Political Mobilization and the Institutional Origins of National Developmentalist States: the Cases of Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt

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Political Mobilization and the Institutional Origins of National Developmentalist States: the Cases of Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt

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My dissertation examines why the common challenge of late development has generated starkly different responses in the Global South. I focus in particular on a cluster of cases that reacted to trade imbalances and political turmoil at the international stage with a combined agenda of economic nationalism, social progress and state-led industrialization, establishing what I term national developmentalist states. Why then, despite facing similar adaptive pressures, did these regimes markedly differ in terms of their durability and socio-economic policies? Through a careful study of such regimes in Turkey, Mexico, Argentina and Egypt during the middle third of the twentieth century, the dissertation specifies four variants of the national-developmentalist state and articulates how each type produced a distinct policy set with varying redistributive implications and political outcomes. I argue that where leaders invested heavily in building cohesive ruling-party and/or state organizations, regimes proved durable even with only moderate levels of economic redistribution. Where such institutions were weak, leaders could expand their popularity through excessive redistribution and risk elite polarization or establish a limited base but remain vulnerable to elite defections and popular opposition. These regime institutions were in turn conditioned by the intensity of intra-elite conflict and

the differing ability of reformist elites to mobilize popular classes at the onset of their rule. I employ multiple strategies of inquiry, including paired comparisons and process tracing, to identify the causal mechanisms that link initial political conflict to institutions, and eventually to regime trajectories.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Berk Esen holds a Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University, with a specialization in comparative politics and international relations. Before joining the PhD program, he received a BA from Vanderbilt University in 2004 and obtained MA degrees in political science from Sabanci University, in integrated social sciences from Jacobs University Bremen, and in government from Cornell University. He spent 18 months conducting research in Buenos Aires and Istanbul and was a visiting fellow at Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires and Sabanci University, Istanbul. His research interests are in the fields of authoritarian regimes, social movements and political parties in the Middle East and Latin America, and political economy of development. Berk's work appeared in Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) and Turkish Studies. In the fall 2014 semester, he was a visiting scholar at Columbia University. In February 2015, he will join Sabanci University as a postdoctoral fellow.

To my parents, Mine and Saffet Esen

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This dissertation emerged out of my fascination with the remarkable, yet surprising, similarities between modern Argentine and Turkish histories. What started off as a two case study soon grew into a much larger project that focuses on four countries and possibly has relevance for other countries elsewhere. My research has taken me to several cities in three continents over the years. During this period, I have incurred significant debt to many people who assisted me along the way. My gratitude to them goes beyond anything I can write in these few pages.

My deepest gratitude goes to my dissertation committee, especially my adviser and mentor, Kenneth Roberts. After I met Ken during a campus visit before starting my PhD, I did not again consider another graduate program. In many ways, Ken affected my decision to come to Cornell and over the years I have always felt that I made the right choice. Ken was always generous with his time and offered great advice as well as support that helped me to overcome various hurdles in graduate school. Above all, I greatly benefited from his vast knowledge of Latin American politics, which made this cross-regional study feasible.

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As my study is centered on the notion of national development, it is only natural that I dedicate this dissertation to the people who have played a central role in my personal development: my parents, Mine and Saffet Esen. I am eternally grateful for the many personal sacrifices they made to ensure that I would have the best education I could possibly get. I owe much of what I learned to them.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS

AAPIC	Argentine Association of Production, Industry, and Commerce
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
ATLAS	Association of Latin American Syndicalist Workers
BA	Bureaucratic Authoritarian
CAPIC	Argentine Confederation of Production, Industry, and Commerce
CEA	Argentine Economic Confederation
CGE	General Economic Confederation
CGOC	General Confederation of Mexican Workers and Peasants
CGT	General Confederation o Labor
CHP	Republican People's Party
CNC	National Peasant Confederation
CNOP	National Confederation of Popular Organizations
COPARMEX	Employers Confederation of the Mexican Republic
CROM	Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers
DNT	National Labor Department
DP	Democrat Party
FENA	Economic Federation of Northern Argentina
FEP	Eva Peron Foundation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	General Intelligence Service
GOU	Group of United Officers
HP	People's Party
IAPI	Argentine Trade Promotion Institute

ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
ITC	Committee of Union and Progress
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KMT	Koumintang
LR	Liberation Rally
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MNR	Revolutionary Nationalist Movement
MP	Nation Party
ND	National Developmentalist
OILL	Ofice of Industrial Research
PAN	National Action Party
PCM	Communist Party of Mexico
PJ	Justicialist Party
PL	Labor Party
PLC	Liberal Constitutionalist Party
PLM	Mexican Labor Party
PNA	National Agrarian Party
PNC	National Cooperativist Party
PNR	National Revolutionary Party
POS	Political Opportunity Structure
PP	Peronist Party
PPF	Peronist Women's Party
PRI	Institutional Revolutionary Party
PSS	Socialist Party of the Southeast
PURN	Single Party of the National Revolution

RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
SCF	Free Republican Party
SOE	State-owned Enterpreise
TCF	Progressive Republican Party
UAR	United Arab Republic
UCR	Radical Civic Union
UCR-JR	Radical Civic Union-Junta Renovador
UD	Democratic Union
UES	Union of Secondary School Students
UF	Railway Worker's Union
UIA	Argentine Industrial Union
UMNO	United Malays National Organization
UN	United Nations
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Four Countries, Two Trends

On the night of May 14, 1950, as he waited for the official results of the general elections, President Ismet Inonu felt proud of himself. Over the past five years, he had transformed the Turkish political system from an authoritarian single-party rule into a multi-party parliamentary regime, ending a long period of repression, party bans, and electoral fraud. For the first time in republican history, Turkish citizens voted freely and in clear numbers. With coercion off the agenda, however, the regime could not stem the rising tide of opposition and saw the base of the ruling party dwindle. In the end, the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti* - DP) - established only four years before by disgruntled CHP elites – defeated the ruling Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* - CHP) by a clear majority. Instead of evolving into a dominant party, the CHP quickly lost power to a newly established opposition party in what was the first democratic governmental turnover in Turkish history.[1] Moreover, the party has not regained an electoral majority and only came to power for brief periods in the ensuing decades.

In July 1952, Mexico also had elections but, unlike Turkey, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional - PRI) won an easy victory with almost three quarters of the votes. The ruling party received what scholars of Mexican politics call a "supermajority" against their opponents, albeit with the help of some voter fraud at the local level. It would take another five decades for regime critics to solve their collective action problems and draw sufficient popular support to electorally defeat the PRI. Why was there such high variance in the spans of two modernizing, post-revolutionary single-party regimes? What

[1] Although Turkey was part of the "second wave", it found little room in the transition literature. For more on the 1950 election and its background, see Karpat (1959), Vanderlippe (2006).

accounts for the CHP's failure to become a dominant party like the PRI? In other words, why did elite defectors draw so much popular support in Turkey, whereas their Mexican counterparts were politically marginalized and electorally weak over the long haul?

However, mass support is not sufficient to ensure longevity in political office. For instance, Juan Peron - an Argentine colonel who first came to power through a military coup and was later elected president in 1946 - was the most popular politician of his generation, generating a level of adulation that was unknown since the death of the Argentine populist president Hipolito Yrigoyen (1852-1933). Indeed, Peron mobilized millions of supporters in mass rallies that turned into major spectacles of his competitive authoritarian regime.[2] Under his guidance, the Partido Justicialista (the Justicialist Party - PJ) won every presidential and parliamentary election it contested between 1946 and 1954. Nevertheless, this did not dissuade his opponents from toppling Peron in another military coup in 1955 and forcing the president into exile.

Another nationalist colonel, Gamal Abdel Nasser, also came to power through a military coup in 1952 and subsequently rose to the presidency. He did not enjoy such popular support but neither did he need to exercise an electoral democracy as seen in Argentina. Unlike Peron, Nasser retained the presidency until his death and his political regime survived for another four decades. This outcome is particularly surprising in light of Egypt's disastrous military defeat during the 1967 Israeli-Arab War. Nasser's critics, far from organizing a coup d'état, bided their time and remained loyal to the regime. Some would eventually throw their lot with Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor, who shifted Egypt's course after his rise to the presidency in 1970. What accounts for the remarkable divergence in the political destinies of these two nationalist colonels and their populist-authoritarian regimes? How was it that Nasser avoided Peron's destiny without enjoying the popular and electoral legitimacy accorded to him?

[2] For more on competitive authoritarian regimes, see Levitsky and Way (2002, 2005, 2006, and 2010).

Comparative cases like these serve as a departure point for this dissertation. During the middle third of the twentieth century, nationalist leaders came to power in much of the developing world with an agenda to strengthen the state and to promote economic development. In countries like Turkey, Mexico, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Argentina, among others, reformist elites replaced liberal oligarchic or patrimonial rulers with new political regimes that sought to expand political participation, transform social order, and improve their relative position in the world economy. By regime, I refer to "formal rules that link the main political institutions, as well as the issue of the political nature of the ties between citizens and rulers" (Cardoso, 1979: 38). Taking advantage of the gradual decline in Western hegemony, these figures destroyed the old order with help from mobilized groups whose economic interests were hurt by global trends, and subsequently turned to the state as an agent of change from above.[3] In the wake of a rapidly changing world order, governments experimented with heterodox and interventionist policies to simultaneously ensure rapid growth and political stability. More specifically, they reacted to disruptions in the international system of trade and military conflict by combining economic nationalism and social justice with a strategy of state-led industrialization to establish what I call national developmentalist - hereafter, ND - states.

Based on their strategies of political incorporation during the "founding moment", these leaders generated popular support, gained the acquiescence of key groups, counteracted opposition to their rule, and projected control over peripheral parts of the country. However, although they all drew some support from emerging business, labor, urban professional, and peasant groups and claimed to represent the nation at large, these regimes varied remarkably in

[3] Scholars have analyzed how interactions of national and international opportunity structures influenced the strength and strategies of social movements (Keck and Sikkink, 1998 and 1999; Imig and Tarrow, 2001; Tarrow, 2005). The weakening of Western economic hegemony after the Great Depression, along with its military decline during and beyond WWII, created a favorable international setting for nationalist movements to challenge the Western order and seek full independence.

the depth of their ties to popular classes, the scope of their redistributive policies, and, ultimately, in their political trajectories. Despite facing similar pressures in the international arena, some regimes – including Mexico and Egypt - displayed remarkable resilience, whereas others – such as Argentina and Turkey - proved fragile and failed to establish a stable order. Similarly, each of these regimes enacted an agenda of national development through varying economic strategies and redistributive policies. What explains these divergent policy outcomes and the political trajectories of national development? In particular, why did the ND states differ in their ability to incorporate lower economic classes and to achieve political stability? Why did regimes pursuing an agenda of national development prove durable in some cases but not in others?

To show how these regimes emerged and later persisted in some cases and collapsed in others, this dissertation is built around a comparison of four nationalist regimes in Turkey, Egypt, Mexico, and Argentina. It offers a two-pronged institutionalist explanation. First, I argue that the varied outcomes were a product of the dissimilar institutional configurations generated by these regimes. If leaders invested in party or state corporatist institutions, regimes proved durable with even moderate levels of economic benefits. Conversely, if those institutions were weak, leaders either expanded their mass support through redistributive policies but risked political polarization or established a limited popular base but remained vulnerable to elite defection and popular counter-mobilization. These different institutional outcomes, in turn, were produced by divergent patterns of contentious politics - in particular, the varied levels of intra-elite conflict and popular mobilization - during the initial stages of the regimes.[4]

[4] Contentious politics involve "interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interests leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiator of claims, or third parties" (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 5). Scholars have traditionally considered contentious politics as an outcome to be explained based on the existing institutions. In contests where political institutions are highly fluid and subject to change, however, contentious politics drive these institutional outcomes as much as being constrained by them. For one such use of contentious politics as an explanatory factor, see Slater (2010). On contentious politics, see Tarrow (1998 and 2005); McAdam et al (2001); Tilly and Tarrow (2007).

Where nationalist leaders faced weak opposition from other elites and only limited leadership rivalries within their movement, they felt no need to invest in strong party and state institutions and had few incentives to incorporate the popular classes in the regime. This led to a *Neopatrimonial ND state*. Where these leaders, by contrast, encountered strong elite opposition to their agenda but lacked popular allies that they could organize, they used the state apparatus to co-opt the popular classes from above. This led to a *Bureaucratic ND state*. In those cases where both intra-elite conflict and popular mobilization was high, prolonged leadership contests led to a *Party Hegemonic ND state*. If that was absent, leaders eschewed building strong party institutions that would limit their autonomy. This led to a *Populist ND state*. These four institutional pathways are shown in Figure 1. In each case, rulers possessed a diverse set of institutional tools for managing elite conflicts and popular pressures, leading to different policy responses and political trajectories. In the six chapters to follow, I specify these four variants of the ND state and explain how several key explanatory factors prompted nationalist leaders to base their rule on dissimilar institutional configurations. I then illustrate how each variant produced distinct policy outcomes and political trajectories.

Figure 1



Rival Theories

There are several plausible but rival theories in the academic literature that may explain why some cases proved more durable than others and their dissimilar political trajectory over several decades. These include modernization theory, resource rents and redistributive policies, culture, regime type, colonial legacy, external support, economic crises, and war. Although some of these theories may be plausible for specific countries, none of them can systematically account for the different political outcomes across these four cases better than the causal argument posited in this dissertation. Chapter 2 positions my institutionalist theory within the larger institutionalist literature and evaluates the factors that drove the varied elite behavior linking regime origins to institutional crafting. In that sense, my two-pronged theory seeks to explain both the origins of the types of institutions and the intra-type variation.[5]

Modernization theory does a poor job of explaining the durability of the authoritarian regime in Mexico (despite impressive growth rates for four decades) and the demise of the Kemalist rule in the late 1940s. On the other hand, both the most and least redistributive cases - Argentina and Turkey, respectively - proved more fragile than the other two. Egypt did have external support (though the country's leadership changed its main ally in the early 1970s without threatening domestic stability) that could potentially explain its resilience over the decades but Mexico attained an even higher degree of stability and durability without any major allies in the internal arena. Except for Mexico, none of the cases were endowed with easily-captured natural resources. Turkey is largely lacking in natural resources, which may partly explain the absence of populist policies. However, Egypt and Argentina, which followed

[5] This is to address Waldner (2003: 2), who rightly decries the narrowing of the institutional studies' scope due to the decline in the number of studies that study the former category.

redistributive policies, had limited oil and gas resources for export and even Mexico became a major oil exporter only in the 1980s. The oil windfall boosted the Mexican government's ability to buy off popular support from key groups (Morrison, 2009) but cannot explain why and how the regime co-opted the popular classes in the 1930s, when it faced a major financial crisis.

Another possible explanation is political culture.[6] Some scholars have used Islam to explain the persistence of authoritarian regimes and perverse economic outcomes in the Middle East (Kedourie, 1992; Hammoudi, 1997; Kuran, 2010), while others mentioned the Iberian tradition as one possible cause for the rise of authoritarian corporatist regimes in Latin America (Wiarda, 1974, 1996, and 2004; for its application to Egypt, see Moore, 1974). Nevertheless, those cases selected within the same region and cultural tradition exhibited different outcomes: the Turkish regime transitioned to a multi-party democratic regime in spite of its Islamic culture, while the authoritarian regime persisted in Egypt. While both the Argentine and the Mexican cases produced corporatist arrangements, their type and institutional strength differed remarkably. Similarly, despite sharing several background conditions, these cases had highly dissimilar regime outcomes. Mexico and Turkey both had single-party rule with remarkably different tenures. Neither the Ottoman nor the Spanish colonial legacy can account for these different trajectories. Moreover, while the Republican People's Party in Turkey lost power in the aftermath of a prolonged economic downturn in the 1940s, the Egyptian and Mexican regimes both survived far stronger economic and fiscal crises.

Neither can we assign much causal weight to political ideologies. First of all, none of the leaders initialy came to power with the aid of an ideogical movement save for nationalism. The

[6] The culturalist perspective has had a limited influence within the state-building literature (Migdal, 2001: 236; Ross, 1997). In contrast, a strong culturalist tradition flourished on other topics related to this dissertation's focus, including regime type, political stability, policy choice, and economic development. For some examples, see Almond and Verba (1963), Laitin (1986), Inglehart (1988 and 1990), Wedeen (2002), Abdelal (2005).

ruling ideologies such as Kemalism and Peronism were shaped over time and in accordance with the policies that leaders followed. Above all, the ruling elites in these countries were pragmatists who shifted their external and domestic alliances and determined political strategies based on the conflicts they faced at the time. Political ideology did not serve as a constraining factor over their rule. Nasser, for instance, initially acted as an US ally in the 1950s but then turned against the Eisenhower administration and gradually drifted toward the Soviet Union during the 1960s. Mustafa Kemal and Inonu similarly had an ambivalent position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The same pragmatism shaped their economic approach: Peron was a fervent anti-American and opposed foreign capital during the initial stages of his presidency but then made overtures to the US in the 1950s when Argentina faced a major economic downturn. PRI had very strong leftist and rightist factions and even the leftist Cardenas had to choose a centrist presidential candidate with certain conservative tendencies.

Structuralist explanations point to differences in agrarian property relations, labor markets, and class structures for analyzing resulting regime types and their outcomes over the long haul (Moore, 1966; Brenner, 1976; Trimberger, 1977; Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1990). While some scholars emphasized capitalist middle-classes (Moore, 1966; Luebbert, 1991) or workers (Ruerschemeyer et. al. 1992) as a democratizing force, others considered landowning aristocrats in labor-repressive regimes to be the culprit for durable authoritarianism and weak state capacity (Paige, 1975; Gerber, 1987; Kurtz, 2013). In explaining the observed variation in the four cases, these accounts are incomplete. Classes do not act in a uniform fashion across countries and are instead often divided over their political objectives (Vitalis, 1995; Angrist, 2005: 10). As Bellin (2002) convincingly demonstrated, class interests are contingent. My findings from these four cases validate this claim. For instance, while Turkish industrial workers turned against the

Kemalist regime and contributed, though weakly, to its electoral demise, labor unions were strong advocates of the authoritarian regimes in Mexico and Egypt. Ultimately, institutional factors structured the way that social classes related to the ND states and, consequently, their interests against the regime. Departing from studies that analyze the relationship between political regimes and particular classes (Grindle, 1985; Bernquist, 1986; Collier and Collier, 1991; Murillo, 2001; Schneider, 2004), this dissertation offers an interactive account.

A growing literature in comparative politics suggests that political coalitions forged by rulers during the "founding moment" of their regimes are the key variable that explains policy responses and regime outcomes (Smith, 2007; Brownlee, 2007; Aidi, 2008; Slater, 2010). As Pepinsky (2009: 7) puts it, "coalitions are the political link that mediates how economic interests translate into adjustment policies." We should, therefore, expect those regimes that spawned a sizable cross-class coalition to have an easier time mitigating redistributive conflicts and generating popular support for their policies than those that do not. These coalitional studies on authoritarian regimes suffer from two major shortcomings. First, it is all too easy to conflate the initial regime coalition and its political management over time. The fact that a particular group was initially incorporated to the regime does not guarantee its inclusion in the long run. Once they consolidate power, leaders have the incentive to reduce costly side payments and can minimize their political coalitions, particularly during economic crises. Without analyzing the institutional landscape of the regime in question, it is not possible to discern how much influence coalition allies enjoyed over the regime. In all of the four cases, rulers remained autonomous from their supporters and acted independently when their political careers were at stake (Geddes, 1994; Evans, 1995). Hence, political coalitions devoid from their institutional arrangements have very little independent impact on policy choices and regime outcomes.

Linked to this coalitional perspective, scholars have suggested that rural incorporation provides regime stability. By co-opting the peasantry, leaders expand their organizational outreach into peripheral areas and withstand redistributive pressures from urban groups.[7] At the outset, this is a plausible argument. Because the majority of the population lived in the countryside, leaders were more likely to attain stability by capturing the rural masses. The weakness of this structural argument, however, lies in its indeterminate nature. Waldner (2004: 30) argued that "the Congress party [in India] built an enduring cross-class coalition--urban professionals, merchants and the rural middle class of prosperous cultivators. The huge popularity that the Congress party enjoyed precluded any need to fear an organized opposition and helped cement pro-democratic preferences among incumbent politicians and opponents". And yet, the same could be said for the Mexican and Egyptian cases that spawned rural-urban coalitions but without a similar democratic outcome. Why did the same coalitional formula resulted in democratic consolidation in India but durable, yet dissimilar, authoritarian trajectories in Mexico and Egypt? Rural incorporation occurred in the global south under very different regime types and with remarkably varied outcomes. This emphasis on the countryside also neglects those cases that had a majority urban population – including Argentina, Uruguay, and Singapore – before they had industrialized.

Methodology

This dissertation follows the tradition of comparative historical research.[8] It conducts a historically-structured, focused comparison of four cases and uses process tracing (George and Bennett, 2004; Collier, 2011; Slater and Ziblatt, 2013) to uncover the origins and consolidation of the national developmentalist state in each regime. In light of the criticisms that small-N

[7] For more on this strategy and on its benefits as well as costs, see Waldner, 2004a and 2004b; Dunfee, 2009.
[8] On the comparative historical tradition, see Skocpol and Somers (1980); Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003). On the comparative method, see Lijphart, 1971 and 1975.

research is subject to selection bias (Geddes, 1990 and King et. al. 1994), I carefully chose these cases to attain variation across my explanatory factors and dependent variable. The four regimes are matched in two distinct pairs according to most-similar design (Teune and Przeworski, 1970), which enabled me to test the causal arguments and to control for alternative explanations. Moreover, I supplement the cross-case analysis with a within-case analysis to break down large political processes and narratives into mechanisms (McAdam et. al. 2001; Tilly, 2001), while identifying the causal mechanisms during the founding moment of these regimes. These rich narratives offer numerous observable implications to help specify the impact of the key explanatory factors.

Another method used in the dissertation is the macro-historical narrative. The causal story is presented within a historical context that illustrates how the explanatory factors interacted with each other and pushed each regime on a divergent trajectory. Through an analysis spanning almost one hundred years, my narrative highlights the importance of temporality and sequencing in each case. This is done with a focus on the critical juncture and path dependency that is exhibited in each case.[9] I focus on the rise of the national developmentalist state as a critical juncture for state and party formations that occurred in distinct ways in these four cases, and then trace the impact of these institutions on regime trajectories over the long haul. Critical juncture allows my analysis to take into consideration both agency and structure (Mahoney and Synder, 1999). The national developmentalist state was a response to a particular type of crisis seen in late developing countries and therefore emerged at a specific period in the developmental history of these cases. Once it was established, however, the state and party institutions linked to

[9] For more on critical junctures and path dependency, see Mahoney 2000 and 2001; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Pierson (1994 and 2000).

this model placed their host countries on a distinct pathway that has shaped the national political arena in the ensuing decades.

The generalizability of this dissertation is assessed on its ability to shed light on other countries within the universe of ND states, which is discussed in Chapter 9. The four selected cases - Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt - all had national developmentalist states that emerged during the middle half of the 20th century and were also prominent in their regions given their population size, land mass, and resources.[10] Case selection was done systematically from a known population (that is, the ND states) to improve the research's external validity (Seawright and Gering, 2008: 296). Among these four cases, as discussed in Chapter 2, the full range of political outcomes for a ND state can be observed. Since the universe of ND states has followed one of the possible four pathways (neo-patrimonial, party-hegemonic, bureaucratic, and populist ND states), the empirical chapters linking each case to a particular pathway have applicability beyond this small sample. This "typological representativeness" (Slater and Ziblatt, 2013; also see the diverse case method, Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 300) helps to attain a wider theoretical and analytical reach for the research. To demonstrate how contentious politics drives regime durability through the intermediation of institutional choices, this study groups these four cases into two paired comparisons.[11] The cases provide a critical variation along with several possible explanations on why autocratic regimes differed in their ability to retain power and counteract opponents.

Why National Development?

The dissertation treats the initiation of the ND state as a crucial historical moment that shaped the political arena over the long haul (Esen, 2014: 603-605). The emergence of the ND

[10] On the importance of case selection, see Eckstein, 1975; King et al 1994; Gerring, 2004 and 2006.
[11] On paired comparison, see Tarrow, 2010; Gisselquist, 2014. For some examples, see Tarrow, 1967; Putnam, 1993; Lieberman, 2003; Samuels, 2003; Wood, 2007.

state corresponded to a transition to import substitution industrialization (ISI) agenda whereby national governments promoted the local production of light, consumer goods (Hirschman, 1968; Waterbury, 1999). This process was accompanied by an institutional expansion of the state apparatus through which public authorities enhanced their ability to direct and manage the economy and attain a higher level of control over society. This led to a dramatic rise in public spending and state employment. In turn, the state bureaucracy tried to alleviate the structural constraints such as limited market size and coordination failures that had hampered industrial investments. Through high tariffs, for instance, national firms were insulated from international competition and allocated a large share of the domestic market. When private investment proved insufficient, governments established state-owned enterprises and national banks to finance large-scale industrial projects. Through such interventions, the ND state expanded the internal market and used domestic production as an engine of industrial growth.

While ISI policies were ubiquitous in the developing world, the ND cases also possessed a strong ideological component of nationalism. Economic nationalism went tandem with ISI policies under the ND model. This stemmed from the fact that unlike "late" industrializers such as Germany, Russia, and Italy (Gerschenkron, 1962), most profitable sectors of the economy were dominated by international capital in the global south (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). As a consequence, nationalist leaders had limited control over their own economy and encountered strong opposition from international economic actors. It should therefore come as no surprise that the ND states favored national industrialists over international capital and saw industrialization as a way to break vestiges of foreign control over their societies. In particular, governments nationalized many foreign-owned companies in order to expand national control over the economy and create funds for promoting new industrial projects.

This nationalist ideology also set these cases on a distinct course in the international arena. In recently colonized societies the ND model emerged out of independence movements and assumed an anti-colonial nature, while in others the emphasis was on economic nationalism and the need to break dependence on the industrialized countries. Unlike other developing countries in the global south, the ND states actively sought to reduce, if not break, their political, economic, and military ties to the West. These cases followed a distinct foreign policy aimed to increase their country's standing and influence at the world stage. Thus, the ND states emerged as some of the core members of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War.[12]

What united nationalist leaders was a desire to improve the relative positioning of their countries in the international arena. In so doing, they envisioned the nation as one unified class, with its economic interests opposed to those in industrialized countries (Love, 1996). For them, the unbalanced division of labor in world economy, which produced vast inequalities between industrialized and agricultural countries, was far more important than the conflict between the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Instead of relying on class-based organizations, nationalist elites therefore bargained with economic groups to spawn multi-class movements that could unite the entire society – with the exception of oligarchic elements – behind their agenda. This explains why nationalism became a rallying point for these elites. Their nationalist ideology was precisely what helped gain them popular legitimacy in the first place.

As part of this strategy, the ND states sought to establish a national community from above. These 'new' societies were expected to support the political regime, mitigate distributive conflict, and promote economic growth in the coming decades. This process, however, did not amount to 'nation-building' since in most cases the nation preceded the rise of the ND state. Rather, the leaders sought to re-create the national identity and redefine the boundaries of the

[12] For more on the non-aligned movement, see Miskovic et al. 2014.

national community. At the same time, this process did not only entail the inclusion of new groups to the regime. In some cases, those groups ruling elites deemed to be dangerous were excluded altogether from the political arena and thus the national community. Rather than treating them as legitimate opposition, leaders classified such groups – the landed aristocracy, ethnic minorities, and religious groups, among others – as anti-regime elements and, by extension, opponents of the nation.

Instead, the nation at large served as the main target of solidarity in these regimes. While nationalism was not new in these countries, its content was transformed over time and became more inclusive under the ND state. National inclusion found its basis in ideas of popular sovereignty and political equality. Citizenship became the basis for an abstract equality among members of the nation, as previous categories of exclusion and separation were dismantled. Just as the shift from export-led growth to import-substitution model weakened their economic power, the oligarchical classes lost much of their political influence and were sidelined by the emerging middle classes. At the same time, the lower classes were included in the polity and given institutional platforms through which they could seek political and economic equality. In accordance with this goal of national unity, the ND states established universal suffrage, expanded health and education services, and redistributed resources to the lower classes. Although the literature tends to focus on industrial growth (Haggard, 1990; Evans, 1995; Waldner, 1999; Chibber, 2003; Kohli, 2004), the ND states promoted a comprehensive agenda that included literacy drives, rural development, and sanitation and health campaigns, among

others. Therefore, the notion of late development does not adequately capture the multi-faceted nature of the regimes under study here.[13]

From the early 1920s to the 1970s, nationalist movements arose in several middle-income countries that were plunged into a profound crisis by disruptions in the international system of trade, political instability and heightened military conflict. The decline in Western hegemony and the subsequent collapse of colonialism left nationalist leaders in these countries with the challenge of establishing new regimes that could generate both economic development and political stability. In response, they pursued a common formula that combined economic nationalism and redistributive social policies with a strategy of state-led industrialization (Esen, 2014). To that end, they enjoyed political discretion in building institutions and distributing resources across different sectors, regions, and economic groups. Their agenda of national development, by pragmatically weaving together various ideas and strategies from otherwise conflicting ideologies, constituted an alternative pathway to modernity, distinct from fascism, socialism, social democracy, democratic corporatism, traditional autocracy, and communism.

For this task, however, nationalist leaders invested in different state and party institutions, which in turn structured their rule for decades to come. Despite facing similar adaptive pressures in world economy, some leaders invested in political institutions that offered corporatist representation to economic groups and subsequently incorporated them into the regime, whereas others preferred to rely on more informal arrangements based on personal rule. As a consequence, some cases established very stable political orders and promoted state-led industrialization, whereas others proved less resilient and experienced major policy reversals and economic crises, and still others consolidated power but fell short of their developmental objectives. Due to this

[13] I define late development as a political context in which "the state explicitly nurtures the development of private sector capital and labor, relying on a variety of means - financial, social, political, and infrastructural" (Bellin, 2002: 3-4).

strict focus on economic goals, the literature has mostly neglected these other policy areas and ignored the ways in which ND states differed from other cases in the global south.[14] To address this void in the literature, this dissertation creates a new state type – the National Developmentalist state – and carves out analytical space to generate a typology of this category. With the use of four regimes that were carefully selected from the universe of cases, the empirical chapters systematically analyze the dissimilar trajectory of the four possible variants of national developmentalism.

Existing State Categories: The Need for a New State Type

As Collier and Levitsky point out, the excessive creation of new terms to classify cases that are not sufficiently novel is likely to generate "conceptual confusion" (1997: 451; also see Levitsky and Way, 2010: 13-14; Armony and Schamis, 2005). In recent years, there has indeed been a proliferation in new subtypes of hybrid and democratic regimes that led scholars to use varied terms for classifying the very same cases. Such 'conceptual hairsplitting' also applies to state subtypes, which are classified in the literature differently according to their class composition and policy functions. Therefore, the obvious conceptual strategy would have been to use a generic category. And yet, no existing term does a good job of capturing the four cases studied in this dissertation.[15]

The ND is a capitalist state which reorganizes the society from above in accordance with a class composition that excludes from political power the upper bourgeoisie and oligarchic landed elites who had hitherto benefited from their close ties to the world economy. It is

[14] All cases that followed an ISI agenda tend to be grouped under the same rubric and were compared with "successful" cases from the East Asia in order to better understand the performance of the developmental states (for some examples, see Waldner, 1999; Chibber, 2003; Kohli, 2004; Doner et. al. 2005; Lewis, 2007; Smith, 2007).

[15] Some scholars have used the terms 'national populist' (Hobsbawn, 1994: 106) and 'national popular' (Murmis and Portantiero, 2006: 170-171) to describe Getúlio Vargas and Juan Peron but as the empirical chapters on Turkey clearly indicate, populism was a strategy used by only some national developmentalist regimes.

characterized by political activation of the middle and popular classes, institutional expansion of the state apparatus, and shift toward an ISI agenda. These central traits enable us to distinguish the ND from other capitalist states in the developing world. The ND states did not only push for rapid industrialization but were also imbued with a distinct nationalist ideology that leaders used to harmonize class distinctions and strengthen their countries in the international arena.

The ND state differs from the liberal oligarchical and traditional authoritarian states with their bureaucratic management of the economy and policy tools to generate desirable outcomes. Unlike the predatory states, the ND states were embedded in social coalitions, allowed entrepreneurship to thrive, and invested in the productive sectors of the economy. Due to the autonomy of their state organs, these cases also do not fit the Marxist state tradition, either. Meanwhile, while they delivered public goods, generated industrial development, and heavily regulated the economy, the ND states differed from the developmental states in several respects: agricultural surplus was not efficiently channeled to the industrial sectors; populist linkages precluded industrial upgrading; and the bureaucracy remained inefficient. Such differences can be observed from the stark variation in the economic performance of the two subtypes. [16]

It also diverges from the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian (BA) state with its class configurations. Unlike the latter, the ND states did not attempt to exclude previously mobilized popular classes but rather made selective alliances with societal groups to establish a new order. While the depth and scope of these alliances varied among the ND states, their existence cannot be disputed. Lastly, the ND states differed from developmentalism (Sikkink, 1991) and

[16] Like their developmental variants, some ND states established planning agencies to regulate and rationalize industrial investment (Geddes, 1995). Though linked to the executive office, these organizations did not gain the status and power that their counterparts had enjoyed in the developmental states and failed to discipline the economic elites (Evans, 1995; Chibber, 2003; Doner, 2009; Raquiza, 2013). Developmental states are few in numbers and concentrated in East Asia: Japan (Johnson, 1982), Korea (Amsden, 1992; Chibber, 2003; Wade, 2004; Kohli, 2004), Taiwan (Haggard, 1990; Waldner, 1999), and Singapore (Doner et. al. 2005; Slater, 2010).

dependent development (Evans, 1979; Gereffi and Evans, 1981), given their emphasis on economic nationalism. The latter sought to attract foreign investment to alleviate balance of payments difficulties, offered favorable terms to multinational enterprises, received developmental aid from the West (Maxfield and Nolt, 1990), and encouraged partnerships between local-private and foreign capital under the supervision of what Freeman termed an "entrepreneurial state" (1982; Duvall and Freeman, 1983). By contrast, the ND states were hostile towards foreign capital and renegotiated the conditions for the presence of MNCs within their borders. Higher taxes rates on these firms and outright nationalization of their assets were some commonly employed strategies. Conversely, the ND states supported national entrepreneurs, whom they held in higher regard than feudal or comprador actors. Both the BA and developmental states emerged at later stages of the ISI model as a backlash against the popular links cultivated by the nationalist leaders.

My conceptualization of national developmentalism is restrictive. I limit the category to countries that were at earlier stages in their economic development. For these cases, nationalist agenda - creating a national community and seizing control of national resources - were as important as their developmental goals. The accomplishment of the former served as a prerequisite for advancing other economic objectives. This category adequately captures the multi-faceted nature of the regimes that ran such states. Lastly, these states appeared in some of the most populous and powerful nations in the global south, giving this study theoretical importance and substantive weight.

Case Selection

To illustrate how regime durability was driven by political institutions, which were themselves a product of the contentious politics during the onset of these cases, this study draws

on two carefully-selected paired comparisons. The research design is derived from the "most similar" systems within each pair in that they share various important elements but differ on the dependent variable - regime durability - so as to allow us to elucidate the causal relationship between this outcome and the intervening and independent variables, both of which also differed in each pair. In each pair, the cases exhibited strong similarities in a number of conjectural and structural factors used by country specialists to explain this outcome, including a common founding event, historical period, economic structure, and regime type.

The first pair of cases - Turkey and Mexico - both experienced a major political revolution in 1908 and 1910, respectively, which ended three decades of autocratic rule under Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) and Porfirio Diaz (1876-1880, 1884-1911) and spurred another decade of civil war and political turmoil.[17] Although they were integrated into world markets during the late 19th century, the two countries still had an inefficient agrarian sector with a large number of subsistence farmers and a sizable ethnic minority. The decade-long conflict and civil strife that ensued after the revolution in both cases ended with the rise of military strongmen, who managed to cobble together various regional groups, socio-economic actors, and political and military elites under the umbrella of an official regime party. This spurred a single-party regime, whose leaders and cadres strongly identified with the revolution and pushed for a highly nationalist and secular agenda.

The second pair of cases - Argentina and Egypt - was endowed with a very fertile land mass that facilitated their rise during the 19th century as major agricultural exporters to industrial

[17] In recent years, comparative research on these two countries has increased substantially, although with the exception of Ozbudun's landmark study, all of these works focus on the contemporary period rather than the first half of the twentieth century. For some examples, see Ozbudun (1970), Waterbury (1993), Eder (2001), Kus and Ozel (2010), Marois (2011), Ozel (2014).

markets, particularly the British Empire.[18] This trade (cotton in Egypt and meat in Argentina) allowed both countries to become major sites for foreign investments, to develop a vibrant urban economy, and to generate enormous wealth for an aristocratic landowning class that dominated political and economic power. Amid this economic growth, political parties relying on urban and rural middle classes as well as progressive landowners came to power in Argentina and Egypt, namely the Union Cívica Radical (UCR) in 1916 and the Wafd Party in 1922. However, they were soon excluded by the traditional ruling class. This authoritarian backlash was pronounced during the early Depression years, when government intervention benefited, for the most part, higher income groups and agrarian interests, instead of the popular classes. This incident also delayed the emergence of a national developmentalist state in these two countries, when compared with the first pair. Frustrated by their political impotence, not to mention their own ties to landed elites, both the Radical and the Wafdist leaders later engaged in various backroom deals and made political compromises to attain power, thereby ruining their reformist credentials in the eyes of mass groups. Since most political elites were either captured by agrarian interests or too weak, the resulting political deadlock was broken by a group of nationalist junior military officers who seized power through military coups in Argentina (1943) and Egypt (1952).

Above all, these seemingly disparate cases are linked and analyzed under a common framework presented in Chapter 2. Despite their otherwise remarkable differences in culture and history, their experience of building national-developmentalist states generated some general patterns and similar challenges that constituted the origins of this study. Such aspects clearly differentiate these cases from other countries in their respective regions - a phenomenon that led many scholars to treat them as outliers. These include strong partisan identities, an authoritarian

[18] Although several scholars have noted, in passing, these interesting similarities between Argentina and Egypt, no comparative study on these cases was ever made (Perlmutter, 1974: 17; Bagchi, 1982: 198; Tylecote, 2014: 163).

legacy, highly interventionist policies in areas beside economics, and political loyalties that go beyond left-right ideological cleavages.[19]

Although no prior study established a connection between this point and the legacy of ND states, scholars have noted the presence of various ideological factions within these regimes (Waterbury, 1983; Ostiguy, 1998; Insel, 2002; Levitsky, 2003; Greene, 2007; Esen, 2014). Although they are treated with special regard by area studies and studied in isolation, there is nothing unique about these cases per se and grouping them under the rubric of a common framework offered by this dissertation may open up analytical space wherein more comparative analysis can take place. To pair cases from two different regions helps to elucidate patterns that are glossed over in regional studies and flush out causal variables that single-country monographs tend to miss (Bunce, 2003: 191; Brownlee, 2007: 14). Given that divergent outcomes occurred in two cases within the same region, this study's research design allows us to move beyond some shared factors.

During the mid-19th century, these four cases were integrated into the world economy as agricultural exporters and were in turn markets for industrialized countries in the West. Under liberal agrarian regimes, patrimonial or oligarchic elites retained huge influence over the state apparatus and controlled significant economic power and huge estates. At the turn of the twentieth century, the old order came under challenge from the rising middle strata - urban

[19] Although the Kemalist CHP is nominally considered to be a leftist party, its agenda has heavy nationalist undertones but other leftist groups fail to achieve a breakthrough due to its hold over urban middle-classes. On the other hand, many center-right voters also identify themselves as Kemalists and occasionally vote for this party in opposition to culturally conservative parties. Historically, the Peronist movement also had leftist and rightist factions, which, their loyalty to Peron notwithstanding disagreed strongly with each other on many substantive issues and fought against one another as much they competed against opposition groups. Thus, the Peronist vs. anti-Peronist divide remains a salient cleavage in Argentine society. Though dominant at the national level for decades, Mexico's PRI also had disparate ideological factions and the party itself is classified as a centrist one under the current three-party system. In Egypt, which had a very authoritarian system over the decades, much of the political competition runs between regime loyalists - spanning both leftists and rightists - and its opponents, who are mostly coalesced under the wing of anti-regime Islamist groups.

professionals, trade bourgeoisie, and civil and military bureaucracy - and popular classes whose interests were hurt by periodic declines in the world economy. As part of a larger global wave from Russia (1905) and Iran (1906) to China (1911), constitutional revolutions occurred in the Ottoman Empire (1908) and Mexico (1910) that destroyed the old order and paved the way for a new class of political elites (for a comparative perspective on these revolutions, see Sohrabi, 2002, and 2011).[20] In Argentina and Egypt, political change came more gradually and through reformist mass-parties that won electoral victories in 1916 and 1922.

Their differences notwithstanding, reformist actors counteracted their oligarchic opponents, challenged the economic order, and briefly occupied political office in each case. However, they failed to stabilize the political arena and consolidate power to establish a new regime. In Mexico and Turkey, for instance, new rulers soon met with a counterrevolutionary backlash and popular unrest as well as external threats during the ensuing decade. Similarly, reformist parties in Argentina and Egypt were excluded from power in the 1930s by traditional elites who curtailed the political arena to enact orthodox economic policies. The pathway for gradual reform was accordingly laid out in each case but eventually blocked. This prompted the rise of a new generation of political and military leaders, who were more nationalist and radical than their predecessors and who supplanted the old order with an interventionist regime. This created a critical juncture that propelled a wave of state formation and paved the way for the creation of a national developmentalist state under remarkably different regimes. In the empirical chapters to follow, I focus on the origins of the ND state and illustrate how the contentious politics during its rise pushed leaders to invest in varied institutions that in turn led to divergent political trajectories.

[20] For a background on the non-Western world during this period see Kasaba 1993, Horowitz 2004, Kayaoglu 2010.

In concluding this section, let me also mention the research's time frame. The dissertation begins the historical analysis in the mid-19th century during which a liberal order had begun to take shape in all four countries. For the first paired comparison (Turkey and Mexico), the analysis runs through the early 1950s, when one regime - Mexico - was consolidated and another - Turkey - defeated at the hands of opposition elites, thus generating a clear divergence in their political trajectories. As for the second paired comparison (Argentina and Egypt), in which the advent of the ND state was delayed until the post-WWII period, the historical chapters trace the narrative until the early mid 1950s and early 1970s, respectively. In 1955, Peron's rule had come to an end by way of a military coup, whereas Nasser, despite his constant worries of such an outcome, stayed in power until his death in 1970. Although the empirical chapters focus on the ND states and the regimes that ran it in each country, the conclusion also includes an epilogue that traces the trajectory of these cases until the early 21st century. In accordance with a view of path dependency, this final part illustrates that those factors specified in the theoretical framework created political structures, which, even in the cases of Turkey and Argentina, where the regimes did not prove durable but the ND movements survived, continued to shape political outcomes in the ensuing decades.

Outline

The chapters to follow are based upon research on primary materials and secondary literature, as well as eighteen months of fieldwork in Turkey and Argentina. This material is presented in six country-specific case chapters that follow a causal narrative around the theoretical argument. Before delving into the empirical chapters in Parts II and III, Chapter 2 concludes Part I with an extensive theoretical discussion of the arguments specified in this introduction and situates the causal story within the relevant literature in comparative

politics. The empirical aspects of this dissertation begin in Part II with a Turkey-Mexico paired comparison. Chapter 3 looks at how the post-WWI nationalist mobilization in Anatolia constituted a critical juncture during which an Ottoman Turkish general, Mustafa Kemal, and his collaborators established a new political regime that stabilized the political arena and laid the groundwork for a Turkish nation-state following a decade of instability and turmoil after the 1908 Revolution. It then illustrates that the ephemeral aspect of the mobilization from below and low-level of intra-elite conflict led the Kemalist leadership to invest little in state and party institutions linked with their new regime, leading to neo-patrimonial rule of a small group of political reformers. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the regime, after Mustafa Kemal's death, failed to address the growing economic and political challenges during and in the immediate aftermath of WWI. It traces how a fateful decision by the country's leadership to open up some room in the political arena, given the absence of a robust political party and corporatist institutions, allowed disgruntled elites to defect from the government and mobilize a sizable portion of the electorate during the 1950 parliamentary elections, thus generating one of the first electoral transfers of power in the global south. Chapter 5 juxtaposes the post-revolutionary Mexico with that of Turkey to identify the higher level of popular mobilization and elite rivalries that occurred in the former case and outlines how these varying factors led to a mass political party and corporatist institutions that co-opted a large portion of the popular classes. Precisely because Mexico experienced a longer period of contentious politics than in Turkey, the Mexican leadership felt the need to invest in state and party institutions, which precluded major elite defection after the 1940s and dampened the potential for anti-regime mobilization, thereby paving the way for a dominant party system well into the end of twentieth century.

In Part III, I devote attention to the second paired comparison, namely Argentina and Egypt, which saw the advent of a ND state in the post-WWII era. Chapter 6 analyzes how leadership rivalries within the junta that came to power in 1943 and elite-led mobilization against military rule prompted Juan Peron, the strongman of the new regime, to undertake a massive popular movement and spawn a multi-class coalition that won the 1946 elections. It subsequently details Peron's success, where a series of his Mexican counterparts failed, to eschew those party institutions that would constrain his autonomy and in effect transform a labor-led party into the most powerful personalistic movement in Latin America. Chapter 7 discusses how Peron, though still popular, experienced considerable difficulty in disciplining the redistributive claims of his movement and, consequently, in assuaging elite fears during his second term, due to the weakness of state and party institutions. Inevitably, his second term was characterized by intense and unmanageable elite opposition along with frequent anti-elite mobilizations that destabilized the political arena, arrested economic development, and finally led a liberal faction of the military to topple him in 1955.

Chapter 8 concludes this part with a discussion of the origins and consolidation of the Nasserite regime, established by a small group of junior officers who came to power in Egypt through a coup much like the GOU that included Peron in the early 1940s. While Peron encountered heavy elite opposition, military rivalries, and a vibrant civil society, Nasser surmounted all intra-junta opposition against his personal rule, and used state power to curb, if temporarily, resistance from various civilian groups. This enabled Nasser to consolidate power without the need for a robust ruling party. However, unlike Peron, he lacked a strong popular base and thus expanded state institutions to impose control over social classes. The outcome was a highly bureaucratic regime that co-opted the popular classes without their political participation

and left military elites in full control of the state apparatus - a durable regime with scant mobilizational capacity. In Part IV, Chapter 9 ends the dissertation with a summary of the main arguments and some initial thoughts on their applicability to other cases.

CHAPTER 2
The Institutional Origins of ND States

Introduction

This dissertation explains the diverging regime paths of the National Developmentalist states during the middle half of the twentieth century. As summarized in Chapter 1, the remarkable variation in the political trajectories of the founding regimes can be explained in large part through their distinctive institutions. During their rise to power, leaders built institutions through which they mobilized their supporters, consolidated their authority, and promoted their policy agendas. While regime formation was accompanied by a bout of institution-building, leaders based their rule on different state and party institutions that later shaped the political arena in the ensuing decades. Where they built robust institutions for resolving elite disputes and incorporating popular classes, regimes proved durable even amid major economic and military crises. Where such structures were weak, regimes had limited capacity to prevent elite defection and encountered strong opposition that proved unmanageable over the long term. Besides institutional strength, however, whether the principal decision-making agency was a political party or state bureaucratic apparatus played a role in determining the regime's base of support. Although this study focuses primarily on Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt, these causal arguments have relevance for a larger universe of cases in the developing world. It is my hope that this study will offer a new perspective and framework to study other, similar regimes.

This chapter elaborates the theoretical framework of the dissertation - introduced in Chapter 1 - by situating my causal arguments within the broader literature. In so doing, three main points are highlighted that may also have some relevance for understanding state-building, political parties, and state-society relations in other similar regimes. First, rather than assert the

primacy of structure or agency, I demonstrate that political institutions were the causal mechanism through which the observed variation occurred. Second, I argue that these institutions, though influenced by underlying structures and leadership factors, were ultimately conditioned by the contentious politics surrounding the onset of each regime. Internal conflicts shaped state and party institutions during this transition period more than any other factor thus far recognized in the literature. I therefore suggest that social movement literature has much to contribute to the analysis of these founding moments. Third, I try to shift attention away from late development - which has lately become an all-encompassing term to characterize a wide array of cases - to national development, which has a narrower scope in terms of classifying regimes but can also speak to political development as well as economic growth.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I elaborate on the ND state to distinguish it from other state subtypes in the developing world and discuss the similarities among the four cases. I then lay out my two-pronged theory, which purports to explain how contentious politics led to remarkable variation in institutional choices that in turn shaped the regime outcomes. Third, I briefly summarize the empirical evidence from the four cases to highlight how each case exhibited different values in the dependent and independent variables. In the final section, I describe the four institutional variants of the ND state. At the end of each section, I operationalize the dependent and independent variables.

The National Developmentalist State

During the first half of the twentieth century, the West was convulsed by war, political conflict, and economic crisis that shattered the liberal order and paved the way for the emergence of communitarian movements, including social democracy and fascism. Such disruptions in the international system of trade along with heightened conflict also plunged middle-income

countries in the global south into a profound crisis. To address this decline in western hegemony and the subsequent collapse of the liberal order, nationalist leaders created new regimes that aspired to promote economic development, social peace, and political stability. While the tectonic changes in Europe during this period have long been documented, few scholars have systematically studied these nationalist regimes in the developing world. This dissertation argues that several middle-income countries addressed this profound crisis with a common national developmentalist formula based on economic nationalism, state-sponsored industrialization, and distributive social policies.

Like proponents of other anti-liberal ideologies, national developmentalists defended "the primacy of politics" (Berman, 2006) and used state power to redesign society and the economic order. They also evoked communitarian goals and the collective good, defined as national welfare in each case. Lastly, national developmentalism represented a "third way" between laissez-faire liberal and Marxist models, offering a capitalist pathway for development that also allowed the state discretion over markets. Although they all responded to instability in the world economy and international politics, national developmentalism differed from other anti-liberal cases in the level of development of the countries in which they emerged. Social democracy and fascism both arose in cases where industrialization had already weakened the power base of the oligarchy and created a powerful working class.[21]

Unlike the Western countries that grappled with problems related to a stagnant industrial sector - mass unemployment, insufficient demand and deflation - late developing countries in the non-Western world faced stronger challenges, such as state formation, nation-building, and

[21] The remarkable variation in regime outcomes among these cases was conditioned by the different coalitional arrangements that incorporated, weakened, or excluded the labor parties. For more on these regime outcomes, see Moore (1966); Luebbert (1991); Berman (2006).

industrial development.[22] While the globalization of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generated some level of social dislocation and mass poverty in the global south, economic development had not yet created strong economic groups in the civil society. The agrarian structure was still partly based on feudal ties and coercive methods. Moreover, foreign investments controlled a sizable portion of the urban economic sector and indigenous entrepreneurs were relatively weak. Consequently, neither labor unions nor peasant organizations became major actors in their own light. Even the urban middle classes were not sufficiently distinguished from the agro-export sector. This blocked the path for gradual political reform even in relatively developed parts of the global south. In absence of a strong push from below, there was much need for midwifery - nationalist leaders who controlled the state apparatus. It should come as no surprise that these regimes tended to rise to power with the aid of armed mobilization or a decolonization struggle that uprooted the old order.[23]

According to national leaders, the international division of labor - relegating their countries to an inferior position as agricultural producers - constituted a "structural imperative" (Evans, 1995: 8). Determined to improve their country's relative position, these leaders treated the entire nation as one unified community with common interests against the industrialized world. For them, the conflict between the industrialized countries and rest of the world trumped

[22] These problems were solved for the most part by what Bendix (1977) called to be the "twin revolutions" of the West, the national and industrial revolutions (Also see, Caramani, 2004: ch. 6).

[23] Junior officers in both Egypt and Argentina toppled the oligarchy with a military coup, while the military leaders played an important role in creating post-revolutionary regimes in Mexico and Turkey. Coups served a similar function in Thailand, Brazil, and South Korea, among others. In others like India, Indonesia, and Tunisia, decolonization paved the way for national developmentalist states. Of course, not all coups during this period led to such an outcome. Civilian governments were overthrown in 17 Latin American countries between 1929 and 1932 (Claudio Veliz, 1980: 279) but national developmentalist states emerged in only a few of them. Ironically, Mexico was not on this list for having already undergone a major regime change in recent years and in Argentina the coup toppled a populist-reformist government, thus paving the way for another coup in 1943.

class conflict within the latter countries.[24] National unity supplanted any preexisting class struggles in society. In that sense, the nationalist ideology allowed these leaders to organize the popular classes around a collective identity without the need for recourse to class interests.

The national developmentalist state became the instrument through which national leaders sought to accomplish these tasks (Esen, 2014). Most importantly, they established a modern state bureaucracy that was designed to carry out regime objectives. The state management of the economy was subsequently expanded. As part of an import substitution, industrialization strategy, the bureaucracy helped private entrepreneurs bridge large technological gaps with industrialized countries, overcome the narrowness of domestic markets, and resolve the coordination failures. High tariffs insulated national firms from international competition. When private investment proved insufficient in sponsoring industrialization, state officials established state-owned enterprises and national banks. The latter was crucial in funneling more resources to the industrial sector. Nationalization of foreign companies was another strategy governments used to expand their control over the economy and create funds for large industrial projects. Moreover, governments raised state fiscal capacity by taking over areas of finance and taxation. Finally, leaders invested in coercive institutions to defend against internal and external threats and expanded the national infrastructure.

Most of the literature has focused on state efforts to facilitate economic development. Such preoccupation with economic outcomes, however, can delimit our understanding of the ND states. While industrialization was one of their primary goals, these cases also promoted other

[24] Long before the rise of dependency literature, leftist intellectuals in late developing countries - Mihail Manoilescu of Romania, Scalabrini Ortiz of Argentina, Vicente Lombardo Toledano of Mexico, the Cadre movement in Turkey, among others - claimed that the society, due to its lower level of industrialization, was not sufficiently stratified to host intense class conflict. Instead, they argued, the state should harmonize the interests of different economic groups to facilitate rapid industrialization and reverse the structural inequalities with the West (Millon, 1966; Chirot, 1980; Kuyas, 1995; Love, 1997).

non-economic objectives such as health drives, literacy campaigns, and non-aligned foreign policy. Hence, the ND state expanded its jurisdiction over education, healthcare, and social security, thus nationalizing the provision of services in these areas. In particular, governments proved instrumental in expanding the electorate, incorporating previously excluded or marginalized communities, and promoting universal suffrage. These policies became part and parcel with the notion of forging a new national community. Members of these communities were also offered a set of social benefits, ranging from free health care to pensions. Public education became accessible to rural communities and linked them to the polity.

This appeal to national unity was only a temporary substitute for dampening class politics. While many economic and ideological groups gathered under the rubric of national developmentalism, they differed in the specific policies chosen to attain such goals. Who will finance the industrialization program? Should the state or private entrepreneurs own the industrial firms? To what extent and how will agrarian resources be funneled to the industrial sector? What should be the financial system for the new regime? Political and economic actors gave different answers to these critical questions and others like them. Indeed, three distinct factions emerged in most ND cases: (1) a fiscally-conservative wing that advocated a more liberal developmentalist course; (2) a populist labor faction; (3) an agrarian faction. Over time, these different factions usually merged into two distinct leftist and rightist factions, both linked to the regime but in a struggle against one another.[25]

[25] Socialist and communist groups cooperated with these regimes and were aligned with their leftist factions. This was due less to lack of ideological foresight than a political dilemma faced by such groups. Due to the low level of industrialization, socialists and communists had very little hope of rising to power by organizing the weak working classes. Instead, political compromise with nationalist leaders offered more immediate gains. Some examples include the ties between the Cardenas administration and the Mexican Communist Party, the state absorption of nationalist-minded communists during Mustafa Kemal's and Nasser's final years, the temporary alliance between Chiang Kai-Shek and the Soviet military advisers and Peron's overtures to Trotskyite groups in early 1950s. During the rudimentary stage of industrialization, leftist groups had an incentive to cooperate with national developmentalist regimes to weaken the oligarchic classes and facilitate economic development. Their interests were also conjoined

Indeed, the ND state was wrought with internal tensions. The struggle among these groups, rather than any inherent ideological inconsistency, should account for policy reversals that occurred under these regimes. Therefore, the policy choices of ND states cannot be deduced from purely economic factors. Rather, they were a function of internal struggles conditioned by the regime's political institutions. The next section tackles the question of why these regimes were linked to remarkably different state and party institutions.

Political Institutions and Regime Durability

Authoritarian leaders have two instruments to sustain their rule: policy concessions and rent distribution (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006: 2). Unlike Gandhi and Przeworski, this study does not treat institutions solely as a mechanism to offer policy concessions and side payments but also as a platform to reconcile elite conflict and promote popular participation. As first argued by Huntington (1968), political institutions can tame popular mobilization and channel mass participation away from transgressive forms. In this sense, robust institutions provide leaders with an additional tool to stifle dissent, resolve intra-elite disputes, and mobilize popular support. Because their economic agenda generates opposition from vested interests in society and entails substantial transfer of resources, institutions play an even more vital role in the ND states. I call the specific problem that these regime leaders confront the "Developmentalist's Dilemma".

While popular mobilization is necessary to destroy the old order, higher levels of political participation intensify elite opposition and polarize the political arena. Consequently, regimes are forced to forge a delicate balance between mobilization and ideological moderation as well as

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whenever the regime clashed with imperialist powers and limited the influence of religious institutions. For nationalist leaders, these groups offered temporary logistical and even popular support, not to mention improved ties with the Soviet Union. But once their interests began to clash, the nationalist regimes did not hesitate to eliminate their former socialist allies.

between redistribution and fiscal discipline. After they gain power, leaders therefore have a strong incentive to demobilize their supporters in order to assuage elite fears. Taken to its extreme, this strategy can curtail the regime's base of support and weaken its ability to discipline the upper classes. This would limit the regime's capacity to enact its economic agenda. Conversely, if leaders frequently employ popular mobilization as a political strategy, they would alienate even moderate groups and fuel redistributive pressures, destabilizing the economy. With such high stakes, there is greater risk of an authoritarian backlash.[26]

Nationalist leaders sought to form a cross-class base that would both counter opposition from traditional elites and keep popular classes at bay. Due to redistributive conflicts in the ND state, however, this was easy said than done. To be sure, nationalism offered a convenient platform from which they could reach out to a diverse set of groups under a theme of unity. Yet, except for times of war, national solidarity on its own could not mitigate such problems. The only solution out of this conundrum was to build robust corporatist institutions - linked either to the ruling party or the state bureaucracy - that integrated socio-economic groups to the regime through binding, interlocking ties. These institutions in turn provide the regime with elite conflict resolution mechanisms and accommodate its popular base without the need for extensive side payments that are unsustainable during 'hard times'. Elite unity is critical for regime durability (Geddes, 1999; Brownlee, 2007; Slater, 2010).[27] In contrast, when such institutions were weak, leaders had difficulty satisfying their popular base and managing the opposition of elites.

[26] On the link between the threat of redistribution and military coups, see Boix (2003); Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).

[27] These institutions not only enhance administrative power but also offer tools for coalition maintenance. Most coalitional studies focus mainly on the initial coalition spawned by leaders but neglect how it changes in the ensuing decades. Yet, popular incorporation does not freeze in time but rather varies over the years. In many cases, these coalitions have changed over time in response to shifts in political dynamics and economic climate.

Consequently, leaders either relied heavily on the military to quash challenges to their rule or employed redistributive policies to generate popular support.

The Theoretical Argument (I): Institutional Subtypes of the ND State as Independent Variable

The independent variable in this study is the institutional variants of the ND state. The state bureaucratic apparatus and the ruling party organization are identified the principal agencies through which the ND state seeks to control society and promote its economic agenda. These organizations can adopt one of two different levels of institutionalization. Together they provide four possible values on the independent variable. These four distinct institutional configurations of the ND state are summarized below in Table 1. As explained in the following section, each one of these configurations created a distinct institutional pathway that shaped the political arena.

When party and/or state structures are robust and cohesive, regimes incorporate the popular classes through interlocking mechanisms that leave little room for autonomous action. Since they did not fear mass opposition, leaders could make policy concessions to opposition groups and moderate their side payments. Furthermore, leaders tapped into these institutions to resolve disputes among groups within the regime's political coalition: industrialists vs. union leaders, bureaucrats vs. managerial elite, and cultivators vs. urban population. While their interests may be conjoined during the "easy stage of industrialization" (O'Donnell, 1973), strong institutions were crucial to accommodate the conflicting demands of these groups at later developmental stages.[28] Due to the improbable chances of drawing support, elites had few incentives to defect and, consequently, regime critics were effectively marginalized. If they still faced opposition, these regimes also possessed a high coercive capacity, dominated the mass media, and could steal elections. In the absence of such institutions, regimes could not

[28] For one such example of middle class discontent, see Walker (2013).

effectively deter their opponents and thus proved "self-undermining" (Greif and Laitin, 2004) in the long run. Elite defection served as the intervening mechanism that led to regime collapse in these cases. Due to their weak base of support, regimes linked to the Neopatrimonial ND states collapsed amid elite-led mobilization and popular discontent. In contrast, the mass support enjoyed by the Populist ND states pushed regime opponents to seek allies outside the partisan arena, thereby paving the way for a coup d'état. The causal mechanisms are shown by the table below.

Table 1

Cases	Mexico	Argentina	Eygpt	Turkey
	Party		**State**	
Institutional Level	Robust	Weak	Robust	Weak
	Elite conflict resolved	Elite conflict intensified	Elite conflict resolved	Elite conflict postponed
Transition to National Development				
	⬇	⬇	⬇	⬇
	Party incorporation	Popular incorporation	Popular cooptation	Popular exclusion
	Elite unity	Elite defection	Elite unity	Elite defection
DV	Durable	Authoritarian backlash	Durable	Democratic transition from above

Since Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies*, there is wide recognition that strong institutions spur regime durability.[29] While my dissertation is embedded in this scholarly

[29] Institutionalist studies have abounded in comparative politics over the last few decades. Scholars have suggested that institutions regulate human behavior, shape economic policy, influence actor incentives, and impose political order, among others. Institutions are used to explain variation in movement strategies (Imig and Tarrow, 1999; Tilly

tradition, it also lays out a causal mechanism linking varied institutions to divergent regime outcomes. The study also illustrates how variation in institutional strength, even within the same regime type, can produce highly dissimilar political outcomes. For instance, scholars have long noted that single-party regimes hold elites together and offer mechanisms to reconcile political conflict and to harness popular support (Duverger, 1964; Huntington and Moore, 1970; Geddes, 1999; Brownlee, 2007). But not all single-party regimes have this level of organizational capacity (for a review, see Smith, 2005). Through comparative analysis of the Turkish and the Mexican single-party rule, this study shows that the regime outcomes were less than a product of single parties per se than their institutional strength.[30]

The notion that authoritarian regimes stabilize their rule by incorporating some sectors of society is a truism in comparative politics (O'Donnell, 1979; Collier and Collier, 1991). Yet, the literature does not clearly specify how different institutions provide leaders with dissimilar incentives to co-opt groups and mobilize their supporters and, in turn, affect the way elites interact with the regime. (For some exceptions, see Slater 2010; Svolik, 2012). In the empirical chapters that follow, this study illustrates how leaders relied on different political strategies matched with the extant institutional configurations, which resulted in distinct political pathways. Several scholars have followed an approach similar to mine. For instance, Collier and Collier (1991) distinguish between party and state formation, though they do not emphasize a regime's differing levels of institutional strength. Brownlee (2007) differentiates between weak and strong ruling parties but his failure to include a separate category for a strong state bureaucratic

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and Tarrow, 2007), level of state capacity (Kurtz, 2013), industrial policy (Chibber, 2003; Smith, 2007), economic performance (North and Weingast, 1989; North, 1990; Haber et. al. 2003; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005 and 2006) regime transition (Bunce, 1999), elite power contestation (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Samuels and Shugart, 2010), ethnic conflict (Lijphart, 1975) and electoral behavior (Lijphart, 1992 and 2012; Cox, 1997).

[30] Unlike Mexico, single-party rule in Turkey did not effectively resolve intra-elite conflicts (Geddes, 1999; Brownlee, 2007), nor offer a prospect of upward mobility for its cadres (Svolik, 2012), nor became a vehicle to reward supporters (Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2006).

apparatus prompts him to confuse coercive capacity with party strength, particularly in the Egyptian case. Lastly, Gandhi and Przeworski (2006 and 2007) convincingly argue that partisan legislatures extend rulers' tenures by broadening the basis of their support. Legislatures can help incorporate opposition forces and increase regime durability only if it is accompanied with a robust ruling party that allows the country's leadership to dominate the leadership. Otherwise this option may result in democratization, as seen in late 1940s Turkey, due to the ruling party's failure to dominate the political arena against rival parties. Thus, the critical factor is not partisan legislatures but ruling party strength.

While regimes linked with both the Bureaucratic and Party Hegemonic ND states proved durable, their policy outcomes and political trajectory have differed.[31] By creating longer time horizon and common interests, robust parties reduce elite insecurity and draw support from lower-level cadres (Brownlee, 2007). The party organization virtually acts like a corporatist forum (though not a democratic one) for a wide array of interest groups and moderates their demands (Collier and Collier, 1991; Gandhi, 2008: ch. 5). At the same time, the party can reward loyalty through selective benefits and make credible threats to party members (Magaloni, 2006; Svolik, 2012). The following empirical chapters validate studies that have suggested that institutionalized ruling parties were more likely to ensure property rights (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011 and 2012), to have a better economic performance (Haber et. al. 2003; Gandhi, 2008), and to rely less on the state security apparatus (Svolik, 2012) than others. State corporatist regimes have sufficient coercive capacity to monitor opposition movements, to scare off challenges, and to repress coordinated activity against the government, if necessary. When it comes to offering

[31] In most of the literature, the state and the ruling party institutions are not sufficiently distinguished and many scholars have used both concepts almost interchangeably (for some exceptions, see Collier and Collier, 1991; Levitsky and Way 2005; Slater 2010). This is the case even in studies (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008) that emphasize the importance of strong institutions.

inducements to create loyalty, however, these regimes have at their disposal a limited bundle of options compared to regimes with robust parties.

Operationalization of the Variables

In discussing durability, it is helpful to distinguish between durability and duration. I define regime durability in terms of its temporal length and as a function of its resilience. Following Grzymala-Busse, durability refers to a regime's "ability to meet and overcome potential crises" (2010: 1279; also, see Slater, 2010: 288). If my institutional argument is plausible, a durable regime should persist due to properties rooted in the endogenous features of its institutions.[32] To assess this point, the empirical chapters focus on how regime institutions shaped the ability of rulers to address internal crises and exogenous shocks and illustrate the mechanism through which the observed outcomes materialized.

The explanatory emphasis of this dissertation is on the principal agency regimes use to manage the political arena and control society. Most ND states were governed by regimes that established a single party with a dominant position in the political arena. What is therefore more important is to determine whether those parties directed the broader state apparatus and had strong formal institutions. I define robust parties as having (1) an effective national-level organization that recruits party personnel and offers cadres a routinized path for upward mobility; (2) formalized ties with popular classes; (3) autonomy from the state bureaucratic apparatus; and (4) internal mechanisms to resolve intra-party disputes (see also, LeBas, 2011: 23-28). To assess the strength of state institutions, I depart from existing literature by proposing new measurement criteria (Levi, 1988; Mann, 2012; Lieberman, 2003; Slater, 2010). The literature emphasizes direct taxation as a proxy for measuring state capacity. While the ability to extract revenue from its population may be an important sign of a state's fiscal power, it is not a very good indicator to

[32] For an excellent discussion on the relationship between institutional resilience and persistence, see Guven (2009).

evaluate the ND state. Due to technical difficulties, most states in the developing world - with the exception of developmental states - encounter difficulties generating revenue. At the same time, the ND states achieve more success in raising revenue from the economic elites and funneling resources within the economy through other, less technically challenging means: land reform, low agricultural prices, nationalization, and sequestration. Instead, I operationalize a state's institutional strength through the scope of state control over the economy, size of the public bureaucracy, the strength of corporatist institutions linked to the bureaucratic apparatus. See Table 2.

Table 2

		Institutional Capacity	
		Low	**High**
Type of Political Linkage	**State**	Turkey	Egypt
	Party	Argentina	Mexico

The Theoretical Argument (II): Contentious Politics as Driving Political Institutions

If variation in institutional configurations of the ND states was so critical for their regime outcomes, what accounts for this broad range of organizational structures in the first place? In particular, why did some nationalist leaders construct robust party organizations to channel political participation, while others refrained from institutionalizing their mass base of support and still others preferred to co-opt and even demobilize their supporters? What then explains their decision to rely on remarkably different types of linkage mechanisms to secure and mobilize their constituencies? Addressing these questions offers a second analytic dimension to this project. Variation in institutional choices - the independent variable used to explain divergent regime outcomes - now becomes the outcome to be explained.

Drawing on previous work by Slater (2010), I argue that these divergent institutional outcomes were themselves a function of the contentious politics that marked the onset of the founding regimes. As the empirical chapters demonstrate, despite their similar agenda, leaders experienced different levels of opposition from elites and within their own movement and had varying capacity to draw support from the popular classes. The dynamics of the political crisis linked to the dawning of a new regime shaped state and party building over the long term. The markedly different political opportunity structures during this transition period produced dissimilar opportunities, constraints, and threats for leaders, in turn prompting those leaders to invest in different institutions to consolidate their power and assure political survival.

These political opportunities were influenced, though not directly shaped, by underlying structural factors.[33] The institutional choices made by these leaders were instead heavily conditioned by three factors: (1) intensity of intra-elite conflict, (2) mobilizational capacity, and (3) duration of the leadership contest within the reformist camp. This theoretical framework combined a rational choice approach (Levi, 1988; Geddes, 1994), which suggests institutions are shaped by strategic interests of political elites, with a society-centric analysis to explain why those interests differed remarkably in these four cases (for similar examples, see Boone, 2003; Slater, 2010; Kurtz, 2013).

According to the rational choice model, parties are structured by the strategic behavior and interests of political elites (Aldrich, 2011). The parties solve their own coordination and collective action problems and offer the elites various benefits, including name brand loyalty,

[33] The Political Opportunity Structure (POS) model contains several factors, including the availability of influential allies, political instability, regime weakness, and multiplicity of independent centers of power within the polity (Tarrow, 1998; McAdam et. al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). My theoretical framework differs from these works with its focus on changes at the regime level. Rather than looking at how the POS shapes success of social movements, I analyze the impact social movements themselves had on the political arena and, consequently, structured the strategic behavior of political leaders to establish new institutions. That in turn affected how the new regime dealt with such movements, ranging from labor unions and agricultural cooperatives to landless peasants and religious groups.

mass support, disciplined cadres, organizational capacity, and information shortcuts for the supporters (Downs, 1959; Roberts, 2006). This proposition applies especially to founding leaders, who, amid their efforts to establish a new political regime, need the assistance of reliable organizations to unify their supporters, to reconcile intra-movement differences, and to spawn a popular coalition. At the same time, mass political organizations can be costly for political leaders. Strong institutions reduce their leadership autonomy and establish horizontal accountability to their close supporters. A similar trade off exists in adopting a mobilizational strategy. While leaders enhance their political prospects with mass support, popular mobilization also requires costly side payments, antagonizes elites, and threatens regime stability (Waldner, 1999 and 2004; Roberts, 2006). Thus, where possible, we should expect leaders to form personalistic organizations, demobilize their supporters after their rise to power, and harness only a limited base of support to sustain them in office.

