteenth century differentiating itself with *le mode*, it is no earlier than the seventeenth century that it became a pan-European word while being adopted into English, German *mode*, Spanish *moda*, Italian *moda*, and Portuguese *moda* as identified from some senses derived from the French word, according to *OED*.<sup>29</sup>

### ***Knowledge and Truth: Overture to the Dialectical Image***

Reworking the Platonic antithesis between opinion (*doxa*) and knowledge (*epistêmê*), Aristotle puts forward the two types of methods for dealing with knowledge: one is dialectic and the other is apodictic.<sup>30</sup> Knowledge achieved by the former is not demonstrable, as it is not so much a science as an art, which, therefore, fails to affirm whether it is valid; whereas knowledge achieved by the latter inevitably proves to be true, for it is “demonstrative knowledge” with the syllogisms as its form.<sup>31</sup> Consequently, apodictic knowledge has taken on the status of a quasi-science in that it holds its validity through demonstration.<sup>32</sup> Although Aristotle proclaims that the knowledge in the domain of dialectic cannot establish its credibility owing to its indemonstrability,<sup>33</sup> he makes it clear that not all knowledge is apodictic.

“Others however assent with respect to knowledge, for (they assert) that it is only through demonstration, but that nothing prevents there being a demonstration of all things, for

demonstration may be effected in a circle, and (things be proved) from each other. We on the contrary assert, that neither is all science demonstrative, but that the science of things immediate is indemonstrable. And this evidently necessary, for if it is requisite to know things prior, and from which demonstration subsists, but some time or other there is a stand made at things immediate, these must of necessity be indemonstrable. This therefore we thus assert, and we say that there is not only science, but also a certain principle of science, by which we know terms.”<sup>34</sup>

As a matter of fact, in order to penetrate Aristotle’s system of knowledge, one should have some understanding of the term *epistêmê*, for it is in no way unequivocal; it can be translated into science or knowledge, as well as into other things.<sup>35</sup> Thus, tautological is the translation of Aristotle’s remark: “What is known by apodictic science, meaning by ‘apodictic’ the knowledge that we possess by having demonstration (*apodeixis*) of it.”<sup>36</sup> Not only does the term *apodictic* pertain to demonstration but also science is demonstrative knowledge.<sup>37</sup> In other words, what constitutes knowledge as science is apodictic certainty that is to be affirmed by demonstration. This elucidates that there is a close affinity between science and knowledge that is embedded in Western philosophy, which is also linguistic in its origin, and this unfolds to reveal why knowledge achieved by any method other than demonstration has been under suspicion in the Western belief system. However “scientifically” true, demonstration is not an absolute touchstone by which all knowledge can be judged, as it works as a syllogism or series of syllogisms based on the first principles.<sup>38</sup>

It is not unfounded to maintain that, hence, what makes a proposition truthful is not just that it is demonstrable but also that the primary principles, which cannot be deduced from any other, are being there as a foundation of its inference or deduction. Nonetheless, the conditions of first principles by Aristotle reveal that they have limitations, by which I mean, not internally but externally. First principles must be universal and constant, which is to say that the application has to be made within the same genus and also something that changes over time does not fit in



the proper first principles.<sup>39</sup> However, no one can possibly deny the fact that not all knowledge is to be universally applied over time or across all space, or that a certain kind of principle or law works well in one domain while not in another. This discontinuity in scientific method while in search of [true] knowledge is that which makes philosophers like Benjamin heed the difference between truth and scientific knowledge. As Benjamin says, “The demand for flawless coherence in scientific deduction is not made in order that truth shall be represented in its unity and singularity. The more scrupulously the theory of scientific knowledge investigates the various disciplines, the more unmistakably their methodological inconsistency is revealed.”<sup>40</sup> For him, knowledge is “a way of acquiring its object,” whereas truth is self-representation; knowledge has to have a coherence set in the consciousness through method (i.e., deduction), whereas truth is “immanent in it as form.”<sup>41</sup> In line with this is another argument by Benjamin that representation has to be the real methodology of the philosophical treatise while the representation of ideas is to be the object of its investigation.<sup>42</sup> Consequently, the task of philosophy is, for Benjamin, to situate the philosopher somewhere between an artist and a scientist. On the one hand, with a sketch of images of the world of ideas the artist does his or her part in producing representation; on the other hand, the scientist formulates concepts by eliminating the merely empirical world.<sup>43</sup> Such is found in Plato’s theory of ideas, Leibniz’s Monadology, and Hegel’s dialectic, according to Benjamin, for they attempt to search for the essence of the world instead of empirical reality, mapping out the “order of ideas.”<sup>44</sup> Each feat of these great philosophers has its own merit in the revelation of truth. Yet, the dialectic is probably one that Benjamin found most appropriate in the representation of ideas as a method of philosophical projects in conjunction with images. As he puts it: “The representation of an idea can under no circumstances be considered successful unless the whole range of possible extremes it contains has been virtually explored.”<sup>45</sup>

### ***Walter Benjamin, Dialectics, and Truth***

A careful probe into the nature of Hegel's dialectic can riddle out the Benjaminian conception of an order of ideas, immanent and necessary at once as a universal science of ideas. The very starting point from which we should make out the relation between Hegel and Benjamin is Hegel's own comments on the origin of the dialectic. Hegel ascribes the inception of dialectic not to Socrates but to Plato,<sup>46</sup> although he knows that Zeno is also known to have first introduced it.<sup>47</sup> Not so much simply disregarding the tradition in dialectic as attempting to recapture the meaning of the Platonic dialectic, which looks for "science of truth" rather than a "science of scientific knowledge," the indication of Plato as the inventor of dialectic unveils the philosophical objective of the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel holds that, unlike Socrates whose dialectical thinking in his dialogue is subjective, Plato is the first that treats the dialectic in a "scientific" manner, for example, by deducing the Many from the One while, at the same time, postulating that it is the Many that determines itself as the One in the *Parmenides*.<sup>48</sup> It is quite certain that, by associating the dialectic with Plato rather than with Socrates or with Zeno, Hegel aims his dialectic to take on a scientific significance just like Plato, as he maintains that the dialectic is the "soul of all genuinely scientific cognition."<sup>49</sup> One should not assume that the word *scientific* is confined to what we customarily use now, but it should be interpreted as another descriptive word for what Benjamin calls the order of ideas, as science here signifies the *whole* process by which cognitions take place. In this respect, Hegel's description of the Platonic dialectic as something that shows the "general finitude of all fixed determinations of understanding,"<sup>50</sup> shares some semblance with the dialectic of his own, as rendered by Hegel:

"The dialectic, on the contrary, is the *immanent* transcending, in which the one-sidedness and restrictedness of the determinations of the understanding displays itself as what it is, i.e., as their negation. That is what everything finite is: its own sublation. Hence, the dialectical constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression, and it is the principle

through which alone *immanent coherence and necessity* enter into the content of science, just as all genuine, nonexternal elevation above the finite is to be found in this principle.”<sup>51</sup>

Indisputably, what Hegel is trying to appeal to is a kind of universal science by which “all genuine, nonexternal elevation above the finite is to be found,” which is imminently coherent and necessary. Plato is identified by Hegel as the first to view the dialectic as a universal science; yet, it is Hegel who gives a modern reinstatement to it with the concept “sublation” (*Aufhebung*), which entails simultaneously “preservation” and “negation,”<sup>52</sup> as compared to the common notions developed from the axioms and theorems as in Euclidean geometry. It must be underscored that the Hegelian dialectic is not something that consists of a binary system along with the world of apodictic in which the primary principles provide an absolute guideline to assess whether a proposition is true or not, as Aristotle expounds. For Hegel, nothing can avoid the logic of dialectic,<sup>53</sup> as everything undergoes the “dialectical movement of thinking,”<sup>54</sup> again, which is akin to the Platonic dialectic that is more holistic than heuristic. To quote Plato in *The Republic*:

“Dialectic must assemble the disciplines they learn in isolation in their previous education, so that they see as a whole (*sunopsin*) the connexions between disciplines, and in the nature of what there is. . . . And this is the most important test of whether someone’s nature is apt for dialectic or not, since the person who can see things as a whole (*sunoptikos*) is a dialectician, and the one who cannot is not. (537c1–7; 12)”<sup>55</sup>

The Platonic justification is based on the “synoptic” method reaching a supreme science above different disciplines while transcending beliefs of the opposite sides, thereby telling us “how things really are,” as Terence Irwin rightly observes.<sup>56</sup> Though both Plato and Aristotle do not completely move beyond the Socratic method of conversation,<sup>57</sup> for the former, the dialectic is the “primary method of philosophical inquiry”<sup>58</sup> and its conclusions are “scientific knowledge of first principles.”<sup>59</sup> However, Aristotle disagrees with Plato on the grounds that the Platonic

dialectic cannot claim to objectivity although it can achieve coherence,<sup>60</sup> and divides the line between the world of the apodictic and the world of the dialectic. Although Aristotle endeavors to obtain objective knowledge with the help of scientific deduction, it is impossible for him to avoid the existence of the realm in which apodictic certainty can by no means prove truth. Added to this, as Irwin puts it, the fact that Aristotelian sciences, which have their own principles, cannot prove themselves to be objectively true, because first principles, the source of justification, are not demonstrable but self-evident with no external justification, seriously undermines *the* condition Aristotle himself sets regarding scientific knowledge, that is, demonstration.<sup>61</sup> This Aristotelian dilemma discloses that scientific knowledge, whose fundamental substantiation is absolutely dependent on demonstrability, has no foundation to turn to in the end. This is unquestionably parallel to Benjamin's skepticism about scientific knowledge, not just because its reasoning is inconsistent but because Aristotelian sciences are impossible to sustain their logic without the epistemic priori, *nous*,<sup>62</sup> by which the knower must grasp self-evident principles as true and cognitively prior.<sup>63</sup> In the last section of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle writes:

“... it must be *nous* that apprehends the first principles. This is evident not only from the foregoing considerations but also because the starting-point of demonstration is not itself demonstration, and so the starting-point of scientific knowledge is not itself scientific knowledge. Therefore, since we possess no other infallible faculty besides scientific knowledge, the source from which such knowledge starts must be *nous*. Thus it will be the primary source of scientific knowledge that apprehends the first principles, while scientific knowledge as a whole is similarly related to the whole world of facts.”<sup>64</sup>

Considered as a priori faculty by Kant, which precedes all *a posteriori* experiences, *nous* is never neutral or independent from human intention from the perspective of Benjamin. Aristotle's supreme principle, that is, *nous*, which requires the right experience and training to recognize first principles, is not appropriate any more than is Adorno's elitist theory of subjectivity.

### *Unintentional Truth and the Dialectical Image*

The Hegelian dialectic is intrinsically in congruence with Benjamin's philosophical interest that centers on a universal science, in which no definite soul whatsoever represents the absolute subjectivity. In the dialectical consciousness of the self, there is no such thing as the unity of transcendental consciousness of all empirical contents to which Kant subscribes. This is linked with another significant feature in the Hegelian dialectic, that is, the discredit of reason's "unconditionedness." According to the Hegelian dialectic, pure being becomes pure nothing and vice versa by passing over into each other; therefore, the idea of "static" thought executed by reason proposed by Kant is rebutted. Hegel criticizes the dogmatic metaphysics of Kant, which he calls a subjective idealism that "has nothing to do with the content, and has before it only the abstract forms of subjectivity and objectivity."<sup>65</sup> Against the idea of lifting reason as the "faculty of the unconditioned," he states:

"Kant did, of course, interpret reason as the faculty of the unconditioned; but his exclusive reduction of reason to abstract identity directly involves the renunciation of its unconditionedness, so that reason is in fact nothing but empty understanding. Reason is unconditioned only because it is not externally determined by a content that is alien to it; on the contrary; it determines itself, and is therefore at home with itself in its content. For Kant, however, the activity of reason expressly consists only in systematizing the material furnished by perception, through the application of the categories, i.e., it consists in bringing that material into an external order, and hence its principle is merely that of noncontradiction."<sup>66</sup>

Hegel's standpoint, running counter to Kant's idealism in which reason is thought of as the faculty that is unrestricted by outer conditions, is in the same vein of Benjamin's proposition of "unintentional" truth that lies in "naked" experience. Sure enough, the account of some issues surrounding the dialectic made so far unearths why Benjamin frequently resorts to it as a means of epistemological search for disinterested truth.<sup>67</sup> For him, the dialectic is where truth, as distinct from scientific knowledge, can be grounded; yet, as mentioned earlier, it is images<sup>68</sup> that

make it possible for unintentional truth to embody itself as something that is visually identifiable in empirical reality. Hence, it can be boiled down to this: the dialectical image is nothing but a medium by which unpremeditated truth comes into sight with the dialectical relations in it overtly displayed.

### ***Why Is the Balance Between Object-Based Research and Theory of Necessity in Fashion Studies?***

There are several reasons why fashion has been thought of as a lesser kind of academic interest. First and foremost is a nature/culture dichotomy in the Western metaphysics. Traditionally, the mind has been associated with culture while the body with nature, which is an object of suppression and control. The Platonic and Christian traditions, which have been the most dominant Western ideology, value the supreme mind which is immortal; as such, it is the real self. The body is a mortal and temporary station where the mind resides for a lifetime. Therefore, body-related topics are worldly, base and unsophisticated as opposed to the mind which is spiritual, noble, and immortal. Compared with the thinking mind, the body had been considered off-topic in the academia until the Renaissance. And yet, it was mainly an artistic and cultural movement, rather than a social, political, and intellectual revolution, that brought back the interest in Greek antiquity. It is during the modern era that the body finally began to be addressed as a territory of intellectual discussion. Indeed, among many of the relatively new academic disciplines are body-related sciences such as eugenics, anthropology, and its progeny, anthropometrics, all of which are attributed to the nineteenth-century interest in the body. Sociology also generally ignored bodies until the late 1980s as Bryan Turner in *The Body and Society* (1984) called for the inclusion of the body in sociology.

Yet, taking into consideration this underestimated corporeal matter, fashion as an academic discipline is still not viewed as strong as film studies or other applied arts, which also

began to pave their way as parts of the academia in the first half of the twentieth century. This is mainly because topics regarding external appearance are deemed mainly as a feminine area of interest and concern, which J. C. Flügel diagnosed as the Great Masculine Renunciation during the Victorian era.<sup>69</sup> Fashion-related classes, for example, were first offered within the curricula of Home Economics whose main objective, at the outset of its inauguration, was to educate women, soon-to-be housewives, about how to run the household economically as a homemaker.<sup>70</sup> Towards the decade of the 1930s, co-ed courses in Home Economics gradually began to be accepted.<sup>71</sup> By the 1960s, the name “Home Economics” was challenged due to gender stereotypes that were evoked by its name.<sup>72</sup> Since then, many colleges changed their name to Human Ecology or other non-gendered titles. Even now in many fashion-related departments of colleges in the U.S., the number of female students is far greater than that of male students.<sup>73</sup> Although it has attained an academic status in many colleges around the world, fashion is a most gender-prejudiced area which divulges the current hierarchy of disciplines and the unbalanced body and mind relations in our society. In order to overcome this barrier, the way fashion is approached must seek to balance between the object-based analysis, and the discourse-oriented account of fashion which has been largely overlooked.

In Chapter 2, I will explore fashion in view of Immanuel Kant’s *schematism* and divide it into a concept and a phenomenon, thereby coming to grips with the conceptual part of fashion, i.e., newness as well as fashion as a whole. In Chapter 3, *Dialectics in Fashion History*, I will discuss how fashion history transforms just like history does, going through dialectical movements: under the pre-fashion system with the momentum of the conflicts and unity between the church and the monarch, while during the fashion system with the impetus that comes from the relay between the individual and the collective. Chapter 4, *The Dialectical Image: The*

Redemption of Fashion, will examine how fashion can be reckoned as a dialectical image which flashes an “unintentional” truth, while being redeemed from the phenomenal. These three chapters in the body of this dissertation are important not only to grapple with fashion as that which belongs to the domain of the mind as well as the body but also to view fashion as indispensable to modernity. Finally, in the Summary and Conclusion Chapter, the major issues examined in this project will be recapitulated, uncovering the connection between fashion and the mind/body relations, which are hardly irrelevant to the development of the Western belief system.



---

## Notes

### Chapter 1

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ulrich Lehmann views *la mode* as critical to understanding modernity arguing, “The hallmarks of *la modernité* found their most immediate reflection in *la mode*.” See Lehmann, *Tigersprung: Fashion in Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), Introduction, p.1.

<sup>2</sup> Bryan S. Turner, *The Body and Society*, 2nd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1996).

<sup>3</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987).

<sup>4</sup> However, this does not mean that superstructures disappear once and for all, as base and superstructure are dialectical influences on each other.

<sup>5</sup> For example, see Ted Polhemus and Lynn Procter, *Fashion and Anti-Fashion: Anthropology of Clothing and Adornment* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), p. 9; Malcolm Barnard, *Fashion as Communication* (London; New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 7; Yuniya Kawamura, *Fashion-ology: An Introduction to Fashion Studies* (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2005), pp. 4–6.

<sup>6</sup> Georg Simmel, “Fashion,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 62(6), ([1957] 1904): 543.

<sup>7</sup> Christopher Breward and Caroline Evans, eds., *Fashion and Modernity* (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2005), Introduction, p. 3.

Here I added “within fashion studies” because in the humanities the discussion about the relationship between modernity and fashion is not hard to find. Thus, the remark made by Breward and Evans illustrates the insularity of fashion studies in general. Another issue is the name of fashion studies, since we do not have a consensus about what fashion is; however, no other terms satisfy the area of academic interest that deals with the parameters of fashion.

<sup>8</sup> Ulrich Lehmann, *Tigersprung: Fashion in Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), p. xii.

<sup>9</sup> It is crucial to note that *la mode française* was not, strictly speaking, meant for both genders, since it has traditionally been used for privileged female elites who could afford expensive haute couture made mainly by French couturiers, while many tailors on Saville Row, London, provided men with somber black suits with fewer varieties in comparison to female attire. Therefore, *la mode* essentially referred not only to a French style but also to a female mode.

<sup>10</sup> *Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary* (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1913).

<sup>11</sup> *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed., ed. J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 743.

<sup>12</sup> *The Oxford English Dictionary*, p. 743.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ingrid Brenninkmeyer, *The Sociology of Fashion* (Paris: Sirey, 1963), p. 2; Kawamura, *Fashion-ology*, p. 3.

---

<sup>18</sup> Kawamura, *Fashion-ology*, p. 4.

<sup>19</sup> Polhemus and Procter, *Fashion and Anti-Fashion*, p. 9; Barnard, *Fashion as Communication*, p. 7.

<sup>20</sup> Barnard, *Fashion as Communication*, p. 7.

<sup>21</sup> For example, concerning the sublime, one of the most grandiose concepts in political philosophy, Jean-Luc Nancy says the following:

The sublime is in fashion. . . . In this sense, the sublime forms a fashion that has persisted uninterruptedly into our own time from the beginnings of modernity, a fashion at once continuous and discontinuous, monotonous and spasmodic. The “sublime” has not always taken this name, but it has always been present. It has always been a fashion because it has always concerned a break within or from aesthetics (whether “aesthetics” designates taste or theory). (Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Sublime Offering,” in *Of the Sublime: Presence in Question*, ed. Jean-Francois Courtine et al., trans. Jeffrey Librett, [Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, (1988) 1993], p. 25)

<sup>22</sup> Barnard, *Fashion as Communication*, pp. 16–17.

<sup>23</sup> *Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English*, 4th ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 411–112.

Also refer to Michael Allen Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). According to Gillespie, all later forms derive from the late Latin derivative *modernus*. The term *modern* and its derivatives come from the Latin *modus*, which means “‘measure,’ and, as a measure of time, ‘just now.’”

<sup>24</sup> Matei Călinescu, *Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 80; Renato Poggioli, *Teoria dell’arte d’avanguardia (English: The Theory of the Avant-Garde)*, trans. Gerald Fitzgerald (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 216.

<sup>25</sup> It should be noted that *modernus* was coined from *modo*, as *hodiernus* was from *hodie* (today), and its etymological root is not *modus* but *modo* according to *A Dictionary of English Etymology* (London: Hensleigh Wedgwood, 1773).

<sup>26</sup> *OED*, p. 947.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 949.

<sup>28</sup> Ernst Robert Curtius categorically says *mode* has nothing to do with *modern*, in *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. Willard Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1948]1953), p. 254.

<sup>29</sup> *OED*, p. 940.

<sup>30</sup> For the relation between Plato’s view and Aristotle’s on the theory of knowledge, see Robert Adamson, *The Development of Greek Philosophy*, ed. W. R. Sorley and R. P. Hardie (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1908), p. 177; and Terence Irwin, *Aristotle’s First Principles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), §76, Dialectic and Justification and §77, Criticisms of Dialectic, pp. 7–8 and pp. 137–141. According to Terence Irwin, for both Plato and Aristotle, dialectic is essentially related to the Socratic method of conversation, while the latter, influenced by the former, develops the dialectic as a concrete method of reaching knowledge, compared to the apodictic.

<sup>31</sup> For a detailed explanation on Aristotle’s proposition of apodictic and analytic, see the chapter titled “Theory of Knowledge,” in *The Development of Greek Philosophy*, ed. Robert Adamson, pp. 170–198.

---

<sup>32</sup> Here, by *science* I mean the modern sense of science whose logic is deduced by demonstration and/or testable formulas and experimentations. However, it should also be mentioned that the connotation of Aristotle's scientific knowledge resonates in the modern use of the term *science* as well. See concerns regarding this issue by Robin Smith in "Aristotle's Logic," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/aristotle-logic/>.

The subject of the Posterior Analytics is *epistêmê*. This is one of several Greek words that can reasonably be translated as "knowledge," but Aristotle is concerned only with knowledge of a certain type (as will be explained below). There is a long tradition of translating *epistêmê* in this technical sense as science, and I shall follow that tradition here. However, readers should not be misled by the use of that word. In particular, Aristotle's theory of science cannot be considered a counterpart to modern philosophy of science, at least not without substantial qualifications.

<sup>33</sup> See Aristotle, *The Organon, or Logical Treatises, of Aristotle: With the Introduction of Porphyry, Literally Translated, with Notes, Syllogistic Examples, Analysis, and Introduction*, vol. 2 (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1902), p. 681.

Chap. XI.—I. The dialectic problem is a theorem, (i.e., a proposition whose truth is to be inquired into,) tending either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, either per se, or as co-operative with something else of this kind, about which the multitude either hold an opinion in neither way, or in a way contrary to the wise, or the wise to the multitude, or each of these to themselves.

<sup>34</sup> Octavius Freire Owen in the notes writes that *perhaps* the word *terms* that appears in the last sentence quoted in the main text is close in meaning to axioms. See Aristotle, *The Organon, or Logical Treatises*, p. 251.

<sup>35</sup> The term *epistêmê* can also be translated into *craft* and *disciplines*. See Terence Irwin, "Aristotle," in *A Companion to Epistemology*, vol. 4, 2nd ed., ed. J. Dancy, E. Sosa, and S. and M. Steup (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 240.

Moreover, "*epistêmê*" may refer either (a) to a body of truths known, or (b) to the state of someone who knows them: hence in sense (a) mathematics or astronomy counts as an *epistêmê* (so that "Science" is the proper translation), and in sense (b) someone who knows such a science counts as having *epistêmê* (so that "knowledge" is the proper translation). The primary example of an *epistêmê* (in sense (a)) is a demonstrative science, but it is not the only example. Aristotle does not confine his use of term "*epistêmê*" to demonstrative science: craft and disciplines that lack a rigorous demonstrative structure are also cases of *epistêmê*.

<sup>36</sup> W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume 6: Aristotle, An Encounter* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 171–178. For consistency, the word *apodeictic* is replaced by the word *apodictic*.

<sup>37</sup> Also refer to the following explanation about *epistêmê*:

There are five virtues of thought: *technê*, *epistêmê*, *phronêsis*, *sophia*, and *nous* (1139b15). Various translations have been offered for each of these terms. Most often, *technê* is translated as craft or art. While *epistêmê* is generally rendered as knowledge, in this context, where it is used in its precise sense, it is sometimes translated as scientific knowledge. However, one must not confuse this usage with our contemporary understanding of science, which includes experimentation. Conducting experiments to confirm hypotheses is a much later development. Rather, translating *epistêmê* as scientific knowledge is a way of emphasizing its certainty. In any event, as soon as Aristotle introduces these five terms, he turns to the distinction between the first two virtues. First, he defines *epistêmê*, as he says, in its accurate sense and leaving aside its analogous uses. Scientific knowledge is distinguished by its objects, which do not admit of change; these objects are eternal and exist of necessity. More precisely, scientific knowledge comprises demonstration, starting from first principles; the latter must also be known, although they are not known by demonstration (1139b15–30). The full account of *epistêmê* in the strict sense is found in *Posterior Analytics*, where Aristotle says that we think we know something without qualification (*epistastha i . . .*

---

*haplôs*) when we think we know (*gignôskein*) the cause by which the thing is, that it is the cause of the thing, and that this cannot be otherwise (71b10–15). As though to emphasize the necessity of what is known, he most frequently uses geometry as an example of *epistêmê*. In this regard, it should be pointed out that Aristotle uses the notion of cause (*aitia*) in a broader sense than it usually has in contemporary thought. Thus, understanding how the geometrical axioms lead to a theorem that right triangles have a certain property would be an instance, for Aristotle, of understanding the cause of the proven property of the right triangle. (Richard Parry, “*Episteme and Techne*,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* [Fall 2008 Edition], ed. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/episteme-techne/>).

<sup>38</sup> See the following explanation on *the* primary principle in Aristotle, *The Organon, or Logical Treatises*, p. 664.

All knowledge rests upon antecedent conviction, and as the general principle which is the basis of all demonstrative reasoning is better known in itself and in its nature, so the particulars from which induction proceeds, are better known to us. This antecedent knowledge is the major proposition of syllogism, the conclusion being the application of the general to the particular, whence the syllogism is the form of all proper science, nor, though strongly attacked by Ramus, has the latter critic ever subsisted a better inferential method.

<sup>39</sup> See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics and Topica*, vol. 2, trans. Hugh Tredennick and E. S. Forster (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann), 1938, p. 61.

There are three factors in a demonstration: (1) The conclusion which is required to be proved, i.e., the application of an essential attribute to some genus; (2) the axioms, on which the proof is based; (3) the underlying genus, whose modifications or essential attributes are disclosed by the demonstration.

Also see Aristotle, *The Organon, or Logical Treatises*, pp. 266–267.

CHAP. X.—Of the Definition and Division of Principles.

I call those principles in each genus, the existence of which it is impossible to demonstrate. What then the first things, and such as result from these signify, is *assumed*, but as to principles, we must assume that they are, but *demonstrate* the rest, as what unity is, or what the straight and a triangle are; it is necessary however to assume that unity and magnitude exist, but to demonstrate the other things.

Of those which are employed in demonstrative sciences, some are peculiar to each science, but other are common, and common according to analogy, since each is useful, so far as it is in the genus under science. The peculiar indeed are such as, that a line is a thing of this kind, and that the straight is, but the common are, as that if equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal. Now each of these is sufficient, so far as it is in the genus, for a (a geometrician) will effect the same, though he should not assume of all, but in magnitudes alone, and the arithmetician in respect of numbers (alone).

<sup>40</sup> Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, trans. John. Osborne (London: NLB, 1977), p. 33.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.

It should be noted that this is similar to Hegel’s objective idealism.

It must certainly be maintained against this that the ob-jects of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances, i.e., they do not have the ground of their being within themselves, but within something else. The further question, then, is how this other is determined. According to the Kantian philosophy, the things that we know about are only appearances for *us*, what they are *in themselves* remains for us an increasingly beyond. The naïve consciousness has rightly taken exception to this subjective idealism, accordingly to which the content of our consciousness is something that is *only* ours, something posited through *us*. In fact, the true situation is that the things of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances, not only for *us*, but also *in-themselves*, and that the proper determination of these things,

---

which are in this sense “finite,” consists in having the ground of their being not within themselves but in the universal divine Idea. This interpretation must also be called idealism, but, as distinct from the subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy, it is *absolute idealism*. (G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris [Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishers, 1991], pp. 88–89)

<sup>42</sup> Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, p. 29.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

In the great philosophies the world is seen in terms of the order of ideas. But the conceptual frameworks within which this took place have, for the most part, long since become fragile. Nevertheless these systems, such as Plato’s theory of ideas, Leibniz’s Monadology, or Hegel’s dialectic, still remain valid as attempts at a description of the world. It is peculiar to all these attempts that they still preserve their meaning, indeed they often reveal it more fully, even when they are applied to the world of ideas instead of empirical reality. For it was as descriptions of an order of ideas that these systems of thought originated. The more intensely the respective thinkers strove to outline the image of reality, the more were they bound to develop a conceptual order which, for the later interpreter, would be seen as serving that original depiction of the world of ideas which was really intended.

Also see *Ibid.*, p. 37.

All essences exist in complete and immaculate independence, not only from phenomena, but, especially, from each other. Just as the harmony of the spheres depends on the orbits of stars which do not come into contact with each other, so the existence of the *mundus intelligibilis* depends on the unbridgeable distance between pure essences. Every idea is a sun and is related to other ideas just as suns are related to each other. The harmonious relationship between essences is what constitutes truth.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>46</sup>

Besides, the dialectic is not a new thing in philosophy. Among the Ancients, Plato is called the inventor of the dialectic, and that is quite correct in that it is in the Platonic philosophy that dialectic first occurs in a form which is freely scientific, and hence also objective. With Socrates, dialectical thinking still has a predominantly subjective shape, consistent with the general character of his philosophizing, namely, that of *irony*. Socrates directed his dialectic first against ordinary consciousness in general, and then, more particularly, against the Sophists. He was accustomed to pretend in his conversations that he wanted to be instructed more precisely about the matter under discussion; and in this connection he raised all manner of questions, so that the people with whom he conversed were led on to say the opposite of what had appeared to them at the beginning to be correct. When the Sophists called themselves teachers, for instance, Socrates, by a series of questions, brought the Sophist Protagoras to the point where he had to admit that all learning is merely recollection.

And by means of a dialectical treatment, Plato shows in his strictly scientific dialogues the general finitude of all fixed determinations of the understanding. Thus, for example, in the *Parmenides*, he deduces the Many from the One, and, notwithstanding that, he shows that the nature of the Many is simply to determine itself as the One. This was the grand manner in which Plato handled the dialectic. (Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. 129)

Terence Irwin also points out that the name *dialectic* is given by Plato.

“Dialectic” (*dialektikē*) is Plato’s name for the sort of systematic discussion (*dialegesthai*) that is practised in Plato’s Socratic dialogues (*dialogoi*). Socrates discusses common beliefs about ethical questions through a conversation that involves the systematic cross-examination of an interlocutor and his intuitive beliefs,

---

exposure of the puzzles they raise, and several attempts to solve the puzzles by modifying the initial beliefs. (*Aristotle's First Principles*, p. 7)

<sup>47</sup> See Hegel's own explanation in Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. 324, n. 110.

<sup>48</sup> Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. 129.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. 129.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 128.

<sup>52</sup> See Susan Buck-Morss's *The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute* (New York, Macmillan Free Press, 1977), p. 94.

<sup>53</sup> This thought is permeated in Hegel's philosophy. See, for example, Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, pp. 92, 130.

<sup>54</sup> Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. 92.

<sup>55</sup> The texts provided here is from Irwin's *Aristotle's First Principles*, chap. 7, § 76, p. 138.

<sup>56</sup> Irwin, *Aristotle's First Principles*, p. 139.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., pp. 7–8.

Plato does explicitly what he does implicitly in the earlier dialogues, using the Socratic method to argue for positive philosophical positions; he regards dialectic as the primary method of philosophical inquiry. Aristotle as well as Plato, dialectic remains closely connected with the Socratic conversation. . . . But Aristotle retains Plato's belief that dialectic is also a method for reaching positive conclusions; this is why he claims that it has a road towards first principles. (Top. 101b3–4)

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 139.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Terence Irwin also thinks this is among the weaknesses of Aristotle. See Irwin, *Aristotle's First Principles*, p. 10; see also Irwin's explanation about Aristotelian scientific knowledge in the same book (p. 131).

<sup>62</sup> Aristotle writes that first principles are grasped by *nous* (*Posterior Analytics* II 19, 100b5–17); here *nous* is translated into intuition. *Aristotle, Posterior Analytics and Topica*, p. 261.

Also refer to Robin's explanation about the translations of *nous*:

Aristotle's account of knowledge of the indemonstrable first premises of sciences is found in *Posterior Analytics* II.19, long regarded as a difficult text to interpret. Briefly, what he says there is that it is another cognitive state, *nous* (translated variously as "insight," "intuition," "intelligence"), which knows them. There is wide disagreement among commentators about the interpretation of his account of how this state is reached; I will offer one possible interpretation. First, Aristotle identifies his problem as explaining how the principles can "become familiar to us," using the same term "familiar" (*gnôrimos*) that he used in presenting the regress problem. What he is presenting, then, is not a method of discovery but a process of becoming wise. Second, he says that in order for knowledge of immediate premises to be possible, we must have a kind of knowledge of them without having learned it, but this knowledge must not be as "precise" as

---

the knowledge that a possessor of science must have. The kind of knowledge in question turns out to be a capacity or power (*dunamis*) which Aristotle compares to the capacity for sense-perception: since our senses are innate, i.e., develop naturally, it is in a way correct to say that we know what e.g. all the colors look like before we have seen them: we have the capacity to see them by nature, and when we first see a color we exercise this capacity without having to learn how to do so first. Likewise, Aristotle holds, our minds have by nature the capacity to recognize the starting points of the sciences. In the case of sensation, the capacity for perception in the sense organ is actualized by the operation on it of the perceptible object. Similarly, Aristotle holds that coming to know first premises is a matter of a potentiality in the mind being actualized by experience of its proper objects: "The soul is of such a nature as to be capable of undergoing this." So, although we cannot come to know the first premises without the necessary experience, just as we cannot see colors without the presence of colored objects, our minds are already so constituted as to be able to recognize the right objects, just as our eyes are already so constituted as to be able to perceive the colors that exist. (Smith, Robin, "Aristotle's Logic," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* [Summer 2011 Edition], ed. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/aristotle-logic/>)

<sup>63</sup> See Irwin's discussion on this topic in §73–75 in *Aristotle's First Principles*.

<sup>64</sup> Aristotle writes that first principles are grasped by *nous* (*Posterior Analytics* II 19, 100b5–17); here *nous* is translated into intuition. *Aristotle, Posterior Analytics and Topica*, , p. 261. I have changed intuition into *nous* lest linguistic confusion makes one find it hard to understand the context.

<sup>65</sup> Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. 89.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>67</sup> For example, see Benjamin's approach in expounding the concept of origin (*Ursprung*) in *The Origin of German Tragic Drama (Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels)*:

Origin [*Ursprung*], although an entirely historical category, has, nevertheless, nothing to do with genesis [*Entstehung*]. The term origin is not intended to describe the process by which the existent came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance. Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it swallows the material involved in the process of genesis. That which is original is never revealed in the naked and manifest existence of the factual; its rhythm is apparent only to a dual insight. On the one hand it needs to be recognized as a process of restoration and reestablishment, but, on the other hand, and precisely because of this, as something imperfect and incomplete. (Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, p. 45)

<sup>68</sup> Cf. According to M. J. Inwood, it is Hegel's view that "an image can be presented before intelligence in the absence of a corresponding intuition." See M. J. Inwood's commentary on the note §454 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, trans. W. Wallace and A. V. Miller with revisions and commentary by M. J. Inwood (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007), p. 486.

<sup>69</sup> J. C. Flüge, *The Psychology of Clothes*, New York, International Universities Press [1969], p. 257.

<sup>70</sup> J. Elias, *Stir It Up: Home Economics in American Culture* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. 37.

<sup>71</sup> Rima D. Apple and Joyce Coleman, "Turbulence, 1961–1985," in *The Challenge of Constantly Changing Times: From Home Economics to Human Ecology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison 1903–2003* (Madison: Parallel Press), p. 77.

<sup>72</sup> Elias, *Stir It Up*, p. 171.

<sup>73</sup> Barnard, *Fashion as Communication*, p. 24.

## CHAPTER 2

### WHAT IMMANUEL KANT WOULD SAY ABOUT FASHION: METAPHYSICS OF PURSUIT OF THE SELF BY WAY OF FASHION

The journal *Fashion Theory* states on their website: “*Fashion Theory* takes as its starting point a definition of ‘fashion’ as the cultural construction of the embodied identity. The importance of studying the body as a site for the deployment of discourses has been well established in a number of disciplines. Until *Fashion Theory*’s launch in 1997 the dressed body had suffered from a lack of critical analysis.”<sup>1</sup> As implied, fashion theory or theory of fashion has not been considered a serious research topic in academia, with the exception of a few thinkers, until the end of the twentieth century. It was also only in recent years that fashion has become incorporated as a topic of philosophical undertaking. *Fashion: A Philosophy* (2006) by Lars Svendsen is one of these recent developments in the study of fashion. Not only does it introduce the discourses on fashion by such philosophers as Georg Simmel, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno, but it also articulates some pitfalls associated with the meanings of fashion as interpreted by contemporary scholars. According to Svendsen, there are two radically different perspectives on fashion. One is that fashion is considered to be essentially no different than clothing, while the other is that fashion is a kind of “mechanism, logic or ideology” of which the area of clothing shares part.<sup>2</sup> Those who are aligned with the former perspective view fashion as “the entire spectrum of attractive clothes styles” or “dress in which the key feature is rapid and continual changing of styles.”<sup>3</sup> Regarding these comments, Svendsen raises a question: “is it [fashion] the clothes themselves or a quality they have that constitutes ‘fashion?’”<sup>4</sup> Neither is he content with Roland Barthes’s view that clothes provides the material basis of fashion, while fashion is a cultural system in which meanings are generated.<sup>5</sup> For Svendsen, both arguments that fashion is linked unequivocally with clothes as well as with a quality (i.e., change)



and that clothes function as the material basis upon which cultural meanings beget remain unconvincing.<sup>6</sup> He writes:

“It is tempting to try to define the term [fashion] by considering it as a designation of a given quality (or a particular combination of qualities) that can be valid for clothes, interior design, politics, science, and other fields. The problem then is to specify accurately what this quality should be. Despite having read many studies of fashion, I have still not seen a single convincing attempt to identify such a quality. We could, of course, try to make a provisional definition of the type: something is fashion only if it functions in a socially distinctive way and is part of a system that replaces it relatively quickly with something new. However, I cannot see that such a definition would add anything important to our greater understanding of both the socially distinctive and the ‘new’ aspects of fashion.”<sup>7</sup>

Discontented, Svendsen tries to investigate fashion as a concept and find its meaning as a philosophical project. Though his initial objective in search of the implications of fashion is ambitious, his conclusion is scarcely clearer than those of other authors he has repudiated:

“In my introduction I wrote that what had to be at the center of a philosophical investigation of fashion was the meaning of fashion. I have attempted to uncover this meaning by studying the diffusion patterns of fashion, its logic and temporality, its relationship to body and language, its status as a commodity and as art and not least, as an ideal for the construction of the self. The conclusion of all these studies can hardly be anything other than to say that fashion is a highly diverse phenomenon that pretends to have meaning, but in reality has meaning to only a very limited extent. It is always possible to say, as the fashion theorist Caroline Evans does, that fashion is capable of expressing the underlying interests circulating in culture, and that as such it is ‘a route to unpleasant truths about the world.’ But what truths are these? That we cultivate surfaces, that we live in an increasingly fictionalized reality, that the constancy of our identities is steadily declining? In that case, fashion tells us truths that it has been perhaps the foremost driving force in realizing.”<sup>8</sup>

Indeed, the conundrum in the conceptualization of fashion comes from its complex character. Let me revisit Svendsen’s comments about the “provisional definition” of fashion, which works only if it operates as a social system that has to do with something new, as well as his comments about the inconceivability of how such an interpretation of fashion could be related to the “socially distinctive and the ‘new’ aspects of fashion.”<sup>9</sup> As Svendsen points out, fashion is a concept. Nonetheless, it is also a phenomenon with which clothing appears to be

conjoined by and large, which makes fashion perplexing to analyze. The impossibility of figuring out the true core of fashion is due to the fact that the two parts are so tightly interlaced that we cannot recognize each thread of a completely disparate nature in the same manner. Hence, the first step in coming to grips with the epistemology of fashion is to split off fashion into a concept and a phenomenon so as to look into the attributes of each domain. It is with the application of Kantian *schematism*, I argue, that fashion is to be posited as both a concept and a phenomenon.

When we are asked to conjure up fashion, most of us think of different styles of clothing, accessories, hair, or nails. These items of fashion are virtually the same as those that belong to dress, which Joanne Eicher and Roach-Higgins define as “an assemblage of body modifications and/or supplements displayed by a person in communicating with other human beings.”<sup>10</sup> They have also clarified the meaning of other terms such as clothing, costume, and apparel in juxtaposition to dress; by doing so they illuminate why terms other than dress do not fit the descriptions of all possible bodily supplements and modifications. This definition of dress, widely adopted by both dress historians and fashion theorists, greatly helps establish the boundary of the phenomenal aspects of fashion around the body, which is dress itself. Body modifications include tattoos, tight-lacing, hair dye, or piercing while body supplements are body enclosures, handheld objects, shoes, makeup, perfume, or even the smell of a variety of hygiene products. According to them, even the blind can share some element of appreciation of dress through tactile, auditory, and olfactory senses, though it is impossible for them to sense through the semaphore of dress.<sup>11</sup> In addition to the radius of all the dress articles possible, the account of dress made by Eicher and Roach-Higgins suggests that dress can be identified by way

of the synthesis of imagination through all sensations, to borrow Kant's terms, not just restricted to the visual sense.

Coupled with the sphere of the body, fashion as a material reality is the same as dress, and they both pertain to things we arrange through the medium of the body; however, they are conceived of differently. People in modern times do not feel that dress and fashion are intrinsically identical. What makes us cognize things differently then? Why do the same objects of which we have exactly the same synthesis of the presentation lead us to have different perceptions? What makes us sure that this is a fashion or that is a piece of dress? One way to get out of this quandary is to analyze *the* quality of fashion, which is newness. This element of fashion has been repeatedly indicated by some sociologists, philosophers, and semioticians. However, it is Walter Benjamin whose explications of the concept of fashion are most prominent. The "eternal recurrence of the new"<sup>12</sup> and the "tireless purveyor [of newness]"<sup>13</sup> spelled out by Benjamin are probably among the most cited depictions of fashion by contemporary fashion theorists. On account of this characteristic, fashion, unlike dress, cannot be cognized simply through the synthesis of presentations of manifold images, as the key element of fashion, being current, new, or novel, cannot be fathomed, in Kantian terms, without consideration of a transcendental time determination. Put another way, only in the spatiotemporal sequence does the concept of newness stand; which is to say, the perception of something new is not possible without reason's apperception of the comparison between one thing before and another thing after in the temporal sequence. This unraveling is hinged upon Kant's *schematism*, according to which human beings have two distinctive cognitive systems: by intuitions and by concepts. In the former, cognitions are achieved by our sensory impressions via our five senses, which are therefore *a posteriori* or dependent on impressions, while in the latter, we make a judgment with

the aid of *a priori* intuitions—time and space—or absolutely independent of all sensory impressions. If we apply these to dress and fashion, we can say the following: Those things that are categorized among the objects of dress are cognized by *a posteriori* intuitions, as we comprehend the characteristics of a dress item by seeing, touching, or smelling it in order to discern the color or the feel, or to determine whether it has been washed, and so on. Even the sounds, or rustle, of different fabrics in motion are distinguishable, and create different impressions.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, those things that are in the realm of fashion are discerned through *a priori* intuitions, for it is with our apprehension of time and space that we can judge whether an object is new or not; or, current or out of date. What implications does this difference between *a priori* and *a posteriori* entail in grappling with fashion? First, it not only offers a yardstick by which to differentiate fashion, which is an outcome of *a priori* cognition, in a rational mode from dress, whose knowledge is formed by way of *a posteriori* experience; it also provides a thread of reasoning by means of which fashion can be raised to the level of metaphysics. Second, the fact that the concept of fashion is deduced by *a priori* reasoning is *the* premise on which it can be maintained that the incessant pursuit of fashion is directly linked to the seeking of the self, about which Kant's transcendental idealism can substantiate the *modus operandi*.

The discussion of the first issue is, indeed, a rekindling of the famous debate between rationalism and empiricism in the early modern period of philosophy. Rationalists' claim is that through reasoning all our concepts and knowledge are shaped, while, for empiricists, sense experience is the ultimate basis of all our concepts and knowledge.<sup>15</sup> Against both arguments, Kant proposes that both understanding and sensibility are indispensable to cognize the sensible world.<sup>16</sup> Running counter to the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, for example, Kant himself writes:

“To posit *sensibility* merely in the indistinctness of representations, and *intellectuality* by comparison in the distinctness of representations, and thereby in a merely *formal* (logical) distinction of consciousness instead of a *real* (psychological) one, which concerns not merely the form but also the content of thought, was a great error of the Leibniz-Wolffian school. Their error was, namely, to posit sensibility in a lack (of clarity in our partial ideas), and consequently in indistinctness, and to posit the character of ideas of understanding in distinctness; whereas in fact sensibility is something very positive and an indispensable addition to ideas of understanding, in order to bring forth a cognition.—But Leibniz was actually to blame. For, he, adhering to the Platonic school, assumed innate, pure intellectual intuitions, called ideas, which are encountered in the human mind, though now only obscurely; and to whose analysis and illumination by means of attention alone we owe the cognition of objects, as they are in themselves. [Marginal note in H:] Sensibility is a subject’s faculty of representation, in so far as it is affected.”<sup>17</sup>

By Kant’s account, while an empirical object is cognized not just with the understanding but also with the synthesis produced by the imagination from the manifold images of its (re)presentations, given to us by means of our sensibility, the transformation from the analytic unity to the synthetic unity of the manifold in *intuition* as such is made not by general logic but by transcendental logic.<sup>18</sup> This informs us of why philosophers while in search of the concept of fashion find it challenging to strip the phenomenal part of fashion from the conceptual part, let alone to arrive at the concept of fashion, viz., newness. In fact, the conception of fashion can be arrived at through transcendental logic, not just because the conceptualization of fashion is made by the synthetic unity that has developed from the analytic unity, but also because our spatiotemporal cognition is essential to the ontology of fashion as well as to the epistemology of fashion.<sup>19</sup> It should be mentioned though that the ontology of fashion cannot antecede the epistemology of fashion. To wit, it is our synthetic *a priori* cognition that makes viable newness, the concept of fashion, since it is not self-contained but comes into being only with our synthetic *a priori* cognitive faculty. This is why Kant emphasizes that it is through our faculty of cognition itself rather than a reference of our cognition that the transcendental is in operation.<sup>20</sup> Thus, to grapple with the concept of fashion is nothing but to take in our cognitive process in light of

Kantian metaphysics. It is noteworthy that the polemic between rationalists and empiricists, at least in regard to the epistemology of knowledge, can be reduced to the question of whether there are synthetic *a priori* propositions.<sup>21</sup> In response to this, Kant argues that at issue is not whether there is a synthetic *a priori* proposition but how this is possible.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, fashion can explicate how a synthetic *a priori* proposition is possible; fashion itself evidences *how* synthetic *a priori* cognition leads us to move away from the analytic unity to the synthetic unity, attesting to the correlation between the two, thereby bringing to light the operation of Kantian metaphysics. A thorough investigation into the relation between the phenomenal and the noumenal of fashion can unmask the peculiar nature of fashion that cannot sustain itself without a synthetic *a priori* cognition.

To reiterate, Kant's *schematism* with the divide between *a priori* and *a posteriori* as well as his distinction between analytic and synthetic helps us to disentangle the phenomenal and the conceptual of fashion theoretically: while the former is elicited by an analytic *a posteriori* judgment and the latter by a synthetic *a priori* judgment, they are interrelated to each other. This not only uncovers the essence of fashion as a binary concept, but it also brings fashion into the domain of discussion about *noumena* and *phenomena*—the realm which we cannot know with our sense impressions and the world of which we can make sense through sensation. This whole line of thought is possible only because fashion would not be that which we call it, were it not for *the* key element of fashion—newness. Even before Benjamin articulated this, Kant also made a brief remark about fashion in relation to novelty:

“Accordingly, it is novelty that makes fashion popular, and to be inventive in all sorts of external forms, even if they often degenerate into something fantastic and somewhat hideous, belongs to the style of courtiers, especially ladies.”<sup>23</sup>

If consistent, as we believe we are, we never stop experimenting with different styles of fashion as we have done over the course of modern history, unless we are in a situation where a coercive power or modality restricts freedom of new fashions, commanding us to be the same. Indeed, this condition of incessant production of fashions by human beings throws light on the dilemma between *noumena* and *phenomena*, in which countless *phenomena* of fashions are created to exhibit newness, *the* idiosyncrasy of fashion as a *noumenon*, but they can never reach out to that *noumenon in toto*. That is to say, no fashion stays “fashionable” beyond a certain time limit because, as soon as our eyes get accustomed to it, it is no longer new. Once something that is deemed a fashion lasts a longer life span than it should, it enters into the sphere of custom or “classic,” as blue jeans or jazz does. This is the paradox of fashion that acutely discloses the cardinal relation between *noumena* and *phenomena*, which can never be compromised as manifested by the endless appearance of new fashions in an attempt to fit in with fashion’s *noumenon*. Not only does the never-ending invention of fashions of different kinds reveal the relation between *noumena* and *phenomena*, but it also substantiates the validity of fashion as both a *noumenon* and a *phenomenon*.

As far as the noumenal aspect of fashion is concerned, fashion suffices to satisfy the requirement of the positive and negative meanings of a *noumenon* posited by Kant; that is, fashion as a concept of newness is “an *object of a nonsensible intuition*,” while it is “*not an object of our sensible intuition*.”<sup>24</sup> Fashion as a *noumenon*, in the positive meaning of the term, cannot be cognized through the five senses because the newness of a fashion of any kind is not only an *a priori* concept but also is a product of the imagination. On the contrary, as fashion is “*not an object of our sensible intuition*” in the negative meaning of its *noumenon*, it needs a *priori* intuitions, time and space, in order to be conceived, for what we now touch, smell, hear, or

see is not in the least new unless there is a time relation between before and now or between past and present from the perspective of now. Certainly, among many simulacra of newness, fashion is the *noumenon* par excellence in the modern era while, at the same time, it is a *phenomenon* that perpetually simulates its *noumenon*. Just like the pure categories, the *noumenon*, newness itself that is brought out by a *priori* intuitions, cannot prove anything about transcendental use on its own, when separated from all sensibility. However, the transcendental logic in newness can be validated by means of a something = fashion, that is, a transcendental object *as such* under the concept of fashion, whose “eternal recurrence” of newness sheds light on what Immanuel Kant says of the characteristics of *noumena*—in particular of the impossibility of understanding of *noumena* through our sensibility, as well as of the certainty of the existence of *noumena* via our intellectual cognitive faculty. It is owing to the fact that fashion is both a phenomenon and a *noumenon*, which makes it feasible for us to perceive the mechanism of the transcendental logic. Accordingly, fashion is of great significance not only in puzzling out the fundamental of the unattainability of *noumena* but also in untangling the contentions among scholars about whether *noumena* are completely unknowable by the human mind. Namely, we can get the picture of the mechanism of newness by means of fashion, in spite of the fact that nothing can ever reach the state of newness as a constant value. Or, put in other words, we can detect the process of the formation of newness in which one thing once called new is replaced by another for the time being, which is in operation dialectically within the setting of the linear time; yet we can in no way know what is to be the next newness as of now. Ontologically speaking, therefore, there is no newness in the empirical world, as nothing remains new under the dynamics of the flowing time. In the sense of epistemology, however, something new exists forever insofar as our *nous* is at work in cooperation with the forms of intuition, time and space. As a consequence, the



analysis of the workings of newness gives us a hint as to how to clarify the distinction between the noumenon and the thing-in-itself, as following. While they both are not objects of our sensible intuition, newness as a *noumenon* can be specified as the thinking of something new as such—“something in which I abstract from all form of sensible intuition.”<sup>25</sup> On the other hand, the thing-in-itself in the sphere of newness is simply unknowable, for nothing subsumed under the concept of newness is ever new. Something may be entitled to be called new for now, but in the blink of an eye, literally speaking, it is no longer new. Furthermore, something new in the future has yet to become knowable, while something new in the past is already meaningless from the perspective of now. Put in a nutshell, newness, the *noumenon (intelligibilia)*<sup>26</sup> of the concept of fashion, is an intellectual intuition about the genesis of newness, whereas the thing-in-itself in newness is impossible to get a firm grip on, as it is independent of the forms of intuition, time and space.<sup>27</sup>

The observation about the concept of fashion that has been made so far helps to rebut the arguments (1) against the existence of *noumena* and things-in-themselves and (2) for the indistinguishableness or semblance between the two terms. The distrust in Kantian development of these concepts is expressed, for instance, by H. J. Paton:

“In their empirical use, concepts are applied to sensible objects, which may be described as appearances, or more technically, phenomena. In their transcendental use, concepts are applied—or such, at least, is the intention—to things as they are in themselves and as they can be grasped by understanding without the aid of sense. Such objects are called ‘noumena,’ that is, understandable or intelligible (and not sensible) objects. Thus, the opposition between phenomena and noumena corresponds to the opposition between the empirical and the transcendental use of concepts. We have now seen that there is no transcendental use of concepts. It is therefore natural enough to conclude that there are no such things as noumena, and even that there are no things-in-themselves.”<sup>28</sup>

Paton categorically asserts that no transcendental use of concepts has been found and, therefore, there are neither *noumena* nor things-in-themselves. To the contrary, as I have revealed, fashion is that which vindicates Kantian transcendental use, thus not only testifying to the existence of *noumena* but, even further, making clear the distinction between *noumena* and things-in-themselves. The philosophization about fashion reveals how the unyielding appearance of a transcendental object *as such* subsumed under the concept of fashion makes it possible for the *noumenon*, newness, to be grasped by our reason, although the thing-in-itself in newness continues to abide in the land of the unknowable. This clears up Paton's other concern about Kant:

“Kant adds that the transcendental object is ‘only the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general, a concept which is determinable through the manifold of appearances.’ I do not know what this means, unless the transcendental object is being identified with the act of thinking or the unity of apperception. I do not think this is very intelligible in itself; but if this is the meaning, it can apply only to the transcendental object in its second sense.”<sup>29</sup>

Of course, a something = fashion, i.e., a transcendental object *as such*, does not provide anything from which we acquire a concept. Yet, the unique character of fashion, which is the ceaseless appearance of a something = fashion, occasions the opportunity for our apperception to grasp its concept—in fact, its *noumenon*—by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in time as an *a priori* condition.<sup>30</sup> In order to decipher this, it is necessary to diagnose what kinds of judgments are employed when conceiving the concept of newness.

It is not difficult to come to a conclusion that the knowledge of newness is achieved by a synthetic judgment. No predicate shall ever be found in newness, for the very fact that a predicate of any kind is already affirmed to belong to newness absolutely nullifies the ‘ontic’ of newness. Put another way, any quality in newness that has been already acknowledged is not new anymore for now, as it belies the *raison d’être* of newness. However, the question as to

whether the concept of newness is arrived at by either *a priori* judgment or *a posteriori* judgment cannot be easily resolved. In point of fact, neither alone accounts for the appearance of newness. Only with both *a priori* judgment and *a posteriori* judgment joined together can the concept of newness constitute its existence. This is because the cognition surrounding newness is not pure, as Kant elucidates: “Every change has its cause is an *a priori* proposition; yet it is not pure, because change is a concept that can be obtained only from experience.”<sup>31</sup> While newness, the concept of fashion, requires both *a priori* and *a posteriori* judgments in league with each other to conceptualize, to say that newness is a synthetic *a priori* knowledge is not fallacious. I mean, this exposition is not incorrect but incomplete, since not all *a priori* cognitions are pure. This has confounded some Kant scholars. Let me first introduce Kant’s own explication on the relation between cognition and experience:

“There can be no doubt that all our cognition begins with experience. For what else might rouse our cognitive power to its operation if objects stirring our senses did not do so? In part these objects by themselves bring about presentations. In part they set in motion our understanding’s activity, by which it compares these presentations, connects or separates them, and thus processes the raw material of sense impressions into a cognition of objects that is called experience.”<sup>32</sup>

Notwithstanding, Kant also holds that not all our cognition “arises from experience,” although it “starts with experience.”<sup>33</sup> In this regard, it can be said that *a priori* cognitions occur *absolutely* independently of all experience.<sup>34</sup> Kant, nevertheless, adds that “we call *a priori* cognitions *pure* if nothing empirical whatsoever is mixed in with them,”<sup>35</sup> implying that not all *a priori* cognitions are pure. Some may find this baffling, but it has to be stressed that sense impressions are mere inputs, while our cognitive power is a *necessary, universal* condition of our *a priori* cognition.<sup>36</sup> Further clarifications call for an examination into the relation between *a priori* and the transcendental.

“If from your experiential concept of a *body* you gradually omit everything that is empirical in a *body*—the color, the hardness or softness, the weight, even the impenetrability—there yet remains the *space* that was occupied by the body (which has now entirely vanished), and this space you cannot omit [from the concept]. Similarly, if from your empirical concept of any object whatever, corporeal or incorporeal, you omit all properties that experience has taught you, you still cannot take away from the concept the property through which you think the object either as a *substance* or as *attaching* to a substance (even though this concept of substance is more determinate than that of an object as such). Hence you must, won over by the necessity with which this concept of substance forces itself upon you, admit that this concept resides a priori in your power.”<sup>37</sup>

Indeed, the “property through which you think the object either as a *substance* or as *attaching* to a substance” is the remnant of a transcendental object *as such*. What I am trying to bring to light is this: while functioning as a correlative of the unity of apperception of fashion and as the presentation of appearances under the concept of fashion, a something = fashion, i.e., a transcendental object *as such* subsumed under the concept of fashion makes it feasible for us to grasp the concept of fashion—that is, newness—as well as to comprehend the composite relation between the phenomenal and the noumenal of fashion. Again, this is not to say that a transcendental object *as such* of any kind points to any concept. It is the distinct nature of fashion as both a phenomenon and a noumenon, with the “eternal recurrence” of the appearance of its phenomenal toward its noumenal, that assists us to look into the transcendental logic.<sup>38</sup> This is why both the phenomenal and the conceptual of fashion are not to be dispensed with in getting a grip on the mechanism of newness in association with fashion. Assuredly, the phenomenal do not lead us to directly conceptualize fashion, but they “rouse our cognitive power to its operation,” to borrow Kant’s expression.<sup>39</sup> To recast, it is not the pure, abstract thought about newness but the *continuous appearance* of a something = newness as a form of fashion that prompts us to formulate the concept of newness. In the view of Kant, therefore, the fact that our reason knows a priori with apodictic certainty that there will be something new as a form of fashion, comprises the necessary part of the proposition that newness, *the* concept of fashion, belongs to the realm of

metaphysics. Kant utters that “Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of reason, is actual; but if considered by itself alone (as the analytical solution of the third principal question showed), it is dialectical and illusory.”<sup>40</sup> In order for metaphysics to claim to be a science, Kant goes on to say that a critique of reason must itself demonstrate the mechanism of *a priori* concepts, especially the possibility of synthetic cognition *a priori*, while identifying the roles of sensibility, understanding, and reason, together with a complete table of the categories.<sup>41</sup> As Kant himself has already declared, we do not need to ask whether synthetic knowledge *a priori* is possible, in that the existence of pure mathematics and pure physics confirms that pure *a priori* synthetic cognitions are “actual and given.”<sup>42</sup> Instead, Kant proposes that we find out *how* synthetic knowledge *a priori* is possible.<sup>43</sup> As some shrewd readers may have figured out, *it is newness, the concept of fashion, that can decrypt how it is possible*. Newness, the concept of fashion, is far from pure while being a synthetic cognition *a priori*, which makes fashion that which proves itself as the evidence of synthetic cognitions *a priori* from experience, illustrating how synthetic cognition *a priori* is possible with an *a priori* relation to objects divulged, while being a synthetic cognition. The cognition surrounding newness, which can by no means avoid the spatiotemporal intuitions, is pure under no circumstances. As Kant states, “*In terms of time*, therefore, no cognition in us precedes experience, and all our cognition begins with experience.”<sup>44</sup> Added to this, the fact that human beings cannot help awaiting a priori something new affirms that synthetic cognitions *a priori* are not just possible but actual. Otherwise, the temporality of human history to date finds no justification of being seen as successive without making it a point that moving forward with something new is the evidence of this succession. Who would claim that there will be nothing new in the form of fashion in the time called modernity? Properly speaking, however, the topic of newness in conjunction with fashion is part

of metaphysics that is confined to the modern era, although the pure, abstract concept of newness is universal. This throws light on the fact that fashion and modernity have strong ontological relations to each other.

So far I have unfolded the attributes of fashion in light of metaphysics. But few would believe that fashion remains in the world of metaphysics. Then, what has this to do with our everyday life? How do metaphysical explications about fashion relate to human beings? Surely, the metaphysical analysis of the connection between newness and fashion exposes that the pursuit of fashion is no more than that of the self according to Kant's transcendental idealism. Therefore, Svendsen is right: fashion is all about the pursuance of identity.<sup>45</sup> Nonetheless, he is also wrong: fashion itself does not dissolve identity, but it is time that is in vicissitude that is the cause of the feeling of our weakening identity. Let me explain how pairing fashion with time is related to the self's unending quest for itself.

From the point of view of Kantian logic, as I have analyzed, the tie between the cognition of things and their concept in the sphere of fashion is conceived synthetically as well as *a priori*. This gives rise to my other thesis that the concept of newness comes into being contingent upon the "existence of my thinking nature," to use Kant's expression.<sup>46</sup> This is grounded on Kant's argument not just that how one is sure that it is one's self to cognize objects through presentations is, indeed, an existential question about the self,<sup>47</sup> but that it is the form of time that provides a clue to resolving the uncertainty of the self, as Kant further contends: "I exist as an intelligence" that is subject to a condition in which temporal relations are the key determinative.<sup>48</sup> This is of immense significance to make out fashion in tandem with newness because it is no less than that thought's activities regarding something new is, in effect, a legitimate act of cognizing oneself. In order to keep up its identity, ontologically speaking,

fashion requires all the branches of the Cogito proposed by Deleuze,<sup>49</sup> that is, ‘I conceive’ a new fashion, ‘I judge’ the fashion, ‘I remember’ the previous fashion, ‘I imagine’ a new fashion, and ‘I perceive’ the relation between the past fashion and a new one. By no means is it possible for fashion in the embryo to be conceived without the power of imagination, which is *the* driving force in the production of something new. The inception of a new fashion cannot dispense with remembrance and judgment, as well; for something new is not conceivable unless there is a faculty of thought that remembers the past or current examples on which judgments are made, in order to create a novelty in comparison to the ones that are already in the mind. Our perception of the connection between bygones and newness is a high-level activity of thought, because it leads us to question the ontology in difference as well as the time disparity between them. Hence, all these subdivisions of thought, as a set of temporal conditions indispensable for the genesis of fashion, attest not only to the temporal changes in thought in relation to fashion but also to the capacity of thought to capture the flow of time, within which the *I* is able to cognize *my* unity of apperception and self-consciousness. Some may maintain that almost everything is conceived, judged, remembered, imagined, and/or perceived; however, these divisions of thought as a full collection of provisos are not necessarily fundamental to its identity, which is utterly dependent on temporal relations. Undoubtedly, the focal point of Kant’s argument about subjectivity stems from his proposition that time is the form of an inward intuition and the formal *a priori* condition of all appearances,<sup>50</sup> while space is the form of an outward intuition.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, time as a subjective condition of our intuition and of experience is *the* determinant of the self, as Kant puts it:

“By means of inner sense the mind intuits itself, of its inner state. Although inner sense provides no intuition of the soul itself as an object, yet there is a determinate form under which alone [as condition] we can intuit the soul’s inner state. [That form is time.] Thus everything belonging to our inner determinations is presented in relations of time.

Time cannot be intuited outwardly, any more than space can be intuited as something within us.”<sup>52</sup>

In consequence, in view of Kant’s transcendental idealism, thought’s activities in relation to fashion under a different temporal modality are the process by which thought cognizes the dominant role that the self plays as well as the (re)presentations of objects. Conversely, something new as a form of fashion is discernible only through a correct appraisal of the transition of time by the thinking subject, *I*, not just as a simple receptive apperception but as an independent subject.

Yet, Kant makes it clear that the cognition of the self through inner experience allows us to perceive us as we *appear* to ourselves only, not as we are in ourselves,<sup>53</sup> which is, in actual fact, congruous with Kant’s transcendental idealism, whose central thesis is that it is impossible for the human being to comprehend things-in-themselves.

“In the self-cognition of the human being through inner experience he does not *make* what he has perceived in himself, for this depends on impressions (the subject matter of representations) that he *receives*. Therefore he is so far enduring, that is, he has a representation of himself as he is affected by himself, which according to its form depends merely on the subjective property of his nature, which should not be interpreted as belonging to the object, even though he still also has the right to attribute it to the object (here his own person), but with the qualification that he can only recognize himself as an object through this representation in experience as he *appears* to himself, not as he, the observed, in himself.”<sup>54</sup>

Then is our endeavor to bring to the surface the mode of operation of self-cognition a dead-end? In reality, Kant does not disappoint us by presenting a cue about how to perceive us as we are in ourselves. He holds that the cognition of ourselves as we are in ourselves is nothing but the consciousness of our freedom, which is a consciousness of “pure spontaneity,” in other words, of the rule of our actions and omission.<sup>55</sup> He continues to say that self-consciousness, that is, the consciousness of freedom, is identifiable only through the “highest practical reason.”<sup>56</sup> Even with this stumbling block, Kant’s expounding on self-consciousness does not tarnish at all the



significance of fashion as a means of seeking after the self. Rather, it explains why we cannot help stopping searching for the self with recourse to fashion. The cognition of ourselves as we appear to us by way of fashion is *temporary*, as nothing that is linked to our inner determinations can avoid its relation to time. Indeed, any effort to find out about the self is destined to be transitory according to the logic of Kant. In this sense, the descriptions of modernity, “transient,” “fleeting,” and “contingent,” by Charles Baudelaire,<sup>57</sup> are not just a poetic aesthetization of time but an apropos apprehension of the time when individuals, i.e., the modern subjects, are put in a situation to realize themselves on their own. Unlike the previous eras where aristocratic, religious, and traditional values were cherished, modernity opens up a stage on which individuals perform their roles without a premade choreography from the outside but have to play impromptu while, at the same time, communicating with the collective. Fashion is that which serves as a medium for displaying one’s identity while also demonstrating one’s association with the outer world. The interminable appearance of fashion in the modern world evinces the specificity of modernity, as well as our ongoing effort to pursue self-cognition that cannot be kept separate from the temporal relations about which Kant provides a solid metaphysical foundation. Thus, the awareness of time during modernity is no more accidental than the affinity between fashion and modernity is. Nevertheless, as one can imagine, the enigma of how we can *sense ourselves* as we are in ourselves is far from easy to crack. Only with a good, unimpaired understanding of freedom that moves away from the Categorical Imperative in Kant’s moral philosophy can we solve the riddle. Once the deep-rooted liaison between freedom and reason is unknotted, we can see why fashion is still an indispensable part of the self pursuing itself—not just as it *appears* to itself but also as it *is* in itself.