And yet, while the ND states promoted similar goals, they sparked different levels of opposition from the elites.[34] That, in turn, shaped their institutional choices. Where there was a high level of intra-elite conflict and the leaders faced intense elite opposition, they sought allies outside the political arena. Conversely, where intra-elite conflict was low, leaders could do away with building strong political organizations, forestall popular mobilization, and instead keep

[34] Variation in the intensity of elite conflict had three main sources. First, regime leaders built new bureaucratic agencies and centralized the fiscal system to increase state capacity. This facilitated state penetration into peripheral regions and several policy areas that were not previously under the jurisdiction of central authorities. Such development spurred conflict among state officials, military leaders, and provincial and local elites over the nature of the new regime. Some of the major issues included the electoral system, land tenure, administrative centralization, and head of state. Second, political and economic elites clashed over their competing visions of economic development, particularly over how to shift resources out of the agricultural sector into industrial investments. Third, elites remained divided over the "social question" (Kurtz, 2013) in general and the integration of popular classes to the new regime in particular. Although any given regime needs to address some of these issues from time to time, the rise of the ND state brought all such questions into the political arena at once and turned the prevailing debates into a zero-sum game. This was especially the case in countries where polarized agrarian relations and vast income inequalities created economic and political elites with much to lose. One should also point out that rifts on these issues existed even within the reformist movement itself. Indeed, the ND states generally had leftist and rightist factions linked to the regime.

fiscal resources for their own discretionary use. Since they faced weak opposition, such leaders had few incentives to make costly institutional investments and opted for a limited political coalition that accommodated many political and even economic elites. In turn, this strategy took radical economic reform and redistributive policies off the policy agenda. Regime critics had difficulty in drawing support from elites, who had few grievances, thus marginalizing the opposition camp.

This pathway resulted in a Neo-patrimonial ND State that undertook limited popular incorporation, as evidenced by the absence of a corporatist system and its weak ruling party. Due to weak pressures from below and limited state capacity, these cases primarily promoted light industries to create demand for locally produced agricultural goods (and appease the landed notables) and expanded the bureaucracy to create employment for members of the urban middle class. Such a policy agenda, far from triggering a zero-sum conflict between landowners and nascent industrialists, reconciled their interests and left no room for side payments to the popular classes. Accordingly, the state enacted a limited agenda of economic reform, low level of redistribution, and slow pace of state-sponsored industrialization. These cases represent a category – ISI model without popular incorporation – not adequately analyzed by a populism literature that focuses on the different ways with which the popular classes were linked to the regimes in late developing countries (Collier and Collier, 1991; Weyland, 2001; Roberts, 2006).

The notion that leaders faced with strong opposition tend to build resilient regimes is no secret. Indeed, scholars have treated high intra-elite conflict almost as a structural force.[35] According to their analyses, intense elite conflict leads at least one of the factions to mobilize the popular classes (Schattschneider, 1975; Waldner, 1999). Smith (2005 and 2007) has recently

[35] In recent years, scholars of authoritarian regimes have focused on elite behavior to explain political outcomes. For some examples, see Waldner (1999), Smith (2005 and 2007), Brownlee (2007 and 2008), Slater (2010), Vu (2010), Svolik (2011 and 2012).

offered a more complicated theory: a virtuous combination of fiscal and political constraints push authoritarian regimes to build more encompassing coalitions, which then ensure regime durability. Yet, this begs another question. If one side can galvanize its supporters, so too can its opponents undertake a similar strategy, thereby spurring successive waves of mobilization that inevitably expand scope of the conflict. Ethno-nationalist mobilization that results in protracted civil wars is a clear demonstration of this phenomenon. At the same time, one side may simply lack the capacity to reach out to broader groups, even if it has an incentive to do so. Throughout history, a multitude of leaders fell short of their quest for power simply because they failed to mobilize a critical mass of supporters. Thus, the issue here is not merely intent but also the capacity to undertake such mobilization.

By assuming popular mobilization to be an automatic outcome of intense intra-elite conflict, rather than a variable that takes on different levels, scholars have neglected the contingent nature of this factor. Mobilizational capacity is a special concern in the context of late development, since the rudimentary stage of industrialization rendered popular classes organizationally weak and underrepresented. In only a few cases, labor unions could effectively protect workers' interests. Moreover, due to the slow development of a market economy, the agrarian power base was not decisively broken in some countries and the peasantry remained captive to patrimonial figures, religious leaders, and oligarchic landowners. Whereas the popular classes gradually developed into strong and autonomous political actors in industrialized countries, such challenges pushed them to seek support from political elites (or populist outsiders) and, in turn, became targets for regime co-optation.[36] Moreover, it is precisely because the

[36] In his analysis of early 1960s southern Italy, Tarrow observes the same phenomenon: "There are forces in a backward society that favor the formation of a leadership group which, in its social composition, education, and training, is far from backward. In fact, it is precisely the backward nature of the society that is responsible for the

strength of these groups was not sufficient to bring them to power that reformist leaders sought cross-class coalitions, rather than adopt a class-based strategy (agrarian or labor parties).[37]

Indeed, this is the political formula of populism. Led by middle-class leaders, populist movements have employed a heterodox, but anti-elitist, discourse - as opposed to direct, class-based language - to appeal to a diverse set of constituencies who opposed the current order but held disparate economic and political interests.[38] As Roberts (2006: 129) puts it, "the rise of populism coincided with the dawning of mass politics during the early stages of import substitution industrialization, when elections could no longer be won without votes from working and middle classes who demanded political incorporation." Naturally, leaders depended on the availability of mass constituencies for pursuing this course. Especially in authoritarian contexts, such mobilizational capacity played a vital role in challenging the status quo. To generate popular support, leaders tapped into pre-existing networks in society. These included, among others, labor unions, churches, civic and ethnic organizations (Kalyvas, 1996; Collier, 1999; McAdam, 1999; Beisinger, 2002; Varshney, 2003; Osa, 2003). And yet, the presence of such networks varied remarkably among late-developing countries.[39] Using Roberts' analogy, while some countries witnessed the dawn of mass politics, others merely experienced its twilight.

The reformist group's level of mobilizational capacity is the second explanatory factor. More specifically, I argue that mobilizational capacity was based on whether leaders linked their organizations to the state or a political party. Where they had a low level of mobilizational

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weakness of working classes and peasant leadership and that turns the attention of middle class intellectuals and professionals to politics, partly due to the absence of alternate opportunities" (Tarrow, 1967: 234).

[37] In some cases, such class-based parties or movements emerged but rarely achieved success. On the need for leftist parties to make strategic appeals to groups beyond the working class, see Przeworski and Sprague (1988).

[38] This partly explains why populist movements, rather than socialist parties as seen in the West, became prevalent in the developing world for much of the twentieth century. The rapid emergence of populist groups in contemporary Europe - though under the rubric of ultra-right, xenophobic parties - can best be understood from this perspective: the proliferation of lower-middle class members and workers hard hit by the myriad effects of globalization.

[39] It should not therefore come as a surprise that the most powerful Latin American populist movement emerged in Argentina, which also had the strongest (yet politically excluded) labor movement in the region.

capacity, intense intra-elite conflict pushed leaders to seek institutional allies within the state, such as the military or the public bureaucracy. This in large part explains why the military emerged as a source of social change in several underdeveloped societies, spurring what Trimberger (1978) calls "revolution from above". Given this inability to generate mass support, leaders instead rely on the state apparatus to eliminate their rivals, crush rebellions, ban opposition parties, reshape society, and undermine the economic basis of the old order. Furthermore, the state absorbs most civilian organizations to limit the political arena for regime opponents.[40] When leaders established a political party, their aim was to monitor all political activity, not mobilize regime supporters. For instance, anyone who held a political post or simply engaged in politics was required to join the ruling party. What it lacked in mobilizational strength, it tried to compensate for by using state resources. Since the state apparatus emerged as the locus of resource distribution and political appointment, the ruling party gradually lost its autonomy and became subordinated to the public bureaucracy. These cases established the Bureaucratic ND State, whereby the national bureaucracy heavily regulated the economy and co-opted labor unions and peasants in a corporatist system.

Conversely, where leaders had high mobilizational capacity, leaders reacted to intense intra-elite conflict with a populist strategy and undertook mass mobilization through an organization outside the state. As scholars of populism have already noted, however, mass mobilization may not always entail significant political organization (Roberts, 2006). In the ND states, some leaders have established robust parties to incorporate their mass constituencies, while others primarily engaged in non-institutionalized, personalistic appeals to their followers. Ultimately, what shaped the final organizational outcome was the leader's relative power within

[40] This was not a sign of strength. On the contrary, it was an admission of the regime's failure to withstand any form of autonomous collective action. In response, all forms of opposition went underground.

his political camp. Here I refer not to the broader struggle in the political arena but merely to the leadership contest occurring within the reformist movement.

In some cases a leader quickly consolidated his power in the movement and subsequently enjoyed undisputed control over its course. Where that was the case, the leader had few incentives to further invest in a party organization and instead governed through informal practices and with a personalistic style. These regimes produced powerful mass movements linked to a Populist ND state through informal ties. In others, where no political actors emerged as a focal point for all factions, potential leaders had a clear interest in strengthening party institutions as a way to prevent leadership contests from spiraling out of control to spur successive cycles of mobilization from below and to ensure their own political careers over the long haul. Accordingly, robust parties offered political elites longer time horizons and kept them tied to each other due to common interests. These regimes produced a Party Hegemonic ND State, which incorporated economic classes through formal, encapsulating institutions linked to a cohesive ruling party.

The rationale for this argument is straightforward. Populist leaders are inherently opposed to strong institutions since such institutions limit their personalistic power and political autonomy. According to Mossige (2009: 31), "the party leader has a clear and inherent interest in determining the directions of the movement, and to discourage the building of institutionalized paths of leadership succession, recruitment of candidates, and the drafting of detailed programs and clear ideological manifestos." Therefore, in cases where the leader did not encounter a strong challenge from within the movement, he eschewed institutions that could limit his actions and allow his potential rivals to challenge his authority. If the leader gains such popularity that none of his associates can credibly threaten to remove him, the leader can then replace them with

sycophants (Myerson, 2008: 127). After their rise to power, moreover, leaders used state patronage to strengthen vertical ties with their supporters but intentionally kept the party weak and eschewed those institutions that could, in the future, impose horizontal accountability.

Only when leaders lacked such popularity did they devote considerable attention to building a strong party organization and institutionalizing it. It should be noted that this argument directly contradicts Brownlee (2007), who asserts that only those regimes that quickly settle elite divisions under the ruling party later develop into robust organizations. In fact, my findings suggest the very opposite: strongly institutionalized, robust parties emerged only in cases with prolonged leadership contests precisely as a way to mitigate elite conflict and create incentives for all factions to stay within the regime. The argument is summarized in Figure 1 below.

Due to the three necessary factors (intense intra-elite conflict, high mobilizational capacity, and prolonged leadership contests), mass-mobilizing parties are extremely rare in the developing world (for some examples, see Smith, 2005; Angrist, 2006; Brownlee, 2007). If any of these explanatory variables was missing, the ND state was instead linked to a different set of state and party institutions. Despite their aversion to strong political institutions, robust parties offered leaders tools that later proved vital in sustaining the regime after the end of their rule. Such parties offer mechanisms to resolve intra-elite conflicts, routinize leadership succession, discipline mid-level cadres and mass constituencies, increase state infrastructural power, and provide party members with selective political benefits (Geddes, 1999; Brownlee, 2007; Slater, 2010; Svolik, 2012).

Figure 2



Operationalization of the Variables:

The Dependent Variable

This framework develops a typology of the ND states based on their type and level of institutionalization.[41] Such categorization, which is based on the nature of regime-society

[41] In recent years, studies on typology construction have flourished in political science. For some examples, see the typology of welfare states (Esping-Anderson, 1990), post-communist regimes (Kitschelt et. al. 1999), union-government relations (Murillo, 2000), populism (Weyland, 2001), industrial economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001), and contentious politics (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007).

linkages along two dimensions - state and ruling party - offers a systematic look into the experience of national development in the global south.[42] Moreover, the four variants exhaust the range of possible organizational outcomes and institutional pathways within the set universe of cases. They include the Neo-Patrimonial ND State (Turkey), the Populist ND State (Argentina), the Party Hegemonic ND State (Mexico), and the Bureaucratic ND State (Egypt). These four variants are described below.

Pathway # 1: Neopatrimonial ND State

This variant emerged in countries ruled by a charismatic leader, who wielded power less through formal institutions than personalistic ties to the public bureaucracy and a small clique of his associates.[43] Political elites gathered under a weakly institutionalized official party that purported to represent the entire nation, thus leaving no legal room for a rival party. Due to the small size of the electorate, rulers faced little redistributive pressure from below and in turn had few incentives to make costly side payments to the popular classes. Instead, the regime spawned a coalition of provincial elites and urban middle classes with the use of state patronage. To draw support from these groups, it also inculcated a nationalist ideology and, in some cases, promoted a personality cult centered on the founding leader. These cases differed from "sultanistic regimes" (Linz, 2000) with their commitment to political and economic development. At the same time, the weak state and party institutions inhibited a radical transformation of the economic order. The Neopatrimonial ND state tended to arise after the collapse of traditional political systems in which the mass peasantry was poor and disenfranchised and the strength of labor unions was weak. For instance, several cases emerged in Eastern Europe after the demise

[42] For more studies on political linkages in the developing world, see Kitschelt et al (1999), Kitschelt (2000), Roberts (2003), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), Calvo and Murillo (2004).
[43] For a similar subtype in communist states, see the discussion of patrimonial communism in Kitschelt et al. (1999: 23-24).

of the Russian and Ottoman Empires, as well as in Thailand after the 1932 Revolution.[44]

Pathway # 2: the Populist ND state

The Populist ND state was also embedded in weak party and state institutions but, unlike the neopatrimonial variant, had enormous mobilizational capacity. In this variant, the leader eschewed a strong political organization to make direct, unmediated appeals to the masses with highly redistributive policies. Inevitably, the dearth of institutions generated zero-sum conflicts between economic elites and the popular classes that the regime was unable to moderate. Conversely, the regime needed to continually distribute material handouts to retain popular support, which in turn generated resentment within the middle class and outright opposition from elites. Under such a polarized environment, the regime could not reliably draw support from mid-level ranks. Political cadres had short time horizons, for they were constantly expected to compete for the personalistic leader's approval. This variant emerged in countries with a relatively higher level of industrialization (or those with enclave industries) that produced a strong and easily-organized working class. At the same time, there was organized resistance from economic elites and sizable parts of the middle class tied to the export sector. Possible cases include Peron's Argentina and Sukarno's Indonesia.[45]

Pathway # 3: The Party Hegemonic ND state

In contrast to these two categories, other types of ND states institutionalized their corporatist arrangements with civic and economic associations. In the first variant, the regime was embedded in a mass party that co-opted groups in civic and partisan society through mutually advantageous ties and developed a strong organization. Accordingly, the party was the

[44] For a discussion of these cases, see Luebbert (1991: 258-266).

[45] The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana-APRA) in Peru also fits this political pattern, though there the military successfully prevented the party from ever claiming power long enough to establish this state variant.

central arena in which various socio-economic groups negotiated policy options with the ruling elites, and various personal as well as ideological elite factions were reconciled. This ruling party directed the state apparatus towards a policy agenda rather than vice versa, as seen in other ND state variants. The party hegemonic model arose in countries where there was a sizable urban population to found the party but where a strong organization was needed for popular incorporation due to the predominantly agrarian population. Possible cases include Mexico under the PRI, India under the Congress Party, Tunusia under the Neo-Destour Party, and Malaysia under UMNO, among others.[46]

Pathway # 4: The Bureaucratic ND state

In the case of the bureaucratic ND state, the principal agency through which corporatist inclusion occurred was not a political party but the state bureaucratic apparatus.[47] Accordingly, the regime devoted considerable effort to channeling participation into the state bureaucracy and used those links to reshape society. Absent a robust party, this bureaucratic model relied heavily on public resources to secure support from interest groups and to enact redistributive policies that ultimately created a bloated state apparatus. Interest representation under this variant was neither mobilizational nor pluralist but nonetheless remained stable. Due to limited mobilization from below, this variant experienced a shortage of loyal cadres drawn from among the popular classes. Rather, the lower level bureaucratic and party ranks mostly came to be filled with career-oriented professionals who had their own independent agenda. To a certain extent, the state corporatist system enabled regime leaders to restrain the influence of these provincial and local elites and instead push for a transformational economic agenda. Possible cases include Egypt and Brazil.

[46] Malaysia is an interesting case in that the ruling party has not only successfully incorporated civic and economic associations with the regime but also welded together the main ethnic groups in the country. Under a similar but much less successful model, one could also include Kenya's KANU.

[47] For more on the distinction between state and party incorporation, see Collier and Collier (1991: 8).

The Independent Variables

Following Waldner (1999: 29), I treat cases in which disputes threatened elite status and material interests as high intensity intra-elite conflict. Scholars using this explanatory factor should avoid making a retrospective analysis on the level of elite conflict. Loose definitions can easily turn this into a tautological variable. This is a particular concern in this project since the ND states, given their policy agendas, threaten the status of political and economic elites tied to the old order. Moreover, any regime formation process is mired in extreme political conflict at the onset. We therefore need to develop criteria for careful measurement. To overcome these challenges, I measure intra-elite conflict in terms of elite capacity to challenge reformist leaders. What is crucial is not that there are some elite losers but that they have the potential to prevent reformist leaders from enacting their agenda. Only in the latter case should we expect to find leaders take direct action to counteract these groups. In particular, I look at whether opposition elites (1) control a mass political party; (2) possess sources of social control; (3) enjoy coercive powers or organic ties with the military; and (4) unrivaled economic power. The intensity level of intra-elite conflict in a country is positively correlated with the presence of these factors.

The second variable measures the ability of leaders to mobilize members in support of the new regime and its policy agenda. While enhancement of organizational strength can improve chances for popular mobilization, its effects are only marginal in the short term. Therefore, I focus on factors that facilitate or inhibit popular mobilization during the founding moment of these regimes. Scholars working on ethnopolitical mobilization have emphasized the relative size of a group, suggesting that greater size spurs group mobilization (Gurr, 1993). Yet, there is little variation on this account since the four regimes were all supported by the majority group and leaders could appeal to the entire nation through their nationalist discourse. Instead, I assess

whether or not leaders had access to organizations that could provide mobilizing structures (political parties, civil societal groups, unions) and tap into existing social networks (religious groups, agrarian networks, indigenous communities) through which they recruited supporters. While this is not completely a structural variable and increasing political opportunities also played a vital role, higher levels of development - social capital (Putnam 2000), urbanization, and social communication (Deutsch, 1966) - naturally offered more fertile ground for reformist groups to challenge the old order.[48]

The third independent variable looks at whether rulers quickly seized control of their movement or experienced a prolonged leadership contest. Following Myerson (2008: 135), I define a political leader "as someone who has a reputational equilibrium of trust with a group of supporters".[49] This factor is treated separately from elite conflict since the intra-party/movement struggle is not over the issue of regime formation but rather on power distribution in the new regime. Through qualitative in-case analysis, I assess if leaders in these four cases quickly defeated their rivals in such a decisive way that regime supporters did not have an incentive to entertain alternative options and that their close supporters lacked the ability to constrain their behavior. The four cases are summarized in Table 3 below.

Table 3

Cases	**Intra-elite conflict**	**Mobilizational Capacity**	**Leader Dominant**
Turkey	Low	Low	Yes
Mexico	High	High	No
Argentina	High	High	Yes
Egypt	High	Low	Yes

[48] This variable combines the resource mobilization and social movement approaches by taking into consideration both the structural and conjectural factors that spurred popular mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly and Tarrow 2007).

[49] Although they have only recently become a topic of systematic inquiry (Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 2003; Egorov and Sonin, 2009; Brownlee, 2007; for an earlier studies, see Herz, 1952; Bunce, 1976 and 1980), leadership struggles play a fundamental role in elite choices regarding institutional crafting and policy options.

Turkey

The Turkish case scores low on all three of the independent variables. The Ottoman Sultan and the traditional ruling class - whose power base was critically weakened after the 1908 Revolution - did not have a party supporting their interests. While the empire did not historically have a landed oligarchy, the bureaucratic and military reforms during the 19th century further weakened the civil society and left it vulnerable to state encroachment (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 19-24; 41-45). At the same time, these reforms engendered rationalized, patriotic sectors within the state bureaucracy and the military. On the other hand, the non-Muslim bourgeoisie was largely liquidated during the ethnic expulsions and massacres that occurred under the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki Partisi - ITC) governments in the 1910s. Thus, during their rise to power, the Kemalist leadership drew considerable support from rationalized, patriotic members of the state apparatus and faced only limited and sporadic elite opposition, which they could dispel against the backdrop of the nationalist campaign after the end of WWI.

Moreover, the urgency of the war effort pushed provincial elites to join forces with Ottoman Turkish military officers and nationalist bureaucrats. During the Greco-Turkish War, the Kemalists tapped into religious and provincial notable networks across Anatolia to raise troops and draw support for the new parliamentary regime in Ankara. Their national organization was conveniently embedded in the resistance groups that arose out of the local chapters of the ITC, which closed itself following the Ottoman defeat in WWI. After the Turkish victory in 1922, Mustafa Kemal easily consolidated his power, demobilized the army, and co-opted the nationalist movement under a largely personalistic party he founded in 1923. Faced with weak elite resistance and leadership challenges, Mustafa Kemal had few incentives to strengthen the

ruling party or to establish a corporatist regime linked to the peasantry (primarily composed of subsistence farmers) and a weak working class. Neither group posed any serious threat to the regime or could easily be mobilized. Consequently, the Kemalist regime developed a weak ruling party and state organization and became one of the few late developing countries to undertake an industrialization program without the assistance of corporatist institutions.

Turkey is an exceptional case to put theories on the formation of single-party regimes under critical scrutiny. Scholars have long argued that the single parties tend to emerge primarily in countries that have undergone revolutions or experienced anti-colonial, nationalist struggles (Huntington, 1968; Huntington and Moore, 1970; Pempel, 1990; for a recent work offering a new causal mechanism, see Levitsky and Way, 2012 and 2013). The Chinese and the Russian Communist Parties, as well as Taiwan's KMT, India's Congress Party and the PRI in Mexico, offer several possible examples. Unlike these cases, Turkey's Republican People's Party was neither robust nor cohesive and failed to buttress the Turkish regime. Hence, the theoretical framework offered in this dissertation - based on low level of elite competition and low mobilizational capacity - provides a more accurate account. In its initial decades, the regime survived not particularly because of the ruling party's strength but in large part due to Mustafa Kemal's charismatic leadership and control over the military. Although economic elites and part of the political class acquiesced to the Kemalist rule, they later defected from the ruling party during "hard times". Given the CHP's low mobilizational capacity and weak local organization, these defecting elites could easily mobilize the masses hard hit by the economic downturns of the early Great Depression and post-WWII eras. While Kemal's intervention in 1930 led to the rival party closing, the second attempt in 1950 succeeded in removing the CHP from power.

Mexico

In sharp contrast with Turkey, Mexico scored high on all three independent variables. Most importantly, the country was mired in an intense and prolonged intra-elite conflict for nearly three decades after the Mexican Revolution. Large landowners and much of the Porfirian elite strongly opposed the new order, fueling several anti-revolutionary challenges in the 1910s and beyond. Due to the high level of land inequality, landowners linked to Diaz's regime had enjoyed significant economic and political power at the local level, while also retaining social control in the countryside with the help of the rural police. The federal army, though organizationally weak, was a conservative force to reckon with for the new regime and clashed with reactionaries as well as middle-class revolutionaries, local bandits, and indigenous groups.

Amid this intense elite conflict, political factions easily recruited and mobilized their followers via the multiplicity of networks embedded in society. These included local political clubs, labor unions, and indigenous communities across most of Mexico’s northern and central states. The country's liberal tradition and party politics, which dated back to the mid-nineteenth century, offered fertile ground for these movements to germinate. One should also include the Catholic Church, whose national leadership and local parishes helped conservative groups overcome their collective action problems and mobilize against the post-revolutionary regime. Finally, Mexico's extensive railroad network, porous border with the U.S., and large land mass, complicated governmental efforts to contain these pressures and stabilize the regime.

While regime leaders tapped into these networks to mobilize their followers against the old order and its remnants, the centrifugal forces spurred by this protracted conflict prevented any single leader from consolidating his power. The stage was instead set for an endemic, contentious politics, offering local leaders many political opportunities to challenge the central

authority and carve out personal fiefdoms. In the end, pro-regime elites united under a strongly institutionalized political party that linked numerous local parties and organization to the regime and paved the way for the rise of a Party Hegemonic State.

Argentina

Argentina scored high on intra-elite conflict and mobilizational capacity but, unlike Mexico, low on leadership rivalry. Consequently, Juan Peron encountered strong opposition from both the landed oligarchy and the upper middle class. Even after the Great Depression, these two groups remained linked to the country's agro-export sector and, consequently, rejected the adoption of a heavily statist agenda like the one proposed by the Argentine junta after 1943. Due to the presence of a powerful landowning and ranching oligarchy, the Argentine case was characterized by high levels of land and income inequality. The agrarian elite dominated the Argentine economy and held political power well into the 20th century, though their social control in the countryside was equally weak.

As the most economically advanced and urbanized country in the region, Argentina offered highly favorable conditions for mass mobilization. Most importantly, there was both a vibrant civil and partisan society. Faced with strong resistance from economic elites, Peron recruited followers from labor unions, established contacts with politicians from several parties, and used the media effectively. And yet, so, too, did the main opposition party. While the landed elite lacked a mass conservative party because of the absence of a mass peasantry and the weakening of feudal ties, the middle-class reformist Radical Party provided a formidable challenge to Peron, pushing him to follow an increasingly populist and thus dangerous course of confrontation with the opposition. Eventually, Peron used his enormous popularity not only to win the presidency but to consolidate his power within the movement. His supporters helped

Peron isolate his rivals in the junta and eliminate the independent-minded union leaders who resisted the creation of a personalistic political party. This led the Argentine case into developing an under-institutionalized, yet powerful, mass movement linked to the Populist ND state.

Egypt

The formation of the ND state generated intense intra-elite conflict in Egypt but leaders there did not have the high level of mobilizational capacity like their Argentine counterparts. Gamal Nasser and his collaborators, therefore, eschewed the option of establishing a mass political party in favor of capturing the state bureaucratic apparatus, which would enable them to reshape society and transform the economic order. This facilitated the creation of a Bureaucratic ND state with a corporatist system linked to the state bureaucracy and a weak ruling party. The regime managed to co-opt the popular classes through encapsulating links but the sort of mobilizational power that the Peronist governments had acquired over the years.

Like Argentina, the landed oligarchy dominated Egypt's large agro-export sector and monopolized political office well into the 1950s. This effect was arguably even more pronounced in Egypt since feudal ties, rather than market relations, still prevailed in large parts of the country and landowners stabilized the countryside, thanks to the intermediation of village leaders and tribal chiefs. Oligarchic liberal parties, with the help of these local notables, laid out political networks across the country. On his rise to power, Nasser thus confronted strong resistance from both civil and partisan society, not to mention non-cooperation by the economic elites. His main advantage was that the agrarian elites, unlike some of their counterparts in Latin America, held very little coercive power against central authority. Junior officers in the Egyptian Army, as in Argentina, opposed the landed oligarchy but were not decisively supportive of Nasser and his small clique, either.

In contrast with Peron, Nasser and his close collaborators could not expect much popular support during the transition period. Oligarchic parties - particularly, the Wafd Party - were backed by provincial notables and urban middle classes, while the Muslim Brotherhood tapped into religious networks to organize their followers across the country. The junior officers were distrusted by pious groups due to their secular, nationalist agenda, did not have unmediated access to the peasantry (despite their land reform), and found labor unions unreliable and weak. Given this strong opposition of the political society, Nasser eventually turned to the state bureaucratic apparatus to counteract his rivals in the junta, eliminate opposition groups, and impose control over society. Accordingly, Nasser's goal was not to mobilize the popular classes but rather to co-opt them so that no other group, either then or in future, would be able to engage in anti-regime mobilization.

In the following chapters I discuss each of these cases in detail, linking their policy choices with the particular institutional subtype of the ND state. As noted in Chapter 1, the dissertation studies four cases that are grouped in two pairs. Part II includes a paired comparison of Turkey and Mexico. The next two chapters demonstrates that the Kemalist regime established a Neo-patrimonial ND state linked with Mustafa Kemal's personalistic rule. In Chapter 5, the analysis turns to the Mexican case that formed a Party Hegemonic ND state in the 1930s. Part III follows this analysis with a paired comparison of Argentina and Egypt. Chapters 6 and 7 look at Juan Peron's efforts to create a Populist ND state linked to his political movement. The final empirical chapter is on Egypt, where the military junta - led by Gamal Abdul Nasser - established a Bureaucratic ND state. In the concluding chapter, I return to a general analysis of the theoretical framework and discuss its implications.

CHAPTER 3
Elite Unity and Weak Institutions under Kemalism

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I laid out this study's theoretical framework. The empirical analysis begins in this chapter, which examines the onset of the National Developmentalist state in Turkey. Turkey, along with Mexico, was one of the first countries in the global south to embark on a program of national-developmentalist state-building. Both cases are post-revolutionary regimes. However, with its decade-long civil war and the ensuing social unrest, the political pendulum swung a greater distance in Mexico; whereas in Turkey, intra-elite conflict was low, centering primarily on a leadership contest and political participation remained limited. This quick closing of wide political opportunity had major consequences. Specifically, the Kemalist regime differed from the other three cases in its low-level of popular incorporation and the absence of a corporatist system. Under the framework of its ND state, the Kemalist elite promoted a reformist program but fell short of challenging the established social order. Turkey was the only case in which the popular classes were not incorporated into the regime. Rather, the regime drew support from a small coalition of provincial elites, landed notables, and urban professionals. As in Argentina, the regime was characterized by a low-level of institutionalization – limited state capacity and weak party organization – but the Kemalist leaders, with their weak popular following, differed from their Peronist counterparts. I characterize this combination of weak institutional capacity and popular strength as a "Neopatrimonial ND state."

This chapter argues that such institutional weakness stemmed from the relatively low level of conflict among Turkish elites, along with the difficulties of drawing support from the popular classes. After the 1908 Revolution, inter-communal conflict and foreign military threats

kept Turkish Muslim elites in relative unity. Under the Young Turk governments, this elite cohesion remained intact through World War I and beyond. Faced with an imminent Allied invasion and the threat of territorial dismemberment, most Turkish elites united behind the nationalist movement spearheaded by a former Ottoman general, Mustafa Kemal. After the nationalist victory, elites unified around the Kemalist faction, while the opposition was unorganized, fragmented, and lacking in popular support. Meanwhile, the prevalence of subsistence farming and war-time destruction made popular mobilization organizationally difficult for the government and opposition alike. Already in power, Kemal had few incentives to invest further in mediating institutions between the state and society, including a robust political party. Instead, he quickly consolidated his power by relying on the bureaucratic apparatus inherited from the Ottoman state, while enlisting the support of a narrow coalition of military officers, civil servants, and provincial elites. As a result, the ruling party developed a weak organization riven by internal conflicts at the provincial level. In the end, the party organization lost its autonomy and became fused with the state bureaucratic apparatus, which constituted the central locus of the regime.

This chapter is organized as follows. The first section offers a brief historical overview. The second section highlights the low level of intra-elite conflict that accompanied Mustafa Kemal's rise to power during the nationalist campaign. The following section explains how Mustafa Kemal, after the nationalist victory, seized control of the state bureaucratic apparatus to consolidate his power without robust political institutions and a deep political coalition. The fourth section argues that a local revolt pushed the Kemalist leaders to further restrict the political arena, thus creating a political regime detached from social classes. The fifth section discusses how a growing economic crisis and popular discontent that lingered in the aftermath of

the Great Depression pushed the Kemalist leadership to attempt to incorporate the broader society, albeit through state rather than party institutions. Even so, the regime would not lay the groundwork for a corporatist system to enlist popular support. The final section concludes with a discussion of Kemal's legacy that connects the regime's organizational weakness to its political trajectory over the ensuing decade.

Elite organization, ethnic mobilization, and defeat

Mass politics in the Ottoman Empire began with the 1908 Revolution. In that year, a group of junior military officers and their civilian allies – known as the Young Turks – toppled the Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), whose autocratic rule resembled that of Diaz in Mexico. This was not so much a revolution as a limited insurrection against a corrupt patrimonial regime.[50] Although Abdulhamid II did not open the economy to the extent that occurred in Mexico, he nonetheless played a pivotal role behind the empire's integration into the world markets. The sultan was a strong-willed ruler, who pushed for political centralization within the empire and created a modern bureaucracy. Instead of seeking radical change, the Young Turks sought to restore the empire to its former glory and preserve its political and economic independence. Faced with strong resistance against this project – Hamidian bureaucrats, liberals, local and religious groups who opposed centralization of power – and split by factional disputes, they responded by gradually building a roust political party (Kayali, 1997; Hanioglu, 2001; Ahmad, 2010), namely the IT.

Despite their origin as an Ottomanist movement, the loss of the Balkan territories during the Balkan Wars (1911-1912) pushed the Unionist leaders to pursue extreme nationalist policies based on Muslim-Turkish solidarity. Although foreign investment never reached the levels seen

[50] The 1908 Revolution is rather similar to the collapse of the imperial order in Iran (1907), China (1911), and Thailand (1932). On the 1908 revolution, see Ramsaur (1957), Kansu (1997); Sohrabi (1995).

in the other three cases, the economy still depended heavily on the West. Therefore, the Unionist elite promoted an agenda of solidarism, protectionism, and interventionism, dubbed the "National Economics" policy.[51] On the eve of WWI, they unilaterally abolished the legal and economic capitulations and raised the tariffs. To counterbalance non-Muslims who dominated commerce, trade, and crafts within the empire, they fostered a Muslim-Turkish commercial bourgeoisie.[52] During the war years, "ethnic-engineering" (Dundar, 2008) and provisioning policies would further shift the balance of economic forces, largely benefiting a group of Muslim-Turkish notables and political leaders. Through these policies, the Unionists laid the groundwork for a national-developmentalist state not unlike the UCR did for the Peronists, the Wafd Party for Nasser and his entourage, and the Mexican revolutionary elites for the PRI.[53]

Nationalist resistance and state-building under invasion

As noted in Chapter 2, the ND state arose in cases that experienced a profound crisis – that is, heightened security threats, international pressures, and increased economic conflict. The Ottoman defeat in WWI sparked such a crisis in Ottoman Turkey.[54] Beside the war's disastrous economic and social costs, the country came under the control of Allied states. After the armistice, the IT government was replaced by weak administrations close to the Ottoman Sultan, thereby creating a power vacuum in the political arena. Against the backdrop of the collapsing Ottoman state, Muslim-Turkish provincial elites established local and regional defense associations to maintain political order and resist foreign occupation (Tekeli and Ilkin, 1989).

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[51] On the economic nationalism of this era, see Ahmad 2014; Toprak, 1982, 2003; Cetinkaya, 2013.

[52] According to the 1915 census, out of the 264 industrial establishments in the Istanbul region and western Anatolia, 172 were owned by foreigners and non-Muslim minorities (Toprak, 1982: 192). Between 1915 and 1918, in contrast, most of the 80 new joint-stock companies were established by Turkish Muslims (Waterbury, 1993: 37).

[53] Hanioglu (2010) suggests that the IT resembled Mexico's Partido Revolucionario Institucional since both parties legitimized their conservative agendas through revolutionary rhetoric. In reality, the PRI regime did not emerge in Mexico until after the Great Depression; a more accurate comparison would be with the CHP. After the initial upheaval that followed the two revolutions, political elites in both cases cobbled together a wide array of regional interests, socio-economic actors, and ideological factions under the umbrella of these two centralized official parties.

[54] For WWI's impact on the Ottoman Empire, see Yalman (1930) and Reynolds (2011).

These organizations played a major role in overcoming collective action problems to support the nationalist cause.[55] Given that most of them were former IT members, they willingly collaborated with nationalist generals, such as Mustafa Kemal, who resisted the Allied-imposed peace. [56] In turn, the nationalist officers relied on these landowners, ethnic and religious elites, and tribal leaders to enlist broader support for the national resistance movement. Such local connections were indeed crucial for mobilizing the Anatolian peasantry, who, for the most part, lived far from urban areas.

Why did these conditions not compel the nationalist leaders to make substantial concessions to the popular classes and seek their political support? Indeed, some level of popular mobilization occurred, albeit through the intermediation of landed notables, ethnic and religious elites, and tribal leaders.[57] During the earlier stages of the military campaign (1919-20), the nationalist leaders relied on these figures to raise troops for the newly organized army. However, these intermediate actors were committed to local aims – including defending their communities from invasion and inter-communal attacks - whereas Mustafa Kemal and his entourage pursued a national strategy. In late 1919, Mustafa Kemal brought together these local defense associations under a single national body, titled Association for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (*Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti).* Additionally, after Istanbul's invasion by the Allied countries in March 1920, the nationalists convened the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, gathering local representatives from across the country. By giving civilian elites an

[55] On the regional congresses held in Anatolia at the time, see Tekeli and Ilkin (1989) and Tanör (1998).
[56] Sidelined from the IT circles, Mustafa Kemal was acceptable figure to various groups whose interests otherwise clashed (Zurcher, 1984). His outspoken criticism of the IT government and its alliance with Germany made him a safe choice for the anti-IT actors, while most IT cadres did not oppose him either, due to his earlier forays into revolutionary politics and impeccable military record. For more on his life, see Mango (1999).
[57] Although some scholars portrayed these congresses as a democratic force (Tanor, 1998) and others found them to be similar to Bolshevik Soviets (Hanioglu, 2011: 95), most councils were composed of ex-IT cadres and notables close to the now toppled IT regime. In many areas, local IT chapters simply dissolved themselves and joined the Society for the Defense of National Rights (Timur, 1997: 9-19; Hanioglu, 2011: 96).

influence over the management of the nationalist struggle, this parliament would in time solidify the link between the military-bureaucratic class and the provincial elites and help draw resources from society with the consent of its representatives.[58]

Intra-elite conflict and the origins of Kemalism

And yet, these local resistance groups did not evolve into a mass political party. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that a sizable portion of the Ottoman bureaucracy defected to the nationalist cause after Istanbul's occupation in 1920 by the Allied forces. Mustafa Kemal, in turn, used such bureaucratic networks to expand the nationalist movement on a national scale and strengthen his leadership. Given this elite cohesion against the foreign invasion - which enabled him to mobilize the popular classes from above – he counteracted the three distinct challenges to his leadership. First, in 1920, the Ankara government twice defeated the armed bands dispatched from Istanbul in the name of the Ottoman sultan (Mango, 1999: 275-276, 280; Gingeras, 2008). Due to the shortage of troops, Mustafa Kemal co-opted local militias into the new regime's army. These forces played a crucial role in defeating the feudal tribes, which used the power vacuum in Anatolia to revolt against the central authority. At the same time, this strategy left Ankara exposed to groups that had initially supported the nationalist cause but refused the centralization of power in Ankara or what Masayuki calls the "nonconformist-type national irregulars" (Yama'uchi, 1978: 42).[59] When Kemal attempted to bring these guerrilla bands under centralized command, a small-scale civil war broke out that ended with Ankara's victory (Mango, 1999: 300-301). Third, Kemal's centralized agenda also met with the resistance of deputies in the Ankara parliament, who became acutely concerned with the power amassed at

[58] On the role that strong legislatures play behind the incorporation of opposition forces and potential challengers into the regime, see Gandhi and Przeworski (2007), Wright and Abel Escriba-Folch (2012).

[59] Perhaps the most famous of them were Circassian Ethem and his two brothers, Resit and Tevfik. Ranchers by professions, they were one of the major power-brokers within the Circassian community of Northwest Anatolia.

his hands. Amid wartime, Kemal could not tolerate a strong opposition against his rule. Therefore, he adopted a populist program accommodating their diverse demands and formed a parliamentary caucus - First Group – to rally his supporters in the legislature.[60]

After his military victory over the Greek forces, however, Kemal had little use for the increasingly hostile parliament. In 1923, he called for new elections, and reorganized the Society for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia into a new, hierarchical party that would purportedly unite the entire nation – the People's Party (Tuncay, 2005: ch. 1). Moreover, to eliminate opposition in the new parliament, he carefully pruned the list of potential candidates, removing local authorities who resisted the new party project. Mustafa Kemal then embarked on a tour of the liberated Anatolian provinces, determined to turn his military prestige into political support. This country tour enabled him to appeal directly to the farmers and merchants, who constituted a clear majority of the electorate (Uyar, 1998: 71-74; Mango, 1999: 370-376). In contrast, because his opponents were from disparate provincial backgrounds, they lacked the organization necessary to rival Kemal's bureaucratic machine.[61] In the end, the Kemalists scored an impressive electoral victory: only three opposition members were elected to the parliament (Gunes, 1991).

This electoral victory represented the wide elite consensus behind the Kemalist government. When the parliament convened, the HP deputies dutifully elected Kemal as chairman of the party and president of the parliament (Kili, 1976: 44; Oz, 1992: 80-81). This was compounded by the fact that partisan divides in this period revolved around questions of secularism and national identity rather than economic issues. After a decade of war, which

[60] On the intra-parliamentary opposition against Kemal, see Frey (1965); Güneş (1985); and Demirel (1994).
[61] There was continuity between the late Ottoman and Turkish states via the educated upper stratum in the public bureaucracy and the military. On this state tradition, see Heper (1985).

sharply reduced production and population levels, economic elites did not fear redistributive pressures and also needed government support for recovery. The key question now was the institutional character of the new regime. In this matter, the Kemalist leadership acted in a resolute and radical fashion, lest any delay would risk a political stasis and embolden their political opponents. First, they proclaimed the republic and abolished the Caliphate in October 1923 and March 1924, respectively (Tuncay, 2005: 70-91; Hanioglu, 2011: ch. 6). The national assembly subsequently adopted the 1924 Constitution envisioning a strong parliament, which provided the legal blueprint of the new regime (Alpkaya, 1998). In reality, Mustafa Kemal was the supreme leader, who imposed his control on the military, ruling party and parliament.

Having easily secured his power, there was little need for Mustafa Kemal to establish a strong party organization and pursue a costly strategy of popular mobilization. Instead, he seized control of the Ottoman state organs – now linked to the new Turkish nation state – to spread Ankara's influence across the country. This was done through a new administrative reform that divided the country into provinces administered by Ankara-appointed governors (Keskin, 2009: 272-289). Ankara was declared as the capital of the new regime, thus ending Istanbul's political hegemony. To ensure the military's loyalty, Mustafa Kemal subsequently appointed his rivals in the army to ceremonial posts and raised the salary of the veteran officers (Mango, 1999: 393). In taking these steps, he was supported particularly by Ismet Inonu (Prime Minister, 1923-1924, 1925-1937) and Fevzi Çakmak (Chief of the General Staff, 1921-1944), who tightly integrated the state bureaucracy and the military to the new regime.

The Rise of the National-Developmentalist State

In the previous section, I argued that Kemal used the broad elite support behind the military campaign to consolidate his power after the victory, turning the nationalist movement

into a hierarchical platform for his leadership. The new regime did not channel the participation of social groups nor showed any interest in organizing elite collective action.[62] Instead, Kemal repeatedly stated in his speeches that Turkey was a nation of simple farmers with little room for class conflict. Through new legislation in 1925, the regime denoted legal standing to business chambers, obliging firms to register, but otherwise resisted the efforts of Istanbul-based merchants to establish a nation-wide organization (Basar, 2007). Technically, these chambers could allow the state to monitor firms but the new system had few inducements. Meanwhile, business elites were too weak to wage a concerted campaign against Ankara; for instance, the first industrial chambers were not established until 1927. Workers were not accorded even this much status. Despite their nationalist agitation during the war years, as well as their later appeals to Ankara, the government quickly closed down the two main labor unions striving to establish a national confederation in 1924 (Tuncay, 2009).

The cornerstone of this approach was an emphasis on social harmony to promote economic growth. Class struggle, given its tendency to ignite conflict, was not tolerated by the Kemalist leadership. Instead, the government followed an interventionist course in hopes to expand national ownership of the economy and to raise domestic production to mitigate any redistributive conflicts over the long term.[63] During the 1920s, the government laid the institutional groundwork for state-led development in the ensuing decades. For instance, new national banks - the Business Bank (1924), the Industrial Bank (1925), and Property and Orphan Bank (1926) - were established as the basis of a new financial system (Guvenc and Isik, 1999;

[62] Most fervent supporters of a corporatist model belonged to the IT's leftist faction. These figures had developed organic ties between the IT and various Muslim Turkish guilds and crafts associations and wanted to promote the same strategy for the Kemalists. For debates on the economic model of representation, see Makal (1997), Kansu (2001), Parla and Davison (2004).

[63] Even though its policies cannot be characterized as etatist, neither were they liberal in nature, as argued by many scholars (Boratav, 1974; Kuruc, 1987; Keyder, 1987; Tezel, 1994).

Kocabasoglu et al. 2005). Through them, more capital was funneled to productive sectors of the economy, thus removing the monetary obstacles that had previously crippled economic development. Moreover, in 1925, the ruling elites achieved fiscal centralization through the abolition of the land tithe.[64]

Under the Kemalist rule, few economic areas were left to foreign control. For example, in 1925, the government brought port services under state management and subsequently prohibited foreign vessels operating from Turkey's waterways. In a similar fashion, the government embarked on a wave of nationalization that included a high number of foreign-owned firms, including railroads and negotiated the terms for foreign debt payments. Third, the government continued the Unionist policy of fostering a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie, as attested by the enactment of the Industrial Encouragement Act (1927). However, the Kemalist leadership was more reserved towards the Istanbul-based economic elites, whom they associated with the material excesses of WWI years and found politically unreliable. Instead, they preferred an Ankara- based bourgeoisie, composed of regime cronies and veteran officers who enriched themselves through government contracts and cheap loans secured through political connections (Keyder, 1981 and 1987; Boratav, 2004: 39-58). These policies were made possible by a combination of high regressive taxes and public monopolies on lucrative trade items, such as sugar, petroleum products, tobacco, matches, and alcoholic beverages.[65]

Elite unity, consolidation of Kemalist leadership, and party weakness

The first challenge to the new regime came from its own ranks. Several of Kemal's war comrades - including Rauf Orbay, Kazim Karabekir, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy - opposed his

[64] I thank Ahmet Kuyas for raising this point. For more on the tithe tax, see Okcuoglu and Onder (2011).

[65] Until the prohibition on tariff controls, which the Lausanne Peace Treaty, which froze to their 1915 levels, lapsed in 1928, the government could not take a protectionist stance and use customs revenues.

monopolization of power and radical secularist agenda (Zurcher, 1984; Tuncay, 2005 104-133). Soon, those groups harmed by the capital's transfer from Istanbul – including the Ottoman establishment and the Istanbul media – joined them. But their personal popularity notwithstanding, the generals had neither popular support nor an organizational base from which to challenge the regime. Due to Mustafa Kemal's popularity in the army, they had little chance of staging a military revolt against Ankara, as occurred frequently in Mexico. Nonetheless, to remove the military from politics, in 1924, Mustafa Kemal asked all generals in the parliament to either resign from their military commissions or parliamentary seats (Hale, 2011; Sarigil, 2012). At first, the regime critics tried to use the internal channels of the party to constrain the president – but to no avail. When the hardliner faction in the People's Party (renamed in 1924 as Republican People's Party - CHP) blocked such efforts to institute intra-party mechanisms, they resigned en masse to form an opposition party, named the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi - TCF).[66]

With state resources at his disposal, Mustafa Kemal felt little need to develop the party organization and establish a deep political coalition. Even after the creation of the Progressive Republican Party (TCF), the CHP leaders did not devote considerable energy to opening up local branches across the country. Instead, Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Inonu both spent the 1924 summer on a national tour to cultivate their ties with provincial elites (Mango, 1999: 410-414; Inonu, 2008). In a largely illiterate, agricultural society, the support of such intermediate actors was crucial for maintaining political control in large parts of the country. Meanwhile, weakened by long wars, the Turkish Muslim elites turned to Ankara for economic support and

[66] In fact, a substantial group within the ruling party seems to have preferred a moderate course (Karaosmanoglu, 1968: 70-71). To prevent more resignations, Kemal briefly replaced the Prime Minister Inonu with Fethi Bey but then quickly sided with the hardliners (Mango, 1999: 418-419; Tuncay, 2005:105-107). For a list of the deputies who resigned, see Tuncay (2005: 113-115). On the party itself, see Zurcher (1991); Ates (1994).

collaboration to seize the property left by the non-Muslim citizens of the Ottoman Empire. During the past decade, the massacring of the country's non-Muslim population – more urbanized and prosperous than their Muslim counterparts – had weakened the commercial bourgeoisie and increased the relative size of the illiterate rural population (Keyder, 1987). This property - seized by provincial elites and civil servants - served as the regime's down payment for building consensus in the countryside. Furthermore, the government enacted economic policies that appealed to these provincial elites and landed notables: abolition of the land tithe, higher state loans, and generous government contracts.[67]

The opposition party, by contrast, failed to generate much excitement in the country, except for Istanbul where a strong anti-government current had existed. The TCF leaders opened up party branches in only a few provinces and had no preexisting political networks (besides some sidelined Unionist officials) that they could tap into to mobilize broader support. Moreover, the opposition elites were met with resistance from state officials. They tried to take advantage of the popular grievances by criticizing the government for its poor management of the refugee crisis and reconstruction efforts. But these were local issues at best. Their messages did not resonate with most elites, who converged around the Kemalist developmental agenda and hoped to benefit from state assistance. After a decade of wars, the societal groups were too weak to wage a credible campaign against Ankara. In particular, the destruction of the non-Muslim communities weakened the commercial bourgeoisie. Thus, there was little room for creating a strong movement that could confront the government (Baskan, 2010). With few elites defecting to their camp, the TCF founders tried to use the parliament as a platform from which they could challenge the president. But there they were outnumbered by hardliner CHP deputies.

[67] Under the Kemalist rule, some landed elites such as Emin Sazak (Eskisehir) served both as parliament deputy and government contractor on large-scale railroad projects.

The regime's compromise with the provincial elites came with a high cost. First, the Kemalist leadership had to contend with the fact that, despite their political and legal reforms, the agrarian social structure was largely preserved in the countryside. Furthermore, state officials could not extract sufficient revenues from the agricultural sector, for the abolished land tithe was not replaced by an alternative system. Instead, the burden was shifted on to the politically marginalized popular classes through regressive indirect taxes (Sarc, 1948: 435). As a result, the government could only funnel limited resources to the industrial sector over the next two decades. During the IT period, Muslim Turkish economic elites, communal leaders, and middle classes had something resembling what Slater (2010) terms a "protection pact" with state and party officials against this perceived non-Muslim threat. Accordingly, members of the nascent Muslim bourgeoisie supported the Unionist government and gave their consent to the regime's efforts to reorder the economic system. Had it continued under Kemalist rule, such support could have served as the basis of a strong regime. When the non-Muslim threat dissipated, however, the logic behind this deep coalitional had also vanished. This impeded the regime's ability to make fiscal demands upon key upper groups.

The main challenge to this stable political order came in the form of an armed rebellion in the East (Olson, 1989; Ozoglu, 2011: 89-100). The Sheikh Said revolt, which erupted in early 1925, was sparked by the Kurdish leaders' loss of autonomy in the region. Over the last two years, the Kemalist regime tightened its tax and troop collection mechanisms, abolished the caliphate, and closed down local madrasas, where language of instruction was Kurdish.[68] These exclusionary policies compelled local Kurdish elites to mobilize their subordinate network of religious followers, tribesmen, and poor tenants. After a four-month-long military operation, the

[68] Since Kurdish tribal and religious leaders, such as Sheikh Said, collected the tithe tax, its abolition was a major blow to their power. I thank Ahmet Kuyas for raising this point. For a historical background on the region and its complicated political landscape, see Mardin (1989), Van Bruinessen (1992), Ozoglu (2004) and Klein (2011).

rebellion was severely repressed (Olson, 1989). At the same time, the rebellion provided a powerful impetus for Ankara to strengthen its coercive institutions across the eastern provinces; the Kemalist elite established quasi-military administrative units to handle Ankara's relations with the local population and provide security in these problematic areas (Kocak, 2010). This was followed by a nationalist program of cultural assimilation and social engineering in Eastern Anatolia (Bayrak, 1993: 481-489; Ungor, 2008: 30-31). To ensure stability in the region, Ankara also made a tacit pact with powerful feudal lords: the cooperating Kurdish elites gained status, protection, and joined the parliament as deputies from the ruling party in return for their political acquiescence.[69]

Although the rebel forces were decisively defeated, regime leaders were still concerned with opposition from the elite ranks. During the revolt, the parliament had enacted a draconian legislation - Maintenance of Order Law (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*) - designed to outlaw almost any opposition group in civil society and partisan arena. Over the next few months, the government used this law to close down anti-government newspapers and political organizations, including the Progressive Republican Party (TCF). Turkey, in effect, became a de facto one-party state. Lastly, Mustafa Kemal used an attempt on his life as a pretext to liquidate the two standing elite groups in the opposition camp: the leadership of the banned TCF and the former IT leaders (Ozoglu, 2011: ch. 4). Thus began a period of "measured terror" (Mango, 1999: ch. 23). Although, Kemal's war comrades such as Kazim Karabekir and Ali Fuat Pasha were acquitted in the end, many others – including Cavit Bey and Kara Kemal – were executed by the special tribunal; still others like Rauf Orbay fled the country in anticipation of the worst.

[69] In a clear sign of political exclusion, the official party did not build a local organization throughout the East; by 1930, the CHP did not have a local chapter in 8 (out of 63) provinces within the predominantly Kurdish region (Uyar, 1998: 235-236).

The Development of the Ruling Party and Elite Collective Action

At the end of 1926, Mustafa Kemal eliminated all of his rivals and consolidated his power across the country. Consequently, the ruling CHP developed into a highly personalistic organization. The party's 1927 statute declared Mustafa Kemal as the party's "Supreme Leader" (Uyar, 1998: 242), granting him the authority to select the parliamentary candidates for the general elections. In sharp contrast with the collegial leadership in the Union and Progress Party (IT), Mustafa Kemal tightly controlled the party administration and extended his influence to lower ranks via party inspectors appointed by the Executive Committee (Uyar, 1998: 244-247; Akin, 2007: 440-441; Kocak, 2010: 129-142). These interventions precluded the routinization of party rules and forestalled the emergence of a strong institutional structure within the party. For instance, the CHP did not have an official political program during its first four years in power and held its first Congress in 1927 (Kili, 1976: 58). Even then, its proceedings were dominated by Mustafa Kemal's gigantic six-day speech (Nutuk), with little floor time reserved for policy debates. [70]

Having relied on the state bureaucratic apparatus, Mustafa Kemal had few incentives to create a deep popular coalition. Following the suppression of the Sheikh Said revolt, the leaders of the republic limited political competition and the level of political participation. Unlike the IT – which was founded in opposition against Abdulhamid II's rule – the CHP was established from above through little contact with the popular classes.[71] Therefore, the ruling elites had an incentive to maintain low levels of political participation and to keep social groups institutionally

[70] The speech was later printed in mass copies and served as the basis for Kemalist historiography for decades. In recent years a more critical approach analyzing Nutuk as a subjective, personal, and constructed text emerged. For some examples, see Zurcher (1984 and 1992), Adak (2003), Alaranta (2008).

[71] The continuation thesis between these two parties is a truism in the Turkish scholarship (Kabasakal, 1991; Uyar, 1998; Zurcher, 2010). And yet, many IT leaders did not recognize Kemal's leadership and refused to join his party in 1922-1923; in fact, some IT cadres openly supported the opposition. While most CHP officials began their political career under the IT's banner, few CHP elites really made it to the top in that party.

unorganized and weak. Throughout the 1920s, the CHP leaders devoted little effort to increasing the party's membership rate, which stagnated at five percent (Oz, 1992: 182-183). For instance, the regime made no effort to bolster the ruling party's membership base. Not that party membership granted much influence. At every opportunity, the Kemalist elite weakened the party leadership's accountability towards its cadres. For instance, parliamentary deputies (who were selected by Kemal himself) constituted a majority of the delegates for the party congress. In that sense, government repression was compounded by restrictions in the intra-party channels. Due to the regime's low mobilizational capacity, a small group of commercial elites and landowners captures party branches in many provincial towns, conflating political and economic power at the local level.[72] Owing to their patron-client ties with the popular classes, these figures retained influence over the local bureaucracy and used their political clout to shape the way government policies were implemented in their areas. Hence, the CHP became a party of notables.

To the frustration of members of the rising middle class, local party cadres were also not inclined to expand political participation, fearing that new recruits would upset the political balance. Although the military-bureaucratic elite remained at the helm of the state, their policies were delimited by provincial elites and landed notables who captured the ruling party at the provincial level. Through their economic power, they fostered patron-client linkages with the popular classes and enjoyed more direct ties to these groups than the state officials. At the same time, they became embedded in the regime's power networks by joining the ruling party. This affiliation allowed them to influence local politics, further their interests against rival families, and maintain their economic power.

[72] This local bourgeoisie had a history of cooperation with Ottoman state officials in areas of tax collection, local governance, and troop mobilization. Most of them belonged to influential families, whose origins can be traced back to the late Ottoman period. For more on these families, see Meeker (2002).

Patterns of regime transformation: survival of the Kemalist rule

Although the relative size of its export sector spared Turkey from a worse slump, the country still experienced large trade deficits and balance of payment problems during the Great Depression (Emrence, 2003). In fact, much like in Mexico, the economic crisis began just after 1927 with the fall in foodstuff prices (Hatipoglu, 1936). Since the coastal regions largely produced cash crops for world markets, the landowning peasants were hard hit by the declining terms of trade and grew into debt. [73] Through the merchants, the crisis soon spread to urban areas, where the sharp fall in rural demand for their products forced many businesses into bankruptcy. Against this backdrop, the government came under intense criticism for its high taxes and deflationary policies.[74] These criticisms soon turned into a popular backlash against corrupt CHP officials.

It should come as no wonder that when Mustafa Kemal, in an attempt to co-opt this rising opposition in developed parts of the country, invited his close collaborator, Fethi Okyar, then Turkey's Ambassador to France, to establish a liberal opposition party in the summer of 1930, public opinion received the news with great excitement. After five years of a closed regime, the public flocked to join the new party's ranks. In just several weeks, the new party, the Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi - SCF), quickly built up mass support among both peasants and urban dwellers alike, establishing local branches across the commercialized parts of the country (Weiker, 1973; Emrence, 2006; Kocak, 2010). Even more alarmingly, many CHP cadres resigned from their party to join the opposition. While the Kemalist leaders continued to

[73] Conversely, the mass peasantry of Anatolia - who produced grains for the domestic market - were mostly insulated from the crisis.
[74] On Kemalist economic policies during this period, see Tekeli and Ilkin (1977 and 1982), Silier (1981), Waterbury (1993), Keyder (1987), Tezel (1994), Kuruc (2012).

stay within the party, most lower-level officials either defected or remained paralyzed. In short, the ruling party failed to maintain elite unity and enlist popular support during the crisis.

What sustained the weakly organized CHP was not its organization but rather support from the state bureaucracy. In most areas, civil servants - those who remained loyal to the regime - steadfastly defended both the government and its ruling party against the rising tide of social unrest and elite opposition. This can be documented from the massive electoral fraud carried out by state officials and military officers during the 1930 municipal elections. When the Kemalist leadership realized that the CHP was about to be defeated by the Free Republican Party - an ersatz party - they systematically rigged the results. Given that it no longer acted like an ersatz party, the opposition party was forced to close down after only three months of existence. This decision met with little societal response across the country, except for a brief reactionary outburst in Menemen and a sporadic Kurdish rebellion in the Eastern province of Agri (Azak, 2010: ch. 1). Nevertheless, the regime's narrow popular base and fledgling elite support had begun to deeply concern the Kemalist leadership. They reacted to this regime crisis by accommodating the economic elites, enlisting support from the middle classes, and expanding bureaucratic control over the national economy and society. In short, the ruling elites again refused to incorporate the popular classes to the regime. This new strategy would sustain the regime for another decade but fail to generate durability over the long term.

First, the government closed down or co-opted civil societal and political organizations - such as the Turkish Women's Union, the Teachers' Association, and the Turkish Hearths - that hitherto remained autonomous from the regime. This policy was less a sign of Kemalism's totalitarian tendencies than an admission of its weakness. Unable to compete against their base of support, regime leaders captured these organizations to channel their activities into the ruling

party. The same strategy was employed with regards to the Free Republican Party, whose cadres were invited back under the CHP's banner.[75] After his three-month-long country trip in late 1930, the president called for new parliamentary elections and subsequently included in its candidate list several prominent CUP (still banned) leaders with strong ties to landowners and the commercial bourgeoisie, such as Halil Mentese and Mithat Sukru Bleda. Furthermore, the ruling party nominated a handful of workers and peasants from its ranks in the 1931 elections (Oz, 1992: 170-171; Uyar, 1998: 263-265).

As befitting a neopatrimonial ND state, these moves did not pave the way for a corporatist system. Beside agrarian cooperatives, the government made little effort to organize the popular classes from above and the worker and peasant deputies had virtually no effect on the policy-making process. Most subsistence farmers remained unorganized, while few unions existed in the workplace. At the same time, the inclusion of figures like Mentese and Bleda allowed the regime to broaden its political coalition and accommodate the economic elites. For instance, the liberal-oriented parliament deputies (close to landed and business elites) and some local delegates openly criticized the government's economic agenda at the 1931 CHP Congress. While the CHP remained under Mustafa Kemal's tight control, the parliament emerged as a limited arena for selective policy discussions on economic matters.

Second, regime leaders devoted their energies to building the Kemalist revolution on deep roots. In the absence of a mass political party, these efforts took an ideological turn. During the 1931 CHP Congress, Kemalist principles were, for the first time, included in the party program. This commenced a struggle within the regime's elite ranks - between a leftist faction composed of former communists and a conservative one associated with several prominent

[75] For instance, the chairman of FRP's Aydin branch, Aydin Menderes (a future prime minister), was personally invited and made a parliament deputy by none other than Mustafa Kemal.

figures of the party - to turn Kemalist principles into an official ideology and, in so doing, shape its content (Kuyas, 1995; Turkes, 1998). Furthermore, the government founded new cultural centers - the People's Houses - with a mission to enlighten the masses (Karpat, 1963; Simsek, 2005; Karaomerlioglu, 1998). Though formally linked to the ruling party, the state bureaucracy financed this initiative. Lastly, these efforts were accompanied by state-sponsored nationalism - especially in areas of language and history - designed to construct a Turkish nation.

In their indoctrination campaign, the Kemalist elite achieved moderate success: they gained the support of the educated groups in society and mobilized a small but dedicated cadre to defend the regime. Given the regime's elitist approach and lack of party-based mobilization, it is little wonder that these efforts merely reached out to a small segment of the population, namely urban dwellers, students, and teachers. Not incidentally, these groups have later become the backbone of the modern, secular society and served as the CHP's partisan voting bloc in the ensuing decades. Conversely, the regime still had limited contact with Anatolian peasants, who were not incorporated by either the state or party institutions. In the late 1930s, albeit without changing the agrarian relations, the Kemalist elite decided to penetrate the countryside with a massive education campaign. Since most villages did not have schools, the government launched an innovative Village Institute project in 1938 (Vexliards and Aytac, 1964; Stone, 1974; Karaomerlioglu, 1998). As discussed in the next chapter, these educational efforts - accelerated during WWII - eventually fractured the ruling political coalition, serving as a major rift between Kemalist bureaucratic elites and landed notables across Anatolia.[76]

[76] There are some strong parallels between the rural education campaigns of the Turkish and Mexican single-party regimes. Under Cardenas, as discussed in Chapter 5, the Mexican government similarly devoted considerable effort to spreading the secular curriculum across the countryside and was supported by leftist and radical teachers, not unlike in Turkey. In both cases, the project produced mixed results but fell short of their initial goals.

Third, the government dramatically increased state management of the economy to address its structural problems, alleviate social unrest, and facilitate rapid industrialization. In the early 1930s, not unlike in other parts of the world, statism became a panacea for the Kemalist leadership (Hale, 1980; Birtek, 1985; Barlas, 1998). In particular, the government built the institutional infrastructure - the currency board, the Central Bank and several new state banks, state-owned enterprises - that sheltered the national economy from global imbalances in the Depression era. In the ensuing years, the Kemalist leadership heavily regulated the international trade, maintained agricultural prices just above their market levels, and promoted state-led industrialization through the First Five-Year plan (Tekeli and Ilkin 1977 and 1982; Barlas, 1998).

Although there was little resistance against state intervention in the 1930s, elites remained divided over the question of how to finance and manage the industrial enterprises planned by the regime. The main policy debate occurred between what I call the "bureaucratic etatists" and "entrepreneurial etatists".[77] After the Great Depression, the bureaucratic etatists - led by the Prime Minister Inonu and his Minister of Economics, Mustafa Seref - launched a concerted program of strong trade restrictions, monetary control, and state regulation. They wanted to separate industrial planning from the financing and management of industrial enterprises as to leave them completely under state control.

Such state dominance antagonized the entrepreneurial etatists - grouped around Celal Bayar - who advocated the advent of an organic partnership between the public sector and national entrepreneurs. As chairman of the semi-official Business Bank, Bayar thus far played an important role in using the bank's funds to finance commercial and industrial investments and

[77] The bureaucratic etatists wanted the state bureaucracy to be autonomous from the social classes and make all the important economic decisions, whereas the latter envisioned a greater degree of partnership between the two.

wanted to pursue industrialization in a flexible manner. In the end, they persuaded the president to replace Mustafa Seref as Minister of Economics with Bayar in 1932. Due to the regime's weak ties to the popular classes, the Kemalist leadership was ultimately prone to such elite pressures. In 1933, the new minister created the Sumerbank that merged the separate agencies responsible for industrial planning and financing.[78] Furthermore, Bayar followed a moderate statist course in which public investments were rationalized and management of state-owned enterprises (SOE) allowed autonomy and flexibility (Waterbury, 1993: 41).

The limits of Kemalist populism and the etatist agenda

Elite accommodation between the Kemalist leaders and national business entrepreneurs as well as industrialists came at the expense of popular classes. In the early republican period, industrial workers did not enjoy any social rights and were largely unprotected against the nascent industrial bourgeoisie. Although some Kemalist technocrats sought to adopt a labor code, resistance from business and industrial elites close to the regime killed their proposals before any could reach the parliamentary floor.[79] By the early 1930s, the ISI program once again brought the issue to the government's attention. Accordingly, the Kemalist leadership wanted to preempt worker radicalization by addressing the worst labor abuses in private factories. In 1936, the parliament enacted a conservative labor code - inspired by the Italian fascist legislation - which was more regressive than those of the conservative authoritarian regimes in Latin America (Collier and Collier, 1979). Enacted without any input from trade unions, the legislation included a 48-hour week, overtime pay, and rudimentary protection against child labor. And yet, the fines

[78] Like Mexico's Nacional Financiera (1934), Sumerbank was a public holding company that was strongly linked to the First Five Year Plan (1934-1938), which primarily focused on light-manufacturing sectors, such as sugar, textiles, and flour. In the following years, the government also established Etibank (1935) and Marine Bank (1937), extending this state-business partnership to the mining sector and maritime commerce.

[79] Except for the land reform bill, no other legislation in this period generated as much controversy and was revised as many times as the labor legislation. Although the first labor bill came to the parliament in late 1924, the final version was not enacted until 1936, under Bayar's direction – after four failed attempts (Caliskan, 1997).

were so low that firms had few incentives to abide by such restrictions. Moreover, small-scale establishments - which employed majority of workers - were exempt from the new labor code. On the other hand, the 1936 labor code prohibited strikes and lockouts. There were no plans to create a Ministry of Labor, as we saw in the other three regimes.

In practical terms, the new legislation brought little change to industrial relations and was eventually put on hold throughout WWII. The Kemalist leadership, far from using the labor code to reach out to workers, did not institute any mechanisms for labor control. The adoption of a labor code - which in other cases represented the first official attempt of labor incorporation - did not lead to closer ties between the regime and workers. This outcome should be attributed to the fact that the Kemalist leaders had little need for labor support and, in fact, risked losing support from the economic elites. It is little surprise that the gradual growth of the industrial labor force during the latter half of the 1930s was not accompanied by a concomitant expansion in the number of unionized workers. Additionally, real wages remained stagnant in this period. Since wage levels were not sufficiently higher than average rural income, most industrial workers were peasants, who sought temporary work but then returned to their villages during harvest time.

After a decade, the Kemalist revolution had still not yet reached the countryside (Jacoby, 2005). Given that 80 % of the workforce was employed in the agricultural sector, this severely constrained the regime's infrastructural power and economic agenda. To facilitate industrialization, the government had to extract surplus from the agricultural sector and link subsistence peasants to the national market and subsequently turn them into consumers. Hence, for both political and economic reasons, land reform became a major item in the government's agenda in the mid-1930s. More specifically, state officials - including the president himself - saw land reform as a way to address the plight of the landless peasants hurt by the Great Depression

(Karaomerlioglu, 1998). Initially, the government had passed a couple of land reform bills that targeted the Kurdish feudal leaders in the Eastern provinces. At the same time, landowning deputies in the CHP fervently resisted the wider implementation of such programs and limited their impact.

At the outset, this outcome may appear to be puzzling. Among the four cases, Turkey had the most favorable conditions to institute land reform from above. Most importantly, the leaders of the republic did not have strong, organic ties to the landowners. Neither were they landowners themselves as seen in post-revolutionary Mexico. Moreover, the landowning elites were not sufficiently organized as in Argentina to threaten the regime. Therefore, the reluctance to push through a land reform should be explained by the regime's own weakness, rather than the opposition's strength. The overhauling of agrarian relations would almost certainly trigger a crisis with landowners. Meanwhile, the Kemalist leadership had little to gain politically from this course in the short run. The landowning class did not pose an existential threat as in Egypt and there were few redistributive pressures from below like in Mexico.

Instead, the Kemalist elite reached out to the rural population with piecemeal policies. Notably, due to declining prices in world markets, the government shifted its focus from export promotion to the internal market. In 1932, it began to purchase wheat directly from farmers slightly above the market price, protecting producers against dramatic price changes. Silos were built and agrarian cooperatives were supported to encourage higher levels of production. Lastly, the ISI model generated demand for domestically-produced raw materials, such as sugar cane, tobacco, and cotton.

In tandem with these policies, the Kemalist leadership also engaged in a limited bout of party building during the first half of the 1930s. Although the regime's ideological campaign was

undertaken primarily by the state bureaucracy, the CHP organization also played a role. The chief architect behind this development was Recep Peker, the former Minister of Interior (1924-1925), Defense (1925-1927), and Public Works (1928-1930), who was appointed as the CHP's General Secretary in 1931. Having already served in several cabinets, Peker was an unusually powerful figure for this post and his appointment reveals Mustafa Kemal's desire to revitalize the party organization amid the regime's larger efforts to penetrate the society. Indeed, Peker quickly emerged as the regime's third most powerful figure - after Mustafa Kemal and the Prime Minister Inonu. Peker was the driving force behind the People's Houses project and made an effort to link them to the ruling party. Furthermore, he toyed with the idea of creating a corporatist structure. Influenced by the fascist party-regimes in Europe, Peker aspired to institute a strong, authoritarian party rule that would control society from above and direct the regime. On the eve of the 1935 CHP Convention, he prepared a proposal for "reform" that would have placed the party in charge of government and sidelined the parliament.

Kemal had little to gain from this model of party-dictatorship, however. As the Supreme Leader, he was already in charge and wielded power without the mediation of party and state institutions. In June 1936, the president dismissed Peker on the pretext that the latter "was trying to gain like Stalin in Russia control of the party for himself" (Karpat, 1959: 73). As a precaution, he left the ruling party in the guardianship of the state bureaucratic apparatus (Mango, 1999: 501; Ozalp, 2004: 63-64). Accordingly, the Minister of Interior became secretary-general of the party and every governor was put in charge of the local CHP organization and the People's Houses in their respective provinces (Uyar, 1998: 78; Kocak, 2010: 114-117). Hence, Peker's abrupt removal thwarted any possibility for the institution of a party-corporatist regime. Quite the contrary, the state-party fusion enhanced bureaucratic tutelage over the already weak CHP

provincial organization. After 1936, Kemal also sidelined some powerful figures in his entourage to reassert his authority in the domestic arena and foreign policy (Kocak, 2010: 120). Notably, he demoted the speaker of the assembly General Kazim Ozalp and replaced Inonu with Bayar, distancing both figures from the line of succession. Hence, there was no one left to balance Mustafa Kemal's charismatic leadership in the party, bureaucracy, and parliament.

Despite the imposition of a Neopatrimonial ND state, Turkey did not devolve into a reactionary, traditional dictatorship, given the Kemalist elite's unwavering commitment to political modernization and economic development. Under Bayar's guidance, the economy revived after the recession of 1929-1932 and grew steadily for the rest of the decade. The ISI model increased the country's industrial capacity in this period. Moreover, the entire country was connected through a dense railroad network. After decades of wars and inter-communal conflicts, the central authority imposed its order across the country and established domestic stability, albeit with the use of brutal repression in the Eastern provinces. Lastly, Turkey managed to join the League of Nations and secured peaceful with its neighbors.

Conclusion

Contentious politics, more than any other factor, played a formative role behind the creation of weak institutions and a narrow political coalition linked to the ND state in Turkey. Contrary to the commonly held view that parties with origins in violent conflict tend to develop strong institutions and spawn large popular bases, the CHP had neither. Although the nationalist campaign waged by the Kemalist elite created a "source of elite cohesion", as theorized by Levitsky and Way (2012 and 2013), Mustafa Kemal chose not to establish a robust political party embedded in the personal networks developed during the Turco-Greek War. Rather, Mustafa Kemal deinstitutionalized the nationalist movement after his election as president in 1923 and

imposed a highly-centralized, yet personalistic, regime. I have attributed this phenomenon to the low level of intra-elite conflict during Kemal's rise to power and the regime's limited popular capacity. The remarkable organizational and political weakness of the ruling CHP, despite nationalist elite solidarity, supports this study's theoretical framework.

To most observers, the Kemalist regime seemed strong in the late 1930s. This, however, was an illusion, which the next chapter illustrates. The regime's weak political institutions - along with the absence of a corporatist system - left the Kemalist elite without effective political tools to counter elite defection and generate popular support. While policy compromises and access to spoils ensured elite cooperation during normal times, the regime remained vulnerable to elite defection and social unrest during crises, such as the Great Depression, when members of the upper classes and even many party officials defected to the opposition and the ruling party stayed in power through a show of force. The ruling political coalition - between the civilian and military bureaucracy and provincial elites - was decisively and irreversibly broken amid World War II, when the Kemalist government imposed a higher economic burden on all social classes, thereby generating elite resistance and social unrest.

The next chapter continues the story and discusses how the government's policies and increasing economic intervention during WWII and in its immediate aftermath threatened the Kemalist leadership's hold on power. Accordingly, the regime's refusal to establish links with the social classes and allow access to policy-making left a crucial gap in state-society relations that was filled by a conservative opposition party - not unlike what happened in Mexico. Yet, whereas the Turkish ruling party failed to arrest the growing popularity of this opposition and was electorally defeated in the end, the ruling party in Mexico maintained a deep base of support and the opposition remained isolated.

CHAPTER 4
Popular Opposition, Elite Defection, and the Demise of the Kemalist Regime

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that the low level of intra-elite conflict and leadership rivalries, together with limited mobilizational capacity, led Mustafa Kemal to not invest in strong institutions and to rely on a limited base of support. The Kemalist regime is the only case being examined here without a corporatist arrangement linked to the National Developmentalist state. As a result, the government did not have extensive patronage networks and enjoyed only limited control over economic groups in civil society. Kemalist leaders followed an accommodationist course, cobbling together a small coalition of civil servants, military officers, provincial elites, and urban professionals. Such reliance on conservative intermediate actors limited the scope of the regime's reformist agenda. State officials lacked the infrastructural power to radically reshape the economic order and instead focused on political and legal reforms that targeted a small portion of society, namely the urban population. Not surprisingly, the Kemalist regime proved to be the least transformative among the four cases: the agrarian structure remained intact, while a shortage of funds reduced the pace of state-led industrialization and the size of urban population did not change under Kemalist rule.

In the absence of a robust party and state corporatist institutions, the regime had few tools to resolve intra-elite disputes and counter elite opposition. To solicit the cooperation of these groups, Kemalist governments offered them rents and also made policy concessions, especially on economic matters. While the secularization reforms were ratified with little opposition in the legislature, regime leaders were more prepared to back down in the face of elite opposition to their economic legislation. For instance, the labor law failed in its first four attempts and land income was not taxed. During hard times, the regime was nonetheless vulnerable to the defection

of upper classes since it could only rely on coercion to stem the rising tide of social opposition. As discussed in Chapter 3, intra-elite disagreements over economic policy amid the Great Depression sparked strong resistance against the government; many former regime supporters joined an opposition party that briefly became the vehicle for anti-government opposition. While the Kemalist leadership countered this challenge with a mixed strategy of coercion and increased state control over the economy, the prolonged economic downturn during WWII and in its immediate aftermath proved unmanageable for the regime.

While the previous chapter focused on the establishment of the Kemalist regime and Mustafa Kemal's presidency, Chapter 4 turns attention to its years of decline through WWII and beyond under his successor, President Ismet Inonu. The war years ruptured the regime's political coalition and sparked elite opposition that exceeded any other period during the single-party rule. Faced with the threat of military invasion and economic collapse, the Inonu administration imposed high taxes on all economic classes to shift the burden onto society and sustain the regime. These policies broke the national consensus – between upper echelons of the state and higher income groups – that sustained the regime until the onset of WWII and generated widespread elite resentment against the government. At the same time, the wartime black market allowed merchants, landowners, and businessmen to accumulate large amounts of capital and challenge the government's statist initiatives. When this opposition began to gain ground within the ruling party, the weakly institutionalized regime was unable to co-opt or repress its opponents and instead expelled them. Rather than being left in the political wilderness, government critics gathered under an opposition party that tapped into the prevailing discontent across the country to gain popular support. As noted in Chapter 2, elite defection was the causal

mechanism for the Kemalist regime collapse in 1950, when the ruling party lost the general election.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I discuss the government's wartime policies and how the heavy tax burden generated widespread elite opposition and popular discontent across the country. The second section argues that the efforts of the Kemalist leadership to limit the growing strength of the upper middle class after the war and gain popular support through land and labor reforms triggered an internal revolt within the ruling party. The third section suggests that President Inonu, given the weakness of intra-party institutions, expelled his internal critics from the party to secure internal unity. In the next section, I trace the development of an opposition party against Kemalist rule and argue that the regime's weak institutions and narrow popular base made it possible for the opposition to quickly gain ground. In the fifth section, I review the belated efforts of the ruling CHP in the late 1940s to expand its party organization and political support to counter the rising tide of the opposition. The final section reviews the CHP's electoral demise at the hands of the DP and discusses its long-term impact.

Leadership Succession amid the War Years

On 11 November 1938, a day after Mustafa Kemal's death, the national assembly elected Inonu second president of the republic. Leadership successions in authoritarian regimes have a tendency to produce elite divisions, particularly when there is no clear precedent for transfer of power (Brownlee, 2007b). In Turkey, too, there was speculation as to whether the regime would survive Mustafa Kemal's absence. The orderly transfer of power owes in large part to Inonu's ability to reduce elite uncertainty. For most party officials, cabinet ministers, and military leaders, Inonu was the best option to preserve the extant distribution of power and sustain their

own positions.[80] In the absence of a split in elite ranks, Inonu consolidated his power at the extraordinary CHP congress, held in December 1938. Like Mustafa Kemal, he became the 'permanent party chairman' and subsequently assumed the title National Chief.

Inonu also took steps to strengthen elite unity by pardoning the regime's long-time critics and inviting leaders of the banned TCF to re-join the ruling party (Kandemir, 1965: 158-159; Aydemir, 1976: 44-45; Vanderlippe, 2005: 28). His policy of reconciliation with Mustafa Kemal's former critics notwithstanding, Inonu also quelled opposition against his rule. In the cabinet he replaced Tevfik Rustu Aras and Sukru Kaya with Refik Saydam and Sukru Saracoglu, two of his closest associates (Kocak, 1986: 145). Inonu's supporters engaged in smear campaigns and anti-corruption investigations against liberal technocrats in Bayar's camp. On January 1939, Inonu finally called for Bayar's resignation (Aydemir, 1975: 41), allegedly due to their disagreement over the economic policy, appointing his close associate, Refik Saydam.[81] Though lacking Mustafa Kemal's charisma, Inonu nonetheless commanded a great deal of loyalty from the bureaucracy, the military, and the ruling party. This orderly transfer of power stands in stark contrast to the conflict in Mexico between the elite supporters of Calles and Cardenas, throughout the 1930s, which set the stage for ruling party's institutional appeals to the popular classes.

Inonu's rise to power coincided with the outbreak of WWII, which posed serious challenges to the Kemalist regime. First, relations with the Soviet Union cooled and Mussolini's

[80] Surely, Inonu had rivals such as minister of interior Sukru Kaya and minister of foreign affairs Tevfik Rustu Aras, who tried to block his election. But their efforts failed when the military chief of staff Fevzi Cakmak, the only alternative with a base of support refused to enter the contest.

[81] During Mustafa Kemal's rule, Bayar's ministerial post sent a credible signal to economic elites that the state would not target them. By the same token, his demotion was a clear sign that a more statist era was about to commence.

expansionary policy in the Balkans threatened Turkey.[82] Even though the government would in the end stay out of the war, the size of the Turkish army nonetheless rose to roughly 1.5 million troops. This placed an enormous burden on the economy, increasing defense spending to almost half of the state budget (Barlas, 1998: 200). Second, to make matters worse, government officials lacked sufficient administrative capacity to maintain price stability and economic growth in this period. Third, decline in foreign trade disrupted industrial growth and lowered trade revenues (Tekeli and Ilkin, 2014: ch. 4). Due to its proximity to the war zone, Turkey could not benefit from increased wartime demand that way that Latin American countries did and instead experienced a sharp fall in export levels (Tezel, 1994: 179-184).

In response to these external threats and domestic challenges, the government began to transform the agriculture-based Turkish economy into a war economy.[83] In particular, the state officials focused on two fundamental goals: (1) to provision urban areas and the military, and (2) to maintain price stability (VanderLippe, 2005: 49-53). In January 1940, these efforts prompted the adoption of the National Defense Law, which gave the government extraordinary powers to restructure the economy and regulate the society.[84] Accordingly, the Saydam government established a monopoly on grain trade, setting fixed prices on all agricultural commodities, and freezing rents in large parts of the country. Through these set-prices, the Kemalist leadership sought to feed both the army and the cities without triggering high inflation (Aydemir, 1975;

[82] Not unlike Peron and Nasser, many Turkish officers had German sympathies during this period (Vanderlippe, 2005: 40-41; Karabekir, 2009: 1132-1148; Kocak, 2010b: 303-321). Concerned with the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe, however, the Inonu administration sought closer relations with France and Britain (Karaosmanoglu, 1968: 165-167; Aydemir, 1975: 117; Kocak, 1986; 229-295; Deringil, 2004; Barlas, 1998).

[83] The chief architect behind this initiative was Sevket Sureyya Aydemir, a communist-turned-nationalist bureaucrat and a graduate of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, who suggested the need for building a "defense economy" as early as May 1939 (Aydemir, 1979: 463-464; Kocak, 1996: 371-372).

[84] Through the National Defense Law, among other things, the government acquired the right to determine both production and price levels in the industry and mining sectors, as well as seize stocks of industrial goods and even factory management to ensure the protection of the nation. It also imposed mandatory work services and overtime shifts on workers, while confiscating the draft animals of peasants with less than four hectares of land. Moreover, the law also prohibited any type of hoarding, stock piling, and price fixing among producers and traders. For more, see Aydemir, 1975: 213-217; Kocak, 1996; Tekeli and Ilkin, 2014: ch. 2.

Tekeli and Ilkin, 2014). In response to the sharp fall in labor participation (due to high number of peasants under arms) after 1941 and the black market of basic supplies, the government further expanded administrative control of the purchase, transportation, and distribution of these goods.

Thus, the exigencies of war spurred a burst of state-building in Turkey. In 1941, the government opened a Directorate of Provisions (Iase Mustesarligi), with sub-directorates in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, and founded the Office of Petroleum (Petrol Ofisi) and the Office of Commerce (Ticaret Ofisi), both connected to the recently established Ministry of Commerce (Kocak, 1996: 391-395; Vanderlippe, 2005: 68; Tekeli and Ilkin, 2014: ch. 5). Accordingly, the state bureaucracy expanded its control over national economy and social life, strengthening its autonomy from the economic classes. Government officials regulated, monitored, and controlled the national economy to an extent never seen before. At the same time, the large degree of state control, coupled with the regime's low infrastructural power, allowed landowners, traders, and corrupt party officials to reap huge profits in the black market. The rise of war profiteers sparked popular resentment, as masses saw the ruling party responsible for the decline in their real income and shortages of basic items. Peasants' products were confiscated by tax collectors and gendarme officers, while workers were obliged to work overtime under low-wages.

In July 1942, Refik Saydam's sudden death prompted a major reversal in the government's economic policy. In light of the complaints from producers and traders, the new prime minister, Sukru Saracoglu, a long-time cabinet minister and Inonu's close associate, abolished the Directorate of Provisioning and appointed Behcet Uz, former mayor and a liberal deputy of Izmir, minister of commerce (Uz, 2009: 79-84). To address the problem of shortages and black market, the new government liberalized the distribution of goods, granting more responsibility to municipality governments (Aydemir, 1975: 222-225, 345). Moreover, it adopted

what was called the 25 % decision to encourage higher production among farmers and landowners.[85] This new policy, far from ensuring price stability, further increased speculation in the market, spurring one of the worst inflation spikes in republican history. The price of bread increased by over 285 % between 1938 and 1943, while meat and sugar prices rose 367 % and 1107 %, respectively (VanderLippe, 2005: 81).

Kemalist leaders were both furious and helpless against their policy agenda being sabotaged in this manner. The state's institutional capacity was not sufficiently strong to monitor the grain trade, while the weakness of the CHP's organization made it difficult to punish the corrupt Kemalist cadres. When both interventionist and liberal policies failed, Inonu decided to target the economic elites directly. The hardliner Recep Peker's appointment as minister of interior in August 1942 presaged the upcoming showdown. On November 1, during the opening session of the parliament, Inonu delivered a critical speech, in which he accused greedy merchants and petty landowners, as well as their political patrons, for the economic ills that the country faced.[86]

Ten days later the government enacted the Wealth Tax (Varlik Vergisi), a one-time levy on excessive profits made during the war.[87] This was followed in May 1943 by the Land Products Tax that sought to confiscate a sizable portion of the agrarian surplus outside the

[85] Grain producers were obliged to sell 25 % of the first fifty tons of their products, 35 % of the next fifty, and 50 % of the rest to the government at low official prices and could sell the rest at the marketplace. Since most peasants produced less than fifty tons, barely enough to cover their own subsistence, this new policy mainly benefited the large producers. For more on this policy, see Pamuk (1988); Kocak (1996: 411-417); Tekeli and Ilkin (2014).

[86] "The old hoarding landowner, counting this uncertain time as an opportunity not to be missed, and the speculating merchant, never satisfied, fruitlessly endeavoring to turn the air we breathe into a commodity, and few a few politicians working for unknown foreign governments, who see all these problems as a great opportunity for political complaints, are all insolently attempting to destroy a great nation's entire life" (translated text from VanderLippe, 2005: 82). As the country was ruled by a single-party autocracy at the time, some of these actors were also CHP members and maybe even in the parliament!

[87] Though couched as a tax against war-profiteers, this tax had another motive: religious discrimination. According to contemporary accounts, Saracoglu openly admitted this aspect of the law in parliament to draw support from reluctant party and state officials (Aktar, 2010: 148). Thus, the local tax boards set much higher rates to non-Muslims, some of whom had to sell their businesses to pay the tax. For more on this tax, see Okte (1987); Kocak, 1996: 479-506; Aktar (2010); Koralturk (2011); Kayra (2011); Tekeli and Ilkin (2014: 39-52).

market mechanism (Kocak, 1996: 522-525; VanderLippe, 2005: 86; Sazak, 2007a: 315-316; Tekeli and Ilkin, 2014: 52-59). These controversial taxes demonstrate that the Kemalist leadership, when the regime was under military threat, was willing to adopt heavy measures against the economic elites. Ironically, the absence of corporatist institutions made it much easier for the government to make decisions and implement policies without consulting economic actors. Unlike Mustafa Kemal, who assuaged economic elites through ad hoc deals and policy compromises, Inonu was bureaucracy-oriented, interventionist, and statist by nature. Under his rule, as Karpat (1959: 139) puts it, "a small bureaucratic-minded group" assumed power at the expense of other factions in the party. By showing a willingness to confiscate private property, to regulate domestic trade, and to charge taxes on economic elites, Inonu steered away from the traditional policy of supporting Muslim-Turkish traders and landowners.

This new course boosted the state's fiscal power only temporarily, as the government preferred one-time, special taxes over direct taxes. Accordingly, the political institutions that could extract the much-needed revenue from society did not yet strengthen the tax apparatus. The proximate cause of this organizational weakness was the unsupportive nature of economic elites towards any rise in state power, especially since it was governed by interventionist bureaucrats. The intensification of WWII did little to generate radical demands among popular groups or directly threaten their interests, two conditions that would have compelled these elites to support the central government. Therefore, compliance with government's policies remained relatively low, especially among members of the upper classes. Hence, the burden fell disproportionately on the popular classes and non-Muslims, while other groups used their political connections to pay relatively lower amounts (for an example, see Koc, 1973: 69). Because the tax apparatus lacked administrative reach and institutional capacity, tax

bureaucrats, despite their professional training and loyalty to the regime, could do little to monitor tax income (Kayra, 2002: 96-97). After several months, state revenues began to revert to their initial levels, compelling the government to revert to regressive measures, such as the widely criticized sales tax on sugar (Kayra, 2002: 97-98; Tekeli and Ilkin, 2014: 59).

Despite wartime exigencies, the Kemalist leaders maintained their conservative fiscal approach, striving for a balanced budget, low inflation, and balanced trade. The government even serviced the Ottoman-era debt, making its final payment in 1943. Due to trade restrictions, Turkey kept its trade deficit low but growing expenses ultimately overburdened the budget. Even then, government officials chose not to significantly increase public debt to cover its accumulated expenses (Tekeli and Ilkin, 2014: 60-68). The government issued national bonds only twice (1941 and 1942), with the pretext of constructing a new railway line and covering national defense spending. At no point during the war did the national debt surpass twenty percent of the GDP (Arsan, 1961: 22-23; 157). Instead of engaging in discretionary spending, the Kemalist elite slashed the budget across the board (except for national defense and foreign debt payment) by ten percent and, as already mentioned, raised taxes.

Inonu, as his vitriolic rhetoric had clearly shown, was aware of the perverse ties between some party officials, mid-level bureaucrats, and economic elites. In sharp contrast to traditional autocracies, Kemalism *did* generate a strong sense of institutional loyalty and ideological attachment among civil servants, military officers, and school teachers. These bureaucratic classes were instilled with Turkish nationalism and saw Kemalism as a bastion of stability, while younger members among them witnessed the rise of the republican regime and took lessons from high-level Kemalist officials at the public university in Ankara (Kayra, 2002: 63-67). Due to the CHP's uncontested rule at lower levels, corruption and incompetence spread across the country.

Therefore, after 1943, when the German threat diminished, Inonu began to look for ways to make the regime more responsive to popular demands without democratization. For the 1943 elections, for instance, the CHP's general secretary, Mahmut Sevket Esendal, recruited younger candidates from urban professional backgrounds rather than the ranks of the bureaucracy and the military (Frey, 1965: 181; Agaoglu, 1969: 112-114). In 38 provinces, the CHP leaders allowed more candidates than available seats, thereby seeking "the exclusion of members of the assembly who were particularly unpopular" (Vanderlippe, 2005: 103; also see Karabekir, 2009: 1316).

These changes coincided with the rise of a conservative intra-party opposition against the Saracoglu government, headed by Celal Bayar and several disgruntled Inonu critics like Tevfik Rustu Aras (Vanderlippe, 2005: 104-112). In March 1944, Saracoglu government received 57 nay votes (against 251 yes) in a vote of confidence (Kocak, 1996: 350-352; Karabekir, 2009: 1358). Two months later, 167 deputies would abstain during a vote on the government's budget, while Celal Bayar, after a highly critical speech, cast the only against vote (Kocak, 1996: 354; for its text, see Bayar, 1999: 365-376). Parallel to these developments, several national dailies (in particular, the socialist *Tan* and the center-right *Vatan*) assumed a more critical stance against government policies (Kocak, 2010: 137-144). In the absence of coercion, the Inonu administration was clearly helpless to muster widespread support among economic and political elites and could no longer easily suppress the growing dissent.

Post-war Reforms and the Rise of Intra-elite Conflict

In the end, Inonu managed to keep Turkey out of war but the country still heavily suffered from its economic repercussions.[88] Most importantly, its development trajectory was disrupted by the need to maintain a large army and diminished production levels. If the industrial

[88] By the time that Turkey declared war on the Axis powers in 1945, WWII was almost over. The Turkish military suffered no losses during this period Kocak (2010: 45-57, 103-110).

revenue index is taken to be 100 in 1938-1939, it fell down to 77 by the end of WWII (Boratav, 88 cited in Kalaycioglu, 2005: 65). Moreover, wheat price index increased from 100 to 568 during the war (Boratav, 88 cited in Kalaycioglu, 2005: 65). High inflation and war-time shortages heavily hit groups with fixed incomes, while peasants suffered from the confiscation of their products at below-market prices.[89] Between 1939 and 1945, income per capita fell from 117.5 Turkish Lira to 73.2 Turkish Lira (Hale, 1981: 76-77).

Although the rising Muslim bourgeoisie benefited from high food prices, speculation, and economic discriminatory policies against the non-Muslims, heavy state intervention during this period broke their trust towards the government (Kalaycioglu, 2005: 70). To their great discomfort, Kemalist policymakers and bureaucrats saw the end of war as an opportunity to reassert state control over the economic actors, retain their autonomy, and resume industrialization (Aydemir, 1979; Keyder, 1987). Notably, the government sought to bring a major sea transportation company under state control and regulate the use of national forestry through a public body (Kocak, 2010: 62-72; Koralturk, 2007). On May 7 1945, Aydemir submitted to the government the Post-War Development Plan, an ambitious economic program of state-led industrialization prepared with input from several ministries to retain economic self-sufficiency (Aydemir, 1975: 397-398, 414-416). Lastly, only a week later, the government tabled what was until then the most comprehensive land reform bill.

The proposal caught many by surprise.[90] For one thing, small proprietorship is the dominant type in Turkish agriculture (Karpat, 1959: 99; Keyder, 1983; Keyder and Tabak,

[89] For the economic conditions during WWII, see Karpat (1959: ch, 3 and 4); Kocak, 1996; Tekeli and Ilkin (2014).

[90] The Kemalist elite contemplated a land reform in the 1930s but were dissuaded from enacting one (Sertel, 1987: 89). Wealth gained by unscrupulous landowners during the war once again brought up this issue (Aydemir, 1975: 333-338). The new bill, prepared by the agricultural minister Rasit Hatipoglu, had a wider focus than its predecessors. Accordingly, land would be reclaimed from unused state land, religious foundations, and large private

1991). Wide base of landownership had prevented the rise of a "labor-repressive" regime in Turkey, as most landowners had little need to sustain a large reserve of labor. While large landowners existed in coastal areas and eastern provinces, most peasants owned some amount of land and could rent more as tenants. Therefore if the government wanted to increase agricultural production, distribution of unused state land would have been a more effective policy than breaking up commercial estates. Hence, it seems that political factors played a more important role than social concerns or economic objectives. First, the Kemalist leaders wanted to appease peasants and to reassert state authority over landowners, who greatly benefited as middlemen between the state and small producers.[91] They wanted peasants to be dependent on the state, rather than on the landowners, for seeds, equipment, and cheap credits, not unlike *ejidos* in Mexico. Third, the ruling elites expected to reduce migration to cities by tying farmers to their land through the distributed plots that could not be sold (Kocak, 2010: 222; Berkes, 2011: 313).

Whatever its causes, the bill sparked open resistance within the CHP parliamentary caucus. Adnan Menderes, a landowning deputy from Aydin, led the campaign from his chair of the agriculture committee (Karpat, 1959: 121-123; Agaoglu, 1967: 14-15; VanderLippe, 2005: 116). He was soon joined by several other deputies, such as Emin Sazak, a landowning deputy from Eskisehir, who criticized both the need for land reform and its specific articles (Sazak, 2007a: 331-338; also see Uran, 2008: 348-350). According to the bill's critics, Turkish agriculture suffered not from land inequality but rather inefficient and low production, which was caused by insufficient bank credits, primitive methods and equipment, and lack of state

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estates to create 50 donum (12.35 acre) farmer hearths, distributed to landless peasants and tenant farmers (Karpat, 1959: 117-119). For more on the land question in Turkey, see Barkan, 1945; Kocak, 2010: 171-180.

[91] If implemented effectively, provisions of the land reform bill would have eliminated the class of large landowners in Turkey (Vanderlippe, 2005: 115). In some ways, the envisioned model was a re-enactment of the traditional Ottoman land tenure system, a large number of tenant farmers protected by a strong state. As such, this conservative social agenda would have clashed with the policy of state-led industrialization, which required mechanization of agriculture and swelling of the ranks of industrial labor.

assistance. Faced with these criticisms, Inonu pushed the bill as a demonstration of his control over the ruling party (Aydemir, 1975: 347-349). Although it finally passed in the end, the government was caught off guard by the organized opposition in the assembly and had little political capital left to implement its provisions.[92]

Lastly, a new generation of socially-conscious Kemalist state and party authorities began to address worker grievances. Until then, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Kemalist elite promoted a tight labor regime to industrialize without massive social dislocation and political change. But the end of WWII and the schism within the ruling class made this policy of enforced labor measures untenable.[93] Moreover, Turkey's admission to the UN and the International Labor Organization created international pressure on the Turkish government to offer social protection for industrial laborers. It was against the backdrop of these changes that the government founded the Ministry of Labour (1945). Moreover, legislation on work-related accidents, old age insurance, and sickness benefits were enacted (Kocak, 2010b: 463-473; Bianchi, 1984: 155).

At the end of WWII, the government confronted an uncertain international system, uncooperative economic elites, and intra-party divisions over the state's economic role in the post-war period. Consequently, the CHP had to regain its legitimacy and spawn a new political coalition as attested by the government's weak overtures to peasants and workers. By June 1945,

[92] As Kocak rightly argues, the bill would have probably passed easily during the war but that, in 1945, both domestic conditions and international dynamics were different. For the deliberations in the parliament, see Kocak, 2010. Indeed, the Kemalist leadership took advantage of the war conditions to push through a major educational drive spearheaded by Village Institutions that would have otherwise met with the opposition of landowners. Thus the number of village schools skyrocketed during the war (Robinson, 1963: 124; Aydemir, 1975: 381; Inonu, 22-25 and 66-68). For more on Village Institutes, see Kocak, 1996: 115-121; Kirby, 2010. Notably, five deputies (Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Koprulu, and Emin Sazak) voted against the 1945 budget and soon were joined by two other prominent deputies (Recep Peker and Hikmet Bayur) in casting a no confidence vote for the Saracoglu government (Toker, 1990: 733; VanderLippe, 2005: 118; Kocak, 2010: 243-246; Gologlu, 2013).

[93] Even during wartime, the state enterprises experienced significant difficulty in finding a sufficient labor force due to high worker turnover (Tekeli and Ilkin, 2014: ch. 3). In early 1940s, state companies already began to offer social welfare programs for making industrial employment attractive but systemic changes were necessary to further expand industrialization (Arnold, 2012: 375-376; Kocak, 2012b: 307-319). More to the point, the abject worker conditions such as their low salaries, and housing shortages increased political consciousness among workers.

Inonu was at a crossroad: He could try to suppress these internal challenges and maintain the status quo or allow for limited political liberalization as a safety valve against stronger opposition in the long run.[94] The former scenario could spur wider societal discontent and international pressure on the Kemalist regime. Turkey, together with Argentina and Spain, was already portrayed as an authoritarian country that refused to fully cooperate with the Allied powers during WWII. Inonu chose the latter option by relaxing political restrictions in an attempt to bring out the opposition into the open.[95]

Internal Opposition within the Single-party regime

Against the backdrop of these events, Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Koprulu submitted a memorandum to the CHP's parliamentary group, seeking to revoke the "democratic spirit" of the 1924 Constitution (for the text, see Yalman, 1956: 221-222). Couched in references to Mustafa Kemal, the document — known as the Statement of the Four (*Dortlu Takrir*) — carried a set of demands, including a call for the party to respect the 1924 Constitution and allow citizens to exercise their political rights and liberties (Karpat, 1959: 144-146; Vanderlippe, 2005: 120). However, there is no evidence to suggest that the four deputies planned to establish an opposition party at this point. As long time CHP deputies, they had personally benefited from the regime and were also aware of the tremendous difficulty of challenging a single-party autocracy. Rather, they had serious misgivings about the government's policies and sought to establish a new party structure that could accommodate elite conflict, thereby giving them more influence over the policy-making process.

[94] According to elite memoirs from this period, Inonu made an extra effort to keep track of the internal opposition, trying to assess its strength (Us, 1966: 633-634; also see Toker, 1990; Barutcu, 2001; Erim, 2008)

[95] For signs of this liberalization, see his speeches on May 19 and November 1, 1945 (Inonu: 30-32). For more on this speech and its interpretation, see Karpat, 1959; Toker, 1990: 103-105; 147 Kocak 2010: 228-233; 740-753.

After a seven-hour long debate, chaired by Inonu himself, the CHP parliamentary caucus rejected the motion (Timur, 2003: 14; Kocak, 2010: 404-409). It would not be wrong to assume that this was Inonu's decision, for few deputies could dare defy his will openly. By why did Inonu promise political liberalization and then block intra-party channels for voicing dissent? I have already eliminated the repression option. In the absence of popular outbursts against the regime, the Kemalist elite may have looked secure in power. But trying to suppress dissent completely would have risked diplomatic isolation and generated resistance among economic elites. The second option would be to revise government policies to appease the disgruntled political leaders and the economic elites. At the very least, this option would have resulted in a cabinet shuffle and a new economic agenda. Even at this point, reconciliation was most likely possible. It is not clear whether Inonu had ever entertained this scenario and if so, why he rejected it. In light of both the domestic factors and international environment, this would have been the safer course — one that would have kept the ruling party intact. Perhaps he surmised that keeping the disgruntled faction within the CHP would trigger further intra-party struggles, larger schisms, and policy stasis in the long run. Or maybe the required concessions were too high for Inonu to personally accept.

Instead, Inonu opted for an alternative strategy. Accordingly, he had the motion rejected and its signatories purged with the assumption that this decision would compel these deputies to establish an opposition party (Gologlu, 2013; Kocak, 2010: 641-674, 690-718, 753-763). This new party, he calculated, would transform the CHP into a strong, cohesive political party by diminishing internal conflict. After two decades of uncontested rule, he also surmised that this opposition could reinvigorate the ruling party and spur regular party meetings at national and local levels. For some, Inonu's strategy was similar to Mustafa Kemal's experiment with the

SCF, which was established as a loyal opposition force amid growing popular discontent in the aftermath of Great Depression (Zurcher, 1994: 217). Lastly, by relying on "nominally democratic institutions" (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007: 1280), Inonu sought to increase his regime's domestic and international legitimacy, drawing Western support against the Soviet threat.[96]

The Rise of the Opposition Party

The intra-party faction soon crystallized in a new political party, named Democrat Party (*Demokratik Parti* - DP).[97] State officials, confident in their hold on power, acted leniently against the new party at first, that is, until it became apparent that the DP organization expanded rapidly (Karpat, 1959: 152-3). By the end of March, the DP leaders established local branches in sixteen provincial seats (out of 63) and thirty six district seats, mainly located in the Aegean, Thrace, and Marmara regions, where commercial agriculture was widespread (Vanderlippe, 2005: 139; Karpat, 1959: 152-153; Kocak, 2012: 102-165). Support was especially strong among landowners, private merchants, and manufacturers, who were severely concerned with the government's interventionist policies, particularly the land reform bill and high taxes. Naturally, the DP's program reflected these concerns: it promised to merge republican and democratic principles, advocated lower taxes and less bureaucracy, espoused a liberal version of statism, and endorsed support for the agricultural sector but no land reform (VanderLippe, 2005: 138-139).

Given the obvious institutional constraints and resource asymmetries, why do political elites ever defect from an autocratic single-party regime? Indeed, Bayar's initial hesitation to

[96] If this was his intention, Inonu seems to have made a serious tactical error: the motion's rejection allowed his critics to leave the party with the pretext of seeking democratization, rather than a strong disagreement with the government's economic policy, not to mention their individual ambitions. When they criticized the parliamentary caucus' decision in newspapers, Menderes and Koprulu, and, then, Koraltan were all expelled from the party. In response, Bayar resigned his seat in the parliament and, albeit with some delay, from the CHP.

[97] Memoirs suggest that Inonu and Bayar were in frequent communication via emissaries and carefully planned this process to make sure that the new party would not become the center of anti-regime activities, either from the pro-Soviet leftist groups or the reactionaries. For more on the party's founding process, see Kocak 2010: 768-772, 848-855 and 2012: 15-47.

resign from the CHP highlights the difficulties of elite defection in such cases. Unfortunately, few studies have explored this question in the Turkish context. Most scholars of authoritarian politics treat the single-party regimes as a stag-hunt game in which none of the players have an incentive to deviate from the ruling party (Geddes: 11 cited in Smith, 2007: 427). In such regimes, as Brownlee (2007) argues, even when they lose in the short term, political elites are better off staying within the ruling party because of the possibility of long-term gains. Therefore, rational careerists should never defect from the ruling party in this regime type (Greene, 2007: 26). Not all authoritarian single party administrations can harness elites together, however. In the absence of strong party institutions, the Kemalist leaders had to instead rely on coercion and personal deals to maintain order. Consequently, the regime lacked the capacity to regulate intra-elite conflict and direct economic groups to act according to its agenda.

In the Turkish case, power was monopolized by a small group of military and bureaucratic elites, thus leaving party operatives and mid-level cadres with little hope of reaching to high office. Since the CHP was a personality-driven party, those who crossed Inonu stood no chance of further political advancement. For instance, Celal Bayar, the DP chairman, had a distinguished career within the CHP as a bank president, cabinet minister, and prime minister in the 1920s and 1930s but after being sidelined by Inonu, he became an insignificant deputy with very little political influence. As a backbencher from 1931 to 1945, after his short stint as local branch chairman for the Free Republican Party (Kocak, 2006: 511), Menderes was, similarly, frustrated with his role in the party. Koraltan and Koprulu were known within the party and had stable positions but did not hold a position in the cabinet.[98] Except for Bayar, none of the DP founders had a good chance of ever attaining high office in the CHP. For disgruntled political elites, who felt their careers were blocked by Inonu, the opposition party therefore offered an

[98] For more on the four founders, see Sarol, 1983; Aydemir, 1969 and Kocak, 2012: 172-173.

alternative venue for power.[99] In turn, the risk of defection was relatively low. An authoritarian party's ability to punish defectors is contingent on its institutional capacity and popular strength, both of which were weak in this case. Once Inonu signaled his commitment for an open regime, the last obstacle — coercion — against such an initiative was lifted.

The DP did not emerge around major social cleavages within Turkish society. Opposition leaders purported to represent popular demands but there was much ambiguity as to what the new party's ideology was. On pressing matters of the day — economic policy and Turco-Soviet relations, in particular — the opposition did not really distinguish itself from the ruling party.[100] When asked if the DP was a leftist or a rightist political party, Adnan Menderes said that if one could discern the CHP's ideology and then he would position the DP accordingly (Toker, 1990: 111-112; Kocak, 2012: 28). Ethnic and religious divisions did not also become salient, either. Rather, the new party emerged in response to the intra-elite divisions, which could no longer be accommodated within the existing institutional structure of the ruling party. Consequently, both parties were multi-class coalitions with loose ideological programs and shifting social cleavages. At the same time, its ranks soon expanded to merge pro-business Kemalist elites with a new generation of politicians interested in expanding political participation. Owing to his stint as former minister of economics and head of the semi-official Business Bank, Bayar could easily recruit his former technocratic bureaucrats and sympathetic businessmen. As one DP elite once put it, Bayar had an unofficial patronage network that he used to control the strings within the party (Sarol, 1983: 103).

[99] In the next few years, several members from Mustafa Kemal's administration who had grievances with Inonu would join the ranks of the opposition. Others like Rauf Orbay and Ali Fuat Cebesoy had old scores to settle and saw the opposition as a way to rectify the past injustices they suffered.

[100] For the party's program, see Kocak, 2012: 47-64. For the DP elites' early contacts with leftist groups, see Sertel 1987: 270-272, 288-303.

Alongside these technocrats and former CHP members were provincial lawyers and doctors, from landowning families, who were established in their local areas, and determined to unseat the ruling party (Agaoglu, 1993: 29; Berkes, 2011: 248-250). During the war, some of them joined the CHP in hopes of capturing the party from within and came to represent the right faction of the party. Accordingly, most DP deputies were more locally entrenched and professional, thus shifting the locus of power away from the military and the state bureaucracy. The DP owed its rapid growth to popular dissatisfaction against the government in cities, as well as its successful recruitment efforts in the countryside. The DP's strategy of portraying the CHP as an agent of the center also resonated with many voters in the countryside. Unlike their Mexican counterparts, the Kemalist elite had hitherto failed to reach out to peasants, who saw few changes in their living standards under the nationalist regime. As a result, in some areas, both the landowners who used their political connections to shift a larger portion of the tax burden to peasants during WWII and those very peasants supported the new party.

Faced with a stronger organized opposition than he had initially expected, Inonu moved forward the local elections from September to May, 1946 and also called for early elections during the same year. Although the DP leaders had initially considered an electoral boycott, they used the 1946 campaign to reach out to voters, frequently holding public rallies and visiting constituencies across the country. In contrast, the local CHP branches were utterly unprepared for such a challenge and even failed to take advantage of their incumbency status. The government kept its budgetary discipline and stayed away from redistributive policies. Not accustomed to strong opposition, the ruling party did not resort to political patronage, defended the statist measures, including recent land reform bill, and also refrained from mobilizing voters on the day of the election (Kocak, 2012: 472-475).

During the campaign, most careerist politicians stayed within the CHP as the surest way to win office. The CHP's candidate list included retired civil servants, military officers, and government officials,[101] some nominated for the first time as a token for their long services to the regime (Kocak, 2012: 486-493; also see Tuncer, 2008). In Istanbul, the ruling party received more than 1500 applications, whereas the DP encountered difficulty in finding candidates with wide name recognition (Oner, 1948). Instead, the DP recruited fresh faces from among urban professionals, merchants, and landowners, who joined a small number of defectors from the ruling party, including Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, Fuat Koprulu, Emin Sazak, and Refik Sevket Ince (Karpat, 1959: 163-164; Toker, 1990; Sazak, 2007b: 291-293; Kocak, 2012: 493-502). Against the party of government, the DP's strategy revolved around the themes of freedom and change. In particular, the opposition promised to ease restrictions on the peasantry and to offer more economic freedom to urban dwellers.

If authoritarian leaders use elections to signal their popular strength, the 1946 elections generated the opposite outcome for the Kemalist elite: the extent of the regime's unpopularity became apparent to CHP supporters and critics alike. In many provincial seats, the DP's vote surpassed that of the CHP, though this lead gradually eroded with results from the countryside favoring the latter party (Kocak, 2012: 513-524). However, the government's victory partly owes to election fraud in some provinces. In single-party regimes, vote rigging is prevalent but usually implemented in a competent manner, as evidenced by the Mexican case.[102] In Turkey, however, the CHP organization was so weak that many local administrators and party officials were caught

[101] The main exception to this orderly change of guards was the case of the former Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Cakmak, who resented Inonu for forcing him to retire after two decades in that post. Refusing several offers from the ruling party, Cakmak surprisingly declared his candidacy as an independent on the DP's list (Toker, 1990: 161-162; Uran, 2008: 378-380; Kocak, 2010: 767 and 2012: 503-513).

[102] On the role of elections under authoritarian regimes, see Lehoucq (2003); Lust-Okar (2006); Magaloni (2006 and 2010); Lindberg (2009); Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009); Blaydes (2011).

off guard by the party's unpopularity in some provinces and then hastily rigged the results to save their own careers (Kocak, 2012: 524-532; for the government's defense, see Uran, 2008: 541-550).[103] Amid accusations of fraud, the CHP took 395 seats in the end, while the DP and independent candidates won 66 and 7 seats, respectively.[104] Thus, the DP secured its dominance in the opposition camp. As one newspaper put it, "the Democratic Party did not win the election; the Republican Party lost it" (Karpat, 1959: 166).

Political Liberalization and the Institution of a Multi-party system

Tough times were ahead for the new government after the election. First of all, Turkey acutely felt the Soviet threat (Toker, 1971; Kocak, 2010: 330-352; for a critical view, see Kucuk, 1980: 434-502). Moreover, transition to peacetime conditions necessitated an adjustment of the prices of local commodities to their international levels. On top of these problems, the Kemalist regime was also faced with a strong opposition in the assembly. Not surprisingly, Inonu again turned to Recep Peker, appointing him as prime minister. Having served as the party's general secretary under Mustafa Kemal, Peker was a seasoned politician and had a talent for hierarchical organization. Accordingly, his government quickly enacted economic measures for adjustment to the postwar period and to comply with the Bretton Woods Agreement, including a sharp devaluation of the Turkish lira, freeing of the sale of gold by the Central Bank, and easing of import restrictions (Karpat, 1959: 172-174; VanderLippe, 2005: 145-146). These measures benefited the agricultural exporters (Kucuk, 1980: 469) but, taken with little concern for their impact on the lower classes, they made the government even more unpopular.

[103] For example, in Istanbul, where the DP scored a major upset by winning 17 seats (out of 27), the governor announced the results with a three day delay because several prominent CHP candidates – including the party's former general secretary Recep Peker – allegedly had lost the election (Oner, 1948; Erim, 2008: 376).

[104] The opposition was also hurt by the fact that it had not yet completed its party organization, especially in the countryside. Where they did establish a strong organization, however, the Democrats drew strong popular support even with few nationally prominent candidates. Besides Istanbul, they won outright in 12 provinces and almost matched the CHP's vote in Izmir, Ankara, and Adana (VanderLippe, 2005: 143). One could only imagine what the outcome would have been if the election was held in 1947 and no fraud took place.

While Peker calmed the initial panic within government ranks after the election and assured the orthodox wing of the party, his appointment inevitably increased tensions between the CHP and the DP.[105] Known for his authoritarian tendencies, Peker was opposed to a quick transition to democracy and, under his watch, the government became increasingly uncooperative with the opposition. This behavior spurred major clashes between deputies in the parliament and encouraged the DP delegates at the party's first general congress, held in January 1947, to adopt a Freedom Charter (Karpat, 1959:180-183; VanderLippe, 2005: 147-148; Inonu, 2008: 446-447). When both parties seemed headed for collision, in the summer of 1947, president Inonu began to meet privately with Peker, the DP leader Bayar, as well as several government and party officials. As the DP rapidly gained strength, hardliners in the ruling party became increasingly worried about the anti-Kemalist propaganda led by what they called "extreme" Democrats at the grassroots level. The DP elites, by conrast, wanted state authorities to be impartial towards their party and ensure that no election fraud would occur in future.

Following his consultations, Inonu issued a statement – the July 12 Declaration – that recognized the right of the opposition to exist and called on both parties to work together within the existing system (Karpat, 1959: 191-193; VanderLippe, 2005: 149-151). The July 12 document was a credible signal of Inonu's commitment to political liberalization and served as a blueprint for cooperation among moderates on both sides.[106] In a closed political system, Inonu assumed that the opposition would harden over time since only the ideologically committed citizens would join its ranks. Instead, he chose to engage moderate critics of the government to

[105] For the division between the orthodox and moderate factions over the question of political liberalization, see Karpat, 1959: 170; Arcayurek, 1983: 123-126; Toker, 1990; Erim, 2008.

[106] Many historians attributed this elite compromise to international pressures and the DP's growing popular strength but, in my view, Inonu played a formative role during this period. It is quite possible that Inonu initially appointed Peker to illustrate to the opposition that political liberalization was not the only option and that they could not survive under the rule of CHP's orthodox faction, while knowing full well that, when the opportunity arose, he would sacrifice Peker on the altar of the nascent Turkish democracy. Also see Inonu, 2008: 458-465.

boost the regime's legitimacy. This "elite pact" brought some level of accord to inter-party relations from above, thus strengthening foundations of the multi-party system (Kalaycioglu, 2005: 71-72). Through this tactical maneuvering, Inonu also elevated himself into the position of a statesman and weakened hardliners on both sides. Soon after the July 12 Declaration, 35 moderate deputies voted against the government in the CHP parliamentary caucus, thus triggering Peker's resignation (Karpat, 1959: 198-199; VanderLippe, 2005: 166; Erim, 2008: 169-185; Uran, 2008: 383). In his place, Inonu appointed Hasan Saka, a middle-of-the-road Kemalist, who, as foreign minister, had signed the San Francisco Charter.[107]

What was unclear at this point was no longer the survivability of the multi-party system but merely whether or not the new system would evolve into a dominant party regime under CHP's control. Recent studies have suggested that hegemonic parties perpetuate their rule by taking advantage of the coordination problems of the opposition (Magaloni, 2006; van de Walle, 2006; Howard and Roessler, 2006; Greene, 2007). Bereft of media control and state resources, they argue, opposition forces encounter difficulty in uniting their forces against the regime. Instead, opposition elites establish ideologically-niche parties that tend to have limited popular appeal. Interestingly, this did not turn out to be the case in Turkey. Although twenty political parties were established between 1945 and 1950, none could rival the DP in its organizational capacity, national presence, and popular support.[108] From the onset, both regime supporters and critics recognized the DP as the main opposition party with a broad base of support.

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[107] Most moderate deputies in the party, who joined the parliament after the 1943 elections, belonged to a younger generation, and thus were urban professionals (lawyers, doctors, merchants etc.). For Inonu, who recruited figures like Erim for leadership positions, the moderates represented the future of the party. Erim soon replaced Falih Rifki Atay, a close friend of Mustafa Kemal, as editor of Ulus, the CHP's official newspaper, and subsequently became a minister and then deputy prime minister in the cabinet (Us, 1966: 727-728; Karabekir, 2009: 1429-1430; Erim, 2008: 218-219). For a criticism of Inonu and his support for the moderates, see Karaosmanoglu, 1968: 177-178.

[108] The first opposition party that was founded in this period was not the DP but rather the National Resurgence Party, bankrolled by a rich businessman (Karpat, 1959: 148-149). For more on these small parties, see (Kocak, 2012: 190-230)

This was not for lack of trying, however. The ruling party in Turkey resorted to most measures from the playbook of authoritarian dominant-party regimes. First, it imposed some level of repression against the opposition forces, including a ban on socialist parties, arrest of regime critics, and limited censorship. For example, martial law remained in effect in Istanbul throughout this period. When necessary, the government could tap into its internal security apparatus to quell domestic opposition. While repression and political restrictions were nowhere close to their previous levels in the last two decades, opposition politicians knew that they had to operate within certain limits. Hence, the political arena was not sufficiently open to accommodate a wide array of ideological groups. Of course, this played into the hands of a moderate party such as the DP, for they had already accepted these restrictions.

Surely, the playing field was not level between the ruling party and the opposition. The ruling elites deliberately funneled state resources to cover the CHP's operational expenses and to fund the local party branches. The People's Houses, which worked as the party's cultural organization across the country, were financed out of the state budget. Unlike dominant parties, however, the CHP did not create extensive distribution networks to funnel patronage to voters and to mobilize them during elections. It did not have sectoral organizations nor did it forge dense local networks enveloping the country. Even after the end of WWII, discretionary spending remained low and the largest share of the budget went to national defense, rather than social spending and education. Scholars of Turkish politics have attributed the CHP's decline to the economic downturn but other authoritarian regimes faced with exogenous economic shocks survived thanks to their large public sectors (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995: 13). In Turkey, however, the state-owned enterprises were not used to deliver large number of patronage jobs.[109]

[109] In terms of patronage, one could perhaps mention the CHP's organic ties with some tribal leaders and landowners in Eastern provinces. But rather than a direct exchange of resources, this was based on a political quid pro quo: the

Due to the disruption caused by the war, the Kemalist elite could not manipulate the economy to expand its core constituencies, as seen in other single-party regimes. Over the years, the regime favored a number of Turkish Muslim contractors and businessmen but others opposed to Inonu's rule also enhanced their wealth during WWII. Given that the propertied classes were not co-opted by the regime and had weak peak associations, the government could not effectively impose its will on them. This was not due to a meritocratic bureaucracy's refusal to divert public resources for partisan gain (Shefter, 1994; Geddes, 1994). High-level bureaucrats were all political appointees and most civil servants remained loyal to the regime. In fact, the number of civil servants rose from 62,000 to over 300,000 between 1922 and the end of WWII (Us, 1969: 649). Rather, the problem stemmed from the fact that having reached and maintained power without much popular support, the ruling party felt little need to build an infrastructure that could galvanize such support when necessary.

Most revolutionary regimes derive their initial legitimacy from securing national unity after a revolution, decolonization struggle, or national liberation war (Zolberg, 1966; Huntington, 1970; Levitsky and Way, 2013). The wartime rupture with the political and economic elites made this national unity untenable. In the early postwar period, the Kemalist regime was faced with internal divisions, economic difficulties, and international pressures. Though some attempts were made to build stronger ties with economic groups after the DP's rise, as will be discussed, they were not systematic. In short, the Kemalist elite lacked an institutional infrastructure for durable authoritarianism to encounter the growing opposition at both the elite and mass levels.[110]

Kemalist elite recognized these feudal actors' local control in exchange for their political support of the government and their acquiescence in a historically volatile region.

[110] For an insider's view on the weakness of the CHP local branches, see Erim 2008: 88, 148-149, 199.

Increased Elite Opposition and Kemalist Party-Building Efforts

Poor electoral performance in 1946 persuaded CHP leaders to expand their organizational presence, adopt a more popular agenda, and direct their appeals to the lower classes. No longer could the party cadres expect the government to repress the opposition. However, this required both organizational and programmatic changes to the party's traditional structure. Notably, the CHP leadership increased the party's organizational presence in the countryside, opening up more local branches from 1946 to 1950 than at any point in its history (Rustow, 1966). In addition, 40 People's Houses and 1644 People's Rooms were established across the country (Tunaya, 1952: 596-597, cited in Angrist, 2005: 184). Because entire CHP chapters defected to the opposition in some areas, there was also a need to rebuild the party. Until then, as Karpat (1959: 197) aptly puts it, the CHP was "a conglomeration of individuals with different economic, social, and political views who had been kept together by the historical and political necessities, and opportunistic purposes, for the last twenty-five years".

The ruling party also began to reach out to the industrial workers. Appointed by Ankara to head the CHP's Workers' Bureau, Refii Barkin was empowered to deal with trade unions on behalf of the party but otherwise had limited influence over the government's social and labor policies.[111] As a deputy from a mining town, Zonguldak, he promoted the labor cause in the parliament, advocating lenient policies towards industrial workers and supporting the land reform bill. Unlike their Mexican counterparts who received assistance from labor unions on their way to power, the Kemalist leaders never felt threatened enough to institutionalize their ties with labor unions. In Istanbul, Barkin united seventeen unions concentrated in the textile sector and in the public enterprises under a regional alliance. Due to their above market salaries and

[111] There is still a controversy as to whether or not a bureau specifically allocated to worker relations existed. For more see Sulker (1975: 45-46) and Makal (2007).

favorable treatment, public sector workers were open to the regime's appeals (Sulker, 1975: 47-48). On the other hand, Barkin excluded the leftist and socialist unions that held a separate political agenda and refused to cooperate with the regime. The Turkish case once again stood out with its conservative strategy: the government tried to co-opt existing unions but made little effort to expand unionization among workers.[112]

Barkin also tried to form unions at state factories in other provinces, hoping to transform the Istanbul regional alliance into a national organization intertwined with the ruling party. In the end, this agenda achieved limited success because of the party authorities' lukewarm support. Many in the party feared what they considered to be the disruptive influence of the proletariat and saw little value in strengthening labor unions. Due to this fear, the government maintained its ban on labor unions' political activities in the revised Law of Associations and adopted tight restrictions and administrative constraints in the Employer and Employee Unions and Union Federations Law of 1947 (Bianchi, 1984: 114; Mello, 2007: 214; Makal, 2007: 218-220). This steadfast concern motivated the government to supplant its solidarist mentality with anti-communist and nationalist principles.[113]

The DP's rise as a Populist Party

While voters were clearly dissatisfied with the CHP, negative retrospective evaluation of the incumbent does not automatically translate into support for the opposition. As Greene (2007: 21) points out, "although negative retrospective evaluations of the incumbent may be a necessary condition for opposition party success, it is clearly not sufficient". To win elections, Democrats

[112] Even in Istanbul, which had approximately 100,000 workers, the unionization rate did not surpass 20 percent. Most of those workers remained excluded from the CHP's appeals at the time and were therefore conducive to the opposition's anti-government activities. According to the party's internal records, pro-regime unions together had 14,620 members, representing three quarters of the unionized workers in Istanbul and a sizable portion of the 72,000 unionized (out of 330,000 total) workers across the country (Robinson, 1963: 132).

[113] This approach resembled the early stages of the state corporatist regime, as seen in Vargas' Brazil and Nasser's Egypt, which recognized the existence of workers but offered them few material benefits and inducements, and organized them under the authoritarian guidance of the state bureaucracy.

needed to accomplish two tasks: demonstrate that the ruling party was not invincible and convince the electorate that they could improve the status quo. Especially after 1947, Democrats rapidly expanded their party's organizational presence in small towns and villages. Its internal structure remained decentralized, for organizational autonomy allowed local branches to better appeal to individual voters and groups marginalized by the regime. Most rank and file members, as well as some party officials, had not participated in politics before. For them, political participation carried an expressive benefit or what Clark and Wilson called a "purposive selective benefit" (cited in Greene, 2007: 123).

At the same time, the DP managed to avoid the trap of becoming an ideologically niche and electorally uncompetitive party, as seen under dominant party systems. Rather, the Democrats quickly emerged as a credible alternative to the ruling party, coalescing anti-status quo actors under its banner and mobilizing new voters. Given that the ruling party did not have extensive patronage networks, the Democrats did not encounter difficulty in attracting voters across the country with loose campaign pledges such as low taxes, cheap credits and higher salaries. Although the government controlled the state radio and some dailies (though a few popular ones such as Vatan sided with the opposition), the low literacy rate and low percentage of radio penetration delimited what advantage the ruling party could gain out of these venues (Kocak, 2012: 461-463 and Kocabasoglu, 2010; for a contrast with Argentina, see Karush, 2012). Moreover, once Inonu ensured the opposition's right to exist – with the July 12 statement and by purging hardliners from the CHP – the regime lost its most effective tool against its critics: use of coercion. As a result, the government found itself on the defensive against the opposition's criticisms with few tools to counter them. Conversely, as the DP's chances of winning arose, its leadership focused increasingly on office-seeking and enforced internal

cohesion among its members. Accordingly, the DP elites devoted considerable effort to ensuring free and fair elections. They raised pressure on the government and compelled the Kemalist elite to commit to a transparent democratic process, thus taking away their ability to practice electoral fraud. In the end, the government was compelled to enact an electoral reform to appease the opposition.

Consequently, the DP leadership followed a middle course between confrontation and compromise (Bayar, 1999: 408). Rather than challenging the ruling party from an ideological angle, the DP leaders concentrated their efforts on building a catch-all organization designed to unite the government's opponents without scaring the Kemalist elite. At every opportunity, Bayar and his deputies signaled their commitment to secularism and supported the government's pro-Western foreign policy. Their criticisms were instead confined to economic and administrative issues. In the event of victory, the DP leaders assured the Kemalist elite that they would not challenge the policies of the CHP era.[114] With their moderate agenda eschewing radical reform and heavy state intervention, the DP elites easily tapped into the elite networks enveloping the country to reach out to masses.

This cautious course spurred a split within the DP between moderates, concerned primarily with seeking office under the current system, and ideological purists or, as Greene (2007: 129-130) puts it, "message-seekers", who regularly sought confrontation with the government. The two groups had varied motives and strategies. The former was not so much interested in settling accounts with the Kemalist past (as this could also implicate them) as winning office. By contrast, the "extremist" Democrats remained suspicious of the DP founders' motives, perceiving any moderation to be the result of a backroom deal with Inonu. By accepting

[114] This is very much in accord with Greene's (2007) analysis of the PAN's moderation during the 1990s, when it dramatically expanded its electoral support against the ruling party.

Inonu's July 12 Declaration, they argued, the DP's founders compromised the party's moral stance and fighting spirit (VanderLippe, 2005: 174). Despite these attacks, the DP leadership renounced such calls for insurrection and defended the July 12 accord (Agaoglu, 1967: 53-60; Sarol, 1983: 88-95).

In 1948, Kenan Oner, head of the DP Istanbul branch, resigned from his position to protest the party leadership (Karpat, 1959: 212-213; Vanderlippe, 2005: 175-176). This was the eruption of a divide that had existed within the party (between different regions and strong political personalities, as well as the divide over strategy) almost since its onset (Oner, 1948; Agaoglu, 1967; Sarol, 1983; Toker, 1990). To quell the intraparty factionalism, the DP central committee expelled Oner's supporters from the party's parliamentary caucus (Agaoglu, 1993: 151-152, 169). In so doing, they sent a credible signal to the Kemalist elite that the DP was not interested in uprooting the political order (Toker, 1990). These expulsions and resignations culminated in the establishment of the Nation Party (Millet Partisi) under the leadership of Fevzi Cakmak and Hikmet Bayur (Karpat, 1959: 216-222). Founded by Inonu critics, the party quickly gathered "extreme" Democrats, as well as some religious figures and radicals.[115]

To conduct a better assessment of the inter-party relations, one needs to take into consideration the two parties' social base. For its proponents, the DP was a mass movement that uprooted the old order and brought forward new leaders who could appeal to the popular classes (Agaoglu, 1972). Against the Kemalist administration, the DP elites promoted what they called the "national will", rallying hundreds of thousands of people to their cause.[116] This view was

[115] They challenged both the ruling party and what they considered the semi loyal opposition party, the DP. As careerist politicians, disgruntled elites, and moderate urban dwellers flocked to the DP, the Nation Party failed to increase its organizational presence and remained small.

[116] Political scientists have recently defined 'populism' not in term of redistributive economic policies but merely as a political strategy of anti-establishment mobilization (Roberts, 1995 and 2006; Weyland, 2001). As such, populist movements do not have a particular electoral constituency or an organization structure. The DP certainly fits this definition better than the CHP, even though Kemalism promoted populism (halkcilik) as part of its official ideology

notably in accord with that of scholars, such as Kucukomer (1969) and Mardin (1973), who associated the Kemalist elite with the bureaucratic and political center, suggesting that they excluded actors in the periphery. By contrast, a second group of scholars, mainly composed of Kemalists, posited that the illiterate, uneducated, and religious masses supported the DP, which deliberately employed a religious discourse to expand its electoral strength. As such, they argued that the DP became a bastion of counter-revolution against the regime (Yetkin, 1983).

Still others claimed that the DP arose from policy divisions among political and economic elites. For example, Kongar (1998) saw the rising commercial and industrial bourgeoisie behind the opposition party. Both Marxist and left Kemalist scholars agreed in their analysis that the excessive agricultural products tax and land reform bill distanced landowners from the CHP (Cem, 1977; Kucuk, 1980; for a dissenting view Karaomerlioglu, 2000). Notably, Keyder (1987 and 2007) and Birtek and Keyder (1975) have argued that an alliance between bureaucratic elites and upper classes was broken during WWII, which then resulted in their political divorce in the latter half of the 1940s. For Birtek and Keyder (1975), land reform bill was a final attempt by the Kemalist elite to draw rural support against these groups defecting from the regime.

The political reality was more complex, however. As Kocak (2012: 182-190) aptly observes, none of these studies offered evidence to support their claims. In sharp contrast to the Kemalist literature, for instance, the DP heavily drew support from non-Muslim communities, secular urban voters, and small producers that were not opposed to secularism. Neither was there a major defection of landowners from the ruling party, as claimed by some. Surely, landed and commercial elites were critical of the government's economic policies but not all could depart

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(Laclau, 2005). Like most populist politicians, the DP elites did not mobilize the masses through class identity but rather as part of the "people", whose interests were no longer served by the government.

from the comforts of being tied to an autocratic single-party. While there were strong disagreements between the pro-business and bureaucratic policy alliances, visible since the late 1920s, the divisions did not correspond to clear class lines. Even after the adoption of the land reform, many landed notables remained within the CHP and, in fact, played an important role in curbing its radical provisions through the intra-party channels. On the other hand, many DP elites' former ties to the ruling party cast a long shadow over the party's portrayal as a spontaneous popular movement opposed to Kemalism. The formation and rise of the DP occurred not despite the Inonu administration, but rather with its approval.

Angrist (2004) is right to suggest that the DP was supported by a multi-class coalition that included landowners, merchants, nascent industrialists, peasants, Islamist groups, and even workers. But so was the CHP. More specifically, the Kemalist elite also drew support from a heterogeneous coalition of provincial elites, large landowners, feudal Kurdish leaders, and peasants. Some of these ties were forged in the wake of the Greco-Turkish War, if not before, and were preserved during the later years. Thanks to the state patronage and favorable policies, these families retained their local influence and economic power under the single-party regime (Keyder, 1987; Meeker, 2002). Owing to its two decade-long autocratic rule, however, the CHP increasingly became a party of government. Consequently, power solidified at the hands of a small group of military and bureaucratic leaders at the top, while local CHP cadres could not be revitalized in the absence of electoral competition. Those who felt marginalized or excluded by the ruling party thus defected to the opposition. As political competition became nationalized, party politics served as a proxy for rivalry between local families, ethnic and religious groups, and even towns. It was common practice for a prominent family to join the opposition party if its rival family was close to the regime (Unbehaun, 2006; Erim, 2008: 190).

What therefore distinguished the two parties was not their dissimilar social composition but rather intra-elite conflict over the distribution of resources and government policies. Those who felt excluded from power, either at the national or local level, joined the opposition in hopes of bettering their individual careers. While both parties had candidates from merchants, landowners, and urban professionals, those within the DP were younger, more locally-based, and had fewer ties to the regime. Some among them also had deep policy grievances and were hurt by the government's policies over the last few years.[117] Over a short period of time, Democrats succeeded in unifying a wide array of groups under its banner, accommodating their economic interests and political demands under a loosely-defined populist agenda. The fact that a newly established party, supported by a plethora of landowners, former Kemalist leaders, and merchants, could gain such popular support is a clear testament to the Kemalist regime's initial failure to incorporate the popular classes to the regime.

Intra-Party Reforms in the CHP and the Conservative Backlash

After the transition to a multi-party system, the CHP leaders began to take into consideration their rank-and-file members and the public opinion. Intra-party debates were allowed in some contexts. Additionally, for the first time in the CHP's history, more convention delegates were selected by local branches than appointed from Ankara. The 1947 CHP convention, where Inonu's moderate faction defeated the orthodox Kemalists led by Recep Peker, became a turning point in these efforts (Erim, 2008: 221-223). This victory then set the stage for moderate delegates (many of whom were local party officials) to revise the party's platform on a number of critical issues, ranging from state intervention to land reform (Karpat,

[117] This phenomenon is not unique to Turkey. Commercial and landed elites in Mexico, who increased their fortune during the Porfiriato years, opposed the post-revolutionary regime, instead supporting an opposition party, named PAN, together with some Catholic groups. Where the DP differed from PAN was its ability to reach out to the popular classes and galvanize voters against the government.

1959: 206-209; VanderLippe, 2005: 171-174). The delegates voted to adopt a more liberal interpretation of statism, directly appeal to peasants, and replace the party's revolutionary ideology with a call for gradual change (Kocak, 2010b: 476). Moreover, the convention turned over the People's Houses to the government (purportedly to give them a non-partisan status), recommended the abolition of the radical Article 17 of the Land Reform Law, and advocated a change in the curriculum of Village Institutes. The delegates also voted to increase their power over the party leadership and to allow local organizations to elect seventy percent of the deputy candidates for the parliamentary elections.

These internal changes also spurred a major revision of the government's policies. In 1947, the Saka government replaced the regime's statist developmental agenda with a moderate economic plan that prioritized an expansion of the agricultural production, investment on the highway system, and light industries. Named after its chief architect, the economist Kemal Suleyman Vaner, the new plan shifted the government's focus from state-led industrialization to agricultural development and light industries based on domestic products (Ilkin and Tekeli, 2009). The groups which accumulated capital during the war years demanded a major reduction in the state control of the economy and more respect for private enterprises (Keyder, 1987; Bugra, 1994). Industrialists claimed that state firms, though once useful for industrialization, had become harmful to the economy and nation (Karpat, 1959: 298).

Concurrent with these developments, social classes began to increase their power vis-à-vis the state and use that for demanding more economic freedom and political support. For instance, some of the most successful private banks of republican history – Yapi Kredi, Garanti, and Akbank – were founded during the late 1940s, as war profiteers shifted their income to business and finance. Similarly, after a hiatus of two decades, the number of associations

skyrocketed between 1946 and 1950.[118] After it joined the Marshall Plan, the government also came under American pressure; through economic advisers and aid, the US enticed the Turkish state officials to reorient their economic policies (Thornburg, 1949; Toren, 2007). Lastly, the Kemalist leaders turned away from the land reform agenda, as symbolized by the appointment of a large landowner, Cavit Oral, as agriculture minister.[119] Instead of redistributing land, the government distributed the aid and equipment sent by the Marshall Plan and used its funds to build new roads (Robinson, 1963: 137-138; Erim, 2008: 285-288; Uran, 2008: 398; Kocak, 2012: 289-305). In so doing, Inonu administration also tried to appease landed notables to make sure that they would not switch their support to the DP.[120]

The laborista strategy began to lose steam in this period as well. For instance, the ruling party funneled very limited funds to pro-regime unions, thus reducing the worker benefits for supporting the regime (for a list of unions that received financial support from the CHP, see also Sulker, 1975: 61-63; Kucuk, 1980: 478; Makal, 2007: 263-265). While workers at state companies had relatively high salaries, those in the private sector could expect little state protection and were also insufficiently organized, under-paid, and weakly incorporated into the regime. The party's control over the industrial working class was therefore limited at best. After the trade liberalization in 1946, the Kemalist regime could no longer effectively protect the domestic market from cheap imports. Workers in the private sector received few material benefits and despised pro-government union leaders. These problems spurred a schism in the

[118] Most of the economic associations coalesced under a national leadership in March 1950, culminating in the establishment of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey. For more on these developments, see Bianchi (1984) and Koralturk (2002).

[119] In this period, those ministers known to have a leftist or radical agenda, such as Rasit Hatipoglu and Hasan Ali Yucel, were sidelined within the party (Arcayurek, 1983: 84-86).

[120] Other factors also played a role in this failure. Firstly, there were no landless movements from which the Kemalist elite could draw support. Besides radical bureaucrats, only the leftist groups supported the reform agenda (Kocak, 2010: 217-221). High illiteracy and low education levels in the countryside precluded the government from reaching out to landless peasants and tenant farmers (Derin, 1995: 190-192).

textile sector (hard hit by the 1946 trade liberalization), culminating in the formation of an alternative alliance of trade unions in Istanbul, named Free Labor Unions Federation.[121]

What can we make of the government's aforementioned shift to the right? Why did Inonu allow the creation of conservative parties but then suppressed the much weaker leftist groups? The obvious answer lies in Turkey's social structure. Even after two decades of secularist reforms, Turkish society was still largely parochial and traditional (Stirling, 1953, 1958, and 1960; Meeker, 2002). For instance, socialism mostly spread among members of non-Muslim communities during the late Ottoman period and failed to take root in the rest of the society during later years. By softening its secularist agenda, the government also hoped to reach out to pious voters, while eliminating religion as a campaign issue. Finally, Inonu used this new course to sever all ties with the Soviet Union, while seeking more military aid and support from the US. Indeed, Washington expected all of its allies during the Cold War to marginalize socialist and communist groups in the domestic arena.