---

## Notes

### Chapter 2

<sup>1</sup> This statement is found in Berg Publisher's website:  
<http://www.bergpublishers.com/BergJournals/FashionTheory/tabid/524/Default.aspx> (accessed as of February 2012).

<sup>2</sup> Lars Svendsen, *Fashion: A Philosophy* (London: Reaktion, 2006), p. 12.  
For the approach of the former perspective, such authors as Anne Hollander and Elizabeth Wilson are illustrated; for the interpretation of the latter, such philosophers as Georg Simmel and Gilles Lipovetsky are introduced.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. The word *fashion* in brackets is my addition.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Lars Svendsen, *Fashion: A Philosophy* (London: Reaktion, 2006), p. 14.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 157.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>10</sup> Joanne B. Eicher and Mary Ellen Roach-Higgins, "Perspectives on Dress and Identity," *Clothing and Textiles Research Journal* 10(4), (1992), 1–8. Reprinted by permission of the International Textile and Apparel Association.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Walter Benjamin, *Selected Writings, Volume 4: 1938–1940*, eds. Michael W. Jennings and Howard Eiland (Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 179.

<sup>13</sup> Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 22.

<sup>14</sup> Among the books on this topic, the following is particularly helpful:  
Donald Clay Johnson and Helen Bradley Foster, eds. *Dress Sense: Emotional and Sensory Experiences of the Body and Clothes* (Oxford, UK; New York: Berg, 2007).

<sup>15</sup> Peter Markie, "Rationalism vs. Empiricism," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta:  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rationalism-empiricism/>.

<sup>16</sup> See the following remark made by Kant:

The capacity (a receptivity) to acquire presentations as a result of the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. Hence by means of sensibility objects are *given* to us, and it alone supplies us with *intuitions*. Through understanding, on the other hand, objects are thought, and from it arise concepts. But all thought must, by means of certain characteristics, refer ultimately to intuitions, whether it does so straightforwardly (*directe*) or circuitously (*indirecte*), and hence it must, in us [human beings], refer ultimately to sensibility, because no object can be given to us in any other manner than through sensibility. (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1996], A20, B34)

Hereafter *CPR*. Citations are noted below with their identifying in-text letter code.

---

<sup>17</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, ed. Robert B. Loudon (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 29.

<sup>18</sup> See Kant's description on this matter:

Bringing various presentations *under* a concept (a task dealt with by general logic) is done analytically. But bringing, not presentations but the *pure synthesis* of presentations, *to* concepts is what transcendental logic teaches. The first [thing] that we must be given a priori in order to cognize any object is the *manifold* of pure intuition. The second [thing] is the *synthesis* of this manifold by the imagination. But this synthesis does not yet yield cognition. The third [thing we need] in order to cognize an object that we encounter is the concepts which give *unity* to this pure synthesis and which consist solely in the presentation of this necessary synthetic unity. And these concepts rest on the understanding.

The same function that gives unity to the various presentations in a *judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various presentations in an *intuition*. This unity—speaking generally—is called pure concept of understanding. Hence the same understanding—and indeed through the same acts whereby it brought about, in concepts, the logical form of a judgment by means of analytic unity—also brings into its presentations a transcendental content, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition as such; and because of this, these presentations are called pure concepts of understanding applying a priori to objects. Bringing such a transcendental content into these presentations is something that general logic cannot accomplish. (*CPR*, A79, B105)

<sup>19</sup> For more clarifications, take a look at Kant's explanation of Transcendental Logic in *CPR*, A56, 57.

We must not call any a priori cognition transcendental, but must call transcendental (i.e., concerning the a priori possibility or the a priori use of cognition) only that a priori cognition whereby we cognize that—and how—certain presentations (intuitions or concepts) are applied, or are possible, simply a priori. Hence neither space nor any a priori geometric determination of it is a transcendental presentation. Rather, we may call transcendental only the cognition that these presentations are not at all of empirical origin, and the possibility whereby they can nonetheless refer a priori to objects of experience. Similarly, the use of space regarding objects in general would also be transcendental. But if the use of space is limited to objects of the senses only, then it is called empirical. The distinction between the transcendental and the empirical belongs, therefore, only to the critique of cognitions, and does not concern the reference of these cognitions to their object.

<sup>20</sup> See Kant's own description about transcendental in Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, 2nd ed., ed. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, [1927] 2001), p. 34.

My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), since it never came into my head to doubt it; but it concerns the sensuous representation of things, to which space and time especially belong. Regarding space and time and, consequently, regarding all appearances in general, I have only shown that they are neither things (but are mere modes of representation) nor are they determinations belonging to things in themselves. But the word “transcendental,” which for me never means a reference of our cognition to things, but only to our faculty of cognition, was meant to obviate this misconception.

<sup>21</sup> See more clarifications on four possible classes of knowledge: analytic a priori, synthetic a priori, analytic a posteriori, and synthetic a posteriori in Georges Dicker, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 15–16.

<sup>22</sup> Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, p. 18.

<sup>23</sup> Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 143.

---

<sup>24</sup> *CPR*, B307, B308.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, A252.

<sup>26</sup> One can identify this correlation between *noumenon* and *intelligibilia* by Kant in *CPR*, A249.

<sup>27</sup> In this respect, it is not incorrect to say, as Sebastian Gardner puts forward, that *noumenon* is an epistemological concept and the thing in itself is a bare ontological concept: while the former is the concept of an object of a certain mode of cognition; the latter is the concept of an object apart from the categories and spatiotemporal intuitions. See Sebastian Gardner, *Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason* (London; New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 130.

<sup>28</sup> H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience: A Commentary on the First Half of the Kritik der reinen vernunft*. (London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan, [1936] 2007), p. 439.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 443–44.

<sup>30</sup> Compared to the concept to newness, for example, the intuition of a house goes through a different process, that is, the synthetic unity of the manifold in space which is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition as such, i.e., the category of magnitude. See Kant's own description:

Hence, e.g., when I turn the empirical intuition of a house into a perception by apprehending the intuition's manifold, then in this apprehension I use as a basis the necessary unity of space and of outer sensible intuition as such; and I draw, as it were, the house's shape in conformity with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. But this same unity, if I abstract from the form of space, resides in the understanding, and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition as such, i.e., the category of magnitude. Hence the synthesis of apprehension, i.e., perception, must conform through to that category. (*CPR*, B162, B163)

<sup>31</sup> *CPR*, B3.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, A1.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, B3.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, B4.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, B6.

<sup>38</sup> Regarding transcendental logic, Kant says the following:

We shall expect, then, that there may perhaps be concepts referring a priori to objects. Not being pure or sensible intuitions, but being merely acts of pure thoughts, they would be concepts, but such concepts as originate neither empirically nor aesthetically. In this expectation, then, we frame in advance the idea of a science of pure understanding and of rational cognition, whereby we think objects completely a priori. Such a science would determine the origin, the range, and the objective validity of such rational cognitions. It would have to be called transcendental logic. (*CPR*, B82)

<sup>39</sup> *CPR*, A1.

<sup>40</sup> Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, p. 99.

---

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> See Kant's own description of this in *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, p. 17.

But it happens, fortunately, that though we cannot assume metaphysics to be an actual science, we can say with confidence that certain pure *a priori* synthetic cognitions are actual and given, namely, pure mathematics and pure physics; for both contain propositions which are everywhere recognized as apodictically certain, partly by mere reason, partly by universal agreement from experience, and yet as independent of experience.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> *CPR*, A1.

<sup>45</sup> See Lars Svendsen's conclusion, especially p. 157 in *Fashion: A Philosophy* (London: Reaktion, 2006).

<sup>46</sup> *CPR*, A384.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., B154–B156.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., B157–B159.

<sup>49</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 138.

<sup>50</sup> *CPR*, A34, B50–B51.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., A23–25, B37–40.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., A23.

<sup>53</sup> Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 30.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., pp. 30–32.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>57</sup> Charles Baudelaire, *Selected Writings on Art and Artists*, ed. P. E. Charvet (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press [c1972]1981), p. 403.

### **CHAPTER 3**

#### **DIALECTICS IN FASHION HISTORY**

Fashion history in modern times is, rather than a record of fashionable dress that comes and goes without its forerunner and successor, a causatum of the dialectical process in which one fashion is cancelled out by another, as is the shape of Hegelian form of history. Not only is the adoption of a fashionable/ popular item of dress by an individual a way of relating to society, but also a fashion phenomenon is an outcome of the tacit agreement between the individual and the collective, which is superseded by another again and again over the course of time. The term ‘fashion,’ instead of ‘dress,’ is used (except when discussing the pre-fashion system) not only because here the point of argument is the agreement between the individual and the collective, but also because dress is a ‘static’ term and encompasses all the items that are arranged around the body regardless of time, which does not necessarily demonstrate Hegelian transformation in history.

This chapter is essentially composed of four parts as examples from history that can begin to illuminate the dialectical process in fashion. First, in the brief section of Introduction regarding the Division between the Pre-Fashion System and the Fashion System, I will analyze the dissimilarity between the pre-fashion system and the subsequent “true” fashion system, which will allow us not only to see the overall trend of the dialectical evolution of vestimentary styles but also to discern the essence of fashion and the impelling force behind its dialectical transformation. Second, I will discuss the dialectical development of the pre-fashion system, mainly prompted by the complex relations between secular power and the church, unlike the fashion system in which the individual-and-collective relations are the key impetus of its dialectical movement. Next, in the section on the Fashion System in the Eighteenth Century and

the Nineteenth Century, I will exemplify the Hegelian mode of history of fashion with the fashions before and after the French Revolution in order to demonstrate the predominance of ideological changes. The Marxist development of fashion history will be demonstrated with the example of the influence of the bicycle on the fashion during the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. The dialectical process in fashion which was run mainly by the vicissitudes of ideological jurisdiction went through metamorphosis by the time the commodity mode of production began to get the upper hand over the power of the dogmatic order of the religious and autocratic, social order. As such, in order to penetrate the procession of the history of fashion in the modern era, the understanding of the shift from Hegelian dialectics to Marxist materialist dialectics is required. Following Hegel, Marx also believes that history is a constant process of dialectics. However, unlike Hegel, for Marx the determinant force behind the development of history is material reality. While the former argues that it is ideology or consciousness that proffers the impetus of the development of history, the latter claims that material reality constitutes who we are or who we believe to be.<sup>1</sup> Last, I will probe how the history of fashion relates to the consciousness of self-determination, just like history itself, as Hegel posits, thereby unmasking the affinity between fashion and zeitgeist as well as substantiating fashion history as a dialectical movement.

### ***Introduction Regarding the Division Between the Pre-Fashion System and the Fashion System***

Unlike the pre-fashion system in which the economic and politico-religious power struggle is most decisive in the dialectical change in dress styles, the fashion system is impossible to sunder from the modern socioeconomic sphere, which is, in point of fact, where the individual and the collective are most conspicuously at interplay with one another. Alan Hunt's studies on sumptuary laws show us that sumptuary restrictions on dress and appearance

were, rather than a prop of the feudal system, a reaction against capitalism,<sup>2</sup> which, I argue, is closely entwined with the formation of individual-and-collective interrelations that are essential to the constitution of fashion phenomena. Hunt maintains that the enactment of sumptuary projects is a signal which marks the shift from the pre-modern to the modern.<sup>3</sup> According to him, the volume of sumptuary laws in the West from the twelfth century to the seventeenth century progressively increased from 4 to 121.<sup>4</sup> However, in the eighteenth century there was a dramatic decline in the restrictions on sumptuary goods.<sup>5</sup> Hunt believes that this has a strong connection with the fall of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. That is to say, the most active period of sumptuary regulation occurred between the demise of feudalism and the growth of manufacturing capitalism, which corresponds to the transitional period between the pre-modern and the modern,<sup>6</sup> although it is impossible to find a moment or a location at which the “historical finger” can be placed.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, as the seventeenth century is reported to have been the highest in the number of sumptuary laws ordained, it can be said that this period is most pivotal as far as the permutation from the pre-modern to the modern is concerned, for, dialectically speaking, it was the climax of the strenuous effort in defense of the feudal, pre-modern values, at which point a sublation occurred to move on to the next stage of a dialectical cycle.

Not only with Hunt’s systematic research on sumptuary projects but also with the history of the development of political philosophy, the seventeenth century can be considered to be among the most momentous historical junctures, if seen from a long range view, signaling civil/liberal society with which individualism came along. The mid-seventeenth century, in which absolutism exerted great influence,<sup>8</sup> saw a rise of modern individualism first hatched by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.<sup>9</sup> They both maintained that a social contract, instead of divine right, endows all authority,<sup>10</sup> although the former espoused absolute authority while the latter offered



the rationale for constitutionalism.<sup>11</sup> Their theories mark the onset of liberal society characterized with “individualism, private property, the primacy of economic motives and market relations, utilitarianism, and a separate and supreme realm of positive law.”<sup>12</sup> What both Hobbes and Locke challenged was centuries-long feudal Christendom and theocratic feudalism at once. The intimate connection between the monarchy and the church had been mutually beneficial in order for them to keep their ruling power, as well illustrated by an absolute monarchy established in the reign of Louis XIV. Earlier in the sixteenth century the Paris Parliament remained within the Holy Catholic Apostolic Church, because it offered the authority of the monarch.<sup>13</sup> Traditionally all kings of France were reckoned as the protectors of the Roman Church being titled “*Roi Très Chrétien* — ‘Very Christian King.’”<sup>14</sup> Across the English Channel, in post-Restoration England not only did Charles II ally himself with the pro-Anglican gentry on religious matters but also managed to stage himself as the loyal protector of the Church of England,<sup>15</sup> following Queen Elizabeth who had already succeeded in becoming both the queen of England and the head of the Anglican Church in the second half of the sixteenth century. All these point to the fact that secular kings and queens in the transitional period between the pre-modern era and the modern era made a great exertion to take advantage of religious doctrines and institutions, so as not to surrender their privilege and sovereignty.

The reason why I give special attention to the concatenated relationship between the church and the monarchy, and between non-religious forces, Catholicism and Protestantism, is that first, the thrust of the dialectical principle of the pre-fashion system can be found in their politico-religious unions as well as conflicts, and, second, the seventeenth century, in which the monarchical effort to accomplish absolutism by means of quasi-religious doctrines was most proactive, was the time when the “true” fashion system finally came into being. Indeed, one

should cast a question as to how the fashion system emerged during the epoch when divine-right theory was eagerly sought after. It is because, I claim, questioning absolutism led the emergence of individualism<sup>16</sup> *as a dialectical response* to the most aggressive absolutist movement. By looking at the convolutions (1) between the secular or humanist interest and Christian morality surrounding the topic of the body and dress (mid-14th–15th centuries), (2) between monarchical power and religious supremacy manifested in the era of Queen Elizabeth (mid-16th century), and (3) between the Protestants and the Catholics (17th century), which I am going to discuss in detail in the section of the Pre-Fashion System, one can come to grips with the propulsive force behind the dialectical transformation prior to the fashion system. On the other hand, to comprehend the “true” fashion system, one needs to grapple with the shifting momentum of dialectical change of fashion, that is, from the Hegelian mode to the Marxist, as the modern era is the time when materialist supremacy began to increasingly override ideological domination of society.

However, one should be cautious when linking fashion and the capitalist environment. Mercantilism, the nationalist form of early capitalism should be discriminated from the capitalism that developed in the seventeenth century, because the former was enchained with state interests in which the Crown took active part by and large to secure its military force, while capitalism from this time on provided a site where the relay between the individual and the collective became feasible, thereby engendering an autonomous dialectical progression in fashion. Mercantile capitalism emerged first with the growth of city-states most notably in Venice as early as in the twelfth century.<sup>17</sup> Some authors believe that the seventeenth century prefigured the modern capitalist economy structure, as China Miéville argues with the evidence from the relationships between states and capital, and also international law<sup>18</sup> that this century is

“transitional to capitalism.”<sup>19</sup> Nonetheless, Miéville also notes that the rise of mercantile capitalism was not “sufficient,” although “necessary,” to bring in the switch to productive capitalism.<sup>20</sup> Why do scholars view mercantilism and capitalism so disparate in nature? And what can this tell us about fashion and its dialectical evolution? The keynote of the discrepancy that also accounts for the difference between the pre-fashion system and the fashion system is that mercantilism contributed to the consolidation of the sovereign state, absolutist or not,<sup>21</sup> whereas individualism, the politico-philosophical foundation of which was laid by Hobbes, Locke, and others in the seventeenth century, was fundamental to liberal bourgeois capitalism, legitimating the bourgeois social and economic relations as well as private property.<sup>22</sup> Put in other words, in the context of fashion, the dialectical transformations of dress styles under the pre-fashion system were in alliance with the interests of the mercantile states; however, those under the fashion system were prompted gradually by capitalist market economy,<sup>23</sup> into which individuals enter of their own volition. As free markets, supported by contemporary thinkers, replaced state and feudal control little by little, the eighteenth century finally saw “the consumer” as a social charterer, and with increasingly affordable fashion goods new consumers from various classes, not limited to a privileged few, began to express their identity.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, the theorization of consumption of fashion as a means of expressing subjectivity and individuality does not fundamentally undermine the principle of the Hegelian history which moves toward the actualization of (*Geist*) spirit’s liberation, for fashion as a material reality is a positive “objectification” that results from the dialectical relation between the individual and the collective. Shaped by dialectical movements with the dynamism between the communication between the individual and the collective, fashion history is impossible to disunite from *Zeitgeist*

(spirit of the times). I will discuss the philosophical rationalization of this concept in the last section of this chapter.

### ***The Pre-Fashion System***

The pre-fashion system in Western society can be traced from the mid-fourteenth century through to mid-seventeenth century, in that the dialectical transformation is discernible in the evolution of vestimentary styles in this time period. Before analyzing the dialectical development of the pre-fashion system, let me first discuss why I locate the mid-fifteenth century,<sup>25</sup> as its beginning and introduce some “morphological” or “formal” studies in fashion, upon which my dating of the pre-fashion system hinges. The basis for assigning a date as to when fashion came into being is absolutely contingent upon the definition of fashion. As explained in the introduction of this dissertation, fashion with respect to modernity did not have its beginning until the seventeenth century. This is grounded in my definition that fashion is more or less a balancing act between universality and individuality, not unlike Georg Simmel’s view,<sup>26</sup> as well as in the observations I have made in the etymology section of the introduction. If I may revisit the most critical point addressed by Kawamura, “as long as the focus is on the material objects,” it is not possible not only to trace the genesis of fashion but also to define fashion in a conclusive manner.<sup>27</sup> Gilles Lipovetsky’s approach in *The Empire of Fashion: Dressing Modern Democracy* (1994) has precise relevance to the heart of this topic, as he has recourse to the conceptual as well as the material:

“I seek to understand the emergence of fashion in the late Middle Ages [mid-fourteenth century] and its principal lines of evolution over the centuries . . . , I have chosen to confine my attention here to a relatively homogeneous object that best exemplifies the phenomenon in question: clothing and its accessories, the archetypal domain of fashion.

“On the other hand, I attempt to comprehend the rising power of fashion in contemporary societies, the central, unprecedented place it occupies in democracies that have set out along the path of consumerism and mass communications. For the dominant

feature of our societies, one that has played a major part in my decision to undertake this book, is precisely the extraordinary generalization of fashion: the extension of the “fashion” form to spheres that once lay beyond its purview, the advent of a society restructured from top to bottom by the attractive and the ephemeral—by the very logic of fashion.”<sup>28</sup>

As illustrated, Lipovetsky has contrived to avail himself of the concept of democracy coupled with consumerism and mass communications, not just resting on the “archetypal domain of fashion,” that is, the vestimentary aspects of fashion only. By democracy he does not necessarily mean a government form or a political system in a narrow sense. Rather, the adoption of this concept is an attempt to overcome the long lasting theories of imitation and distinction which draw upon class difference.<sup>29</sup> The following remark further clarifies the essence of his concept of democracy in conjunction with fashion:

“The Democratization of appearance was matched by the extension and eventual generalization of *a desire for fashion*, a desire previously confined to the privileged strata of society. The hundred years’ fashion not only brought divergent ways of dressing closer together, it also turned frivolous ephemera into objects of desire for the masses as it gave tangible form to the democratic right to fashion. Although increasingly broad strata of society had been gaining access to fashion over the centuries, it was only after the two world wars that the “right” to fashion gained a real foothold and won mass-market legitimacy. Earlier, when members of the lower classes imitated aristocratic dress they had been subject to sarcasm; that time had long since passed. What was deemed ridiculous in the democratic age was not so much imitation in fashion (apart from manifestations of snobbery) as being out-of-date; that was the new mass “taboo.” The hundred years’ fashion simultaneously freed personal appearance from traditional norms and imposed on all and sundry the ethos of change, the cult of modernity. Fashion was more than a right; it had become a social imperative. Through the magic of haute couture, fashion magazines, and fashion-plate celebrities, the masses were trained in the code of fashion, in the rapid variations of the seasonal collections, while at the same time the code of originality and personality was becoming sacred.”<sup>30</sup>

What Lipovetsky is trying to convey here is the magnitude of individuality and of up-to-dateness in an era of democracy, *the* medium of propagandization and dissemination of whose value is fashion, of course. As “a special agent of the democratic revolution,” he claims, fashion hampered the dispersion of “principle of inequality in dress” while debilitating “traditionalist

behaviors and values” in favor of the desire for novelty in association with the interest in the physical look.<sup>31</sup> According to him, fashion is an essentially a western phenomenon.<sup>32</sup> He maintains that the way sartorial changes took place in ancient Egypt, the Greek and Roman republics, China, India, Japan and other traditional Asian civilizations does not reflect the character of fashion, lacking “autonomous aesthetic logic” while void of “regular renewal characteristic of fashion,” but they are affected mainly by “circumstantial influences or relations of domination.”<sup>33</sup> For him, fashion is “an order of value” that stands against the “model of timeless legitimacy based on submission to a collective past,” while promoting the sense of the present and the new, as fashion is “the systematic reign of the ephemeral, of frequent evanescent fluctuation,” less of a display of wealth.<sup>34</sup> Lipovetsky also pays heed to the bifurcation of men’s and women’s dress in terms of shape that became apparent during the late Middle Ages as something that has to do with democracy in an incomprehensible manner, saying, “There is a dissymmetry between masculine and feminine appearance. We need to take another look at the dichotomy, which may be optional and imprecise but which remains enigmatic in relation to the historical thrust of modern democracies.”<sup>35</sup> By his account there is a murkiness about how the disjunction of dress according to gender that happened during the late Middle Ages is related to democracy as well as the germination of fashion.

According to Hunt, when sumptuary regulations in western society were in most active operation, that is, during the transitional period from the pre-modern to the modern, the gendered ordering of dress also appeared.<sup>36</sup> However, he holds that this does not mean that there is a causative relation between them.<sup>37</sup> The gendered dress appeared in the mid-fourteenth century, with which many authors directly or indirectly associate the beginning of fashion,<sup>38</sup> while sumptuary laws were “already well established by the early decades of the fourteenth century.”<sup>39</sup>

Hunt also maintains that the court was an important source for the fourteenth-century initial development of the beginnings of “sexual dimorphism in dress” with the help of “a revival of aesthetics concerns” and the “emergence of tailoring,” and the gendered dress was spurred by “conspicuous consumption and self-individualization.”<sup>40</sup> During this transition to capitalism the breakdown of the feudal system which valued familial bond and kinship continued until the modern subject as an “individual” who sought after pleasure through consumption in the bourgeois mode came into existence. Hunt’s assertion about the relation between sumptuary regulations and sexual dimorphism in dress assists us to apprehend the import of the advent of the gendered dress. As he himself indicates, the sexual differentiation in dress discloses the “anxiety of the ordering of gender,” at a time when the “complex construction of gender in the emergence of modernity is shaped,”<sup>41</sup> which is a significant take-off toward the constitution of individualism as opposed to the non-descriptive or universal body that is ruled by conventional, feudal, and religious ideology. Not unlike Hunt, Christopher Breward makes an interesting remark as to the relation between the appearance of gendered dress and individuality in the mid-fourteenth century, in which “a sense of self-knowledge” emerged ushering in the rise of individuality.<sup>42</sup> Boucher also says of the sexual differentiation as “the first symptoms of Humanism,” which were “a leaning towards secular art, an ideal of man at once more independent and more avid for action, an interest no longer applied to the universal, but to the individual and particular.”<sup>43</sup> In addition, Lipovetsky’s other remark about fashion—“fashion indeed illustrates the ethos of aristocratic ostentation and expense, an ethos diametrically opposed to the modern bourgeois spirit devoted to savings, foresights, and calculation”—is disturbing, since, according to his definition, fashion is “a special agent of the democratic revolution,” with a particular interest in individuality and contemporaneousness. All things

considered, despite the perplexity of Lipovetsky's contradictory narratives, it can be said that the fourteenth century is pivotal to the evolution of fashion because a pre-fashion system, if not the full-blown fashion system, began to emerge during this period. As pointed out by Lipovetsky and others, "cutting-to-fit," or tailoring, as opposed to simple methods like draping or gathering, which were the chief method of dressing the body for the previous centuries, perhaps, for the preceding millennium according to Linda Welters,<sup>44</sup> was invented sometime around the mid-fourteenth century.<sup>45</sup> Since this turning point, as one can see from any dress history books that cover modern western societies, countless shapes in dress with varied tightness and looseness in different parts of dress, which, sometimes, became extreme exaggerations or distortions, also have appeared and disappeared on the stage of history.

Among those who strive to search for the logic of the changes in terms of the shape and silhouette of dress are Alfred Kroeber and Agnes Brooks Young. With the quantitative analyses of the dimensions of a range of variables, such as the length and the width of skirts, and the depth of décolletage, featured in fashion magazines and journals from 1844 to 1919 (in his first study) and from 1787 to 1936 (in his second study with Jane Richardson in 1940), Kroeber postulates changes in fashion that have a certain basic pattern as well as regularity. In an article in 1919, he hypothesized that there is an "underlying pulsation in the width of civilized women's skirts" over a century "with an analogous rhythm in skirt length," over about a third.<sup>46</sup> In a 1940 article, Kroeber, attempted to establish the measurements of the basic dimensions of women's dress over three centuries, seeking to understand the relation of changes in fashion styles to the development of civilization.<sup>47</sup> (To Kroeber, civilization is synonymous with culture.<sup>48</sup>) Although not possible to conceive the intrinsic nature of fashion changes, for example, "from full to narrow and back to full skirts in a century,"<sup>49</sup> he says, the regularity in fashion change betokens



“the principle of civilizational determinism,” but it “scores as against individualistic randomness,” implying that little force by individual influence has changed the momentum of evolutions of culture as well as dress styles.<sup>50</sup> Young, another exponent of fashion cycle theory, conducting research on fashion magazines from 1760 to 1937, has detected a series of “annual typicals” of the contour and shape of women’s skirts and come to a conclusion that fashion change is a continuous and slow process.<sup>51</sup> What is noteworthy is Young’s third conclusion—“fashion change in women’s dress always proceeds by the modification of what has previously prevailed, and never by abrupt departure from it. Each new fashion can be traced back to its predecessor, for it is always an outgrowth or an adaptation in which the lineal descent is clearly evident.” This is similar to the assertion I have made in the introductory part of this chapter, “fashion history in modern times is, rather than a record of fashionable dress which comes and goes without its forerunner and successor, a causatum of the dialectical process in which one fashion is cancelled out by another, as is the shape of Hegelian form of history.” According to Young, sartorial change over three centuries in terms of the silhouette of women’s skirts is essentially cyclical in the unvarying order of the bell, the back-fullness and the tubular, and this repeats over time.<sup>52</sup> Kroeber also acknowledges the “regularity of the swing of an enormous pendulum” when it comes to the changes in the major proportions of dress over a long duration of time often exceeding a human life span, while such details as trimmings, pleats and ruffles alter rapidly.<sup>53</sup> It has to be highlighted that what both authors have revealed together, by means of quantitative analysis with the measurements of western women’s dresses over three centuries, is not the recurrence of the same stylistic changes with a given set of models, which do not apply to our time anymore (the contour of the skirt does not change in the order of the bell, the back-fullness and the tubular every thirty years, nor the variations in the width and length of skirts have the

same regularity as in the previous three centuries), but the “sublation,” the most paramount feature in the development of fashion history that bears out the characteristic of dialectical evolution in history. This leap from quantity to quality on the stage of sublation is clarified by Hegel in one of five divisions of logic in *The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1991):

“Addition. The identity of quality and quantity present in measure is only *implicit* at first, and not yet *posited*. This implies that each of the two determinations, whose unity is measure, also claims validity on its own account. In this way, on the one hand, quantitative determinations of what is there can be altered, without its quality being affected thereby, but, on the other, this indifferent increase and decrease also has a limit, the transgression of which alters the quality. Thus, for instance, the temperature of water is, up to a point, indifferent in relation to its liquid state; but there comes a point in the increasing or decreasing of the temperature of liquid water where this state of cohesion changes qualitatively, and the water is transformed into steam, on the one hand, the ice, on the other. When a quantitative alteration takes place it appears, to start with, to be something quite innocuous; but something quite different lurks behind it, and this seemingly innocent alteration of the quantitative is like a ruse with which to catch the qualitative.”<sup>54</sup>

Hegel also writes:

“As we have seen, quantity is not merely capable of alteration, i.e., of increase and decrease; rather, it is, generally and as such, the process of going beyond itself. And in measure, quantity does indeed confirm this nature. But now, when the quantity that is present in measure exceeds a certain limit, the corresponding quality is thereby sublated, too. What is negated in this way, however, is not quality in general, but only this determinate quality, whose place is immediately taken again by another one. This process of measure, which proves to be alternately a mere alteration of quantity and an overturning of quantity into quality, can be visualised in the image of a knotted line.”<sup>55</sup>

The illustration of water becoming steam or ice depending on the increasing or decreasing of the temperature of liquid water allows us to comprehend the mechanism of sublation, at which point a quantitative alteration results in a qualitative change. In conformity with the dialectical transformation by sublation are Kroeber’s findings regarding the dimensional changes in fashion obtained through statistical analysis. According to him, there is a period of

turbulent vibrations in “quantity” before a qualitative change in fashion history is made. To be more specific, macroscopically speaking, approximately 70 years saw little variation from the focal trend, but in 30 or more years there was a high degree of instability until another dominant trend was laid down.<sup>56</sup> Hence, we can say that quantitative data analyses by Kroeber and Young are nothing but evidence that bespeaks the dialectical transformation of fashion history; that is, in the mode of dialectical succession, proceeding behind a forerunner while being followed by a successor (Young), fueled by sublation (Kroeber), just like history itself.

Given the “big picture” of the movement of fashion styles over centuries, with respect to the dialectical transmutation, we should, by necessity, take a look at each stage with a distinct shape or contour from the fourteenth century through to the seventeenth century, the time period Kroeber and Young haven’t dealt with; that is, from the beginning stage of the pre-fashion system to the time when the fashion system is about to set up its operation. Not only does this help us see the differences between the two systems, but it also assists us to fathom the overall flow of fashion history from a dialectical point of view.

I would like to focus on the vying relations in the midst of the “politico-religious” evolutions propelled by the protestant reformation including Renaissance humanism, the English reformation in the sixteenth century, and the puritan movement in the seventeenth century with the growing secular power as the impetus of the “formal” or “morphological” transformation in dress styles during the pre-fashion system. This avenue in search of the momentum of the changes in the contour of the clothed body before the period of the fashion system will greatly help us not only penetrate Hegel’s view that ideology or consciousness is the cause of change in our empirical, material world but also come to understand the disparity between the pre-fashion system and the fashion system: the former is swayed by politico-religious hegemonic relations

while the latter is shaped increasingly more by the autonomous relay between the individual and the collective. This does not mean that ideological predominance as the most significant dialectical force in forging the history of fashion suddenly ceased to exercise its influence with the rise of the fashion system. As one can see from the fashion changes before and after the French Revolution, which I will discuss later, ideology was and is still a most powerful factor in the dialectics of fashion system, but the individual-collective interactions became so powerful to the extent that they outweigh the ideological dominance. I would like to add that this is not that the reference points for my argument are ambiguous but that no single narrative of history can explain the complex historical development. There is no clear-cut line between the pre-modern and the modern as well as between the pre-fashion system and the mature fashion system at which the historical finger can be located, as Hunt has remarked. Despite this, I have attempted to pin down the seventeenth century as a most critical watershed between the pre-fashion system and the fashion system on the basis that fashion is a communication between the individual and the collective.