For a regime that eschewed class-based mobilization and had limited resources for redistribution, this was perhaps the ideal course to sustain its power. Through these new policies of limited statism, the Inonu administration offered a credible signal to the provincial and business elites as well as landed notables that the CHP would not adopt excessive taxes and expand state enterprises at the expense of the private sector. Both national and foreign capital was encouraged to invest in the economy. In line with these changes, Inonu continued to promote the moderate wing within the ruling party. In 1949 he appointed Semsettin Gunaltay, a moderate pious scholar of history, as prime minister, while young deputies received ministerial

[121] Established in 1950, the dissident unions in this regional alliance threw their lot with the DP (Sulker, 1975: 51-57). This development precipitated a major gap within the regime's nascent worker base and signaled its weakness. The limited pluralist model of industrial relations, which the Kemalist elite preferred to prevent the unification of the industrial workers under, unexpectedly allowed them to form alliances against the government.

positions in the new cabinet (Aydemir, 1975: 475-476; Erim, 2008: 399-400). As political leaders from the founding generation reached the age of retirement (some already died), they were replaced by a new generation of Kemalists, groomed for power in the last several years by the party leadership. Furthermore, the government would moderate its stance towards Islam in areas of religious education and religious observation (VanderLippe, 2005: 181-192).

The CHP's electoral platform highlights just how far the party leadership had revised its positions over the last few years to target the median voter: limited statism, support for the private sector, tax reform, removal of Kemalism's six arrows from the constitution. Additionally, the ruling party appealed to peasants and urban dwellers with specific material promises, including cheap credits, seeds and farm equipment, cheaper utilities, affordable housing, roads, and jobs. This shift from hardline secularist and heavily bureaucratic policies was in accord with other dominant parties, such as those in Mexico (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007), Taiwan (Amsden and Chu, 2003), and Africa (Zoldberg, 1966), which have generally been centrist in their policy preferences. The DP's electoral platform was not very different on economic issues, though it attributed the country's social and economic ills to the CHP rule (Karpat, 1959: 240). By curbing its ideological excesses and relaxing autocratic controls, the CHP adjusted to its new place within the nascent two-party system and apparently stopped its popular decline (Karpat, 1959: 226). The CHP also tried to use a permissive electoral system to block the DP's rise.

1950 Elections and the Kemalist Defeat

But old habits do not change easily. On the eve of the 1950 election, the ruling party still lacked organic links with the popular classes. Even as late as 1950, CHP's Labor Minister Semseddin Sirer was opposed to the workers' right to strike (Kocak, 2010b: 500-502). The DP, in contrast, benefited from anti-incumbent sentiment among workers and further expanded its

appeal by advocating the right to strike. The opposition also had the sympathy of rural middle classes and small proprietors, despite the absence of a clear, class-based agenda. Nevertheless, the ruling party was assured of its victory: it only nominated Gunaltay and Inonu from two (multiple nominations were possible) provinces and fielded a candidate in all 63 provinces, while the DP and the Nation Party had nominees in 62 and 22 provinces, respectively.[122] In the end, the DP scored an impressive victory with 53.6 percent of the votes against the CHP's 39.9 percent, whereas the Nation Party polled 3.03 percent (VanderLippe, 2005: 204). Thanks to the majoritarian system, the DP obtained 85 percent of the seats in parliament, thus consigning the CHP to a small caucus.[123] The Kemalist elite chose this electoral system to obstruct the DP's rise but instead became its own victim.

Ecological voting analyses from the 1950 election dispute both the Kemalist account interpreting the CHP's defeat as a counterrevolution and the argument that the regime's secularist policies severed the party's ties with mass voters.[124] Support for the DP was strongest in the more developed western Turkey (Marmara and Aegean regions), where commercial farming was widespread and landownership more equitable. Moreover, at the provincial level, the DP vote correlated positively with higher rates of urbanization, literacy, and income per capita. On the other hand, the CHP vote was higher in the underdeveloped eastern, southeastern and Black Sea provinces, where local notables mobilized their clients to vote for the government (Arcayurek, 1983: 189-190; Tuncer, 2010; Ozbudun, 2013: 39-40).[125]

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[122] For Inonu's speeches and notes during campaign, see (Derin, 1995: 216-250; Inonu, 2008: 532-535).

[123] Except for Inonu and Gunaltay, the rest of the cabinet members lost their seats. For more on the results, see Tuncer (2010) and Demirel (2013).

[124] For some examples, see Ozbudun (1976 and 2013), Ozbudun and Tachau (1975).

[125] Most notables remained loyal to the CHP even in opposition, suggesting that factors other than incumbency advantage motivated their political decisions. Among these factors, one could mention loyalty to prominent local figures within the CHP, solidarity with the Kemalist revolution, and participation in the military struggle in the early 1920s. More research is needed to develop a better understanding of the sources of the CHP's support in these areas.

This was neither a traditional backlash against the ruling party nor really a "ruralizing election". The rural vote divided almost equally between the two main parties and the DP's victory was due to its high margins in urban areas. Consequently, traditionalist and religious groups did not constitute a large portion of the DP's voter base. If religiosity was a salient factor, then the Nation Party – with its more conservative agenda than the DP – should have done well against both parties. In reality, the MP trailed both parties and failed to win seats in any province except for Kirsehir, where the idiosyncratic populist politician, Ihsan Bolukbasi, was elected as deputy. Islam constituted an integral part of Turkish culture but religion did not yet become politically salient.

Instead, the DP owes its victory to the "participation crisis" (La Palombara and Weiner, 1966) and its success in appealing to groups marginalized by the single-party regime: industrial workers, commercial farmers, urban mercantile interests, and non-Muslims. Magaloni (2006) provides a similar analysis about income levels and internalization of the national economy creating geographical pattern in the distribution of the parties' electoral support in Mexico. While there are some parallels between both the CHP's and the PRI's electoral demise, it should be pointed out that the latter party retained its electoral majority and survived in power for several decades longer than the former, thanks to its social programs, union support, and land reform (Ozbudun, 1970). Having lost the support of urban voters and commercial farmers with its war-time policies, the CHP, by contrast, did not have strong state and party institutions to galvanize support through clientelist networks and economic redistribution.

One should also point out that the post-WWII period proved to be unfavorable to the national developmentalist states.[126] More specifically, rapid rise in international capital flows

[126] This is not to suggest that these states did not emerge during the post-war era, as demonstrated by the Argentine and Egyptian cases, but rather faced higher political and economic pressures in the international arena.

forced nationalist governments to comply with the demands of newly established intergovernmental organizations like the IMF and integrate their financial systems to the world economy. Moreover, the US government relied on its impressive industrial capacity, vast resources, and military prowess to open up developing markets for American and multi-national companies. These changes created intense pressure on the nationalist regimes, diverting their resources away from long-term industrial investments and into the agricultural sector, as well as light industries. For instance, in 1945, the Turkish government's failure to raise sufficient domestic funds and secure loans from the EximBank to finance its heavy industrialization program compelled government officials to pursue an alternative developmental strategy. No longer did the West tolerate governments that primarily subsidized national capital at the expense of foreign companies. Developing countries were compelled to host multi-national companies and to allow partnerships between domestic and foreign capital (Cardoso and Enzo, 1979; Sikkink, 1991).

Conclusion

Among the cases analyzed in this dissertation, the Kemalist regime was the only one that did not establish enduring links with the popular classes. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how Mustafa Kemal consolidated his power based on his iron grip on the coercive apparatus of the state and on elite compromise. This chapter reveals that such a strategy did not create the foundations for a durable regime. Under Inonu, statist measures and higher taxes to cover wartime expenses fractured the elite coalition undergirding the regime and strengthened intra-party opposition. At the same time, the regime's weak institutional capacity limited government efforts to collect more resources from society and discipline critics within the ruling party. By the end of WWII, Inonu assuaged both his domestic opponents and international pressures by

allowing an officially-sanctioned opposition party. According to Inonu, this party was to serve as a safety valve for the regime without undermining its founding principles. Due to the regime's weak popular base, the ruling party was unable to take advantage of its resource advantages against the rising opposition and was soon eclipsed by this new party.

Due to the absence of strong ties between the Kemalist regime and popular classes, the DP easily filled this gap in state-society relations and secured electoral support through populist slogans. While weakly institutionalized regimes such as Turkey and Argentina remained vulnerable to elite defection, their markedly different capacity for political mobilization generated distinct regime outcomes. Unlike Argentina, where the Peronist government's popularity led regime opponents to contemplate a military coup, regime critics in Turkey successfully devoted their energies – via the democratic channels established by Inonu himself – into defeating the government electorally. The Kemalist leadership's last minute attempts to enhance its party organization and appeal to voters did not prevent this outcome. Instead of turning into a dominant party system, as was the case in Mexico, opening political space allowed the opposition to defeat the CHP at the polls. The next chapter juxtaposes the Turkish case to the single-party regime in Mexico, where the ruling party, though similarly faced with the defection of conservative elites, maintained its popular strength and political hegemony to the end of the twentieth century.

The 1950 electoral defeat proved to be long-lasting. Except for brief stints in coalition governments, the CHP did not come to power again, instead serving as the main opposition party. In contrast, the DP incorporated the mass peasantry to the new regime through party-based patronage networks. In a rural society, these organic ties enabled populist center-right parties to establish and maintain political hegemony well into the 1990s. On the other hand, by leaving

power peacefully to moderate CHP critics, the Kemalist elite managed to preserve most of the ND state institutions and the regime's earlier secular reforms. According to the then CHP's general secretary, Hilmi Uran (2008: 409-410), Inonu wanted to stay in government and leave power both at once, thinking that a peaceful transfer of power was necessary for democratic consolidation. After the election, Inonu would write: "my biggest defeat is my biggest victory" (Heper, 1998 cited in VanderLippe, 2006: 206; also see Erim, 2008: 352-353; Derin, 1995: 255). He was probably right.

CHAPTER 5
Elite Accomodation and Popular Mobilization under Strong Party Rule in Mexico

Introduction

We saw in Chapter 4 that the Kemalist leaders, absent strong party and state institutions, were unable to counter the electoral mobilization spearheaded by a group of disgruntled elites that defected from the ruling party, the CHP. This resulted in the CHP's surprising defeat by a political party that had emerged merely five years before and lacked access to patronage sources. Other single-party regimes proved more durable, however. In Mexico, the single party regime established by revolutionary chieftains survived well into the 1990s, producing one of the longest-running party rules of the twentieth century. The chapter analyzes the formation of this durable single-party regime, juxtaposing the PRI in Mexico to Turkey's CHP to assess the factors behind the stark political divergence in these two middle-income countries. Turkey and Mexico after the late 19th century shared many structural and politico-cultural factors that scholars have used to explain political outcomes in each case, albeit separately. When one compares the two cases with each other, however, none of these accounts stands up to critical scrutiny. This paired comparison therefore offers a chance to flesh out the impact of the causal variables specified in Chapter 1.

The two cases indeed have more in common than is usually recognized. First, each of these countries began the 20th century with a revolution – 1908 in Turkey and 1910 in Mexico – that toppled an autocrat, namely sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) and Porfirio Diaz (1876-1880, 1884-1911), respectively, who, though integrating their countries into the world market, eschewed the liberal, representative order to impose their personal rule. Both countries

subsequently endured nearly two decades of political instability, economic crisis, and military conflict, punctuated by a single-party regime that revolutionary generals had established to secure political order: the CHP in Turkey and the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in Mexico, which were created in 1923 and 1929, respectively. Both countries had a large rural economy, low urbanization and literacy rates, and high income inequality. While their initial focus was on agricultural development the two regimes, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, expanded their economic agendas, expanded the scope of state intervention, and followed radical cultural policies aimed at transforming society. Inevitably, this put these regimes at odds with religious peasants, who made up the majority of their population; each of the regimes consequently encountered a religiously inspired regional revolt in the 1920s. Moreover, their statist agendas generated strong opposition among a group of elites, who formed an alternative party to challenge the Kemalist and Mexican single-party regimes: the DP in 1945 and PAN in 1939, respectively. Faced with this opposition and the early postwar economic downturn, both governments would later adopt a liberal developmentalist course.

By the early 1950s, however, Mexico's ruling party, which had changed its name to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) had reestablished political control, kept much of the ruling class united, and retained popular support, while the CHP, despite its overtures to economic groups, failed to prevent an exodus of elite and mass support, and was subsequently defeated in the 1950 elections. This divergent outcome is especially puzzling, since the Mexican economic elites, given their proximity to the United States, were more powerful than their Turkish counterparts, who remained under-organized, while the Turkish military, with a longer history and stronger traditions than that of Mexico, should have been well poised to repress the opposition. Rulers in both countries confronted opposition from left and right factions in the

ruling party and followed a pragmatic, rather than ideological, course to address the fiscal, financial, and social challenges to their national-developmentalist agenda. Why then did these two regimes demonstrate markedly different abilities to control the political opposition and stay in power?

Three key features are vital to understanding the stark differences in the political trajectories of these two post-revolutionary regimes: the intensity of intra-elite conflict, the level of popular mobilization, and the speed with which a leader consolidated power. As noted in Chapter 3, the Turkish case scored low on the first two factors and high on the third. After his military victory in 1922, the nationalist elites coalesced behind Mustafa Kemal's political agenda to topple the Ottoman sultanate and establish a republican regime. His few elite opponents, in contrast, lacked the capacity to reach out to the lower economic classes. Therefore, Kemal had few incentives to establish robust political institutions and a broad political coalition. Ironically, this initial strength weakened the Kemalist elite's ability to cope with opposition forces in later years, for the regime lacked the institutions necessary to mobilize the popular classes and to achieve elite accommodation. In contrast, Mexico witnessed a long period of severe intra-elite conflict over the choice of political institutions and economic policies, and an autonomous mobilization triggered by revolutionary upheaval in the countryside. Both factors fueled contentious politics for decades on end, preventing any revolutionary leader from consolidating his power until the late 1930s. This sustained conflict created shifting political opportunities. In the end, political incorporation of both the peasantry and the organized labor was necessary to control the masses and defuse threats from below. Due to the absence of a clear leader to emerge in the initial years, this process occurred under the banner of a strong political party that unified different elite factions and offered each group assurances for their continued existence.

This chapter offers a detailed historical account to demonstrate how these three factors shaped the Mexican political trajectory during the first half of the 20th century. It describes the intense intra-elite conflict from the outbreak of the Mexican revolution, through the civil war and beyond, which pitted regional chieftains against the supporters of Diaz's oligarchic regime and then against each other. Conflict between political and economic elites also raged over the choice of political institutions and economic policies. Further, close attention is given to the autonomous popular mobilization during the revolutionary upheaval, ranging from Emiliano Zapata's guerrillas to Pancho Villa's armed bands, and from the *Cristero* rebellion to *Sinarquistas*. Another layer of the narrative looks at the frequent leadership struggles that revolved around the presidential races. Due to the high level of elite conflict and popular mobilization, no president managed to consolidate power until the 1930s. Ultimately, three presidents (Madero, Carranza, and Obregon) were assassinated and four others (Diaz, Huerta, de la Huerta, and Calles) went into exile. Unlike the Kemalist regime that managed to impose order quickly, Mexican politics therefore oscillated between two opposite trends: popular mobilization and political consolidation. Among the presidents, Alvaro Obregon came very close to consolidating his personal power without the need for strong institutions that would limit his autonomy. In the end, however, his assassination threatened the entire political system, pushing the politically insecure but opportunist Plutarco Elias Calles to invest in a new party which, unlike the CHP, developed a wide popular base, and established conflict-limiting mechanisms to maintain elite accommodation. In turn, this party-led corporatist system allowed the PRI to stay in power until the end of the twentieth century, while, in 1950, an opposition party easily defeated the elitist CHP, despite its command of state resources and the security apparatus. Conversely, unlike the DP, the PAN had no popular constituency and remained, over the

decades, a small, niche party. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the mechanisms through which the PRI remained durable for decades.

Intense Intra-Elite Conflict and Popular Mobilization during the Mexican Revolution

What began as a local revolt against the reelection of Porfirio Diaz (ruled from 1876-1880, 1884-1911) as president of Mexico, led by Francisco Madero, a wealthy *hacendado* from Coahuila, turned into one of the major revolutions of the century.[127] Akin to Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II, Diaz established a tight grip over Mexico via a personal network of military commanders, governors, and caciques but never institutionalized his power. Under his rule, the Mexican economy was tightly integrated into the world markets, growing at a rapid pace and attracting vast amounts of foreign capital in transportation, mining, and agriculture. His economic policy heavily relied on the belief that the export of natural resources, such as sugar, coffee henequen, and oil, would generate sufficient material wealth to promote Mexico's development. While rapid expansion of commercial agriculture and the railroad network spurred a strong rural middle class, political discontent was also simmering beneath the surface. Urban professionals, rural middle classes, and dissident landlords, despite the new economic opportunities offered by the *Porfirian* modernization, resented the loss of political autonomy under his despotic rule (Tutino, 1990; Cordova, 1997). Most notable was Diaz's efforts to centralize power with the help of a group of liberal technocrats, who promised to rationalize the administration. Also known as cientificos, they opened up the economy to foreign investments and while doing so accumulated political office, land, and resources in their hands.[128]

[127] On the Mexican Revolution, see Cockcroft (1968), Bailey (1978); Knight (1986)

[128] The most important among them were Bernardo Reyes and Treasury Secretary Jose Yves Limantour, who balanced the budget in 1893, secured international loans, and nationalized the Mexican railways. For a sympathetic account, see Bell (1914). Also see Bortz and Haber (2002).

Therefore it is little wonder that in 1910 when Madero rose up against Diaz's rule, liberal middle classes joined his campaign, opening up anti-reelection clubs and then taking up arms against the regime (Ruiz, 1980: ch. 9; Krauze, 1997: ch. 10). Just as the Balkan territories in the Ottoman Empire, with their proximity to Europe, constituted the center of opposition in the 1908 Revolution, so did the early wave of revolutionaries find refuge in the sparsely populated, northern states of Mexico - away from Diaz's federal army but close to the United States border.[129] If the conflict had ended in May 1911, when Diaz went into exile and Madero was elected president, the Mexican Revolution "would have constituted no more than a form of 'middle-class' protest" (Knight, 1980: 19), not unlike what happened in the Turkish case. In Mexico, though, the intra-elite political struggles - between the Porfirian landed elites, high clergy, and local caciques, on the one hand and liberal, largely urban, middle-class and small landowners, on the other - spurred a militarily wider and socially deeper conflict, following the rise of popular movements originating in the countryside.

Arguably, two key features of the Porfirian regime - the rapid expansion of commercial agriculture and low political centralization - brought about these marked differences. Both countries, in an attempt to integrate into the world market, enacted liberal land laws in the late 1850s that purported to secure private ownership in the countryside.[130] During Diaz's rule, expansion of commercial agriculture spurred land concentration and vast economic inequalities in Mexico, while the Ottoman state authorities protected the peasantry by keeping intact the traditional agrarian structure and limiting the political influence of financiers. Though Diaz far exceeded his Ottoman counterparts in promoting an economic transformation, his record in political centralization lagged behind theirs. Whereas the Ottoman sultans modernized the state

[129] More importantly, both the Balkan regions and Mexico were some of the major epicenters of banditry at the turn of the century (Brading, 1980: 3).
[130] On the liberalism of 19th century Mexico and the land law of 1856, see Hale (1968); Jacobs (1982).

bureaucracy and the military in order to root out local challenges against their rule, Diaz refrained from building a strong army and instead relied on an intermediate political class of loyal governors and *jefe politicos*, backed by rural police (*rurales*), to secure order and to implement political decisions in the countryside. The process of political centralization in Mexico was far from complete by 1910: many regions were beyond the control of the central government and only nominally recognized Diaz's authority.

Three decades of agrarian dispossession and concentration, when unaccompanied by a subsequent development of political centralization, left a sizable portion of the Mexican society vulnerable to global imbalances, financial shocks, and market speculation.[131] Therefore, the breakdown of order in 1910-1911 prompted a host of rural and urban workers, indigenous peoples, ranchers, miners, cowboys, and frontiers to mobilize in search of economic opportunities, land restitution, or political autonomy. Two groups in particular left a large impact at the national level. The villagers of Morelos, led by Zapata, started a revolt to reclaim their communal land that was confiscated by sugar *hacendados* over the last decades. While Zapatistas were the most cohesive and organized peasant movement, peasants in other states- Durango, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Guerrero, Laguna, and Sonora- also revolted, occupying their land previously expropriated by haciendas.[132] By contrast, Pancho Villa, a social bandit from Durango, mobilized dispossessed northern ranchers, miners, cowboys, and estate dependents, who grieved the loss of autonomy due to land concentration under Diaz and wanted relief from the insecurities of seasonal labor. Such movements, which were fueled by agrarian grievances

[131] Land dispossession weakened the power of local notables and swelled the ranks of rural labor, lowering real wages both in the countryside and the cities. Further, foreign companies exploited Mexican workers in enclave industries. For more on the economic aspects of the revolutionary upheaval, see Katz (1974); Hart (1987), Knight (1980).

[132] For more on the local histories of the revolution, see Jacobs (1982), Benjamin and Wasserman (1990); Lear (2001).

and popular demands, turned the Mexican Revolution into a mass phenomenon and an intense social conflict.[133]

In contrast the overall excitement his presidency generated, Madero failed to enact a land reform as requested by the Zapatistas and to build a support base while in office (Collier and Collier, 1991: 120-121). Despite the advice of his associates, he also refused to purge the Porfirian officials and politicians, who still controlled the state machine. Due to his political indecisiveness and impotence, Madero soon encountered several armed rebellions across the country, carried out by both former Porfiristas and autonomous popular leaders. Consequently, Madero came to rely on the federal army led by Victoriano Huerta to restore order. Seizing the initiative, Huerta instead toppled the government to restore a moderate version of the old regime; Madero and his vice president were both killed. In short, Madero encountered an opposition that was more powerful, sustained, and had a wider social base than that encountered by his Turkish counterparts at any point. Such popular movements were largely absent from the Turkish case, while the military was a steadfast support of the government.

Madero's death suddenly left the revolutionaries without a leader. Venustiano Carranza from Cuahuila, as the only governor who refused to recognize Huerta's authority, emerged as the First Chief of the Constitutionalists.[134] But his leadership was not recognized by all parties. In reality, the Revolution consisted of several distinct and autonomous movements that temporarily fought alongside each other but otherwise had conflicting agendas. Huerta also proved to be a far more formidable foe than Diaz: he strengthened the army, made overtures to the clergy and Porfirista landowners, and secured order in states with proximity to Mexico City, if temporarily. In the end, however, popular mobilization from below obstructed all reactionary attempts to

[133] Some excellent biographies exist on these two historic figures. For more see, Womack (1968); Katz (1998); Ruiz (1980: ch. 12 and 13); Krauze (1997: 11 and 12).
[134] For Carranza's leadership and policies, see Ruiz (1980: ch. 10); Krauze (1997: ch. 13); Richmond (1983).

impose an oligarchic government, resulting in the Huerta government's collapse in 1914. By the same token, though, liberal elements of the revolution also failed to establish political order because they, too, had to confront these groups. When they failed to reach a settlement at the Convention of Aguascalientes (Quirk, 1981), these revolutionary forces began to fight against each other. At one point, the Villista and Zapatista forces even captured Mexico City and forced Carranza's forces to take refuge in Veracruz.[135]

Faced with a power vacuum in the country and intense opposition from below, the Constitutionalists felt the need to mobilize popular support. Therefore, radical reform was not an ideological choice but necessity.[136] For instance, the Constitutionalists made overtures to labor unions in Mexico City, organizing "Red Battalions" to fight on their side. Despite his earlier objections, Carranza publicly endorsed the program of agrarian reform (Hamnett, 2006: 213). In the end, the Constitutionalist forces led by Alvaro Obregon, a self-taught general from Sonora, defeated the popular forces led by Zapata and Villa, securing control over the Mexico and ending the civil war. The latter's defeat, despite their superior numbers over Obregon's forces, reveal the challenges faced by popular movements in bringing about a regime change. While the Constitutionalist camp had in its ranks landowners, urban professionals, and ranchers with administrative experience and educational background to offer a national vision, the zapatistas and villistas suffered from an absence of clear goals beyond their immediate demands, lacked the

[135] Not even during the armistice period (1918-1919), when the military was demobilized, political elites divided, and the country under invasion, had Turkey witnessed state collapse of such proportions. Whereas the Turkish army lacked sufficient number of troops but kept its organizational structure intact, the Constitutionalists faced the very opposite problem: Carranza could easily find troops but had to build political institutions almost from scratch. For a definitive account of this period in Mexican history, see Hall (1981: 59-139); Knight (1986); Tutino (1990); Collier and Collier (1991: 122-123).

[136] He also purged the old elites in the territories, replacing them with young, radical administrators (Knight, 1991: 53). The list includes Salvador Alvarado of Yucatan, Francisco Mugica of Tabasco, Plutarco Elias Calles of Sonora, and Jesus Agustin Castro to Oaxaca (Salamini, 1980; Joseph and Nugent, 1994; Buchenau and Beezley, 2009). These governors soon began to organize workers and peasants from above, pacified the Porirista challenge, distributed land, and enacted some of the most progressive legislation in the country.

capacity to govern the country and refused to institute a national government that would impose order (Knight, 1980; Katz, 1988).

However, the sustained mobilization from below, along with intense elite conflict, culminated in the constitutional convention held in the city of Queretaro between December 1, 1916 and January 31, 1917. Carranza hoped that the convention would produce a moderate document in the liberal tradition of nineteenth-century Mexico, including the principle of no re-election. However, a majority of the delegates, tacitly supported by Obregon, took inspiration from the revolutionary upheaval and addressed the calls for social reform (Hall, 1981: ch. 10; Buchenau, 2011: 88-92). The radical tone of this body matched that of its Turkish counterpart, the National Assembly (1920-1923) convened in Ankara during the Turco-Greek War (1920-1922). Whereas the Turkish body mainly focused on political goals like the war effort and the abolition of the sultanate, however, Mexican *constituyente* endorsed the principles of social justice, anti-clericalism, and economic nationalism. In the new Constitution, three articles stood out: free, secular, and public education (article 3), land reform and national ownership of land and subsoil resources (article 27), and extensive labor rights (article 123).

The promulgation of the Mexican Constitution, along with the ratification of Carranza's presidency, ended four years of factional conflict but did not bring stability to the political arena. For one thing, Carranza had limited control over the regional caciques and his military commanders, such as Gonzalez and Obregon. There was also the question of what to do with *zapatistas* and *vilistas*, both of which were defeated but not yet co-opted by the new regime. Further, Carranza increasingly acted alone in power, even refusing to fill some cabinet posts (Hall, 1981: 192-193). The president also broke with the congress, which was increasingly opposed to his personalistic rule. Even more distressing was his refusal to deliver on his promise

of land reform and support for worker rights, which weakened the government's support base. Instead, much like Madero's accomodationist course, Carranza reached out to the urban middle classes and landowners with conservative policies that ignored the social provisions of the 1917 Constitution. Akin to the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress, for instance, the president attempted to cultivate new ties with industrialists by organizing the First National Congress of Industrialists in late 1917.[137] The following year also saw the creation of a labor federation, the CROM and its political arm, PLM.

State-building Efforts and Leadership Struggles

Although the civil war had officially ended, economic conflict therefore remained at the forefront of the political arena.[138] While Carranza's personalistic style, push to control the congress, and opposition to radical reform were not all that different from Mustafa Kemal's leadership, unlike the latter, Carranza lacked both mass support and wide backing within the ranks of the government bureaucracy and the military. Notably, he faced opposition from the reformist elites in the Constitutionalist camp, a group that included many revolutionary officers, professionals, and northern ranchers. These reformist figures, such as Obregon and his fellow Sonoran associates, saw a need for creating a new political regime freed from remnants of the Porfirian elite and building state institutions upon a strong popular base, which would diffuse challenges from below and counteract elite threats.[139] Also joining them was the *Partido Liberal*

[137] Its chief architect was Alberto J. Pani, the secretary of industry, commerce, and labor (1917-1918), who was a classical liberal in monetary matters but opposed Diaz and supported Madero's rebellion. The congress led to the establishment of the Confederation of Industrial Chambers (CONCAMIN) but did not produce an alliance between the regime and industrialists (Shafer, 1973: 25-41; Haber et al. 2003: 44-47; Schneider, 2004: 61; Gauss, 2010: 34).

[138] Carranza's economic policies created resentment among peasants, particularly after Zapata's assassination in 1919 and spurred a major strike wave, thereby destabilizing what was already a precarious regime. For labor's precarious position within the revolutionary camp, see Ruiz (1980: ch. 16 and 17)

[139] Many were small entrepreneurs and landowners, who despised the Porfirian landed elites and were not indifferent to the problems of the rural population. Others felt personally committed to the plight of the masses they led into battle. They also knew that some level of popular mobilization was necessary to defeat Carranza.

Constitucionalista (PLC), the majority party in the congress and which Obregon and his associates initially tried to use to restrain Carranza in office (Hall, 1981: ch. 9; Buchenau, 2011: 88, 101-103).

Thus, the absence of a strong leader prolonged the intra-elite struggles among revolutionary chieftains to dominate the new regime established under the Constitution of 1917. Although Carranza sabotaged the PLC's development, weakened the congress, and increased executive control of the electoral process, he lacked the authority to impose his own agenda.[140] Not incidentally, tensions broke out over the question of presidential succession in 1920. President Carranza, constitutionally barred from running again, opposed the frontrunner Obregon's candidacy. Running against the government machine, Obregon thus had no option but to mobilize popular support. Carranza's opponents, along with proponents of radical reform, soon flocked to his campaign. When, in response, Carranza imposed his own candidate in Sonora and tried to circumvent the presidential elections, an obreganista rebellion broke out that resulted in the president's assassination in 1920 (Hall, 1981: ch. 13).

Aside from his connections with a spate of political and military elites, Obregon cultivated ties to agrarian groups and made a secret pact with the CROM that organized a labor party (PLM) to give support for his campaign. His electoral coalition also included the *Partido Nacional Agrarista* (National Agrarian Party, PNA), which merged *agrarista* groups after Zapata's assassination, the PLC, and the *Partido Nacional Cooperatista* (National Cooperatist Party, PNC). Unlike the PLM and PNA, these two parties had a largely urban, middle-class base (Garrido, 1995: 38-39; Collier and Collier, 1991: 206-207). The support of four distinct parties allowed Obregon to act very much like an independent candidate: He did not need to depend on any fellow general for political support, adopted a moderate discourse, and made few specific

[140] For his 1919-1920 presidential campaign, I relied on Hall (1981:ch. 11 and 12); Buchenau, 2011: 97-110

campaign promises. On the campaign trail, Obregon also declared his intensions to form a political party that would unify different strands of the revolution, not unlike the regime parties that accompanied the political rise of Mustafa Kemal, Nasser, and Peron.[141] In September 1920, Obregon won an impressive victory at the polls to herald a new chapter in Mexican history, also known as the Sonoran dynasty.[142]

Thus began the presidency of Alvaro Obregon. Although Mustafa Kemal (b. 1881) and Obregon (b. 1880) both came to power in 1920, conditions surrounding their rise could not have been more dissimilar. As explained in Chapter 2, the 1908 Revolution and the ensuing wars weakened but did not destroy the Ottoman state structure. When Mustafa Kemal tried to anchor the republican regime on the Ottoman institutions, he encountered weak autonomous mobilization from below and only limited elite resistance. Further, the military was firmly behind his leadership. By sharp contrast, Obregon operated in a precarious environment: the Mexican Revolution destroyed the Porfirian state and uprooted the social structure but failed to produce unity around a political agenda. Long after the collapse of the old regime, revolutionary leaders were fighting over political and material spoils. Notably, the federal government had limited oversight over zone commanders, governors, and regional chieftains, each of whom had varied mobilizational powers they could use as leverage against Mexico City. Like Obregon, each of these revolutionary generals political ambitions, which made their cooperation with the federal government a marriage of convenience. This was unthinkable in Turkey, where the only

[141] It was not uncommon for nationalist leaders in late-late developing countries to spawn a cross-class coalition as they establish a personalistic party that would govern the country, albeit in an authoritarian manner. This party strengthens the leader's control over the political arena, but does little to constrain his power. Unlike the other three leaders, Obregon failed to consummate this project and instead used parties as springboards to national power but never an administrative tool. This was in large part due to Obregon's failure to consolidate power during his presidency, as explained in the next section.

[142] The term derives from the fact that three consecutive presidents –de la Huerta, Obregon and Celles– in this period were all from the state of Sonora. For more on the Sonora tradition, see Aguilar Camin, 1980; Hall, 1981; Buchenau 2007 and 2011.

regional challenge to the regime, located in the Kurdish-populated eastern provinces, was quickly repressed and had little impact on national politics. Lastly, under pressure from oil and mining companies, the United States government pressured the Obregon administration on various matters of economic policy (Hall, 1995).

Obregon faced a war-torn country in need of political order and stability. His authority rested not on any institutional body, but rather on charismatic power fostered during long campaigns and reinforced by personal contacts, material rewards, and political favors to a spate of allies across the country (Hall, 1981: ch. 6; Buchenau, 2011: ch. 5). In building close ties with powerful governors and regional chieftains, he struggled to subjugate far-flung provinces under the control of the central authority.[143] To be sure, Obregon was a national leader and a military hero. Even the military was not fully under his control, however. As a precaution, he regularly rotated the military zone commanders to prevent them from building a local base of support and eliminated those who crossed him.[144] In 1921, for instance, the government crushed a rebellion organized by the carrancista Generals Blanco and Murguia, both of whom were killed in the end. Pancho Villa, who retired to a ranch in Durango, was assassinated in 1923.

The assertion of central authority in these years led to an outbreak of conflict at two distinct levels: the first was a struggle among different factions at the local level and the second was a competition between the national government and the local state authorities for control. Given Mexico's large size and its weak central rule in the pre-revolutionary era, the federal government had only fledging control over the different states. What little control the national

[143] In prosperous northern states Obregon promoted pro-business governors, who favored private entrepreneurs and agricultural investments. In southern states, where haciendas and plantations were prevalent Obregon instead affiliated himself with radical governors, who organized peasants and pushed for land reform.

[144] Abelardo Rodriguez, a fellow Sonoran general, is a case in point. Obregon appointed Rodriguez as governor of Baja California to oust its strongman, Esteban Cantu. Rodriguez proved not only highly capable of taking over the reins of the state government but also boosted the regional economy and in the process built his own business empire. In exchange for his support for the government, Rodriguez was awarded command of the military zone in addition to the governor's post, both of which he kept until 1929.

government of Diaz had enjoyed collapsed during the 1910 Revolution and neither Madero nor Carranza managed to impose constitutional order. In this power vacuum, revolutionary chieftains carved out local fiefdoms, where they raised troops and organized the popular classes from above to seek influence at the national level and, ultimately, capture the presidency. None of these caudillos accumulated sufficient military power and prestige to establish unity, however. With Obregon's rise to the presidency, this began to change. Akin to Mancur Olson's "roving bandits", these leaders used the revolutionary upheaval to reshape property relations in their favor and subsequently became "stationary bandits" who now favored the status quo to expand their power and wealth (Olson, 1993; Buchenau, 2011: 167). At a time of great political uncertainty and weak state institutions, revolutionary leaders encouraged investment by offering special guarantees and state credits to a group of pro-regime economic elites but, unlike the Diaz period, also incorporated industrial labor (Haber et. al 2003; Gauss, 2011: ch. 1).

After a decade of conflict, the new rulers were confronted with the challenge to build a national market, promote economic growth to benefit the popular classes, and renegotiate relations with the Catholic Church and the foreign companies. Obregon, shifting the locus of power from the military to the civilian political organs, assembled a strong cabinet that included, among others, the Minister of Interior Calles, the Minister of Treasury de la Huerta, and the Minister of Education Vascencelos (Buchenau, 2007: ch. 4; Buchenau, 2011: 118-127). Notably, Calles took charge of the federal police, while de la Huerta focused on restoring the crippled financial system and reaching a settlement with the international bankers and oil companies (Hall, 1995: ch. 5). Obregon managed to reduce the size of the army and shrink the share of defense spending in the federal budget, instead funding infrastructure, education, and health (Wilkie, 1970: 162). This stability proved to be ephemeral, however. The consortium of parties

that supported Obregon's electoral campaign had conflicting priorities, which led to major disagreements over the economic agenda. The middle-class oriented PLC soon came under attack by other parties in the congress and was weakened. Due to its limited fiscal base, the government could not address much of the redistributive demands of industrial workers and peasants at the same time. The result was that revolutionary chieftains struggled to expand their political power through these different parties: the PNA with the President Obregon, the PNC with the Treasury Minister de la Huerta, and the PLM with the Interior Minister Calles (Collier and Collier, 1991: 207-208; Buchenau, 2011: 127-137).

The United States government's refusal to recognize the Obregon administration further aggravated the political crisis. During this period, Mexico was unable to procure arms legally and to attract foreign capital. De la Huerta's failure to secure a new loan left the Mexican financial system in dire shape, forcing Obregon to sign the Bucraeli Accords with the United States in late 1923 (Hall, 1995: ch. 7). Against this backdrop, Obregon's decision in late 1923 to support Calles for the presidency brought to surface the deep rifts that had existed within the administration, particularly between de la Huerta and the Obregon-Calles bloc. Intra-elite political disputes were also common in the Turkish case, as epitomized by Inonu's conflict with Rauf Orbay in 1922 and Fethi Okyar in 1930. Whereas disgruntled Turkish elites found weak support from the military and had a limited popular base, however, political splits in Mexico escalated rapidly into a military revolt by tapping into other grievances in society. Notably, de la Huerta resigned from the cabinet in September 1923 and, encouraged by division generals resentful of Calles, started an armed revolt two months later (Hall, 1995: ch. 8). Roughly speaking, one third of the generals in active duty – one hundred and two – and half of the troops in the Mexican army joined the revolt. A civilian himself, de la Huerta was also supported by the

PNC, as well as several governors, union leaders unaffiliated with the CROM, and much of the urban middle classes. In the end, the Obregon administration prevailed in large part due to its ability to arm agraristas across the country and to use the CROM-led battalions to keep peace in the cities. According to an estimate, pro-Obregon governors recruited over one hundred thousand volunteers from among beneficiaries of land reform to fight for the regime (Buchenau, 2011: 133). This popular force, given the military's limited strength, proved critical in defeating the rebels united only in their opposition to Obregon and Calles.

Following De la Huerta's defeat Obregon summarily executed or purged the dissident officers from the army, while other rivals like de la Huerta went into exile in the United States and his local allies lost power in their regions.[145] After his victory in the 1924 elections, Calles assumed the presidency in what was the first peaceful transfer of power in Mexico since 1884.[146] Calles' hold on power was tenuous, however. For one thing, he owed his presidency to the *obreganista* faction of the military and the *agraristas*, neither of which supported him wholeheartedly. Even in self-retirement, Obregon cast a long shadow over Mexican politics via his powerful supporters among division generals, governors, and cabinet ministers (Buchenau, 2011: ch. 6). The majority commanded by Obregon's allies in the congress, led by the PNA, further curtailed Calles' room for maneuver. This left Calles even more dependent than Obregon on the CROM. Consequently, the CROM leaders gained strong influence over policy matters, financial and organizational benefits, and several high-ranking government posts, as epitomized by the appointment of Morones as minister of industry, commerce, and labor – the highest post ever achieved by a labor leader in Latin America until the rise of Peronism (Collier and Collier, 1991:210-219). Aside from his alliance with the CROM, Calles also made use of government

[145] For an example of a local family that lost power due to their support for de la Huerta, see Jacobs (1982: ch. 5).
[146] For the 1924 presidential campaign, see Valenzuela (1998).

patronage to form his own group of loyalists across the country. Moreover, faced with Obregon's personal bloc and the agrarista groups, Calles first began to entertain the notion of forming a political party, particularly centered on the model of *Partido Socialista del Sureste* (Socialist Party of the Southeast, PSS) in Yucatan (Joseph, 1980; Buchenau, 2010: 45).

During the initial years of his presidency, Calles also embarked on a quest for post-revolutionary state building and economic reconstruction (Buchenau, 2007: 118-124). His policies would pave the way for the founding of a proto-ND state, akin to the Inonu governments in 1920s Turkey. Joining him in these efforts was a burgeoning technocratic class or "neo-cientificos" like Finance Ministers Alberto Pani (1923-1927, 1932-1933) and Luis Montes de Oca (1927-1932), who held classical liberal views in finance but opposed autocratic tendencies and rent-seeking behavior of Porfirian elites and saw a technical state necessary for promoting economic growth and industrial development (Knight, 1986: 525). Under the guidance of Finance Minister Pani, in 1925, Calles established Mexico's first official bank of issue, the Banco de Mexico, which augmented state control over the banking system, stabilized public financing, and soon evolved into a central bank (Maxfield, 1990: ch. 2; Maurer, 2002). Much like the *Is Bankasi* in Turkey, the *Banco de Mexico* soon became a lender to several regime insiders and revolutionary generals, who invested in land deals, the housing market, and the nascent industries (Gauss, 2010: 33). Further, the government introduced the nation's first income tax, balanced the budget, and renegotiated the country's foreign debt. Pressed for revenues, Calles also sought to impose greater control over land and subsoil resources exploited by foreign mining companies (Buchenau, 2007: Ch. 5).

In contrast to the Diaz period, Calles used economic policy for promoting industrial and agricultural development. While land distribution slowed down, the government concentrated its

efforts on raising agricultural productivity by providing cultivators with cheap credit, better roads and irrigation (Krause, Meyer and Reyes, 1978: 98-107). The burgeoning class of revolutionary elites, who had taken possession of some of the most fertile lands across the country, stood to gain from these policies. The state authorities envisioned that expansion of the agricultural production would increase demand for the small and medium-scale industrialists, whom they considered a support group for the new regime. Both Obregon and Calles, despite their owing power to agrarian support, emphasized the need for industrialization and actively supported Mexican industrialists through tax-exemption legislation, cheap credits, and tariffs. Indeed, planning commissions, such as the abortive National Economic Council (Consejo Nacional Economico) formed in 1928, became early arenas for the establishment of a corporatist system under Calles, bringing together representatives of industrialists, labor unions, merchants, and consumers with technocrats. For a time, thanks to the alliance with the CROM, industrial peace and sharp decline in the number of legal strikes augmented these official efforts.

Beginning with 1926, however, Calles' labor populism and anticlerical agenda spurred a conservative backlash from private entrepreneurs, agraristas, foreign companies, and the Catholic Church. Agrarian organizations such as the PNA, for instance, criticized the PLM's growing role within the administration and the slow pace of land reform. Joining them were businessmen concerned with the rapid rise of unionization and worried that a state-labor alliance would reduce their profits and control over the workplace. Although Calles was firmly committed to a program of economic development along capitalist lines, Morones' radical rhetoric, along with rising tensions with the United States, deeply alarmed the national bourgeoisie. Relations with the United Sates also worsened to a considerable extent due to the government's economic nationalism, as epitomized in the 1925 Petroleum Law. Lastly, Calles

found himself locked in a protracted battle with Catholic groups after he sought to enforce the anti-clerical provisions in the 1917 Constitution. With support from opponents of land reform and the clergy, this triggered a full-scale rebellion in the west-central states, Mexico's Catholic heartland.[147] In response, the battered Calles government overhauled the region's agrarian structure and mobilized half of the army, along with the agraristas. In the end, the Cristero rebellion (1926-1929) drained government resources, lowered investor confidence, and undermined attempts to stabilize the regime.

This concerted opposition precluded Calles from consummating the state alliance with the CROM (Collier and Collier, 1991: 219-224). These events, while weakening Calles' authority, played into Obregon's hands. From Sonora, the former president was preparing for his political comeback. Since Diaz's fall, Mexican politics was plagued by the prevalence of revolutionary *caudillos*, who, though unbounded by political institutions, failed to consolidate their power at the national level. At this time, Obregon was arguably the only leader with the capability to bring together the different strands of the "Revolutionary Family" and establish order.[148] He had loyalists among governors, division generals, cabinet ministers, and congressmen, and cultivated strong ties with agrarian groups to expand his support base. Given Obregon's popularity, President Calles also felt compelled to rally behind his candidacy, rather than risk a violent and risky clash with Obregon like Carranza did in 1920. In the end, Obregon

[147] The Cristero rebellion was a product of the contentious church-state relations in Mexico, exacerbated by the Revolution's anticlerical radicalism. One should also mention that the national-developmentalist state has a tendency to clash with religious groups, due to its intrusive, centralizing agenda. Both Nasser and Peron faced a strong challenge from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Catholic Church, which spearheaded the growing opposition in the country. More tellingly, the Kemalist regime was shaken by the traditional, though localized, Seyh Said revolt (1924-1925), which proved costly for the republican government and affected its views on religious groups. For more on the Cristero revolt, see Bailey (1974), Purnell (1999), Boyer (2003: ch. 5); Butler (2004).

[148] Based on Brandenburg's definition (1964:3), I use the term Revolutionary Family to refer to "the elitist group who have run Mexico continuously since the 1910 Revolution, laid the policy line for the country to follow, and who continue to hold effective decision making power."

easily won the 1928 presidential election but was assassinated by a young Catholic before he could assume office.[149]

Obregon's assassination triggered a crisis that threatened the entire system, much like Madero's execution in 1913. Mexico was already facing a major economic downturn amidst the Depression and now the country had also plunged into a succession crisis. Because the 1917 Constitution abolished the office of the vice president, the congress was expected to pick a new president but no strong candidate emerged. Some elites like Adalberto Tejeda, the cacique of Veracruz, wanted to extend Calles's term but the latter was strongly opposed by hard core obraganistas, who accused him of complicity in their leader's murder. Obregon's death was a major blow to their own political ambitions, since they lacked the same rapport with Calles. To be sure, Calles commanded some authority among the revolutionary leaders but also lacked his predecessor's popularity and charisma. Notably, many generals considered a run for the presidency now that Obregon was dead. Lastly, the regime faced opposition from the urban middle classes and economic elites, not to mention the ongoing Cristero revolt.

Party-formation as a Solution for Intense Political Rivalries

To break the deadlock, during his last *informe* (state-of-the-nation address), Calles announced his intensions to step down at the end of his term and pledged not to seek the presidency again (Marcoux, 1994: 128). Mexico, he declared, should transform from a "country of one man" to a "nation of institutions and laws". Instead, he called for the congress to pick a provisional president until new elections were scheduled. [150] The chief among these institutions

[149] Few studies take into consideration the importance of historical contingency. Indeed, we can never know how the Mexican and Turkish regimes would have developed, if Obregon had survived this assassination attempt in 1928 or that Mustafa Kemal died from the heart attack he suffered in 1924. Some accounts suggest that Obregon was planning to establish a political party designed to unify different strands of the revolutionary forces from above. Had he succeeded, the outcome would have most likely resembled Mustafa Kemal's CHP, rather than the PRI.

[150] His decision was followed by a pledge that the military would stay out of politics: "I speak in my triple character of a member of the revolutionary party, of general of Division and supreme chief of the Army which the

was a political party.[151] In his speech, Calles asked for political parties to be formed: first, an umbrella party to bring together the different elements of the "Revolutionary Family" and the second, an opposition party to represent what he called the reactionary elements. By renouncing power voluntarily, Calles stoked up enough political capital to isolate the hard core obranistas in the congress and dissuade revolutionary generals from seeking the presidency themselves. At no other time was his moral power higher. He had the support of several powerful regional and local caciques, and faced no competition from any other national organization. For the presidency, he ultimately chose Emilio Portes Gil, who had the support of the moderate obreganistas, various agrarista groups, large parts of the military, and was on friendly terms with the president (for other candidates, see Loyola Diaz, 1980: 109). As expected, his election united the Revolutionary Family for long enough to allow the latter to focus on founding a new party. Less than two months after his *informe*, Calles gathered the key revolutionary figures from across the country to enlist their support for the formation of a new political party (Marcoux, 1994: 163-170; Leon, 1987: 294). The meeting produced a manifesto, published in the newspapers on December 2nd, which became the basis for the new party, PNR.[152]

The organizing committee set February 10, 1929 as the date by which all existing regional and local parties seeking to join the PNR must apply; a party convention was then scheduled for March 1st in Queretaro, the city where the Mexican Constitution was promulgated.

Constitution makes me, as president of the Republic. Never like today, after the unchangeable resolution which I have taken, not to occupy again the presidency of the Republic, have I felt more sure in vouching for the unselfish and noble conduct of the army" (the translated text cited in Marcoux, 1994: 136).

[151] To be sure, political parties had already existed in post-revolutionary Mexico; but, until then, they mainly served as springboards for regional chieftains and caudillos (and disbanded when they acted autonomously) or had strictly sectoral representation as in PLM and PNC.

[152] Most notable among the participants were some regional leaders, who headed their own local parties in their respective states: Portes Gil of Tamaulipas (Partido Socialista Fronterizo, PSF), Aaron Saenz, Adalberto Tejeda of Veracruz (Partido Tejedista Veracruzano), Bartolome Garzia Correa of Yucatan (Partido Socialista del Sureste, PSS), and Manuel Perez Trevino of Coahuila (Partido Laborista de Coahuila).The best account on the PNR remains to be Garrido (1995). According to Garrido, at least 148 parties existed in twenty-eight states of Mexico. Also see, Marcoux 1994: ch. 5.

In some ways, the PNR resembled Mustafa Kemal's CHP, which, in 1923, was founded from above by merging local resistance associations throughout the country. However, these local organizations lacked a strong popular base and their leaders were soon co-opted into a centralized bureaucracy headed by Mustafa Kemal, who shared little power with the CHP organization. By contrast, the regional and local parties that joined the PNR had popular bases of their own, thus allowing their leaders to wield influence over the central leadership. In other words, Calles did not establish the PNR from a position of power and thus as a personalistic party. Rather the party was to secure his waning power during an unstable period, serving as a political apparatus to retain personal control over the revolutionary elites. Calles and his collaborators therefore structured the party's organization on a wide ideological and popular base and appealed to all social classes in the country with the exception of large businessmen, big landowners, and the high clergy, as epitomized by the populist language of its founding documents.[153] The PNR leadership sought to unify all of the revolutionary actors under its banner so as to mitigate intra-elite conflict and establish control over the country.

The new party's success in resolving elite disputes within its institutional body soon began to produce concrete results. The nomination battle for the 1929 presidential elections, for instance, resulted in the victory of Pascual Ortiz Rubio, an outsider who previously served as Obregon's Minister of Communications and Public Works, over Aaron Saenz, a conservative Calles loyalist and former foreign minister, even though the latter was initially considered the frontrunner (Marcoux, 1994: ch. 6). For the leftist-oriented elites, however, Saenz was not

[153] Nowhere is this desire for elite unity more apparent than the attempts of party leaders to appropriate the legacies of all prominent leaders of the revolution, including figures such as Madero, Carranza, Obregon, Villa, Zapata and Calles (the first five assassinated), who fought as much against each other, as they did for the revolution. Moreover, the PNR officials claimed to combine "Villa's and Zapata's agrarian aims with Carranza's and Obregon's economic nationalism and Madero's commitment to effective suffrage and political democracy" (Buchenau, 2007: 156).

sufficiently committed to the Revolution's principles.[154] To keep peace, Calles complied and Saenz did not revolt. The PNR also served as a check to the ambitions of powerful generals. Most political leaders and military elites, now united under the PNR's banner, opposed the *obragonista* General Jose Gonzalo Escobar, who staged a revolt against the government in Sonora, on the third day of the PNR convention. The government, with Calles as the new Minister of War, crushed the Escobar rebellion and carried out a major purge of hard core *obreganistas* in the army. From this point onward, any revolting general expected to fight not only the government but also a substantial part of the military and the ruling party. Lastly, the PNR ran Ortiz Rubio's presidential campaign across the country and helped him win the election. As the ruling party gained strength, the candidate began to matter less.

Whereas Mustafa Kemal ruled based on his charisma and command over state institutions, Mexico thus evolved into a complex political system in which power was shared by Calles, the president, the legislature, and the PNR regional strongmen. Under the party's banner, revolutionary generals and regional chieftains united to retain political office and receive material rewards. Hence, the party – rather than state institutions – gradually became the mechanism through which political patronage was distributed. As Quintana (2010: 59) aptly put it, "Calles understood that he who controls the party controls the country". While military conflict decreased, a new class of urban-based politicians, skilled in organization and administration, began to emerge across the country, taking the lead in unifying the popular elements that had mobilized over the past decade. Calles did not enjoy hegemony over the political arena; but the stasis allowed him to act as a kingmaker during this interim period, known as the Maximato (1928-1934). Like Obregon, he exercised strong influence over his successors, Portes Gil, Ortiz Rubio and Abelardo Rodriguez. Through the PNR, Calles sought to

[154] For the Monterrey industrial elites, see Camp (1988); Snodgrass (2003); Gauss (2010).

bring together the contentious factions of the Revolutionary Family and achieve national integration. The party's popular base notwithstanding, the former president was primarily focused on the need for order and reconstruction after the Depression. Notably, he turned against land reform; opposed labor agitation; and cultivated strong ties with business elites.[155] To control the popular classes from above and appease a new generation of progressives who rose within the party, however, Calles endorsed the adoption of a Federal Labour Law (1931), along with the Agrarian Code of 1934 (Collier and Collier, 1991: 225-232). Against this backdrop, the 1933 party congress accepted an interventionist Six-Year Plan and chose Lazaro Cardenas, the governor of Michoacan, as its presidential candidate for the 1934 elections. For Calles and his fellow collaborators, Cardenas was an ideal candidate as he could both appease the popular sectors and continue the policies of the Maximato era.[156]

Popular Incorporation as a Party-building Strategy

The state-building project was not yet complete, however. The armed conflict of 1910-20 led to new forms of institutional mobilization – agrarian leagues, trade unions, local parties, religious groups in various sizes – that the PNR did not fully control and coopt. Moreover, the 1929 presidential elections demonstrated that the government had limited appeal in west-central provinces and even came close to losing against (save for electoral fraud) Jose Vascencelos (Sherman, 1997: 21-23), Obregon's former minister of education, whose popular candidacy united the Catholics, urban middle classes, and business elites across the country. The expansion of state power was arrested in some regions by the Catholic mobilization and in others by

[155] On the conservative nature of this period, see Meyer, Segovia, and Lajous (1978); Medin (1982); Buchenau (2007: ch. 6)

[156] Cardenas was younger than most revolutionary generals and had a limited political base. Moreover, Cardenas owed his meteoric rise in large part to Calles (Krauze, 1997: 439-443). He commanded little loyalty among the upper echelons of the military and had few ties with the business elites. Lastly, most of his cabinet and state governors (50 % of them military men) were handpicked by General Calles.

regional elites, whose alliance with Calles was precarious at best. Meanwhile, neither the *agraristas* nor the workers who supported and fought with the government were incorporated into the regime. Additionally, the long recession of 1926-1932 augmented these popular challenges and further increased the popular discontent in the country. During this period, both the foreign trade and output fell; unemployment rose and sharp decline in prices triggered a slump in Mexican gross domestic product.[157] Although Turkey also suffered from an early Depression during the same time period, its political panorama was more stable and centralized than that of Mexico.

To offset the regime's popular deficiencies, Cardenas emerged as a populist president *par excellence*.[158] Although his election victory was all but certain, he embarked on an extended campaign tour of eighteen thousand miles across the country. He also made overtures to peasant and worker leaders. Election of a candidate from the PNR's progressive/leftist wing created an opening in the political opportunity structure, which the popular groups seized to recover the lost ground of the Maximato years. Supported by sympathetic governors, *agrarismo* was on the rise again, while unions began to strike in higher numbers. This popular resurgence gave Cardenas an important tool in restraining Calles that Abelardo Rodrigueez and Portes Gil lacked during their time in office. In this new political climate, Calles' hold on power – given his opposition to labor agitation and *agrarismo* – was indeed weaker than many had assumed.

The labor's growing militancy alarmed the business community and persuaded Calles and his conservative allies in the PNR to confront Cardenas (Buchenau, 2007: 173-183). In June 1935, Calles used the occasion of a strike by telephone and telegraph workers as a pretext to criticize what he considered to be growing radicalism in the country under Cardenas' rule. Such

[157] Between 1926 and 1933, no less than nineteen states adopted protectionist legislation for industry (Gauss, 2010: 47). For more on Mexico's economic slump during this period, see Haber (1989: ch. 9).
[158] On the Cardenas presidency, see Cordova (1974); Hamilton (1982); Knight (1994); Krauze (1997: ch. 16)

an intervention by a former president was common in post-revolutionary Mexico, even if its direct manner remained rare: Obregon had a strong voice during Calles' last two years in office and Calles himself carried great weight during the presidencies of Portes Gil, Ortez Rubio, and Abelardo. What differed, however, was Cardenas' response. Historian Alan Knight (1991: 254) aptly captures Calles' dilemma in this situation: "Calles could destabilize the new administration, but at great risk to his life's work. Cardenas, if he rejected compromise, would have to call on the support of the left, which implied new, radical commitments."

During his days as President of the PNR (between November 1930 and August 1931), Cardenas was indeed a first-hand witness to Calles' quarrels with the then President of Mexico Ortiz Rubio (Krauze, 454). Therefore, in anticipation of Calles' opposition, Cardenas had already begun to replace *callista* generals in key military garrisons with officers (former Vilistas, Zapatistas, and Carrancistas), who had a history of opposition to the Sonoran generals (Cordova, 1974: 141; Krauze, 1997: 457). He also pushed through the congress a law that abolished the lifetime appointment of judges, thereby removing Calles' appointees from the bench. Additionally, he made tactical alliances with revolutionary generals and regional chieftains like Saturnino Cedillo of San Luis, Portes Gil of Tamaulipas, Candido Aguilar of Veracruz, Maximino Avila Camacho of Pueblo, and Juan Andrew Almazan of Nuevo Leon, who were affronted by Calles during their careers.[159] Due to Cardenas' strong response and faced with popular protests, Calles backed down and temporarily left for the United States. Naturally, his tactical retreat spurred a wave of defections that weakened his bloc in the congress and allowed Cardenas to purge fourteen *callista* governors like Garrido Canabal of Tabasco. Cardenas

[159] These kinds of tactical alliances, though crucial for his consolidation of power, limited the scope of Cardenas' reforms in some states. For instance, Maximino Avila Camacho (brother of future president, Manuel Avila Camacho) was conservative *caudillo* who cracked down on unions and slowed down the agrarian reform. For more on his career, see Quintana (2010).

appointed his close allies in their stead, with the expectation that they would further his agrarian agenda in their respective states. [160] Further, Cardenas quickly formed a new cabinet to replace *callista* ministers with members from the left wing of the PNR, including Francisco J. Mugica. These shrewd moves weakened Calles but the former president was still a formidable political foe, with powerful allies across the country. Cardenas had control of the office of the president and the PNR but neither was fully institutionalized at this point. To defeat Calles completely, Cardenas therefore spawned a popular alliance with dissident peasant and worker groups and relied on their mobilizational strength.

Since the disintegration of the state-labor alliance after Obregon's assassination, the labor movement underwent a process of radicalization and mobilization against the regime, particularly with the rise of Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who gathered unions that broke away from CROM and other dissident worker groups to found an independent labor organization, the Confederacion General de Obreros y Campesinos Mexicanos (General Confederation of Mexican Workers and Peasants, CGOC) (Camin and Meyer, 1993: 126-127; Middlebrook, 1995: ch. 3). In early 1936, the government organized a unity labor congress, which served as a precursor to a national federation of labor, the CTM.[161] Due to its autonomy from the state, Cardenas was forced to offer high inducements to secure the organized labor's support. During the showdown with Calles, number of strikes peaked in 1936, while labor courts, tripartite councils, and arbitration boards began to adopt a pro-labor line. In July 1935, soon after his first public clash with Calles, Cardenas also began to organize campesinos from above by way of

[160] For one such radical cardenista governor Efrain Gutierrez of Chiapas, see Lewis (2009). On Garrido Canabal, see Harper (2009).

[161] One should note that the labor movement did not play "an initiating role in precipitating the break with Calles", as Collier and Collier (1991: 238) have claimed but, more accurately, thrived as a result of the high intra-elite conflict and these leadership struggles. The size of the industrial workers was still too small to exert such power over the Mexican government. These labor unions afforded Cardenas a huge mobilizational advantage over his rival. For more on the labor movement under Cardenas, see Ashby (1967).

forming a single statewide agrarian league in each state. Each agrarian community was instructed to send two representatives for the state-wide conference, which subsequently turned into a national peasant confederation, the CNC.

In April 1936, this popular support finally allowed Cardenas to force Calles into exile in the United States with his entourage, including the CROM leader Luis Morones (Buchenau, 2007: 183-184). Following this victory, Cardenas deepened the reform process by mobilizing industrial workers and peasants in what Collier and Collier (1991: 202) describe as a "complete instance of radical populism". Against opposition from conservative PNR leaders, the government pushed for agrarian reform, rural education initiatives, unionization, railroad nationalization, and expropriation of oil companies. Land redistribution was Cardenas' key policy to promote rural development, liberate the campesinos, and break the power base of autonomous regional chieftains. Unlike Calles, Cardenas prioritized communal ownership by the *ejidos* as an alternative to the hacienda and established the National Bank of Ejidal Credit to funnel resources to these units.[162] In sharp contrast with his predecessors, Cardenas also expropriated land from productive estates, some of which belonged to revolutionary generals (Krauze, 1997: 460-469). The ejido program thus became part and parcel with his state-building agenda. The ejidaros' dependence on the state for irrigation, seeds, roads, and credits eroded the power base of traditional caudillos and caciques. Agrarian reform also shaped the regime's education policy in this period. To penetrate the traditional social order and recover support after

[162] Although the consolidation of haciendas under Diaz stopped after the Mexican Revolution, the trend was not reversed completely but rather survived, albeit under new owners. Since the end of Mexican Civil War, many revolutionary elites seized some of the most fertile lands in the country. Cardenas' strategy, by contrast, focused on increasing food supply and gaining self-sufficiency in basic goods like corn, wheat, and beans through the amalgamation of ejidos, which would be financed through the Ejidal bank. Thus, Cardenas distributed more land (18 million hectares) than any Mexican president, increasing *ejido* land from 15 percent to 47 percent of cultivated land and diminishing the landless population from 2,5 million to 1, 9 million (Knight, 1991: 258). For more on land reform, see Hamilton (1982); Boyer (2003); Gauss (2010: 103-108).

the Cristero revolt, the government pushed for a socialist state education program[163] and appointed rural teachers (maestro rural) to educate, as well as organize campesinos and Indian communities (Anguiano, 1975: 45; Vaughan, 1997). Lastly, he encouraged the unionization of workers, which set in motion the government's takeover of railways and foreign-owned oil companies in 1937 and 1938, respectively (Knight, 1991: 277-284). The latter move was the culmination of nearly two decades of economic nationalism and revolutionary discourse, while also resembling nationalist takeovers of foreign companies in Turkey, Argentina, and Egypt.[164]

It was not uncommon for a Mexican president to enhance his power by way of cultivating close ties with popular classes. Obregon had a strong agrarian base and made a secret pact with the CROM leader Morones. His successor Calles further expanded this alliance, while Portes Gil and Abelardo Rodriguez enjoyed the support of the agrarista groups. Where Cardenas differed from his predecessors was not his mobilization of labor and peasant groups per se but the manner with which he carried out this strategy. His predecessors tended to rely on personal ties during their leadership struggles. The popular classes, though allied with a shifting group of political leaders, were thus still not fully incorporated into the regime. Instead, Cardenas cemented his popular alliance through formalized links with the PNR.[165] During his struggle with Calles, he

[163] This trend predated Cardenas, as signaled by the appointment of Narciso Bassols, a Marxist, to the Ministry of Education in 1931. Cardenas deepened these programs, raised the educational expenditure to over ten percent of total government spending, and tied them together with his agrarian agenda. In September 1935, leftist factions took control of the National University in September 1935 to align this prestigious institution of higher learning with the government. There seems to be an interesting overlap with the Kemalist education reforms of the same period. Akin to their Mexican counterparts, the Kemalist elite appointed former Marxists (the Cadre movement) to the Ministry of Education, reorganized the Istanbul University, and opened Village Institutes in the late 1930s across the Turkish countryside. In both cases, these initiative met with a strong backlash from the traditional society, though the Kemalist regime lacked the strong agrarista support (and land reform) seen in Mexico.

[164] According to Schuler (1999), Cardenas took advantage of the escalating tensions between Nazi Germany and the Allied power to gain flexibility in his policy course. This is reminiscent of Nasser's tactical mastery in occupying the Suez Canal during the height of the Cold War. For a discussion of the connection between labor activism and nationalization under Cardenas, see Ashby, 1967: 197-212; Knight, 1991: 277-284.

[165] This resembled his efforts, while governor of Michoacan, to unite working-class and peasant leaders under the Confederation Revolucionaria Michoacana (Revolutionary Federation of Michoacan). This organization

urged the party committees to recruit workers and organize peasants from above. Under Portes Gil's tenure as PNR chairman, the party began to organize various agrarista groups across the country. This popular strategy was later followed by a formal coalition of the PNR, the CTM, and the PCM (Communist Party of Mexico) for the 1937 legislative elections, when working-class and peasant representatives first run as PNR candidates.[166] Through these alliances, Cardenas further consolidated his leadership within the party and limited the influence of conservative and centrist groups who opposed his policies.

Finally, at the 1938 PNR convention, Cardenas reorganized the loose coalitions of regional and local parties headed by revolutionary generals into a popular yet corporatist party, the PRM. Organized labor and peasantry were incorporated into the new party through their sectoral organization, the CTM and the CNC (Maxfield, 1990: 50-55; Collier and Collier, 1991: 239-247). To limit CTM's hegemony over the working-class movement, Cardenas made sure to organize the government employees and rural workers separately. They were joined by a 'popular' sector that largely included middle-class elements and state-employees, along with the military, organized separately to reflect its crucial role for the regime. While membership in the PNR was individual, the PRM introduced a new system of membership based on these four constituent sectors - labor, peasantry, popular, and military.[167]

But why did Cardenas choose to rely on a political party, as opposed to the state bureaucracy, for his project of political incorporation? State corporatism was more suitable to a hierarchical model of administration and would have strengthened Cardenas' leadership. Indeed,

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subsequently assisted the government's efforts to carry out land reform, offer state education, and put down the Cristero revolt (Cordova, 1974: 28-34; Krauze, 1997: 445-447; Boyer (2003).

[166] The Mexican state had a contentious relationship with the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM) but the party entered into a short alliance with the Cardenas government in accordance with the Soviet foreign policy at the time. For the PCM's origins, see Spenser (2011).

[167] Although businessmen were not integrated to the PNR, the Cardenas administration passed the 1936 law for Chamber of Commerce and Industry to create the country's first economy-wide peak association (Schneider, 2004: 62-63).

ejidos left many peasants dependent on state assistance, thus offering fertile ground for state corporatism. This varied strategy stemmed from Cardenas' initial weakness against other political elites within the so-called Revolutionary Family. Faced with strong opposition from conservative revolutionary leaders and regional chieftains, Cardenas lacked a sufficient power base to pursue a more personalistic approach. In the absence of a party organization, his authority would have remained vulnerable to counter-attacks from callistas and other political rivals. In fact, thanks to Calles, the revolutionary generals and local caciques had already begun to be co-opted into the PNR. Cardenas deepened this process by first mobilizing and then including the popular classes into the party structure. This placed a limit on the local power of caudillos, as seen in the swift defeat of Cedillo in 1938, and thus buttressed state and party institutions that were still fragile. On the other hand, subjugating these local elites into the state bureaucracy would have been highly difficult, if not impossible. Instead, Cardenas brought them on board by recognizing their local domains in exchange for their support of the PRM.

The year 1938 also proved to be a "Cardenista Thermidor," however (Knight, 1991: 289). Following the oil nationalization, Cardenas shifted his focus to consolidating these reforms against the countervailing forces in society. Indeed, his shift to the left alienated the economic elites, the devout Catholics, the urban middle classes, and even some members of the revolutionary elite (Sherman, 1997: 101). The previous year witnessed the emergence of the Union Nacional Sinarquista (UNS), a mass-based, reactionary movement, primarily composed of peasants in the west-central Mexico, who were opposed to the values of the Mexican revolution and land reform.[168] The secular elements of the right, under the leadership of Manuel Gomez Morin, was represented by the National Action Party (*Partido Accion Nacional*, PAN), which

[168] On the UNS, see Meyer (1978); Serrano Alvarez (1992); Dormady (2011: ch. 3)

drew much of its support from the middle classes.[169] The PAN leaders, though not opposed to the Mexican Revolution, grew increasingly disillusioned by authoritarian and corrupt practices of the post-revolutionary governments; their criticisms centered on opposition to land reform, socialist education, and radicalization of the masses. Joining them were several caudillos and revolutionary veterans, who experimented with several fringe rightist groups that had sprouted in the last few years (Sherman, 1997: ch. 7). While ultimately some caudillos like Saturnino Cedillo revolted against the regime, others like Jose Vascencelos flirted with fascism, and still others like the callista landlord and politician Manuel Perez Trevino founded a political party with an eye towards the 1940 elections.[170] In particular, a period of intense food shortages, poor distribution of products, and price fluctuations plagued the final years of his presidency.

As discontent grew against his agenda, Cardenas and his collaborators became concerned by the possibility of a massive defection or a conservative coup before the 1940 elections. Indeed, many PRM elites who became rich and conservative since the Revolution attacked the party's left wing, epitomized by the union leader Toledano and the PRM president Luis Rodriguez. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a national-developmentalist agenda attracts support from both those on the right and the left. This rapid shift to the left under Cardenas, however, alienated large sectors of the middle class, business elites and social conservatives, who supported economic nationalism but opposed heavy state interventionism. This is reminiscent of the rise of an Anatolian-based, conservative intra-party opposition against the Kemalist government's war-time statism, secular-humanist educational initiatives (such as the Village Institutes), and

[169] For more on the PAN, see Loaeza (1999); Mizrahi (2003); Hernandez Company (2014b). One of the party's founders, Gomez Morin, was a liberal technocrat and lawyer who worked for Alberto Pani during Calles' rule and played an important role in the creating of Mexico's financial system (Gauss, 2010: 30-34; Maxfield, 1990: 40-42; Hernandez Company, 2014b: 4-6). Moreover, many scholars have argued that the middle classes have turned against the Cardenas administration. For some example, see Weyl and Weyl (1939); Sherman (1997: ch. 7).
[170] For more on Cedillo's life and political career, see Ankerson (1980 and 1984).

ultimately the land reform bill of 1945. Unlike Ismet Inonu, though, Cardenas was not fully in control of his party. Despite its two corporate bodies, the PRM leadership was too weak to exert any real influence on various party leaders, each of whom had a local enclave. Moreover, he was unable, and possibly unwilling, to serve for another term. Therefore, Cardenas softened his rhetoric and reform agenda to keep national unity. Thus, the land reform slowed down; unions were asked to refrain from strikes; and the social education programme was changed (Medina, 1978: 93; Knight, 1991: 295).

Moreover, Cardenas hoped to use the nomination process for the presidency to keep different factions united under the banner of the ruling party. Unlike his predecessors, he therefore refused to choose his successor, including the frontrunner Francisco Mugica, his close associate and ideological comrade (Knight, 1991: 296; Krauze, 1997: 478-479; Niblo, 1999: 79-81). Given the discontent among some generals, Mugica's candidacy had the risk of fracturing the party and sparking a military insurrection. Therefore, many PRM elites, along with the CTM and the CNC leaders, lined up behind Manuel Avila Camacho.[171] The only open challenge came from a conservative General Almazan, who cultivated close ties with the Monterrey industrialists, and had served under both Obregon and Calles. However, Camacho's choice appeased the conservative wing of the party and undercut the opposition's support base. Moreover, regime critics suffered from a collective action problem: they failed to coalesce behind a single candidate (Medina 1978, 100-105; Knight, 1991: 298; Sherman, 1997: 121-125). In the end, Camacho defeated Almazan with 2.26 million votes against his 129,000. Almazan

[171] Camacho served as Cardenas' chief of staff and also fought alongside him against the Escobar rebellion. But his political rise began in earnest after the conservative backlash against Cardenas (Krauze, 1997: ch. 17). As first the undersecretary (1934-1937) and then secretary of national defense (1937-1940), Camacho was the government's chief negotiator with dissident generals in Nuevo Leon and the semi-fascist leaders of the PRAC, generals Pablo Gonzalez and Marcelo Caravelo and led the military campaign against Saturnino Cedillo (Niblo, 1999: 78).

publicly criticized the government's fraudulent electoral tactics[172] but, with no backing from the United States, refrained from calling for an armed revolt (Niblo, 1999: 87-89). As one observer put it, he was "too fat, sick, and rich to chance rebellion" (Knight, 1991: 301). Most of his supporters in the army also backed away from this option, while the Monterrey group, fearing the economic risks of an insurrection, decided to give the president-elect a clean slate and hoped for reconciliation. Camacho started his term with no incidence of a military insurrection, a rarity in Mexican politics.[173]

The Era of the Institutionalized Party and Regime Consolidation

Camacho campaigned for office on an agenda of conciliation and class cooperation. His cabinet – including members from the left and right factions as well as several of his loyalists – reflected these principles (Krauze, 1997: 505). On the eve of WWII, Camacho took steps to reduce internal dissentions within the party and appease long-time regime critics. Notably, he reversed his predecessors' radical cultural policies, made overtures to the Catholic hierarchy, and quieted the Sinarquistas by granting them the colony of Maria Auxiliadora in Baja California (Krauze, 1997: 506; Dormady, 2011: ch. 3).[174] In 1940, Camacho became the first president in twentieth-century Mexico to confess his Catholic beliefs. With Cardenas out of office, much of the dissident right made their way back to the party. In a symbolic gesture, Camacho also allowed for the return of political exiles like Calles and gathered all living ex-presidents for the annual Independence Day celebrations in 1942– a clear reminder that they were all part of the

[172] There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that Almazan did in fact win in Mexico's three largest industrial cities and thus carried a sizable part of the labor vote (Gauss, 2010: 99). For more on the 1940 elections, see (Medina, 1978; Sherman, 1997: ch. 8; Quintana, 2010: 90-97).

[173] In the 1946 elections the CHP similarly came under accusations of electoral fraud by the opposition. But the Kemalist elite lacked a popular base to counter these criticisms and were ultimately pressured into holding free elections in 1950, while the PRM easily surmounted this opposition with its corporate partners.

[174] As part of his overtures to the Catholic clergy, Camacho removed cardenistas from the cabinet and replaced his predecessor's socialist education policy with a standard curriculum that emphasized Mexico's Catholic identity (Niblo, 1999: 92-106; 134-135). This was followed by a major purge of communists and other hardliner cardenistas from the federal bureaucracy, the state-owned enterprises and the PRM (Carr, 1992: 143, 147).

semi-official party, despite their contentious history.[175] The security threat caused by WWII also added to the urgency of intra-elite unity. As modernization of the armed forces became a high priority for the government, defense expenditure as a share of the national budget increased but Camacho also disbanded the party's military sector (Krauze, 1997: 511-512). Lastly, the common Nazi threat contributed to an US-Mexican rapprochement: the United States government accepted the 1938 nationalization of the foreign companies, helped Mexico secure its first international loan since the Revolution (Camin and Meyer, 1993: 164) and signed the 1942 Reciprocal Trade Agreement with the Camacho administration.[176]

This decline in intra-elite conflict allowed the Camacho administration to deviate from Cardenas' populist economic policies and endorse a liberal developmentalist agenda (Niblo, 1999: 75-141). His administration encouraged land ownership, fostered Mexican industrialists and businessmen, and tamed the labor movement. The agrarian reform came to a sudden halt. Given that Camacho was a proponent of the "ranchero culture" (Krauze, 1997: 498), his agrarian policy instead emphasized small land ownership over communal agrarian structures. Against ejidos, the government protected landowners from the threat of expropriation, while encouraging them to invest in efficient production. Instead of land expropriation, government funds were funneled to large irrigation and industrial projects. WWII created fertile ground for import substitution, just as the government's focus was shifting from agrarian reform to industrialization. Accordingly, the ruling elites, aware of the regime's weak support among the bourgeoning manufacturing sector, sought to cultivate stronger ties with industrialists (Davis, 1993 and 1994; Shadlen, 2010; Gauss, 2010: ch. 3). For example, the government enacted a new

[175] During the course of the war, he called Cardenas back to serve as defense minister, while appointing Rodriguez (later elected as governor of Sonora in 1943) as zone commander in Mexico's Caribbean coast, and reinstituting Calles as general, albeit without an assignment (Niblo, 1999: 116-117).
[176] For the economic results of this trade agreement, see Gauss (2010: ch. 5); also see, Jones (2014).

Chambers Law in 1941 that divided the confederations of industry and commerce, thereby creating a special chamber for the nascent manufacturing sector (Shafer, 1973: 47; Schneider, 2004: 63). The new organization was designated to represent the small industry and to serve as a counterweight to the CTM. Additionally, Camacho offered institutional representation to the middle sectors of the society through the Confederacion Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP), closely integrated to the PRM.

This emphasis on national unity came at the expense of the party-labor alliance forged by Cardenas, however. Despite their early and strong support for his candidacy, the CTM soon found its influence to be in sharp decline under Camacho's rule. In the 1943 legislative elections, for instance, some the CTM's quotas for the congress were rewarded to the CNOP. The government opposed strikes and controlled wages to minimize inflationary pressures during the wartime. Consequently, marginalization of the left within the labor movement became one of the Camacho's primary goals (Collier and Collier, 1991: 409-411). For instance, when his government clashed with Toledano, Camacho had him removed from his post as secretary-general of the CTM; he was subsequently replaced by Fidel Velasquez, who represented the weak unions located at small factories of Mexico City. In 1943, the cardenista Graciano Sanchez was also replaced by a Camacho loyalist in the CNC leadership. In 1942, the CTM's new leadership endorsed a *pacto obrero* that suspended strikes and inter-union conflicts during the war. Not incidentally, workers experienced sharp reductions in their real wages (Wilkie, 1970: 187) but refrained from challenging their employers and the government, except for widespread strikes in the 1943-44 period (Middlebrook, 113-114; Gauss, 2010: 101). In response, the

government introduced a social security scheme as a way to attain industrial peace and kept food prices low, albeit with some shortages.[177]

While the Monterrey industrialists – grouped under the COPARMEX – continued to oppose state interventions, representatives of the nascent manufacturing industry welcomed such government efforts to keep labor costs low and even cooperated with CTM on a common agenda of tariff protection, class collaboration, and industrial peace (Gauss, 2010: 184-192).[178] This foreshadowed the state-business-labor alliance that would be forged by the ruling party, which provided the basis for Mexico's rapid growth through import substitution industrialization over the next three decades. In short, the PRM emerged under Camacho's rule as a powerful organization in its own right. The era of caudillo politics and personalistic parties were finally over. While powerful governors still existed in some underdeveloped states, few could dominate a province for more than one term, save for some exceptions like Gonzalo Santos of San Luis Potosi (Lomnitz-Adler, 1992: 192-194; Krauze, 1997: 513-515; Niblo, 1999: 89). As the PRM gradually took control of the local machines, governors lost their independent power bases and turned into party operatives. His choice for the presidential succession, the minister of Interior Miguel Aleman, quickly received the support of the CTM, the CNC, and CNOP, and easily won the election. Bloody leadership contests were clearly a thing of the past. In 1946, he also left his imprint on the party structure: He reorganized the PRM into the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) that gave more weight to the middle-class sectors at the expense of the CTM.

[177] In contrast with postwar Turkey, the Camacho administration tackled high inflation by distributing products at lower prices to popular stores (Moreno, 2003: 34-35). This policy was very similar to the Peronist strategy of confronting increased food prices in urban areas during the late 1940s and 1950s.

[178] COPARMEX was founded in 1929 by the rich industrialists of Monterrey, who opposed the government's efforts in that period to pass a labor law and instead wanted to preserve their autonomy from state and party institutions (Schneider, 2004: 66-68).

As a young president, Aleman's meteoric rise to the top reflected the transfer of power within the Revolutionary Family to a new generation.[179] Notably, these new elites did not participate in the armed conflict of 1910-1920, came outside of the military, and were ambitious *universitarios* with law or business degrees. Many of them enjoyed close personal ties with businessmen, developed personal networks starting from their university days, and rose in politics based on their administrative skills and technocratic expertise. For example, Aleman's cabinet included several of his own law-school classmates but not a single cardenista (Krauze, 1997: 540). Miguel Aleman's term would become the final chapter in the institutionalization of the Mexican Revolution via the semi-official party. Hence, Aleman concentrated power in the federal government and the ruling party, both of which were controlled by the president. During his first year alone, Aleman replaced ten state governors who were from other factions of party, including the carnedista governor of Jalisco, and an Emilio Portes Gil supporter from Tamaulipas (Smith, 1991: 341-342; Krauze, 1997: 568). He also eschewed the quota system, tightened the party's control of peasant and worker groups, and, following a brief experiment with primaries, centralized the nomination process to weaken regional caciques (Smith, 1991: 341, 344).

In the economic arena, Aleman furthered Camacho's pro-business policies by emphasizing industrial modernization through the private sector.[180] The president protected the small farmer against *ejiditarios*, reduced land redistribution, and funneled much of the government's investment into large public works that mainly benefited large haciendas and ranches in the northern states (Krauze, 1997: 540-543; Niblo, 1999: 183-188). Much like what

[179] Miguel Aleman previously served as senator and governor of Veracruz and joined Camacho's cabinet as the Minister of Interior after managing his presidential election campaign (Krauze, 1997: ch. 18; Niblo, 1999: ch. 3).

[180] Since the private banks were not willing to finance large scale projects, the Nacional Financiera, a state-investment bank, fostered Mexican industrialists and businessmen across the country, akin to Turkey's Sumerbank. For more on the Nacional Financiera, see Bennett and Sharpe, 1980; Ramirez, 1986. A group of technocrats located in the Office of Industrial Research (*Oficina de Investigaciones Industriales*, OILL) pushed for rational economic planning during the 1940s and 1950s (Gauss, 2010). For an excellent study that looks at how the Mexican government used economic nationalism in their dealings with multinational companies, see Moreno (2003).

we saw in the Kemalist governments during the latter half of the 1940s, the Aleman administration shifted its focus from land reform to productivity and profit; undertook irrigation and road projects; and increasingly looked towards the United States to finance them. A conservative wing of the ruling party in each of the two cases expanded its political influence and endorsed anti-communism, as part of a backlash against progressive and statist policies. Thanks to their non-belligerent status, both governments gained a favorable balance of trade during the war but were flooded with foreign manufactured goods as soon as the military conflict ended. Thus, they faced an uphill battle in re-integrating their economies to world market without the anticipated social costs of this transition. If anything, Turkey was at an advantage over Mexico, since it received aid through the Marshall Plan (1948-1952), while Mexico, same as the rest of Latin America, was excluded from American foreign aid in this period. The rapidly declining trade balance in the postwar period forced Aleman to implement trade controls, enact new tariffs, and devalue the peso (Maxfield, 1990: 73-74, 81-82). Protected by high tariffs, a new group of small industrialists – mostly producing non-durable consumer and intermediate goods – had sprouted in Mexico City, which, by 1950, housed 38 percent of the country's total production (Reynold, 169 cited in Gauss, 2010: 171; Moreno, 2003: 42). Unlike the Monterrey groups, these industrialists collaborated with the government on an ISI agenda and in turn received credit opportunities and tax breaks.

If the Camacho years saw a general decline in union power, Aleman completely broke the autonomy of industrial workers. In what Kevin Middlebrook described as "a defining moment in the evolution of post-revolutionary state-labor relations", Aleman used the occasion of a strike by petroleum workers, organized in his first month in office, to crush union activism. Although his actions had initially fractured the CTM and spurred the formation of a dissident

labor confederation (*Confederacion Unica de Trabajadores*, CUT), Aleman managed to subjugate most unions through material rewards and repression.[181] In just a few years, regime cronies replaced recalcitrant union leaders and a collaborationist leadership assumed power in the CTM under Fidel Velasquez, who would keep his post until his death in 1997 (Collier and Collier, 1991: 415). Ironically, organic linkages between the PRI and CTM reached their highest levels in this period, just as labor unions' autonomous power waned. The PRI elites also weakened the CTM leaders by strengthening other rival union groups (for this strategy, see Murillo, 2001). Hence, Aleman reoriented the popular coalition Cardenas forged by pronouncing the weight of the popular sector (the white-collar and middle class groups), which he organized and coopted to the ruling party under a new confederation, CNOP.[182]

Some scholars have portrayed the Aleman years as a period of decline, when the regime's popular nationalistic aspects disappeared and the revolution was exhausted (Niblo, 1999: 244).[183] And yet, whereas Turkey's CHP was defeated, in 1950, by a conservative-populist opposition party, the PRI's presidential nominee Ruiz Cortines won an overwhelming victory against his rivals in the 1952 elections.[184] What explains this stark variation in the political outcomes of these two post-revolutionary regimes? The answer lies not so much in the existence of an official regime party (Brownlee, 2007; Aidi, 2008; Svolik, 2012), as in what type of a ruling party these

[181] For the split within the CTM, see Medina (1979: 152-156); Middlebrook; 1995: ch. 4.

[182] Beginning from the late 1930s, the rapid urbanization acutely increased the need for and the number of professionals in the country. As Mexico shifted from an agrarian to industrial economy, regulation of these professionals strengthened the power of the federal government over both members of these professions and the state governments. Moreno, 2003: 22-25.

[183] On the 1940's culture of decline and corruption, see Aguilar Camin and Meyer (1993), Hamilton (1982), and Knight (1990), Niblo (1995). Many scholars have treated 1940 as the end date or the Mexican Revolution, suggesting that after that period business interests tended to prevail over popular concerns (Hamilton, 1982; Teichman, 1988; Camp, 1989). Instead, I follow Maxfield's (1990) argument that Mexico in this long period witnessed competition between two policy currents espoused by the banker's alliance (tight monetary policy, low taxation, fixed exchange rates) and the Cardenas coalition (loose monetary policy, agrarian reform, and labor rights).

[184] Cortines was an uncharismatic but honest party operative, who served as Aleman's sub-secretary in the ministry of Interior and later as governor of Veracruz (Krauze, 1997: ch. 19). His nomination commenced "the era of the institutionalized candidate" in Mexican politics (Niblo, 1999: 241).

regimes had. By the late 1940s, the CHP was still an elitist, personalistic party with a small political base and hence lacked what Collier and Collier (1991: 416) called "conflict-limiting mechanisms". Unlike the Mexican case, leadership turnover and policy shifts in Turkey remained rare. This left the Kemalist regime vulnerable against the defection of disgruntled elites, especially since they were encouraged by the ruling party's low mobilizational capacity. In Mexico, by contrast, the PRI's corporatist ties to the popular classes offered the ruling party a large reserve of votes. Not incidentally, the electoral participation rates in Mexico were much higher than those in Turkey during the same period.

This popular base allowed the PRI to prevail electorally, despite facing a more diverse opposition than the CHP in Turkey. Aside from the PAN, the PRI candidate faced resistance from the party's left wing; thus, Cortines also ran against Toledano's Partido Popular and Miguel Henriquez Guzman, a career military officer supported by many cardenistas and dissident leftist leaders.[185] Even when government policies did not benefit the lower-income groups, the PRI provided its allies side payments to enlist their support. Following the announcement of Cortines' candidacy, for instance, the CTM led by Fidel Velasquez declared the support of his organization and mobilized unions behind the candidate (Cosio Villegas, 1975: 131). The PRI also offered Catholic groups various benefits in order to weaken the conservative PAN candidate's support base (Smith, 1991: 346). While cooperation was rewarded by the government, opposition resulted in a loss of jobs, material rewards, and political appointments. Toledano's demotion from the CTM's leadership in 1941 is a powerful, though not rare, example. Due the absence of such an organic relationship with economic groups, the CHP lacked the capacity to punish defectors and defeats its opponents. When finally faced with an opposition

[185] Disillusioned by the government's conservative course, Lombardo Toledano resigned from the PRM to establish a semi-loyal, leftist party (Partido Popular, PP) that gathered dissident PRM leaders with moderate worker and peasant groups.

party in the late 1940s, the Kemalist elite instead relied on the brokerage of local notables, a political strategy that had appeal primarily in underdeveloped areas.

The final stage of the ruling party's institutionalization culminated in the electoral law of 1946. The new electoral system, far from addressing calls for reform, strengthened government control over the voting process, eliminated regional and personalistic parties, and restricted electoral competition. In short, it legalized the dominant party system in Mexico. This electoral law thus stands in sharp contrast to the election law of 1950, which the Kemalist leadership enacted to guarantee free and fair elections in Turkey, thus paving the way for their own electoral defeat the same year. Indeed, both parties encountered opposition in the late 1940s. But whereas the CHP allowed democratic elections and agreed to step down, the PRI engaged in electoral fraud, despite its superior mobilizational capacity.[186] In that sense, the Kemalist leaders' refusal to establish a corporatist system may have limited their popular appeal and weakened their capacity to promote political and economic reforms. But it also aborted the rise of vested corporate interests that would oppose democratization. In Mexico, by contrast, a host of PRI politicians, peasant leaders, and union officials resisted this scenario, lest government turnover would uproot their patronage networks.

Conclusion

By the late 1940s Mexico became a one-party dominant system. Both the military and the Supreme Court came under the PRI's control, losing whatever autonomy they had enjoyed previously (Krauze, 1997: 567-568; Camin and Meyer, 1993: 163). The regime was embedded

[186] Candido Aguilar, a former carrancista general and a supporter of Guzman, sent a letter to Aleman prior to the 1952 election: "these errors or mistakes (*corruption*) would be forgiven by future generations if you, transcending the squalid interests of a group or of your friends, should rise to the height of the patriots and statesmen and establish democracy in Mexico, which we have not been able to achieve after forty years of struggle" (Bassols cited in Krauze, 1997: 594). This is arguably how President Inonu, who presided over the transition to multi-party rule in Turkey, hoped the future generations would remember his legacy. Aleman, leading a colossal state and party bureaucracy, was in a markedly different position than Inonu.

primarily on three groups, namely peasantry, labor unions, and middle classes, each of which was co-opted into the PRI's organizational structure.[187] The party leadership maintained some basic level of equilibrium among these three constituent groups and distributed material rewards and political posts based on a quota system to gain the support of sectoral leaders. Political decisions were made through *acuerdos* that brought together shifting alliances of groups and factions within the party. The state, on the other hand, was administered by a coalition of what Smith (1991) calls *tecnicos* and *politicos*. The former refers to a group of highly trained bureaucrats, who filled the ranks of various planning agencies and ministries, while the latter consisted of seasoned politicians who occupied various elected posts and rose through the party ranks. As state administration was decoupled from the PRI's popular sectors, the delicate balance between the two groups gradually was broken to the former's advantage. This reflected the popular groups' loss of influence within the party. Administrative experience and technical expertise mattered more for political advancement than party service. For example, 62.5 % of the 240 cabinet ministers to serve between 1946 and 2000 had only administrative experience and virtually no contact with the PRI (Hernandez Company, 2014a: 19).[188]

Weakening of the party administration vis-à-vis the state bureaucracy was, in some ways, an inevitable outcome of the sharp decline in intra and inter party competition. The executive branch, due to its access to state resources, had an inherent advantage over party functionaries in single-party regimes. The PRI's incorporation of the popular sectors, however, allowed the party to elicit popular support, even when official policies hurt their economic interests. Once a decision was made by the PRI leadership, all constituent groups lined up and mobilized their

[187] For an overview of the PRI's rule during the latter half of the century, see Hansen (1971); Purcell (1975); Smith (1991); Greene (2007).
[188] None of the five presidents who served after 1970 held an elected post previously. For more on their political backgrounds, see Smith, 1979; Castaneda, 2000; Camp, 2011.

respective bases to follow the part line. The PRI-affiliated governors, municipal presidents, party bosses, and village leaders all funneled resources to mobilize voters during elections and were rewarded with political posts and various material perks for their service.[189] This was missing in the Kemalist regime, where the ruling party lacked such a party-run corporatist system to reach out to economic groups and an extensive patronage network that appealed to voters.

As the PRI became "the only game in town", opposition parties could only draw voters deeply committed to certain ideologies, such as devout Catholics, communists, and free-market liberals (Magaloni, 2006 and Greene, 2007). Localized and small, these groups could not threaten the PRI's electoral dominance. The government also engaged in fraudulent electoral practices to curb the opposition.[190] Instead, the real threat to PRI's rule came from within its ranks (Molinar, 1991). However, due to the party's strong control over state institutions and popular organizations, few disgruntled elites had incentive to defect from the ruling party. Defection meant a guaranteed loss of power, influence, and elimination from the political arena. Even those who lost in the short term decided to stay within the ruling party, hoping to prevail in future. Sure enough, the no reelection policy ensured frequent turnover of political elites and facilitated policy shifts, when and if necessary. In short, the PRI elites established a durable regime by blocking all of the possible pathways for breakdown: elite defection, institutional rivalries, popular discontent, and mass insurrection.

Between the early 1940s and late 1970s, the PRI's efforts for a conciliation of classes generated what some observers called the 'Mexican miracle' with an annual increase of five

[189] For an extensive volume of the biographies of Mexican politicians, see Camp (1982).
[190] For the opposition's few electoral victories at the municipal level, see Krauze (1997: 569-570); Hernandez Company (2014a: 14). While electoral fraud most likely did not change the outcome of presidential elections, the same cannot be said for local and state-wide races, where the PRI frequently imposed from above unpopular candidates and repressed popular protests, if necessary. For one such violent episode, see Niblo (1999: 152-156); Newcomer (2004: ch. 5).

percent in the country's GDP.[191] This economic transformation was largely driven by an import-substitution industrialization that expanded the ranks of the middle class and triggered a secular trend towards urbanization. The percentage of the Mexican population who lived in the cities (in urban areas with 20,000 inhabitants or more) climbed up from 9.2 percent in 1900 to 35 percent in 1970, while less than 40 percent of the economically active population engaged in agriculture. This development also reflected a rapid growth in the Mexican population, which increased from 20 million in 1940 to 36 million and 70 million in 1960 and 1980, respectively. While these economic and demographic changes are not unique to Mexico –indeed, they were also achieved by other national-developmentalist states (and ISI cases) – the political stability that accompanied this transformation is quite rare. During these decades, the PRI's rule was uninterrupted; there was no military coup; and every president managed to serve out his full six-year term.

At the outset, the PRI's political model – poised as the 'perfect dictatorship' – can be characterized as stable, in addition to being durable.[192] A closer look, however, reflects a more complicated picture with some major shortcomings of both the ND state and the specific Mexican model. First, as seen in other ND cases, the Mexican economy made little progress in the capital goods sector; and much of the industrial development concentrated on non-durable consumer goods and intermediate goods. Similarly, Mexico could not advance from an import-substitution industrialization to an export-oriented growth model that would have mitigated the foreign reserve shortages. Moreover, the regime proved incapable of addressing the widespread and growing unemployment after the early 1970s. Therefore, many young people sought employment in the informal sector or abroad, particularly the United States – akin to Egyptian

[191] For more on Mexican development, see Hansen (1971); Aguilar Camin and Meyer 1993: (159-250).
[192] For a summary of this period, see (Joseph and Buchenau, 2013: ch. 7).

workers in the Gulf States and Turkish workers in Germany. Hence, the ND states, given their excessive reliance on ISI model, underperformed the developmental states.[193]

Mexico stands apart from other ND states in some ways, however. Due to the CTM's declining political influence within the PRI, there was a steady decline in the real wages that led to an increasingly uneven distribution of national income after 1940 (Camin and Meyer, 1993: 172-174; Smith, 1991: 326-327). In contrast to its taming of the popular classes, the PRI had less control over the upper-middle and the middle classes, which stood to benefit from Mexico's economic transformation. Even by the standards of other middle-income countries, Mexico had very low tax revenues. Instead, the ruling party increasingly relied on its oil revenues, which, thanks to the petroleum bonanza after the 1970s, provided the regime with a huge windfall of foreign exchange. In turn, the PRI governments distributed material rewards to various constituencies without the need for taxation (Morrison, 2009). These structural weakness of the Mexican economy triggered two major crises in the post-1980 period (the debt crisis of 1982 and the peso crisis of 1994), which pushed the Mexican leaders to engage in neo-liberal reforms and adopt austerity measures that weakened the party's popular base (Waterbury, 1993). Thanks to its strong party rule that cushioned some of the negative effects, Mexico enacted these reforms more effectively than the ND states like Turkey and Egypt that lacked such a semi-official party.

The PRI rule was not "self-sustaining", however (for a discussion, see Slater, 2010). Over the decades, rapid urbanization and industrialization eroded its stable base and left the party vulnerable to opposition challenges. While the peasants continued to vote for the PRI in overwhelming numbers, the urban middle classes and independent unions grew uneasy with the

[193] There is already a very rich literature that focuses on a systemic comparison of import-substitution and export-oriented industrialization, the institutional configurations that adopt the latter strategy, and the origins of such cases. This topic remains beyond the scope of this dissertation, which looks at the diverse political and economic outcomes in the cases that belong to a subset of the former category, namely the national-developmentalist states.

party's authoritarian control of Mexican politics. Moreover, the electoral weight of the rural vote sharply decreased in the 1960s and 1970s. The first sign of trouble came with the 1968 student protests of Tlatelco, which was violently suppressed and later censored by the PRI government. Following the 1982 debt crisis and the ensuing economic downturn, the public's trust on the government's economic management declined. Lastly, the government's shift to a neo-liberal economic agenda, advocated by a slate of US-trained technocrats and politicians, undermined the PRI's strong ties with labor unions and weakened the overall size of the working class. Aside from the PAN's electoral rise, the PRI had to deal with defections from its left wing. Most notable was the resignation of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, who contested the 1988 presidential elections under the banner of a new party.

The Mexican leaders, confident of the PRI's organization, took steps for democratization after the late 1980s in what Slater and Wong (2013) term as a "conceding to thrive scenario". Accordingly, the PRI elites democratized from a position of relative strength and in a gradual manner, which markedly differs from the Turkish case, whereby the Kemalist leadership, prompted by growing intra-elite conflict and popular dissatisfaction, allowed for a rapid liberalization. Following this political opening, the PRI lost the mayoral race of Mexico City and its absolute majority in the congress in 1997, and the presidential election in 2000, five decades later than their Kemalist counterparts. Even more strikingly, however, a restructured PRI would later score a major political comeback by retaking the congress and the presidency in 2009 and 2012, respectively. In the end, the PRI's vast mobilizational capacity and centrist ideological position allowed the party to quickly bounce back, while the CHP remained as an opposition party, albeit the main one, for most of the time since 1950.

CHAPTER 6
Elite Conflict, Populist Mobilization, and the Rise of Peronism

Introduction

We saw in the last three chapters that Turkish and Mexican leaders undertook a twin process of national unification and state-building in the early decades of the 20th century. Thus, they had already consolidated their power when confronted with the Great Depression and responded to the crisis by accelerating their industrialization policies as part of their wider agenda of national development. By contrast, Argentina and Egypt both followed an orthodox policy course during the same period, even though reformist parties - the UCR and the Wafd Party, respectively - were in power in the earlier decades. In both countries, conservative government used state power to protect the landed oligarchy from the pernicious effects of world markets and limit opposition against the regime. Their authoritarian policies had eroded the political institutions to such an extent that neither regime held much legitimacy in the eyes of the masses and were easily toppled by nationalist junior officers, who subsequently embarked on a delayed project of national development. The next three chapters explore this new wave of national developmentalism by focusing on the dissimilar political trajectories of the Argentine and Egyptian cases after the 1943 and 1952 coups, respectively.

Having assumed power amid the turbulence of WWI, the Argentine junta quickly adopted a program of state-building, industrial development, and national revival. In just a period of three years, the military regime enacted over 2,000 decrees designed to increase state management of economy, centralize power in the federal government, adopt social programs, and push for autarkic policies. In June 1946, when Juan Peron was inaugurated as the President of Argentina, the federal government was more influential over collective bargaining, industrial relations, monetary and industrial policies, social security, and education than at any period in

Argentine history. Under Peron's guidance, the new regime was embedded in a deep political coalition that culminated in a Populist National Developmentalist state. Due to its strong ties with labour unions, the regime enjoyed tremendous popular support but was also characterized by weak state and party institutions. As a result, the Peronist regime proved to be the most redistributive and fragile case among the four countries. Peron's initial institutional choices later left him with weak political tools to discipline his base of support and resolve growing elite conflict that led to ideological polarization, cycles of mobilization, and a coup d'état.

This chapter argues that these institutional choices were conditioned by the contentious politics that arose during Peron's rise to power after the 1943 military coup. The military junta encountered high level of elite resistance and remained divided amid growing opposition from the civil society. The political parties were more organized than those in Egypt and had extensive links to society, thus allowing them to resist the installation of a ND state from above. At the same time, the labour unions were stronger than their counterparts in the other three cases but largely excluded from the political arena. Faced with strong resistance from the landed oligarchy and business elites as well as all mainstream political parties, Peron found himself in a subordinate position in the junta (an outcome Nasser avoided) when most of his colleagues turned against him in September/October 1945. With his access to state power blocked, Peron opted for a strategy of popular mobilization by tapping into labour unions and an eclectic coalition of old-guard politicians. This was sufficient to sideline his rivals in the junta and defeat the opposition bloc in the 1946 presidential elections.

Once in control of the state, Peron easily consolidated his power and defeated all intra-movement efforts to restrain his leadership. Instead, taking advantage of the positive economic outlook in his earlier years, Peron used state patronage to link labour unions to his presidential

office and personalize the regime. Parallel to such efforts, he also dissolved the constituent parties of the Peronist electoral coalition in order to establish a vertical political party dominated by his cronies. Fearful that strong institutions could later be used by his potential rivals, he chose not to create a strong party organization and instead relied on labour unions to run campaigns.

Historical Background

Argentina underwent an oligarchic project of state-building that was fueled by the political compromise between Buenos Aires and the provincial elites during the second half of the 19th century.[194] In exchange for an end to the political hegemony of Buenos Aires, which became a federal city in 1880, and an equitable share of its custom duties, the provincial elites accepted the formation of national institutions (Guy, 1979; Oszlak, 2004; Rock, 2000 and 2002; Salvatore, 2003; Juarez-Dappe, 2010). The national unification paved the way for Argentina's emergence in world economy as an exporter of wool, grain, and beef. This rising agro-export sector, coupled with political stability under an oligarchical rule, attracted vast amounts of foreign investment and immigration that turned the country into an economic powerhouse in the region (Moran, 1970; Gallo, 1993; Taylor, 1994; Salvatore, 2001; Pineda, 2009). As new areas were opened for farming and goods from distant parts of the country transported to Buenos Aires (destined for world markets) with the newly built railroads, the agrarian economy experienced a major boom. Between the 1870s and the 1930 Depression, the country's population increased from two to twelve million and its gross domestic product (GDP) expanded by a scale of twenty (Rocchi, 2006: 1).

During these years, the open economy was a source of impressive social mobility. The Argentine prosperity benefited not only its native population but also millions of immigrants,

[194] For a summary of Argentine history during 19th century, see Criscenti (1961), Scobie (1972), Rock (1987), Shumway (1993), Romero (2001), Nouzeilles and Montaldo (2002), Ternavasio (2009).

who moved up from sharecropping arrangement to prosperous tenant farmer and then landowning status in a decade after their arrival. In this respect, Argentina differed from other Latin American countries that similarly had a major export sector, such as Mexico or Brazil. Moreover, fast-growing cities like Buenos Aires created employment for the masses. It is little wonder then that at the turn of the 20th century many had considered Argentina to resemble settler countries such as Canada and Australia. By contrast, the capacity of Argentine political institutions to absorb popular pressures from below and channel political participation was limited. Just as a small group of landowning and ranching families dominated the agrarian economy, so did an oligarchic ruling class captured political power in this period (Alejandro, 1970; Hora, 2001; Amaral, 1988). The conservative rulers, instead of incorporating the rising middle classes and large wave of immigrants to the regime, gained their acquiescence with improvements in their material wealth and living standards.

In times of economic boom, the Argentine politics was stable. By contrast, during times of economic downturn, the open economy hurt a wide array of economic groups and pushed them into collective action. Due to their exclusion from power networks, the middle and lower middle classes mobilized against governments and occasionally engaged in popular uprisings amid cyclical recessions in 1873, 1890, 1893, and 1905 (Sabato, 1990, 2001; Lettieri, 2003). The urban and rural middle classes, especially those in the province of Buenos Aires, had organized under Bartolome Mitre's Liberal Party and the Leandro Alem's Civic Union to counter the dominance of the Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN) led by provincial elites, who had used the Electoral College and the Senate to control Argentine politics for decades. After a failed uprising in 1890, the Civic Union unified with other reformist groups to establish a radical party, namely the Union Civica Radical (UCR), which, under the guidance of the eccentric populist

Hipolito Yrigoyen, built a vast political machine in the 1900s across the littoral provinces, including the federal capital and the province of Buenos Aires.

Founded in 1891 by Alem to defeat the PAN with any means available, the UCR abstained from elections under Yrigoyen's leadership until secret and universal male voting was introduced in 1912.[195] Although portrayed in the literature as the party of the emerging middle classes, the UCR had a wide and diverse membership profile and included many landowners. Its main distinction from PAN was its committed to political reform and in the first democratic presidential elections, held in 1916, the UCR leader Yrigoyen came to power. After decades of economic expansion, Argentina finally entered into an era of political reform and increased participation in politics. Once in power, the UCR expanded its base of support by offering constituencies government jobs, higher salaries, and increased access to public services, including a highly popular university reform. Since the party's base - including high number of mid-size landowners, urban middle-classes and workers employed in the agro-export sector - benefited from the liberal developmentalist policies, the UCR governments did not diverge from the economic course initially set by the old elites.

After the Great Depression, however, Yrigoyen's base of support eroded significantly and the country plunged into a major crisis that paved the way for the 1930 coup detat led by forces under the command of General Jose Felix Uriburu. Uriburu banned the political parties, suspended the 1853 Constitution and sought to institute an authoritarian corporatist regime akin to those in the Iberian countries. Due to strong opposition from society, Uriburu failed to implement his political plans and, upon his untimely death in 1932, political control shifted to the hands of General Agustin Justo, a classical liberal, who was elected president in the 1932

[195] For a history of the UCR, see Rock (1972 and 1975), Guerrero (1983), Horowitz (2008), Persello (2007); Alonso (2000).

elections. The landed oligarchy, whose economic power did not erode under the UCR governments, again returned to the center of Argentine politics. Over the next decade, known in Argentine history as the decade infame, conservative governments ruled the country through electoral fraud. The UCR, though not completely excluded from the political arena, was not allowed to win elections and come to power, either.

Origins of the National Developmentalist State

By the early 1940s Argentina faced an eminent crisis due to disruptions in international trade, isolation in its foreign policy, and intense political divisions. Argentine imports declined during WWII but its export revenues decreased even more since Britain could not pay its war time debts (Di Tella and Zymelman, 1967: 485). These economic difficulties triggered distributive conflicts within the agrarian upper class and between traditional manufacturers and the nascent import-substituting bourgeoisie as well as the urban labor force (Waisman, 1989: 164; Ciria, 1968; and Diaz Araujo, 1971: 11-201). As the country's economic options narrowed, political contestation became a zero-sum game. For instance, the long feud between the Radicals and the Conservatives reached its crescendo in 1940 with the defeat of the Economic Reactivation Plan (Pinedo Plan) in Congress, thus leaving the government without a coherent economic agenda during wartime.[196] With few leaders of national stature left in the political arena – three former presidents, Marcelo de Alvear, Roberto Ortiz, and Agustin Justo, died in the early 1940s – both the government and opposition groups experienced factional strife.[197]

[196] The first attempt to modify the country's development path came with a plan prepared in 1940 by the Minister of Finance, Federico Pinedo (Weil, 1944; Llach, 1984; and Cramer, 1996). Though a liberal himself, Pinedo had realized that agricultural exports alone could not sustain the Argentine economy in the post-Depression era. For larger debates in Argentina on developmental policies, see Jimenez (2006).

[197] There were rumors that Radicals and Socialists would unite behind a common candidate to defeat the Concordancia government (Weil, 1944: 43). On the political developments during the pre-1943 period, see Potash (1969: ch. 6), Sanguinetti (1981), Matsushita (1983), Ciria (1968), Walter (2003).

President Ramon Castillo could command a majority in the Senate but lost the Chamber of Deputies to the UCR in the 1940 elections. In response, he began to rule by decree.

Faced with such a deadlock, armed forces seized power on June 4, 1943 (Potash, 1969: ch. 7). Like in Egypt, the coup architects were mostly junior officers. The military conspirators easily toppled the unpopular government but formulating a new administration proved to be a major challenge. Similar to 1930, the military was divided on economic matters and foreign policy: between a moderate, pro-Allied faction and a nationalist, conservative group with pro-Axis sympathies. Despite their mutual opposition to the Castillo administration, both groups held starkly different views. For their part, the nationalist officers were organized under a lodge named *Grupo de Oficiales Union* (Group of United Officers - GOU). The GOU members wanted state power to introduce drastic changes and therefore quickly sidelined moderate faction in the junta.[198] Three days after the coup, for instance, the titular leader General Rawson was forced to resign over disagreements on cabinet appointments. This was followed by the resignation of the Foreign Minister Saturnino Storni in October 1943, and lastly, by those of the President Pedro Ramirez (replaced with the nationalist Edelmiro Farrell) and his entourage in early 1944. They were replaced by hardliner nationalists, who had been influenced by the reactionary Catholic and anti-Semitic milieu of the interwar years. [199] Indeed, the US efforts to cajole Argentina into

[198] The moderate faction consisted of officers linked to the old order, including several generals and frustrated Radical officers, who preferred a pro-Allied government that would facilitate gradual reforms and end electoral fraud. By contrast, most GOU members were second-generation Argentine and came from lower-middle and middle class backgrounds. Naturally, they were concerned with issues of social justice, and envisioned the state to play a larger role over the management of economy and alleviate mass poverty and unemployment. For them, the 1943 coup was a corrective to the faulty policy turn after Justo's election in 1932. On the GOU and this rift within the junta, see Potash (1969 and 1984), Goldwert (1972: 58-93), Mercante (1995), Norden (1996: 23-24).

[199] Some GOU members enjoyed close ties with ultra-nationalist groups that did not have wider support but were popular in the military. On anti-Semitism in this period, see Rock (1993), Spektorowski (1994), Finchelstein (2007 and 2010).

joining an Inter-American system generated resentment among nationalist officers (Rapoport, 1981: 77-238; Potash, 1969: 201-237).

In its first few months, the junta reached out to the urban and rural middle classes. To address wartime inflation, the military leaders pressured suppliers to reduce the price of essential foodstuff, slashed the tramway and bus fares, and raised the salary of civil servants. This was followed by efforts to stabilize the agricultural sector amid fluctuations in markets. By decree, tenure rents were reduced by twenty percent.[200] Furthermore, the government seized all grain storage bins and grain elevators to protect farmers against speculators and promulgated the Peon's Statute (*Estatuto del Peon*) to set a minimum wage for rural workers. These measures created a rural base for the new regime and weakened the oligarchic landowners and grain speculators.[201]

Under the direction of its nationalist members, the junta also adopted a protectionist agenda to end Argentina's dependency on foreign manufactured goods and alleviate balance of payments difficulties. This goal of economic independence was compounded foreign policy in which the nationalist officers sought to break free of prior diplomatic ties. Unlike their predecessors, who saw the efficient agricultural sector as the engine for growth, the government promoted industrial development as an official policy. The junta members rightly calculated that restrictions on international trade had already created a favorable environment for promoting national development. And so began the push for autarky. First, the government used its sterling reserves - blocked by Britain during the wartime - to retire government bonds and nationalize the

[200] Since the closing of the frontier, tenant farmers had complained of the precarious nature of their contracts and sought help from the government. Tenure reforms were enacted in 1921 and 1931 (Fienup et. al. 1969: 302-3; Solberg, 1987; Gallo, 2006) but these measures were of limited scale. In 1942 the government enacted a new law designed to freeze rents until the end of WWII (Hora, 2001: 216-17).
[201] For agrarian policies of the military government, see Lattuada (1986: ch. 3; Sandoval, 1988).

semi-bankrupt British utility companies.[202] The state authorities also financed massive construction and mining projects to provide the nascent Argentine industry with cheap energy. Due to the limited size of its domestic market, Argentina also signed commercial treaties with Chile, Bolivia and Paraguay and developed closer ties with other nationalist government to create an anti-liberal bloc in the region.[203]

These policies met with strong resistance from both national and international actors. For instance, the US government was irritated by the Argentine plans for regional hegemony and responded with growing economic and military pressure on the new regime. Meanwhile, the government's economic program was attacked by groups that historically benefited from an open economy, such as foreign companies, importers and exporters as well as mainstream political parties. After a brief interlude, the UCR leaders demanded the restoration of civil liberties and political freedoms and new elections. The junta responded by tightening its political control and enacting more comprehensive measures. In late 1943, it appointed federal interventors to Buenos Aires and Cordoba, the federal capital, universities, state agencies, and large unions (Rennie, 1945: 349-50). The appointed officials were asked to limit dissent in their organizations and help contain the rising tide of opposition. This was followed by media censorship and a ban on political parties. In contrast with the country's liberal tradition, the government engaged in an official propaganda that blended xenophobic nationalism with Catholic themes and restored religious instruction in public schools (Rennie, 1945: 368-383; Rock, 1987: 250; Kennedy, 1958:

[202] During the early months of 1944, the Argentine government repatriated 500 million pesos of British debt and expropriated Compania Primitiva de Gas (British), Compania Tranvias Electricos de Tucuman (American), Compania de Electricidad de Este Argentina (American) and Compania Hidroelectrica de Tucuman (American) in additional to cancelling the autonomy of the much hated Corporacion de Transportes (Rennie, 1945: 376-8).

[203] The Argentine junta supported other nationalist officers in their campaign to seize power in neighboring countries, such as the coup in Bolivia in December, 1943. The GOU officers saw these regimes as vital for countering the US hegemony and Brazilian influence in the region and for finding markets for Argentine products. For more on GOU's diplomatic strategy, see Francis (1977), MacDonald (1980), and Zanatta (2005).

186-201). Lastly, in accordance with its "nation-in-arms" philosophy, the military elites pushed for a large-scale mobilization of men and resources.[204]

Given that the Argentine society was highly mobilized at the time, it is little wonder that the military leaders failed to stabilize the political arena through the use of state power. This stemmed from Argentina's unusual conditions. First, as a result of mass migration trends, the country had in recent decades become predominantly urban. In 1914, 53 % of its population lived in towns or cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants and in 1947 this rate rose to 62 %. Especially in Buenos Aires, immigrants produced a vibrant civil society as reflected in the high number of neighbourhood associations, mutual-aid societies, charity organizations, cultural groups, and sports clubs. In the partisan society, political parties had extensive organizations that channelled political participation. Conversely, the countryside was sparsely populated but prone to mobilization. Majority of the agricultural producers were yeomen and tenant farmers, though semi-feudal relations still existed in interior provinces with indigenous communities (Hora, 2001; Barsky, 2003; Balsa, 2006: ch. 1 and 2). Despite the high level of land concentration, large landowners had limited control over the rural population. Due to their immigrant background most tenant farmers lacked strong ties to land and frequently moved around.[205]

Labor Mobilization and Building a Populist Coalition

The primary challenge to state-building efforts in Argentina came from this unbalanced social structure and its consequences for popular mobilization. More than a million people

[204] The intellectual source of this philosophy was a Prussian general and military theorist Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (1843-1916), who argued that manpower mobilization can make up for resource limitations at a time of military conflict. Invited by the Sultan, von der Goltz also worked for two decades until his death as an adviser to modernize the Ottoman Army. The Argentine government (1898-1902) similarly invited a German mission, which included von der Goltz's son (Resende-Santos, 1996: 243; Atkins and Thompson, 1972: 259).

[205] Two major structural changes were under way in the Argentine countryside during WWII (Vanderlei, 2008: ch. 1). Due to the sharp decline in the price of cereal, most landowners shifted to cattle-raising by evicting their tenants. Others tried to remain competitive by mechanizing their production, which left tens of thousands of rural workers unemployed.

migrated to Buenos Aires between 1935 and 1945 (Conde, 2009: 120), expanding urban labor force. While the growth in industrial production, coupled with a shift to labor-intensive activities, created employment for these migrants, the public authorities were still confronted with drastic social problems (Tamarin, 1985: 43-45). According to official figures, one third of the people in Buenos Aires were born elsewhere and half of the urban workforce lived in the area for less than five years (Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998: 145). The rapid growth in the workforce did not help with the already low wage levels during the 1930s and the early 1940s. In short, before the genesis of the ND state, Argentina had already been confronted with problems usually faced by developing countries after a cycle of import-substitution-industrialization.

Against this backdrop, the junta inherited a labor movement that was bitterly divided between two factions, the CGT 1 and the CGT 2. Initially, the military leaders closed down the communist unions (as well as the CGT 2) and issued a decree that imposed tight restrictions on professional associations. There was every indication that the new regime envisioned a loyal and weak labor movement that would refrain from direct political action, adopt a nationalist ideology, and support the government. With half a century of organized action, however, Argentine unions could not be tamed so easily. First came the meat-packers strike in June, 1943; this was followed by a larger strike by railroad workers after the government intervened in their unions, namely La Fraternidad and the Union Ferroviaria. Despite some support from the countryside, urban consumers, and the Catholic Church, the junta was thus headed for a major confrontation before the end of its third month in power.

It was at this conjuncture that Peron was appointed to replace Carlos Giani in the understaffed National Department of Labor, and his close friend Mercante – whose father was a member of la Fraternidad and his brother of UF – became the new interventor to the two railroad

unions (Mercante, 1995: 48; Rein, 2008: 39-40). Over the following month, they successfully ended the strikes and began to reverse the junta's anti-union measures. In turn, they wooed union leaders into supporting the new regime. Due to their initial success, the National Labor Department (DNT) was transformed into a cabinet-level secretariat on November 27, with Mercante named as the director-general of labor and direct social action (Director de Accion Social Directa).[206] At the DNT Peron laid the groundwork for a pro-labor statist coalition that catapulted him to national prominence. Under his guidance, a team of policy experts, labor lawyers, and union leaders subsequently turned his abstract ideas into concrete policies, developed social and labor programs on his behalf, wrote decrees later adopted by the military regime, and built the institutional infrastructure that facilitated the transformation of the Labor Department into a powerful secretariat.[207] With its rapid expansion into healthcare, social security, and pension programs that were previously under the purview of provincial and regional governments (Tamarin, 1985: 181-183; Buchanan, 1985: 63; Panettieri, 2000: 31-53), the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare became the laboratory for the transformation of the liberal Argentine state.

From the outset, Peron reached out to trade unions with the promise to improve their material conditions and legal rights. Argentine union leaders were accustomed to establishing

[206] The National Department of Labor was created in 1907 by a presidential decree and later authorized by Congress in 1912. Until Peron's appointment, it had jurisdiction only in the federal capital and the national territories.

[207] Chief among them was Jose Figuerola, a Barcelonan expert in labor relations and corporate law, who briefly worked at the Labor Ministry of his native Spain, under the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, before his migration to Argentina (Page, 1983: 69; Rein, 2008: 56-58). As head of the statistics division of the National Labor Department (NLD), he was already familiar with the plight of the Argentine working class (Fayt, 1967: 96-97; Gambini, 1999: 115). Figuerola saw Peron as a charismatic leader, who could institute a corporatist system that he thought Argentina needed desperately. During the military rule, Figuerola became the chief architect behind Peronist labor policies and was later appointed in 1944 as secretary-general of the Consejo Nacional de Posguerra. He was joined by Juan Bramuglia, a native of Buenos Aires province and labor lawyer with extensive ties to Socialist unions, who developed social welfare and labor legislation for Peron (Rein, 2008: 72-74). In the Secretariat of Labor, Bramuglia was the Director-General of social welfare and later appointed as the spokesperson for the Caja Nacional de Ahorro Postal (National Postal Savings Fund) and interventor in the Caja Nacional de Jubilaciones y Pensiones Civiles (national pension fund).

contact with state officials and political elites. For instance, Yrigoyen had adopted *obrerismo* as an electoral strategy during his two presidential terms. Such political engagement, however, did not culminate in a corporatist system in which labor unions were given certain legal rights and political inducements. None of the political parties, including the Socialist Party, had forged organic ties with workers in this period. This void created a political opportunity for outsiders such as Peron to make overtures to organized labor. Still, securing the loyalty of union officials was not easy for Peron. [208] His military background and sympathies for Mussolini were known by the labor leaders. Between 1943 and 1944, together with Mercante, Peron held numerous meetings with union officials at his DNT office, promising them support during collective-bargaining negotiations. Many were skeptical.

In 1944 Peron began to deliver on his promises. With the Labor Secretary's support behind them, unions began to negotiate better terms from employers and gain greater influence over shop-floor rules. On Peron's urging, the military government settled disputes on behalf of workers in those sectors in which local capital had limited control, thus appealing to workers without ostracizing most industrialists (Horowitz, 1990: 203). Nearly one thousand collective agreements (five hundred of them in the province of Buenos Aires) were signed in 1944 alone, which produced a 12 percent rise in the real wage of unskilled workers' average real wages (Tamarin, 1985: 191; Elena, 2011: 64). Workers were also given paid vacations, extension of medical coverage, and more legal rights. In the end, the concrete benefits offered by the Secretariat of Labor persuaded many union leaders, such as Luis Gray of the Federacion Obreros

[208] Peron's relationship with labor unions Argentine working class has been widely discussed in the literature. While the orthodox school, headed by Germani, attributed Peron's popularity among workers to the high number of internal migrants who moved to Buenos Aires in the previous decade and were not yet co-opted by the old labor unions, thus leaving them vulnerable to paternalist appeals (Germani, 1978; Di Tella, 1965, 1981, 2001), more revisionist accounts claimed that the old labor leadership also supported Peron, and that they played an active role in his rise in exchange for material and policy concessions that benefited the working masses (Murmis and Portaniero, 1970; Torre, 1998 and 1990).

y Empleados Telefonico and Angel Borlenghi of the Federcion Empleados de Comercio, to support Peron, who, in turn, used them as intermediaries to appeal to rank and file members. [209]

Socio-economic Groups, Intra-Elite Opposition, and Mobilizing Structures

Having risen to power with junior officers, Peron began to establish tactical coalitions and outmaneuver his rivals in the junta.[210] Paramount among them was Edelmiro Farrell, who first became the Ministry of War in the Ramirez administration, and then rose to the vice presidency and the presidency in October 1943 and February 1944, respectively. He owed this meteoric rise to the GOU's open support, with Peron as the chief architect, and, in turn, appointed Peron as his Undersecretary of War (June 1943), Secretary of Labor (November 1943), Minister of War (February 1944), and Vice President (July 1944). Beside his personal connections, Peron was also well served by his political intelligence and pragmatic nature. During WWII, he chartered a balanced course between the moderate liberal and the reactionary nationalist factions of the army and subsequently sidelined both groups. By 1944, both of the ministerial posts became primary components in his efforts to seize control of the state apparatus and establish a corporatist system from above. While the Ministry of War gave him control over the army through budgetary allocations and appointments, it was the Secretariat of Labor that

[209] The position of Angel Gabriel Borlenghi, a long-time socialist and leader of the union for the Commercial Employees, is a case in point (Rein, 2008: 26-29). Skeptical towards a regime dominated by nationalist officers, Borlenghi became convinced of the positive role Peron could play in improving the lives of Argentine workers, when Peron pushed to have a retirement pension (unsuccessfully sought by Borlenghi for over a decade) plan passed. In celebration of this decree, a grateful Borlenghi held a ceremony in front of the Secretariat of Labor attended by his entire staff and thousands of his union members (Luna, 1971). Although he remained committed to the labor cause, Borlenghi quickly pledged his loyalty for Peron and worked hard to get other communist and socialist labor leaders to endorse Peron (Sylvester, 1968: ch. 17; Torre, 1990: 50-89).

[210] The GOU did not initially have a clear leader but instead developed cliques based on ideological and personal differences. In particular, four GOU members had high positions in the junta: Colonel Enrique Gonzalez was secretary to President Ramirez, Emilio Ramirez the chief of police of the federal capital, Eduardo Avalos the commander of the crucial Campo de Mayo garrison near Buenos Aires, and Peron secretary to Minister of War, Edelmiro Farrell. During the political crisis that led to President Ramirez's resignation, Peron forced out the first two colonels. Rising to the vice-presidency in June 1944, Peron eliminated his strongest rival, then Minister of Interior General Luis Perlinger, who was supported by Catholic nationalists (Potash, 1969: 234-248; 261-262, Page, 1983: 73-74; Walter, 1993: 103-6).

served as his base of operation and from whence he could reach out to socio-economic groups in Buenos Aires.

Peron also reached out to politicians from mainstream parties. His eyes were set on the UCR, which had the most extensive party organization at the time, despite being excluded from power for over a decade. Its populist tradition made the party a suitable partner and political channel for Peron. An endorsement from the Radicals, he figured, would open the way for the presidency, much like Justo's example in the 1932 elections. Peron appealed to the party officials through two different channels: (1) he contacted party elites in the Buenos Aires province via Bramuglia and (2) he offered a political deal to the popular ex-governor of Cordoba, Amadeo Sabattini, who was known to be a nationalist and reformist.[211] Following Alvear's conservative line, the unionist faction, which at the time controlled the UCR leadership, refused to negotiate with a member of the military government. As for Sabattini, he declined Peron's offer of vice presidency at a meeting in mid-1944 and rejected any other political option other than a presidential ticket dominated by the UCR candidates. This was a critical point in the trajectory of the Peronist movement because it thwarted Peron's ambitions to co-opt UCR organization (much like Mustafa Kemal took over the Union and Progress Party organizations in the early 1920).

In order to appeal to a wider coalition, Peron reached beyond his base of support in the army and among labor unions. In 1944 alone, he made hundreds of public appearances across the country and delivered speeches at public events and private occasions to a wide array of socio-economic, professional and political groups (Elena, 2011: 67). In particular, he targeted the middle-class neighborhoods of Buenos Aires and, not incidentally, was the first Argentine "politician" to promote 'middle class' as a political identity. During the 1944 summer the

[211] Sabattini was elected as governor of Cordoba from the UCR ticket at the height of the fraudulent Conservative rule, thanks to the decision of Conservative policymakers to not engage in electoral fraud in that province (Ciria, 1975; Halperin-Donghi, 2004; Tcach, 2007).

Secretariat of Labor organized public meetings at several middle-class barrios of Buenos Aires, including Flores, Palermo, and Constitucion. At each event, he would convey a message of support, and promise residents and shopkeepers state assistance (Adamovsky, 2009: 245-7). Like his strategy with labor unions, Peron also established contacts with numerous professional groups and economic associations. Unlike labor unions, few of these groups responded to this call with enthusiasm - except for the *Confederacion General de Empleados de Comercio* led by Angel Borlenghi (Adamovsky, 2009: 255-257). The association of teachers, and lawyers were both highly critical of the regime's nationalist agenda and support for Catholic public education. Many others were put off by Peron's direct ties to unions, fearing that this would lead to a loss of social hierarchy between workers and employers in the workplace. Meanwhile, retailers and shopkeepers were opposed to price freezes and other commercial restrictions placed by the military government. In late 1944, most of these organizations defected to the opposition camp and rekindled their ties with the UCR.

By contrast, due to their frustration with the political influence enjoyed by the landowning oligarchy, some industrialists welcomed the opportunity to play a greater role in the policy-making process under military rule.[212] Some junta members, in turn, saw the industrial bourgeoisie a natural ally for their new regime. Accordingly, many military officers and industrialists converged on the need to advance and protect national industries for defense and economic development.[213] In April, 1944, the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce was

[212] It should be pointed out that relations between the Rural Sociedad Argentina and the UIA remained harmonious until the Great Depression since many members from both organizations connected through family and business ties (Schvarzer, 1991: 74-80; Hora, 2001: 193-200). Until then, the UIA adopted a conservative agenda, showing more concern for the growth of labor unions and populist figures in government than the promotion of tariff protection and state-led industrialization (Rocchi, 2005: 152-176)

[213] Some UIA members frequently published articles on the topic of industrialization in the army's journal, ''Revista Militar'', while many nationalist officers (especially those with engineering backgrounds) were invited as guests and speakers to the UIA's Instituto de Estudios y Conferencias Industriales lecture series. Given that both groups had

established to oversee nonagricultural sectors of the economy, including domestic commerce (Campione, 2003). The Farrell administration also opened the Banco Crédito Industrial Argentina (Industrial Bank), the first public bank that explicitly offered long-term and low-interest credits to industrial firms. With its capital provided by both the Banco de la Nación Argentina and the government, the structure of the Industrial Bank reflected a coalition among the military and the UIA elites: beside the representatives from the War and Navy ministries, ten members of the board of directors came from the UIA and private banks (Potash, 1969: 251-252; Rougier, 2007: 82-83). In August, 1944, President Farrell picked Peron to lead the newly-established National Council on Postwar Planning, a semi-official body that was designed to serve as model for corporatist planning in the postwar period and included members from many influential industrial firms, the labor unions, government and military. It was in this context that Peron made a conciliatory appeal to business in August, 1944. Speaking to a select group of businessmen at the stock exchange ‘‘Bolsa speech’’, he warned them on the potential threat posed by worker radicalism in the post-war era:

‘‘Don’t be afraid of my unionism. Never has capitalism been firmer than now…. What I want to do is to organize the workers through the state, so that the state shows them the way forward. In this way, revolutionary currents endangering capitalist society in the postwar can be neutralized’’ (English translation, Rock, 1987: 257; quotation from Llorente, 1980: 275).

Despite these overtures, Peron was untrustworthy for the business elites. While they desired state support, business elites were wary of excessive state intervention in labor relations, distrusting Peron as an outsider with Axis sympathies and radical ideas (Lucchini, 1990: 60-68; Horowitz, 1990: 201). Furthermore, they saw Peron a cause of labor agitation and opposed his efforts to institute a corporatist regime. As one of their members put it, Peron came across like a “pyromaniac fireman who threw fuel on the fire at the same time he claimed he could put the fire

recognized the need for state-led industrialization as a new economic model, such contacts reflected the search for a political strategy to consummate that agenda (Brennan and Rougier, 2009: 28).

out" (Romero, 2001: 95). Peron's radical rhetoric, along with his cozy ties to labor unions, intimidated many industrialists. Similar to majority of the urban middle classes (Adamovsky, 2009: 273-279), industrialists became increasingly concerned with the erosion of the social hierarchy in general, and the loss of control on the factory shop floors to union leaders, in particular.

Recent studies have suggested, however, that industrialists were divided on how to protect their interests and did not act unified as a class (Schvarzer, 1991: 84-99; Brennan and Rougier, 2009: ch. 2). In particular, industrialists were divided across and within sectors based on whether or not their firm catered to the domestic market and could pass high labor costs to their consumers (Mainwaring, 1986; Brennan, 1998). Some industrialists supported Peron from the beginning, whereas others opposed him overtly and still others chose not to oppose Peron directly but refrained from cooperating with him.[214] In the end, it was the existence of strong opposition parties and the dominance of export-oriented industrialists that shifted the balance of power. The truce between the regime and industrialists was finally broken in the summer of 1945. [215] The Allied victories in Europe also encouraged the opposition elites and rallied them against Peron, known for his sympathies for Mussolini.

Due to this growing opposition, Peron relied on his access to state patronage to expand his popular base and to consummate his agenda. His public campaign to help victims of the San Juan earthquake in 1945 turned him into a household name (Healey, 2002 and 2011). At this

[214] While some scholars have argued that an ''anti-status quo elite'' composed of new industrialists supported Peron's dirigeste policies (Di Tella, 1965; Murmis and Portantiero, 1971), others have cited UIA's open support for the opposition in the 1946 elections as evidence that industrialists' contribution to the purportedly polyclass alliance behind him was minimal (Cuneo, 1967; Kenworthy, 1972; Horowitz, 1990; Jauregui, 2004).

[215] Peron used the council to chart out a corporatist agenda and solicit support from prominent industrialists. As late as April, the UIA was still sending representatives to government commissions or organs established to promote an official industrial policy, including the *Consejo Nacional de Post-Guerra*. Citing their inability to influence its decisions, the UIA representatives resigned from the council in August of the same year (Jauregui, 2000: 72).

point, he had switched from seeking the endorsement of existing parties to building a new political movement. This was a delicate task, however. Despite being the "second" most powerful man of the regime, Peron increasingly adopted a critical tone against the economic order and consequently emerged as an "anti-status quo" leader (Di Tella, 1965 and 1987). In time, he surrounded himself with what Rein (2008) terms the ''second line'' of leaders – intermediaries through whom Peron reached out to different sectors of society. As the strongman of the junta and through loyal federal interventors, he co-opted dissident politicians, union leaders, and provincial elites into a personal network. After his alliance proposal was refused by the UCR leadership, Peron began to lure the mid-level cadres in an attempt to capture the party's base. For instance, he had appointed the loyal Bramuglia as federal interventor to Buenos Aires in December, 1944.[216] In turn, Bramuglia spawned a popular coalition from the La *Fraternidad*, the UF and the meatpackers' union located in Berisso, and laid the groundwork for a political machine to rival the UCR organization.[217]

In June, 1945, Ernesto Boatti, the president of the UCR's Buenos Aires branch, accused Peron and Bramuglia of trying to hijack the party by registering civil servants as party members (Rein, 2008: 91-92). The first break in the UCR ranks occurred in August, 1945, when Hortensio Jazmin Quijano, an Alverista Radical from Corrientes, took the post of the interior minister in the military government. Quijano was followed by Armando G. Antille, Yrigoyen's legal counsel after the 1930 coup, who became the Finance Minister and by another former Alvearist

[216] Buenos Aires was the most fertile, heavily populated, and developed province of the Argentine Republic. Home to millions of immigrants and a booming economy, it was an asset for anyone with political ambitions. Except for Yrigoyen during the 1916 election, no candidate in modern times won the presidency without carrying Buenos Aires. On the provincial politics of Buenos Aires and its impact on national politics, see Walter (1993 and 2002).
[217] For more on the symbolic importance of Berisso and the collective culture of meat-packer workers, see (James, 1997; James and Lobato, 2004)

deputy, Juan I. Cooke, chosen for the Foreign Ministry.[218] Despite these defections, Peron's hopes of fracturing the opposition did not materialize. Those Radicals who responded to his call were mostly careerists with mainly local influence. The UCR leadership quickly announced that any member who collaborated with the military government would be expelled from the party. Peron never seriously contemplated seeking the Socialist Party's endorsement but targeted its voter base, particularly in the federal capital. The defection of mid-level Socialist figures - including Borlenghi and Bramuglia - was vital in persuading other union members to cast their lot with Peron over their party (Torre, 1990: 50-89; Rein, 2008: 92-93). Besides offering material benefits and policy concessions, Peron also provided defecting cadres the possibility of political advancement through the ranks of the Peronist movement.

Such developments illustrate the high level of intra-elite resistance against the government's course, increasingly directed at Juan Peron. In response, Peron had access to lower income groups and mobilized his supporters as part of his political strategy. But so did the opposition. In what was the largest demonstration in Argentine history nearly one million people gathered in downtown Buenos Aires on 19 September, 1945 to call for democratic elections. Most members of the junta, except for Peron and his entourage, did not want to counter this opposition by further appeals to workers; some had already begun to negotiate with the Radicals (unbeknownst to Peron), while others, such as president Farrell, wanted to call for elections and retire afterwards. Not Peron, though. Instead, the Vice President turned to his base. On October 2, 1945, his courting of the organized labor culminated in the Decree 23,852, which constituted a

[218] Quijano started his political career as a Yrigoyenist but then switched his support to Alvear following the latter's election as president in 1922. He later founded the Banco Popular and the Sociedad Rural de Resistancia to promote economic development in his region. Later elected as national deputy (1924-1928) and senator (1928-1930) from Santa Fe, Antille ironically served as the Minister of Justice in the provincial government of Enrique Mosca, the VP candidate for the UCR-led Union Democratica. He also founded the Yrigoyenist magazine, *Hecos e Ideas*, which naturally followed a Peronist line during this period.

rupture in Argentine industrial relations (Adelman, 1992: 250-251). The new legislation became the centerpiece of the collective bargaining system.[219] By legalizing their status, Peron in effect strengthened trade unions against their employers and also linked them to the Labor Secretariat.

This legislation was the last straw for his opponents in the junta, however. On October 9, under pressure from General Avalos of the Campo de Mayo garrison, Peron was forced to resign from all his duties. He was then arrested and subsequently sent to the island of Martin Garcia, where Yrigoyen was taken after the 1930 military coup. Peron's rivals in the junta replaced his loyalists in the cabinet and began to reverse his pro-labor policies. Meanwhile, the opposition leaders called on the Supreme Court to assume control of the government until elections were held.[220] What they failed to take into consideration was that Peron's movement remained intact despite his arrest. As early as October 9, labor leaders - including Borlenghi, Silverio Portieri and Luis Gay - established a national strike committee. They were soon joined by Mercante, who coordinated the efforts from his office at the Secretariat of Labor. Labor leaders and Peronists in the junta knew that Peron's arrest also jeopardized their own political future and policy achievements. Following a tense meeting, the CGT Central Committee called for the mobilization of unions for October 17 and declared a general strike. Notes from the meeting indicate that a heated discussion took place, with some union officials preferring to negotiate with the military government instead of declaring a strike (Tamarin, 1985: 198-199). The decision was ultimately taken by a 16-11 vote.

[219] It granted full legal rights to labor unions (article 9 and 10), albeit with the recognition of the Labor Secretariat (article 43); ensured delegate and steward elections for each organization (article 4); established a tribunal network for bargaining with employers (article 49) and also allowed unions to participate in politics (article 33).

[220] The new Secretary of Labour Juan Fentones fanned the flames with his announcement of support for laissez-faire labor relations, declaring that the new administration would desist from "drastic remedies unfounded in law and which pose uncertainties to production" (Murmis and Portantiero, 1971: 104; Llorente, 1980: 252).

No other event better symbolizes the ability of Peron, whom Di Tella referred to as a "*movilizador* caudillo" (Di Tella, 2003: 41) to draw a large crowd to the streets than the October 17-18 protests. From the early hours of October 17, large crowds from the outskirts and low-income neighborhoods of Buenos Aires gathered at the Plaza de Mayo to demand Peron's release. Unable to dispel the masses, the junta released Peron from the Military Hospital and allowed him to greet the crowds from the balcony of the Casa Rosada. The jubilee turned into a major show of force for organized labor and was followed with a general strike the next day. While the October 17-18 demonstrations did not surpass the March for Freedom and the Constitution in their size, they were nonetheless significant for demonstrating the organizational capacity of labor unions and their devotion to Peron.[221] They placed the working class into the center stage of Argentine politics.

In the ensuing weeks, pro-Peron union leaders - Luis Gay, Cipriano Reyes, and Luis Monzalvo of the railway workers, in particular - colluded to establish a labor party that would preserve their achievements and secure the influence of unions in Argentine politics (Torre, 1990: 182-183; Del Campo, 1983: 223; Gay, 1999). Like its British counterpart, the Labor Party was organically linked to industrial unions, enrolling union members to the party (Pont, 1984). The labor leaders assumed that this new party would hold Peron accountable and moderate his militaristic views. While Peron was designated the ''first member'' of the party (Monsalvo, 1974: 208; Torre, 1990: 189), the founding committee did not envision a strong leadership post but instead emphasized the mobilizational power of labor unions. Meanwhile, Peron was unhappy about the independent course taken by union leaders. Like most officers of his

[221] The exact details of the worker-led protests, which would later be celebrated as People's Loyalty Day (Dia de la Lealtad Popular), are beyond the scope of this dissertation. For more details on this event, see Navarro (1980), James (1988), and Torre et al (2005).

generation, he associated party politics with corruption and social unrest. As an army man, he was neither accustomed to nor comfortable with intra-party debates, factional struggles, and policy fights. As such, he resembled Obregon, Mustafa Kemal, and Nasser, who used their popularity in the military to consolidate their power and created a weak party organization for limited mobilization against opponents.

Although the strength of civil society precluded Peron from completely sidelining or closing down all political parties, he considered being nominated by them and then governing autonomously as the president. His failure to persuade Sabattini and other high-ranking Radicals, coupled with alienation from his colleagues in the junta, thwarted this option and forced Peron to reconsider his choices. Faced with an intense intra-elite opposition, Peron reached out to socio-economic groups and dissident politicians marginalized in the political arena. Using the existing mobilizational networks, he spawned an electoral coalition from a conglomerate of urban and rural workers, tenant farmers, provincial merchants, immigrant entrepreneurs, Catholics, and nationalist officers and intellectuals. His most important constituency was the trade unions.[222] Through the *Partido Laborista*, Peron gained a surrogate organization at the national level. The *PL* was particularly strong in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Salta and Tucuman (MacKinnon, 1995: 5; MacKinnon, 2002: 36), where there was a critical mass of industrial or agricultural workers.[223] Peron balanced the heavy worker presence in his coalition with dissident and careerist Radicals recruited from interior provinces, including Santa Fe, Corrientes, La Rioja and Santiago del

[222] There is still a wide debate on which labor unions joined the Peronist cause from 1943 to 1945, and whether or not they were previously connected into the existing party networks. For a more extensive discussion on specific unions and their leaders, see Tamarin (1985), Matsushita (1986), Horowitz (1990), Torre (1990), and Di Tella (2002).

[223] The PL campaign across Argentina generated a favorable political opportunity structure for the mobilization of marginalized groups: the Syrian-Lebanese community in La Rioja and Santiago del Estero, Indians in Salta and Jujuy, sugar workers in Tucuman, agricultural workers in Jujuy, San Luis, Mendoza, and Catamarca, and tenant farmers in Santa Fe mobilized to support Peronist candidates (MacKinnon, 1996: 7-9 and 12-13).