Now let us take a look at the dialectical evolution of dress styles under the pre-fashion system. Many dress historians hold that clothes during the Middle Ages were cut in different versions of simple rectangular or circular shapes in general until the early fourteenth century,<sup>57</sup> at which point tailoring was invented, and used for men's doublets and women's bodices thereafter. However, closely fitted garments were worn periodically, most notably in Italian city-states, in the tenth, eleventh, and early twelfth century, as well as the early thirteenth century, and reappeared in the fifteenth century; and even until the fifteenth century the simple, long robes were not uncommon in England and France.<sup>58</sup> As Mary G. Houston in her research on the medieval costume in England and France puts it, "In general the costumes of this century (in

13th-century England and France) are cut on the simplest geometric plans and, except for a few very early examples, there is no attempt to fit the figure as was seen in the twelfth and again in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.”<sup>59</sup> Compare the plan of the tunics cut in simple geometric shapes in the 13th century by Mary G. Houston with the 14th century-patterns drawn by Poul Nörlund, which discloses the evidence of tailoring.




Illustration 1. A man's tunic (c. 13th century), Mary G. Houston, *Medieval Costume in England and France: The 13th, 14th, and 15th Centuries* (New York: Dover Publications, 1996), p. 2.




Illustration 2. A woman's tunic (c. 13th century), Mary G. Houston, *Medieval Costume in England and France: The 13th, 14th, and 15th Centuries* (New York: Dover Publications, 1996), p. 2.




Illustration 3. A semicircular cloak for both sexes (c. 6th century–c. 13th century), Mary G. Houston, *Medieval Costume in England and France: The 13th, 14th, and 15th Centuries* (New York: Dover Publications, 1996), p. 3.



Illustration 4. A plan for a garment (c.1450 B.C.–c.14th A.D.), Mary G. Houston, *Medieval Costume in England and France: The 13th, 14th, and 15th Centuries* (New York: Dover Publications, 1996), pp. 3–4.




Illustration 5. A plan for a cape-like garment (c.5th century–c.13th century), Mary G. Houston, *Medieval Costume in England and France: The 13th, 14th, and 15th Centuries* (New York: Dover Publications, 1996), pp. 3–5.




Illustration 6. A man's tunic, Herjolfsnes no. 33, 34 (Mid-Late 14th Century), Nörlund, Poul. "Buried Norsemen at Herjolfsnes: An Archaeological and Historical Study." *Meddelelser om Gronland: Udgivne af Kommissionen for ledelsen af de geologiske og geogrfiske undersogelser i Gronland*. Bind LXVII. Kobenhavn: C.A. Reitzel, 1924.<sup>60</sup>




Illustration 7. A long sleeved dress, Herjolfsnes no. 38 (Mid-Late 14th Century), Nörlund, Poul. "Buried Norsemen at Herjolfsnes: An Archaeological and Historical Study." *Meddelelser om Gronland: Udgivne af Kommissionen for ledelsen af de geologiske og geografiske undersøgelser i Gronland*. Bind LXVII. Kobenhavn: C. A. Reitzel, 1924.<sup>61</sup>

It is worth mentioning again that, as explained earlier with the findings by Kroeber and Young, no sublation of dress "form" occurs without foregoing stylistic swings of pendulum. The periodical appearance of the elements of the figure-fitting garments such as lacing, buttons and gores can be regarded as the trace of these swings; and yet clothes were basically simple, long and baggy until the mid-fourteenth century. In spite of the regional differences in detail of various types of garments, during the late medieval period of the fourteenth century and early fifteenth century, and the Renaissance that spans roughly from the mid-fifteenth through to sixteenth century,<sup>62</sup> the shapes of male dress and the upper body forms of female dress were periodically either closer to the body, as they accentuated physique, or looser, but gradually moving in the direction of truly tailored-to-fit garments. This signals a morphological transformation that has bearing with the development of sense of individuality, indispensable to the individual-collective relations—the essential element of the fashion system. The general dress style of men became slimmer, shorter for young men than in proceeding centuries, concurrent with the contemporary cultural trend of the veneration of the youthful body and its physical sensuality,<sup>63</sup> particularly inspired by the Italian Renaissance.<sup>64</sup>

During the Mannerist Renaissance, after 1520, with the influence of first the German and later the Spanish court,<sup>65</sup> exaggerated distortion was achieved by a padding (of the doublet in particular) and a slashing with the lining fabric forced through the slits, creating a somewhat tense, twisted, or grotesque look.<sup>66</sup> In Christopher Breward's opinion: "Within medieval society the body was prioritized as the dwelling-place of soul, inner character was displayed throughout outward signs and clothing could not avoid implication in such a problematic moral arena."<sup>67</sup> However, by the Renaissance, when a general sense of freedom for man to control his own destiny emerged, leaving behind the oppression by the church,<sup>68</sup> geometrically shaped robes and gowns gradually gave way to more form-fitting clothing, especially for men, while the female dress in the early part of the period retained a religious or "conventional" style.<sup>69</sup>

In later sixteenth-century Europe there were huge national and regional differences in dress, while Catholic Spain was the strongest influence.<sup>70</sup> The political and economic dynamics among Italy, Spain, France, and England greatly affected the way people dressed in this period.<sup>71</sup> Although the heart of culture in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Italy gave her supremacy to Spain due to the discovery of America (1492), which impacted the trade of Spain, France, and England, leading to the decline of the Italian city-states' mercantile power.<sup>72</sup> However, in the second half of the sixteenth century, the glorious age of Queen Elizabeth, England became a significant power in Europe, with her wide exploration of different parts of the world.<sup>73</sup> A great Catholic Armada of 132 ships, the largest massing of maritime power until the nineteenth century was defeated by England in 1588.<sup>74</sup> It was not only a battle over the naval power but also a religious war between Catholics and Protestants. The campaign of the Invincible Armada, with banners bearing the image of the Holy Virgin, prepared by Phillip II of Spain, in agreement with the Catholic pope for the retaliation of the execution of Catholic Mary, Elizabeth's cousin,<sup>75</sup> was



initiated to get rid of England protestant queen, who was supported by a wave of nationalism.<sup>76</sup>

As shown in the Armada Portrait of Queen Elizabeth, commissioned to celebrate a great national victory over Spain, Queen Elizabeth's dresses and gestures, rendered in her portraits, are filled with allegories of political supremacy of England (and herself as the symbol of the monarchical state) and artificial display of power, visually exhibiting the rise of England as a power at sea and in commerce and diplomacy.<sup>77</sup>

The dress style in the Elizabethan/Jacobean era (c.1560–1620), which projects a rigid and repressive atmosphere,<sup>78</sup> enhanced by an exaggerated display of power, is antithetical to the relaxed and casual Renaissance mode. Graham Reynolds's description helps us visualize the artificially tailored dressed body during this era:

“In fact, in this period more than any other, the shape of the clothed human body was as clay in the hands of the tailors; with wire and bombast they compressed it here and inflated it there, regardless of the anatomical structure of legs and arms, of waists and bosoms. At times they produced results so different from the natural human form that one is forcibly reminded of the deformations and mutilations practiced upon themselves by savage tribes. This is particularly the case in the closing decade of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, when the bodice was restricted to a narrow inverted cone standing on its point upon the enormous cylinder of the drum farthingale, flanked at the sides by puffed leg-of-mutton sleeves and crowned by a great ruff.”<sup>79</sup>

It has to be pointed out again that this sartorial impression is achieved in the midst of the politico-religious struggle while in the evolution of medieval kingdoms into early modern nation-states, in which the monarchs strived to consolidate their status, steering the relation between church and state. Although different kinds of trimmings and embellishments such as starched lace and ribbons adorned the doublets and cloaks,<sup>80</sup> the serious impression of the dress style of the Elizabethan/Jacobean era, enhanced by strict bodily deportment, is unmistakably transferable. As Ronnie Mirkin points out,

“It is evident that Elizabethan and Jacobean costume was built so as to enforce the body to act according to correct rules of conduct. Right behaviour would strike the spectator with awe; wrong deportment would have a comical or grotesque effect. The most important items of clothing to determine the correct position of the body were the rigid whaleboned doublet and the stayed corset—stiff instruments for encasing the torso of both men and women and setting it upright.”<sup>81</sup>

The Elizabethan/ Jacobean dress is antithetical to the Renaissance dress, on the ground that it is the acme of the exaggerated, unnatural dress, more distorted than the stiff Spanish silhouette, as opposed to the natural, form-fitting dress of the Renaissance. For example, in the second half of the sixteenth century the farthingale and the ruff grew to exaggerated proportions:<sup>82</sup> Anne of Denmark’s farthingale is reported to have been “four feet wide in the hips.”<sup>83</sup>

I argue that these ostentatious expressions of power or grandiosity, particularly in the late sixteenth-century England, by the medium of dress with its exaggerated form achieved by a variety of tools and methods, were in accordance with the art of governing people by Elizabeth as both the secular sovereignty and the head of the Anglican church at once. The imposing dress style of the Elizabethan/ Jacobean era and the dignified vestimentary mode of the High Medieval Ages are hardly dissimilar, for the reason that they are not only on the other side of “figure-friendly” garments, but also an indispensable means of upholding their politico-religious supremacy. This demonstrates the Hegelian mode of succession of history; that is, there is a forerunner of an historical event followed by a successor. Again, the politico-religious unity and conflicts were the dialectical principle of the pre-fashion system, contrary to the fashion system in which the autonomous individual-collective relations are the key momentum of the evolution of fashion, fostered by the capitalist bourgeois social relations. However, in this period, the breakdown of the monolithic authority of religion, plus the rise of mercantile capitalism is

evidence of a shift in the direction of an individual-collective dichotomy that would become even more significant in the next century.

The exaggerations of the Elizabethan/ Jacobean period would give way to the “Cavalier” style that made its appearance during the early part of the Baroque period. Like Italian Renaissance dress (during the mid-15th to early 16th centuries) that had preceded Mannerist style, the cavalier style cast a comfortable and sprightly look.<sup>84</sup> This early Baroque style set in opposition to the modes of the Renaissance and the Elizabethan-Jacobean era, though completely different from them in both form and content. The corseted shape was softened.<sup>85</sup> Men’s hair became longer, softer and more flowing and, instead of starched ruffs, the relaxed falling lace collars or limp, unstarched ruffs appeared, “as if released from the inhibitions against length and fullness created by the high neckwear of the Elizabethan-Jacobean Period.”<sup>86</sup> The overall look became more relaxed and animated, accentuated with turned-down leather boots and a wide-brimmed hat, which developed into different cocked hats.<sup>87</sup> However, this carefree style with loose hair was different from the sartorial type of the Renaissance with its emphasis on the idealized, classical dimensions of the body and from that of the Elizabethan/ Jacobean era that projected the impression of stiffness and a bombastic air attained by starched, stiff fabrics and other devices. Towards the mid-seventeenth century not only men’s dress but also women’s dress became relatively lighter and softer than the late sixteenth century: wire or padding disappeared, and the farthingale was replaced by looser, layered skirts, allowing much greater freedom of movement.<sup>88</sup> The simplification of Women’s clothing was also achieved with gauze scarves, which replaced lace collars and kerchiefs, and a less exuberant use of fabrics.<sup>89</sup> Francis M. Kelly and Randolph Schwabe write, “‘Cavalier’ dress, graceful and unconstrained, was a protest against Spanish artificiality, . . .”<sup>90</sup> The taut, inflated, or sometimes disfigured dress style

of the Elizabethan/ Jacobean can be said to have served as a counter-influence that brought forth the Cavalier style, the jaunty look of which did not come into being out of nowhere however, as its prototype can be traced from the “body-hugging” Renaissance mode of dress. In view of the silhouette, the sartorial transformation of the first half of the seventeenth century is progressive as well as dialectical. By progressive I mean that the Cavalier style takes on quite a different mood because of its distinctive shape or form, probably unknown to anyone on earth previously. In spite of the much less strain on the dress with a renewed Baroque interest in the natural human form and movement, there is also some flavor of theatricality or grandeur, if not artificiality like the Spanish style. The Cavalier wore a hat at a skewed angle, a cloak flung over one side, and a lovelock fell loosely at one side, and even the boot tops were not straightly cut.<sup>91</sup> The Baroque irregularity or asymmetry in dress style with the sense of flamboyant movement, which some people call a braggadocio air, not only endows the Cavalier mode with a unique dynamics but also makes the silhouette of the Cavalier dress distinctively progressive. The Cavalier style—a reaction to the politico-religious unity that happened during the Elizabethan era while a successor to the earlier example of the Renaissance mode characterized with freedom away from the feudal, religious bodily politics—demonstrates how dress styles were fashioned by a growing conflict between monarchical interest in political and religious supremacy and the spread of individualist dissent with the reformation. The less rigid, more relaxed style of Cavaliers in the first half of the seventeenth century was a rejection against the stiffened, starched, and structured late Elizabethan mode in the second half of the sixteenth century. However, the Cavalier fashion could not stay clear of a dialectical movement either, as it was also supplanted by the Restoration style in the second half of the seventeenth century—the consequence of the antithetical relations between the Cavalier style and the Puritan style. It has to be noted that the conflicting style war

between the Cavalier mode and the Puritan mode foreboded the beginning of the modern dialectical transformation whose thrust was shaped by the autonomous dialectical relation among people from different classes, rather than by the politico-religious power game among those of privileged, aristocratic classes, as in the previous centuries. Now I will explain this dialectical cycle.

Another dialectical sublation in dress style can be observed in the late Baroque period (c. 1660–1715), in which the soft, relaxed style in men's clothing was superseded by decorative frenzy, becoming more ornate and stiff. For example, soft turned-down leather boots with lace and ribbon trim, of Spanish military origin, fashionable since about 1625,<sup>92</sup> were gone in favor of heeled court shoes and silk stockings.<sup>93</sup> As a matter of fact, it is by no means simple to analyze the dialectical changeover in the late Baroque vestimentary style, for the religious wars, inseparable from political dominance during this time, resulted in the complexity of the dialectical transformation in dress styles. Already in the early Baroque, through the blood-shedding Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) the conflicts between Protestant and Catholics became on the surface across European continent.<sup>94</sup> After the English Civil War (1642–1651) between Parliamentarians (Roundheads)<sup>95</sup> and Royalists (Cavaliers), who espoused Catholic Stuarts,<sup>96</sup> came the period of the execution of King Charles I, followed by parliamentary and military dictatorship by Oliver Cromwell, during which time clothes became dull and drab.<sup>97</sup> Yet, there was also the contrasting costume of the aristocratic supporters of the king, termed the Cavaliers who existed simultaneously with the Puritans and their dress in the seventeenth century.<sup>98</sup> It should be noted that "the cavalier as a type was by no means exclusively English."<sup>99</sup> Between 1625 and 1660, both men's and women's clothing became relatively more comfortable,<sup>100</sup> and female dress like men's attire became relaxing, as ruffs, farthingales, boned stomacher, which created the stiff-

corseted contour, disappeared.<sup>101</sup> The Cavalier style is flamboyant but gracious, if compared side by side with the dark, dry and unpicturesque Puritan style:<sup>102</sup> the Cavalier wore long hair and donned a slashed silk doublet, a point-lace collar, and a broad-brimmed hat with rosettes, plums, and flashy buckles decorated;<sup>103</sup> on the other hand, the Puritan with short hair wore “a stiff, high-crowned, plain, broad-brimmed hat of severe and forbidding aspect,” “a doublet and a hose made of coarse dark cloth,” and “a cloak of some sombre shade,” “brought well round his shoulders instead of being flung over one side,” as was the Cavalier’s.<sup>104</sup>

Notwithstanding the Cavalier style often typifies the sartorial mode of the early seventeenth century, it is erroneous that the puritan dress code was marginal during the first half of the seventeenth century in England, as Georgiana Hill states that the puritans represented a considerable number of the middle class.<sup>105</sup> He also remarks that their wardrobe choice was “a matter of conscience,” rather than “a matter of custom,”<sup>106</sup> which is quite aligned with the Hegelian history that is shaped by the dialectics of the moment of ideology, idea, or consciousness. Conscience is a consciousness of moral choice and belief in God in a religious sense, while it is “a consciousness, that is duty of itself,” for Kant. Not unlike the latter, Hegel sees conscience as self-consciousness that knows “what right and duty are” and “what it thus knows and wills is truly right and duty.”<sup>107</sup> The fact that the Puritans chose drab outfits owing to their “conscience,” that resulted from their belief disclosed how powerful individual belief and autonomy had become in defining new collective ideologies beyond that dictated by established church and king.

While the transformation from the ideological preponderance to the materialist sway is significant when penetrating the fashion system, what is still most prominent in term of the internal principle for dialectics of the pre-modern society and the early stage of the modern era,

is ideology and consciousness, which include political views, religious belief, and conscience. Out of the irreconcilable modes of the Cavalier and the Puritan came the Restoration style on to the horizon as a dialectical consequence not long after Charles II came from exile in 1660. The politico-religious shift described by Michael H. MacDonald—"The Restoration involved a return of the Stuart monarchy and of the traditional Church of England—as well as a reaction against the enforced morality of Puritan rule and the upheavals of the recent past,"<sup>108</sup> is absolutely congruent to the dialectical mutation of the dress style of the time. As Kelly and Schwabe have noted, the late Baroque style in England is a "reaction against" the Puritan mode of dress;<sup>109</sup> and yet, the vestimentary mode in the second half of the seventeenth century also succeeded to the royalist Cavalier style. The sartorial style during the rule of the pro-Catholic and anti-Protestant Charles II of England again became ostentatious with a lot of embellishments added,<sup>110</sup> as Charles II and later James II viewed "fashion leadership" no different from "political leadership" and tried to restore the splendor in dress of the glorious Tudor and Stuart monarchy in French style, as pointed out by David Kuchta.<sup>111</sup> Noteworthy is that the two kings in England along with Louis XIV of France aspired to establish an absolute monarchy, the doctrine that justifies an authoritarian political and religious program.<sup>112</sup> It has to be pointed out that, with the rise of absolutism and divine-right theory, the vestimentary style in all the countries of Europe also became heavier, bulkier, and more excessive.<sup>113</sup> Russell elucidates my argument that the contour of the dressed body had enlarged or diminished over the course of the pre-fashion system, depending on the fluctuating monarchical interest in enhancing political and religious power at once. However, toward the close of the reign of Louis XIV, "an increasing aestheticization and commodification of both clothing and private life" not from the court but from elite individuals came into sight, resulting in the different fashion cultures of *la cour* and *la ville*,<sup>114</sup> which, in fact,

illustrates the transitional period in which the antithetical dialectical forces between Louis's kingship, with which the voluminous and opulent court dress was deeply connected, and individuals' motives to dress themselves for private pleasure.

The point I am trying to say is not simply that the volume of dress became bigger simply in proportion to the actual power of kings or queens, or the Church, but that their interest in dress was inseparable from their effort to get the control over politico-religious status quo under the pre-modern era, which is none other than is the Hegelian conception of history that is regulated by ideological superstructure from which political and/ or religious convictions or beliefs are in no way kept apart. Not to be overlooked is the fact that there is a period of "swings" in quantity preceding a qualitative shift in the dialectical transformation in fashion history. In other words, the morphological changes found in fashion history attest to the antithetical phase prior to sublation, by means of which a dialectical movement finds its momentum to proceed.

A systematic probe into the morphological alterations of fashion over centuries is essential to tracing the dialectical evolution of fashion as well as the inception of fashion from the perspective of "formal" changes in fashion. Nevertheless, as I have explained earlier, fashion is not just a material object but also an outcome of the communications between the individual and the collective. Stylistic changes are not enough in defining the parameters of fashion. The dialectical evolution in dress styles before the germination of the full-blown fashion system manifests more of the dogmatic rule of the times coupled with the shifts in monarchical leadership in relation to church and the emerging mercantile class than of the communications between the individual and the collective, what Lipovetsky would deem as the evidence of democracy, to which individuality and the sense of up-to-dateness are essential. The difference between the pre-fashion system and the fashion system is that the former is more of an outcome



of the hegemonic relations in the political-cum-religious early modern states and nations whereas the latter is shaped by the autonomous communications between the individual and the collective. There were increasingly individuals that swayed the direction of fashion of the time from the seventeenth century onwards, as religious and political dissent grew and challenged the old authoritarian hierarchy. The bottom line is that the dialectical evolution in terms of the silhouette or shape of dress in the pre-fashion system has more to do with the politico-religious hegemonic relations than the autonomous, or “democratic” relay between the individual and the collective. Not to be forgotten is that, as I have explained earlier by referencing Hunt, Breward, and Boucher, it is from the period of the pre-fashion system that the self-awareness of the body as an individuated and gendered site in league with the interest in personal taste and needs began to grow, although the full-scale individual and collective interactions are found in the fashion system. In spite of their unequivocal disparities, the pre-fashion system and the fashion system are in no way separable when coming to grips with the overall dialectical movement in fashion history.

### ***The Fashion System in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century***

In the first half of this section I will discuss fashions before and after the French Revolution, since they most clearly reveal the Hegelian mechanism in fashion, while in the second half I will look into the dialectical transformation of fashion in the mode of Marx’s dialectical materialism, the mode of which is a dialectical movement; however, its momentum is material reality, as opposed to the Hegelian impetus, i.e., ideological predominance. And in the latter part of this section the fashion transformations caused by the advent of the “safety” bicycle that occurred at the turn of the twentieth century will be analyzed, with the special interest in

Marx's materialist dialectic, whose "materialist conception of history" best accounts for the dialectical mutations of fashion during this transitional period.

As mentioned above, not only were the ideological shifts the driving force behind the transformation of fashion at the turn of the eighteenth century, but also the three distinctive stages of the evolution of fashion during this time are acutely discernible. As opposed to the aristocratic Bourbon style, which is pompous and sumptuous with a lot of decorations, Greco-Roman dresses, in token of the collective aspiration towards democracy, were adopted and later supplanted by the mode of the Bourbon Restoration. Nevertheless, fashion did not revert after these processes of transition just as the Bourbon Restoration did not succeed in getting back the equivalent of the power of the absolute monarchy of the previous century. Closely intertwined, fashion and ideology during this time are impossible to take apart.

Anticipating the demise of the monarchy and its vestimentary norms, a wave of Anglomania in the 1770s and 1780s already swept France, almost all areas of society illustrating the denigration of the French as well as the keen interest in the English manner and freedom of thought<sup>115</sup> which had grown from the radical philosophies of Isaac Newton and John Locke in the early decades of the eighteenth century.<sup>116</sup> The anglophile was readily identifiable by appearance: the robe *à l'anglaise* for women was much simpler in ornament and fabric while the luxuriant *justaucorps*, the staple for the male aristocrat, was eschewed in favor of a *frac* or a *redingote*.<sup>117</sup> However, it should be noted that the habit of *à l'anglaise* and the habit of *à la française* existed together in Paris in the 1770s and 1780s.<sup>118</sup> To be sure, this visually demonstrated the cohabitation of the two different rules of late eighteenth-century France, that is, of the French absolute monarchy and of English political liberties achieved by a series of constitutional breakthroughs such as the Bill of Rights (1689) and the Act of Settlement (1701),

both of which diminished the power of the Crown while establishing the sovereignty of Parliament. Notwithstanding the concurrence of antithetical modes of appearance, the epitome of the aristocratic grandiosity of the French Bourbon monarchy is the robe à *la française* with yards of resplendent silk brocade draped over wide panniers creating an exaggerated rectangular shape.<sup>119</sup>



Illustration 8. Court dress, ca. 1750, British, Blue silk taffeta brocaded with silver thread. Purchase, Irene Lewisohn Bequest, 1965 (C.I.65.13.1a-c). Source: Druesedow, Jean L. "In Style: Celebrating Fifty Years of The Costume Institute." *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin*, 45, no. 2 (Fall, 1987). p. 8.

Typical of Rococo style, with intricate floral motifs often used for surface ornamentation, this mode of the dress was particularly popular in the mid-eighteenth century. Another extravagance *de rigueur* for the French aristocrat was huge wigs which went to extreme in both size and form towards the 1770s. Indeed, the spectacular *coiffures* with their elaborate embellishments were also another means of displaying the ostentatious exhibition of aristocratic power and wealth.

However, the symbols of the eighteenth-century aristocrats such as brocades, lace, periwig and powder, not to mention the robe *à la française*, suddenly disappeared under the Republic, especially during the Reign of Terror, because the French nobility deliberately avoided them lest they were recognized to be an aristocrat. The ebbing of the badges of aristocracy occurred without doubt, out of political turmoil as a letter (1818) from France by Franklin James Didier clearly shows the atmosphere of this time.

“During the reign of Robespierre and the Jacobins, fashion was as anarchical as the government. After the famous 6th October, and 10th August 1791 and '92 when the Chateaux of Versailles and Tuileries were pillaged, you might have seen blacksmiths in court dresses, coalsellers with embroidered waistcoats, and fishwomen in high-heeled shoes. Terror arrived with the red cap of Liberty, introduced a Spartan simplicity in dress. The least foppery was regarded as an aristocratic symptom, and ragged clothes were the order of the day.”<sup>120</sup>

Although the vestimentary rules were chaotic in these turbulent years as was the society in general, the issues regarding dress were among the main concerns of the Republic from the beginning of the Revolution. The concept of equality was the chief element of its propaganda for which sartorial codes were employed.<sup>121</sup> For example, one of the first acts of the new National Assembly in October 1789 was to allow the Estates to wear whatever they chose instead of the official costumes designated by court order.<sup>122</sup> With the progress of the revolution, things became even more confusing and disorderly than before. The confusion of the politics of

physical appearance made the identification of internal enemies as well as political opponents of the Republic difficult.<sup>123</sup> As a result, attempts were made to restructure dress codes. In 1793 black wigs *à la Jacobine* were banned while *bonnets rouges* were restricted to meetings of sections' committees only, for example, as it became extremely perplexing to tell apart intentional misuse of republican signs and manifestation of self-expression.<sup>124</sup> Thus while the idea of universal equality via dress and appearances was utilized to abolish the visible signs of hierarchical order of the absolute monarchy, acquiring a "salutary political significance,"<sup>125</sup> it also placed the inchoate government at risk. As the revolutionary spirit was consolidated with the red liberty cap, tricolor cockades, and sans-culottes, of great demand on the part of the government led by Robespierre was the establishment of the dress of the new regime by which people could express their political convictions. To further this end, David Jacques-Louis, as both an ardent supporter of Robespierre and the master of neoclassicism, was commissioned to design uniforms for government officials as well as civilian costumes, which were mixtures of classicism, historicism and his own imagination.<sup>126</sup> Although the campaign directed by the Committee of Public Safety in a bureaucratic attempt to have civilians adopt these designs was never successful,<sup>127</sup> his other project, the Fête de la Révolution, whose prototype is Roman Catholic ceremonies, drew tens of thousands of people. This fete made the public familiar with his version of Grecian dresses.<sup>128</sup> The white Directoire dress made of almost transparent muslin, a loosely woven cotton fabric, became so popular among fashionable ladies that they wore the diaphanous dress even in the winter.



On December 24, 1803, Jerome Bonaparte (1784–1866), brother of Napoleon, married Elizabeth Patterson (1785–1879) of Baltimore. The beautiful and fashionable young American was married in a dress of muslin and lace that, according to a contemporary, “would fit easily into a gentleman’s pocket.” This description is a reference to the fashion, at the very beginning of the nineteenth century, for very sheer, narrow dresses that caused a sensation, more because of their contrast with the elaborate hooped costumes of previous decades than for any real immodesty. Although originally thought to have been Elizabeth Patterson’s wedding dress, the formal gown pictured probably dates from after 1804—when this type of vertical white embroidery became fashionable. Napoleon had the marriage annulled in 1805 and made Jerome king of Westphalia in 1807. That same year Jerome married the princess of Württemberg. Elizabeth, forbidden by the emperor to enter France, remained in Baltimore with her son, Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte (1805–1870). The very sheer cotton muslin from which the dress is made was probably imported from India already embroidered with heavy white cotton thread in satin stitches and French knots. Under the transparent muslin were worn the chemise, corset, and underdress that only a daring few had briefly abandoned in imitation of “Grecian” drapery—the first of many fanciful nineteenth-century allusions to details of costume in earlier historic periods. Purchase, Gifts in memory of Elizabeth N. Lawrence, 1983 (1983.6.1)

Illustration 9. Grecian style dress. c.1804.

Purchase: Gift in memory of Elizabeth N. Lawrence, 1983. (1983.6.1).

Source: Druesedow, Jean L. “In Style: Celebrating Fifty Years of The Costume Institute.” *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin*, v. 45, no. 2 (Fall, 1987). p. 26.

Certainly, the adoption of the flowing Grecian-inspired dress with high waist unveils the French collective ideal of their new regime as heir to the Greek and Roman Republics. Even the cotton fabric used for the dress gave off some sort of sensation having political resonance synesthetically ingrained in the mind as Walter Benjamin’s quotation from Edouard Foucaud elucidated:

“‘Cotton fabrics replace brocades and satins, . . . and before long, thanks to . . . the revolutionary spirit, the dress of the lower classes becomes more seemly and agreeable to the eye.’ Edouard Foucaud, *Paris inventeur: Physiologie de l’industrie française* (Paris, 1844), p.64 (referring to the Revolution of 1789)” [B 6a,3]<sup>129</sup>

It is interesting that the collective preference for the light and sheer muslin over heavy brocades and glossy satin typically used for the dresses of the old régime was also looked to as evidence of the democratic zeitgeist. As a matter of fact, the rage for the neoclassical style of dress was encouraged by governmental effort to control the politics of dress and appearances in accordance with its ideological interests. Most telling is the ban against wearing mourning dresses in public in March 1794 for the reason that they were incompatible with the new regime of appearances.<sup>130</sup> The widespread popularity of the Directoire gown during the French Revolution years was not coincidental but a result of the collective values created by the revolution -in the name of “the despotism of liberty against tyranny.”<sup>131</sup> No institutional propaganda can make anything “fashionable” among people unless the dream of the individual and that of the collective converged at some point of juncture as exemplified by fashion during the Revolution. The fascination of the Greco-Roman dress, indeed, is a manifestation of the shared desire of the individual, the collective, and government for democracy in style of the Roman Republic.

No less political than the vogue for the neoclassical style of dress is the advent of the fashion of the Bourbon Restoration. The first thing the Bourbon royalists did was to bring back corsets and wider skirts in order to regain some of the look of the ancien régime.<sup>132</sup> However, this time parts of the woman’s dress, such as the sleeve and the neckline, all became larger and more accentuated toward 1830s.<sup>133</sup>





However, passing through the upheavals of the Revolution, female dresses regained somewhat elaborate gestures during the Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy.<sup>135</sup> Yet, the overall male wardrobe became more functional than aristocratic as the sword was gradually replaced by canes and sticks.<sup>136</sup> But this does not mean fashion changed entirely in the name of practicality. For example, after the Paris revolution of 1830, Louis Philippe of the House of Bourbon, France's citizen king, carried an umbrella as a "democratic symbol of his proximity to the people,"<sup>137</sup> not because he could not afford his own carriage. No doubt these changes in vestimentary behavior resulted from the ideological transformations that had begun at the turn of the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, later in the century new consumer products through technological innovations led the forefront of the permutation of fashion. The advent of the safety bicycle in the 1890s, if not the first rudimentary bicycle in the 1820s, best exemplifies how fashion was transformed in the hands of materialistic power instead of hegemonic ideology of the time, as women began to wear bifurcated dress in public domain owing not to ideological supremacy but to the sway of commodity and technology.<sup>138</sup> A dress reform movement in the preceding decades led notably by Bloomers in the USA failed to get the collective approval while Rational Dress Societies which appeared in 1880s in England gained little acceptance from the public.<sup>139</sup> Patricia Warner points out that throughout the entire nineteenth century not only men but also many women did not accept women in pants.<sup>140</sup> However, with a growing interest in sports and exercise, women in the last decades of the nineteenth century were allowed to wear a new kind of uniform style of gym suit, which not only initiated the take-off of modern sportswear but also contributed to the improvement of women's clothing in the twentieth century, according to Warner.<sup>141</sup> Nevertheless, most of the clothing, inspired by Amelia Bloomer, was confined to

private spheres, spas, gymnasiums, or segregated educational communities.<sup>142</sup> Women's higher education also encouraged women to wear trousered dress, but it was also private clothing, "never meant to be seen in public."<sup>143</sup> It was not really deemed as "appropriate" for ordinary women to wear pants in public, however, things changed due to the bicycle, as Warner states:

"Without it, the sea change in women's dress in the early twentieth century could not have taken place. Acceptance of new ideas about clothing had to begin somewhere, and as we have seen, it certainly wasn't about to happen in the public sphere. If anything could have brought it about, it would have been the bicycle craze, embraced with such enthusiasm by all classes everywhere."<sup>144</sup>

As indicated by Warner, the bicycle craze at the end of the nineteenth century finally made it possible for women to wear trousers in public gradually without taking the risk of receiving a moral reproach.