Estero. These figures resigned from their parties to establish the UCR-*Junta Renovadora*,[224] and some conservative bosses, who shared a deep-hatred of the Radicals and needed state patronage for their local machines in rural areas, grouped under the *Partido Independiente* (Mackinnon, 1995: 6; MacKinnon, 2002: 35-36). Lastly, Peron united a wide array of military officers, nationalist intellectuals, and the Catholic higher clergy with his Hispano-Catholic discourse. The Catholic clergy's open support was especially crucial, for it assured many conservative voters and provincial businessmen, who shared Peron's antagonism towards the liberal economic order but also opposed his pro-labor policies (Di Tella, 2001: 158).

Although the Partido Laborista and the UCR-JR both recognized Peron's leadership, there was little else they shared common. The Labor Party leaders considered the UCR-JR to be a part of the political establishment discredited in the 1930s. Therefore, they resisted Peron's efforts to merge both parties but in the end agreed to join an electoral pact (Torre, 1990: 193-195). By contrast, *Renovador* Radicals used their political experience and Peron's support to outmaneuver the Laborista candidates. Due to this mutual distrust, there was much discord and competition within the Peronist movement over candidate selection.[225] As a new leader, Peron could not dictate a list of candidates nationally. Instead, this task fell on the shoulders of Bramuglia, who was selected by Peron to head the *Junta Nacional de Coordinacion*, an informal body of Peron's trusted deputies, which would purportedly transcend both parties to put together the candidate lists. As he pored over the telegrams sent by hopeful candidates from different

[224] The ex-Radicals' importance for Peron was more significant than their electoral weight; their participation allowed Peron to gain much needed autonomy from the labor unions and directly appeal to the Radical base (Torre, 1990: 192; Luna, 1969: ch. 5). To that end, he picked an experienced but low-key UCR-JR politician, Hortensio Quijano, as his running mate over Mercante who was supported by the PL.

[225] After the Vice Presidency, the governorship of the province of Buenos Aires was the most contested post. Peron wanted to nominate Alejandro Leloir, a landowner with some name recognition, who was a major figure from the UCR-JR. By contrast, at their convention, the PL elites initially wanted to nominate Bramuglia and later chose Mercante, when the former decided to not accept the offer (Reyes, 1989: 48-49; Torre, 1990: 198; Rein, 2008: 98-100). Unable to convince the party to change its decision, Peron had to go along with Mercante's candidacy.

parts of the country, seeking to compile a common list to unify, reconcile, and co-opt different groups, Bramuglia faced a colossal challenge. In the end, his efforts met with partial success: the Renavodar Radicals and Laboristas participated in elections under separate lists in only six provinces, namely Buenos Aires, Tucuman, Catamarca, Jujuy, Santiago del Estero and San Luis (Rein, 2008: 100-101; for a dissenting view, see Torre, 1990: 161; Gay, 1999: 81).

In late 1945 Peron was opposed by a wide elite coalition that included most political parties, mass media, and economic groups as well as the civil society. Fearing his rise to power, the Socialist and Communist Parties, along with several high-ranking Conservative politicians, lined up behind the UCR's presidential ticket under the *Union Democratica*. During the campaign, newspapers – including *La Nacion* and *La Prensa* – were highly critical of Peron, giving extensive coverage to the opposition campaign. Due to his previous ties with the Axis powers and nationalist foreign policy, the US State Department was also hostile towards Peron. After his appointment in 1945, Spruille Braden, the US Ambassador to Argentina, sought to isolate Peron diplomatically and embolden opposition parties with messages of active support (1984; MacDonald, 1980; Vanucci, 1986).

While Peron was regarded by most members of the politico-cultural establishment and economic elites as a proto-fascist figure (Codovilla, 1946), his appeals to labor unions transformed what was otherwise a clerical, right-wing regime into a hybrid one with strong popular support. Conversely, what had once been a pro-democracy movement with a strong leftist component shifted into a ''civic coalition'' that prioritized defense of political liberalism over economic issues during the campaign (Ostiguy, 2009: 21). The fact that the Union Democratica parties even contemplated the inclusion of the Conservatives – the party responsible for the fraudulent regime – is a clear indication of the political realignment and their aversion to

Peron. In the end, the UD nominated two liberal members – Jose Tamborini and Enrique Mosca – from the Anti-Personalista (Alvearista) wing of the UCR as its presidential ticket.

In reality, the Union Democratica was no less heterogeneous than the Peronist camp, experiencing sharp divisions in its policy and candidate selection processes. After the UCR's decision to nominate two *anti-personalistas*, those Radical activists who subscribed to the populist yrigoyenista tradition met in Rosario on November 10 and formed the Movement of Intransigence Renovation (MIR) (Del Mazo, 1957; Luna, 1969: ch. 4). Though excluded from the UCR national committee, the MIR group nominated their candidates for governorship in several provinces (Torre, 1990: 200; Ciria, 1968: 151-157). Some of their members, such as Sabattini, had already pushed for political and economic reforms in the late 1930s at the provincial level but neither had sufficient organizational capacity nor popular mandate to implement them at the national scale. This rift played into Peron's hands. In many provinces, conservatives ran under a separate list that eclipsed the opposition vote against the Peronists. In others, Peron co-opted the conservative bosses, who drew him votes in areas that had weak union presence (Llorente, 1980; Gonzalez Esteves, 1980). Indeed, many conservative politicians, who wanted to block the Radical ascendancy, gravitated towards Peron as a viable alternative.

In terms of their economic agendas, there was little difference between the Peronist and Union Democratica electoral platforms. Both sides endorsed agrarian reform, nationalization of public services, and social security for workers. Many UD leaders were not against industrialization and would have supported closer ties with unions. Where they fundamentally differed from Peron was their commitment to political liberalism and, by extension, opposition to a corporatist project that would bring industrial relations, collective bargaining, and national economy under state control (Torre, 1990: 199-219). Accordingly, UD portrayed the 1946

election as a choice between democracy and tyranny, turning the campaign into a referendum on Peron. They were emboldened by Vargas' fall in Brazil and the victory of the Allies in WWII, both in 1945. By contrast, Peron skillfully turned the debate from political liberalism to social justice, as he attacked the economic order for generating vast income inequalities. In so doing, he opened up a new cleavage in Argentine politics and received a popular mandate to promote an agenda of national development.

Political Participation and the National Developmentalist State

In the 1946 elections Peron scored a major victory with 52.4 percent of the vote against the Union Democratica's 42.51 percent (Canton, 1973: 272). Moreover, the Peronist candidates captured 80 percent of the Chamber of Deputies, 14 out of 15 governorships, and 28 out of 30 Senators. Peron's electoral triumph was most pronounced in developed parts of the country, including the previous Radical strongholds of the federal capital and the province of Buenos Aires.[226] The election results also transformed the political establishment, promoting a new cohort of politically inexperienced legislators from lower-middle class and working class background. Scholars disagree about the relationship between social structure and Peronist vote. Some argue that support for Peron came primarily from lower-income workers (Snow, 1969; Little, 1973) and recent rural migrants to urban centers (Germani, 1965), while others allude to the poly-class alliance behind Peron's coalition (Di Tella, 1965), claiming that his national vote was based on a loose coalition of various socio-economic groups (Smith, 1969; Mora y Arauj and Llorente, 1980; Gibson, 1997). The primary factor behind Peron's victory was arguably the failure of mainstream parties to adjust to the changing demographics and accommodate the interests of new groups.

[226] Not incidentally, both provinces have a history of providing initial support for new (and reformist) political movements – Radicals in 1916, Socialists in 1924, and Peronists in 1946 – and of sustaining a stable electoral base for them (Canton, 1969 and 1973).

Thanks to his activities as Secretary of Labor, Peron successfully appealed to the growing urban working class. Most upper-middle class and the middle class voters went for the opposition, while support for the Communist and Socialist Parties eroded. Peron's vote share concentrated in the underdeveloped northwestern parts of the Buenos Aires province, the peripheral parts of the federal capital, and the working-class quarters of the city (Little, 1973: 272; Wellhofer, 1974: 239-245). In Cordoba, Tucuman, Santa Fe and Entre Rios, the Peronist vote was not associated with the change in the number of registered voters and turnout, an indication of mobilization (Wellhofer, 1974: 247-248). Instead, he used an eclectic mobilizational strategy outside of Buenos Aires. Notably, he penetrated the rural vote in littoral provinces (Cordoba, Santa Fe, Tucuman, and Entre Rios) by co-opting former Radical cadres and the clientelist networks of traditional parties. In other provinces, with divisions between the two camps less salient, Peron chose to rely on old conservative party bosses, the Catholic Church, and maverick Radical figures. It was only in backwater interior provinces, such as Jujuy, Salta, Corrientes, Catamarca, and San Luis, where state presence was minimal and local party machines still dominant, that the opposition could hold the Peronist tide, carrying five provinces.

Despite this electoral victory, the Peronist movement remained divided. As the largest component of the electoral coalition – responsible for 70 percent of the votes (Canton, 1973: 200) – PL leaders planned to turn their party into the main Peronist organization. Peron had other plans, however. On May 23, 1946, surrounded by his closest deputies, he made a radio announcement in which he stated his desire to dissolve the political parties that constituted the Peronist electoral coalition and reorganize them into a single organization, named *Partido Unico de la Revolucion Nacional* (Single Party of the Revolution).[227] Unlike Mustafa Kemal and Gamal

[227] On April 5, 1946 several Peronist leaders – including Bramuglia, Alberto Teisaire and Alejandro Leloir - signed a manifesto that called for the different Peronist organizations to ''pour the content of their experiences into a solid

Abdul Nasser, who also established their power from above, Peron encountered a highly mobilized base. His strategy was to place this mass base under a clear hierarchy through which he would control the entire movement and resolve its internal disputes by fiat. In this way, he could weed out his opponents by resorting to party discipline and gradually replace them with his syncopates. Thus began the absorption of organized labour into Peronism. This process occurred simultaneously at two levels: the imposition of control over labour unions in civil society and the PL branches in the partisan arena.

After the radio announcement, Peron formed the National Executive Council, with equal number of members from the two main constituent parties: Ricardo Guardo, Ernesto Bavio, Diego Luis Molinari (Peronist crony), Rodolfo Decker from UCR-JR, Osvaldo Amelotti, Silverio Pontieri and Hector Sustaita Seeber from the Labor Party. Since the PL had a larger base, Peron gave his support to the UCR-JR and promoted its candidates. His first act was to limit the PL's influence by reducing the number of senators elected from its ranks. When the provincial congresses met, Peron pressured the PL candidates to step down and cede their posts to UCR-JR figures. When they refused, Peron lobbied the provincial legislatures to select the UCR-JR to take up the positions elected from the Peronist list.[228] This sparked a major crisis between the two parties over the control of provincial legislatures and governorships. In the end, the Labor candidates lost their senatorial posts to the JR nominees in the capital federal, the

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party unity'' and to ''begin without any loss of time the second part of this historic cycle…within a solid shared organization'' (Rein, 2008: 101). When this initiative met with the PL's opposition, Peron decided to take direct action. For the full text of Peron's statement, see MacKinnon (2002: 39-41). The party's name was changed to Partido Unico de la Revolucion and then to Partido Unico in January 1947.

[228] The most distorted case arguably occurred in Catamarca, where despite receiving 117 votes in the election against the Labor Party's 15,000 votes, the JR nominee was chosen by the provincial legislature. In the capital federal, Alberto Teisaire, a Peronist crony and later vice-president, was selected as senator over Luis Gay, then president of the Labor Party (Torre, 1990: 245).

provinces of Buenos Aires and Catamarca, but managed to retain them in Tucuman, La Rioja and Santa Fe (Torre, 1990: 233-245).

These internal divisions notwithstanding, the 1946 elections gave Peron the popular mandate to transform the liberal Argentine state.[229] Instead, he promoted an agenda of national development. This political project had three crucial components: (1) higher level of state management of economy and promotion of ISI policies, (2) shift in the locus of the national economy from agrarian exports to domestic consumption, (3) cooperation between Argentine entrepreneurs and workers to push for rapid economic growth. In this task, Peron was assisted by the Farrell administration's measures to expand state control over the economy between the February 1946 elections and his inauguration in June. With Peron's urging, the government nationalized the Central Bank and saving deposits at privately-owned banks during this transition period. Moreover, a state agency - *Instituto Argentino para la Promocion del Intercambio* (IAPI) - was established to oversee the trade of major export items, such as meat and cereal (Novick, 1986). It is important to note that the junta had already established the Secretariat of Labor and the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce in 1944. Peron also benefited from fiscal centralization, which the conservative government had attained in 1934 with a co-participation system that regulated the national and provincial share of tax revenues (Eaton, 2001).

The Five-Year Plan (*Plan Quinquenal*), which was announced by Peron himself in October 1946, served as the new government's economic roadmap. Prepared by Peron's trusted aide, Jose Figuerola, who was the Secretary for Technical Affairs at the time, the Plan highlighted the importance of reviving the domestic market and need for increasing state control

[229] For a discussion of the foundations of the liberal state in Argentina, see Rock (2000 and 2002), Negretto and Aguilar-Rivera (2000), Lopez-Alves (2000: ch. 4), Centeno and Lopez-Alves (2001: ch. 5), Centeno and Ferraro (2013: ch. 8 and 11).

over economic activity to channel the national resources efficiently and provide technical planning.[230] Instead of a fully-fledged industrial program, the Plan suggested a wide array of projects to facilitate economic development in various areas, including the agricultural and industrial sectors, public health, construction, and housing. In its industrial strategy, the Peronist government primarily focused on offering more funds for manufacturing firms to deepen and diversity the industrial sector. Although the junta had established the Banco Industrial for this function, its funds were insufficient and therefore Peron expanded the monetary supply and raised credits for industrialists through the Central Bank. [231] To mitigate wide income gaps among states, Peron increased revenues funnelled to the provincial authorities. In November 1946, for instance, he met with provincial finance ministers to discuss the co-participation system and subsequently passed a legislation that raised the provincial shares (Eaton, 1999: 12).[232] In order to implement this program, Peron needed societal support. The plan's inaguaration therefore pushed him to impose a corporatist order on two key groups in society, namely Argentine enterpreneurs and labor unions.

The Establishment of Movement Corporatism

It is difficult to overemphasize the union's – and that of labor leaders like Borlenghi, Reyes, and Gay – behind Peron's political rise. Yet one question still remains. If these unions were so powerful, why did they fail to retain their organizational autonomy against Peron's later interventions? To preserve their autonomy, unions must rely on their own sources of financing

[230] On Peronist planning, see Berrotaran (2004), Campione (2003), and Elena (2005).

[231] Many industrialists were cash-starved, relying on their personal networks to secure capital through the stock market and the private banks, and refrained from engaging in high-level investments that were too costly and risky. On the financing of industrial projects, see (Rocchi, 2006; Regalsky, 1999).

[232] Like his redistributive policies, this resource allocation strategy had a political purpose. Accordingly, Peron relied on a diverse, populist electoral coalition that included traditional political caudillos from the interior provinces and therefore made side-payments to provincial leaders in order to keep these groups under his patronage (Sawers, 1998: 199; Gibson, 1997: 345).

and membership pool. Where they lacked these resources, unions could not increase their capacity and thus needed state assistance over the long term (Di Tella, 1981: 39). Regime leaders, in turn, may choose to support worker organizations but this comes at a price. In exchange for material benefits, legal security, and organizational assistance, ruling elites incorporated workers to the regime, though this co-optation process – whether conducted through state bureaucracy, a ruling party, or a personalistic movement – differed among cases.

Juan Peron co-opted the most dynamic elements of his political base (organized labor) into a vertically organized, personalistic movement – mostly financed by the state bureaucracy – and assimilated his political functionaries by unifying them under the umbrella of a hierarchical party. The labor was incorporated to the regime between 1946 and 1949. During this period, Peron offered generous inducements in the form of social programs, legal rights, and redistributive schemes.[233] For instance, cooperative union leaders were promoted to cabinet posts and received other political jobs and high salaries. These state perks also trickled down to rank and file members.[234] In the late 1940s, the number of workers covered by social security and health insurance programs increased a great deal. Due to the expansion in labor-intensive industries and public employment, the urban labor force and the percentage of unionized workers grew substantially; in 1950 union density reached 49 percent (Doyon, 1975: 154 and 158). Peron kept these workers employed and economically satisfied: from 1946 to 1949 real wages rose

[233] Peron also reached out to lower-middle class employees, artisans, self-employed traders, provincial merchants, rural laborers, and housewives. Among others, the government compelled producers to lower meat prices, offered subsidies for basic consumer items, and opened shops that sold foodstuff at reduced rates (Milanesio, 2006, 2010, and 2013). This culminated in the domestication of the markets whereby by commercial exchanges increasingly came in line with social concerns (Elena, 2007: 115). These measures spurred vibrant commercial activity urban areas and brought lower-income citizens into the national market.

[234] Due to the rise of the Labour Party during the 1946 general election, the number of union members reached its highest level in Congress in this period (Canton, 1966: 40, 56-7). Laborista deputies were on average younger (ibid. 37), politically inexperienced, and had lower levels of education than their counterparts (ibid. 46).

over 60 percent, which in turn raised workers' share of the national income from 44 to 55 percent (Baily, 1967: 77; Diaz Alejandro, 1970: 124-125; Collier and Collier, 1991: 341).[235]

In exchange for these benefits, Peron gained labor acquiescence to increased state control over unions. This was done through legislation that granted the Argentine state various prerogatives, including the power to declare strikes illegal, to mediate collective bargaining agreements, to supervise union elections, to withdraw the legal status of unions, and to confiscate their property (Baily, 1967: ch. 5; Blanksten, 1953: 261-271). Uncooperative officials were replaced with Peronist cronies through whom Peron captured control of the CGT (Buchanan, 1986: 64; Carri, 1967: 37-41; Alexander, 1962: 172-209). In November 1946, Peron first tried to seize control of the CGT by nominating Borlenghi for its leadership but lost when the delegates voted for Luis Gay, the ex-leader of *Partido Laborista*. After this initial setback, Peron removed the CGT's Secretary General from office in January 1947 based on fictitious charges and instead placed a little-known loyalist in that position.

If done through formal institutions, these policies would have led to state corporatism as seen in Nasser's Egypt. Unlike Nasser, Peron operated within a democratic system that brought some restrictions on his use of power. At the time, he was not even eligible to run for re-election. Therefore, he did not incorporate workers to a bureaucratic organ he was not sure he could control over the long term. Furthermore, he was concerned that any official who was put in charge of labour administration could build a power base among unions (much like he did between 1943 and 1945) and later challenge him. Bypassing the state bureaucracy for labour affairs, he instead co-opted labour unions into a vertical chain of command linked to his presidential office. Given that presidential duties did not allow him sufficient time to oversee this

[235] During the heyday of Peronism, real wages grew by 5.6 percent in 1946, 25.3 percent in 1947, and another 23.5 percent in 1948, while social spending increased by fifteen fold during this period (Mainwaring, 1986: 12).

relationship the way he could while Secretary of Labor, however, he delegated some responsibilities to a small circle, including his wife, Eva Peron. As an ally of the CGT, from 1946 to 1949, Eva Peron occupied an office in the Secretary of Labor, serving as Peron's emissary. As such, she met with labour delegations, formed contacts with union leaders, and monitored activities of the state and union officials (Buchanan, 1985: 69).

The Secretariat of Labor had two primary functions: the administration of unions and provision of welfare services to workers. During Peron's first term, while the state agency tightened its grip on unions, its welfare functions were divested to other organs, including the charity foundation run by Eva Peron (Buchanan, 1985: 70). Directly controlled by Eva Peron and funded by the state, the Eva Peron Foundation - which will be discussed in the following chapter - became an informal avenue for Peron to directly reach out to the masses and gain their personal devotion.[236] By contrast, the Secretariat's budgetary allocation for social expenditure decreased from 48 % to 6 % between 1947 and 1950. In so doing, Peron prevented the Secretariat (became a Ministry in 1949) that was in charge of unions from having the resources to gain the support of rank and file union members. Greater share from the budget instead went to salaries, an indication that Peronist union leaders were increasingly rewarded with jobs at the Secretariat of Labour. While Peron solidified his personal appeal among rank and file members, he kept their leaders content through such state patronage, turning them into what Di Tella (2001: 58) calls "corporatist trade union bureaucracy." Underfunded and with side payments shifted to informal organizations over which Peron had personal control, the corporatist system remained under-

[236] Her charitable acts later became a model for the wives of other ambitious Peronist politicians such as Hilda Duhalde and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (Auyero, 2001). For a biography of Eva Peron and her significance for Argentine politics, see Peron (1951), Navarro (1977), Barnes (1978), Fraser and Navarro (1996).

institutionalized. I classify such corporative arrangements that score high on mobilizational capacity but weak on institutional strength as *movement corporatism*.[237]

Union support, however, was not sufficient to establish a tripod system of official representation in which the state acts a neutral arbiter between the industrial bourgeoisie and organized labor. Therefore, Peron again reached out to industrialists after his victory. Although most of them supported the *Union Democratica*, he calculated that many would now switch sides.[238] Indeed, several prominent industrialists - including the former UIA president Luis Colombo and the country's richest industrialist Di Tella - expressed an interest in cooperating with Peron. And yet, the anti-Peronist ticket headed by Pascual Gambino and Raul Lamuraglia defeated the "collaborationist" list Peron supported in the internal elections of the UIA.[239] The government reacted by abrogating the UIA's *personeria gremial* status, not unlike its strategy for uncooperative unions (Brennan and Rougier, 2009: 33; Lewis, 1990: 157).

The election result made apparent the internal divisions among industrialists. The Peronist camp received strong support from small and medium-sized firms most of which were established during the Depression years and needed state support and tariff protection. The surprising result signaled the weight of sectors linked with international trade; despite their relative decline during Depression years, these firms were still predominant within the UIA (Mainwaring, 1986; Villanueva, 1972). Their opposition to Peron stemmed from his decision to shift Argentina from an export-based model, from whence they benefited together with the large

[237] Neither of the two subtypes – state and party corporatism – adequately captures the type of arrangements through which Peron wielded power over labor unions. Peron did not administer the corporatist system through a political party, as suggested by Collier and Collier (1991), nor did the incorporation process occur under the control of the state bureaucratic apparatus as argued by Buchanan (1985).

[238] Some UIA members financially backed the opposition candidates, channelling money for the Union Democratica campaign that fuelled the division between two camps (Schvarzer, 1991: 92-94).

[239] The anti-Peronist camp had difficulty recruiting a candidate due to antagonism from the government. Indeed, the Peronist administration later retaliated against Pascual Gambino, who lost most of his fortune during these years (Schvarzer, 1991: 95). For more on this split, see Lewis (1990: 155-157), Schwarzer (1991: 94-98), and Brennan and Rougier (2009: 31-32).

agrarian bourgeoisie, to an ISI model. For them, the gradual expansion of the urban consumer market, coupled with export opportunities, was sufficient to promote industrialization in the light industries without state intervention. This course would have preserved the status quo and kept wages stagnant. By contrast, Peron's policies – exchange rate overvaluation, high tariffs, monetary policy, trade controls, and price controls – were disastrous for companies that relied on foreign trade. Because of the competition in world markets, they could not pass on the high labor costs and IAPI restrictions on shipping and exports to customers. Indeed, the industry's share in total exports decreased from 17 percent in 1943-1945 to 2.5 percent in 1948-1950, a trend that would continue in Peron's later years (Mainwaring, 1986: 6).

Indeed, the Argentine economy was one of the most industrialized in the global south.[240] What it lacked was a nationalist industrial policy to allocate efficiently the resources needed for deepening its industrialization. In the immediate aftermath of WWII, many perceived Argentina to be at a juncture over whether the international or domestic markets should be prioritized in industrial production (Barbero and Rocchi, 2003: 278). The former option was endorsed by the traditional elites who had strong ties to the agro-export sectors. However, this regional export scheme was not a viable strategy, not least due to strong opposition from the US government.[241] In that sense, the real choice for Argentine policymakers was not between export and inward oriented models but rather on how much economic power industrial workers should have under an import substitution strategy. The Peronist economic policy was based on high salary levels

[240] Recent research indicates that the industrial growth in the pre-Depression era was sizeable. For instance, the Argentine industry grew annually by 8 percent between 1875 and 1913 and continued to expand with a respectable 7 percent in the 1930s. In an environment of partial protection, Argentine industry grew in sectors that relied heavily on raw materials produced cheaply at home, including food, beverages, and tobacco.

[241] Rock (1987: 268-9) is right to suggest that the Argentine products were no longer competitive in the post-war environment and that these Latin American countries, due to low labour costs, were more rivals than partners. Even then, Peron made an effort to reserve some markets for Argentina's manufactured exports through bilateral agreements with Chile and Bolivia and enjoyed close economic ties with Franco's Spain.

and other material benefits handed to workers in exchange for attaining industrial peace that would benefit industrialists and also create full employment under a rapidly growing economy (Elena, 2011: ch. 2). State planners developed policies that generated jobs and higher income for workers, who were, in turn, expected to generate demand that would increase domestic production. To cushion the negative effects of these policies for the industrial bourgeoisie, the regime offered low-interest credits from the Bank of Industrial Credit.

Peron's initial decision to strip the UIA of its *personeria gremial*, instead of closing it down immediately, betrayed his desire to redesign the association from above. Like his counterparts in Mexico and Egypt, Peron aspired to establish a peak association for businessmen but faced strong collective action problems: there were powerful interest groups that rivaled regime-sponsored associations, siphoning away resources and lowering incentives for businessmen to join. His policies were not inevitably destined to clash with industrialists and, in fact, benefited many manufacturing firms producing for the domestic market (Cuneo, 1967: 181; Brennan, 1998: 82). Thanks to high tariff levels, these companies could compensate for high labor costs and foreign exchange shortages with high prices. This effect was pronounced in the metalurgical industry and consumer durables, whose production levels soared after Peron's rise to power (Teichman, 1981). Rather, Peron's failure owes more to divisions among economic elites than any unwillingness on his part to engage national entrepreneurs, as suggested by some scholars (Schneider, 2004: 178-179). Indeed, tensions were visible even among various industrial sectors protected by the new regime. For instance, tariff protection for light industry harmed the metallurgical firms whose products could be imported freely by others, even though they paid overvalued exchange rates for raw materials (Mainwaring, 1986: 9-11).

In May 1946, he established the *Asociacio Argentina de la Produccion, Industria y Comercio (AAPIC)*, which included commercial and landed elites as well as industrialists. However, the AAPIC made little effort to achieve a presence beyond Buenos Aires (Brennan and Rougier, 2009: 34-35). Instead of allowing the regime to organize the entire business community, the organization merely became a vehicle for opportunist business to seek state favors. Unable to transform the organization into a peak business association, Peron soon disbanded the AAPIC and subsequently established the *Confederacion Economica Argentina* (CEA) but to no avail. Although some industrialists previously affiliated with the UIA had joined, the CEA still had a limited base, relied on a voluntary membership structure, and failed to include most firms located outside of Buenos Aires (Brennan, 1998). Peron failed to overcome opposition from traditional sectors and accommodate the conflicting interests of business groups, including between those in Buenos Aires and the interior provinces.[242] Due to insufficient support from businessmen, one leg of the corporatist system therefore remained absent.

Limited support from the industrial bourgeoisie impacted Argentina's developmental trajectory in the ensuing years. Since the private capital controlled most of the industrial sector in Argentina, the viability of Peron's agenda depended on strong support drawn from the industrial bourgeoisie. Over time, industrialists faced the daunting challenge of making profits against escalating labor costs and some industrialists also complained of the difficulty to procure cheap credits and import goods. Moreover, the regime's failure to establish a peak business association limited government efforts to solve the collective action problems among industrialists and funnel resources to cooperative firms. At the same time, the Peronist redistributive policies

[242] When Peron assumed power, industrialization had already run its course for half a century. This represents an anomaly in the global south, where the industrial bourgeoisie was typically feeble and remained dependent on the state. On state-business relations in the developing world, see Shafer (1973); Bugra (1994); Bianchi (1984 and 1989); Kohli (2004) and Bellin (2002).

created strong vested interests in society that prevented Argentina from deepening its industrialization process (Teichman, 1981: 152; Diaz Alejandro, 1970: 258). Given this failure to promote vertically integrated and efficient industrial development, it is little wonder that the Peronist government experienced economic bottlenecks after just a few years.[243] These problems are discussed in the next chapter.

Consolidation of the Peronist Regime and Political Opposition

The Peronists were not alone in experiencing internal strife, however. After the election, the opposition parties found themselves in a starkly different context in which they had to compete against an increasingly popular government amid immense chances in the political arena. Except for the UCR, no other opposition party had representation in the bicameral legislature. With no access to power, the popular base of these parties continued to erode.[244] Responding to the new political realities, the Socialist and Communist Parties both concentrated their efforts in the civil society and increasingly drew support from the intelligentsia (Sigal, 2002: 29-44; Fiorucci, 2006; Nallim, 2012: ch. 7). In Congress, resistance to the Peronist agenda was waged by a small, but effective, group of Radical deputies, among them reformist legislators such as Balbin and Frondizi, who would later rise to the leadership of the party.[245] During the parliamentary debates, these figures acknowledged that the state had an important role to play for economic and social development but also called on Peron to expand the democratic space and shift power to the civil society. Further, they defended the freedom of association and the workers' right to strike, proposing reformist legislation, including annual holidays, paid leave,

[243] For a review of Argentine industry during these years, see Belini (2006a, 2006b, 2010); Rougier and Schvarzer (2006), Belini and Rougier (2008).
[244] This was the first time since 1904 – when Alfredo Palacios was elected as the first Socialist deputy in the Western hemisphere – that the Socialists were not represented in the parliament. On parties in this period, see Tcach (1991), Altamirano (2001: 13-26), Sebastiani (2005).
[245] On Frondizi's long political career and economic ideas, see Rouquie (1975); Sikkink, (1988).

retirement for employees and workers and compensation for work-related accidents, free distribution of textbooks and inexpensive public housing (Sebastiani, 2003: 318-323).

In a sign of the radical changes that had occurred under Peron, the intransigent faction won control of the UCR national committee in 1948 (Del Mazo, 1957: 142-154). Although they strongly opposed Peron, the new UCR leadership was committed to political and economic reform. Among others, they advocated the nationalization of the foreign-owned transportation and utility companies and pressured the government to allow parliamentary oversight of its policy agenda. By contrast, Peron began to curtail the democratic space that was necessary for such a debate, including growing pressure on the national media and restrictions on parliamentary control of the executive branch (Luna, 1984: 312; Sebastiani, 2003: 321-322). In response, opposition parties experienced deep schisms and internal debates on how best to deal with a regime that was increasingly authoritarian but yet still popular. They were divided among factions that defended political engagement in order to resist Peronist policies, and those that advocated complete withdrawal from an illegitimate system (Hallim, 2012: ch. 7). As discussed in the next chapter, these debates continued among the opposition ranks well into the 1950s. Peron's growing authoritarian practices, coupled with increased state control on the economy and society, strengthened the latter group and culminated in an anti-Peronist coup in 1955.

After bringing the Peronist movement under control, Peron turned his attention to shaping the political system. As already discussed, he undermined the opposition and tightened his control over the national media. Similarly, his government sought to assert its control over the universities, which had become the hotbed of radicalism after the 1943 coup. In response, the government purged over 1,500 academics from the professorial body and facilitated the establishment of student organizations to rival those of the opposition (Rock, 1987: 280-281). An

important step in this process was the creation of a partisan identity tied to the new regime. In 1949 Peron formalized his political ideas and economic views into an eclectic ideology – Justicialismo – that merged the radical rhetoric of labour populism with Christian humanism.[246] Despite the allure of universalism, the justicialismo was strongly anchored in nationalist principles. Similar personalistic ideologies were created by other national developmentalist regimes, including Kemalism, Nasserism, Nehruism, Baathism, and pancasila (for some examples, see Sigmund, 1963). Like them, justicialismo steered between the free market and dirigisme to adopt an economic model that opposed Marxism, offered economic development through national harmony rather than class conflict, and advocated a non-aligned foreign policy.

In 1946 Peron broke judicial independence by impeaching four out of the five sitting Supreme Court judges. For the Peronists, the Supreme Court was a symbol of authoritarian rule and an ally of the oligarchy, as evidence by its ratification of electoral fraud throughout the 1930s. Over the recent years, the Court acted as a 'veto player' by overturning several of Peron's labor reforms, including the special court for work-related cases.[247] It is therefore little wonder that Peron, with his clear parliamentary majority, decided to abrogate the Court's autonomy from the executive branch. These impeachments removed the last institutional hurdle against Peron's agenda. In doing so, however, Peron created a bad precedent and politicized the courts.[248] This

[246] Justicialismo was presented as a system of social harmony that could eschew class conflict in a modern society. Peron's writings, however, betray an incoherent pattern of thought, unsystematically merging references from ancient Greek philosophy and Christian theology with those of modern thinkers and his propagandist statements. For a positive account, see McLynn (1983).

[247] In June 1945 the Supreme Court found these courts to be unconstitutional (Alston and Gallo, 2010) but the military government ignored this decision. In February 1946, the Supreme Court also ruled that the junta had violated the Constitution by creating the Secretariat of Labor. The ruling opened into question the legatimacy of Peron's policies and demonstrated that should Peron lose the election, his policy achievements would be overturned.

[248] Until Peron's election as president 82 percent of the Supreme Court justices left the Court either due to death from natural causes or retirement. Since then, this rate fell to 9 percent, with rest of the judges being removed because of resignation, impeachment, or irregular removal (Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin, 1999: 702; Alston and Gallo, 2010).

politicization led to high turnover among Court Justices and eroded rule of law in the country over the long term (Helmke, 2002; Iaryczower et al. 2002).

The final step in the transformation of the political regime came with the enactment of a ‘‘Justicialist successor’’ to the 1853 Constitution. The Peronist leaders claimed that the existing institutions distributed economic and political power in an unequal manner, thus allowing their opponents to slow down the pace of reform. The constituent assembly was convened just after the December 1948 elections that gave the Peronists a sizable majority: 109 Peronists, 48 Radicals and 1 Laborista (Ilsey, 1952: 227). In the new document, Peron accumulated vast powers in the office of the presidency and laid a legal framework for promoting economic nationalism and social justice. The new constitution abrogated term limits for the president and expanded the federal government’s jurisdiction over provincial authorities in several areas, including education and social security. Other items include the declaration that all property has a social function (Article 38) and that both capital as well as natural resources could be put in service of the nation (Article 39).[249] According to the president, these changes transformed “political democracy” into “social democracy” (Scott, 1951: 567).

In reality, however, Peron seized control of all formal democratic institutions so as to prevent any checks and balances over his use of state power. Peron had managed in three years to replace the old order with a corporatist system centred on his personal authority and popular mandate. This was a common outcome in the national developmentalist regimes in which the rulers gained dominance over the management of the economy and imposed their control over society. Like the other three cases, the new regime was informally inaugurated with the

[249] This is similar to the Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, which Cardenas used to nationalize foreign the oil companies. Other amendments legalized policies already adopted during Peron’s first term, including the national takeover of public utilities, regulation of foreign trade and extension of government control over the monetary policy and coinage (Fayt, 1967: 240; Cafiero, 1961: 380-83; Ciria, 1972: 142; Rock, 1987: 288-289). For a more exhaustive list of amendments, see Scott (1951) and Ilsey (1952).

promulgation of a constitution. The new order was not the product of a revolutionary period, however. Peron derived the constituent power from his popular mandate, as reinforced with the increase of the Peronist vote share from 53.1 % to 59.1 % in the March 1948 parliamentary elections.[250] Although the facade of the democratic institutions was preserved, they no longer carried the same weight. The abuse of state power left the government with a significant advantage vis-a-vis its opponents. Due to the government's unequal access to political institutions, resources, and media, the playing field was skewed against the opposition (for the importance of a level playing field, see Levitsky and Way, 2010a). Hence, the installation of the ND state was accompanied in Argentina with the rise of "competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky and Way, 2002 and 2010b).

Conclusion

In his game theoretical study of authoritarian regimes, Svolik (2012) argues that autocrats face two primary conflicts: the first one is between those who rule and those who are ruled (authoritarian control) and the second one among those who rule (authoritarian power-sharing). Peron addressed the first problem by establishing, with the help of trusted intermediaries, a popular base that catapulted him to power. Figures such as Bramuglia and Borlenghi served as his envoy among urban workers; Miranda and Harbin reached out to the Argentine industrialist bourgeoisie to expand Peronism's political alliance; Jose Figuerola helped reorient the National Labor Department along corporatist lines; and Mercante preserved Peron's authority in the military and the labor bureaucracy after he was deposed in October 1945 (Rein, 2008: 22-23). Once in office, however, Peron consolidated his power by tightening his control over the movement and distributing benefits to key groups in exchange for their continued support.

[250] Although Yrigoyen had reached similar levels of support in the 1928 presidential elections, his faction lacked a majority in the Senate. By contrast, Peronist dominated both houses of the parliament (Anderson, 2010: ch. 7).

Meanwhile, he established a vertical organization to swallow the Labor Party and the Junta Renovadora, hampering the development of a strong party apparatus. Determined to maximize his power, Peron later turned against his "second line of leadership". Except for Borlenghi, he replaced these political leaders with syncopates who lacked an independent base of power.

The promulgationn of the 1949 Constitution was the final step in Peron's quest for political dominance. Under his rule, Argentina underwent a major transformation by expanding its state bureaucratic apparatus and regulating its economy and industrial relations. Some of the important policy changes include the nationalization of the banking sector and foreign-owned enterprises, land tenure reform, social security legislation, state control over international trade, and corporative arrangement of organized labour. Purging the aforementioned figures however came at the cost of weakening the Peronist movement over the long term. Since he did not invest in state and party institutions, the regime continued to rely on state patronage, along with cultural appeals to the popular classes.

As I show in the next chapter, the economic downturn that followed the lean years limited Peron's ability to buy off popular support. With the CGT leadership dominated by Peron's cronies, several unions went on strike against the austerity measures of the Peronist government, while others, though still retaining their loyalty to Peron, limited their active support for the regime. The personalistic aspect of the corporatist system also precluded inter-class bargains. In response, Peron would increasingly adopt a strategy of polarization to keep his base intact. Lacking corporatist institutions that could moderate and regulate redistributive struggles, Peron as increasingly unable to restrain labour demands and facilitate industrialization. In the end, the upper middle and middle classes defected from the regime and engendered a poly-class alliance among various parties, the military and civil society.

CHAPTER 7
Ideological Polarization, Elite Defection, and Military Coup in Argentina

Introduction

Following his rise to power, Peron established what could best be described as a Populist ND state embedded in a deep political coalition. Thanks to its encompassing ties with labor unions, the regime had tremendous popular support but was also characterized by weak political institutions. Accordingly, the corporatist provisions that Peron made with the labor unions were not based upon formal state or party institutions and did not extend to other groups in society. These institutional choices were, in turn, conditioned by the contentious politics that accompanied Peron's initial efforts to establish a new order after the 1943 coup. Faced with strong resistance from the traditional landed and business elites as well as establishment parties, Peron found himself in a subordinate position in the junta and needed the support and mobilization of labor unions to secure his power. After his electoral victory in 1946, Peron easily surmounted his potential rivals in the eclectic movement that later became known as Peronism and consolidated his power without investing in robust institutions. Buoyed by the positive economic outlook in his early years, Peron used his access to state resources to personalize the new regime. The height of his political power came in 1949, when the parliament adopted a new constitution that solidified the new regime's policies and expanded his presidential authorities.

Taking advantage of the postwar economic boom, Peron increased his popularity in these years and distributed material benefits to impose personal control over the labor movement and co-opt his support into a vertically-organized party. Although the constituent groups within the Peronist ruling coalition struggled against each other, until 1949, Peron managed to postpone the outbreak of serious redistributive conflicts with a highly redistributive agenda. Political developments after this period illustrate the limitations of this personalist political strategy within

the context of a ND state. In times of economic downturn, which limited the government's redistributive capacity, Peron faced tremendous difficulty in keeping his political coalition intact. Due to the absence of formal corporatist institutions, Peron lacked the political tools to discipline his popular base and to follow a developmental agenda. The first part of this chapter analyzes how Peron, faced with an economic downturn after 1949, tried to curb labor demands to increase economic productivity and address the Argentine economy's structural problems.

Faced with internal contradictions in his ruling coalition and growing opposition from other parties, Peron sought to establish hegemony in both civil society and the partisan arena. Accordingly, the government created officially-sanctioned interest associations in various sectors to bring Argentine society under Peronist control and to weaken the opposition. The existence of nominally democratic institutions, however, complicated such efforts and prevented Peron from making these associations compulsory and non-competitive. Indeed, Argentina is one of the few cases in which the ND state was installed under a democratic system. The second part of this chapter focuses on these efforts and the opposition's response to this political project. It suggests that since Peron was loath to institutionalize these organizations, he ultimately failed to expand the corporatist system and co-opt the opposition. Given Peron's grassroots organization and unfair incumbency advantages, the opposition could not defeat the ruling party at the polls, a stark contrast with the Turkish case.

The third and final part looks at the Peronist regime's collapse. In particular, it suggests that Peron's growing authoritarian policies and electoral strength pushed the opposition groups to seek extra-political allies. Unlike Turkey, where the regime had a limited base of support, Peron maintained his popularity even in times of economic crisis. In response, the opposition elites sought alternative ways with which they could defeat Peron. Naturally, Argentine politics turned

into a zero sum game during this period. Bolstered by the symbolic power of the Catholic Church, the opposition rallied behind the anti-Peronist factions of the military – the only actor with sufficient power to defeat Peron. Although Peron was ultimately removed from power, the coup failed to destroy Peronism as a political force. Instead, the Peronist movement surmounted two decades of state repression and remains as the hegemonic political force in the country.

Hard Times in the Argentine Economy

By late 1948, when Peron reached the height of his power, the early signs of trouble in the economy became apparent. At the heart of the crisis was an acute balance-of-payments problem (Diaz Alejandro, 1970; Cortes Conde, 2009: 127, 139-141). As local industries grew, so did the demand for imports. This was not, however, accompanied by a commensurate rise in export revenues.[251] While Argentine imports quadrupled from their low wartime base in 1945 to 1949, exports stagnated in the same period as a result of the declining trend in international prices and demand levels for Argentine products (Rock, 1987: 289). What triggered this imbalance was, first and foremost, a triangular trade relationship between Argentina, Western Europe, and the US. As an exporter of foodstuffs, Argentina amassed a large trade surplus with the Western European countries, particularly the UK, whose currencies were not convertible (Cortes Conde, 2009: 170-171). Meanwhile, most of its imports came from the US that had little demand for its products in turn (Escude, 1983; MacDonald, 1986; Rein, 2008: 109-111).[252]

[251] The Argentine economy was driven by its success in attracting foreign investment in the 19th century (Ferns, 1960; Cortes Conde, 1979; Taylor, 1998). Although they spurred high growth rates, these capital flows left the country vulnerable to global economic shocks. From its peak of 35 % in the early 1900s, the fixed gross investment as a portion of GDP fell dramatically in the ensuing decades. In particular, the war years left most Argentine firms with a lack of capitalization and technology (Cortes Conde, 2009: 128-130).

[252] After Truman's decision to prohibit governments from using Marshall Aid funds to purchase Argentine products, Argentina risked losing its European markets altogether (Escuede, 1980; Rein, 2008: 111-113). From the mid-1930s to 1948-1952, Argentina's share of the world wheat trade dropped from 23 to 9 % and corn from 64 to 23.5 %, while the US share rose from 7 to 46.1 percent for wheat, and 9 to 63.9 percent for corn (Cafiero, 1961: 296; Diaz

Argentina experienced a sharp fall – from 1947 onwards – in its level of agricultural production and, by extension, export revenues. Some causes for this decline such as the inconvertibility of the sterling pound, the exclusion from Marshall Plan, and drought were obviously beyond the regime's control (Ferrer, 1967: 145-178; Di Tella and Zymelman, 1967: 492-530; Mallon and Sourrouille, 1975). However, these problems were compounded by the regime's pricing and wage policies in the countryside.[253] By forcing landowners to sell their cash crops to the state for below-market prices, the government effectively discounted their incentive to produce more and thus constrained its export capacity. While land reform was not a viable option due to the small size of the peasantry, the Peronist regime heavily intervened in the agricultural sector in order to funnel resources to the industrial sector: to industrialists as cheap credits and subsidies and to workers as high wages. Naturally, both groups wanted to keep food prices affordable but since Argentina's economy depended on the export of foodstuffs, their increased consumption triggered economic bottlenecks for the regime.[254]

Although the government initially financed imports with its impressive war-time reserves and export revenues, neither was sufficient to cover the growing demand after 1948. By fueling imports, the First Five-Year Plan arguably made Argentina even more vulnerable to shifts in the world economy and thus failed to end Argentina's economic dependence. For instance, the 1949 Anglo-Argentine agreement, which ensured the exchange of meat exports for British-controlled Middle East oil, had less favorable terms than the Roca-Runciman Treaty, long vilified by nationalists for its unfair treatment of Argentina. To raise demand for Argentine products, Peron

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Alejandro, 1970: 201; and Rock, 1987: 292-293). Other Latin American countries did not face the same challenge since their tropical products – banana, sugar, coffee, and rum – were not produced in the US.

[253] On how governments undermined their agricultural production with their interventionist policies, see Bates (2005 and 2008).

[254] In 1949-1950, the government could not meet its meat export quota for the British market, in part due to higher domestic meat consumption. For a history of Argentina's meat trade, see Smith (1969).

initially banked his hopes on the outbreak of hostilities between the US and Soviet Union, a war that obviously never occurred. As an alternative, the government later turned to bilateral trade agreements with Britain, Spain, and Brazil, but still to no avail.[255] These foreign exchange difficulties augmented the trade deficit and inflation, culminating in the first "stop and go cycle" of the Argentine economy in 1948 (Braun and Joy, 1968).

Peron's economic advisers were not initially concerned with high inflation, which, they argued, stemmed from a shortage of goods to meet growing demand. Therefore, they pumped money into state-owned enterprises and industrial firms in order to raise national production but import difficulties and rising labor costs hampered their plans. When inflation hit thirty percent, Peron adopted a tight monetary policy to promote price stability: restriction of money supply, public spending cuts, and reduction in credits and subsidies. This new economic course was exemplified by the departure of Miguel Miranda, Peron's "economics tsar", who, perhaps more than any other official, personified the regime's easy credit policies and inward-oriented model. In September 1949, the Central Bank declared that loans not used for the production of goods and services would be restricted and that the national industries had to meet the criteria of national interest, though this policy was interpreted in a flexible manner. Basic items such as spare parts and machines, raw materials, oil, and intermediate goods were to be given priority in the distribution of import licenses. Consequently, imports between 1949 and 1952 fell by over 50 percent (Belini, 2009: 25). Moreover, a balance was struck between industrial development and agricultural growth: farmers were given more funds and cheap seeds, while the IAPI paid them a greater portion of the world market prices.

[255] In 1947, the First Lady Eva Peron embarked on a three-month diplomatic visit across Europe (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Switzerland and France). The government especially cultivated close ties with the Franco regime, a major buyer of meat and wheat. But this trade was sustained on long-term credit, since Franco's Spain had limited funds for international trade. For more on Argentine-Spanish relations, see Rein (1993).

Such measures did not alleviate the structural problems of the Peronist economic model, however. After strong performance during Peron's first three years in office, the Argentine economy went into depression in 1949 and again in 1952 and had sluggish growth between the two years. Midway into his first term, Peron thus faced some tough choices. The government could no longer afford radical distribution towards workers and was increasingly forced to seek a more balanced approach. This would require Peron to discipline his labor base and gain the acquiescence of other economic groups for a new agenda. To limit the rising opposition against the regime, he tightened state control over society and curtailed the political arena.

Negotiating a Corporatist State from Above

The impending crisis altered the relationship between the Peronist regime and the industrial bourgeoisie, already challenged by a dual escalation of inflation and wage levels. More specifically, after 1949, the industrialists grew worried about redistributive pressures and the declining imports and government credits (Bellini, 2009). Due to the regime's fiscal troubles, national entrepreneurs now found themselves locked in bitter labor disputes that resulted in frequent strikes and production losses in 1949 and 1950 (Doyon, 1984). The problem was especially acute in the country's traditional industries - including wine, flour and meat-packing, where the increasing production costs and thus prices clashed with the government's efforts to keep basic items affordable for urban consumers.[256] Even the metallurgical industry, which benefited from an expansion of the domestic market under Peron's rule, became critical of the problems with organized labor, restricted access to foreign technology, shortage of credits, and excessive state interventionism (Rougier and Brennan, 2010: 77). As early as 1947, *Camara Argentina de Industrias Metalurgicas*, the employers' association for the manufacturers of the

[256] The contentious bargaining process in the flour industry is a case in point. After a protracted dispute between the Argentine Flour Workers' Union (UOMA) and flour industry, the National Economic Council settled the disagreement by offering state funds to cover any wage increases (Mainwaring, 1986: 16-17).

metalworking industry, had complained about the broken discipline at the shop floors and the high wages. They also complained of unfair advantages since the SOEs could operate with budgetary losses.[257]

It was at this stage that the absence of a peak association for businessmen was felt by both the Peronist and economic elites (Schneider, 2004: 179). Although the UIA, due to its opposition to Peron's pro-labor measures, refused to join the corporatist framework under military rule, other industrialists were willing to negotiate with Peron after his electoral victory. We saw in the last chapter that a "conciliatory" faction tried to capture the UIA leadership but lost in the internal election, setting the stage for government intervention (Lewis, 1990: 155-157; Schvarzer, 1991: 94-98). Some powerful holdouts notwithstanding, the conciliatory group then gained representation through the Association de la Produccion, la Industria y el Comercio (AAPIC) – later transformed into *Confederacion Economica Argentina* (CEA) – within the corporatist structure imposed from above (Brennan and Rougier, 2010: 32-35; Acuna, 2004: 104-135). In so doing, they strove to retain their dominant voice against other economic groups and influence the government's economic policy. For his part, Peron wanted to incorporate small and medium industrial bourgeoisie into the UIA in order to organize businessmen on a national scale and to limit the influence of liberal economic elites from Buenos Aires.

Meanwhile, even to Peron's surprise, small businessmen from the interior provinces autonomously mobilized to form the *Federacion Economica del Norte Argentino* (FENA) and

[257] The private firms were historically the engine of industrial growth in Argentina, with the public sector playing a limited role. On the Argentine industrialization, see Dorfman (1983); Katz and Kosacoff (1989), Lewis (1993), Schvarzer (1996), Brennan and Rougier (2010). During the 1940s, the Argentine state emerged as a major player in the industrial sector (Berrotaran, 2003; Girbal-Blacha, 2003; Jauregui, 2004; Belini, 2006; 2009; Rougier and Schvarzer, 2006; Belini and Rougier, 2008). Aside from the national oil company (Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales - YPF), the state took over the administration of national water, energy, and gas firms. In 1947, the German firms taken over by the Argentine government at the end of WWII were organized under la Direccion Nacional Industrias del Estado (Belini, 2001; 2006). Lastly, in 1941, a General Directorate of Military Factories was established to undertake heavy industrialization.

later the *Confederacion Argentina de la Produccion, la Industria y el Comercio* (CAPIC) to provide balance against the AAPIC-CEA (Brennan, 1998: 92-99). These businessmen, long left under the shadow of Buenos Aires, used the UIA's eclipse as an opportunity to assert their weight and join the distribution networks and economic planning of the regime. This was more than an inconvenience for the regime, however. The fragmentation of the business class hampered Peron's plans to create a peak association that would harmonize the conflicting interests of entrepreneurs and balance against the growing influence of the CGT. Such business support was vital for accomplishing the Peronist economic agenda, given the relatively large size of the Argentine private sector.

In that sense, the conflict between the CEA and CAPIC neutralized the capitalist class as a unitary actor, leaving businessmen without a powerful spokesperson against organized labor during the first five years of Peron's rule (Brennan and Rougier, 2010: 78-80). Finally, in 1952, Peron subsequently settled the matter by intervening in the negotiations to unite both sides within a single organization, *Confederacion General Economica* (CGE). Accordingly, the government sided with provincial businessmen who proved more cooperative, essentially leaving the newly formed association under the CAPIC hegemony. As a consequence, many industrialists were not represented within the CGE and thus excluded from the limited corporatist space offered by the regime. Subsequently, the CEA was taken over by the CGE and the UIA dissolved after a hiatus of 7 years, a symbolic reminder of Peron's failure to restructure this organization in accordance with his plans (Waldmann, 1978: 178-204; Schneider, 2004: 178-181).

Meanwhile, Peron failed to institute a corporatist system that could coordinate among economic actors and harmonize different sectoral and regional interests. Since the regime's most important ally was organized labor, the government had difficulty adopting measures that would

deepen the industrialization process (Barbero and Rocchi, 2003: 280-282). This generated inflationary pressures on the Argentine economy since productivity increases did not keep pace with wage gains. Given the large size of the working class in Argentina, however, it was not financially feasible to sustain a large populist coalition that included the workers, industrialists, and middle class (Di Tella, 2001: 140-141). In particular, many businessmen refused to support the government without the disciplining of labor unions. The resultant Peronist political coalition - provincial businessmen, a small group of industrialists, and a majority of workers – was not broad enough to keep industrial peace and political stability, especially in light of strong resistance from the economic elites and opposition parties.

Disciplining Organized Labor

Aware of the impending crisis, Peron knew that his regime's long term success depended on increasing economic productivity. Faced with economic realities and pressure from business elites, he began to curb labor demands. At a July 1949 cabinet meeting, for instance, Peron called for restraint in public projects and wage increases, lower domestic consumption of export goods, and higher subsidies for the agricultural sector. Fearing worker backlash, however, the government proceeded cautiously and enforced the stabilization program mainly in those sectors such as transportation, construction, and food industries that most affected the inflation rate. In early 1950, the government ordered the railway administration to make increases in personal and wage levels commensurate with productivity gains and instituted a salary freeze.

In addition to austerity measures, Peron made an effort to cushion their negative impact on his popular coalition. While the government slashed food subsidies to raise export revenues, it also intensified the campaign against speculators and hoarders to keep price levels low. Similarly, public spending was maintained and loans earmarked to pro-government industrialists

were resumed, even if they were now subject to more scrutiny.[258] Although the surge in public spending and wage levels came to a halt, no drastic reversal in economic strategy occurred until the 1951 elections.[259] In the wake of a stagnated industrial sector that lost an estimated 80,000 manufacturing jobs from 1949 to 1953, the government found employment in other sectors (Cafiero, 1961: 66; Rock, 1987: 301-302). Some jobs were also compensated by growth in the tariff-protected heavy industry, which subsequently led to a surge in autonomous union activity during Peron's second term and beyond.[260]

To be sure, labor unions under the Peronist rule rapidly expanded their membership size and organizational power (Doyon, 1975; Galiani and Gerchunoff, 2003). At the same time, this development created a dilemma for Peron: strong unions were vital for Peron's electoral prospects but now that he had gained the presidency, their autonomous action and excessive wage claims could impair long-term economic growth and thus his own political career. We have already seen how Peron, upon his rise to power, tried to centralize his control over the labor movement. The essential element of this program was industrial peace: in return for high wages, the unions were expected not to strike and bring the national economy to a standstill.[261] Moreover, the government eroded the autonomy enjoyed by individual unions, pushing the CGT to exert greater control over them. The CGT, in turn, was controlled by Peronist figureheads,

[258] On the credit policies of the Industrial Bank during this period, see Rougier (2001), Girbal-Blacha (2003).

[259] After 1949 the regime engaged in public campaigns for educating the public to consume moderately. To revive the national economy, Peron relied on a new ally – the housewife – to keep household consumption in check (Milanesio,2006). Similarly, the regime continued its support for public-housing projects, food policy, and worker benefits. For more on such policies, see Elena (2007 and 2011), Milanesio (2010 and 2013).

[260] The metal-workers union grew exponentially after Peron came to power, even though communists remained powerful within some local branches. The Peronist regime was rocked by a major strike in this sector in 1952 (Munck et. al. 1987: 139). In accordance with the import-substitution policies, the union continued to increase its strength and size in the 1950s and 1960s to gain dominance of the labor movement under the controversial labor leader, Augusto Vandor (Brennan, 1994; Brennan and Gordillo, 1994; McGuire, 1999).

[261] Indeed, the right to strike was not included in the "Rights of the Worker", announced by Peron on February 24, 1947 and later included in the preamble of the 1949 Constitution. To ensure labor acquiescence, in 1947, the CGT Extraordinary Congress established the Arbitration Commission designed to offer mediation in labor disputes and negotiate collective contracts between unions, employers, and the Secretary of Labor (Rotondaro, 1971: 210-217).

with close personal ties to Juan and Eva Peron (Rotondaro, 1971: 211; Page, 1983: 181; Collier and Collier, 1991: 342).

Gaining workers' acquiescence for the "bureaucratization" of the labor movement, however, was no longer easy (Munck et. al. 1987: 140-143). By 1949, the notion that the harmonious state-labor relations made strikes unnecessary as a bargaining tool was not applicable any more due to stagnant wages. Because union leaders showed little resistance to government demands, dissident mid-rank officials in several unions challenged their leaders and the aforementioned austerity measures (McGuire, 1997: 67-69). By integrating the union hierarchy into the regime, Peron's centralization policy alienated labor leaders from their base and left them vulnerable to internal challenges from the rank and file members.[262] The decision to not build formal corporatist institutions later inhibited the regime's efforts to establish hierarchical ties between rank and file workers and union officials, on the one hand, and union leaders and the government, on the other. Indeed, Peron had few political posts with which he could reward his allies in the labor movement for their loyalty. In 1950, the CGT was designated as the third component of the Peronist movement, including exerting some influence over the candidate-selection process, but the union-party ties were highly informal. Accordingly, the deal was based on Peron's verbal agreement. Although the CGT bureaucracy had power to intervene in recalcitrant unions, this was still far from the hierarchical labor bureaucracy established by the Egyptian state under Nasser.[263] The union leaders, who were squeezed between the demands of

[262] In a sign of growing strain between the government and workers (Doyon, 1977: 461), between 1948 and 1951 wildcat strikes occurred among *frigorifico*, sugar, textile, textile, tobacco, and railroad workers, among others (Doyon, 1975; Sidicaro, 1981: 54; Munck et. al. 1987: 135-140). There is some evidence to suggest that some of Peron's rivals within the movement such as Mercante and Bramuglia had also supported these strikes (Baily, 1967: 133-134; Rein, 2008: 156).

[263] The CGT leadership could intervene in affiliated unions whenever a disagreement arose between union leaders and members, thanks to Article 67 that was adopted by a small margin of the delegates (338,476 to 308,601) in the 1950 CGT Congress. When a union voted pro-Peron leaders out of office, the CGT simply took over the union and

their members and pressures from above, continued to face concerted opposition (both from Peronist and anti-Peronist members). While the CGT forestalled these challenges from below by intervening in unions, it had limited impact over the activities of rank-and-file members, who became more radical in the ensuing years.

Several factors increased the strength of labor unions during this period. Most importantly, the industrial production was heavily concentrated in large-scale factories located in close proximity to each other and to main urban centers. The relative cost of organizing and mobilizing workers – a crucial advantage for Peron during his political rise – was low in contrast to the other three cases. Second, the absence of a mass peasantry limited the labor reserve army in the countryside, which in turn prevented employers from keeping worker salaries low at a time of economic growth. Even before Peron came to power, collective bargaining had been on the rise (Gaudio and Pilone, 1983 and 1984). Since 1943, Peron had succeeded in suppressing the old political groups in labor unions but nonetheless fell short of his goal to rescind the autonomy of rank-and-file workers (Munck et. al 1987: 141; Di Tella, 2003).

Most workers did not attribute their hardships directly to Peron, but instead criticized their union leaders, whom they accused of being unresponsive to their demands. Accordingly, they did not question the legitimacy of Peron's regime – which benefited them a great deal – but sought autonomy from the CGT for their respective unions. Notably, dissident sectors of the textile, metallurgical, and other unions increasingly acted against the government's austerity measures (Collier and Collier, 1991: 343) and shook the regime in its last years with several major strikes. As he juxtaposed the CGT to CGE under a corporatist state from above and

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replaced its leaders with new figures who would be subservient to the regime. The recalcitrant members could resist by going to strike but generally lacked sufficient resources to hold on against the Peronist state and the CGT.

pushed the CGT to accept wage restraint (for some evidence on this point, see Baily, 1967: 140), many workers were pushed to apathy.

Beside his tight control over the CGT leadership, Peron weathered the political storm with his popularity among the Argentine masses. The president reached out to groups marginalized within the political arena – including tenant farmers, urban poor and sport fans – to expand his electoral coalition (Rein, 1998; Elena, 2005 and 2007; Milanesio, 2006). Based on its charity for the poor, technical schools, and social security programs, the Peronist regime thus laid the foundations of a welfare state in this period (Rein, 1998; Guy, 2008: ch. 6). This mobilizational strategy helped to expand the national electorate, as Peron sought new constituencies to incorporate into his movement. In 1947, for instance, the Congress adopted the Law of Female Suffrage after nearly five decades of feminist struggle for political empowerment.[264] Furthermore, the national territories were transformed into provinces - including La Pampa and Chaco in 1951 - thereby allowing the local population to vote in parliamentary elections. Since the opposition parties had weak organizations in these economically underdeveloped states, Peron easily drew votes there with his populist rhetoric and use of state patronage. Thanks to such efforts, five years into Peron's first term, the national electorate had more than doubled.

The government also engaged in state propaganda to inculcate Peron's ideas to the nation. Justicialism became compulsory teaching in public schools (Blanksten, 1953: 276-305; Alexander, 1979: 61-63; Crassweller, 1988: 226-228) and the government also established *Escuela Superior Peronista* to offer courses on Peron and his political philosophy.[265] Lastly, the president employed popular mobilization as a tool to facilitate large scale change and surmount

[264] On the history of the women's suffrage movement in Argentina, see Lavrin (1995: ch. 8); Hammond (2011).
[265] As he put it, this school had two purposes: "the first is the formation of Justicialists" and "the second the exaltation of Peronist values to serve the Justicialist doctrine in the best way" (Blanksten, 1953: 342).

his opponents in the partisan and economic arenas. Accordingly, Peron assembled the disparate demands of his popular base, essentially incorporating previously marginalized groups into the political arena (James, 1988; Laclau, 2005). In order to accomplish this goal, he tapped into existing social cleavages and popular identities: *hispanidad*, *nacionalismo*, Catholicism, migrants, and the gaucho tradition (Slatta, 1992; Shumway, 1991; Sarmiento, 2003) as opposed to a European, secular, and liberal one endorsed by the opposition (Ostiguy, 1997; Nallim, 2012: ch. 1). Moreover, the massive Peronist rallies – attended by workers from different parts of the country – fostered cohesion in the movement and strengthened the "charismatic bond" between the leader and his followers.[266]

Due to his official duties, Peron scarcely had time to reach out to the popular classes except during these political rallies. His physical absence was partly filled by Eva Peron, who quickly emerged as the most beloved spokesperson for the regime. Evita, as she came to be known, was indeed the perfect surrogate for Peron. As the First Lady, she would not pose a threat to Peron's leadership, even at the height of her popularity. Devoted to her husband, she worked tirelessly and served as a conduit between the president and tens of thousands of people whom she met (Page, 1983: ch. 27; Barry, 2009).What popularized the First Lady in the public opinion was her charity work, carried out under the Maria Eva Duarte de Peron Foundation, renamed in 1950 as *Fundacion Eva Peron* – hereafter FEP (Fraser and Navarro, 1996: ch. 8; Plotkin, 2003: ch. 7; Barry 2008; Stawski, 2009).

[266] Peron benefited from the cultural alienation and economic marginalization felt by the popular classes, effectively using the prejudice of upper-class Argentines against internal migrants and low-income groups (Milanesio, 2013). In so doing, he simplified the political reality into a Manichean dichotomy. The display of Peronist identity – songs, images, graffiti etc. – at such mass events were ingrained in the national imagination through the government-sponsored media outlets. Indeed, through such an "us vs. them" discourse, movement leaders carve out a political niche and distinguish their supporters from opponents (Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Polletta, 2009).

Launched during the lean years of Peronism, the FEP collected large donations from private sources, CGT, and the national government to offer assistance to the needs and build safe houses for orphans, unwed mothers, and the elderly, along with low-cost residences, schools, vacation facilities, health centers, and children's hospitals.[267] In so doing, the FEP provided social welfare to groups insufficiently covered by Peronist policies: the low-income groups unaffiliated with labor unions, including unwed mothers and their children, elderly, unemployed and poor. Under Evita's guidance, the FEP grew into a hybrid organization with mixed private and official functions (Stawski, 2009: 58) or, as Page put it, "a state within a state" (1983: 232).

Politically, however, Evita left her enduring mark by creating the Peronist Women's Party (*Partido Peronista Femenino*), which mobilized a generation of women to further the Peronist cause (Bianchi and Sanchez, 1988; Fraser and Navarro, 1996: 107-109; Barry, 2008 and 2009). More specifically, she carefully selected women delegates who were then sent across the country to set up *unidades basicas* for women in neighborhoods, shops, and factories, providing them with a meeting place outside of their homes and a network through which they could empower themselves. As a testament to Evita's organizational skills, by 1952, the PFF had 500,000 members in 3,600 headquarters across the entire country (Fraser and Navarro, 1986: 107), with more branches than any other organization save for the Catholic Church. The PFF sparked such an excitement that the UCR elites feared the ominous scenario of being relegated to third place at the polls, that is, after the PP and PPF. Under Eva Peron's guidance, the party offered Argentine women a venue to mobilize on behalf of the regime and to gain political

[267] Despite its sizable budget, the FEP did not keep accounts and lacked transparency. Not even the total number of its employees was known. Eva's tight control and unchecked power in the foundation mirrored Peron's own personalistic style. Thanks to the FEP, Peron could engage in social welfare without investing in bureaucratic institutions and draw personal devotion from aid recipients.

experience (Plotkin, 2003: ch. 8). However, the party lacked discernible influence over the policy-making process.

Consolidation of the Anti-Peronist Opposition

Despite his success with industrial workers, Peron failed to make significant headway into the opposition camp, which converged behind the centrist UCR. Seen as best poised to defeat the Peronist Party, the Radicals indeed drew support from members of other parties, thus hemorrhaging the vote share of its former allies in Union Democratica.[268] Following the 1946 defeat, the *intransigentes* captured the UCR National Committee and began a process of reorganization to keep the party as a viable electoral option against Peron. As the new constitutional arrangements enhanced presidential control and weakened the legislative branch (Anderson, 2010: ch. 7), the UCR leaders responded by shifting their focus away from Congress and began to make direct popular appeals. Notably, they devoted considerable effort to revitalizing their local chapters and holding public assemblies, party press, and sectoral congresses (Tcach, 1991). Through various campaign pledges, the Radicals elites tried to demonstrate that Peronism was not the only progressive force in the country and to regain the mass support they had lost to Peron.

In order to break the growing Peronist hegemony, the new UCR leadership reconciled principles of political liberalism with state interventionism, while steadfastly opposing the corporatist management of the economy. Through this reformist agenda, they appealed to the middle and lower middle classes. For instance, when they criticized the government in Congress, it was mostly to expand the adopted reforms rather than to abrogate them. Amid the economic downturn, they also criticized Peron with corruption allegations (such as illegal sale of import

[268] The UCR served as the rallying point for the opposition and contributed to the hardening of the anti-Peronist sentiment. This stabilized its vote share during the Peronist years. For instance, the party increased its electoral support from 28 % in 1948 to 32.3 % in 1951. By contrast, other opposition parties were wiped out electorally.

licenses, embezzlement cases, and misuse of funds at the *Fundacion Eva Peron*). With politicians like Ricardo Balbin and Arturo Frondizi, who assumed the mantle of leadership on the eve of the 1951 election (Sebastiani, 2005: ch. 4), the party adjusted to the new Argentina that was more mobilized, urban, and populist than only a decade ago.

Unlike his predecessors, Peron was a transformative leader: he redistributed power and income between groups, transferred resources from agriculture to industry, shifted the country's traditional foreign policy, and established a new constitutional order. As a result, the only opposition that he could tolerate was one that accepted the new regime's core principles. And yet, while Peron unified a heterogeneous mass around his agenda, he failed to weld the nation into a unified whole (Laclau, 2005: 159). To his frustration, most intellectuals and urban professionals remained firmly opposed to his policies. Moreover, he was still confronted by parties from the old order that criticized not only the government but the new regime itself. Lastly, Peron did not have the national legitimacy that naturally came from leading a revolution, winning a military victory, or even toppling a monarchy. What he lacked in prestige, he compensated for with his popular support and, if that was not sufficient, with repression.

However, whereas rulers in other cases could ban opposition parties, arrest their critics, and control the media to protect their new regimes, Peron was bounded by the façade of democratic institutions, weakened though they were. In other words, he could intimidate but not eliminate his opponents, harass but not ban other parties, and censor but not dominate the press. Accordingly, the persecutory power of the state was enhanced and extra restrictions were placed on the media, including the formation of a bicameral commission that closed down scores of

opposition newspapers in April 1950 (Sebastiani, 2003: 324).[269] Of particular importance was a new contempt law (Ley de Desacato) that increased penalties for libel and defamation against public authorities; this legislation became a convenient legal tool to silence anti-Peronists. The government dealt a final blow to the opposition by adopting a majoritarian electoral system which, coupled with gerrymandering, limited the opposition's strength in Congress.

These restrictions pushed opposition figures to seek new allies – most particularly, the military. Such appeals, in turn, resonated with officers who, either for personal or political reasons, harbored resentment and hostility against the president. As discussed in the previous chapter, the strength of the civilian-led opposition in 1945 pushed the junta off the course to establish a military dictatorship and yet it was Peron, one of the chief architects of the 1943 coup, who ultimately benefited from the return to democratic rule. The opposition's appeals resonated with officers who resented Peron's quick political rise and the new direction of the country under his rule. While Peron's opponents in the Army were forced to resign after the October 17-18 protests, many mid-level officers continued to oppose his policies.[270] These rifts remained dormant until 1951, when Peron's decision to run for reelection and rumors of Evita's vice-presidential nomination caused uproar among the officer corps (Whitaker, 1954: 161; Potash, 1980: 119). Conspiratorial groups soon appeared and began to establish contacts with anti-Peronist politicians (Potash, 1980: 126-128).

The first rupture in the regime's ties to the military occurred in September 1951, when a retired general sparked a military rebellion that was quickly quelled by pro-government forces

[269] The government also took control of the La Prensa, the largest and oldest metropolitan daily (Sirven, 1984: 95-115), leaving a much subdued la Nacion as the only national newspaper with an independent editorial line. For more on Peron's relations with the media, see Cane (2012).

[270] According to Goldwert (1972: 111-112) 40 percent of officers were Peronist and another 20 percent were anti-Peronist, while others remained cautious and passive. Most regime loyalists were located in the Army, while the liberal navy opposed the government and the air forces remained moderate in its support for Peron.