Illustration 11. "The Start." American Stereoscopic Company (ca. 1897).  
Reproduction No. LC-USZ62-93792.  
<http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/93508170>.

Female bicyclers were hailed as modern, progressive, and fashionable, although women on a bicycle were suspected to be prone to be sexually stimulated while riding by some medical doctors in the very beginning. Contemporary readers may be bewildered why the adoption of pants in the female wardrobe was controversial at the second half of the nineteenth century. In fact pants were an ancient emblem of masculinity and male authority which must be kept intact from women; therefore, the issues surrounding pants were not limited to wardrobe choices but associated with phallogentric ideology. The tension between the both sexes is well described in the 1855 American print, titled “The Discord,” disclosing how contentious it was ~~back~~ then for women to wear pants which were thought of as male prerogatives. The man pulling on a pair of pants says that he would “rather die than let my wife have my pants. A man ought always to be the ruler.” The woman on the right cheers his wife who is fighting over the pants: “Bravo Sarah! Stick to them, it is only us which ought to rule and to whom the pants fit the best.” Nevertheless, a technological innovation cut across all the complicated ideological concerns changing not only the fashion of the turn of the nineteenth century but also women’s political status, as pioneer feminist Susan B. Anthony stated that “It [bicycling] has done more to emancipate women than anything else in the world. . . . It gives women a feeling of freedom and self-reliance.”<sup>145</sup> *Scribner’s Magazine* (1896) in the same year also said, “It [the bicycle] has given all women practical liberty to wear trousers if they want to, and indeed, to get themselves into any sort of decent raiment which they find convenient for whatever enterprise they have in hand. . . . Three years ago, no modest American woman would hardly have ventured on the street in New York with a skirt that stopped above her ankles, and leggings that reached obviously to her knees. To-day she can do it without exciting attention.”<sup>146</sup> This social complaisance toward the exposure of the legs is indeed revolutionary because it provided the touchstone for women to

expose their legs and wear short skirts with “unsuspected possibilities for the depiction of the raised skirt” as Walter Benjamin describes.<sup>147</sup> The daring look of the female cyclist and her fashion comparable to that of the cabaret singer and her revealing dress was “provocative to the male world in those days,”<sup>148</sup> as he puts it:

“Who still knows, nowadays, where it was that in the last decade of the previous century women would offer to men their most seductive aspect, the most intimate promise of their figure? In the asphalted indoor arenas where people learned to ride bicycles. The woman as cyclist competes with the cabaret singer for the place of honor on posters, and gives to fashion its most daring line. [B1,8]”<sup>149</sup>

Thanks to the bicycle, the trousers which were antithetical to the full skirt finally led to the advent of short skirts. The knee-length skirt and the short hair style which became all the rage among *garçons* in the 1920s would have not existed without the collective endorsement of trousers for female cyclists decades ago, which had already cut across the commotion brought out by the hegemonic conflicts between the sexes. The ubiquitous appearance of female cyclists in fashion plates, posters, advertisements and magazines at the turn of the nineteenth century illustrates the changing aesthetics and social mores of the time bringing to light “what a profound harmony controls all the components of history” of this particular period as Baudelaire writes in *The Painter of Modern Life* (1995):

“And if to the fashion plate representing each age he [an impartial student] were to add the philosophic thought with which that age was most preoccupied or concerned—the thought being inevitably suggested by the fashion-plate—he would see what a profound harmony controls all the components of history, . . .”<sup>150</sup>

People can choose whatever they like to wear, theoretically at the very least, but not every dress item becomes a fashion without the approval of the collective. To put it differently, fashion as a social concept demonstrates where the ideal of the individual and that of the collective converge while fashion as a concrete material externalizes the exact merging point

where the imaginary forces between the individual and the collective meet. Not only that, but fashion is also an “affair of violent contrasts,” “each few years’ swing of the pendulum reversing that of the preceding,”<sup>151</sup> and its history in the modern times is a corollary of an endless dialectical process spelled out by Hegel and Marx. Over the course of time the swings of this pendulum would speed up. It has to be noted that the trial-error period of the adoption of pants by the Bloomers and dress reformers in the second half of the nineteenth century and the hedonic period of the symbiosis of the habit of *à l’anglaise* and the habit of *à la française* in the 1770s and 1780s before the French Revolution can be reckoned as the oscillating stage before a sublation, which I have discussed, referring to Kroeber and Young in the early part of this chapter. Unless coupled with a clear insight into the ups and downs of ideological turbulence and into the industrial, technological, and commercial expansion of the previous centuries in which individual consumers make choices following their self-interest, as opposed to the period of the mercantile economy, “a system of trading centres, trading with one another, but ultimately dependent upon trade with the outside world,”<sup>152</sup> any account of the history of fashion is nothing but a superficial chronicle of changing appearances. Conversely, both ideological conflicts and modes of production in the context of the development of technology in history will be made much more comprehensible through the discourse on the history of fashion of the modern era.

### ***Fashion, Consciousness, and Zeitgeist***

Now that we have come to understand how the development of fashion history is not disparate from that of history in a broader sense in view of dialectics, we, as a matter of course, need to discuss how the dialectical progress of fashion history is related to the modern subject’s pursuit of subjectivity, individuality, and self-consciousness. Indeed, without a lucid explanation about this nexus, dialectics in fashion history does not stand up to critical examination, as, for

Hegel, the dialectic of history is a process in which the “Spirit” (*Geist*) reaches self-consciousness—that is, a consciousness of self-determination.<sup>153</sup> Hegel in *Philosophy of History* (1902) writes:

“The History of the World begins with its general aim—the realization of the Idea of Spirit—only in an *implicit* form (*an sich*) that is, as Nature; a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of History (as already observed), is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one. Thus appearing in the form of merely natural existence, natural will—that which has been called the subjective side—physical craving, instinct, passion, private interest, as also opinion and subjective conception—spontaneously present themselves at the very commencement. This vast congeries of volitions, interests and activities, constitute the instruments and means of the World-Spirit for attaining its object; bringing it to consciousness, and realizing it. And this aim is none other than finding itself—coming to itself in concrete actuality.”<sup>154</sup>

In reality, the colligation between fashion and such concepts as subjectivity, individuality, and self-consciousness is among the most popular subjects of discussion in fashion studies. To illustrate, in *Fashion in Focus: Concepts, Practices and Politics* (2011), Tim Edwards maintains that the fashion consumer is “a desiring subject who desires both objects and other subjects” and “a desirer of alternative forms of subjectivity.”<sup>155</sup> In order to set out to explore the relations between fashion and subjectivity, a companion concept to modernity,<sup>156</sup> I propose probing the topic of subjectivity under the lens of transcendental empiricism set forth by Gilles Deleuze, in that it will help us grapple with the relations between fashion and subjectivity as well as between the desire for objects and the desirer. The themes of inquiry are: (1) what Deleuzian subjectivity is in relation to time and (2) how fashion can be understood in terms of Deleuzian time. To this end, it is crucial to understand the gist of his philosophy Deleuze himself calls transcendental empiricism,<sup>157</sup> about which a lot of debate has taken place in an attempt to decipher the meaning of the oxymoron of transcendental combined with empiricism. I think that the distinction between thought and being, made on the basis of the concept of “Difference” in Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* (1994), provides a clear insight into his philosophy. Like Kant, he

repudiates the logic of the Cartesian dualism in which the “I think” makes the “I am” equal to the thinking subject without justification and, then, he adopts Kantian transcendental to elucidate “an *a priori* relation between thought and being.”<sup>158</sup>

“The determination (“I think”) obviously implies something undetermined (“I am”), but nothing so far tells us how it is that this undermined is determinable by the “*I think*”: “in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the *being itself*, although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.” Kant therefore adds a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the determination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference—no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines; no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an internal Difference which establishes an *a priori* relation between thought and being.”<sup>159</sup>

As indicated above, Deleuzian transcendental does not pertain to differences found in external experiences, but reveals internal differences that cannot be fathomed in real experience. Accordingly, it questions the validity of association of the “Same” that are conventionally viewed as no different from each other. In line with this, the Deleuzian transcendental unfolds the relation between thought and being, instead of searching for the ontology of the mind. Indeed, this is where transcendental and empiricism are merged in a Deleuzian way, in which he draws a line between the epistemological and the ontological of the subject:

“The essence and the destiny of empiricism are not tied to the atom but rather to the essence of association; therefore, empiricism does not raise the problem of the origin of the mind but rather the problem of the constitution of the subject.”<sup>160</sup>

Running counter to Descartes and Kant, Deleuze believes that the “Cogito” is an empirical being rather than an independent entity and the mind is given not as a system but as “a collection of ideas.”<sup>161</sup> He, therefore, renounces the supremacy of the mind and subject all together by collating them with an assemblage of ideas and a disposition.

“The mind is not subject; it is subjected. When the subject is constituted in the mind under the effect of principles, the mind apprehends itself as a self, for it has been

qualified. But the problem is this: if the subject is constituted only inside the collection of ideas, how can the collection of ideas be apprehended as a self, how can I say “I,” under the influence of those same principles? We do not really understand how we can move from dispositions to the self, or from the subject to the self. How can the subject and the mind, in the last analysis, be one and the same inside the self? The self must be both a collection of ideas and a disposition, and mind and subject.”<sup>162</sup>

By responding to the question he has made—“how can I say ‘I’?” another account of subjectivity in light of Humean empiricism offers a core of Deleuzian empiricism regarding the self:

“We start with atomic parts, but these atomic parts have transitions, passages, “tendencies,” which circulate from one to another. These tendencies give rise to *habits*. Isn’t this the answer to the question “what are we?” We are habits, nothing but habits—the habit of saying “I.” Perhaps, there is no more striking answer to the problem of the Self.”<sup>163</sup>

Then, how do habits constitute the self? Under what mechanism? In order to puzzle out habits in Deleuze, it is imperative to look into his notion of time, since habits are referred to as the basis of the synthesis of time. According to him, there are three stages of synthesis of time, among which the first synthesis of time, the foundation of time, is habits constituting time as a present;<sup>164</sup> while the second, fundamental synthesis of time is memory that comprises time as a pure past.<sup>165</sup> And the final synthesis of time is a phase in which the future is engendered as a form of “eternal return.”<sup>166</sup> He further argues that all three syntheses are different modes of “Repetition”;<sup>167</sup> therefore, all is repetition. Consequently, a question arises as to how something new is hatched under this condition of Repetition, for it is nothing but an outcome of the temporary synthesis. Although Deleuze further explicates that it is imagination and habits that “draw something new from repetition,”<sup>168</sup> this does not unravel why our habits of imagination pursue things that have yet to be seen or heard of, that are new. Even more complicated is that imagination is neither constant nor uniform, according to Deleuze.<sup>169</sup> In addition to this, another question as to imagination emerges. If imagination is inconsistent, how does something new



come out of imagination without end, although intermittently at some point? To be sure, how our habits of imagining beget a novelty on a continuous basis is another Deleuzian-like question, I claim, for it brings forth the issue of the constitution of imagination rather than of its origin, which is of internal differences of imagination. What is great about Deleuzian philosophy, concerning *newness* and its formation, at the very least, is that the logic of details does not contradict its overall argument. In other words, the answers for the questions I have raised can be found in transcendental empiricism. First, a novelty comes into being continuously with some interruptions owing not to imagination but to our habits that do repeat on the condition of Repetition. Remember that habits as the originary synthesis of time operate on the condition of Repetition; however, imagination itself does not. In addition, just as the mind is no more than a collection of ideas, like “a collection without an album, a play without a stage, a flux of perceptions,”<sup>170</sup> so is imagination as Deleuze himself spells out:

“Nothing is done *by* the imagination; everything is done *in* the imagination. It is not even a faculty for forming ideas, because the production of an idea by the imagination is only the reproduction of an impression in the imagination.”<sup>171</sup>

Second, inasmuch as experience makes impressions in the mind, in a strictly Deleuzian sense, the human desire for something new is due to the lack of experience. Assuredly, it is helpful to refer to Walter Benjamin’s interpretation of Marcel Proust, who believes that our experience is contingent upon chance, thereby illustrating the inevitable fluctuation in terms of the amount of experience.<sup>172</sup> With the example of the advent of newspapers, Benjamin expounds on how modern-day modes of communication, concise and clear in content but excessive in quantity, are attributed to the isolation of information from experience resulting in “increasing atrophy of experience.”<sup>173</sup> Inspired by Karl Kraus, he adds that even the brief journalistic style of newspapers as one form of linguistic habit “paralyzes the imagination” of the reader.<sup>174</sup>

Benjamin's observation clearly bears out the relation between experience and imagination during a time when individual experience was on the wane to the point of "atrophy." Without a doubt, we are familiar with this state of being on the verge of void of experience, which is often called boredom, and it is hardly groundless to relate boredom with the procreation of newness, for novelty is sought after in order to fill out the decreased stimuli in the mind caused by the lack of experience. As such, it is not surprising that boredom, along with the quest for newness, progress, novelty, and innovation, is viewed as a typical phenomenon of modernity.

And yet, what makes boredom immensely critical in a philosophical discourse is the unique condition in which the subject is situated in relation to the deficiency of experience, although there is a myriad of information available out there. Borrowing from Elizabeth S. Goodstein, therefore, boredom is "an experience of subjective crisis."<sup>175</sup> That is, experience on a personal level is almost devoid; in fact, not completely drained enough to feel bored. It is under this circumstance that a subjective crisis takes place. I argue that transcendental empiricism is particularly useful in comprehending why and how existential questions are brought about while one is in a state of boredom. From the perspective of Deleuzian empiricism, the essential condition in which the Cogito questions about its being is not the subject that is "preexisting,"<sup>176</sup> but the status quo of being destitute of experience in which the Cogito as an empirical being sets in as Deleuze explains.

"The pure self of "I think" thus appears to be a beginning only because it has referred all its presuppositions back to the empirical self. Moreover, while Hegel criticized Descartes for this, he does not seem, for his part, to proceed otherwise: pure being, in turn, is a beginning only by virtue of referring all its presuppositions back to sensible, concrete, empirical being."<sup>177</sup>

Once the dearth of experience is apprehended, the "I think," now questions about the self, not just about the self itself, but the self being in *that* situation. How does this happen? As opposed

to Descartes's Cogito, which is constant such that it should never get bored, since it has its own autonomy, thought in Deleuze is subjected to the chance of being involved with experience and sometimes complains about the lack of sources of imagination. Hence, boredom is probably the best example that reveals the mechanism under which empiricism becomes transcendental, since questions regarding one's existence come out directly from the sensible, the experience of lack of experience.

All things considered, to seek after something new is essentially to look for the condition in which the "I think" confirms its subjectivity, thereby becoming the whole as an active self, not as a mere receptivity of intuition in the Kantian sense. In that account, pursuing fashion, which is *newness* par excellence, is no less meaningful in search of one's autonomy. Georg Simmel must have sensed this when he remarked that women's limited social and political experience made them more preoccupied with fashion; therefore, fashion became an outlet for expressing their individuality:<sup>178</sup> "Thus it seems as though fashion were the valve through which woman's craving for some measure of conspicuousness and individual prominence finds vent, when its satisfaction is denied her in other fields."<sup>179</sup>

---

## Notes

### Chapter 3

<sup>1</sup> Refer to the following remark made by Marx and Engels, for example:

“The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.” (*The German Ideology*, ed. and intro. C. J. Arthur [New York: International Publishers, 1970], p. 47)

<sup>2</sup> pp. 28, 146.

<sup>3</sup> Alan Hunt, *Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law* (New York, 1996), pp. 28, 44, 140.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

Hunt’s quantitative investigation covers France, England, Italian cities including Venice and Florence, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, Scotland, and North America during the time that spans from the twelfth century through to the eighteenth century.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 28, 140.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>8</sup> Lynn Hunt, Thomas R. Martin, Barbara H. Rosenwein, and Bonnie G. Smith, *The Making of the West, Volume B: 1340–1830: Peoples and Cultures*, 4th edition (Boston and New York: Bedford/ St. Martins, 2012), p. 516.

<sup>9</sup> Daniel W. Rossides, *Social Theory: Its Origins, History, and Contemporary Relevance* (Dix Hills, NY: General Hall, 1998), p. 49.

<sup>10</sup> Hunt, et al., *The Making of the West*, p. 531.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Rossides, p. 49.

<sup>13</sup> Yves Charbit, *The Classical Foundations of Population Thought: From Plato to Quesnay* (New York: Springer, 2010), p. 159.

<sup>14</sup> Graham Hancock and Robert Bauval. *The Master Game: Unmasking the Secret Rulers of the World* (New York: The Disinformation Company, 2011), p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> Thomas O’Malley, “Religion and the Newspaper Press, 1660–1685,” in *The Press in English Society from the Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries*, ed. Michael Harris and Alan Lee (London: Associated University Press, 1986), p. 36.

<sup>16</sup> Yves Charbit, *The Classical Foundations of Population Thought*, p. 160.

---

<sup>17</sup> A. J. Poitras, *Capitalist Rising: The Short History of a Long Insurgency* (New York: Vantage Press, 2007), pp. 30–31.

<sup>18</sup> China Mieville, *Between Equal Rights: A Marxist's Theory of International Law* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p. 224.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 200.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 203.

<sup>22</sup> This interpretation of various seventeenth-century thinkers, so-called possessive individualism, is made by C. B. MacPherson. See C. B. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

<sup>23</sup> James A. Caporaso and David P. Levine, *Theories of Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 160.

<sup>24</sup> Giorgio Riello and Peter McNeil, "The Fashion Revolution: The 'Long' Eighteenth Century," in *The Fashion History Reader: Global Perspectives*, Giorgio Riello and Peter McNeil, eds., (New York: London, Routledge, 2010), p. 174.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Many authors believe that sometime in the fourteenth century fashion emerged.

The most widely accepted hypothesis dates fashion's emergence to the appearance of a new men's clothing styles in the mid-fourteenth century Burgundy. Proposed by Paul Post in the first decade of the twentieth century, based primarily on illuminations and other visual representations, and secondarily on moralist texts, it said that modern male dress first appears in France around 1350 with the revolution produced by the appearance of the short surcoat on young men, in radical opposition to the long robe, which continued to be worn by older and more venerable men.

Sarah-Grace Heller, *Fashion in Medieval France* (Cambridge, UK: D. S. Brewer, 2007), p. 48.

From what is taken by most scholars to be the beginnings of an institutionalized fashion cycle in the West, namely, fourteenth-century Burgundian court life, up to the present, fashion has repeatedly, if not exclusively, drawn upon certain recurrent instabilities in the social identities of Western men and women. Fred Davis, *Fashion, Culture, and Identity* (Chicago, University Press, 1992), p. 17.

An intensified aristocratic interest in fashionable clothing seems first to have become noticeable at the Burgundian court in the fourteenth century, . . .

Elizabeth Wilson, *Adorned in Dreams: Fashion and Modernity*, rev. ed. (London: Tauris, 2003).

The Court of Burgundy was especially notable for luxurious dress during the 14th and 15th centuries. . . . Phyllis G. Tortora and Keith Eubank, *Survey of Historic Costume*, 4th ed. (New York: Fairchild, 2005), p. 123.

Costume historians have long claimed that fashion began in Europe in the middle of the fourteenth century (Boucher 1966; Breward 1995; Laver 1995; Tortora and Eubank 2010).

Linda Welters, "Introduction," in *The Fashion Reader*, ed. Linda Welters and Abby Lillethun (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2007), p. 3.

Scholars generally recognize the fourteenth century as a time when workers in costume crafts, merchants, and eager customers, both an aristocracy and a wealthy bourgeoisie, clearly portrayed the kinds of social behavior associated with fashion, behavior from which the highly complex fashion system of the twentieth century and twenty-first centuries has evolved (Roach-Higgins 1995: 395–6).

Kawamura, *Fashion-ology*, p. 49.

---

It was in the second half of the fourteenth century that clothes both for men and for women took on new forms, and something emerges which we can already call 'fashion.'

James Laver, *Costume and Fashion: A Concise History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 62.

See also Susan Crane, *The Performance of Self: Ritual, Clothing, and Identity During the Hundred Years War*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), pp. 3, 13.

<sup>26</sup> Simmel writes:

Fashion is the imitation of a given example and satisfies the demand for social adaptation; it leads the individual upon the road which all travel, it furnishes a general condition, which resolves the conduct of every individual into a mere example. At the same time it satisfies in no less degree the need of differentiation, the tendency towards dissimilarity, the desire for change and contrast, . . . Thus fashion represents nothing more than one of the many forms of life by the aid of which we seek to combine in uniform spheres of activity the tendency towards social equalization with the desire for individual differentiation and change.

"Fashion," 543.

<sup>27</sup> Kawamura, *Fashion-ology*, p. 4.

<sup>28</sup> Gilles Lipovetsky, *The Empire of Fashion: Dressing Modern Democracy*, trans. Catherine Porter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 5.

The brackets are my addition.

Cf. He writes, "...: this sums up the logic that had governed fashion ever since it came into being in the West, starting in the middle of the fourteenth century" (ibid., p. 65).

<sup>29</sup> In epilogue Lipovetsky says:

My primary goal in *L'empire de l'éphémère*, was to offer a new interpretation of fashion in a broad historical perspective, breaking sharply with the hegemonic epistemological model inherited from the nineteenth century and regularly adopted by historians and sociologists ever since: namely, the paradigm of symbolic class struggle and competition, or—as it has come to be called in the wake of Pierre Bourdieu's work—the logic of distinction.

A theoretical updating was needed because the model of social distinction had proved unable to account either for the historical invention of fashion in the fourteenth century or for the major organizational, behavioral, and aesthetic mutations that orchestrated its historical development. I did not seek to deny the impact of competition for social rank on fashion; rather I sought to demonstrate that such competition has less explanatory value than the modern individualist ethic that has been present exclusively in the West for more than six centuries. (ibid., p. 242 in epilogue)

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp. 19–20.

Lipovetsky also says: "Fashion was the first manifestation of a passion characteristic of the West, the passion for what is "modern" (ibid., p. 24).

---

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 19–20.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>36</sup> Alan Hunt, *Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 13–14.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 45.

The reason that some caution is needed about linking the advent of sumptuary legislation with the rise of fashion is that in both England and in the Italian cities of Florence and Venice sumptuary laws were already well established by the early decades of the fourteenth century and predated the eruption of the increasingly self-conscious fashion in the Burgundian court.

<sup>38</sup> See Crane, *The Performance of Self*, p. 13; Jay Calderin, *Form, Fit and Fashion: All the Details Fashion Designers Need to Know but Can Never Find*, (Beverly, Massachusetts: Rockport Publishers Inc. 2009), p. 28; Elisabeth Crowfoot, Frances Pritchard, and Kay Staniland, *Textiles and Clothing, 1150–1450* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 1992), p. 7; Welters, “Introduction,” p. 3; Christopher Breward, *The Culture of Fashion* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 13, 29; James Laver, *A Concise History of Costume* (London: Thames and Hudson, and New York: Abrams, 1969), p. 62; Wilson, *Adorned in Dreams*, p. 18; Fernand Braudel, *The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible, Volume I of Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 317.

<sup>39</sup> Alan Hunt, *Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 45.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp. 45–46.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., pp. 13–14.

<sup>42</sup> Christopher Breward states:

As well as defining gender roles and status within family based communities, the pervasiveness of fashion as a new concept from the 1350s had a more direct impact on the emergence of the individual—a sense of self-knowledge and an understanding of man's place in the wider structures of the world. Within medieval society the body was prioritized as the dwelling-place of soul, inner character was displayed throughout outward signs and clothing could not avoid implication in such a problematic moral arena. Individuality and the communications of the soul were manifested through various strategies. (*The Culture of Fashion*, p. 35)

<sup>43</sup> Francois Boucher, *20000 Years of Fashion: The History of Costume and Adornment* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, [1967] 1987); originally, *Histoire du costume en Occident, de l'antiquité à nos jours* (Paris: Flammarion, 1965), p. 191.

<sup>44</sup> Welters, “Introduction,” p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> See Crane, *The Performance of Self*, p. 13; Jay Calderin, *Form, Fit and Fashion*, p. 28; Crowfoot, et al., *Textiles and Clothing*, p. 7; Linda Welters, “Introduction,” p. 3; Christopher Breward, *The Culture of Fashion*, pp. 13, 29; Laver, *A Concise History of Costume*, p. 62; Wilson, *Adorned in Dreams*, p. 18; Braudel, *The Structures of Everyday Life*, p. 317.

<sup>46</sup> A. L. Kroeber, “On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes of Fashion,” *American Anthropologist* 21 (1919):235–263, on 257–258.

---

<sup>47</sup> A. L. Kroeber and Jane Richardson, "Three Centuries of Women's Dress Fashions: Quantitative Analysis," *University of California Anthropological Records* 5 (1940):111–153.

<sup>48</sup> "Like many anthropologists, I use the word civilization almost synonymously with the word culture," says Kroeber. A. L. Kroeber, *Style and Civilizations* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 150.

<sup>49</sup> A. L. Kroeber, "On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes of Fashion," *American Anthropologist* 21 (1919): 235–263, on p. 259.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 261.

<sup>51</sup> Agnes Brooks Young, *Recurring Cycles of Fashion* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1937), p. 205.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 206.

Refer to Young's periodization:

Back-fullness, 1760 through 1795, or 36 years  
Tubular, 1796 through 1829, or 34 years  
Bell, 1830 through 1867, or 38 years  
Back-fullness, 1868 through 1899, or 32 years  
Tubular, 1900 through 1937, or 38 years so far (*Ibid.*, p. 22)

She also writes:

Changes in the fashion of women's dress have been grouped in well-defined cycles, (the three accepted types of street dress skirts are Back-fullness, Tubular, Bell) during each of which the continuous evolution has consisted of modifications of a single type of dress characterized by the form and contour of its skirt. And the succession of these three skirt types, and of the dress cycles consisting of modifications based on them, has so far taken place on an almost regular time schedule in which each cycle has lasted for approximately one-third of a century. (*Ibid.*, pp. 206–207)

<sup>53</sup> A. L. Kroeber, "On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes of Fashion," *American Anthropologist* 21 (1919): 235–263, on 258.

<sup>54</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, Part I. A new translation with introduction and notes by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), § 108, p. 17.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, § 172, p. 172.

<sup>56</sup> Kroeber writes:

While we were measuring and tabulating fashion plates, my colleague Jane Richardson and I could not help but note that dress modes were relatively steady and tranquil during a period which began about 1835 and ended around 1905. Previous to this 70-year calm cycle, there was a period of at least 45 agitated and fluctuating years back to the beginning of our measurable record in 1788. There was also another period of instability and change for the 30 or more years from 1905 to 1936 when we concluded our measurements. This last period may have continued on beyond the span of our data—as the earlier one may have begun before our data commenced in 1788.

It is obvious that the first of the two periods of fashion agitation is pretty much that of the French Revolution, Napoleonic Wars, and post-Napoleonic tensions through the revolutionary attempts of 1830. Equally, the second era of fashion agitation was the period of pre-1914 mounting political tension, of World War I, and of the uneasy inter-World War years. But 1835–1905 coincides almost exactly with the reign of Victoria in England, with peace on the Continent of Europe broken only by brief wars and rapid recuperations—in short the golden nineteenth-century culmination of the industrial, laissez faire, and



---

bourgeois democratic phase of our civilization. The American Civil War had no effect, because high fashions were originating in Europe.

This contrast between relatively placid periods of fashion change and relatively vehement ones is probably of greater significance than the fact of long-time swings between extremes, because of its seeming connection or correlation with periods of much larger events of history. Why should decades of social and political unrest affect women's clothes at all? Why should for instance skirts be narrow but waists wide in an agitated time, and then reverse as peaceful contentment settles on the civilized world? Why these particular results? And through what mechanism?

A. L. Kroeber, *Style and Civilizations* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 10–12.

<sup>57</sup> See Crane, *The Performance of Self*, p. 13; Calderin, *Form, Fit and Fashion*, p. 28; Crowfoot, et al., *Textiles and Clothing*, p. 7; Welters, "Introduction," p. 3; Breward, *The Culture of Fashion*, pp. 13, 29; Laver, *A Concise History of Costume*, p. 62; Wilson, *Adorned in Dreams* p. 18; Braudel, *The Structures of Everyday Life*, p. 317.

<sup>58</sup> Mary G. Houston, *Medieval Costume in England and France: The 13th, 14th, and 15th Centuries* (New York: Dover Publications, 1996), p. 1.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. Parenthesis is my addition.

<sup>60</sup> The image was obtained from <http://www.personal.utulsa.edu/~marc-carlson/cloth/herjol33.html> (accessed as of May 2012).

<sup>61</sup> This image was obtained from <http://www.personal.utulsa.edu/~marc-carlson/cloth/herjol38.html> (accessed as of May 2012).

<sup>62</sup> See Joan Nunn's explanation about the regional and national differences in dress during this time:

There is considerable national variation in dress at this time, although with increasing trade and travel the exchange of fashion ideas was growing. In general, Italian dress was soft, fluid and elegant, reflecting the idealization of the human form so important in Italian Renaissance art; Spanish similar but quickly becoming more rigid; German over-elaborate, slashed and puffed, with hats loaded with feathers; French influenced by Italy until about 1510, then more Spanish; English, influenced firstly by Italy, then Germany, and finally very strongly by Spain. (Joan Nunn, *Fashion in Costume 1200–2000*, 2nd ed. [London: Herbert Press, 2000], p. 29)

Also refer to Fernand Braudel's following comment: "... whereas the traditional costume had been much the same all over the continent, the spread of the shorter costume was irregular, subject to resistance and variation, so that eventually national styles of dressing were evolved, all influencing each other to a greater or lesser extent—the French, Burgundian, Italian or English costume, etc." (*The Structures of Everyday Life*, p. 317.)

<sup>63</sup> Douglas Russell, *Costume History and Style* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 139–156.

<sup>64</sup> R. Turner Wilcox, *The Mode in Costume* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 69.

<sup>65</sup> Welters, "Europe to 1700," p. 30.

<sup>66</sup> Russell, *Costume History and Style*, pp. 196–212; Dani Cavallaro and Alexandra Warwick, *Fashioning the Frame: Boundaries, Dress and Body* (Oxford: Berg, 1998), p. 12.

<sup>67</sup> Breward, *The Culture of Fashion*, p. 34.

<sup>68</sup> Michael J. Anthony and Warren S. Benson, *Exploring the History and Philosophy of Christian Education: Principles for the 21st Century* (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2003), p. 159.

---

<sup>69</sup> Wilcox, *The Mode in Costume*, p. 69.

<sup>70</sup> Carolyn G. Bradley, *Western World Costume: An Outline History* (New York,: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954), pp. 155–160.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 158.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 155.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> Robin W. Winks, *World Civilization: A Brief History* (San Diego, CA: Collegiate Press, 1993), p. 243.

<sup>75</sup> John P. McKay, Bennett D. Hill, John Buckler, et al. *A History of Western Society, Volume 1: From Antiquity to the Enlightenment* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2011), p. 425.

<sup>76</sup> Winks, *World Civilization*, p. 243.

<sup>77</sup> Jane Ashelford, *The Art of Dress: Clothes and Society 1500–1914* (London: National Trust Enterprises, 1996), p. 33; Rose-Marie Hagen and Rainer Hagen, *What Great Paintings Say*, vol. 1. (Köln; London: Taschen, 2003), pp. 201–207.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Douglas Russell says, “During the Elizabethan-Jacobean Period the modes in male and female dress were loosely characterized as the Spanish style because in color and somewhat less line and silhouette, their major inspiration came from the fashions of the formal Spanish court.” Russell, *Costume History and Style*, p. 218.

<sup>79</sup> Graham Reynolds, “Elizabethan and Jacobean,” in *Costume of the Western World: Fashion of the Renaissance in England, France, Spain and Holland*. ed. James Laver (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), p. 131.

<sup>80</sup> Ronald M. Berger, *The Most Necessary Luxuries. The Mercers’ Company of Coventry, 1550–1680* (University Park, PA: 1993), p. 23. “Men adorned their doublets and cloaks with lace, ribbons, buttons, and gold and silver thread. . . . Starch, which Puritans called “the devil’s liquor,” was used to fashion exotic cambric and lawn ruffs. . . . Complaints of wasteful spending on clothes increased dramatically after the mid-sixteenth century.”

<sup>81</sup> R. Mirkin, “Performing Selfhood: The Costumed Body as a Site of Mediation Between Life, Art and Theatre in the English Renaissance,” in *Body Dressing*, ed. J. Entwistle, E. Wilson (Oxford & New York: Berg, 2001), p. 155.

<sup>82</sup> Wilcox, *The Mode in Costume* pp. 128–129.

<sup>83</sup> C. Willet Cunnington and Phillis Cunnington, *The History of Underclothes* (New York: Dover, [1951] 1992), p. 51.