(Goldwert, 1972: 112-113; Potash, 1980: 124-137). For Peron, however, the failed rebellion revealed a somber reality: even at the height of his popularity, he did not enjoy the full support of the military. Therefore, the incident led to some major political changes. First, Peron announced a "state of internal warfare" that was later maintained until the end of his term. Under this extra-constitutional measure, the opposition was subject to severe restrictions during the 1951 campaign and beyond. Furthermore, lengthy jail sentences were given to the participants of the uprising and nearly 200 junior officers were discharged from the military (Goldwert, 1972: 113). Peron also replaced major troop commanders in all three forces with loyalist figures and removed regiments that participated in the rebellion outside of Buenos Aires.

To prevent the military from becoming an independent force, Peron also took several precautions after the 1951 rebellion: the powers of the Interior Ministry were expanded; the police assumed a larger role in internal security and intelligence; and a limited number of arms were given to the CGT. By the end of 1952, the police forces reached double the size of the army in and around Buenos Aires, with almost 150,000 members (Goldwert, 1972: 113). Furthermore, the Peronist doctrine entered the curriculum of military schools. Lastly, through various distributive schemes, Peron tried to increase his influence over scores of officers who benefited from government policies.[271] For pacifying the military, Peron turned to his long-time friend, General Franklin Lucero, who had been appointed Minister of the Army on October 1949. From this point forward, loyalty was prioritized over professional abilities. With his close aide at the helm, the Army began to be restructured as a Peronist force. Whereas regime loyalists were awarded with promotions, political appointments, and material benefits, others were confined to

[271] For instance, greater flexibility was introduced into the promotion system which expanded the rank pyramid at senior levels and improved the conditions of non-commissioned officers (Potash, 1980: 108-112, 117-118). Officers were included in a two-tiered price system that allowed high-ranking Peronists to purchase imported cars at below the market prices and received automatic wage increases adjusted to inflation.

bureaucratic posts or forced to retire. In such an environment, political neutrality was no longer an option in the military.

Peron without Peronism

Following an intense campaign, Peron won the 1951 presidential elections with a comfortable 64 percent of the vote share (up from 54 percent in 1946), expanding his majority from 260,000 to 2.3 million. An important portion of that difference was made up by first-time women voters, who, thanks to Evita's efforts, chose the Peronist ticket in overwhelming numbers. Moreover, the Peronist candidates captured the entire Senate and won sizable majorities in every province, including the federal capital (Canton, 1969: 140-148; Page, 1983: ch. 28). Among opposition parties, only the UCR demonstrated some electoral strength, winning fourteen seats (10 %).

Despite this popular support, Peron began his second term against the backdrop of a stagnant economy, a polarized society, and social unrest. After a brief trade boom during the Korean War, Argentina was hit by an economic crisis in 1952. In response, Peron announced an economic austerity program designed to simulate private savings and investment, restrict credit policies, and freeze wages for two years. These policies were expected to lower the inflation rate and mitigate the balance of payments difficulties. Through a "*vuelta al campo*" strategy, the government also began to funnel more resources to the agrarian sector, including paying above market prices for agricultural goods, and offering cheap credits and imports to farmers. In its Second Five-Year Plan, announced in December 1952, the government shifted its focus to the development of capital goods and heavy industries and the export of consumer durables, such as chemical products, cotton textiles, and electric home appliances (Cafiero, 1961: 320-328; Wynia, 1978: 70-80; Rock, 1987: 307-308). In essence, these policy changes offered the country Peron

without Peronism. To ensure the cooperation of national entrepreneurs for the new economic program, Peron promised to create favorable conditions for private investment.

These measures brought temporary economic relief but failed to solve its structural problems. Most importantly, the Second Five-Year Plan's push for capital-intensive industries pronounced the scarcity of capital and foreign exchanges in Argentina. As a last resort, Peron actively courted multinational firms to invest in Argentina with a controversial foreign investment law enacted in July 1953 (Rock, 1987: 308-309). After his nationalization campaigns, Peron's decision to re-open the economy for foreign investment, however, had major implications, not least in strategic sectors like the petroleum industry (Alexander, 1979: 65-68, 102; Solberg, 1979). The new law conflicted with the nationalist principles espoused by Article 40 of the 1949 Constitution that gave the state full control over natural resources. It also allowed foreign investors to transfer out of the country up to eight percent of their annual profits and their initial investment capital after ten years, provisions that were deemed exploitative by many nationalist circles.

Not surprisingly, the initiative met with the strong resistance of opposition deputies in Congress, most notably that of Frondizi (1956). Peron also confronted discontent from within his own ranks, including nationalist military officers.[272] His dilemma stemmed from the fact that economic self-sufficiency – the regime's official goal – was not feasible solely based on national capital. To deepen the industrialization process, the country needed foreign capital and technology which in turn would limit national control over the production process (Page, 1983: ch. 32; Cafiero, 1961: ch. 17). By inviting foreign capital into Argentina, Peron also paid a political price. The Argentine president could no longer follow an autonomous diplomatic course

[272] For Peron's complicated relationship with nationalists, see Buchrucker (1987); Walter (1993), Spektorowski (1994 and 2013).

to counter the US interests and Brazil's regional ambitions in the region and was compelled to moderate his stance on the US. Until then, in what was termed the "Third Position" (Rein, 2008: ch. 3), Peron's Argentina pursued a balanced foreign policy, essentially steering a middle ground between the two power blocs to maintain its independence.[273] Instead, Peron sought to build closer ties with their neighboring countries that enhanced their national security, and economic development.[274] After Dwight Eisenhower's election victory, however, Peron began to make diplomatic overtures to the US president and encouraged American firms to explore the Argentine market. Peron's new stance matched the general principles of American foreign policy during the early post-war era. In the new postwar order, the US government did not push for free trade in the developing world (like Britain did in the late 19th century) and accepted high tariff barriers, provided that the host countries allowed American firms to establish plants and produce for the highly-protected local market (Ruggie, 1982; Maxfield and Nolt, 1990).

This new economic course also motivated Peron to upgrade Argentina's regional policy. For one, the timing seemed very opportune. By the end of 1952, both Chile and Brazil were ruled by populist presidents who similarly endorsed an inward-oriented development model (Di Tella, 2001: 82-84; 103-106; 120-121). In 1953, Peron made his first foreign trip to Chile (Bray, 1967), producing preliminary agreements that sought stronger economic ties between the two countries. During the following year, the Argentine signed similar agreements with Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Paraguay in an attempt to enhance Argentine economic influence over the region (Page, 1983: ch. 31). As the Argentine economy showed signs of saturation, the government gradually

[273] Despite his anti-communist ideology, Peron did not want to join a US-led security alliance in the region either. Indeed, Peron resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union that were broken off in 1917 (Rapoport, 1997: 265-337) and resisted the US efforts to introduce military functions to the Organization of American States (OAS) in Rio de Janeiro and Bogota conferences in 1947 and 1948, respectively.

[274] Peronist figures such as Miranda saw a role for Chile, Peru, Paraguay, and Bolivia as producers of raw materials for the growing industrial base in Argentina. The Argentine government also supported friendly regimes in neighboring countries, such as MNR in Bolivia, Marcos Perez Jimenez in Venezuela, and Manuel Odria in Peru.

turned its attention to other markets in the region, seeking cheap raw materials and new outlets for its products (Barbero and Rocchi, 2003: 282). In addition to such formal diplomatic relations, Peron also used labor unions to expand his regime's influence across the region. Notably, he placed a labor attaché within every Argentine embassy in Latin America and sent trade union leaders on foreign visits.[275]

Although the new policy course stabilized the economy in the short run, it also made apparent the internal tensions of the Peronist coalition. Moreover, in 1952, the regime was further shaken by the death of Eva Peron, who died of cancer at the age of thirty-three (Page, 1983: ch. 29; Crassweller, 1988: 242-247; Fraser and Navarro, 1996: ch. 10). With her departure, Peron lost his most outspoken advocate, a figure who personified the regime's strong ties to the Catholic principles and agenda of social justice.[276] Peron then took over the leadership of the *Partido Peronista Femenino* and *Fundacion Eva Peron*, linking both organizations to his presidential office. In particular, Peron wanted to control the PPF in order to retain the support of majority of the Argentine women. After her death, Peron selected Delia Degliuomani de Parodi[277] as the party's titular head, essentially initiating the "routinization" of Eva's charisma. Accordingly, the PPF lost this autonomy within the movement and underwent a similar process

[275] In November 1952, he established a new international labor organization, ATLAS (Agrupación de Trabajadores Latinoamericanos Sindicalistas) designed to be a pro-Peronist challenger to a rival hemisphere-wide confederation and advocate his policies across the region (Alexander, 1979: 71-73). In appealing to the working masses in other countries, Peron hoped to augment Argentina's international influence and emerge as a leader with wider appeal, the way that Nasser did. For more on Peron's labor activities at the world stage and an overview of ATLAS, see (Baily, 1967: 121-122; Munck et. al. 1987: 144; Alexander, 2009: 177-198).

[276] Just before her death, Evita called on her female followers to support the austerity measures and contribute to the success of the newly adopted economic program: "no podemos excluir a la mujer argentina de esta responsabilidad social y menos a las mujeres peronistas, que además representamos la esencia viva y fecunda del auténtico pueblo argentino. Por eso queremos asumir y asumimos, nuestra responsabilidad en la patriótica tarea común" (cited in Barry, 2008: 8). The government distributed her announcement to the women's *unidades básicas*, accompanied by a copy of the 1952 *Plan Economico*. Their support was vital for the plan's success, for Argentine women were expected to cut their home consumption (Barry, 2008: 4-5).

[277] Despite her modest education and political inexperience, Parodi had the advantage of being trusted by both Juan and Eva Peron; she was first hired by Peron in 1944 to work as a stenographer in the Secretariat of Labor and then worked alongside Evita during the San Juan earthquake relief efforts, the FEP, and was a delegate of San Luis and a national deputy, both from the PPF.

of absorption from above that the CGT had experienced. This process culminated on April 25, 1953, when Delia de Parodi was elected as one of the vice presidents of Congress. While much of the fluidity in the PPF organization under Evita disappeared, the party continued to channel women's participation in politics. Moreover, it retained its electoral strength and one third of all Peronist candidates came from its ranks.

Cyclical economic downturns are a ubiquitous element of the inward-oriented economic model. Confronted with capital shortages and economic inefficiency, the other three cases had also relaxed their statist policies to attract foreign capital and encourage national entrepreneurs to invest more. What set Argentina apart was not the policy shift itself but rather how quickly it occurred. Compared to these cases, the Peronist regime faced little military threat and its public sector did not constitute a key source of employment. The fact that the Argentine government, after only three years in power, depleted its reserves and ran out of funds may come as a surprise. Here again the problem was caused by Peron's inability to institutionalize the distribution of spoils and discipline his popular base to promote economic development. Absent strong institutions, Peron relied heavily on material side payments to maintain popular support. Additionally, the large urban population prevented the government from engaging in material but non-cash payments such as land, thus exerting a heavy pressure on the state budget.

***La Comunidad Organizada*: the Incomplete Corporatist State**

With its majoritarian elements and emphasis on social justice, the new regime was interventionist, redistributive, and developmentalist but lacked a national consensus seen in the other three cases. Accordingly, despite its popular base support, the government continued to face resistance from various segments of society, as exhibited in the failed coup attempt in 1951 and the opposition's stable electoral strength. After 1951, he began to emphasize the need for

centralized control in the hands of a "conductor", who could mobilize, organize, and lead the masses (Peron, 1951 and 1964; Page, 1983: ch. 25). For Peron, politics meant conflict and unless directed by a strong leader, popular action would lead to chaos. Such a charismatic figure was uniquely positioned to attain national consensus and harmonize the conflicting interests of socio-economic groups. During his second term, Peron therefore intensified his efforts to expand the base of the corporatist system, gradually co-opting non-labor groups - including consumers, professionals, students, intellectuals, and employers - into the regime. This would, he hoped, enable the regime to control and discipline its popular coalition. By organizing citizens into hierarchically-structured, sectoral groups, the president aspired to establish a hegemony over the developed Argentine society, while still keeping the facade of democratic institutions. This was an attempt to peronize society, albeit through the electoral path.

Through the newly established Subsecretary of Culture, for instance, Peron recruited a group of 'loyalist' intellectuals and sought to establish regime control over the professional associations. Both groups carried a disproportionate weight, for they could provide the regime with some legitimacy among the upper middle and middle classes.[278] This way, Peron would transform Peronism from a worker-led populist movement - however electorally dominant - into a national, corporatist force in which the ND state was embedded. In 1953, these efforts culminated in the establishment of Confederacion General de Profesionales (CGP), which was envisioned as an umbrealla organization to serve as a conduit between the Peronist state and professionals, much like the CGT did with unionized workers (Crassweller, 1988: 260; Adamovsky, 2006). Even though the CGP quickly incorporated a long list of associations from various professional sectors and offered them state support and funding, most of these groups

[278] As early as July 1944, la Direccion de Accion Social Directa para Profesionales (DASDP) was established within the Secretary of Labor and Provision to reach out to urban professionals (Adamovsky, 2006: 245-6). Unlike union officials, professional associations distrusted such efforts from above.

remained weak, unpopular, and marginalized in their respective fields. In contrast to the other three regimes that drew support from teachers, professionals, and intellectuals, the Peronist regime had a limited base in these groups.[279]

In order to redesign the national curriculum and inculcate its ideology to students, the government also intervened in the education system.[280] Although this was common in national developmentalist regimes, the existence of nominally democratic institutions complicated Peron's efforts to carry out this process from above. The educated youth constituted a potential pool for recruiting mid-level cadres for the movement and was thus crucial for Peronism's long-term prospects. Although some anti-Peronist professors were fired in 1945, Peron failed to make inroads among university students.[281] For university students, the government established the Confederation General de los Universitarios (CGU) to challenge the anti-government FUA (Argentine University Federation) that had historically represented this group (Rein, 1998: ch. 4; Acha, 2011). In a controversial move, moreover, the government established the Union of Secondary School Students (UES), whose mission was to include the secondary school youth into the Peronist movement (Alexander, 1979: 95-97; Page, 1983: 290-294).

Peronist State-Party Union

Such centralization of power at Peron's hands and in the government also occurred within the Peronist party, which had become highly personalist over the years (Mackinnon,

[279] Most intellectual figures in this period were fervently anti-Peronist (Fiorucci, 2011), whereas support for Peron came from nationalist and Catholic circles – two marginal groups within the liberal Argentine intelliengtsia. On the liberal traditions of the Argentine intelligentsia, see Nallim (2012), Botana and Gallo (2014).

[280] On Peronization of the education system, see Blanksten (1953: 186-198); Rein (1998); and Plotkin (2003: ch. 5).

[281] Argentine universities were bastions of conservatism until 1918, when the Yrigoyen government expanded enrollment to include students from middle-class backgrounds. During the ensuing years, pro-UCR groups dominated the student body with an agenda of liberalism and reform. For a historical background on student politics, see Snow and Manzetti (1993: ch. 6). Only in the 1960s, when the number of students from low-income and working–class backgrounds rose significantly, Peronism would finally gain a secure base among leftist university students (James, 1976; Gillespie, 1982).

2002b). After the dissolution of the Partido Laborista, both the Single Party of the National Revolution (PURN) and its successor, the Peronist Party (PP) were created from above to retain power through patron-client ties (Little, 1973; Levitsky, 2003). Through state patronage, Peron tightened control over the party organization in the same way that he did with the CGT (Mackinnon, 2002a). Party elites with independent support bases, such as the Buenos Aires governor Mercante (Aelo, 2004 and 2012: ch. 5), were replaced with sycophants, while Peron intervened in provincial branches to handpick candidates for elections (Zorrilla, 1983; Rein, 2009: ch. 3 and 4). Due to this fluid structure, no stable career paths could emerge in the party; attaining high political and bureaucratic posts instead depended on loyalty to Peron (Levitsky, 2003: 39).

Due to the fluid structure of the party and its highly mobilized base, Peron referred to the Peronist organization as a "movement"[282] rather than a party (Carri, 1967: 35; Little, 1973; Collier and Collier, 1991: 346). In 1951, Peron established a "parallel hierarchy" next to the party organs, creating a national strategic command and provincial tactical centers (Levitsky, 2003: 39-40). More specifically, the Consejo Superior laid out a hierarchical structure to coordinate the different bodies of the Peronist movement: (1) Supreme Chief, Juan Peron, (2) the Strategic Command formed by the Consejo Superior of the PP and the PPF, and the Administrative Council of the CGT, (3) Comandos Tacticos in each province, composed of one member from the PP, the PPF, and the CGT and the governor, (4) Subcomandos Tacticos (municipalities) composed of the mayor and one member from the three aforementioned

[282] In terms of this movement-party dichotomy, scholars have seen parallels between Yrigoyen's UCR and Peron's PP. Yrigoyen also built a popular movement without a strong party structure and occasionally behaved in undemocratic ways (Mustapic, 1984; Peruzzotti, 1997). Similar to Peron, he resorted to federal interventions to reshape the political arena and promoted state officials and military officers based on partisan loyalties (Gomez, 1947; Goldwert, 1968). Unlike Peron, Yrigoyen courted but not co-opted organized labor; he sought electoral support from a wide array of socio-economic groups without seeking control over them. Moreover, until the end of his rule, he was committed to the liberal economic order and its political institutions.

organizations (Chumbita, 1989; Tcach, 1991; Aelo, 2012: ch. 6). As the leader, Peron appointed members of the Consejo Superior (Aelo, 2010: 179-180) and, in turn, these functionaries were expected to suppress any internal dissent against Peron and follow his policies.

During Peron's second term, the party and state structures became conflated, as the PP increasingly became an official party (Ciria, 1972; Little, 1973; Tcach and Philp, 2010). Provincial branches were financed by the state and public authorities openly supported and campaigned for the party's candidates. Precisely because he did not invest in a ruling party, Peron chose to borrow state resources to serve his political aims. On the other hand, the fact that the party's activities were run from within the government further eroded its autonomy. As a sign of growing party-state ties during the early 1950s, the Peronist governors and mayors across the country were intertwined with party officials. This practice was clearly at odds with the façade of electoral competition in the country. It seems that Peronist authorities did not seriously contemplate the possibility of losing elections, despite the fact that several municipalities were already run by the Radical opposition (Aelo, 2012: 187).

Unlike Egypt and Turkey, where such a state-party communion came as a substitute for low political participation, the Peronist regime retained its mobilization capacity and the Peronist machine continued to deliver strong electoral majorities across the country. This largely stems from the origins of the Peronist party (and movement) that was labor-based and populist (Collier and Collier, 1991; Levitsky, 2003; Roberts, 2006). Accordingly, the regime retained close ties with labor unions, which, given the weakness of the party, served as a surrogate organization. In contrast to the other three cases that had a majority rural population, Argentine society was already highly urbanized and contained the largest and best organized labor movement in Latin America – with a union density of approximately 50 percent at its peak (Doyon, 1975). And yet,

because this party-union linkage was not formalized, the labor participation in the Peronist movement was neither stable nor routinized, and instead depended personally on Peron. While, for instance, labor unions had the right to appoint a third of all Peronist candidates ("the *tercio* system"), this rule was neither disclosed on the party's statute (Pont, 1984: 59) nor practiced widely (Levitsky, 2003: 40). Although high-level union officials held prestigious positions within the party, there was also no clear path for union officials to rise within the party, a stark contrast to the PRI's organic ties with labor unions.

Disintegration of the Peronist Coalition

By 1954, Peron seemed to be on the verge of building la *comunidad organizada*. In civil society, beside the CGT, the CGE was created for small and medium employers, the CGP for middle-class professionals, the CGU for university students, the Union del Personal Civil de la Nacion for government employees, and the UES for high school students. Additionally, women were organized under the umbrella of *Fundacion Eva Peron* with strong ties to the regime. In the partisan arena, the PP and PPF also organized voters through an extensive web of *unidades basicas* that engulfed the entire country. From middle school until retirement, the majority of Argentines could find corporatist representation along occupational, ideological, gender, and educational lines under a Peronist entity. However, Peron refused to institutionalize a party organization and refrained from linking these economic and cultural associations to the regime through encapsulating, formal institutions. In turn, the absence of an overarching bureaucratic structure delimited Peronism's ability to build a system of officially sanctioned, hierarchical, and compulsory interest associations.

Using various inducements, coupled with the participation of Peronist rank-and-file members, the government tried to capture control of these associations and unify them under

pro-regime confederations at the national level. This was reflected in Peron's efforts to organize loyalist writers, professionals, intellectuals, and students, marginalized by their peers, under distinct groups that enjoyed a privileged relationship with the government. Through these initiatives, Peron hoped to weaken the opposition camp and transform his electoral dominance into hegemonic power over the entire society. In light of government subsidies and state-imposed constraints on groups, the Peronist regime exhibited several important elements of state corporatism a la Egypt. Unlike Nasser, Peron did not accompany such plans with a corporatist system of representation in the political arena. Ultimately, the strength of the civil society and his personalistic approach prevented Peron from imposing a completely non-pluralist system of group representation structured and controlled by the state; rival groups in each sector were weakened but not closed down. Many professional associations resisted official attempts to organize from above and retained their autonomy. Given that membership was not mandatory, many anti-Peronists simply chose not to join these pro-regime organizations (Adamovsky, 2011).

Membership in these pro-regime organizations was, for the most part, limited to Peronist sympathizers, whereas his opponents adopted what Hagood (2012: 72) calls a "defensive withdrawal from political engagement". In staunchly anti-Peronist sectors, pro-regime groups remained weak, organizationally hollow, and unable to compete with their counterparts.[283] This constrained the regime's ability to coordinate wage and labor policies; to expand its popular base beyond workers; and to weaken the opposition camp. Instead, Peron increasingly relied on an informal corporatist decision-making structure in his final years, holding regular meetings with representatives of the CGT and CGE (which also attended cabinet meetings beginning in 1953).

[283] The pro-regime Confederacion General de los Universitarios (CGU) failed to make any real headway among university students. According to Walter (1968: 138), the CGU had only 200 members at the Engineering Faculty of the UBA, whereas 4000 students were affiliated with reformist groups during the same period. After remaining inactive until 1954, the FUA re-emerged as the locus of opposition against the regime among university students.

By inviting these groups into a dialogue, Peron hoped to contain labor unrest against wage freezes (Doyon, 1984; James, 1981). During the National Congress of Productivity and Social Welfare, held in 1955, the government brought together CGT and CGE elites to coordinate price and wage levels as part of its official policy to increase productivity in the Argentine economy (Rock, 1987: 309-313; Brennan and Rougier, 2009: 59-60).

Such efforts to organize the entire society from above, under Peronist-led corporate bodies, however, met with the resistance of a former ally: the Catholic Church (Page, 1983: ch. 34). Because of their overwhelming support for Peron in the 1946 elections, the Catholic organizations had initially avoided the political purges and indoctrination campaigns that was a feature of Peronist rule and instead received various policy concessions over the years. Like in other parts of Latin America, however, the Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy had historically been aligned with the upper classes in Argentina. Therefore, Peron's radical policies, charity work, and polarizing discourse alienated many priests. And yet, it was Peron's decision to organize high-school students - an area traditionally left to Catholic groups - that led the Argentine Catholic Church to challenge the government.

Unlike Turkey and Egypt, where religion was historically intertwined with the state apparatus, the Argentine state was not an official patron of Roman Catholics. Like in Mexico, the Peronist government could not prevent the autonomous mobilization of priests, who drew support from pious Catholics and quickly became a rallying point for the opposition.[284] As Slater has convincingly argued, the prospect of an uprising improves substantially when communal and

[284] Following his public denunciation of Catholic priests in November 1954, Catholic rituals turned into political demonstrations against the regime, with priests taking the center stage in defiance of Peron himself. For instance, the celebration of Immaculate Conception (December 8, 1954) and the annual Corpus Christi procession (June 11, 1955) led to a huge turnout, as many secular anti-Peronists, who had not set foot inside a church in years, joined their religious compatriots to protest Peron's encroaching powers. This also severed the last link between integral nationalists of the right and the Peronist regime, pushing many nationalist officers firmly in the opposition camp For Catholics' differing degrees of loyalty and how it varied over the years, see Snow and Manzetti (1993), Caimari (1995); Zanatta (1996).

religious leaders assume an oppositional stance, since that helps overcome the collective action problems to mobilize (Slater, 2009). Faced with a Catholic mobilization, Peron retaliated with tactics that were now familiar: the Catholic daily, El Pueblo, was closed down and the legal standing (*personeria gremial*) of *Accion Catolica* was revoked. The government also ended state subsidies to private Catholic schools, annulled the legislation of compulsory Catholic instruction in public schools, and, in a dramatic move, legalized divorce.

In hindsight, scholars have questioned the prudence of Peron's behavior. Peron's bad timing and tactical mistakes notwithstanding, a conflict of interest between a national developmentalist state and organized religion was common in all cases. What distinguished the Peronist regime was not the outbreak of this conflict but rather its outcome. Already confronted with a mobilized opposition in the civil society and partisan arena, the Catholic Church's defection to the anti-Peronist camp weakened the regime significantly. In particular, the clash between the Peronist government and Catholic Church led many officers to defect from the regime and expanded the ranks of those conspiring against the regime.

Even after these defections, however, Peron remained popular and his regime was still electorally strong. In the 1954 legislative elections, the Peronist Party had even increased its vote share (up from 63.5 % to 64.3 %) and Admiral Teisaire was elected as vice president to replace the late Hortensio Quijano.[285] Although the Peronist cross-class coalition showed signs of disintegration due to the regime's internal tensions (Alexander, 1979: ch. 6; Di Tella, 2001: 161-162), the UCR-led opposition could not make inroads into the Peronist base. If anything, Peron's personal control over his movement became more pronounced, thanks to the centralization of power within the PP. Moreover, the Peronization of the education system and the new corporatist

[285] This support was not evenly distributed across the country. While Buenos Aires province remained a Peronist stronghold, the UCR made inroads into Peron's electoral coalition in other littoral provinces and the federal capital.

structure imposed from above blurred demarcating lines between the state, ruling party, and society. With the national media virtually under Peronist control, the opposition parties lacked any effective venues from which they could propagate their ideas and challenge the government. In principle, many Radicals did not oppose redistributive policies and were also in favor of state-led industrialization. They were, however, concerned with the immense political and economic power amassed in the hands of Peron. Ultimately, it was primarily political conflict that motivated many opposition elites to support a military coup. Increased polarization created what Potash (1980: 182) described as "an incipient revolutionary state of mind" among anti-Peronist officers. Since most anti-Peronist officers were purged from the army after the 1951 failed coup attempt, the Navy forces took the lead in planning an uprising. The historically liberal Navy had remained as a bastion of anti-Peronism throughout this period (Potash, 1980). They were also joined by officers from interior provinces and retired generals.

The fact that, despite limited Army support, poor planning, and weak coordination among different forces, officers were willing to risk their careers, and even lives, is a testament to their deep-seated hatred of the regime. By contrast, Peron showed signs of losing control of events. In the absence of an institutionalized decision-making process – the Congress and the VP remained silent, and the PP was powerless – the Army Minister General Lucero increasingly took charge. Based on his recommendations, Peron replaced several members of his cabinet, including the Minister of Interior Borlenghi and the Secretary-General of the CGT, and eased restrictions on the opposition to generate a temporary reconciliation with the opposition in the summer of 1955. At this point, however, most opposition elites refused to negotiate with Peron. They instead deliberately escalated the political conflict (Potash, 1980: 183; Page, 1983, 305-310; Collier and Collier, 1991: 378).

Peron's Downfall

In September 1955, a coalition of Army and Navy forces led by anti-Peronist officers staged a joint uprising that led to Peron's downfall. Faced with an ultimatum, Peron decided to leave power voluntarily and subsequently sought asylum in Paraguay. A military junta – mostly composed of Peronist generals – led the negotiations with the coup organizers in his absence, while he waited inside a Paraguayan gunboat anchored eight kilometers offshore (Page, 1983: 332-333). Once the great conductor, Peron was now merely a president separated from his movement, with his political future unclear. The Liberating Revolution, as later called by its supporters, ended nearly a decade of Peron's presidency and returned the country back to military rule.[286] This was the third successful military coup in less than 25 years and while Peron participated in the first two, this time, ironically, he became a target of one.

The 1955 coup's success was far from inevitable, however. First of all, there is no evidence to suggest that a majority of the military officers supported the intervention, let alone the junta's anti-Peronist course in the ensuing months. Due to his own background, Peron enjoyed some prestige among officers and soldiers alike and closely knew the military's top brass. Given the close ties of most generals to the regime, many officers must have hesitated to join such a risky conspiracy. The collective action problems associated with military coups are immense (Feaver, 1999). The pro-government forces were thus at a great advantage to put down this attempt, much like they did in two previous cases in September 1951 and June 1955. Moreover, Peron did not face a "moral hazard problem" (Svolik, 2012) that is common among illiberal regimes. Having already won several elections, Peron - a former military officer himself - held strong parliamentary and electoral majorities and led the strongest populist movement in

[286] For more on the Liberating Revolution, see Carril (1959: 59-123); Lucero (1959: 132-157); Goldwert (1972: 130-136); Godio (1973); Lonardi (1980); Page (1983: ch. 36).

Latin America. At the outset, Peron faced the most favorable conditions to establish political control over the military. Why then was he toppled?

The answer should be sought in the origins of the Peronist regime and its institutional structure. Peron's rule was not the product of a violent struggle that had reconfigured the military and created common political loyalties (Levitsky and Way, 2012 and 2013), as seen in Mexico and Turkey. But neither could he transform the regime into a military dictatorship a la Nasser's Egypt, given the strength of civil society and his own popular base. As a "coup-proofing measure" (Quinlivan, 1999), Peron could have created parallel forces by arming labor battalions and neighborhood groups. Apparently, after the first failed coup attempt in 1951, Evita had suggested exactly that (Potash, 1980: 143). However, Peron was already under criticism from the economic elites and the opposition parties and, most likely, did not want to further intimidate the middle class. Instead, Peron engaged in brinkmanship to handle the military during his second term: he handpicked generals in the armed forces, improved the material conditions of army officers and delegated the military's control to a close supporter, General Lucero.

As with other aspects of the Peron's rule, however, the military was weakly linked to the regime and remained politically isolated. Due to the increasing personalization of the regime, a handful of generals close to Peron held any political influence and even they were mostly distanced from the networks of power. Thus, the military elites did not hold many high-level political posts and lacked an institutionalized mechanism to shape the policy-making process. This contrasted starkly with the Mexican and Egyptian cases in which the military was co-opted by the ruling party and state bureaucratic apparatus, respectively. Under Nasser's rule, as discussed in the following chapter, the military and civilian realms were fused and military officers were overrepresented in the upper echelons of the regime. Even in Turkey, where state

and party institutions were relatively weak, the military enjoyed institutional autonomy and was integrated to the regime, not the least due to its rule in the regime's founding.

Unlike these cases, the Argentine officer corps did not see regime durability as vital for their careers. On the contrary, Peron's partisan appointments introduced the polarization in the political arena into the military and created a strong anti-Peronist group that saw its interests to be better served under a different administration. Many officers resented Peron's redistributive policies, anti-Catholic discourse, and the growing influence of labor unions. Over time, these ideological divisions engulfed the entire organization and created pockets of resistance against the regime. The 1955 coup did not occur after the breakdown of bargaining over institutional and policy concessions between the government and military (for this theory, see Svolik, 2012: ch. 5).[287] Furthermore, the Argentine military elites did not acquire the opportunity to intervene in politics because they had become indispensable for civilian rulers to repress the opposition. In fact, the Peronist regime offers evidence for the opposite scenario. It was not the government but opposition elements that invited the military to intervene in politics. Due to Peron's growing authoritarianism and their electoral weakness, the military's involvement was the only path available for the opposition.

By contrast, Peron deliberately kept the military out of politics. In a context in which the military was not strongly linked to the regime, some officers were prone to follow outside appeals from civilian actors to intervene in politics. At the same time, the coup did not occur as a result of an alliance that the military forged with the commercial and landed elites, as suggested by some accounts.[288] Although most supported an anti-Peronist restoration, they did not play an

[287] For the literature on military interventions, see Nun (1969), Luttwark (1968), Nordlinger (1976), Stepan (1988).
[288] The notion of an alliance between the military and the landed elite or the bourgeoisie is commonly used by scholars to explain coups in the Latin American context. For some examples, see O'Donnell (1973), Loveman (1994), Drake (1996), Paige (1997).

active role during the events. Few even knew about the coup plan. Rather, the initiative came from a coalition of nationalist, Catholic, and liberal officers, who, encouraged by the Catholic Church's growing resistance and tacit support from civilian opposition elites, seized the opportunity to take action.

There is still a debate on why Peron resigned with no resistance.[289]There is, however, a larger and theoretically more important question at hand: why did the Peronist masses not come to Peron's rescue and demonstrate against the military coup, as they did on October 17-18, 1945? Large-scale mobilization may have indeed tilted the balance of political forces in Peron's favor and saved his presidency - like what had happened to Peron in 1945 and to Hugo Chavez in 2002.[290] Instead, whereas anti-Peronist groups raced with each other to demonstrate their support for the coup, the Peronist base remained inactive and mostly silent in the aftermath of the coup. In his taped memoirs, Peron himself mentioned this very issue: "the unions also disillusioned me. A general strike was prepared and they didn't go out. They tried to make deals with those on their way in…. Then I reached the conclusion that the Argentine people deserved a terrible punishment for having done this" (Luca de Tena, 1976: 230; cited in Page, 1983).

The answer lies in large part in the increasing personalization of the Peronist regime over the past decade. Both the PP and the PPF lacked an autonomous decision-making body that would have allowed them to act in Peron's absence. The Argentine labor movement – the strongest in Latin America – was similarly entangled by a national bureaucracy subservient to Peron. His departure from the scene therefore paralyzed the Peronist base, leaving them with no

[289] Peron later suggested that he had not resigned but merely wanted to give his generals a document they could use during their negotiations. The fact that he did not send the letter to Congress, as required by law, lends some credence to his account. For this point, see Potash (1980: 204); Page (1983: 322). Nevertheless, Peron still bears full responsibility for delegating his powers to Lucero at such a critical moment.

[290] I would like to thank Ken Roberts for suggesting this parallel with the failed coup against the Venezuela President Hugo Chavez in 2002.

clear line of hierarchy to take charge in this time of great uncertainties and risks. The president himself contributed to this outcome by replacing his strong, competent, and skillful associates, who played a vital role during his rise to power, with incompetent cronies.[291] Even more ominously, the Peronist base now risked losing the regime's accomplishments since they were not backed by strong institutions. Therefore, many of Peron's close supporters chose to appease the military junta, instead of resistance, in an effort to preserve the status quo as much as possible, albeit without the divisive former president. The Peronist generals led the way by treating Peron's ambiguous letter as his formal resignation and accepting the demands of the coup organizers. The CGT issued a communique, calling workers to keep their calm during this transition period. The CGE similarly followed a cautious and moderate course after the coup and recognized the new government with the expectation that Peron's economic nationalism would continue in the new era. Lastly, the Catholic hierarchy, previously a strong supporter of the regime, had already moved to the ranks of the opposition after its public clash with Peron. The actions of these four corporate groups - namely, the military, the CGT, the CGE, and the Catholic Church - left little room for direct resistance.

Conclusion

Peron's departure initially left his movement in disarray. Many Peronist figures took refuge in Uruguay, while others reportedly quit politics, and still others cooperated with the new regime in exchange for protection against legal prosecution and partisan attacks. The provisional government dissolved the PP and the PPF, as well as the Fundacion Eva Peron, confiscating all of their property. The CGT and its member unions were taken over and scores of Peronists were

[291] Of the three chief architects of the labor mobilization that saved Peron from prison on October 17, 1945, one labor leader (Cipriano Reyes) was still in prison on factitious charges, the other (Luis Gay) largely forgotten after his removal from the CGT leadership in 1947, and, lastly, his chief deputy (Domingo Mercante) was sidelined once his term ended as governor of Buenos Aires.

purged from the state bureaucracy, universities, the military, and labor organizations.[292] Following Lonardi's brief rule of "national reconciliation" (Collier and Collier, 1991: 485), successive governments sought to eliminate Peronism as a political force (Potash, 1980: 241-271; Rodriguez Lamas, 1985: 147): Peron was discharged from the Army (Norden, 1996: 27) and kept in exile, while Peronist symbols, slogans, and photographs were banned in public spaces (Page, 1983: 343). This repression went far beyond anything experienced by the Kemalist elites, who handed power to a political party that was founded by former regime members.

And yet, Peronism survived this repression for almost two decades (Munck et. al. 1987: ch. 12, McGuire, 1997; Seveso, 2010 and 2011). During the "Resistance" period, the movement persisted not merely out of loyalty to Peron, but because of its ability to remain as the voice of the lower and working classes in Argentina. By contrast, Kemalism lacked such a popular base and political outreach. In seeking power against the populist center-right parties, the CHP relied on the support of secular groups, including urban professionals, military officers, and intellectuals, whereas the Peronists struggled against the very same strata and instead drew support from the popular classes. The Peronist movement owes its popularity to its redistributive policies while in power. For workers, who immensely benefited during Peron's early years and were politically empowered, the 1955 coup was not a welcome change, even if the Peronist government's resource distribution slowed down in recent years.

The weakly institutionalized Peronist Party lacked the organizational capacity to unify different strands of the movement without Peron's strong leadership and the movement was left fractured throughout this period.[293] More specifically, it was divided between a more radical syndicalist core, represented by labor unions prevalent in the federal capital and Buenos Aires

[292] For a summary of post-1955 politics, see Baschetti (1997), Spinelli (2004), Persello (2007: 171-195).
[293] Some scholars have suggested that precisely because of its flexible nature, the Peronist movement/party proved so adept at change (Levitsky, 2001 and 2003).

province, and a neo-Peronist group split among Peronist old guards and local politicians from underdeveloped interior provinces (Madsen and Snow, 1991: 58). Without a corporatist structure that integrated unions within the regime, both military and civilian governments encountered tremendous difficulty in controlling the CGT and its member organizations. In the leader's absence, many Peronist leaders established parties to tap into the movement's popular networks and further their careers (Potash, 1959; Ranis, 1966; Tcach, 1995; Rein, 2008: ch. 4). Their occasional victories notwithstanding, these neo-Peronist parties failed in their ultimate objective due to his sabotaging from abroad and concerted resistance from the top brass of the Argentine military: to create a moderate Peronist identity without Peron's autocratic control. Meanwhile, some unions - when freed from the CGT's tight bureaucratic control - developed a trend of 'independent Peronism' (Munck et. al. 1987: 141), whereby workers respected the nominal leadership of Peron but acted autonomously in search of their own material interests.

During the post-coup period, the Argentine politics, as O'Donnell (1973) noted, was characterized by an "impossible game": no party could win an election absent Peron's consent but the winner was vetoed by the armed forces as soon as it tried to bring Peronism back into the system. Consequently, Argentine politics oscillated between populist governments and military tutelage (Collier and Collier, 1991: 486-497). Despite the disintegration of the PP organization, labor unions allowed the larger movement to resist state repression and expand its presence in low-income neighborhoods across the country. These unions replaced the banned party, providing financial resources, organizational outreach and activists to the Peronist cause (McGuire, 1997). Due to this union support, Peronist parties have consistently won a clear majority among workers and urban poor (Snow, 1969; Smith, 1972; Schoultz, 1983; Ostiguy, 1998) in elections that they were allowed to contest (O'Donnell, 1973: 172; Levitsky, 2003: 41).

It was this phenomenon, coupled with Peron's absence, which transformed Peronism from a state-sponsored, charismatic party into a horizontally-organized, popular movement. Labor activism helped the Peronist movement avoid the pitfalls of instability and electoral erosion that typically affects personalist parties (Panebianco, 1988). Ironically, neither Peron nor his opponents expected this outcome. Excluded from power, Peronism had later reemerged as an umbrella movement with various disparate and conflicting factions - a hegemonic force in Argentine politics for decades to come. In that sense, Peron succeeded in uprooting the old liberal order and pushing for interventionist policies that transferred resources from agrarian to industrial sectors and from the landowning elites to urban classes. At the same time, his failure to attain national harmony while in power generated entrenched political struggles and redistributive conflicts that still have not subsided completely.

CHAPTER 8
Elite Politics, State Cooptation and Regime Consolidation in Egypt

Introduction

The previous chapter argued that Juan Peron's failure to formalize the regime's links with labor unions and institutionalize the Peronist movement contributed to his downfall in 1955. This chapter looks at the populist-distributive authoritarian regime in Egypt, which was also established by junior military officers in the post-war period but, unlike the Argentine case, proved durable for decades. In contrast to Peron's political strategy, Gamal Abdul Nasser, the leader of the Egyptian military junta, established formal corporatist institutions that allowed the regime to keep the elites intact and maintain popular support with limited redistributive pressures from below. These institutions themselves were a product of the initial opposition Nasser faced from the political establishment and his failure to mobilize the masses in support of the new order. Nasser linked these corporatist institutions to the state bureaucratic apparatus, which co-opted the Egyptian society from above. Consequently, his regime had a lower mobilizational capacity but longer durability than the Argentine case. Although several studies have already noted the remarkable similarities between these two regimes (Di Tella, 1965: 65-67; Waterbury, 1983: 313; Bianchi, 1989: 27-28; Posusney, 1997: 24; Aidi, 2008: 61-62), no thorough comparative research was ever conducted to compare Egypt and Argentina. This chapter offers a causal narrative of the rise and consolidation of Nasserism in order to juxtapose the durable Egyptian case to that of Peron's Argentina, highlighting the core propositions of this dissertation.

In many ways, Nasser's military popular regime resembled the Peronist rule. Like Peron, Nasser came to power as the result of a military coup, severed ties with Britain, and targeted the liberal elites who had in the past opposed attempts to reorient the country's developmental trajectory. Both countries were ruled by a landowning oligarchy that controlled the agro-export

sector and were closely integrated to Britain. After the 1952 coup, similar to Peron, Nasser opposed the ruling establishment and instead made contacts with opposition groups and tried to control the military in order to seize control of the state apparatus. While Peron ultimately lost this power struggle against moderate elements in the junta and saw popular mobilization as his only way to defeat the strong civil opposition, Gamal Abdel Nasser, by contrast, faced a much weaker civil society and prevailed in a brief, if decisive, leadership contest to dominate the new regime without significant mass support. Since he smashed the opposition and captured the state bureaucracy, Nasser felt no need for creating a popular movement, as Peron did in Argentina.

Instead, faced with external threats and a moderate level of opposition from domestic political groups including the Wafd Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasser linked the peasantry and labor to the state through a corporatist system, thus stabilizing the political arena after the tumultuous inter-war years. Like Peron, Nasser spawned a military-popular alliance that allowed the regime to shift agricultural surplus to the industrial sector and redistribute resources from the landed oligarchy and upper classes to middle and lower-middle classes. Given his personal control over the regime, it is of little surprise that the ruling party was weakly institutionalized and was captured by the state bureaucracy. Instead, the regime leaders used the single party as a means to screen candidates for political office and close the political arena to rival groups. This pushed Nasser to expand bureaucratic control over the economy to an extent not seen in any other national developmentalist regimes and to expand the state's intelligence agencies. This symbiotic relationship with the military and corporatist ties to labor unions and peasants allowed the regime to weather economic crises and military defeats.

Due the absence of a robust party, Nasser relied on the state's coercive apparatus to resolve intra-elite conflicts and strengthen his leadership. Consequently, the regime's political

coalition was skewed towards the military over time, while the popular classes remained passive throughout Nasser's rule and after. Moreover, the absence of a strong party undercut the regime's ability to penetrate the countryside and to enhance state capacity against the rural middle class that opposed Nasser's more radical reforms in the 1960s. Faced with increased intra-elite conflict, potential challenges to his leadership, and mobilization from below in mid 1960s, Nasser briefly strengthened the ruling party and followed a mobilizational strategy but then reversed course once he eliminated his rivals after the 1967 defeat in the Six-Day War.

The origins of the Free Officers coup

Egypt won de facto independence from Ottoman rule in 1810s under the then governor Mehmet Ali Pasha, who destroyed the tax-farming system and bequeathed state lands to a small group of Turco-Albanian state officials (Baer, 1969: 63; Gerber, 1987: 101; Fahmy, 1997). By the 1820s, much like in Argentina, this policy led to the rise of a powerful landed aristocracy that would shape the country's political trajectory for the next century. Similarly, Egypt emerged as a major agrarian exporter (cotton) during the 19th century and quickly became one of Britain's main trade partners, thereby attracting large amounts of foreign capital and non-Egyptian entrepreneurs.[294] In 1882, the British forces took advantage of a military uprising against the Khedivate of Egypt to occupy the country and establish a de facto protectorate over the country. The small group of Turco-Circassian landowners and their mercantile partners stood to benefit from this integration to the world markets and retained their economic power under British rule.

[294] For more on the Ottoman rule in Egypt, see Shaw (1962); Hathaway (2002). Unlike Argentina, a sparsely populated frontier country, Egypt was overpopulated and, given the pressure on land, feudal relations remained intact in the countryside even after the introduction of commercial farming. On commercialization of the Egyptian agriculture, see Owen (1969). The landed aristocracy collected rents and taxes from peasants through the middlemen, namely, the *umdah*, they selected from among the village's largest proprietors and usually passed from father to son. These figures established patron-client ties with the mass peasantry, dealt with the village's administrative affairs, and executed state orders. Due to this hierarchical agrarian structure, Egyptian peasants (in contrast with their Argentine counterparts) had limited mobilizational capacity and remained politically submissive over the course of the next century. For a detailed analysis of *umdahs* and political developments during this period, see Baer (1969: ch. 3 and 6); Mayfield (1971: ch. 2 and 4); Binder (1978: ch. 3).

In cooperation with the British colonial authorities, these elites had dominated the political arena and accumulated much of the wealth, while blocking the rise of an urban middle class—the *effendiyya* class—composed of teachers, civil servants, and professionals.[295] During the interwar era, when the pace of urbanization increased rapidly in Cairo and Alexandria, these agrarian elites also expanded their investments into the banking sector and food-processing, cement, and textile industries.[296]

Following the 1919 nationalist revolt, progressive landed notables and urban professionals coalesced under the Wafd Party to challenge the Egyptian khedive (later called king) and his British overlords but were blocked from exercising power for long periods, not unlike the UCR in Argentina.[297] Accordingly, Egypt witnessed the rise of an authoritarian, anti-Wafd government led by Ismail Sidqi, who combined a reactionary agenda with protection of the country's agrarian interests and light-industries during the Depression era.[298] Inter-war Egyptian

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[295] Between 1914 and 1952, landlords occupied roughly fifty-eight percent of all cabinet posts (Botman, 1988: xiv). On the effendiyya, see Gershoni and Jankowski, 1995; Laron (2013). Under pressure from the British Consul Lord Cromer, the Egyptian government funneled its resources to irrigation works, rather than education. By 1902, there were only three state secondary schools in Egypt, producing less than 100 graduates each year. While this number increased over the years (Tignor, 1966: 323), education was still a privilege for the upper classes (Reid, 2002).

[296] In Egypt's booming agro-export economy, there was a high degree of overlap between industrial and agrarian elites and light-manufacturing industries emerged to complement the country's agrarian exports. These companies were largely funded by investor coalitions who had access to political elites and dominated Alexandria and Cairo's economic associations. Similar to Argentina, with its Italian business community, many of these entrepreneurs emerged from with minority groups (Jewish and Greek). For more on pre-1952 Egyptian economy, see Vitalis (1994); Zaalouk (1989: ch. 1).

[297] In 1919, Egyptian elites started a signature campaign to send a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. When British authorities denied this request and exiled four Egyptian leaders, nation-wide protests erupted with support from broad sections of the society, including unions and peasants mobilized by their *umdhas*. This campaign paved the way for the rise of the Wafd (meaning delegation in Arabic) Party. On the 1919 Revolution, see Tignor (1976); Goldberg (1992). From the early 1920s to 1952, Egypt enjoyed parliamentary rule that worked as an oligarchic democracy. Most parties were led by landed elites, who sought to gain patronage resources and policy influence through a seat in the parliament (Angrist, 2005: 65-67). At the local level, these parties developed political networks with a string of prominent families and *umdahs* to mobilize voters during election time (Baer, 1969: 59).

[298] Though supportive of a gradual policy of industrialization, Sidqi purged union leaders, curtailed the political space, and cooperated with the Egyptian King. Sidqi also increased customs duties on imported goods to protect native industries but this policy was not buttressed by social policy and had limited, if any, impact on the alleviation of mass poverty in Egypt. Peasants suffered immensely due to low cotton prices during the 1930s. On Sidqi's rule and policies, see Bianchi (1989: 69-72); Vitalis (1994: 181-189); Deeb (1979); Badrawi (1996). For a review of pre-1952 Egyptian politics, see Deeb (1979); Goldsmith and Johnson (2005); Whidden (2013).

politics was a three-way struggle between the conservative Egyptian King, the British, as the ex-colonial power, and the Wafd Party. The party also resembled its Argentine counterpart in its ability to mobilize masses behind an agenda of political reform, which was lacking in its social elements and failed to address the country's deep-seated problems. Since they drew status and wealth from their property, the Wafd leaders opposed a radical economic transformation.

The origins of the regime

On 22nd of July, 1952, a group of junior military men known as the Free Officers overthrew the government and forced the king to abdicate.[299] The leaders of the coup were nationalist officers who opposed Britain's strong influence, felt outraged by Egypt's defeat during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, and abhorred the corrupt ruling class as epitomized by King Faruk's playboy lifestyle.[300] Officially founded in 1949, the Free Officers had envisioned a longer period of preparation but were prompted into hasty action when they discovered the King's plans to have them arrested (Hopwood, 1993: 35). The figurehead behind the coup was Mohammad Naguib, a fifty-three year old general, who, like General Ramirez, lacked close ties with the coup architect. Instead, power lay with junior officers, who were younger than thirty-five and came from lower-middle class families. The Egyptian military resembled its Argentine counterpart in that it was historically led by members of the landed aristocracy and kept small.[301] That changed with the 1936 Anglo-British treaty, which opened the Royal Military Academy to

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[299] For more on the Free Officers, see Gordon (1992); Vatikiotis (1978); Beattie (1994). Several major players from this period later wrote their memoirs. See Nasser (1955), Sadat (1978), Naguib (1984), Mohi el Din (1992).

[300] Between 1950 and 1952, a popular alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood, the communists, the socialists, and the Wafdist Vanguard waged a guerilla campaign against the British in the Suez Canal Zone that resulted in heavy native casualties, radicalized Egyptian officers, and generated a massive wave of protests against the government. In none of the other cases was colonial influence as dominant as it was in Egypt at this time.

[301] This was a legacy of the Arabi revolt that was defeated by the British forces in 1882 (Cole, 1993). Under British pressure, the Egyptian government replaced the military with a small force and muted its political influence. Consequently, the mantle of leadership within the nationalist camp was left to reformist landowners and urban professionals, thus resembling the Argentine case rather than, say, Turkey.

those from less privileged backgrounds. Unlike their predecessors, these officers were shaped by a nationalist worldview and developed an anti-British and anti-liberal discourse that differed significantly from that of the ruling class. This explains why, as with the GOU in Argentina, the Free Officers were imbued with an "anti-status quo ideology" (di Tella, 1965 and 1997).

Their principle of majority rule by collective leadership notwithstanding, Gamal Abdel Nasser quickly emerged as the unofficial leader of the junta. In many ways, Nasser resembled Peron: he was a charismatic officer with an extensive network of officers that he developed during his time as an instructor at the Royal Military Academy. [302] In the 1930s Nasser demonstrated against the British; pinned his hopes on the Wafd Party to secure Egypt's independence from colonial influence; and later fought in the 1948 War. But the corrupt and ineffective Wafd governments would later disappoint Nasser. Others such as Anwar Sadat, like some figures in the GOU, were inspired by the Axis successes during the early stages of WWII and saw Germany as a potential ally for securing Egypt's independence from Britain.

The quick demise of the old order precluded the Free Officers from forging strong ties with other groups in society (Baker, 1978: 27). They had several broad objectives but no clear program to implement these principles. With virtually no administrative experience, the coup leaders turned to anti-liberal figures and some old guard politicians, whom Beattie (1994: 75) calls "transitional authoritarians", who were hitherto sidelined by the Wafd Party and the

[302] Eight members of the first twelve-member junta had rural roots and most came from modest families, such as low-level civil servants and small or middle peasants (Batatu, 1984: 8). Nasser's biography is representative of this group. His father came from a small landowning family in Upper Egypt but later worked as a clerk in the post service. Through his family, Nasser was exposed both to the rural life and to growing opportunities in cities for education and travel. Born in 1918, he had a late entry to military school but nevertheless idealized its lifestyle and developed an esprit de corps with other officers that served him well. On Nasser's life, see Nutting (1972); Vatikiotis (1978); Aburish (2013). See also Haykal (1972) for a candid account written by a Nasser confidant.

country's ruling aristocracy.[303] At the same time, Nasser selected a portion of the Free Officers and several loyalist officers to create a fourteen-member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) that emerged as the highest governing authority in post-1952 Egypt (Beattie, 1994: 71). During their first weeks in power, the junta enacted a number of popular reforms to garner popular support for the new regime (Gordon, 1992: 61-62). These included cuts on automobile subsidies for cabinet ministers, abolition of honorific titles like *bey* and pasha, tax reforms, pay increases for the military, and reduction in tenant rents.[304]

Moderate elite opposition and spontaneous mobilization

Most civilian politicians initially celebrated the Free Officers' coup in hopes that the military would quickly reconvene the parliament. In particular, Wafdists welcomed the elimination of their political nemesis, King Farouk, and assumed that the junior officers, given their political inexperience and young age, would soon turn to them for advice. As soon as their agenda became apparent, however, the Free Officers encountered strong opposition from several sources: (1) resistance from economic and political elites, along with pressure from foreign governments; (2) moderate levels of spontaneous mobilization from below; (3) and splits within the junta that fueled a leadership struggle. Between 1952 and 1954, Nasser was locked in a battle against internal rivals and external opponents to establish a new regime. Like Peron, he struggled to control the armed forces, turn the RCC into a viable cabinet, and co-opt those social forces sympathetic to his agenda, while crushing his political opponents. In the end, he would succeed to an even greater extent than Peron, whose rivals in the junta blocked his smooth rise to power

[303] This is reminiscent of GOU's heavy reliance on integral nationalists and Argentine fascists during their first months in office. For the young Egyptian officers, who were unaccustomed with administrative affairs and economic policy, these figures served an important role during the first months (Gershoni and Jankowski, 2002). Regime leaders also turned to technocrats and engineers for technical matters (Tignor, 1998: ch. 2).

[304] The Free Officers were sensitive to popular reactions, as evidenced by their veto of a proposal to increase taxes on tobacco and cigarette (Tignor, 1998: 68).

and whose civilian opponents remained in the political arena. Nasser, by contrast, would decisively defeat his rivals in the junta, repress anti-regime mobilizations, and dismantle or absorb the existing political parties to maintain order within the military regime.

The first sign of strain erupted with the agrarian reform law of September, which set a limit of landownership for up to 200 feddans (1 feddan amounted to 1.0368 acres) and allowed an additional 100 feddans for their dependent children.[305] The expropriated land would then be sold to tenants and farmers, who owned less than five feddans of land. Naturally, the new decree generated strong reaction among economic and political elites. With the royal family in exile, however, the landed aristocracy tied to the old order had little, if any, power to resist this measure.[306] Wafd leaders were willing to compromise on the issue and eventually dropped their support for large landowners but continued their calls for a return to parliamentary rule (Beattie, 1994: 74). When tensions between the new regime and leadership of the established parties did not dissipate, the RCC arrested sixty-four prominent politicians from all major parties and shuffled the cabinet. Moreover, the RCC announced the Party Reorganization Law that called on

[305] The Egyptian and Argentine juntas both introduced rent controls for agricultural tenants but the Free Officers went further with a land reform that broke the dominance of the landowning oligarchy. Due to the country's limited fertile land and low urbanization rate, Egyptian landowners exercised a higher degree of social control over the peasantry than their Argentine counterparts. Land reform was therefore vital for the new regime to break their power base and garner popular support in the countryside. On the pre-1952 agrarian structure and previous reform attempts, see Johnson (2004). For the 1952 land reform and its impact, see Saab (1967); Abdel-Fadil (1980); Adams (1986: ch. 5); Waterbury (1983: ch. 12).

[306] This was a legacy of Muhammad Ali, whose state-building reforms in the early 19th century weakened the coercive power of the landed aristocrats and left them dependent on the central authority (Fahmy, 1997). The landed aristocracy primarily consisted of absentee landlords, who filled the ranks of political parties but commanded no military force of their own. To state the most obvious, there was no Egyptian equivalent of the Mexican *rurales*. Due to their Europeanized lifestyle and Turco-Circassian background, they were also culturally estranged from the rest of the society. In short, their high degree of social control provided the impetus for the junta's land reform, while their low level of coercive strength can account for the relative ease with which the program was carried out.

political parties to purge their corrupt members, renew their programs, and dissolved them pending re-certification by the Interior Minister by October 7.[307]

However, the regime lacked the popular organization necessary to compete with the Wafd's national machine. The party had won every election since its founding and formed several governments, giving it administrative experience and strong support within the bureaucracy. Like Argentina's UCR, it gathered prominent landowners and urban middle-class professionals but also had a popular base with its ties to labor unions and student groups.[308] Regime leaders initially hoped that younger party members would oust the old-guard leadership and ease their plans to restructure the political arena. Some frustrated politicians did cooperate with the government but most political elites resisted. Land reform may have dealt a severe blow to the Wafd's wealthy constituencies in the countryside but party cadres, their frustration with the party's old guards notwithstanding, quickly rallied around Nahhas to resist the RCC's attempts to overhaul the party system (Gordon, 1992: ch. 3 and 4). Following its failure to bring political parties in line, the RCC abrogated the 1923 Constitution on 10 December 1952 and assumed total control. This was followed by a decree to dissolve all political parties, initiating a three-year transition period "to enable the establishment of healthy constitutional democratic government" (Hamrush, 139 cited in Brownlee, 2007: 51).

[307] By that date, fifteen parties applied for recertification and seven was finally approved on November 8. These include the Sa'dist, Liberal Constitutionalist, Nationalist, New Nationalist, Wafdist Bloc, Workers, and Daughter of the Nile parties (Gordon, 1992: 72).

[308] Faced with a sharp rise in the number of strikes, the Wafd leader and Prime Minister Zaghlul, like his Argentine counterpart Yrigoyen, crushed the labor movement and disbanded the communist-led Confederation of Trade Unions. In its stead, the government established a nationalist labor organization led by Wafdist lawyers Muhammad Thabit and Zuhayr Sabri (Botman, 1988: 4). At the same time, the party was not in power long enough to solidify these links and co-opt the labor movement into the regime through modest redistributive policies (Bianchi, 1989: 66). Instead, an Egyptian communist organization rose as the leading force within the Egyptian labor movement in the interwar period and played an important role amidst the postwar nationalist mobilization (Aidi, 2009: 45; Deeb 1979, Beinin 1982). The party also did not have a mass base among the poor peasantry, owing to Wafd leaders' ties to provincial notables and middle-level peasants (Angrist, 2005: 66-67).

During the interwar period, various anti-liberal groups had challenged the traditional parties, expanding political participation to a growing petty bourgeoisie composed of civil servants, artisans, teachers, and tradesmen. These groups thrived in the 1930s, when Prime Minister Ismail Sidqi's reactive policies and the impact of the Great Depression, produced a popular backlash. The most important among them was the Muslim Brotherhood, a popular organization dedicated to imposing Islam on all aspects of the Egyptian society. Established in 1928 by a Muslim teacher, Hassan al-Banna, the organization rapidly grew to rival Wafd's party machine with two thousand branches and half million members in 1949 (Mitchell, 1993: 328). Young Egypt, which later renamed itself as the Socialist Party of Egypt, was another anti-establishment organization that merged nationalism with a call for social justice. Its program advocated land reform, nationalization of industry, and income tax (Jankowski, 1975; Vatikiotis, 1978: 67-83). Furthermore, communist groups had a limited but dedicated following during this period.[309]

Given their anti-elitist and anti-British agendas, the Free Officers collaborated with these groups to draw logistical assistance but then eschewed organizational engagement after the coup. Although these groups could not rule Egypt directly, the junta feared their capacity to mobilize the popular classes and students against the regime and gain influence through independent cells in the military. For instance, a strike by textile workers on August 9, 1952 at the mill town Kafr al-Dawwar revealed the strength of the labor movement.[310] More importantly, the Muslim Brotherhood had a large base of supporters among groups to which the junta wanted

[309] During the interwar period, communist parties had a leadership that primarily came from landowning and urban middle class families (Botman, 1988: 18-31). In terms of political strategy, they focused on organizing skilled workers and artisans and were alien to the nationalist cause. However, they later gained strength by organizing workers in the textile and transportation sectors and adopting a more nationalist agenda.

[310] The government responded with a full use of force: they arrested 545 workers and charged twenty-nine with arson and incitement to riot, hanging two by a court order. Since then, scholars have suggested that workers had struck in response to the rising political opportunities after the coup and were largely supportive of the new government. For more information on the strike, see Beinin and Lockman 1998: 421-426; Botman (1988: 125-130).

to appeal: students, lower-level officers, and the lower-middle classes. For instance, just as university students protested against Peron, so were there anti-Nasser demonstrations at Cairo University (Gordon, 1992: 75).

In addition to such external challenges, factionalism erupted within the RCC and in the military at large. For one thing, the junta members had no common agenda beside Egyptian nationalism to unite them. Rather, they exhibited ideological eclecticism based on their personal contacts prior to the coup: several were close to the Muslim Brotherhood; a few were socialists; and still others had sympathy for extreme-right nationalist groups. When coupled with the fact that their equal ranks aborted the establishment of a clear hierarchy, the RCC meetings became host to petty quarrels, personal slights, and policy clashes. In particular, two major points of contention split the junta: the scale of anticipated reforms and the date for withdrawal from politics. Naguib and Khaled Muhi al-Din, though supportive of the reforms, were among those who wanted to return to parliamentary politics and gain legitimacy through electoral support. Despite its minority status within the RCC, this faction had wide support among the professionally-minded artillery and cavalry units and benefited from Naguib's overall popularity.[311] In light of his growing prestige, Naquib gradually turned to civilian groups to maintain the regime's legitimacy and balance his rivals in the junta. By contrast, the majority of the RCC members led by Nasser envisioned a long period in power to reorganize the political arena and destroy Egypt's traditional social structure.

Transition from above

Faced with resistance from various civilian groups, regime leaders felt the need to establish a popular base of support. In January 1953, just after its ban on political parties, the RCC constructed a political organization called the Liberation Rally. While junta members

[311] On conflicts within the officer corps, see Gordon (1992); Beattie (1994: ch. 4).

assumed top positions (Naguib became the president and Nasser occupied the general secretary), second-rank Free Officers played a more active role in its organization. The RCC members usually managed the task of opening up local branches in their respective provinces and hometowns. The party's main objective was to unify disparate groups under its wing and promote national unity behind the new regime. This was done through a defense of the land reform law and nationalistic appeals to transcend prior ideological differences. As early as January 1953, Major Ahmed Tu'eima and Major Ibrahim al-Tahawi, the LR's Nasserist deputy secretaries, began holding meetings with hundreds of trade union leaders to link their organization to the regime. Instead of promoting mass mobilization, however, the party's function was "to take up political space" (Beattie, 1994: 80) and prevent rival groups from organizing in the political arena (Binder, 1978: 41). To do so, the party opened its ranks to a wide array of political activists, state officials, and local elites from different parts of the country (Gordon, 1992: 80; Mayfield, 1971: 104-105). Just as land reform wiped out the aristocratic class at the top but preserved the country's agricultural system, the RCC members hoped that the LR would accommodate lower and mid-level officials of parties banned by the regime, while wiping out their top leadership.

During the next two years, Ahmet Tu'eima toured the country to meet prominent families and establish party branches in their areas. Naturally, the LR's enrollment figures soon exploded as many opportunists turned to this venue as the surest way to secure political posts and village chiefs registered their entire villages to maintain their local influence. Established from above and supported by the state bureaucracy, at first glance, the LR may seem more similar to Mustafa Kemal's CHP than to Peron's movement. Unlike the Kemalists, the RCC members faced a hostile political arena and had to confront several strong civilian groups. Even if the LR apparatus

remained underdeveloped, this led the LR leaders to seek a wider popular base and establish contact with unions and peasant groups.[312] On the other hand, contrary to his populist rhetoric, Peron made similar appeals to local elites and landed notables outside of Buenos Aires, where labor unions clearly dominated, and Peron's Unión Cívica Radical - Junta Renovadora had a traditional base with many former members of old parties.

As Interior Minister, Nasser also had the opportunity to control the information available to the public and placed the liberal civil society into military submission (Gordon, 1992: 84-85).[313] In November 1952, he pushed for the creation of the Ministry for National Guidance, which was designed to control propaganda and censorship. The RCC, as in Argentina, introduced mandatory conscription in 1955, an important step in the militarization of Egyptian society. Unlike Peron, however, Nasser also wisely secured the support of the US government. Portraying Naguib as soft on communism and tied to the old establishment parties, he persuaded the Americans to give him political and intelligence assistance (Kandil, 2012: 106-107). To be sure, the United States was not yet a major actor in Egyptian politics, but Nasser's American contacts supported him at a very uncertain time, both for Egypt and the junta.[314]

Having come to power through a coup d'état, Nasser knew all too well the danger posed by the armed forces to his rule. Not incidentally, the young colonel closely monitored the military to prevent his rivals from penetrating its ranks. In June 1953, for instance, he persuaded

[312] At the same time, weakness of the popular forces supportive of the government led regime leaders to rely heavily on the state apparatus. Campuses and factories became main centers of opposition against the government (Gordon, 1992: 82) and the LR failed to counteract the Wafd organization, even when the latter was banned.

[313] When Nasser handed his ministerial post to another fellow RCC member Zakaria Muhi al-Din, in October 1953, the state's detention and surveillance capabilities had already been greatly enhanced. On his prompting, Zakaria purged 400 officers from the 3,000-strong police corps and established the country's first civilian intelligence agency in December 1953, namely the General Intelligence Service (GIS).

[314] It bears mentioning that during the earlier stages of Cold War, the US government played a different role in the Middle East than it did in Latin America—a region where American companies had higher investments and economic interests. Because of their interest in curtailing the influence of colonial powers, the US adopted a progressive attitude toward Egypt. For instance, they did not defend the monarchy, encouraged the British to evacuate its troops from the Canal, and even endorsed land reform after the 1952 coup. In short, the interests of the Free Officers and the US government did not clash at this stage, if not aligned completely.

Naguib to appoint his closest friend Abdel Hakim Amer as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Amer later became a crucial ally in his efforts to coup-proof the military. Like Peron, Nasser purged his opponents from the military, replacing them with a network of supporters. Accordingly, Nasser stepped up surveillance activities through the Directorate of the Military Intelligence Department that he controlled and created new surveillance organs, such as the General Investigations Department and later the President's Bureau of Information (Kandil, 2012). Over the course of two years nearly eight hundred officers retired, while more than 2,300 were assigned to administrative tasks in the army and many others moved to the civilian bureaucracy.

Following this crackdown, the weakened opposition began to rally around Mohammad Naguib, the figurehead of the 1952 coup, as the only regime leader who could stop Nasser. Friction between the two figures grew throughout 1953. Due to his older age and class background, Naguib increasingly felt estranged from his younger colleagues and was, for the most part, opposed to their radical policies and harsh measures against opponents. Despite his formal titles, Naguib's influence within the RCC was strictly limited. But he commanded widespread popularity among the populace and enjoyed support from many commissioned officers, who lamented the breakdown of rank discipline over the last two years. Nasser tried to isolate him politically and excluded him from the decision-making process. Naguib responded by traveling across the country and making popular appeals to balance his opponents in the regime. By January 1954, cards were stacked against Nasser: a sizable portion of the army, the Wafd, economic elites, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the urban middle classes all opposed his rule.[315]

[315] Although the Free Officers struggled to appease propertied classes and passed favorable legislation during this transition period, the liberal business elites did not support them (Tignor, 1998: ch. 2).

Leadership contest: the March crisis

The first showdown took place on February 23, 1954, when Naguib resigned from his posts and openly broke with Nasser and the RCC (Aidi, 2009: 49-50). His resignation, though accepted by the RCC, spurred a revolt the next day among cavalry officers, who, like the Argentine Navy forces, came from upper-class backgrounds and had family ties to old regime parties. Although Nasser managed to surmount this challenge with the help of pro-RCC second-rank officers and the state security apparatus, he was then confronted with massive pro-Naguib demonstrations in Cairo an Alexandria, which resembled in spirit, if not scale, the anti-Peronist, pro-democracy protests of September 1945. Though led by the Muslim Brothers, members of the Wafdists, Marxists, and the Egyptian Socialist Party (all banned at this point) joined the crowds and forced the RCC to back down and reinstate Naguib to his former posts.[316] Despite their relative weakness compared to Argentina, these intra-elite divisions within the military allowed popular groups to force the RCC to retreat. While the junta members were in disarray, Nasser assumed full control of the situation using coercion. Prompted by him, the security forces rounded up prominent demonstration leaders and cracked down on the opposition. With their popular networks weakened by the military regime, however, the banned parties did not have the organizational capacity to sustain these protests. Unlike in the Argentine case, the RCC's opponents also had no hope of eliciting support from the United States.[317] When Naguib called for the release of all political prisoners and the army's return to the barracks, Nasser responded with a tactical retreat: On March 5, he promised open parliamentary elections, promised to end

[316] After the cessation of civilian political activity, communist groups joined with several members of the left-wing Wafd, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Socialist Party, and union leaders to compose the United Revolutionary Front (like the Union Democratica in Argentina), later renamed the National Democratic Front in April 1953 (Botman, 1988: 132-133).

[317] During the past two years, Nasser had wisely developed close ties with American officials, including the then CIA Middle East chief, Kermit Roosevelt, and secured their support in the event of political clashes. For Nasser's early interactions with the US, see Laron (2013: ch. 2)

martial law, and lifted press censorship. Furthermore, the RCC revoked the earlier ban on old political parties and pledged to not form a party.

Before any of the opposition parties could seize the moment, however, Nasser and his close collaborators staged a plot to dispel such plans.[318] First, Nasser secured the release of the Brothers and promised the MB leader close coordination in return for his group's support. Then, between March 27-29, Cairo and Alexandria witnessed popular demonstrations, led by the Transportation Workers' Union, in support of Nasser and against the return to parliamentary rule. Although many unions supported a return to democracy, Nasser's deputies in the LR used their personal contacts to persuade some labor leaders to switch sides and demonstrate for the government.[319] Nasser loyalist Military Criminal Intelligence and Military Police personnel also joined the demonstrating workers, while the LR and state officials carried truckloads of peasants to Cairo in anticipation of further clashes. Clearly, Nasser's opponents were outmaneuvered. Opposition parties, lawyers' and journalists' syndicates, and university students rallied against the government but police and military forces quelled the disturbances. The MB's defection hurt their numbers and morale. Nasser did not have support from the more militant manufacturing workers but neither did he need them at this point. Naguib made a last-minute effort to dispel the anti-democracy demonstrations but his orders were ignored by the Cairo Police Division in which his supporters were outnumbered by the Nasserite camp. The anti-Nasser tide had turned.