<sup>84</sup> Douglas Russell describes this change in dress as following:

Compare, for example, the qualities of dress in the Evening Ball for the Wedding of the Duc de joyeuse, dated about 1581, with those in the famous *The Garden of Love* by Rubens, dated about 1632. It is as if the ruffs had suddenly melted into soft lace collars and the boning, padding, and forcing of the body had relaxed into an easy expansion of the clothing away from the contours of the body. The tortured, excessively decorated fabric surfaces have been replaced by an interest in the natural character of the fabric itself. Like architecture, sculpture, and painting in the Baroque era, the costumes moved, expanded, and spread out into space to create a sense of size and grandeur. (Russell, *Costume History and Style*, p. 237)

<sup>85</sup> Wilcox, *The Mode in Costume*, p. 142.

---

<sup>86</sup> Russell, *Costume History and Style*, p. 241.

<sup>87</sup> *The Leisure Hour*, vol. 42 (s.n., 1893), p. 282.

<sup>88</sup> Blanche Payne, Geitel Winakor, and Jane Farrell-Beck, *The History of Costume, From Ancient Mesopotamia Through the Twentieth Century*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), p. 338.

<sup>89</sup> Christopher, Breward, *The Culture of Fashion: A New History of Fashionable Dress*. (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. 1995), p.80, p.83.

<sup>90</sup> Francis M. Kelly and Randolph Schwabe, *European Costume of Fashion of Fashion: 1490–1790* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2002), introduction, xiii; originally published under the title *Historic Costume: A Chronicle of Fashion in Western Europe 1490–1790* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: B. T. Batsford, 1925), xiii.

<sup>91</sup> Russell, *Costume History and Style*,, p. 249.

Also see Douglas Gorsline, *What People Wore: 1800 Illustrations from Ancient Times to the Early Twentieth Century* (New York: Dover Publications, 1994), p. 66.

<sup>92</sup> Wilcox, *The Mode in Costume* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 143.

<sup>93</sup> Mila Contini. *Fashion: From Ancient Egypt to the Present Day*, ed. James Laver (New York: Odyssey Press, 1965), p. 148.

<sup>94</sup> James Harvey Robinson, *An Introduction to the History of Western Europe* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1903), p. 465.

<sup>95</sup> For the origin of the nickname see Georgiana Hill, *A History of English Dress from the Saxon Period to the Present Day*, Volume 1 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893), p. 281.

<sup>96</sup> Jason McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship in Revolutionary England* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 2007), p. 5.

<sup>97</sup> *Headstart in History: Reformation and Rebellion 1485–1750*, Steve Arman, et al. (Oxford, Heinemann, 2002), p. 205.

<sup>98</sup> Hill, *A History of English Dress*, p. 279. Also see, *What People Wore*, p. 66.

<sup>99</sup> Edwin Tunis, *Weapons: A Pictorial History* (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, [1954]1999), p. 92.

<sup>100</sup> Blanche Payne, Geitel Winakor, and Jane Farrell-Beck, *The History of Costume: From Ancient Mesopotamia through the Twentieth Century*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), p. 338.

<sup>101</sup> Wilcox. *The Mode in Costume* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 153.

<sup>102</sup> Hill, *A History of English Dress*, pp. 282–283.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 268.

<sup>104</sup> For more information about the dress styles between the Puritan and the Cavalier, see *ibid.*, pp. 281–283.

<sup>105</sup> Hill, *A History of English Dress*, p. 283.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

---

<sup>107</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood and trans. Hugh B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 164.

<sup>108</sup> Michael H. MacDonald, *Europe, A Tantalizing Romance* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996), p. 21.

<sup>109</sup> Kelly and Schwabe, *European Costume of Fashion*, introduction xiii.

<sup>110</sup> David Kuchta, "The Making of the Self-Made Man," in *The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective*, ed. Victoria de Grazia and Ellen Furlough, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), p. 56.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Toby Reiner, *Divine Right of Kings in Encyclopedia of Political Theory*, ed. Mark Bevir (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2010), pp. 399–340.

<sup>113</sup> Douglas Russell notes that the dress shape became much bulkier and heavier toward the end of the seventeenth century. This coincides with the theoretical development of diving-right monarchy. Refer to the following references.

"The costume fashions after about 1685 in all the countries of Europe were much heavier than those in the 1660s and 1670s and often remind one of a great upholstered chair." (Russell, *Costume History and Style*, p. 260.)

Also see Toby Reiner, *Divine Right of Kings in Encyclopedia of Political Theory*, ed. Mark Bevir (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2010), pp. 399–340.

<sup>114</sup> Jennifer Michelle Jones, *Sexing La Mode: Gender, Fashion and Commercial Culture in Old Regime France*, (Oxford: Berg, 2004), p.41.

<sup>115</sup> Josephine Greider, *Anglomania in France, 1740–1789: Fact, Fiction and Political Discourse* (Geneva: Droz, 1985), p. 9.

<sup>116</sup> Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 515–527.

<sup>117</sup> Josephine Greider, *Anglomania in France, 1740–1789: Fact, Fiction and Political Discourse* (Geneva: Droz, 1985), pp. 11–12.

<sup>118</sup> Valerie Steele, *Paris Fashion: A Cultural History*. 2nd ed., rev. and updated. (Oxford; New York: Berg, 1998), p. 32.

<sup>119</sup> Augustin Challamel, *The History of Fashion in France, or, the Dress of Women from the Gallo-Roman Period to the Present Time*, trans. Mrs. Cashel Hoey and John Lillie (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1882), p. 290.

<sup>120</sup> Franklin James Didier, *Letters from Paris and Other Cities of France, Holland, &c.: Written During a Tour and Residence in These Countries, in the Years 1816, 17, 18, 19, and 20* (Baltimore, MD; New York: James V. Seaman, 1821), p. 202.

<sup>121</sup> Alison Ribeiro, *Fashion in the French Revolution* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), p. 101.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., pp. 239, 241.

---

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., p. 232.

<sup>126</sup> Aileen Ribeiro, *Fashion in the French Revolution* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), pp. 102–104.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p. 104.

<sup>128</sup> Alice Mackrell, “The Dress of the Parisian Élégentes with Special Reference to Le Journal des dames et des modes from June 1797 until December 1799,” MA thesis, Courtauld Institute, 1977, p. 45; cited in Alice Mackrell, *Art and Fashion: The Impact of Art on Fashion and Fashion on Art* (London: Chrysalis Books Group, 2005), p. 40.

<sup>129</sup> Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, p. 75.

<sup>130</sup> Richard Wrigley, *The Politics of Appearances: Representations of Dress in Revolutionary France* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002), p. 235.

<sup>131</sup> This expression is from Maximilien Robespierre, *Sur les principes de morale politique Discours devant la Convention le 17 pluviôse an II* (5 février 1794) [http://www.royet.org/nea1789-1794/archives/discours/robespierre\\_principes\\_morale\\_politique\\_05\\_02\\_94.htm](http://www.royet.org/nea1789-1794/archives/discours/robespierre_principes_morale_politique_05_02_94.htm) (accessed as of January 1, 2012); cited in George L. Scherger, “The Evolution of Modern Liberty,” PhD thesis, Cornell University, June 1899, p. 262.

<sup>132</sup> See Wilcox, *The Mode in Costume*, p. 249; James Laver, *Costume* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1964), p. 86; Mila Contini, *Fashion: From Ancient Egypt to the Present Day*, ed. James Laver (New York: Odyssey Press, 1965), p. 231; Phyllis Tortora and Keith Eubank, *A Survey of Historic Costume* (New York: Fairchild Publications, 1989), p. 220.

Mila Contini writes:

The return of the Royal family to Paris brought the first signs of romanticism in the high collars and Henry IV hats, laden with plumes and tassels. Then the first Mary Stuart belts appeared, which tended to lower the waist. When the waist line returned to normal, corsets also returned. Skirts became twice as full as they had been, and were embellished with pleats, frills and ribbons. . . . Sleeves, which up to the time of the Congress of Vienna had been narrow and long, became shorter and swelled up into strange shapes, like ‘ham’ and ‘legs of mutton.’ Shoulders became wider and drooping, broadened by immense triangular collars. The waist grew smaller and smaller, but skirts remained full, so that the female body at this time acquired the shape of an hour-glass. . . .

In the nineteenth century many former styles were echoed and reintroduced. Just as the Directoire period saw a revival of Greek fashion, and the Empire period reintroduced the spencer and redingote, so the Second Empire revived the fashion for the hoop. (Contini, *Fashion*, p. 231)

<sup>133</sup> Judith Chazin-Bennahum, *The Lure of Perfection: Fashion and Ballet, 1780–1830* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 148; Nunn, *Fashion in Costume 1200–2000*, p. 121; Phyllis Tortora and Keith Eubank, *A Survey of Historic Costume* (New York: Fairchild Publications, 1989), p. 222.

For example, Joan Nunn states:

The dominant feature of dress between 1830 and 1835 was the enormous sleeves, set into a dropped armhole and cut to achieve width below the shoulder point. (The transition to large sleeves was foreshadowed during 1810–20 by the practice of placing a large transparent sleeve over an opaque small one in the old shape.) The gigot (1824–36), a daytime sleeve very full at the shoulder but tapering towards the elbow and tight at the wrist, was cut on the bias, set in smooth under the arm and pleated or gathered around the top; . . . The trend towards what we now think of as typically Victorian dress began in the late 1830s and was established during the 1840s—tight-fitted, boned bodice with a pointed waistline, sleeves (often surmounted by a mancheron or jockey—a kind of epaulette) set in so low that it must have been

---

difficult to lift the arm, and a long, immensely full skirt over a crescent-shaped bustle and numerous petticoats . . . (Nunn, *Fashion in Costume 1200–2000*, p. 121)

Also see Russell's account in *Costume History and Style* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983):

Female gowns, even in the very last days of the Empire, had added many ruffles and much lacy trim, and by 1820 the high waistline began to drop from just below the bust to just above the waist, the corset now returned; sleeves began to expand in size; skirts began to flare out in many folds over layered petticoats to the ankle; and appliqué, ruching, embroidery, and lace ruffles began to trim all edges of the gown . . ." (p. 334)

Later in the 1820s the sleeves gradually took the focus of attention as they continued to grow in size until they had to be stiffened with special linings. Some were still puffed at the top and then pleated into a slim sleeve below, but the majority were of the tapering, leg-o-mutton variety. . . . Skirts became even wider at the bottom during the 1820s, with more ornamentation and definition toward the bottom of the skirt such as tucks, pleats, ruffles, appliqué, or loops of silk or fur." (p. 341)

"The styles and silhouettes of the late 1820s remained in fashion well into the 1830s with shoulders and sleeves expanding to every wider and fuller proportions." (p. 342)

<sup>134</sup> Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, p. 68, [B2a, 7].

<sup>135</sup> Some may argue that fashion is not of Hegelian mechanism on the ground that female fashion regained magnificence after the Revolutions not responding to the ideological changes although men's fashion became darker and simpler towards the end of the nineteenth century. However, this discrepancy between men's and women's fashion is also due to the dominant ideology during the Romanticism that men are 'rational' while women are 'emotional,' which affected fashion by and large. Bound with the name of manner and etiquette, I argue, women and women's fashion showed a somewhat limited response to the ideological transmutation made through the Revolutions.

Cf. see the following remark by Georg Simmel that is cited by Walter Benjamin. Simmel explains, "why women in general are the staunchest adherents of fashion . . . Specifically: from the weakness of the social position to which women have been condemned for the greater part of history derives their intimate relation with all that is 'etiquette,'" Georg Simmel, *Philosophische Kultur* (Leipzig, 1911); Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, p. 68, [B7, 8].

<sup>136</sup> Penelope Bryde, *The Male Image: Men's Fashions in Britain, 1300–1970* (London: BT Batsford, 1979), p. 33.

<sup>137</sup> Rose-Marie Hagen and Rainer Hagen, *What Great Paintings Say*, p. 396.

<sup>138</sup> Although the first rudimentary bicycle, "little more than a saddle atop a bar connecting two wheels," was introduced by Baron von Drais to the public in 1816 (Robert Crego, *Sports and Games of the 18th and 19th Centuries*, Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 2003, p. 67), not until the mass production of the modern "safety" bicycle in 1890s did a large number of women begin to ride.

See the following remark by Zack Furness:

Elite women in Europe and the United States were the first to utilize cycling technologies, though most were excluded from riding the high-wheeler, or "ordinary," bicycle (the one with the big front wheel) as well as most models manufactured prior to the modern "safety" bicycle, which is essentially the bicycle as we know it today. "Ordinaries" were incredibly difficult to operate and both clothing and behavioral restrictions made it nearly impossible for women to ride them. Early bicycles were specifically gendered for male use and those women who were the rare exceptions to this rule were mainly "an already suspect class of women" stage performers who used the high wheeler in an act." Tricycle use, on the other hand, was passively supported in the 1880s and the design of the machines made them easier for women to ride: they were both physically easier to operate and many were built to allow for the accompaniment of a male chaperon. Women could thus operate tricycles without dramatically challenging the dominant social norms

---

of the period. Following the mass production of the safety bicycle in the 1890s, many women took up cycling and found in it a renewed sense of freedom and mobility. (*One Less Car: Bicycling and the Politics of Automobility* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), p. 19)

<sup>139</sup> Lois W. Banner, “Dress,” in *Encyclopedia of Social History*, ed. Peter N. Stearns (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), p. 278.

<sup>140</sup> Patricia Campbell Warner, *When the Girls Came Out to Play: The Birth of American Sportswear* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006), p. 141.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>145</sup> *New York World* interview, February 2, 1896.

<sup>146</sup> *Scribner’s Magazine* 19, (1896): 783.

<sup>147</sup> Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, p. 64, [B1a, 3].

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62, [B1, 2].

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63, [B1, 8].

<sup>150</sup> Charles Baudelaire, *The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays*, ed. and trans. Jonathan Mayne (London: Phaidon Press, 1995), pp. 2–3.

<sup>151</sup> Ruth Benedict, “Dress,” in *Fashion Foundations: Early Writings on Fashion and Dress*, ed. Kim K. P. Johnson, Susan J. Torntore, and Joanne B. Eicher (Oxford; New York: Berg Publishers, 2003), p. 33.

<sup>152</sup> John R. Hicks, *A Theory of Economic History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 42–43. Hicks says, “a system of trading centres, trading with one another but ultimately dependent upon trade with the outside world.”

<sup>153</sup> See J. Sibree’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of history. “The philosophy of History exhibits the successive stages by which he reaches the consciousness, that it is his own inmost being that thus governs him—i.e., a consciousness of self-determination.” Georg Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: American Dome Library Co., 1902), p. 164.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>155</sup> Tim Edwards states: “The current rise of designer fashion—albeit something of a misnomer for branded fashion—does not contradict this, though clearly it may well escalate the process. . . . More problematically still it also becomes a process of desiring subjectivity *per se*. Not only is the fashion consumer a desiring subject who desires both objects and other subjects but a desirer of alternative forms of subjectivity.” *Fashion in Focus: Concepts, Practices, and Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 157–158.

Cf. Edwards also points out that the link between the fashion culture and human subjectivity is gendered. “Thus, to return to the point made earlier concerning designer-label culture working through a particular relationship between the world of objects and human subjectivity, that connection is particularly gendered one.” *Ibid.*, p. 156.

---

<sup>156</sup> The definition of *modernity* cannot be made without an exploration of the theme of subjectivity. Concerning this, see Harvie Ferguson, *Modernity and Subjectivity: Body, Soul, Spirit* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000).

<sup>157</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, pp. xx–xxi.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., pp. 85–86.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 31.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., pp. 22–23.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., p. x.

<sup>164</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 79.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., pp. 73–76.

<sup>169</sup> Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, p. 23.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., p. 22–23.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>172</sup> Benjamin, *Selected Writings*, pp. 315–316.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Goodstein, Elizabeth S. *Experience Without Qualities: Boredom and Modernity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 5.

<sup>176</sup> Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, p. 29.

<sup>177</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 164.

<sup>178</sup> Simmel, “Fashion,” 550–551.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., p. 551.



## CHAPTER 4

### THE DIALECTICAL IMAGE: THE REDEMPTION OF FASHION

This chapter inquires into fashion as a dialectical image and the import of this link. As implied in the title, the point at which fashion becomes a dialectical image coincides with the redemption of fashion from the phenomenal world in light of Walter Benjamin's reading of Plato, as that which dialectical images impart is nothing but truth. The truth that fashion in the form of the dialectical image exposes carries a significant political bearing because it is of both the individual and the collective at once. Resting on the expoundings put forth in the literature review regarding why and how a dialectical method, rather than an apodictic method, is apt for the revelation of Benjaminian truth, this chapter discusses the rationales behind the justification of fashion as a dialectical image. According to Walter Benjamin, the dialectical image flashes truth while in the phenomenal world, and the realm of non-material abstract Platonic Forms or Ideas to which truth appertains can be identified not through scientific deduction, or apodictic demonstration, but through representation, or images, particularly dialectical images. The discourse about how the moment at which fashion becomes a dialectical image is when a Platonic redemption—the salvation of phenomena and the representation of Ideas at once—is made, hinges upon Benjamin's epistemology, which distances truth from knowledge, calling upon us to hark back to the pre-Kantian philosophies such as Plato. Put in other words, fashion in the form of a dialectical image is redeemed from the site of phenomena only because it, while still a phenomenon itself, visually discloses truth which originally resides in the sphere of Plato's Forms or Ideas. It is Benjamin's theory of experience (*Erfahrung*), which is impossible to sever from his epistemology, that tells us that experience, the unified and continuous manifold of knowledge as opposed to knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) of experience, is tantamount to truth—

“unintentional” truth that is communicable among people—to which fashion as a dialectical image is akin to a great degree.

In “On Perception” (“*Über die Wahrnehmung*”) Walter Benjamin proposes that the distinction between “experience” (*Erfahrung*) and “knowledge” (*Erkenntnis*) be made in order to discover truth.<sup>1</sup> For Benjamin, “perception” (*Wahrnehmung*), as in the title of the article, means nothing other than truth reached by experience. The linguistic similarity between the words *perception* and *true* in German—as the German word *wahr* in *perception* (*Wahrnehmung*) stands for true—may present us with an inkling of this. Here in the same treatise, Benjamin scrutinizes Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, in which there is a “discontinuity” of knowledge and experience—strictly speaking, of pure knowledge and experience, as the former is achieved by the categories while the latter by senses.<sup>2</sup> According to Benjamin, the conceptualization or the *metaphysics* of nature from sensation is different than that from the categories, so much so that Kant circumvented a “unified epistemological center” in which the continuity of knowledge and experience takes place.<sup>3</sup> Here sensation (sensibility) is set in contrast to the categories, the “true root concepts of pure understanding.”<sup>4</sup> Sensibility is “our mind’s receptivity,” or “its ability to receive presentations;” on the other hand, understanding is “our ability to produce presentation.”<sup>5</sup> The former is “sensible cognition,” while the latter is our spontaneity of cognition.<sup>6</sup> The term nature means things found in our natural, empirical world out of which we receive presentations. Just as Hegel reprimands Kant for the dichotomy between sensibility and categories, or between the “sensible material” and “its universal relations,” to borrow Hegel’s words, on which the absolute distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is based,<sup>7</sup> so does Benjamin. Even more compatible to Benjamin, Hegel also points out that the antithetical relation between objectivity and subjectivity becomes blurry to the degree that nothing remains counterposed with

subjectivity except the *thing-in-itself*, as “experience *in its entirety* falls within *subjectivity*.”<sup>8</sup>

What this account of the counter or contrasting relation between sensibility and categories as the most fundamental concepts of pure understanding entails is none other than the most serious shortcoming of the Kant’s idealism indeed. With the Transcendental Aesthetic that poses the danger of putting Transcendental Idealism of experience into a speculative idealism, Benjamin also reveals the foible of the Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, whose hallmark is a necessary a priori condition of possible experience, in that the existence of speculative knowledge that could be reached by a process of deduction undermines the status of the “highest determinants of knowledge” based on the “system of categories.”<sup>9</sup> The implication Benjamin has made from the elucidation about the shortcomings of Kant’s idealism that is centered on the supremacy of reason which, independent of experience, knows everything a priori with apodictic certainty is this: truth does not come from knowledge of experience but from “raw” experience, especially if it is one that is shaped in a way that is absolutely detached from the involvement of human beings. It is the concept of unintentional truth<sup>10</sup> conceived by Benjamin, and also by Adorno, that can help us fathom Benjamin’s purpose of demarcating between the immediate and natural concept of experience and the concept of experience in the context of knowledge.

Comprehension of this is of greatest importance, because the messages transferred by fashion in the form of a dialectical image are by no means incongruous to “unintentional” truth,” the quintessence of Benjamin’s theory of experience (*Erfahrung*) which outruns knowledge of experience. The following remark made by Benjamin in *Ursprung des deutschen*

*Trauerspiels* (*Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 1928) mirrors well what he thinks of truth that is not premeditated by our knowledge:

“Truth does not enter into relationships, particularly intentional ones. The object of knowledge, determined as it is by the intention inherent in the concept, is not the truth. Truth is an intentionless state of being, made up of ideas. The proper approach to it is not therefore one of intention and knowledge, but rather a total immersion and absorption in it. Truth is the death of intention.”<sup>11</sup>

Even though both Benjamin and Adorno are convinced of the concept of unintentional truth, for the latter what entails in relation to experience is suited to the privileged individual subject that could capture the moment of intellectual experience, while for the former truth is not limited to a few exclusive elites. As pointed out by Susan Buck-Morss, Adorno is adamantly opposed to the idea of a collective subject, holding onto the concept of the individual.<sup>12</sup> For Adorno, the thinking subject vis-à-vis the object, as compared to Lukács’s proletariat subject whose class consciousness gives rise to its identity, is characterized with a thrust of nonidentity, void of a political experience.<sup>13</sup> Whereas Adorno is stubbornly resistant to a philosophical experience,<sup>14</sup> Benjamin’s theory of experience pertains to the relation between cultural productions and political revolution in the sense that they are the outcome of collective consciousness he espouses. This is why Benjaminian exposition of experience is strikingly pertinent in the explications of fashion, since it offers a theoretical tool by which fashion as a cultural object can be considered to be a distinctively modern embodiment whose quality is enhanced by a political significance.

In order to understand how and why fashion is associated with the dialectical image that bears political meaning we need to make out the functions of the dialectical image. Tapping into this requires a close examination into different ways of interpretation (of different objects.) Fashion in the form of a dialectical image is among the “naked” or “raw” objects to be “interpreted” as something that tells us some truths, according to the Benjaminian line of thinking.

This demands clarifications about different approaches in hermeneutics; as one can see, it is a matter of interpretation. To illustrate, according to Buck-Morss, while Wilhelm Dilthey contends that the task of hermeneutics is to reclaim the subjective meaning behind cultural objects, Adorno aims to search for what messages they transfer rather than their creators' conscious intent.<sup>15</sup> Buck-Morss has reduced this as following: "For Dilthey, it was the artist which hermeneutics tries to understand; for Adorno it was the artwork."<sup>16</sup> Fashion, like art, can be reasonably described in the hermeneutic frame of reference.

Though in agreement with hermeneutics that cultural phenomena are "expressions of life," Benjamin is closer to the beliefs of Adorno, but the object of his hermeneutics is not just works of art but almost everything, including commodities of all kinds found in our life. He is interested in grappling with the "aura" in commodity products in modern times as compared with Adorno whose elitist philosophy, revolving especially around the individual subjectivity, is tangent to the sociopolitical interplay.<sup>17</sup> As might have been glimpsed, this has a strong bearing on Benjamin's theory of experience. He believes that there is truth in objective reality regardless of the creator's intention and without the relay between the subject and the object. Instead of being identified with the subject, he asserts, it is the image that is transmitting the truth in "natural" objects or in "vulgar" experience.

Just as image, for Benjamin, is indispensable to the revelation of truth, so is his concept of the dialectical image. He views fashion as an important object of representation that is eligible to be a dialectical image, because its visual messages are nothing other than unintentional truth, as, I argue, they are the end products of communications between the individual and the collective at once. Thus, it can be reasoned out that how images can be dialectical is virtually the same question as how truth can be attained by the dialectic. That being said, we are on the verge

of leaving the territory of Kantian epistemology, which finds a basis for knowledge from apodictic certainty. This is exactly why Benjamin calls attention to a revision as regards the Kantian concept of knowledge in “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” (1918) (*“Über das Programm der kommenden Philosophie”*).<sup>18</sup> He asserts Kant’s conception of knowledge is valid insofar as knowledge is obtained from the interconnection between subject and object, such that the relation between knowledge and experience to human empirical consciousness is restrained under this condition.<sup>19</sup> Besides, in the Kantian system our imagination, the source of all sorts of synthesis, made out of understanding and sensibility, is bound to our individual living egos that have *intentio*, such that our knowledge falls into nothing other than subjectively constructed cognition. Having dissented, Benjamin suggests redressing the Kantian concept of knowledge, which, he believes, is directly related to the emendation of the concept of experience as well.<sup>20</sup> It has to be emphasized that this effort toward a future philosophy should be made in the context of pre-Kantian epistemology rather than of Marxist materialist revision.<sup>21</sup> In fact, it traces as far as back to Plato, as Benjamin has intimated in *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels* (Origin of German Tragic Drama, 1928):

“Truth, bodied forth in the dance of represented ideas, resists being projected, by whatever means, into the realm of knowledge. Knowledge is possession. Its very object is determined by the fact that it must be taken possession of—even if in a transcendental sense—in the consciousness. The quality of possession remains. For the thing possessed, representation is secondary; it does not have prior existence as something representing itself. But the opposite holds good of truth. For knowledge, method is a way of acquiring its object—even by creating it in the consciousness; for truth it is self-representation, and is therefore immanent in it as form. Unlike the methodology of knowledge, this form does not derive from a coherence established in the consciousness, but from an essence. Again and again, the statement that the object of knowledge is not identical with the truth will prove itself to be one of the profoundest intentions of philosophy in its original form, the Platonic theory of ideas.”<sup>22</sup>

To be specific, the incongruity<sup>23</sup> between empirically conceivable objects that appear to be beautiful and an object that is what beauty is laid down in Plato's theory of "ideas" or "forms" is the bedrock of Benjamin's argument that the Platonic view of the relationship of truth and beauty is not to be dispensed with in coming to grips with the definition of truth itself.<sup>24</sup> Why is this investigation necessary?—because this dichotomy between the phenomenal and the Platonic world of "ideas" or "forms" is *the* condition in which the redemption of fashion takes place. Benjamin notes that in *The Symposium* Plato renders truth in the realm of ideas as the intrinsic content of beauty and avers truth to be beautiful.<sup>25</sup> He also holds that the postulation that truth is beautiful must be interpreted within the frame of reference of erotic desire,<sup>26</sup> since eroticism permeates *The Symposium*.<sup>27</sup> This is to say that "truth is not so much beautiful in itself, as for whomever seeks it," just as "a person is beautiful in the eyes of his lover, but not in himself."<sup>28</sup> In spite of that, this essence of truth by no means diminishes the beauty of truth, as Benjamin describes it: "Eros follows it in its flight, but as its lover, not as its pursuer; so that for the sake of its outward appearance beauty will always flee: in dread before the intellect, in fear before the lover."<sup>29</sup> Whoever has been in love should know the moment of beauty whose content is truth—being in love itself. Far from a metaphor, the relation between truth and beauty in light of the Platonic ideas, according to Benjamin, does not just illuminate the difference between truth and the object of knowledge, but also explains why cognitions of things that are in the realms of ideas have long lost their validity as scientific truth.<sup>30</sup> Again, this has to do with Benjamin's epistemology, which dissociates truth from knowledge: the latter is possession while the former reveals itself through representation.<sup>31</sup> The domain where truth resides, therefore, is immanent while impossible to prove through scientific deduction. It is the contrast between apodictic and dialectic expounded in the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics* in *Organon* by Aristotle that will

further assist us to discern the world of truth compared to that of scientific deduction. In fact, grappling with Benjamin's theory of experience requires an understanding of the epistemological distinction between apodictic and dialectic expounded by Aristotle as well as Plato and clarifications as to why Benjamin questions the Kantian concept of knowledge.

As the relations among truth, the dialectic and images are brought to light in the literature review, we can finally embark on the main discussion of this chapter, that is, of how fashion is related to the dialectical image. While in this investigation, it can be puzzled out why collective consciousness is a significant element of the formation of the dialectical image and how experience (*Erfahrung*) is shaped by the collective as well as by the individual. Despite Benjamin's frequent association of fashion with the dialectical image, little has been scrutinized about the implications of their marriage. Among the most recent studies carried out on this topic is an essay by Ulrich Lehmann titled "Tigersprung: Fashioning History" (1999). Lehmann claims that fashion is a dialectical image on the grounds that the example of the twenty yards of linen and the frock coat compared by Marx poses the contrast between the concrete roll of cloth and its abstraction, clothing with sophisticated cut and style, forming a dialectical relation between raw material and cultural product with its "trans-historical" leap into the present.<sup>32</sup> None the less, Lehmann's proposition is not a pure image but a deliberate pairing between abstractness and rawness whose image is conceived in the mind being tainted with Marxist thoughts. Who would create an actual image comprised of some raw cloth and a frock coat unless a person intentionally does so? This is an act that Benjamin would oppose as a carefully contrived fabrication of some *intentio*, which can never disclose any truth at all. Besides the condition under which truths are revealed fortuitously and unwittingly, the topics revolving around the



concept of the dialectical image by Benjamin should be directed toward the issue of time, which does not flow as in the Hegelian, linear time, as Benjamin himself remarks:

“On the dialectical image. In it lies time. Already with Hegel, time enters into dialectic. But the Hegelian dialectic knows time solely as the properly historical, if not psychological, time of thinking. The time differential <Zeitdifferential> in which alone the dialectical image is real is still unknown to him. Attempt to show this with regard to fashion. Real time enters the dialectical image not in natural magnitude—let alone psychologically—but in its smallest gestalt. All in all, the temporal momentum <das Zeitmoment> in the dialectical image can be determined only through confrontation with another concept. This concept is the “now of recognizability” <Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit>. <Q°,21>”<sup>33</sup>

In contrast to the Hegelian progress of time, which is also Kantian, Benjamin avows that there is another logic of time that gives rise to real time. It is fashion that proves how the dialectical image works by presenting the time differential (*Zeitdifferential*) between real time<sup>34</sup> and now, writes Benjamin. Yet, little is known about how this way of thinking works. In order to fill this gap, I suggest examining the three key topics—nowtime (*Jetztzeit*), the relation between what-has-been and now, and collective consciousness, which will help to clarify why it is appropriate to discuss fashion in the context of the dialectical image.

First, let me introduce the following contemplation about the connection between images and their relation to nowtime made by Benjamin,<sup>35</sup> as it clues us in as to what the [dialectical] image is and why fashion is annexed with it.

“What distinguishes images from the “essences” of phenomenology is their historical index. (Heidegger seeks in vain to rescue history for phenomenology absolutely through “historicity.”) These images are to be thought of entirely apart from the categories of the “human sciences,” from so-called habitus, from style, and the like. For the historical index of the images not only says that they belong to a particular time; it says, above all, that they attain to legibility only at a particular time. And, indeed, this acceding “to legibility” constitutes a specific critical point in the movement at their interior: Every present day is determined by the images that are synchronic with it: each “now” is the now of a particular recognizability. In it, truth is charged to the bursting point with time. (This point of explosion, and nothing else, is the death of the *intentio*, which thus coincides with the birth of authentic historical time, the time of truth.) It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what is

past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words; image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is purely temporal, the relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but figural *«bildlich»*. Only dialectical images are genuinely historical—that is, not archaic—images. The images that is read—which is to say, the image in the now of its recognizability—bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous critical moment on which all reading is founded. [N3,1]”<sup>36</sup>

As spelled out by Benjamin, the dialectical image is specific to nowtime, which makes fashion a prime example of the dialectical image. Fashion is nothing but an expression of being current, as falling behind the time is inexcusable in the world of fashion. Fashion captures the nowtime and visually transfers its messages to be read.<sup>37</sup> For example, fashion, a conveyer of inexorable appearances of newness, is a cardinal element of the nineteenth-century Western society, the Ur-history of the subsequent commodity societies.<sup>38</sup> The truth revealed through the dialectical image as a form of fashion is the antinomy of modernity where the supply of materials for fashions grows at a rapidly accelerating rate by means of the capitalist production mode but its destiny to disappear soon is inevitable.<sup>39</sup>

Before moving onto another aspect of the concatenation between fashion and the dialectical image, let me remind you that nowtime, the point in which truth comes forth, is hardly asynchronic with the tempo of fashion. This is of highest significance to our endeavor to grasp the threshold function of fashion in the revelation of truth. Indeed, the next quotation which has long been deemed as among the most esoteric reflections by Benjamin, is ready to be cracked:

“Resolute refusal of the concept of “timeless truth” is in order. Nevertheless, truth is not—as Marxism would have it—a merely contingent function of knowing, but is bound to a nucleus of time lying hidden with the knower and the known alike. This is so true that the eternal, in any case, is far more the ruffle on a dress than some idea.”<sup>40</sup>

There is no “time-less” truth but eternal truth. The “bursting point” at which Benjaminian unintentional truth evinces itself is nowtime. Plus, the status of knowing a truth is not invariant

but changes over time. So is the relation between the knower and the known. As such, the eternal as a truth of now of any kind is no less long than the life span of a fashion, the “ruffle on a dress,” which is destined to be superseded soon by something else. Benjamin’s rumination over timeless truth tells us nothing but the importance of the moment of truth, the nowtime, which is as fugitive as fashion. And yet, this does not qualify the claim that there is no such truth as the eternal. Say, fashion is the eternal sameness. As unscientific as the Platonic notion of love, with which Benjamin makes an analogy in *Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels* (*Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 1928), the truth [of eternity] has a home in the territory of the Platonic ideas not in the phenomenal. Then how do truths come into view so that we can catch a glimpse of them? Only in the representation of phenomena do ideas make their appearance.<sup>41</sup> It is to this end that the dialectical image serves its grand purposes: it *shows* us the sociohistorical specificity of a particular time while capturing the moment of the truth, that is, nowtime, in which no intention whatsoever can possibly meddle. The truth displayed in a dialectical image is a revelation of a past that was the nowtime at one time. As far as a dialectical image in the form of fashion is concerned, we can discover more than one truth from it. The truth that fashion as the dialectical image delineates is not just the sociohistorical condition of modernity but also the relation between (Platonic) ideas and phenomena. Though antithetical, eternity (eternal sameness or eternal recurrence) and transitoriness are equally true in the workings of fashion. This dialectical truth is *the* basis on which fashion is to be redeemed from the sphere of phenomena, which is to say that it is the dialectical image with which fashion is sanctioned to leave the phenomenal world, as it exposes the moment wherein the Platonic redemption of phenomena of fashion is realized. Recondite, the Platonic redemption, however, is an indispensable part of Benjamin’s theory of experience (*Erfahrung*), since truth *appears* only through the empirical object. It is the

salvation of phenomena and the representation of ideas at once, and the “two things at a single stroke,” to borrow Benjamin’s expression,<sup>42</sup> occur in the form of the dialectical image. What comes about in fashion as the dialectical image is a truth that belongs to the Platonic world of ideas but flashes as an image. Indeed, what can better show the eternal transitoriness than fashion while encapsulating a nowtime?

In addition to the similarity to nowtime, the relation between what-has-been and now is another vital quality that vouches for the compatibility between fashion and the dialectical image. Of highest relevance to this is the fact that the “figural” relation between what-has-been and now is the idiosyncrasy of fashion while manifesting the time differential. Fashion cannot be purely of the now, in that it is essentially a temporary response to what-has-been as of now. As I have discussed in the chapter titled, “Dialectics in Fashion History,” the development of history of fashion in modern times is in concert with that of history in general. This means that the dialectical progress in fashion is not a mechanical replacement of the fashion of the immediate past but a sublated *causatum* passed over from the antagonistic relation, which comes into effect for some duration, in which the antithetical relation lingers, thereby consisting of what-has-been. Where fashion cites some distant past, not what-has-been, there is something revolutionary or radical about it. Most prominent is the sudden boom of the high-waisted clothes following the style of the Roman Republic, during the decades around the 1789 Revolution, which Benjamin refers to as a “tiger’s leap.”<sup>43</sup> Then, does the dialectical image drawing on the Greco-Roman dress styles have no bearing on what-has-been? Not at all. Benjamin holds that it is by the dialectical image not only that everything past becomes more actual than it was but also that the “explosive materials” dormant in what-has-been become kindled.<sup>44</sup> He also designates fashion as the “authentic figure” of the dialectical process in which one past event finds its currency to be

more than it was and something lying asleep in what-has-been becomes visually disclosed.<sup>45</sup> This definitely points to the most critical remit of fashion in reference to the dialectical image, whose impact has political implications beyond historiographical significance, as suggested by Benjamin.<sup>46</sup> The foundation for this argument is that experience (*Erfahrung*), in which both the collective and the individual partake, is formulated in what-has-been. From this epistemological platform, it can be said that the historical perception or consciousness aroused by a dialectical image, which hypostatizes experiences (*Erfahrungen*), is *awakening* by the collective as well as by the individual. How does this empathy between the individual and the collective work? How can individuals and the collective share the same dream and awake contemporaneously from sleeping? Although Benjamin has not clearly enunciated the paradigm by which the individual and the collective relay to each other, he implies that the subject of the dream is not just individuals but also the collective, as he writes: “Here the question arises: In what different canonical ways can man behave (the individual man, but also the collective) with regard to dreaming?”<sup>47</sup> Indeed, fashion is in the heart of the matrix where individuals and the collective play their own game, while becoming a medium for the social intercourse between them, in the midst of which the realization of the now-being (*Jetztsein*) also takes places. The most rudimentary basis for this argument is that the reference point by which individuals adjust themselves to the collective is nowtime,<sup>48</sup> without which it is impossible to have any coherent historiography of humanity written. Nowtime sets the tempo of the fashion, a virtual banner for the progression of modernity, according to which the individual and the collective march together. This is possible because the consciousness of the nowtime is the core of the communication between the individual and the collective while keeping track of each other.

Last but not least, fashion can also explain how collective consciousness is operative in relation to the dialectical image. As discussed by many Benjamin scholars, the association he made between the dialectical image and Jungian concepts such as consciousness and dream is one of the most serious objections made by Adorno, who criticizes it for the mystification with psychoanalysis as well as for the lack of attention to class differences.<sup>49</sup> The grounds on which Adorno criticizes this concept is that not only is the image of a classless society a myth, inasmuch as it is a combination of the archaic image of the utopia and modernity, but also, resting on Marx's conviction, the (false) consciousness created by objects is a consequence within alienated bourgeois individuals caused by the fetish character of the commodity.<sup>50</sup> Dismissing any positive aspects of collective consciousness, Adorno emphatically writes in a letter to Benjamin that, citing Horkheimer, the mass ego is not something that preexists but kicks in only in emergency situations like earthquakes and catastrophes.<sup>51</sup> When it comes to the dialectical image, Adorno also gives a negative voice:

“I would add that dialectical images as models are not social products but objective constellations in which the social condition represents itself. Consequently, no ideology or social “accomplishment” of any sort can ever be attributed to the dialectical image.”<sup>52</sup>

As some readers may have already noticed, all these claims and concerns made by Adorno, which are Marxist in origin, can be counterattacked successfully with the topic of fashion. Contrary to Adorno's protestation, as expressed above, fashion is a social product, a result of the relation between the individual and the collective, while being a dialectical image and a social system itself in which the two entities give and receive their messages reciprocally. And the constellations created by fashion as a dialectical image lay bare the unintentional truth about the nowtime, exposing the sociohistorical condition of the time, according to Benjamin's line of thought. However, Adorno, drawing on the dogmatic Marxist materialist thesis, asseverates that,

dialectically speaking, commodity gives birth to (false) consciousness that has to do with desire and fear.<sup>53</sup> Nothing can better clarify the discrepancy between the perspectives of Adorno and Benjamin than the difference between experience (*Erfahrung*) and lived experience (*Erlebnis*) indeed. The consciousness, whether individual or collective or both, Benjamin ties in with the dialectical image is made up of experience (*Erfahrung*); on the other hand, as for Adorno, the consciousness formed in connection with commodity products is lived experience (*Erlebnis*), which deals with feelings like desire and fear. Whereas experience (*Erfahrung*) is a blend between the individual past and the collective past, as specified briefly by Benjamin,<sup>54</sup> which is, therefore, absolutely related to historical consciousness as well,<sup>55</sup> experience (*Erlebnis*) is a subjective, personal, lived experience.<sup>56</sup>

In reality, these are not just purely philosophical distinctions. From the linguistic point of view, the disparity between the two words in German is undisguised. After collating their linguistic usages, Anna Wierzbicka explicates that whereas experience (*Erlebnis*) is a special, memorable event in one's life, accompanied by some emotion, experience (*Erfahrung*) is connected with neither bodily nor emotional feelings, but it implies knowledge that is communicable to other people.<sup>57</sup> To be more specific, experience (*Erlebnis*) refers to any particular episodes associated with feelings such that it remains in one's memory, while experience (*Erfahrung*) is a conscious, attentive, contemporaneous thought and/or knowledge based on an awareness of what is happening to *us*—"lessons that can be drawn from what happened to me' (and that could be conveyed to others)."<sup>58</sup> Resting on the evidence of the corpora surrounding the English word, *experience*, Wierzbicka also discusses that in English, although not as distinctive with different words as in German, there are two kinds of experiences in English by and large: one that is linked with "past experience, accumulated knowledge" and

the other with “current experience, sensory or sensory-like.”<sup>59</sup> As one can see right away, these two do not correspond respectively to the German words, *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis*, particularly because *Erlebnis* does not have any reference to sensory prototypes while *Erfahrungen*, the plural noun, can be identified with sensory impressions (*Eindrücke*).<sup>60</sup> What is most crucial in this cross-linguistic perspective on “experience” is the fact that, notwithstanding that the critical difference between *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis* is more or less clear, experiences of two kinds in English that Wierzbicka sorts out are not necessarily discrete. Not only does English not differentiate different kinds of “experiences” with different names, as the German language does, but, as revealed by Wierzbicka’s research, it is heavily entrenched with British empiricism to such a degree that knowledge in the world where Anglo English is spoken means nothing but experience-based knowledge.<sup>61</sup> As a result, knowledge that is achieved by seeing and touching (feeling) is more epistemologically secure than anything else.<sup>62</sup> The same applies to *science*. According to Wierzbicka again, the English word *science* is saturated with empiricism when exclusive of humanities, logic, and mathematics, while its German counterpart *Wissenschaft* is not.<sup>63</sup> This accounts for why in English, knowledge arrived by experience, that is, experience obtained out of sensory prototypes, as considered to be of highest rank in the edifice of human knowledge, molded the modern concept of science itself.<sup>64</sup> Wierzbicka’s extensive study on the three English words—*experience*, *evidence*, and *sense*—irrefutably discloses the cultural and historical baggage of English inundated with British empiricism and Anglophone philosophy,<sup>65</sup> which also has shaped a *Weltanschauung* that is not just confined to ways of knowing empirically.<sup>66</sup> Hardly digressive, the finding by Wierzbicka unequivocally unpacks the embedded influence of knowledge built on evidence or demonstration under the auspice of empiricism which, in fact, dates back to Aristotle, who posits the world of apodictic in



opposition to that of dialectic. Indeed, the impossibility of translating *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis* into *experience* without some additional explanations about the characteristics of each by all means confirms that there are different “experiences” that are not interchangeable, as they stand apart from each other, whether corrupted with empiricism (like the English experience) or communicable between the individual and the collective as a piece of knowledge and/or thought (like the German *Erfahrung*), or subjective and personal while being acquired in the course of living (like the German *Erlebnis*).

We now return to our chief discussion about the contrasting perspectives on the dialectal image between Adorno and Benjamin, which are absolutely linked with the concept of “experience.” What we can elicit based on Wierzbicka’s linguistic analysis is the following: First, experience (*Erfahrung*) is a “conscious, attentive, contemporaneous” thought and/or knowledge gathered or collected over time while being under many situations and reflected upon. Second, experience (*Erfahrung*) is communicable between the individual and the collective, if I may repeat, for it is contingent on an “awareness of what is happening to *us*”—“‘lessons that can be drawn from what happened to me’ (and that could be conveyed to others).” How can we know that a piece of thought or knowledge accumulated over time is transferred from the individual to the collective or vice versa? Linguistic evidence from the collocations and contexts surrounding experience (*Erfahrung*) may present this transmission, but it is at the risk of being singled out as a “Germanic” way of thinking, just as British empiricism’s gold standard of seeing and touching (feeling), is ineradicable in English, as uncovered by Wierzbicka. However, fashion, which is pan-Western, to say the least, can visually exhibit the communications between the individual and the collective. This is, as I have explained elsewhere, because fashion cannot exist without the approval of the collective, although a few individuals initiate its beginning. This is *the* reason

why fashion deserves attention as among the most serious areas of study in political science. It is barely hyperbole to state that few theories on political behavior can stay clear of the influence of fashion in the modern times, the fulcrum on which each pole of the individual and the collective teeter-totters ceaselessly. So, figuratively speaking, the policy-makers' job is not more than locating the correct balancing point of the seesaw called politics. The jaded description of fashion—an expression of the spirit of the time (*zeitgeist*)—alludes to the relation of fashion to the times-spirit,<sup>67</sup> as both are nothing less than outcomes of the mediation between the collective and the individual. Yet, the argument that the understanding by fashion of the times is the real task of politics is never a new idea. A century ago, J. C. Bluntschli, a commentator who acknowledged fashion's affinity to the spirit of the times already made an insightful comment about the relation between politics and the grappling with it:

“Practical politics is an art which has a great many complicated problems to solve, an art which has to deal with many joint and personal forces. The result of political struggles necessitates treaties of peace, attempts at settlement or adjustment and compromises. The man who, out of blind zeal for the spirit of the times scorns all compromise, may, indeed, be an honorable doctrinarian, but he must not expect the success or laurels of the statesman.”<sup>68</sup>

Before completing this scrutiny concerning the relation between fashion and the dialectical image, I would like to briefly pinpoint the two most momentous features of fashion as a theoretical thrust of modernity. Fashion can explain away the theory of the regressive Marxist social relations caused by commodity fetishism, for it is a concrete embodiment of the ever-evolving, dialectical relation between the individual and the collective. Moreover, with reference to the dialectical image, fashion can be thought of as a positive reification of objects to the extent that they function as the point of departure from which to *see* some truths, which is hardly dissimilar to what Benjamin views as the Platonic redemption in which empirical reality is redeemed to be on a par with ideas. Indeed, for centuries, fashion has been accused of its

vacuousness for the reason that its incessant changes do not amend anything indeed. Both Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno are in agreement that the eternal recurrence of the new, the epitome of the modern, bourgeois society does not alter anything, while the newness remains the same consisting of the eternity of hell.<sup>69</sup> Even so, redemption can be found in fashion, the “tireless purveyor of newness,”<sup>70</sup> insofar as it is construed as a dialectical image. Benjamin’s annexation of fashion with the dialectical image also suggests that through the dialectical image of fashion as both an object of self-reflexivity and the means of taking cognizance of collective consciousness does sleeping consciousness arouse from slumber at the nadir of the Kantian mechanical thought. It is because the image of the dialectical relation between what-has-been and now, as revealed in a fashion is also a “constellation” formed out of the interactions over time, between the collective and the individual as well. A dialectical image obtained out of fashion not only captures the moment of a historical truth, but also hypostatizes a piece of “communicable” knowledge or thought that individuals are not just an auxiliary fragment to the whole but working members who may change the whole, although one single individual is markedly powerless. This explains every inch of the disparity between the inflexible doctrinarian who turns a blind eye to the *zeitgeist* and the successful political leader who is absolutely aware of its dynamics through fashion. Hence, the peculiar nature of fashion, that is, the temporary adjustment between the collective and the individual, while each keeps its potency ready to exercise at any moment, ought to be elevated as a real substance in practical politics. Not to be overlooked is the fact that fashion is also a subject matter of epistemology as well as of practical politics, for the “conscious, attentive, contemporaneous” knowledge and/or thought exchanged under the fashion system between the individual and the collective is experience (*Erfahrung*), which proffers the *content* of truth. Hard to penetrate, Benjamin’s theory of experience

(*Erfahrung*) has been thought of as an esoteric part of his philosophy. Nonetheless, with the mundane topic of fashion, it finally comes to view, making it possible for us to apprehend how the unintentional truth, the thrust of his epistemological stance, appears as it is leaving the Platonic realm of ideas.

---

## Notes

### Chapter 4

<sup>1</sup> Benjamin, "On Perception," pp. 93–95.

Also see Buck-Morss's *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*, p. 91.

The *Trauerspiel* essay distinguished between the Kantian concept of experience as "knowledge" (*Erkenntnis*), the cognitive method of which was adequate for science, and what he called philosophical "experience" (*Erfahrung*), which was concerned with the revelation of truth. In the former case, the subject constituted the world in accord with its own conceptual structures; in the latter, the subject constituted "ideas" whose structure was objective, determined by the particular phenomena themselves, by the "elective affinities" of their elements, to use Goethe's term; in Adorno's language, by their "inner logic." Kantian knowledge was "possession"; it entailed breaking reality apart so that it could be subsumed under the concepts which "issue from out of the spontaneity of understanding." But philosophical experience was the "representation of ideas" (*Darstellung der Ideen*) from out of empirical reality itself.

<sup>2</sup> Benjamin, "On Perception," pp. 93–94.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 106–107.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, p. 81.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Benjamin, "On Perception," pp. 93–96.

<sup>10</sup> See Buck-Morss's *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*, p. 77–81.

<sup>11</sup> Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, trans. John Osborne (London: NLB, 1977), pp. 35–36; see also another translation by Buck-Morss in *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*, p. 77.

<sup>12</sup> Buck-Morss in *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*, p. 82.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 82–85.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 84–85.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 79.

According to F. R. Ankersmit, Adorno was influenced by Gadamer's idea in *Truth and Method*. See F. R. Ankersmit, *Sublime Historical Experience* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 20.

<sup>17</sup> See Buck-Morss's analysis of the weakness of Adorno's position regarding the topic of subjectivity in Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*, p. 84, and her explanation about the concept of "aura" Benjamin uses when describing some mystic qualities in commodity goods in the same book, p. 78.

---

<sup>18</sup> Walter Benjamin, “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy,” in *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913–1926*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 102.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.

<sup>21</sup> See Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*, p. 78 and Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky, “Hanging Over the Abyss: On the Relation Between Knowledge and Experience in Hermann Cohen and Walter Benjamin,” in *Hermann Cohen’s Critical Idealism*, ed. Reinier Munk (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2005), p. 182.

<sup>22</sup> Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, pp. 29–30.

<sup>23</sup> Richard Kraut notes that almost all major works of Plato is, in some way, devoted to or grounded in this distinction. See Kraut, Richard, “Plato,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2009 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/plato/>.

<sup>24</sup> Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, p. 30.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>27</sup> Concerning the relation between eroticism and Plato’s *Symposium*, also see the introduction by Christopher Gill in Plato, *The Symposium*, ed. and trans. Christopher Gill (New York: Penguin, 1999), pp. x–xv.

<sup>28</sup> Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, p. 31.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31–32.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.

<sup>32</sup> Ulrich Lehmann, “Tigersprung: Fashioning History,” *Fashion Theory* 3(3) (1999): 297–322, on 303.

<sup>33</sup> Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, p. 867.

<sup>34</sup> For the moment when “a higher grade of actuality” is achieved, see the following remark by Benjamin. Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, pp. 391–392.

It is said that the dialectical method consists in doing justice each time to the concrete historical situation of its object. But that is not enough. For it is just as much a matter of doing justice to the concrete historical situation of the *interest* taken in the object. And *this* situation is always so constituted that the interest is itself preformed in that object and, above all, feel this object concretized in itself and upraised from its former being into the higher concretion of now-being [*Jetztsein*] (waking being!) In what way this now-being (which is something other than the now-being of “the present time” [*Jetztzeit*], since it is being punctuated and intermittent) already signifies, in itself, a higher concretion—this question, of course, can be entertained by the dialectical method only within the purview of a historical perception that at all points has overcome the ideology of progress. In regard to such a perception, one could speak of the increasing concentration (integration) of reality, such that everything past (in its time) can acquire a higher grade of actuality than it had in the moment of its existing. How it marks itself as higher actuality is determined by the image as which and in which it is comprehended. And this dialectical penetration and actualization of

---

former contexts puts the truth of all present action to the test. Or rather, it serves to ignite the explosive materials that are latent in what has been (the authentic figure of which is *fashion*). To approach, in this way, “what has been” means to treat it not historiographically, as heretofore, but politically, in political categories. □fashion□ [K2, 3]

<sup>35</sup> Refer to Leland De la Durantaye’s comments on Benjamin’s concept of nowtime:

One of the most important as well as most enigmatic concepts that Benjamin employed to try to catch the winds of history in his conceptual sail was what he opposed to “empty, homogenous time” and called a “concept of the present as ‘nowtime [Jetztzeit]’” (Benjamin GS, I.704; see also Benjamin GS, I.702). The term that Benjamin chose to liberate the dynamic energies of revolutionary thought is an unusual one and, as a result, not easy to translate. In German, *Jetztzeit* usually means “contemporary time” or “the present time,” and philosophers from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche to Heidegger used it as a derogatory term for the narrowly contemporary (that is, a superficial time focused only on the here and now, with no sense for the times of the past or those of the future). In Benjamin’s hands, however, *Jetztzeit* is given a different valence and a new dynamism. (Leland de la Durantaye, *Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009], p. 102)

<sup>36</sup> Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, [N3, 1], p. 463.

<sup>37</sup> But, this legibility of the sociohistorical specificity is not without misgivings. Admittedly, some signals in fashion may be weak or ambiguous, but not all linguistic or semiotic communications are straightforward either.

<sup>38</sup> According to Buck-Morss, Benjamin conceptualizes the nineteenth-century Paris in particular as the ur-history of commodity society. See Susan Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 47, 217, and 239.

<sup>39</sup> Following are probably the most relevant observations regarding the connection between fashion and evanescence. Fashion: “Madame Death! Madame Death!” . . . Fashion always stands in opposition to the organic. Not art. It defends the rights of corpse before the living being, which it couples to the inorganic world. . . . (p. 894)

Where they impinge on the present moment, birth and death—the former through natural circumstances, the latter through social ones—considerably restrict the field of play for fashion. This state of affair is properly elucidated through two parallel circumstances. The first concerns birth, and shows the natural engendering of life “overcome” <*aufgehoben*> by novelty in the realm of fashion. The second circumstance concern death: it appears in fashion as no less “overcome,” and precisely through the sex appeal of the inorganic, which is something generated by fashion. [B9,2] (p. 79)

. . . For fashion was never anything other than the parody of the motley cadaver, provocation of death through the woman, and bitter colloquy with decay whispered between shrill bursts of mechanical laughter. That is fashion. And that is why she changes so quickly; she titillates death and is already something different, something new, as he casts about to crush her. . . . [B1,4], (p. 63)

. . . Every fashion is to some extent a bitter satire on love; in every fashion, perversities are suggested by the most ruthless means. Every fashion stands in opposition to the organic. Every fashion couples the living body to the inorganic. . . .” [B1a,4], (p. 64)

All of the quotations above are excerpted from Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*.

<sup>40</sup> Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, [N3, 2], p. 463.

<sup>41</sup> Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, p. 34.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

---

They [ideas] remain obscure so long as phenomena do not declare their faith to them and gather round them. It is the function of concepts to group phenomena together, and the division which is brought about within them thanks to the distinguishing power of the intellect is all the more significant in that it brings about two things at a single stroke: the salvation of phenomena and the representation of ideas.

<sup>43</sup> “Tiger’s leap into the past” (Thesis XIV) is probably among the most widely known expressions by Benjamin. Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” p. 395.

<sup>44</sup> Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, pp. 391–392.

It is said that the dialectical method consists in doing justice each time to the concrete historical situation of its object. But that is not enough. For it is just as much a matter of doing justice to the concrete historical situation of the *interest* taken in the object. And *this* situation is always so constituted that the interest is itself preformed in that object and, above all, feel this object concretized in itself and upraised from its former being into the higher concretion of now-being [*Jetztsein*] (waking being!) In what way this now-being (which is something other than the now-being of “the present time” [*Jetztzeit*], since it is being punctuated and intermittent) already signifies, in itself, a higher concretion—this question, of course, can be entertained by the dialectical method only within the purview of a historical perception that at all points has overcome the ideology of progress. In regard to such a perception, one could speak of the increasing concentration (integration) of reality, such that everything past (in its time) can acquire a higher grade of actuality than it had in the moment of its existing. How it marks itself as higher actuality is determined by the image as which and in which it is comprehended. And this dialectical penetration and actualization of former contexts puts the truth of all present action to the test. Or rather, it serves to ignite the explosive materials that are latent in what has been (the authentic figure of which is *fashion*). To approach, in this way, “what has been” means to treat it not historiographically, as heretofore, but politically, in political categories. □fashion□ [K2, 3]

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. (in the section “Materials for the Exposé of 1935”), p. 907.

<sup>48</sup> See Leland De la Durantaye’s explanation about Benjamin’s use of nowtime (*Jetztzeit*).

In German, *Jetztzeit* usually means “contemporary times” or “the present time,” and philosophers from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche to Heidegger used it as a derogatory term for the narrowly contemporary (that is, a superficial time focused only on the here and now, with no sense for the times of the past or those of the future. In Benjamin’s hands, however, *Jetztzeit* is given a different valence and a new dynamism. “Now-time” is conceived of in the most literal possible sense as a conception of time focused on the radical opportunity that every moment brings with it. . . . (Leland de la Durantaye, *Giorgio Agamben*, p. 102)

<sup>49</sup> See Adorno’s own criticism against this:

If, by its disenchantment, the dialectical image is psychologized as “dream,” it succumbs precisely in this way to the magic of bourgeois psychology. For who is the subject of the dream? In the nineteenth century, certainly only the individual, from whose dreaming, however, neither the fetish character nor its monuments can be read in a directly mimetic way. For this reason the collective consciousness is brought into play; and in the present version I fear that it cannot be distinguished from Jung’s concept. It is open to criticism from both sides: from that of the social process, since it hypostatizes archaic images precisely where dialectical ones are produced by the commodity character—and are produced not within an archaic collective ego, but within alienated bourgeois individuals; and from that of psychology, since, as Horkheimer says, the mass ego exists only in earthquakes and catastrophes, while otherwise the objective multiple [*Mehrwert*] exists precisely in individual subjects, and asserts itself attention from true objectivity



---

and from the alienated subjectivity that is its correlate. Our task is to polarize and dissolve this “consciousness” dialectically into society and individual, and not to galvanize it as a pictorial correlative of the commodity character. That no differentiation between classes remains in the dreaming collective speaks a clear enough warning. (*Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings*, vol. 3, 1935–1938. ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings [Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University, 2002], pp. 55–56)

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., pp. 54–55.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 58

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 54.

If you locate the dialectical image in consciousness as “dream,” not only has the concept thereby become disenchanted and commonplace, but it has also forfeited its objective authority, which might legitimate it from a materialist standpoint. The fetish character of the commodity is not a fact of consciousness, but is dialectical in the crucial sense that it produces consciousness. This means, however, that consciousness or the unconscious cannot simply reflect it as dream, but responds to it equally with desire and fear.

<sup>54</sup> Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 4, 1938–1940*, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 316.

Where there is experience [*Erfahrung*] in the strict sense of the word, certain contents of the individual past combine in the memory [*Gedächtnis*] with material from the collective past.

<sup>55</sup> Any records of history consist of the historiography of the collective to which individuals belong. Historical consciousness is nothing but a manifestation of the individual’s awareness of his or her stance while being part of the collective. Without this sense of belonging, historical consciousness is pointless. Individuals are not mere parts of the sum about which history has been written but they are essential to the constitution of historical consciousness, which is a kind of accumulated experience (*Erfahrung*) over time between individuals and the collective. One can take in how this is so once the dialectical relation between the individual and the collective is decrypted.

<sup>56</sup> See Beatrice Hanssen’s summary of the differences between experience (*Erfahrung*) and lived experience (*Erlebnis*) and her compendium of the latter’s relation to Benjamin’s philosophy, which, I think, affords a concise overview of the existing scholarship in these subject matters.

Benjamin discusses this change in the structure of experience in “Motifs,” (*SW* IV, 131–14). The word used for experience here, *Erfahrung*, along with *Erlebnis*, which is close to yet distinct in meaning from *Erfahrung*, are key words running through all of Benjamin’s thought. Among Benjamin’s most important texts on the topic are “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” (*SW* I, 100–10); “Experience” (1931 or 1932; *SW* II, 553); “Experience and Poverty” (1933; *SW* II, 731–36); “The Storyteller,” and “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” (*SW* III, 143–66 and *SW* IV, 313–55). For the English translator, the pair *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis*, which both can be rendered by “experience,” poses inordinate translation difficulties since there exists no corresponding English pair that captures the varying German connotations. In a note to a sentence from Benjamin’s 1929 text, “The Return of the *Flâneur*,” the Harvard edition proposes the following demarcation: *Erlebnis*, “a single, noteworthy experience”; *Erfahrung*, “‘experience’ in the sense of leaning from life over an extended period” (*SW* II, 267n). Although appropriate in this context, the translation cannot be maintained in all instances. Often for Benjamin, the term *Erlebnis* signaled a negative condition, the irrationalist “experience cult” of vitalism taken to task in section I of “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire.” His earliest use of the term *Erfahrung* sought to uncover—in Nietzschean fashion—the “mask” of experience, often worn as a solace by elders and “spiritless philistines,” who were blind to higher values that remained “inexperientable” (see “Experience,” *SW*, 3–5). Subsequently, the term *Erfahrung* came to represent the attempt to retrieve a more authentic, non-scientific concept of experience, which would include “absolute experience” and the “experience of the Absolute.” As such, it frequently appeared in

---

conjunction with a heightened state of perception. Perhaps the most helpful distinctions between the pair *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis* emerge in “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” where both were securely linked to Benjamin’s theory of memory and where authentic *Erfahrung* was tantamount to the ability to countenance the auratic. *Erfahrung* in this context meant the conjunction between the individual past and the collective past.

Beatrice Hanssen, “Language and Mimesis in Walter Benjamin’s Work,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin*, ed. David S. Ferris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 70n.

<sup>57</sup> Anna Wierzbicka, *Experience, Evidence, and Sense: The Hidden Cultural Legacy of English* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 82–87.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., pp. 31 and 82–89. According to Wierzbicka, the differentiation between these two meanings in the English word experience is Lockean perspective versus post-Lockean perspective, about which she discusses throughout the book along with Shakespearean experience.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., introduction.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> It is amiss though if one concludes that this unfolds the German versus English thought process, as Wierzbicka discusses the unique feature of Anglo English in comparison with other European languages such as French, Polish, or Russian. See, for example, pp. 88 and 90.

<sup>66</sup> See the introduction.

<sup>67</sup> J. C. Bluntschli, “Zeitgeist,” in *Cyclopædia of Political Science, Political Economy, and the Political History of the United States* (3 vols., 1881–1884), ed. John Joseph Lalor (Chicago: Melbert B. Gary & Company, 1884), pp. 1130–1135; see p. 1132, in particular.

The times-spirit, indeed, exercises its power on the fashion too. It manifests itself by way of preference in the art style or different ages, from which even the fashion can not free itself, and most clearly in the architectonic style, but in music and in literature also. (p. 1132)

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 1135.

<sup>69</sup> See Walter Benjamin’s view on this:

The “modern,” the time of hell. The punishments of hell are always the newest thing going in this domain. What is at issue is not that “the same thing happens over and over,” and even less would it be a question here of eternal return. It is rather that precisely in that which is newest the fact of the world never alters—that this newest remains, in every respect, the same. This constitutes the eternity of hell. To determine the totality of traits by which the “modern” is defined would be to represent hell. <G°,17> (Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, pp. 842–43)

Also see Adorno’s view on bourgeoisie industrialism whose momentum is nothing but repetition of the new.

---

The intertwining of eternal sameness and the new in the exchange relation manifests itself in the imagos of progress in bourgeois industrialism. What seems paradoxical is that these imagos grow old and that anything new should ever make its appearance at all, given that technology ensures that the eternal sameness of the exchange principle is intensified to the point where repetition prevails throughout the sphere of production. (Theodor W. Adorno, *History and Freedom: Lectures 1964–1965*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Rodney Livingstone [Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006], p. 171)

<sup>70</sup> Benjamin writes, “Newness is a quality independent of the use value of the commodity. It is the source of that illusion of which fashion is the tireless purveyor.” Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, p. 22.

## CHAPTER 5

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

#### *Purpose of this Dissertation and the Main Points*

The main objective of this dissertation is to explore how fashion is engaged with the issues that belong to the realm of the mind as well as to that of the body. The relay between the individual and the collective found in fashion is closely entwined with the development of modernity, in which individuals make their choices out of their own volition, while still communicating with the collective. To substantiate my grand thesis, I have probed into fashion that is disciplined by the mind, drawing upon a discursive observation over fashion in the purview of philosophy, history, and political science, rather than upon empirical analysis and socio-cultural context only, thereby laying the foundations for the link between fashion and the humanities. By tracking down of the origin of fashion, one can see that fashion is not just something that adorns the body but also a concept that is communicated by the mind. The relay between the individual and the collective evinced in fashion phenomena assures us that fashion did not exist until the seventeenth century, in which the sense of individuality as an independent subject emerged, while also being in league with collectivity. This will lead us to apprehend the affinity between fashion and modernity, as both are indispensable to the development of the constitution of modern subjectivity.

In the chapter, What Immanuel Kant says about Fashion, I have delved into fashion as a metaphysical domain. Resorting to Kantian *schematism*, fashion is divided into a concept and a phenomenon; that is, an *a priori* concept of the understanding and a phenomenal *a posteriori* appearance. This is to lay open the kernel of fashion which is not just restricted to corporal matters but also related to activities in the mind with reference to *newness*, the principal concept

of fashion. Another element that is as paramount as *newness* in fashion is the manifestation of an accommodation, for the time being, between the individual and the collective through fashion and in fashion. Namely fashion is a medium to express social relations and, at the same time, the phenomenon itself that surges for the sake of contingency on an interminable basis. While Kantian discourse makes it possible for fashion to be dichotomized into a concept and a phenomenon, i.e., *newness* and new things, *newness* that is constitutive of fashion is not universal across times but strictly limited to the time in which the succession of time is accepted by the general population. Besides, although universal is the pure sense of *newness* formulated through Kantian *a priori* conditions, the superstructure for this concept to register in real life was not available until the modern era in which the commodity mode of production under capitalist economy was established.