Nasser's consolidation of power

With popular groups off the streets, Nasser easily crushed what was left of the opposition: hundreds of pro-Naguib officers were imprisoned or purged, while many others switched sides to jump on the Nasser bandwagon. Naguib, though formally Egypt's president, was sidelined and

[318] This part is based on Gordon (1992: ch. 7); Beattie (1994: 89-98); Tignor (1998: 85); Aidi (2009: 51-53).
[319] Since these unions had limited ties to the old parties and operated in sectors dominated by foreign companies, they were particularly susceptible to Nasser's nationalist appeals.

later put under house arrest. Nasser was determined to silence his civilian critics as well. In the ensuing months, the government fined opposition newspapers; arrested hundreds of communists and student leaders; fired intransigent professors; and dissolved the councils of professional syndicates. Hence, liberal groups were silenced to an unprecedented extent. On April 17, 1954, Nasser replaced civilian, pro-business members of the cabinet with either his military allies or technocrats who would be more subservient.[320] He broke the last link with the old regime by prohibiting anyone who held high office between February 1942 and July 1952 to exercise political power. With his other critics defeated, Nasser finally turned against the Muslim Brotherhood, which, by now, was fragmented under heavy pressure from the regime. Following a failed assassination attempt on his life by an alleged MB member, Nasser retaliated with a massive crackdown on the organization (Gordon, 1992: ch. 10). In the next few weeks, the government imprisoned up to 30,000 members and forced many others to hide underground.[321]

On the surface, the March crisis resembles the mass protests that occurred in Argentina on October 17-18, 1945. While Peron and Nasser both saved their political careers during these incidents, a closer look at the two cases reveals major differences that later contributed to their varying political trajectories. First of all, the popular mobilization in Argentina was more autonomous, widespread, and decisive than the one in Egypt, where unions constituted only an auxiliary force within the Nasserite camp. Unlike Peron, who found himself outnumbered at the upper echelons of the military and was even imprisoned at one point, the Egyptian junta did not turn against Nasser, save for Naguib and his few military allies. Having enlisted the support of

[320] For a list of the sacked ministers, see Tignor (1998: 86). This move also served the purpose of closely aligning the cabinet with the RCC; eight RCC men were now in government and only two - Anwar al-Sadat and Abd al-Hakim Amr - did not have a ministerial portfolio.

[321] Similar to Peron's complicated relationship with the Catholic groups, Nasser initially relied on the Muslim Brotherhood to enlist popular support and establish contacts. They both converged on an anti-liberal worldview, Egyptian nationalism, and hatred toward the British. Fissures ultimately emerged between the two groups, as was the case in Argentina, because of their refusal to share political power and popular base.

key figures in the state security apparatus, Nasser organized popular mobilization merely to defeat his civilian opponents without opening up major cracks within the military, whereas Peron absolutely needed union support to surmount his former allies in the military.[322] Peron's victory in October was therefore contingent on his ability to win the upcoming 1946 elections. Nasser, by contrast, defeated his main rival to become Egypt's undisputed leader after the March crisis. Unlike Peron, Nasser quickly consolidated his power without the need for a popular mandate.

Nasser's leadership was further pronounced in April 1955, when he participated the founding meeting of the Conference of the Non-aligned Nations held in Bandung, Indonesia. There, Nasser shared diplomatic stage with world-renowned leaders such as Nehru and Zhou Enlai, and developed close ties with Tito and Sukarno of Indonesia. Upon his return, Nasser declared his intentions to return to parliamentary rule but without the old parties. On January 1, 1956, the RCC announced a provisional constitution that granted the president broad powers. The document endorsed state-planning, emphasized public welfare, and provided a legal basis for nationalization (Tignor, 1998: 93). Lastly, the document called for the formation of a new organization, the National Union, to replace the Liberation Rally. Little public debate was allowed, however. In a sham election, Egyptians ratified the new constitution and approved Nasser, the only candidate, as president with 99 percent of the vote. After the return to constitutional rule, the RCC was dissolved. While the former RCC members would continue to occupy high positions, they now served at Nasser's pleasure and could therefore be dismissed at

[322] By early 1954, Nasser loyalists commanded commanding posts of the armed forces and could have eliminated the cavalry's threat. But this scenario would have resulted in a civil war within the military and weakened the regime's base among officers in the long run. While this option was also debated and apparently found support in the RCC, Amer's refusal to accept the use of force and Nasser's last minute brinkmanship averted this outcome (Baker, 1978: 53-54). Therefore, Nasser needed some level of popular support, nurtured by the state forces, to defeat his opponents without the need for spilling blood within the military.

any time. Indeed, in this new period, Nasser began to rely on a new group of civilian technocrats and second-level Free Officers, who were much more subservient to his agenda.

During the March crisis, Nasser incurred debts to several groups. Clearly, the most important one was the military: Nasser raised officer salaries, increased military expenditure, and appointed officers to a wide array of administrative, political, and diplomatic posts. Wealth and social status of commissioned officers arose dramatically in this period. Just as Peron envisioned a populist alliance between military, workers, and businessmen, so, too, Nasser spawned a military-popular coalition to challenge the landed oligarchy, foreign capital, and their mercantile allies. In the Egyptian case, however, the military constituted the locus of power within the regime. While, for instance, Peron electorally mobilized his popular base, Nasser neither needed nor sought direct political engagement with his allies. From the outset, the Egyptian national-developmentalist state remained autonomous from its popular base. During the latter half of the 1950s, Nasser's "Estado Novo" (Beatie, 1994; Aidi, 2009) developed into an instrument through which the government transferred material benefits and privileges to economic groups in exchange for their acquiescence. This gave way to a tight system of control from above that prevented them from diverging from government policies.

Personalization of power

Nasser achieved such control by creating highly centralized peak associations within each sector that were closely linked to particular state ministries. The government pushed for the creation of the Egyptian Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions in 1955 and 1957, respectively (Bianchi, 1989: 124-128, 165-166). This centralized model bolstered the position of corporate leaders within their respective sectors but compromised their autonomy. The regime extended state control over economic associations by

appointing chamber board members, including the president of the federation. Like Peron, Nasser lowered the criteria of compulsory membership for small manufacturing firms to expand the membership structure of the Federation of Egyptian Industries—hitherto controlled by the big bourgeoisie—and granted the Ministry of Industry (created in 1956) the right of veto for all of its decisions. For Nasser, this oversight was critical to coordinate economic planning under state capitalism. The regime also reserved the right to intervene in the management of the professional syndicates.[323] For instance, both the journalists' and lawyers' syndicates, previously at the forefront of protests, lost their autonomy after government-supported candidates won representation in their executive councils. Not even the religious institutions were free from such state control (Bianchi, 1989: 179-183).

As he tightened control over the new regime, Nasser met with growing resistance from the West. Tensions were high with Israel, as evidenced by the armed clashes along the border. While a diplomatic deal with the UK government in July 1954 secured the pullout of the British troops from the Suez Canal, relations between the two countries also remained rocky (Hopwood, 1993: 41-44; Johnson, 2004: 176-191). Moreover, Nasser's adoption of "positive neutralism"—whereby Egypt played off the two superpowers to gain a stronger hand in bilateral relations—caused friction with the Eisenhower administration, which viewed the young president's leftward drift with alarm.[324] So when the Western governments refused to provide Egypt with military supplies against Israel, Nasser concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955, thereby upsetting the delicate regional balance of power in Egypt's favor. Despite veiled threats from both the UK and the US governments, Nasser stood by the agreement. This development

[323] On the professional syndicates, see Springborg (1978); Bianchi (1989: ch. 4).
[324] Wafd's foreign policy during the interwar period also contained elements of neutrality driven by an anti-British popular sentiment (Manela 2009). But it was Nasser who turned this policy into a doctrine, aligning diplomatic policy with his economic and political agenda.

triggered a series of events from late 1955 to late 1956 that transformed both Egypt and the wider Middle East: the withdrawal of US and British funding for the Aswan Dam, Nasser's retaliation with the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the tripartite aggression led by Israel's invasion of Egypt during the Suez crisis (Tignor, 1998: ch. 3; Johnson, 2004: 191-208; Laron, 2013). These incidents sharply curtailed the century-long British and French influence over Egypt and pushed the military regime away from the US government and towards the Soviet Union. However, Nasser won a political victory when US pressure and Soviet threats forced the aggressor states (Israel, Britain and France) to remove their forces from the Suez Canal (Hopwood, 1993: 45-57). The victory boosted Nasser's prestige significantly.

After the Suez War, Nasser reacted by sequestering the sizable financial, industrial, and agricultural assets that British and French nationals and Egypt's Jewish citizens had accumulated (Zaalouk, 1989: ch. 2; Tignor, 1998: ch. 4). This process accelerated in January 1957, when the government enacted four ordinances to increase national control over foreign holdings in Egypt, especially banks and insurance firms.[325] To help ease the transition into economic independence, Nasser increasingly turned to the public sector, which was reinvigorated by the recent sequestrations. In 1958, drafted by Aziz Sidqi, the Harvard-trained Minister of Industry, the government enacted a five-year industrial development plan, partly financed by a Soviet loan. Even at this point, though, the regime was not against private capital. Moderates in government, led by the LSE-trained Minister of Finance Abdul Qaysuni, advocated a role for entrepreneurs, provided that they followed the goals set by the regime.[326] For instance, in his first industrial plan

[325] Notably, the government compelled all banks and insurance companies operating in Egypt to have only Egyptian directors and shareholders, effective after a transition period. Moreover, the new law demanded all private firms that are the sole distributors of a commodity to transform themselves into Egyptian companies. The dissolution of Egypt's links with the West and the concomitant growth in Egyptian nationalism also led to a mass exodus of the country's large expatriate community. Out of the 45,000 Egyptian Jews, for instance, more than half left the country by late 1956 and most others would follow in the next two to three years (Tignor, 1998: 135).

[326] On economic planning in this period, see Waterbury (1983: 70-71); Zaalouk, 1989: 37-38; Tignor, 1998: 177.

Sidqi projected that a majority of investments would come from private sources (Waterbury, 1983: 71-72). But entrepreneurs, intimidated by the growing state intervention and sequestrations, had little confidence in the Nasserite regime and refused to budge.

The first sign of economic radicalization came in October 1958, when Egypt ended talks with World Bank officials and signed a deal with the Soviet Union to build the Aswan Dam.[327] At this point, the state authorities had begun to intervene in almost every sector of the economy. The conflict between the Nasserite regime and private investors finally came to a head in February 1960, when the government nationalized Egypt's two most powerful, though nonetheless Egyptian-controlled, banks, the National Bank of Egypt and Bank Misr.[328] These moves culminated in the decrees of July 1961, which brought much of the country's private sector under state control (Waterbury, 1993: 62; Ginat, 1997: 15-16). In the end, around three hundred industrial and commercial firms were nationalized, turning shipping, banking, insurance, and foreign trade into virtually a state monopoly.[329] Workers, by contrast, were granted shorter work hours, a quarter of annual profits, and participation in firm management. Lastly, a land reform decree - enacted in July 1961 - lowered the limit of landholdings from two hundred to one hundred feddans per person (Abdel-Fadil, 1975: 9; Saab, 1967: ch. 13).

What accounts for the 1961 socialist laws and subsequent wave of nationalization? Some have argued that Nasser's suspicious personality led him to destroy all alternative sources of

[327] For the story behind the Aswan Dam, see Goldschmidt (1988: 104-106); Tignor (1998: 102-113; 2010: 262-265); Laron (2013). On the regime's statist policies during this period, see Tignor (1998: ch. 5)

[328] The National Bank of Egypt, much like the Ottoman Bank in the Turkish context, was established by British investors at the end of the nineteenth century but acquired an Egyptian staff over time and in 1951 became the country's de facto central bank. The government would later establish a new central bank, as a state-administered organ, in 1961. The Bank Misr, on the other hand, had a large control over the textile sector through its subsidiary firms, the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company and the Misr Fine Spinning and Weaving Company.

[329] The government nationalized all private banks and insurance companies as well as shipping firms and companies in the cement, steel, fertilizer, and hotel sectors. Ninety-one companies were mandated to sell half of their shares to the state, while in another hundred and fifty-nine firms, any shares held in over 10,000 Egyptian pounds were to be sold to the public sector.

power, resulting in a giant bureaucratic state (Stephens, 1971; Dekmejian, 1971; Beattie, 1994). Others have stressed the Free Officers' anti-liberal worldview and zeal for rapid industrialization (Vatikiotis, 1978). Due to their administrative inexperience, the Egyptian leadership was overly optimistic about the efficacy of state-planning. Still others emphasized economic factors, arguing that increased state control over the economy was an outcome of Egyptian capitalists' failure to bankroll rapid industrialization and move the country from import-substitution to capital-intensive industrialization (Waterbury, 1983; Tignor, 1998: 178-180). Lastly, some scholars have pointed out the internal contradictions of Nasser's political coalition (Ansari, 1986). Having incorporated the popular classes into the regime, regime leaders needed rapid growth to provide prosperity but lacked the cooperation of the private sector.

Although these studies expanded our stock of knowledge on the Nasserite regime, they fail to address why the Egyptian leadership shifted to the left so dramatically and in that particular period. Most of these factors were at play in the other national-developmentalist cases. Junior officers were also in power in Turkey and Argentina, while both Mexico and Argentina have had colonial histories and sizable foreign investments. Moreover, Anwar Sadat, a fellow Free Officer, would later reverse his country's economic policy course. Likewise the other three studied cases also experienced severe payment crises and sluggish industrial growth but did not sequester so many national firms, instead opting for other control mechanisms such as high tariffs, trade licenses, and exchange regulations.

Instead, this chapter treats Nasser's leftward shift after the mid-1950s as a contingent event, whose occurrence can best be explained through a set of political factors. Nasser was not simply a socialist ideologue or a political reformer with a clear economic agenda. His later socialist discourse notwithstanding, Nasser was accommodating towards the private sector,

including foreign capital, at earlier stages of his political career. What pushed him to change course was a combination of the type of threats against the regime and the resources available to counter them. Like Peron, Nasser faced strong resistance from a small group of large landowners and national capitalists, who, devoid of political influence, refused economic cooperation with the regime. Due to the country's strategically important location, the Egyptian leadership was also locked in a costly dispute with Israel and faced pressure from Western governments that went beyond anything that the Peronist regime had to endure. Nasser expanded the public sector to counter these threats, eliminated alternative centers of power within the country, and funnel resources from the agricultural to the industrial sector. While these trends existed in other national-developmentalist cases, the combination of domestic and external pressures forced the Egyptian leadership to take more drastic measures to control the economy.

Both the Mexican and Turkish ruling elites, for instance, raised the level of public investments but also relied on a burgeoning class of pro-regime entrepreneurs who emerged from among their ranks. Nasser could not fall back on this option, for Egypt's economic elites were connected with the banned Wafd Party and had historical ties to foreign capital. Unless these groups were broken, their large monopolies and cartels in most sectors would preclude the rise of a regime-friendly entrepreneurial class. Peron faced similar dilemmas but in the absence of strong external threats and military disputes he had fewer incentives to directly target the Argentine economic elites. Anyway, this course would have most likely mobilized large portion of the society against the government and brought the economy to a standstill. Instead, Peron could capture a larger portion of the agrarian profits to bankroll an industrialization program and simultaneously raise real wages without the risky option of expropriation.

Nasser, by contrast, faced no such obstacle: the Wafd Party's popular networks were mostly dismantled and few Egyptian businessmen could retaliate against a full government attack with popular mobilization. On the other hand, the urban middle classes whose career aspirations were blocked under the old regime demanded new jobs and opportunities for upward mobility, just like peasants starved for land. With his anti-colonial, nationalist, and interventionist agenda, Nasser addressed the needs of his support base: peasants received land, workers were given higher wages, and the expanded public sector emerged as the main source of employment for the rising middle classes.[330] Furthermore, the nationalization of major firms produced a new class that Mahmoud Hussein (1973) refers to as the "state bourgeoisie".[331] The policy of excessive nationalization created a strong trend toward centralization and arrested the industrialization process. This gave way to a highly inefficient institutional framework whereby political loyalty took priority over administrative competence and managers had limited autonomy in a four-step chain of command stretching from the president to minister to corporation head to enterprise head (Baker, 1978: 186-187).

Fitting with this domestic agenda, Egypt became a major revisionist force in the region. Nasser's intransigent attitude and fierce nationalism turned him into a popular hero and uprooted the delicate post-war order in the Middle East. During 1957 alone, civil war broke out in Lebanon; military officers toppled the Iraqi monarchy; and King Hussein of Jordan put down a similar coup attempt. Nasser's rhetoric and example prompted the emergence of Arab nationalist

[330] From the late 1950s, the government adopted a policy of offering public sector jobs to every high school and college graduate, whose high numbers (school enrollment more than tripled in the 1950s and 1960s) precluded their employment by the private sector (Adams, 1986: 45).

[331] This group was composed of bureaucratic and managerial elites, high-ranking civil servants, directors of public sector companies, and wholesale traders, whose access to state resources and protected markets granted them economic power and political influence. In 1964, engineers constituted majority of the ministers in government. Between 1962/1963 and 1966/1967, the number of technocrats rose sixty-one percent (Zaalouk, 1989: 41).

forces from Algeria to Iraq.[332] More concretely, the Syrian Baath Party sought Nasser's help in defeating the local communist forces that seemed to be on the verge of taking control. These calls culminated in the unification of both countries in early 1958 under the United Arab Republic (UAR), with North Yemen joining them later that year. In that sense, Nasserism was not only an anti-status quo ideology within Egypt but also across the entire Middle East. After a series of successes, Egypt's pan-Arab nationalism was blocked by Western powers and other rival Arab governments.[333] Contrary to Nasser's hopes, other Arab states did not rush to join the UAR. In a dramatic example, the junior military officers led by Qasim, who toppled the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, managed to maintain their country's independence. Even more ominously, Syria seceded from the union after a rightist military coup in Damascus in 1961.

State corporatism and Arab socialism

While Nasser blamed Syrian reactionaries for the coup, he began to worry that a traditional backlash could also occur in Egypt. He especially feared a power grab by a conservative subset of the army leadership.[334] This nervous mindset compelled him to deepen the economic reforms and overhaul the political system. More particularly, Nasser extended the July 1961 laws, gave orders for a new round of sequestrations, and arrested dozens of old politicians and landowners. It was after the Syria debacle that Nasser first began to emphasize the importance of creating political institutions that would challenge reactionary economic elites.

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[332] Peron tried to appeal to other populist leaders in the region but with only limited success. Cultural similarities among the Arab peoples, coupled with their leaders' ties to imperialist powers, however, created increasing political opportunities for Nasser to reach out to a wider Arab audience – both to cement his regime against the West and increase his political influence.

[333] Aside from Syria's attacks in the Arab League, Nasser faced rivalry from Iraq's President Abd al-Karim Qasim, who forged strong ties with the Soviet Union. His regime was also opposed by the monarchies in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Morocco. This vulnerable state partly explains why Nasser promptly recognized the coup against the Yemeni monarchy in 1962 and sent Egyptian forces to support the newly established republican government against royalist forces supported by Saudi Arabia (Hopwood, 1993: 64-67; Ferris, 2013). On regional politics in this period, see Seale (1965); Podeh (1999); Kerr (1971); Jankovski (2002).

[334] There were rumors that some prominent Egyptian businessmen approached Amer, known for his more conservative views, to ask him to either restrain Nasser or remove him from power (Waterbury, 1983: 74).

These efforts culminated in a new manifesto, the National Charter, which was adopted by a plebiscite in June 1962.[335] The charter advocated a socialist course to overcome Egypt's domestic and foreign obstacles to development and called for a new popular organization, the Arab Socialist Union, to supplant the National Union, which had allegedly turned into a platform for feudal actors to challenge the regime. In contrast, the new party would enlist support from a broad coalition of popular classes, intellectuals, and professionals. In light of this goal, the charter established a fifty percent quota for workers and peasants in all representative bodies, and made party membership obligatory for holding any kind of office and political assignment. The representation system came against the backdrop of the gradual shift to a corporatist political formula that had begun in the mid-1950s.[336] The Egyptian unions were tightly incorporated into the state bureaucracy between the Unified Labor Code of 1959 and the Trade Unions Law of 1964 (Bianchi, 1989; Goldberg, 1992; Posusney, 1997). After the 1950s, the regime penetrated the countryside with a number of administrative organizations: agricultural cooperatives, village councils and banks. Through the cooperatives, for instance, the state provided seeds, fertilizers, and credits to supplant the local landlords and moneylenders and tie peasants to the regime.[337]

At the outset, the ASU looked no different than its predecessors with its pyramid-like organizational structure. [338] Although membership was voluntary, local elites still joined the

[335] On the charter, see Binder (1978: 308-310); Beattie (1994: 162-165); Ginat (1997: 19-22).

[336] This argument sharply differs from analysis Clement Moore, who describes Egypt as a "nonincoporated" society due to the weakness of its organized groups (Moore, 1970; also see Springborg, 1979). Not only does this view ignore the growing organizational capacity of workers in Egyptian society (see for instance, Posusney, 1993; Aidi, 2008) but also confuses authoritarianism with lack of participation. Under Nasser's state corporatist formula, these groups became junior partners of the regime.

[337] In practice, agrarian cooperatives and village councils were captured by large farmers and rich peasants, who used their patronage to benefit disproportionately from the provision of rural credit. Moreover, state funds were limited, which left small and landless peasants producing main food crops still dependent on local moneylenders. On the question of cooperatives, see Saab (1967: ch. 10); Baker (1978: ch. 8); Adams (1986: ch. 3 and 4).

[338] On top of the hierarchy lay the Supreme Executive Committee and the General Secretariat that were linked to a string of local committees (district committees and basic units) via the middle-tier of the General National Congress. Moreover, the party was established from above and with the government's support. For the ASU's organizational structure, see Mayfield (1971: ch. 6); Harik (1973: ch. 6); Binder (1978: ch. 13); Brownlee (2007: 85-88).

party in large numbers to preserve their status. Nonetheless, the ASU differed from the Liberation Rally and the National Union with special emphasis to the forging of a national alliance of working forces—peasants, workers, urban professionals, and soldiers. Second, the party leadership organized these groups into two types of "basic units" according to their place of work and residence. The creation of nonresidential units in schools, government offices, and factories was unprecedented in Egypt and had much in common with Peron's *unidades basicas*. In the next years, the party established 6,789 basic units—2,442 in workplaces and 4,447 residential—across the country (Mayfield, 1971: 124). Despite this extensive network, economic groups remained linked to the bureaucracy under the corporatist system. For instance, labor unions were united around a few national federations under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor. In exchange for increases in real wages, job security, and employment levels, they accepted state-imposed constraints, including prohibition of strikes, class antagonism, work stoppages, and anti-regime activity (Bianchi, 1989; Beinin, 1989). The Ministry of Agriculture funneled credits, fertilizers, and seeds to the rural population through the agrarian cooperatives.

Nasser hesitated to organize an autonomous organization that could offer his rival resources to challenge his leadership. Instead, the president filled the upper echelons of the party—the Supreme Executive Committee and the General Secretariat—with his associates, who then created their own fiefdoms within the ASU organization. Moreover, Nasser's interventions prevented the routinization of intra-party rules and blocked the rise of cadres. For instance, intermediate organs such as the Central Committee were not formed, thus breaking the link between the rank and file membership and party leaders (Dekmejian, 1971: 153; Brownlee, 2007: 86). The ASU apparatus could not provide its members with many opportunities for career advancement. A military career or a bureaucratic job, by contrast, offered more tangible benefits.

Rapid expansion of party ranks at lower levels and Nasser's personalistic leadership produced a dual structure within the party: the ASU leaders, given their positions in the cabinet and state bureaucracy, enacted government policies but had limited capacity to have party cadres follow them. The latter, by contrast, enjoyed great discretion in their communities due to their economic power and local connections but had no say over the policy-making process.

Political solution: brief reinvigoration of the ASU

Nasser relied on state institutions—the military and the public bureaucracy—rather than the ASU, as was suggested by Brownlee (2007), to control the political arena and resolved intra-elite conflicts through informal arrangements.[339] This created a political arena structured around rival centers of power, whereby army officers, security officials, managers of state companies, and bureaucrats competed for Nasser's attention. But several developments pushed Nasser to strengthen the ASU. Most importantly, strains intensified between Nasser and his erstwhile closest friend Abdel Hakim Amer after the UAR's disintegration. Besides selecting the Egyptian military leadership, Amer commanded an expanding patronage network beyond the army, a fact that led Nasser to decry the existence of a parallel military state in Egypt.[340] The president also encountered resistance within the government against his leftward policies. Some old RCC members, such as Kemal al-Din Hussein and Boghdadi, deeply opposed his nationalizations as excessive, while conservative elites like Sadat carried a deep mistrust towards the Soviet Union (Waterbury, 1983: 321).[341]

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[339] In 1964, at least twenty-to provincial governors out of twenty-six had a military background and another three hundred served in state ministries (Baker, 1978: 55). At the same time, the number of public sector jobs grew from quarter million to one million under Nasser's rule (Baker, 1978: 72).

[340] According to available elite accounts, Nasser twice tried to remove him from office but eventually backed down. The first such attempt occurred in the aftermath of Amer's poor management of the 1956 War and then after Syria's secession in 1961. There was a deep tug of war, at least since the late 1950s, between Amer and Nasser for control over the country's military and police forces and intelligence networks.

[341] Added to these military elites were civilian ministers and managers of state-owned enterprises, who saw profit-sharing schemes and worker participation in administration as outside interventions and wholeheartedly

In addition to these troubles, popular unrest simmered beneath the surface. In 1965, the funeral of the Wafd Party's last leader, Mustafa Nahhas, turned into a massive anti-government demonstration. The regime also faced resistance from the Muslim Brotherhood, whose organizational structure was dismantled but not completely defeated. [342] Under the spiritual guidance of Seyyid Qub, a radical new group emerged within the MB to challenge the secular state in the 1960s (Kepel, 1985: 20-23 and 1993). What intensified these intra-elite disputes was a decline in economic growth after the "easy" stage of ISI became exhausted. Following an average annual growth rate of 5.5 percent between 1959 and 1964, Egypt began to face serious economic bottlenecks that left it dependent on outside aid.[343] Lastly, Nasser saw the US efforts to unseat non-aligned leaders—Lumumba's assassination (1961) and the coups against Nkrumah (1965) and Sukarno (1966)—and feared that he would be next in line.

Faced with these challenges, Nasser decided to revitalize the ASU organization.[344] In particular, he lamented the absence of well-trained cadres that precluded the party from becoming a cohesive organization. Instead, rich peasants used their patronage to dominate basic units and agrarian cooperatives in many areas. Additionally, Egypt's expanding state bureaucracy overshadowed the ASU organization at local levels. Party cadres found it difficult to

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advocated state-guided capitalism as bulwark against socialism. In the end, Hussein and Boghdadi both resigned from their cabinet posts in March 1964, while the president sacked his pro-Western Finance Minister Qaysuni.

[342] The Egyptian leadership had limited success in securing support from religious groups outside the purview of the Egyptian state's religious institutions, (Hopwood, 1993:95-99). One such example was the Islamic Congress, founded by the RCC in September, 1954. In later years, regime elites established an extensive network of religious institutions within the state to bring Muslim leaders in line.

[343] Egypt received $3.43 billion worth of foreign loans and credits between 1957 and 1965 (Baker, 1978: 45; also see, Waterbury, 1983: ch. 16). The regime was derailed off its development goal due to its excessive defense spending, which increased sevenfold from 1950 to 1965, rising from 3.90 percent in 1950-1951 to 12.30 percent in 1964-1965 (Baker, 1978: 56). Furthermore, the construction of the Aswan High dam and the first Five-Year Plan vastly increased the external debt in the 1960s. Despite increased public investment, the government fell short of its targeted production level in the first Five Year Plan. The ISI agenda increased imports by driving up the demand for intermediate industrial goods and lowered agricultural exports. As early as 1962, Egypt faced a balance of payments crisis and ended up adopting several austerity measures under Zakaria Muhi al-Din's government. Fearing popular unrest, however, Nasser soon reverted back to his populist formula. For more on this period's economic problems, see Beattie (1994: 192-194); Ginat (1997: 24-25).

[344] Mayfield (1971: ch. 6 and 7); Ginat (1997: 27); Beattie (1994: 166-168); Waterbury (1983: 333-336).

circumvent the bureaucracy and also encountered opposition from military officers, who feared the loss of their institutional benefits and privileges to civilian politicians under a strong party rule. Therefore, in June 1963, the president asked his closest associates to form a secret vanguard apparatus within the party (Binder, 1978). Organized in a cell-based structure, the Vanguard Organization was to create a disciplined intra-party structure that would disseminate Nasser's ideas and break the dominance of these powerful local figures.[345] Another such attempt was the creation of the Youth Organization, which, like the *Escuela Superior Peronista*, was designed to groom young cadres with training in the regime's official doctrine. The 1964 amnesty for the communists, done at the behest of Soviet pressure, accelerated Nasser's efforts to create a loyal vanguard within the party. Over the next few months, many communists joined the ASU as individuals and the Egyptian Communist Party disbanded itself.[346] Lastly, Nasser indefinitely postponed the upcoming basic-unit elections scheduled for April 1965. Instead, the provincial party leaders were asked to select lower-level cadres and expand party ranks with civil servants, who would receive their salaries but focus on political duties within the party.

Nasser used these new formations to reinvigorate the ASU from above. As part of his strategy to use state power to buttress the ruling party, Nasser appointed the then Prime Minister (1962-1965) Ali Sabri as the general secretary of the party and vice president of the UAR.

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[345] This new formation was so secret that no other old RCC member, aside from Amer, knew of its existence at first. Nasser expected absolute loyalty and tight organization from his vanguard recruits. Vanguard cells were not to exceed ten members at any given time. Nasser, disappointed with his insufficient control at the mass level, was staging a coup against his own party!

[346] While many scholars of Egyptian politics compared Nasser's vanguard project with Tito's political model (for instance, see Ginat, 1997: 14), Mustafa Kemal's Turkey is a much closer case. Faced with popular discontent after the Great Depression, Mustafa Kemal, like Nasser, contemplated reinvigorating the single-party's organization and sought assistance from a group of nationalist-minded communists. Similar to Kemal's experiment (and possibly Cardenas' in Mexico), Nasser employed communists in education and media, rather than critical posts that would give them control of the regime's institutions. The communist recruits in Egypt were encouraged to develop and disseminate an official doctrine that would help the regime to mobilize the masses. For more information on these communist recruits, see Ginat (1997). During the 1940s, there was also a leftist Vanguard within the Wafd Party that struggled to shift the party from center to the left – with little success. For Nasser's evolving relationship with the Egyptian communists, see Botman (1988: 139-147). On Soviet-Egyptian relations under Nasser, see Ginat (2004).

Determined to balance the various elite factions under his wing, Nasser picked Zakaria Muhi al-Din, a rightist member of the old RCC, to replace Sabri as prime minister. Sabri quickly breathed new life into the party. For instance, he redesigned the Institute for Socialist Studies to train party cadres selected from the Youth Organization. In an attempt to penetrate lower levels of the party, he appointed "leadership groups" to take charge of the basic units. Similarly, Sabri's ASU tightened its grip on syndicate councils and extended control over the bureaucracy and national media (Beattie, 1994: 182-189). After 1965, the party began to emerge as a strong power center within the regime, subservient to Nasser's will on the surface but also loyal to Sabri.

The burgeoning of the party soon created fissures within the regime, however. Chief among them was Amer, who interpreted the YO's rapid expansion as a threat and pressured Nasser for its dissolution. On the other hand, technocrats and managerial elites became concerned with interference from ASU committees into what they considered to be their purview.[347] Local notables and provincial civil servants, whom Binder (1978) called “the second stratum in Egypt”, were also reluctant to share power with officials appointed from above and opposed the empowerment of peasants and workers. Although these groups initially supported Nasser's erstwhile efforts to resist colonialism and benefited from the regime’s land reforms, they deeply opposed his recent leftward turn. These clashes came to the forefront with the murder of an ASU official by a landowner in Kamshish in April 30, 1966 (Binder, 342-346; Ansari, 1986: 19-56; Beattie, 1994: 195). When the incident broke out in national media, Nasser set up a Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism, but appointed Amer, rather than Sabri, to lead it (Baker, 1978: 112). Rightist Nasserists saw the widening of this conflict as a threat to regime security and wanted to put an end to mobilization from below.

[347] To get a sense of their resentments, see the debates surrounding the Production Congress that Nasser organized with managerial corps in March 1967 (Baker, 1978: 182-183).

Military setback and political retrenchment

In the end, the real threat to the regime came from an external source rather than a domestic one. As tensions heightened, Israel defeated Egypt decisively during the 1967 Six-Day War.[348] This outcome devastated the Egyptian leadership. Beside its human toll, the loss left nearly eighty percent of the country's military equipment in need of replacement. Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and blockade of the Suez Canal shattered the regime's image of invincibility, left a staggering financial bill, and substantially shrank the gross domestic production in 1967-1968. With its public finances in dire shape, the government serviced its debt only thanks to last-minute aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. For Nasser, this was quite possibly the lowest point of his career. However, he would manage to turn this military defeat into political victory in the ensuing months. First, he resigned during a televised speech, only to return when masses organized by the ASU cells swept onto the streets of Cairo and demanded his reinstatement.[349] Energized by this popular outburst, the president forced his main rival Amer to resign and purged the entire senior military command, including the Minister of War Shams Badran and the chief of intelligence (1957-1967) Salah Nasr. All were tried and convicted for plotting against the president, receiving lengthy sentences. Nasser refrained from taking on the entire armed forces but merely focused on consolidating power internally.

Although his leadership was not yet in question, Nasser's government came under heavy criticism from different sectors of society. Socialists blamed the defeat on reactionaries within

[348] On the 1967 War, see Oren (2003). This part largely draws on Hussein (1973: ch. 7 and 8); Zaalouk (1989: 52-54); Gordon (2006: 101-111); Binder (1978: ch. 14); Hopwood (1993: 76-83); Beattie (1994: ch. 7).

[349] Like Peron, Nasser had a habit of appealing directly to the masses during periods of defeat and uncertainty. While personalistic pattern of political leadership was ubiquitous in both Middle East and Latin America, few leaders in the former region appealed to the masses, through public rallies and radio speeches, as effectively as Nasser did. Egypt, as in Argentina, witnessed massive migration during this period: between 1947 and 1960, nearly one million rural migrants flowed to Cairo and many others to Alexandria (Podeh and Winckler, 2004: 15). At the helm of the Egyptian state, Nasser emerged as a charismatic leader who could captivate these masses already predisposed to fatherly, hierarchical figures and in need of economic improvement.

the ASU and called for the president to transform the party into a more disciplined organization, while others like right-wing Muslims and urban professionals demanded liberalization. For instance, the ASU candidates began to encounter stronger resistance in the lawyers' and journalists' syndicates (Bianchi, 1989: 93). Moreover, the demonstrations that brought Nasser back to power created a dangerous precedent for the regime by directly involving the masses in the political arena. In February 1968, when Egypt's High Military Court gave officers tried for their negligence in the 1967 War lenient sentences, protests broke out in working-class suburbs of Cairo such as Helwan, where many modern factories were located. University students in Cairo and Alexandria also took to the streets (one group surrounding the National Assembly) demanding free press and student unions, and competitive elections. Panicked state officials deployed military forces, given that the police proved insufficient, for the first time since 1954 to contain the protests. After nearly fifteen years of state co-option, growing economic problems and military defeat led active, organized segments of the society to challenge the regime.

Neither the vanguard solution nor political liberalization was desirable for Nasser. Having only recently counteracted Amer's threat, the president did not want the ASU to emerge as an alternative power center within the regime. If anything, the Kamshish affair demonstrated the risks of overhauling the rural structure through activist party cadres; Nasser preferred to contain, rather than fuel, these contentious episodes. On the other hand, he saw political liberalization as a dangerous path that could allow the counter-revolutionaries to overthrow the regime. In response, Nasser reshuffled his cabinet and announced the reform manifesto of March 30: the holding of parliamentary elections, the preparation of a new constitution, and the reorganization of the ASU. Despite such promises, the president chose to tighten control in the political arena. In November 1968, when student protesters again demonstrated for greater civil

liberties and the removal of Nasser's Interior Minister, the government arrested more than 500 students and closed all secondary schools and universities. After the war, Nasser terminated his policy of organizing the popular classes under the ASU and, in 1968, allowed for intra-party elections from the basic units to the central committee. This led to the resurgence of provincial notables and rich peasants, whose local control Sabri had tried to eliminate over the last years (Waterbury, 1983: 329-332; Aidi, 2009: 77). At the upper echelons of the party, the president created a balance between the two main contending factions, led by Sabri and Sadat, that were represented within the party's High Executive Committee.[350] In a major shake-up, Nasser removed Sabri from the powerful post of the ASU general secretary and appointed Sadat to the vice presidency in 1969.

Regime continuity under a new leader

In September 1970, Nasser died of heart attack at the age of 52. Unlike Peron, who was toppled by another coup, Nasser stayed in power for nearly two decades despite major setbacks. The Vice President Anwar Sadat, a fellow Free Officer, succeeded him in what can be considered a sign of regime continuity.[351] At the same time, Sadat had no institutional base of support and, consequently, entered into a power-sharing agreement with pro-Nasser centrist elites who controlled the regime's various centers of power, including the military, the ASU, various intelligence agencies, and police forces.[352] Like in the late 1920s Mexico, the absence of a strong leader to succeed Nasser created, if temporarily, a political opportunity for establishing a strong party that could resolve intra-elite disputes, reduce individual insecurity of regime leaders, and maintain unity within the regime. Since political power emanated from access to the state

[350] For these elections, see (Harik, 1974: ch. 13; Binder, 1978: ch. 14)
[351] For a detailed, though not exhaustive, summary of the Sadat era, see Baker, 1990; Binder (1978: ch. 15).
[352] These include Ali Sabri (ex-prime minister, ex-secretary general of the ASU, and minister of state for air defense), Sharawi Guma (minister of interior), Sami Sharaf (minister of state for presidential affairs), and Muhammad Fawzi (minister of war and commander of the armed forces).

apparatus, the key political actors had little, if any, incentive to trade their administrative and military posts for positions within the ASU. This was especially the case for Sadat, who derived immense legal authority from the presidency that was endowed with tremendous powers over the cabinet, the parliament, and the courts (Hinnebusch, 2003).

Belonging to the conservative wing of the regime, Sadat had never been fully on board with Nasser's socialist policies and soon began to chart his own course: he returned some of the sequestered land obtained after the Suez Crisis, secretly negotiated with the US government over Israel, and entered into union talks with Libya and Syria. Consequently, the new president found himself locked in a power struggle with Nasser loyalists. In response, he appealed to the second line of command of the security forces to shore up his base of support and took advantage of personal rivalries among regime elites (Beattie, 2000:44-49). In May 1971, when these disagreements erupted into open conflict, Sadat first removed Sabri from all of his posts and subsequently arrested his other opponents at the upper echelons of the party. What eased Sadat's power grab was his rivals' decision to resign en masse since they wrongly thought that this would stir a public outcry. Due to the ASU hierarchical structure, party cells had no mobilizational capacity independent from the state apparatus, which was mostly under the president's control. As a result, "in one stroke, Sadat had eliminated almost everyone in the collective leadership that could conceivably pose a threat to him" (Dekmejian, 1971: 309).

In the aftermath of this showdown, Sadat consolidated power by tapping into Nasser's highly centralized corporatist system. After the "Corrective Revolution", he replaced several hundred Nasserist Vanguards in government and party posts with officials more amenable to his leadership and purged his critics from the syndicate councils.[353] The leftist students and workers, who protested the president throughout 1971, lacked encompassing ties with rest of society and

[353] This part draws from Baker (1978: 126-169); Waterury (1983: 349-352); Beattie (2000: 73-81); Brownlee (2007).

were contained by the regime. Boosted by his political victory in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, Sadat sharply diverged from his predecessor's policies, while keeping his corporatist formula intact.[354] In the diplomatic arena, he severed Egypt's ties with the Soviet Union, reconciled with the US government, and initiated peace negotiations with Israel that eventually culminated in the 1979. Against the backdrop of these diplomatic overtures, Sadat also opened up Egypt's foreign trade to private companies, offered incentives to foreign investment, and reversed Nasser's land reform.[355] He curried favors with managerial elites and businessmen, who were sidelined by Nasser in his last years, and narrowed the regime's popular base to accommodate the rural middle class.

Lacking Nasser's charisma, Sadat allowed more room for interest-group activity and the private sector in exchange for gaining a free hand in foreign policy. Finally, Sadat allowed the regime's fringe leftist and rightist elements to organize separately for the upcoming elections, thereby jettisoning Nasser's ASU. In the 1976 parliamentary elections, the president's faction, supported by the state bureaucracy and the national media, won 280 seats out of 352 available, while the left and right platforms took two and twelve seats, respectively. Anti-regime independents, supported by the still banned Wafd Party and Muslim Brotherhood, won forty-eight seats (Waterbury, 1983: ch. 15; Beattie, 2000: 199-200; Brownlee, 2007: 91). The following year, Sadat supplanted the ASU with his own organization, the National Democratic

[354] Under his successor's rule, Nasser did not have the same kind of protection that Mustafa Kemal had during Inonu's presidency. While Sadat shied away from directly attacking Nasser, he allowed, if not encouraged, heavy criticism of the former president's policies (Binder, 2004: 53-55). Starting from mid-1970s, some intellectuals have publicly repudiated Nasser and his policies but unlike Argentina, where anti-Peronism flourished after 1955, this trend only helped Sadat shift the country's course under the same military regime. For some examples from the left and the right, see Hussein (1973); Al-Hakim (1985) and also see Sadat (1977). For a public rebuttal from Nasser's wife, see Nasser (2013). Leftist intellectuals, by contrast, held on to Nasser's legacy in an attempt to block Sadat's policies (Binder, 2004: 50-51; Nathan, 2004: 130). For a scholarly analysis of Nasserism, see Podeh and Winckler (2004).

[355] On Sadat's 'open door' (infitah) policy, see Zaalouk (1989: 55-59).

Party (NDP), a weakly-institutionalized party that accommodated economic elites, urban professionals, and the rural middle classes.

These political measures failed to address the country's economic bottlenecks, however. As a last measure, Sadat sought IMF help to cover the short-term debt and promised a structural adjustment program that would decrease subsidies on consumer products.[356] The government's austerity measures—announced in January 1977—were met with heavy rioting across the country that forced Sadat to declare a state of emergency and use military forces to put down the demonstrations. To avert further unrest, Sadat rescinded the price hikes and maintained Nasser's generous social policies that were paid with foreign credits and deficit financing. The absence of a mass party that could channel popular participation undercut Sadat's ability to diffuse social pressures from below and restructure the Egyptian economy. Consequently, the president relied on the military even more than Nasser. This can be evidenced from the sharp increase in defense spending during the late 1970s and the appointment of the commander of the Air Force, Husnu Mubarek, to the vice presidency in 1975. Sadat sustained the large public sector and continued to fund the cooperatives to ensure the political acquiescence of a sizable portion of society.

Additionally, Sadat counteracted the resurgence of the liberal opposition—the New Wafd was founded in 1977—with a pious rhetoric and curtailed the political arena to prevent opponents from gaining a platform to criticize government policies. This perverse combination of big bureaucracy and economic opening generated widespread corruption at the upper echelons of the regime, particularly in Sadat's inner circle. Although Nasser's corporatist formula was maintained, negative economic conditions began to erode the regime's erstwhile

[356] Such a reversal was common in the national-developmentalist states. Leaders ranging from Aleman to Inonu, and not to mention Peron in his second term, invited foreign capital to cover current account deficits caused by a decade of ISI and redistributive policies.

social achievements. When assassinated in 1981, Sadat was less popular than his predecessor, despite having dismantled Nasser's hold on the political system over the past decade.

Conclusion: State corporatism and the "post-populist authoritarian state"[357]

Sedat's crony capitalism persisted under his successor Hosni Mubarak as well. Given the regime's inability to finance populist policies any longer, Mubarak liberalized trade, sought foreign investments, and privatized state owned enterprises under the IMF's straitjacket. In 1992, the government revoked Nasser's Agrarian Reform Law, not unlike the PRI's decision in the 1980s to abrogate *ejidos*. Moreover, Mubarak curtailed the regime's initial popular coalition to accommodate rent-seeking urban and rural elites (King, 2009: 113) but the corporatist institutions underpinning the regime remained intact. Meanwhile, the NDP's higher ranks were filled with prominent businessmen, landowners, and former bureaucrats, who, in turn, were expected to sustain the regime's patronage networks and maintain political stability by funneling resources to their local clients.

Not incidentally, these liberal policies began to erode the regime's base of popular support. In the latter half of the 2000s, there was a large wave of social unrest and violence against landowners in the countryside and a growing number of strikes at state-owned factories. Mubarak struggled to counter these popular outbursts with state patronage and by tapping into the regime's ancillary corporatist institutions. Since the regime blocked the rise of peasant-based and labor parties, many unionized workers and peasants expressed their discontent within the institutional contours of the corporatist system – that is, outside the electoral arena. This weakened the moderate opposition parties that were allowed to compete under Egypt's limited multi-party system. While the rural middle class remained an ally, a growing number of urban middle and lower-middle classes shifted their allegiance to more radical anti-regime groups,

[357] Hinnebusch (2003).

particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. The regime's failure to implement a comprehensive economic liberalization program dampened the country's developmental trajectory and precluded the rise of a liberal Muslim bourgeoisie that could, as was seen in the 1990s Turkey, moderate the political Islamic movement. Faced with an assertive and radical Islamic opposition, the regime in turn repressed the political arena, hence blocking both economic and political liberalization (Gumuscu, 2010).

Given the absence of a robust political party, it is little surprise that the Egyptian leaders failed to channel the participation of the popular classes and redistribute resources in a partisan way so as to maintain support against the opposition. To make up for the NDP's organizational weakness, Mubarak relied increasingly on the state security apparatus and resorted to repression against the Islamist groups. Hence, the Mubarak years proved to be more oppressive than those of his predecessors. For a limited period, repression and limited state accommodation of labor unions averted the political situation from spiraling out of control. The seeming political stability, however, belied the regime's internal tensions and its increasing inability to contain the popular opposition. The economic decay under Mubarak, when coupled with the state's declining redistributive policies, broke the social contract that sustained the regime for decades. Faced with this failure of the secular model of national development, the Islamist activists were uniquely positioned to take advantage of the networks of religious solidarity organizations—the only organized area beyond the purview of the Egyptian state and its corporatist institutions—to mobilize the disillusioned masses. In the end, these tensions culminated in a revolutionary uprising that brought down the Mubarak government and his cronies in February 2011. This was followed by the Muslim Brotherhood victories in the January 2012 parliamentary and June 2012 presidential elections. Though popular, the MB did not have access to the state bureaucratic

apparatus and soon met with opposition from its own bureaucratic ranks. After one year in office, the elected President Mohamed Morsi was toppled by another military coup detat and the fledging regime slided back to authoritarian rule. Morsi's short and rocky term illustrate the difficulties of changing a regime that is strongly rooted in strong state institutions.

CHAPTER 9
Conclusions, Implications, and Contributions

Introduction

This study has analyzed the rise and consolidation of the ND state in Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt and discussed why the regimes linked with this state type experienced a remarkable variation in their trajectories. My theoretical framework offers a two-pronged institutionalist argument to account for this variation. First, I argue that the political institutions leaders chose in the regime's founding moment had unforeseen but crucial effects during times of regime contestation. The key to my argument is that institutions provided leaders with different mechanisms to resolve elite conflicts and maintain popular support. Where founding leaders established robust institutions, their regimes proved durable, even during economic and military crises. These institutions generally took the form of corporatist arrangements linked either to the state bureaucratic apparatus or the ruling party. Conversely, where leaders established weak institutions, their regimes lacked mechanisms to resolve elite conflicts and proved fragile over the long term. In the absence of strong institutions, leaders were compelled to seek popular mobilization behind a redistributive agenda that inevitably sparked polarization or achieved elite accommodation though policy concessions. Under both scenarios, elites were prone to defect at times of political instability and economic crises.

These diverse institutional choices have in turn originated from variation in the level of elite conflict, mobilizational capacity, and the duration of leadership contests that accompanied the installation of the ND state. Where leaders encountered weak opposition from other elites and their leadership was relatively secure, they had few incentives to establish robust institutions and deep political coalitions. Consequently, they formed ND states governed by highly personalistic institutions, which I term the *Neopatrimonial ND state* as was seen in Turkey.

These cases resembled sultanistic regimes but differed from them due their commitment to industrialization and societal development. Due to their limited popular capacity, such regimes survived as long as leaders managed to keep elites intact through policy concessions and state patronage. In contrast, high elite conflict pushed leaders to seek outside allies but in cases where their mobilizational capacity was low, they relied heavily on the state bureaucratic apparatus. In turn, the newly expanded state bureaucracy co-opted the economic groups from above and laid the groundwork for a *Bureaucratic ND state* which existed in Egypt. Since the popular classes were linked to and professional associations absorbed by the state, opponents had few platforms from which they could challenge the regime. The only path was mobilization of excluded social groups through economic and ideological appeals - not likely as long as the corporatist regime remained in place.

In cases where both intra-elite conflict and mobilizational capacity was high, the institutional outcomes were conditioned by the leadership struggle during the regime's founding moment. Initially, leaders had great difficulty committing to strong institutions for fear that such institutions would later constrain their political autonomy and provide others with resources to challenge them. Therefore, where leaders quickly defeated their rivals to secure dominance within their faction, they established deep political coalitions to defeat their opponents but eschewed the intermediation of strong party institutions. This led to what I term a *Populist ND state* as emerged in Argentina. Given that weak institutions prevented the regime from disciplining its popular base, these cases were compelled to pursue developmental goals and redistributive policies simultaneously. This prevented the government from effectively channeling resources to the industrial sector and generated inflationary pressures that destabilized the entire regime. Conversely, where no clear leader emerged during the founding

moment, political elites had an incentive to build a strong party organization that would secure their own careers and defeat regime opponents. In turn, this official party seized control of state institutions to create a *Party Hegemonic ND state* as in Mexico. Unlike the Bureaucratic ND states, the ruling party served as the primary agency to contain intra-elite tensions, mediate the conflicting interests of economic groups, and maintain popular support for the regime. Due to this political machine, these cases proved both durable and stable, transforming their societies with far less conflict than those faced by other ND states.

Four Trajectories

I use this theoretical framework to address why the trajectory of nationalist regimes have varied so remarkably in Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt. Among the four cases, the Mexican and Egyptian regimes embedded their Party Hegemonic and Bureaucratic ND states, respectively, in strong institutional arrangements that proved durable for decades. Accordingly, the two regimes not only survived military defeats like the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and economic crises such as the 1980s debt crisis but also maintained power even after the decline in the scope of their redistributive policies. And yet, the variance in the institutional locus of these two cases - namely, the ruling party or the state bureaucratic apparatus - affected how they fared in the long run. Due to its robust ruling party that maintained a popular base, the Mexican regime undertook economic and political liberalization far better than the Egyptian regime, which failed on both counts by the turn of the 21st century.

After decades of relative stability, the Mexican leaders embarked on structural reforms to address the fiscal crisis and exogenous shocks that plagued their economy in the 1980s (Collier, 1992: 86-89). In effect, ruling elites dismantled the ND state and shifted dramatically from populist nationalism and the ISI model to neoliberal orthodoxy, trade liberalization, and export-

oriented industrialization (Pastor and Wise, 1997; Teichman, 1997). These economic reforms, which altered the existing patronage mechanisms, fractured the ruling coalition and led some PRI stalwarts - including Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the late President Cardenas - to defect from the ruling party in 1987 to rally a mass opposition against the government (Middlebrook, 1989: 219-220; Collier, 1992: 111-117). Because the party enjoyed close ties to the labor unions, however, the PRI surmounted such popular challenges - albeit with the help of electoral fraud. Subsequently, it tried to broaden its social base with the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) that was designed to finance small and medium-sized anti-poverty projects in regional development, education, health and transportation (Cornelius et al. 1994). In the end, the PRI lost its parliamentary majority in the 1998 elections and the presidency in 2000. However, instead of splintering in the ensuing years, local party officials kept the PRI electorally viable in many states across Mexico and the party scored major electoral victories in recent years, winning the 2009 legislative and 2012 general elections (Flores-Macias, 2013).

By contrast, the absence of such a strong party organization precluded Egyptian leaders from overcoming popular opposition to economic reforms, hence compelling them to rely on external aid and loans to sustain the regime. For instance, Sadat's efforts to cut subsidies in 1977 failed due to mass riots across Egypt. Although the state's organic ties to labor unions and agricultural associations initially provided a popular base, the bloated public sector could no longer finance the regime's redistributive agenda and offer work to the large flow of peasant migrants. Like their Mexican counterparts, the Egyptian government revoked Nasser's land reform and privatized several state-owned enterprises after the 1980s. Under Mubarak’s rule, regime cronies, corrupt businessmen, and techno-managerial elites captured the ruling NDP branches and isolated the regime from the deep political coalition spawned by Nasser in the

1950s and 1960s. The NDP, unable to rally popular support for its policies like the PRI, employed both state patronage (funneled to key rural groups and labor unions) and repression against the opposition. The military also benefited from the regime's privatization agenda and was increasingly called on by state officials to curb the growing opposition.

Unlike Mexico, where moderate center-left and center-right parties increased their support under a liberalizing political regime, regime critics in Egypt calesced behind Islamist groups - most particularly, the Muslim Brotherhood - which established ideological, social, and economic ties with the disaffected urban dwellers. This opposition tide culminated in the massive protests that toppled Mubarak in February 2011 and led to the Muslim Brotherhood victories in the January 2012 parliamentary and June 2012 presidential elections. And yet, the state bureaucratic apparatus remained firmly in the hands of old regime cronies with the result that the incoming Mohamed Morsi administration was unable to penetrate the economy and society. Amid massive protests, this time against the civilian government, the military removed Morsi from the presidency and declared the Brotherhood illegal in 2013. In contrast to Mexico, where a revitalized PRI made a strong comeback, the NDP collapsed after Mubarak's fall and the old regime forces survived with the help of the military's putsch. With both economic and political liberalization process interrupted, authoritarian rule was re-instituted indefinitely.

In Argentina, Peron's abrupt fall from power spurred a long period of political instability and ideological polarization. Most importantly, the ND state was dismantled by the anti-Peronist elites, who reverted to liberal policies but not without strong resistance from Peronist groups. Although Peron was in exile, his movement remained popular. In the absence of an ideological consensus that Kemalism provided in Turkey, the anti-Peronists were divided on how to reintegrate Peronist groups into the system. This produced a political deadlock, which O'Donnell

(1973) aptly characterized as an "impossible game": with Peronists excluded from the political arena, no political party could win an election without Peron's overt support and the electoral winner was barred by the military from implementing any aspect of the Peronist agenda. For decades, Argentine politics experienced civilian rule punctured by military intervention, oscillating between efforts to institute an anti-Peronist hegemony and popular backlash.

At the same time, the Peronist movement was fragmented among various ideological and personalistic factions as well. In Peron's absence, the weakly institutionalized Peronist party - banned by the junta, in either case - lacked the organizational capacity to unify different strands of the movement. In particular, the movement was internally divided between a radical syndicalist core prevalent in worker neighborhoods of Cordoba and Buenos Aires and various neo-Peronist groups led by Peronist stalwarts and local politicians from the interior provinces (Madsen and Snow, 1991: 58). None of the neo-Peronist parties succeeded in consolidating the Peronist base and charting a moderate course that could balance between the resistance from the military and Peron's interventions from abroad (Ranis, 1966; Tcach, 1995; Rein, 2008: ch. 4). Due to his initial failure to integrate workers into the regime through formal corporatist links, Peron's fall from power left labor unions in a weakened but nonetheless autonomous position. These independent unions were too powerful to be repressed and also evaded government efforts to impose control from above.

Instead, freed from Peron's tight grip, unions sought their own material interests and adopted a confrontational course that prevented anti-Peronist groups from taking root in society. During Peron's exile, they substituted for the banned Peronist party organization, extending its presence into low-income neighborhoods and attracting new members as well as financial resources for the movement. This labor activism transformed Peronism from a state-sponsored,

personalistic movement into a horizontally-organized movement that retained its electoral hold over a clear majority of workers and urban poor for decades.[358] Furthermore, Peron deliberately obstructed worker leaders' efforts to establish a labor party by balancing different factions against each other and eliminating potential rivals within the movement. Peron's return from exile and subsequent election as president in 1973, far from mitigating the polarization in society, intensified the conflict between left and right Peronists, who, in the absence of strong party institutions, organized separately and fought with each other. Political violence spiraled out of control after Peron's death in 1974, when his politically inexperienced wife and Vice President, Isabel Peron, took office. In 1976, the Argentine military toppled her.

In Turkey the Democrat Party, after its electoral victory in 1950, quickly consolidated its power and linked the peasantry to the regime, thereby winning in the 1954 and 1957 elections. Hence, Turkey became one of the few "peasant democracies" at the time.[359] The DP's electoral success - owing to the government's price support and other subsidies for the agrarian population - rectified the Kemalist elite's failure to seek popular incorporation in previous decades and turned the CHP into a perennial opposition party throughout the 1950s. Moreover, the DP extended public services to marginal communities and improved state performance. These ties with the rural masses paved the way for the political dominant of center-right populist parties in Turkish politics for decades to come. At the same time, though, expansionary fiscal policies triggered inflationary pressures and a severe balance of payment crisis. In response, the DP government repressed the growing urban opposition that had converged around the CHP in the

[358] On the positive correlation between Peronist vote share and these popular classes, see Snow (1969), Smith (1972), Schoultz (1983), and Ostiguy (1998). Peronist candidates received a stable plurality in each election they contested and won the presidency in all but two cases - 1983 and 1999 - until the present day.

[359] The most noted example of a peasant democracy was India, which had, under Nehru's leadership, established a national developmentalist state. The Congress Party's strong ties to rural notables and mobilizing networks allowed it to stay in power for decades, even as its policies, like 1950s Turkey, shifted from a developmental course to agrarian capitalism after the 1970s. For more on this case, see Varshney (1998); Chibber (2003).

late 1950s, turning Turkey into a competitive authoritarian regime.[360] In 1960, the DP government was toppled by a military coup, which resembled the 1955 coup against Peron (for a similar analysis, see Sozen, 2010: 402-403).

As in Argentina, Turkish politics became "an impossible game" over the next two decades; the rural masses periodically voted for the DP's successor parties, which compelled the military to intervene in politics, either overtly or openly. Just as the Peronist movement survived during the late 1950s and 1960s with support drawn from labor unions, the DP's successor parties relied on the peasantry as a loyal voter base. By contrast, the CHP strengthened its ties to the intellectual elite, students, urban professionals, and some unions. After the 1960s, when ISI policies expanded labor unions, the CHP gradually shifted to the left and adopted a leftist Kemalist course. In 1972, just after the military forced a conservative populist government out of power, Bulent Ecevit, the CHP's leftist Secretary General, opposed Inonu's cautious stance towards military rule and defeated him for the party's leadership post. Under his leadership, the CHP won 41.4 percent in the 1977 general elections – its best result since 1950.

And yet, this electoral resurgence was not sufficient for the CHP to come to power on its own. Rather, a coalition government of conservative populist, ultra-nationalist, and Islamist parties - self-described as a 'National Front' government - held a slim parliamentary majority thanks to its strong electoral showing in small Anatolian towns and countryside. This was to have dire consequences for the country's fledgling parliamentary system. Instead of facilitating democratic consolidation, the 1970s was marked by social upheaval and political instability in Turkey. Since the working class was not incorporated to the regime, the twin processes of industrialization and urbanization led to a disaffected population in cities who were not effectively channeled into party politics. Much like the countries in the Southern Cone during

[360] On the concept of competitive authoritarian regime, see Levitsky and Way (2002, 2005, 2006, and 2010).

this period, Turkey experienced an intense terrorist campaign that claimed nearly 5,000 lives between 1976 and 1980 (Sayari, 2010). More people died in Turkey during one week in 1980 than in an entire year in Italy (Sayari and Hoffman, 1994). The ensuing instability and violence paved the way for a military coup that same year.

In both countries, the collapse of the founding regime generated a long period of instability during which a number of populist governments and military administrations - such as in 1955, 1963, 1966, and 1976 in Argentina and in 1960, 1971, and 1980 in Turkey - oscillated in power. And yet, the two national developmentalist movements had staying power in their respective societies, albeit for different reasons. The Peronist ties to labor unions allowed the movement to remain a formidable electoral force and destabilize non-Peronist administrations, as evidenced during the large-scale strikes under Raul Alfonsin in the late 1980s. Conversely, its weak support among the society's middle strata - urban professionals, civil servants, and teachers - limited Peronism's ability to achieve ideological hegemony (Fiorucci, 2006 and 2011; vom Hau, 2009). By contrast, Kemalism retained its political influence thanks to the same middle-class groups that were so strongly anti-Peronist, and its connections with the military and state bureaucracy. Given that the Kemalist elite failed to incorporate the popular classes into the regime while in power, their trajectory after the 1950 defeat was almost the opposite of their Peronist counterparts: they sustained organic ties with bureaucratic actors, received support from middle-class groups and university students, and relied on the regime's veto players - the military, the Constitutional Court, and the president - to constrain the populist governments.[361]

During military rule that ended in 1983 both countries shifted their course from an ISI model to export-oriented industrialization, liberalized their markets, and curtailed the scope of redistributive policies to peasants and workers, respectively. The adoption of a neo-liberal

[361] On the trajectory of the CHP in this period, see Kili (1976), Bila (2009), Ciddi (2010).

agenda altered traditional politics, eventually giving way to populist right-wing leaders, Carlos Menem (1989-1999) in Argentina and Turgut Ozal (1983-1993) in Turkey, who merged a populist rhetoric with targeted resource distribution to cushion the effects of their economic policies. Both countries were severely hit by a financial crisis that broke out in 2001, culminating a restructuring of the political arena. Ironically, despite being caused by their predecessor's faulty economic policies, the moderate center-left governments - the coalition government led by the Kemalist Democratic Left Party in Turkey and the UCR-FREPASO coalition in Argentina - that assumed power in 1999 paid the political price. Consequently, both countries turned to populist options, albeit different variants: the left-Peronist Nestor Kirchner and Islamist-populist Tayyip Erdogan. Since the 2001 crisis, Argentine politics have been utterly dominated by Peronist parties; the Kirchner administrations representing the left-wing of the movement and various federal and right-wing Peronist groups constituting the opposition. By contrast, given the Kemalist elite's aversion to populism, the anti-Kemalist Islamist groups filled the void and stood to benefit from the dramatic rises in poverty levels.

Universe of Cases

A cursory look at other regions suggests that ND states appeared in several other countries during the 20th century. This study's theoretical framework would have implications for these cases as well. Analyzing more cases from the universe would offer more observable implications to test the core propositions of this study. Future research based on the conceptualization offered in this dissertation could open a new avenue of inquiry for experts of these countries and offer us a refined understanding of the global south. In recent years, the number of cross-regional works in the Middle Eastern studies has proliferated. This dissertation joins this new scholarly tradition in engaging the comparative politics literature.

Countries in which industrialization gained speed during the nineteenth century are obviously out of consideration. Due to their aversion to the capitalist model, all socialist and communist regimes can also be ruled out. For reasons elaborated in Chapter 2, social democratic and fascist states need to be excluded as well. Furthermore, we can also cast aside the settler republics - Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada - whose agrarian-based economies were deeply hurt by the Great Depression.[362] Although they enacted an ISI agenda like the ND states, these cases gradually industrialized without promoting economic nationalism, remained tightly linked to the foreign policy of their metropolitan country, and experienced few changes in their political systems. Rather, their regime and state institutions remained intact during this shift to an industrialization agenda.

In the Western world, the authoritarian corporatist Iberian cases - namely, Salazar's Portugal and Franco's Spain - came closest to the ND states. Like the ND cases, both regimes reshaped social structures, regulated industrial relations, and heavily intervened in the economy. In contrast to the ND states, however, both governments enacted a reactionary agenda, allied themselves with religious institutions, and excluded the popular classes. Instead of facilitating state-sponsored industrialization, moreover, their goal was to contain popular pressures from below. Another difference was the class configurations in which these regimes were embedded. While the ND states sought some level of popular incorporation against conservative landowners, the two Iberian cases drew support from landed and religious elites, as well as middle classes radicalized by the Great Depression, to target labor unions.[363]

[362] Despite its remarkably different economic trajectory during the latter half of the twentieth century, Argentina was in many ways similar to these settler republics. The country had favorable factor endowments, high immigration, and high land to labor ratio. The causes for its economic divergence are still debated in the literature (Moran, 1970; Schwartz, 1989; Adelman, 1994).

[363] Some national developmentalist leaders – most prominently, Juan Peron – may have taken their strategy of mass mobilization (and some degree of ani-Semitism) from fascist leaders like Benito Mussolini but they have mobilized

When we turn our attention to the non-Western world, the picture gets a little more complicated. The rentier states, due to their excessive reliance on the revenue generated from the exploitation of natural resources, have not established any developmentalist institutions. Given the persistence of colonial legacies, economic dependency, and ethnic conflict, many parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America also experienced institutional atrophy and neo-patrimonial rule. Under these conditions, reformist groups faced tremendous difficulty in breaking the political dominance of the oligarchical classes to enact developmentalist policies in these countries. The limited pool of skilled workforce and economic expertise also complicated efforts to push for state-led industrialization. When coupled with the weakness of civil society, these cases ended up with neo-patrimonial rule (van de Walle, 1997) or praetorian politics (Huntington, 1968).[364]

In other countries - including Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, Syria, China, and Yugoslavia - the old order was eventually broken through a peasant-based revolution or a socialist military coup that brought non-capitalist governments to power (Wolf, 1969; Skocpol, 1979). Although their aversion to the capitalist model precluded the rise of the ND states, these cases can be treated as the socialist counterpart to the ND states during Cold War. As noted in the previous section, the developmental states have in many ways resembled the ND state. Several developmentalist regimes like Israel, Taiwan, and South Korea may have even begun with agendas similar to the

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against the oligarchy (Hobsbawn, 1994: 135). On the connections between the fascist ideology and Peronism, see Spektorowski (2003) and Finchelstein (2010).

[364] Sub-Saharan Africa exhibits these problems most visibly. Western colonialism and the delayed rise of centralized political structures generated what Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) call a "pervasive institutional legacy", characterized by intense income inequality, poor human capital, and neo-patrimonial rule. While interstate borders have rarely changed, the region became host to numerous civil wars and endemic social unrest due to ethnic, religious, and tribal conflict (Laitin, 1986; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Young, 1994; Herbst, 2000). Although most of the continent was ruled by single-party regimes, few of them even attempted to establish a ND state. When some post-colonial governments - buoyed by high commodity prices - adopted interventionist policies and embarked on large-scale public projects, the results were generally disastrous: bloated public sector, flourishing black market, endemic corruption, and huge public debt (van de Walle, 1997).

ND states but over time they upgraded their economic institutions to achieve a more productive allocation of resources, cohesive economic management, and higher policy performance.

When all of these countries are excluded, we are left with a universe of twelve cases: Turkey, Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, India, Malaysia, Sukarno's Indonesia, Thailand, Bolivia, and Tunisia. Additionally, Chiang Kai-shek's China may also be added to this list. Similar to 1920s Mexico, Republican China was carved out among regional warlords, who were eventually defeated in the late 1920s by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Under his rule, the Nationalist government increased state management of the economy, pushed for nationalist cultural policies, and renegotiated unequal treaties with the West. Squeezed between a brutal Japanese invasion and a popular communist campaign, however, the Kuomintang eventually lost the Chinese Civil War, ending the nationalist regime. Indeed, the fact that the KMT later emerged as the driving force of the developmental state in Taiwan demonstrate the close connections between the developmental and the ND states.

A cursory glance at the eight cases not covered in this dissertation offer evidence that suggest the theoretical framework offered here also explain political outcomes in other ND states. Among them, the regimes linked with robust political parties - Malaysia, India, Tunisia - proved highly durable and managed to preserve the institutions of the ND state for decades on end. They were followed by Brazil, which, under President Getulio Vargas, established a bureaucratic ND state that organized labor unions from above, suppressed leftist groups, and promoted an ISI agenda. In contrast with Egypt, Vargas, who had a civilian background, did not completely control the military and faced growing opposition from its ranks toward the end of his rule. This culminated in Vargas' deposition from power and subsequent liberalization in 1945 and, after his return to power, in his suicide in 1954.The Bureaucratic ND state, however, remained intact and

enabled the country to rapidly industrialize under both civilian and military governments during the late 1960s and 1970s.

In this group, Bolivia seems to be the only case that does not fully fit the model. Indeed, Bolivia is a borderline case between an incomplete revolution and single-party rule under the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR - Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario). The ND state was established by the MNR, whose origins trace back to the early 1940s and, fitting with the dissertation's theoretical framework, lacked a clear, undisputed leader. Like in Mexico, the 1952 Revolution there triggered a set of dramatic changes that included state-led industrialization, nationalization of tin mines, land reform, and universal suffrage, among others. Unlike the PRI, the ruling MNR fell short of its goal to incorporate labor, peasantry, and military to the party structure and attain political stability. In the early 1960s, the party was wrought with factional struggles and political splits caused by then President Paz Estenssoro's attempts to establish personal control. Increasing pressures from labor unions and growing political conflict within the ruling party culminated in the 1964 military coup that toppled the MNR. The military administration preserved some of the ND structure and scaled down the 1952 Revolution's objectives, while making overtures to the US. While the MNR remained as the strongest political party for rest of the century and won presidential elections, high level of ethnic, political, and economic continued as a fixture of Bolivian politics under both military and civilian rule until the rise of Evo Morales in the early 21st century. Bolivia is thus an interesting case to juxtapose to Mexico, where the ruling party managed to contain similar tensions that erupted between unions, peasant groups, conservative political and economic forces, and the military in the 1930s and 1940s.

Several interwar cases - including Greece under Metaxas, Poland under Josef Pilsudski, and Hungary under Miklos Horthy - are on the borderline between traditional autocracies and nationalist developmentalist regimes.[365] Like Mustafa Kemal, all three figures participated in WWI as decorated military officers (Metaxas, in fact, fought against Turkkey during the Greco-Turkish War) and during the interwar era seized control of the fledgling political systems in their respective countries. Unlike Turkey, the three countries had irredentist agendas, were under the threat of foreign invasion, and faced popular challenges from below. These factors pushed them on