It is in the chapter Dialectics of Fashion History with the expoundings about the fashion system as well as the pre-fashion system that one can identify the social, political and economic meaning of *newness* in the form of fashion as a matrix of modernity, in which the individual as a consumer began to look for something new at a marketplace. The dialectical evolution in vestimentary styles under the pre-fashion system was caused by the conflicts and union between the church and the monarch; on the other hand, the communications between the individual and the collective are the propulsive force behind the dialectical transformation in fashion during the time in which the fashion system works in full-scale operation. The dialectical evolution in vestimentary styles in the pre-fashion system from the Renaissance to the seventeenth century is closely entwined with the political-cum-religious hegemony in early modern states, as shown in the conflicts between humanism and Christianity concerning the body and dress (mid-14th–15th centuries), between the political and religious power struggles during the reign of Queen

Elizabeth (mid-16th century), and later between Protestantism and Catholicism (17th century). It is the seventeenth century, in particular, on which I have laid a special focus as the pivotal time period in history, in which the watershed between the pre-fashion system coupled with mercantilism and the fashion system with bourgeois capitalism occurs. Hunt's investigation into sumptuary projects as well as modern individualism developed, most notably, by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke greatly supports this hypothesis.

However, from the late seventeenth century onward, the autonomous communications between the individual and the collective became increasingly indispensable to the evolution of fashion system. Fashions before and after the French Revolution unequivocally display the Hegelian mechanism in fashion with ideological predominance as its impetus, whereas the dialectical change of fashion in the mode of Marx's dialectical materialism, exemplified with the case of the advent of the bicycle, divulges the power of material reality enhanced by consumerism as the driving force behind the evolution of fashion toward the end of the nineteenth century.

In the last chapter of the body of this dissertation, I have analyzed fashion as an example of the dialectical image, the concept of which is set forth by Walter Benjamin, assisting us to overcome the negative Marxist objectification, which is often linked with the devaluation of fashion. Benjamin gives us hints as to how mundane objects such as fashion can be "redeemed" from the phenomenal world while exposing truth. According to Benjamin, truth that belongs to the realm of Platonic Forms or Ideas can be made out via representation, particularly dialectical images, not by way of scientific deduction, or apodictic demonstration. Grounded on this, I have further explicated how fashion in the form of the dialectical image has a political import, on the basis that it is an outcome of both the individual and the collective at once. It is Benjamin's

theory of experience (*Erfahrung*), in particular, that helps us understand why the “visual” message, which fashion as a manifestation of the communication between the individual and the collective transfers, is commensurate with truth—an “unintentional” truth.

### ***Conclusions: Individual-Collective Relations in Fashion and Modernity***

Fashion, in a social sense, is a *modus vivendi*, a temporary agreement between the individual and the collective. It is transitory because it lasts until another of its kind comes into being. It is insatiable because it is always in progress for an endless adjustment. Thus, fashion is in *operation ad infinitum*. Like other modern production, fashion is found in a relatively liberal society which is capable of tolerating incessant change. This explains why some cultures do not have fashion phenomena. Since the concept of individuality and the sense of individualism acting against collectivism are indispensable for the ontology of fashion, it is not erroneous to say that fashion appeared no earlier than the turn of the seventeenth century. It exists in many different layers of society, but this ad interim accommodation of a disagreement of individual and collective is most obvious in the way certain items of dress in fashion are selected. The reason for this is not difficult to find. The way one dresses oneself visually discloses the degree to which he or she follows a fashion—a certain social agreement. That one ignores the latest fashion doesn’t mean he is not in agreement with any. To be sure, the realm he belongs to is less fugitive than the popular fashion, yet it is intrinsically influenced by the fashion system over time, though he may not be aware of the fact that his choice made today actually stems from the synthesis of previous fashions. Fashion can be found almost everywhere in modern society. However, the adjustment made between the individual and the collective should be viewed as neither arbitrary nor rational but as a process of shaping a “form of value,” although temporary and transitory, to borrow Jean-François Lyotard’s term.<sup>1</sup> As he aptly points out, even “the

relationship of the suppliers and users of knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use” has become no less than “the relationship of commodity producers and consumers to the commodities they produce and consume,” illustrating the transformation in the process of the legitimation of knowledge in our time.<sup>2</sup> Not only can knowledge not sustain unchanged as Lyotard puts it, but also truth is contingent upon “political economy” which is swayed by “constant economic and political incitement” according to Michel Foucault.<sup>3</sup>

As previous chapters have divulged, the tacit communications between the individual and the collective, the kernel of fashion, makes fashion an apropos topic of the mind, not just one that is confined to the body and bodily matters. There is something meaningful that people living in modern times impart by means of fashion, which is by far the paramount characteristic of modernity, unlike the Middle Ages, whose feudal mode of social relations was dominated by the privileged few. Put another way, it is the relay between the individual and the collective in terms, not just of vestimentary matters but also of experience (*Erfahrung*), that can clear up how and why fashion is of political significance during modern times. What is positive about modernity definitely has to do with the fact that it is a series of outcomes of the communications between the individual and the collective.

Fashion is not restricted to bodily concerns and matters not only because it has significant effect on modern social relations between the individual and the collective, but also because the connection between fashion and modern philosophy, from Kant to Benjamin, is too patent to disregard, as explored in this dissertation, which, in turn, offers a rationale by which one can trace the ontology of fashion resting on theoretical discourse and critical theory. With recourse to Kant, the pursuance of something new, the conceptual side of fashion, is to be considered as part of the metaphysical domain arrived at by a synthetic *a priori* judgment, manifesting the unique



human faculty to perform a higher level of thought process, and as an incessant attempt to seek after one's self. According to Kant's transcendental idealism, however, in the flow of time, the "I" cognizes my unity of apperception and self-consciousness, through which, however, the "I" perceives "me" as it appears to "myself," not as the "me" in "myself." Hence, a vigorous investigation is required to find out how "I" perceives "me" in "myself" through the topic of freedom, as Kant himself has intimated. Next, due to the affinity to the dialectical image put forward by Benjamin, fashion can be elevated to the point that it overturns the Marxist commodity fetishism with which fashion is often associated. This is exactly what I have tried to convey in the chapter, "The Dialectical Image: The Redemption of Fashion." Fashion as a dialectical image represents some unintentional truths, the most integral foundation of which is that it is a consequence of the mediation between the individual and the collective.

Simmel has already indicated that fashion plays a pivotal role as an intermediary between rules of the dominant and those of individual discretion.

"Fashion is the imitation of a given example and satisfies the demand for social adaptation; it leads the individual upon the road which all travel, it furnishes a general condition, which resolves the conduct of every individual into a mere example. At the same time it satisfies in no less degree the need of differentiation, the tendency towards dissimilarity, the desire for change and contrast, . . . Thus fashion represents nothing more than one of the many forms of life by the aid of which we seek to combine in uniform spheres of activity the tendency towards social equalization with the desire for individual differentiation and change."<sup>4</sup>

It is through fashion that individuals demonstrate their subjugation to the norms of class or of society they are dependent on or aspire to belong to, and, at the same time, express their individuality. Thus, fashion is not simply an ornament for beautification but a dialectical image found in the numerous negotiations between social and individual. If fashion lost its function as a provider of sources for distinctive individuality, the members of society would wear the same as Thomas More described in *Utopia* (1516): "Throughout the island they wear the same sort of

clothes, . . . The fashion never alters.”<sup>5</sup> The unsuccessful revolution carried out by communists in the twentieth century shares the same defect as the utopian idealism too—that is, the underestimation of the desire for individuality acting against collectivism which is the fundamental trait of human nature.<sup>6</sup> The Constructivist products in both art forms and commodities, which were created not just in favor of practicality and functionality but also in the service of the Bolshevik revolution, allow few or no variations for individual taste, visually exhibiting the collective interest in mobility over individual discretions during the revolutionary era.<sup>7</sup> Those revolutionists also failed to grasp the social atmosphere in which the individual consciousness became secure whereas the collective consciousness waning from the nineteenth century.<sup>8</sup> In this transition fashion takes on a historically and politically significant stance, for not only has fashion greatly facilitated the reversal as a purveyor of individual interests, but the remit of fashion has also resided in the dream consciousness of the collective as elucidated in the modes of life in utopian communities. The zeitgeist with which fashion is often associated, which I have analyzed in detail in the chapter *Dialectics in Fashion History*, is none other than evidence that denotes how fashion is related to the constitution of subjectivity and individuality in relation to collectivity or collective consciousness.

Before closing, I would like to introduce Hegel’s observation about the task of political science, for it offers a clear frame of reference as to why fashion does matter in the field of not only sociology but also political science, as fashion belongs to the domain of the mind as well as of the phenomenal world of the body. Hegel states:

It is the task of political science, which originates at this point, to detect the laws governing the movement of the masses in the intricacy of their qualitative and quantitative relations. . . . To discover the element of necessity is the object of political science, a science which does honour to thought, because it finds laws in a mass of accidents. Interesting is it to witness the action and reaction of the different relations, how

the special circles group themselves, influence others, and in turn receive from them help or hindrance.<sup>9</sup>

The study of people and the relations among people is not just about sociology but also about political science. Gavin Drewry and Anita Dander have pointed out the proximity between political science and other disciplines including sociology: “Political science has always been an eclectic discipline, drawing in particular upon (and contributing to) scholarly work in the areas of philosophy, economics, history, sociology—and law,”<sup>10</sup> and “Political science is the organized study of government and politics. It borrows from the related disciplines of history, philosophy, sociology, economics, and law.”<sup>11</sup>

### ***Contribution and Future Studies***

“Why is there something rather than nothing?” asked Leibniz.<sup>12</sup> If this phrase is fundamental to metaphysical inquiries, why is there something new rather than nothing new? is the question that this dissertation claims to answer by means of fashion. This project is a direct application of philosophical discourse to fashion studies and fashion history, demonstrating how metaphysics is of ‘practical’ use in apprehending the human mind and how it is to be melded with empirical reality. On the other hand, from the perspective of fashion, the internal conflict between its concept and phenomena, i.e., between *newness* and new fashions of different kinds, can be pronounced through philosophical discourse, thereby delineating the epistemological meaning of fashion as both a concept and a phenomenon, which helps us comprehend the attributes of modernity. Thereupon, the ‘superficiality’ with which fashion is heavily laden is to be challenged. The dichotomy between the concept of fashion and fashion phenomena will also lay a theoretical foundation to unveil the difference among terminologies such as fashion, clothing, and dress, which are often bespoken with little clarification.

Further studies are required, though, in order to link fashion and other disciplines such as philosophy, so as, first, to make the topic of fashion an indispensable part of the humanist tradition in academia and, second, to apprehend the idiosyncrasy of modernity, for fashion is inseparable from the constitution of the modern subject as well as of the modern era. I believe that more systematic observations about fashion history and fashion behaviors coupled with theories developed in different traditions other than critical theory, which has its core in German idealism, to which this dissertation appertains, will help us achieve this goal. Perhaps, post-structuralist philosophers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Julia Kristeva in the twentieth century will further assist us in our understanding of the relation between fashion and modernity from a different angle. In addition, studies in fashion history in the twentieth century in view of dialectics should be carried out, as this dissertation has not covered the significant portion of this important period.

---

## Notes

### Chapter 5

<sup>1</sup> Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (UK: Manchester University Press, [1979] 1984), p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, 1st American ed., ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 131–132.

<sup>4</sup> Simmel, “Fashion,” 543.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas More, *Utopia*, Chapter 4: Of Their Trades, and Manner of Life (Rockville, MD: Arc Manor LLC, 2008), p. 51.

<sup>6</sup> Regarding this topic, refer to Anne E. Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents* (Bloomington, IN, 2000), p. 135.

Fourier, for example, saw fashion as the main means of subsistence of commerce which is harmful to all ‘productive’ industries. See “Fashion and Parasitism,” in *The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier: Selected Texts on Work, Love, and Passionate Attraction* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972).

<sup>7</sup> Refer to Susan Buck-Morss, chapter 4, “Culture for the Masses,” in *Dream World and Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000).

<sup>8</sup> Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, p. 389.

<sup>9</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. S. W. Dyde (London: George Bell & Sons, 1986), p. 101.

<sup>10</sup> Gavin Drewry, “A Political Scientist’s Perspective,” in *The Judicial House of Lords 1876–2009* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 440.

<sup>11</sup> Anita C. Danker, *The Essentials of Political Science* (Piscataway, NJ: Research & Education Association, 2003), p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Leibniz: Selections*, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), p. 527.

## Bibliography

- Adamson, Robert. 1908. *The Development of Greek Philosophy*. Edited by W. R. Sorley and Robert Purvis Hardie. Edinburgh; London: W. Blackwood and Sons.
- A Dictionary of English Etymology*. 1773. London: Hensleigh Wedgwood.
- Adorno, Theodor W. 2006. *History and Freedom: Lectures 1964–1965*. Edited by Rolf Tiedemann, translated by Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Ankersmit, F. R. 2005. *Sublime Historical Experience*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Anthony, Michael J., and Warren S. Benson. 2003. *Exploring the History and Philosophy of Christian Education: Principles for the 21st Century*. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications.
- Apple, Rima D., and Joyce Coleman. 2003. "Turbulence, 1961–1985." In *The Challenge of Constantly Changing Times: From Home Economics to Human Ecology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison 1903–2003*. Madison, WI: Parallel Press.
- Aristotle. 1901. Octavius Freire Owen. *The Organon: Or Logical Treatises of Aristotle: With the Introduction of Porphyry*, vol. 2. London: G. Bell and Sons.
- Aristotle. 1938. *Posterior Analytics and Topica*, vol. 2. Translated by Hugh Tredennick and E. S. Forster. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann.
- Arman, Steve, Rosemary Rees, Simon Bird, and Malcolm Wilkinson. eds. 2002. *Headstart in History: Reformation and Rebellion 1485–1750*. Oxford: Heinemann.
- Ashelford, Jane. 1996. *The Art of Dress: Clothes and Society 1500–1914*. London: National Trust Enterprises.
- Banner, Lois W. 1994. "Dress." In *Encyclopedia of Social History*, edited by Peter N. Stearns. New York: Garland Publishing.
- Barnard, Malcolm. 1996. *Fashion as Communication*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Baudelaire, Charles. (1972) 1981. *Selected Writings on Art and Artists*. Edited by P. E. Charvet. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Baudelaire, Charles. 1995. *The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays*. 2nd edition. Edited and translated by Jonathan Mayne. London: Phaidon Press.
- Beecher, J., and R. Bienvenu, eds. 1972. *The Utopia Vision of Charles Fourier: Selected Texts on Work, Love, and Passionate Attraction*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Benedict, Ruth. 2003. "Dress." In *Fashion Foundations: Early writings on Fashion and Dress*, edited by Kim K. P. Johnson, Susan J. Torntore, and Joanne B. Eicher. Oxford; New York: Berg Publishers.
- Benjamin, Walter. 1977. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*. Translated by J. Osborne, introduction by George Steiner. London: New Left Books.

- Benjamin, Walter. 1996. *Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913–1926*. Translated by Edmund Jephcott, edited by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings. Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Benjamin, Walter. 2002. *The Arcades Project*. Edited by Rolf Tiedemann, translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Benjamin, Walter. 2002. *Selected Writings, Volume 3: 1935–1938*. Edited by Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings. Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Benjamin, Walter. 2003. *Selected Writings, Volume 4: 1938–1940*, Edited by Michael W. Jennings and Howard Eiland. Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Berg Publisher. Accessed in February 2012.  
<http://www.bergpublishers.com/BergJournals/FashionTheory/tabid/524/Default.aspx>.
- Berger, Ronald M. 1993. *The Most Necessary Luxuries: The Mercers' Company of Coventry, 1550–1680*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Bluntschli, J. C. 1884. "Zeitgeist." In *Cyclopædia of Political Science, Political Economy, and the Political History of the United States* (3 vols., 1881–1884), edited by John Joseph Lalor. Chicago: Melbert B. Gary & Company.
- Boucher, Francois. (1987) 1965. *20,000 Years of Fashion: The History of Costume and Adornment*, New York: Abrams. Originally, *Histoire du costume en Occident, de l'antiquité à nos jours*, Paris: Flammarion.
- Bradley, Carolyn G. 1954. *Western World Costume: An Outline History*. New York: Meredith.
- Braudel, Fernand. 1992. *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century, Volume I: The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Breward, Christopher. 1995. *The Culture of Fashion: A New History of Fashionable Dress*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Breward, Christopher, and Caroline Evans, eds. 2005. *Fashion and Modernity*. Oxford; New York: Berg.
- Buck-Morss, Susan. 1977. *The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute*. New York: Free Press.
- Buck-Morss, Susan. 1995. *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Buck-Morss, Susan. 2000. *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Byrde, Penelope. 1979. *The Male Image: Men's Fashion in Britain, 1300–1970*. London: B. T. Batsford.
- Byrde, Penelope. 1992. *Nineteenth Century Fashion*. London: B. T. Batsford.
- Calderin, Jay. 2009. *Form, Fit and Fashion: All the Details Fashion Designers Need to Know but Can Never Find*. Beverly, Mass. : Rockport Publishers.

- Călinescu, Matei. 1987. *Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Caporaso, James A., and David P. Levine. 1992. *Theories of Political Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cavallaro, Dani, and Alexandra Warwick. 1998. *Fashioning the Frame: Boundaries, Dress and Body*. Oxford: Berg.
- Challamel, Augustin. 1882. *The History of Fashion in France, or, the Dress of Women from the Gallo-Roman Period to the Present Time*. Translated by Mrs. Cashel Hoey and John Lillie. London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington.
- Charbit, Yves. 2010. *The Classical Foundations of Population Thought: From Plato to Quesnay*. NY, Springer.
- Chazin-Bennahum, Judith. 2005. *The Lure of Perfection: Fashion and Ballet, 1780–1830*. New York: Routledge.
- Contini, Mila. 1965. *Fashion: From Ancient Egypt to the Present Day*. Edited by James Laver. New York: Odyssey Press.
- Crane, Susan. 2002. *The Performance of Self: Ritual, Clothing, and Identity During the Hundred Years War*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Crego, Robert. 2003. *Sports and Games of the 18th and 19th Centuries*. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press.
- Crowfoot, Elisabeth, Frances Pritchard, and Kay Staniland. 1992. *Textiles and Clothing, 1150–1450*. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press.
- Cunnington, C. Willet, and Phillis Cunnington. (1951) 1992. *The History of Underclothes*. New York: Dover.
- Curtius, Ernst Robert. 1953. *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*. Translated by Willard Trask. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Danker, Anita C. 2003. *The Essentials of Political Science*. Piscataway, NJ: Research & Education Association.
- Davis, Fred. 1992. *Fashion, Culture, and Identity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles. 1991. *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*. Translated by Constantin V. Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles. 1994. *Difference and Repetition*. Translated by Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deuber-Mankowsky, Astrid. 2005. "Hanging Over the Abyss: On the Relation Between Knowledge and Experience in Hermann Cohen and Walter Benjamin." In *Hermann Cohen's Critical Idealism*, edited by Reinier Munk. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, pp. 161–192.
- Dicker, Georges. 2004. *Kant's Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Didier, Franklin James. 1821. *Letters from Paris and Other Cities of France, Holland, &c.: Written During a Tour and Residence in These Countries, in the Years 1816, 17, 18, 19, and 20*. Baltimore, MD; New York: James V. Seaman.
- Drewry, Gavin. 2009. "A Political Scientist's Perspective." In *The Judicial House of Lords 1876–2009*, edited by L. Blom-Cooper, G. Drewry, and B. Dickson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.



- Durantaye, Leland de la. 2009. *Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Edwards, Tim. 2011. *Fashion in Focus: Concepts, Practices, and Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- Eicher, Joanne B., and Mary Ellen Roach-Higgins. 1992. "Perspectives on Dress and Identity." *Clothing and Textiles Research Journal* 10 (4):1–8.
- Elias, J. 2008. *Stir It Up: Home Economics in American Culture*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Ferguson, Harvie. 2000. *Modernity and Subjectivity: Body, Soul, Spirit*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
- Flügel, J. C. 1969. *The Psychology of Clothes*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Forgeng, L. 2010. *Daily Life in Elizabethan England*. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.
- Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*. 1st American ed. Edited by Colin Gordon, New York: Pantheon Books.
- Furness, Zack. 2010. *One Less Car: Bicycling and the Politics of Automobility*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Gardner, Sebastian. 1999. *Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Gillespie, Michael Allen. 2008. *The Theological Origins of Modernity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Goodstein, Elizabeth S. 2005. *Experience Without Qualities: Boredom and Modernity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Gorsline, Douglas. 1994. *What People Wore: 1800 Illustrations from Ancient Times to the Early Twentieth Century*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.
- Gorsuch, Anne E. 2000. *Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents, Bloomington*. Indiana University Press.
- Grieder, Josephine. 1985. *Anglomania in France, 1740–1789: Fact, Fiction, and Political Discourse*. Geneva: Librairie Droz.
- Guthrie, W. K. C. 1982. *A History of Greek Philosophy: Aristotle, an Encounter*, vol. 6. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hagen, Rose-Marie, and Rainer Hagen. 1998. *What Great Paintings Say*, vol. 3. Köln; London: Taschen.
- Hagen, Rose-Marie, and Rainer Hagen. 2003. *What Great Paintings Say*. vol. 1. Köln; London: Taschen.
- Hancock, Graham, and Robert Bauval. 2011. *The Master Game: Unmasking the Secret Rulers of the World*. New York: The Disinformation Company.
- Hanssen, Beatrice. 2004. "Language and Mimesis in Walter Benjamin's Work." In *The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin*, edited by David S. Ferris, pp. 54–72. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hegel, G. W. H. 1896. *Philosophy of Right*. Translated by S.W. Dyde. London: George Bell & Sons.

- Hegel, G. W. F. 1902. *Philosophy of History*. Translated by J. Sibree, New York: American Dome Library Co.
- Hegel, G. W. F. 1991. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Edited by Allen W. Wood, translated by Hugh B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hegel, G. W. F. 1991. *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*. Translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishers.
- Hegel, G. W. F. 2007. *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*. Translated by W. Wallace and A.V. Miller, with revisions and commentary by M. J. Inwood. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Heller, Sarah Grace. 2007. *Fashion in Medieval France*. Cambridge, UK: D. S. Brewer.
- Herjolsnes. Accessed in May 2012. "Kyrtils/Cotes/Tunics/Gowns." Herjolsnes no. 33, 34. Illustration: "Pattern drawing based on Norlund." <http://www.personal.utulsa.edu/~marc-carlson/cloth/herjol33.html>
- Herjolsnes. Accessed in May 2012. "Kyrtils/Cotes/Tunics/Gowns." Herjolsnes no. 38. Illustration: "Pattern drawing based on Norlund." <http://www.personal.utulsa.edu/~marc-carlson/cloth/herjol38.html>.
- Hicks, John R. 1969. *A Theory of Economic History*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Hill, Georgiana. 1893. *A History of English Dress from the Saxon Period to the Present Day*, vol. 1. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Houston, Mary G. 1996. *Medieval Costume in England and France: The 13th, 14th, and 15th Centuries*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Hunt, Alan. 1996. *Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Hunt, Lynn, Thomas R. Martin, Barbara H. Rosenwein, and Bonnie G. Smith. 2012. *The Making of the West, Volume B: 1340–1830: Peoples and Cultures*. 4th edition. Boston; New York: Bedford/ ST. Martin's.
- Irwin, Terence. (1988) 2002. *Aristotle's First Principles*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Irwin, Terence. 2010. "Aristotle." In *A Companion to Epistemology*, vol. 4, 2nd edition (pp. 240–244), edited by J. Dancy, E. Sosa, and S. and M. Steup. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- Israel, Jonathan I. 2001. *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Johnson, Donald Clay, and Helen Bradley Foster, eds. 2007. *Dress Sense: Emotional and Sensory Experiences of the Body and Clothes*. Oxford, UK; New York: Berg.
- Jones, Jennifer Michelle. 2004. *Sexing La Mode: Gender, Fashion and Commercial Culture in Old Regime France*. Oxford and New York: Berg.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1987. *Critique of Judgment*, Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co.

- Kant, Immanuel. (1927) 2001. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*. Translated by Paul Carus, edited by James W. Ellington. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1996. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar, introduced by Patricia Kitcher. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
- Kant, Immanuel. 2006. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Edited by Robert B. Louden. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kawamura, Yuniya. 2005. *Fashion-ology: An Introduction to Fashion Studies*. Oxford and New York: Berg.
- Kelly, Francis M., and Randolph Schwabe.(1925) 2002. *European Costume and Fashion: 1490–1790*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications. Originally published under the title *Historic Costume: A Chronicle of Fashion in Western Europe 1490–1790*. New York, Charles Scriber's Sons; London, B. T. Batsford.
- Kojève, Alexandre. 1980. *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit*. Assembled by Raymond Queneau. Edited by Allan Bloom, translated by James H. Nichols. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kraut, Richard. Fall 2009. "Plato." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/plato/>.
- Kroeber, A. L. 1919. "On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes of Fashion." *American Anthropologist* 21 (1919):235–263.
- Kroeber, A. L., and Jane Richardson. 1940. "Three Centuries of Women's Dress Fashions: Quantitative Analysis." *University of California Anthropological Records* 5 (1940):111–153.
- Kroeber, A. L. 1973. *Style and Civilizations*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Kuchta, David. 1996. "The Making of the Self-Made Man." In *The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective*, edited by Victoria de Grazia and Ellen Furlough. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Laver, James 1964. *Costume*. New York: Hawthorn Books.
- Laver, James. 1969. *A Concise History of Costume*. London: Thames and Hudson, and New York: Abrams.
- Laver, James. 1983. *Costume and Fashion: A Concise History*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lehmann, Ulrich. 1999. "Tigersprung: Fashioning History." *Fashion Theory* 3 (3):297–322.
- Lehmann, Ulrich. 2000. *Tigersprung: Fashion in Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. *Leibniz. Selections*. Edited by Philip P. Wiener. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951.
- Lipovetsky, Gilles. 1994. *The Empire of Fashion: Dressing Modern Democracy*. Translated by Catherine Porter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lyotard, Jean-François. (1979) 1984. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- MacDonald, Michael H. 1996. *Europe, a Tantalizing Romance*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

- Mackrell, Alice. 1997. "The Dress of the Parisian Éléantes with Special Reference to Le Journal des Dames et Des Modes from June 1797 until December 1799." MA thesis, Courtauld Institute.
- Mackrell, Alice. 2005. *Art and Fashion: The Impact of Art on Fashion and Fashion on Art*. London: Chrysalis Books Group.
- MacPherson, C. B. 1962. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Markie, Peter. Fall 2009. "Rationalism vs. Empiricism." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rationalism-empiricism/>.
- Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. 1970. *The German Ideology*. Edited by C. J. Arthur. New York: International Publishers. 1970.
- McElligott, Jason. 2007. *Royalism, Print and Censorship in Revolutionary England*. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell.
- McKay, John P., Bennett D. Hill, and John Buckler. 2011. *A History of Western Society, Volume 1: From Antiquity to the Enlightenment*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Mieville, China. 2006. *Between Equal Rights: A Marxist's Theory of International Law*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
- Mirkin, R. 2001. "Performing Selfhood: The Costumed Body as a Site of Mediation Between Life, Art and Theatre in the English Renaissance." In *Body Dressing*, edited by J. Entwistle and E. Wilson. Oxford; New York: Berg.
- More, Thomas, 2008. *Utopia*. Rockville, MD: Arc Manor LLC.
- Nancy, Jean-Luc. 1988. "The Sublime Offering." In *Of the Sublime: Presence in Question*, Jean-Francois Courtine et al. trans. Jeffrey Librett, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- New York World*, interview. February 2, 1896.
- Noble, Thomas F. X., Barry Strauss, Duane Osheim, Kristen B. Neuschel, and Elinor A. Accampo. 2011. *Western Civilization: Beyond Boundaries Volume II: Since 1560*. 6th edition. Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Nunn, Joan. 2000. *Fashion in Costume 1200–2000*. 2nd edition. London: Herbert Press.
- O'Malley, Thomas. 1986. "Religion and the Newspaper Press, 1660–1685." In *The Press in English Society from the Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries*, edited by Michael Harris and Alan Lee. London: Associated University Presses.
- Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English*. 4th edition. 1966. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Parry, Richard. Fall 2008. "Episteme and Techne." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/episteme-techne/>.
- Partridge, Eric. 1966. *Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English*. 4th edition. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Paton, H. J. (1936) 2007. *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience: A Commentary on the First Half of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*. London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan.

- Payne, Blanche, Geitel Winakor, and Jane Farrell-Beck. 1992. *The History of Costume: From Ancient Mesopotamia Through the Twentieth Century*. 2nd edition. New York: Harper Collins.
- Plato. 1999. *The Symposium*, edited and translated by Christopher Gill. London; New York: Penguin Books.
- Poggioli, Renato. 1968. *The Theory of the Avant-garde*. Translated by Gerald Fitzgerald. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Poitras, A. J. 2007. *Capitalist Rising: The Short History of a Long Insurgency*. New York: Vantage Press.
- Polhemus, Ted, and Lynn Procter. 1978. *Fashion and Anti-Fashion: Anthropology of Clothing and Adornment*. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Reiner, Toby. 2010. *Divine Right of Kings in Encyclopedia of Political Theory*. Edited by Mark Bevir. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Reynolds, Graham. 1951. "Elizabethan and Jacobean. In *Costume of the Western World: Fashion of the Renaissance in England, France, Spain and Holland*, edited by James Laver. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Ribeiro, Aileen. 1988. *Fashion in the French Revolution*. New York: Holmes & Meier.
- Ribeiro, Aileen. 2003. *Dress and Morality*. Oxford; New York: Berg.
- Riello, Giorgio, and Peter McNeil. 2010. "The Fashion Revolution: The 'Long' Eighteenth Century." In *The Fashion History Reader: Global Perspectives*, edited by Giorgio Riello and Peter McNeil. New York; London: Routledge.
- Robespierre, Maximilien. February 5, 1794. *Sur les principes de morale politique Discours devant la Convention le 17 pluviôse an II.* [http://www.royet.org/nea1789-1794/archives/discours/robespierre\\_principes\\_morale\\_politique\\_05\\_02\\_94.htm](http://www.royet.org/nea1789-1794/archives/discours/robespierre_principes_morale_politique_05_02_94.htm).
- Robinson, James Harvey. 1903. *An Introduction to the History of Western Europe*. Boston: Ginn and Co.
- Rossides, Daniel W. 1998. *Social Theory: Its Origins, History, and Contemporary Relevance*. Dix Hills, NY: General Hall.
- Russell, Douglas. 1983. *Costume History and Style*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Scherger, George L. 1989. "The Evolution of Modern Liberty." PhD thesis, Cornell University.
- Scribner's Magazine*. "The Point of View." *Scribner's Magazine* 19 (June 1896): 783.
- Simmel, Georg. (1904) 1957. "Fashion." *The American Journal of Sociology* 62 (6).
- Smith, Robin. Summer 2011. "Aristotle's Logic." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2011 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/aristotle-logic/>.
- Steele, Valerie. 1998. *Paris Fashion: A Cultural History*. 2nd edition, revised and updated. Oxford; New York: Berg.
- Svendsen, Lars. 2006. *Fashion: A Philosophy*. London: Reaktion.

- The Judicial House of Lords 1876–2009*. 2009. Edited by Louis Blom-Cooper, Brice Dickson, and Gavin Drewry. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
- The Leisure Hour*, vol. 42. s.n. 1893.
- The Oxford English Dictionary*. 2nd edition. 1989. Edited by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, p. 743.
- Tortora, Phyllis G., and Keith Eubank. (1989) 2005. *Survey of Historic Costume*. 4th edition. New York: Fairchild Publications.
- Tunis, Edwin. (1954)1999. *Weapons: A Pictorial History*. Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Turner, Bryan S. 1996. *The Body and Society*. 2nd edition. London: Sage Publications.
- Warner, Patricia Campbell. 2006. *When the Girls Came Out to Play: The Birth of American Sportswear*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary*. 1913. Springfield, MA: G. C. Merriam Co.
- Wedgwood, Hensleigh, and J. C. Atkinson. 1872. *A Dictionary of English Etymology*. 2nd edition. London: Trübner & Co.
- Welters, Linda. 2007. "Introduction." In *The Fashion Reader*, edited by Linda Welters and Abby Lillethun, Oxford, UK: Berg.
- Wierzbicka, Anna. 2010. *Experience, Evidence, and Sense: The Hidden Cultural Legacy of English*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wilcox, R. Turner. 1958. *The Mode in Costume*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Wilson, Elizabeth. 2005. *Adorned in Dreams: Fashion and Modernity*. London: IB Tauris.
- Winks, Robin W. 1993. *World Civilization: A Brief History*. San Diego, CA: Collegiate Press.
- Wrigley, Richard. 2002. *The Politics of Appearances: Representations of Dress in Revolutionary France*. Oxford; New York: Berg.
- Young, Agnes Brooks. 1937. *Recurring Cycles of Fashion*. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers.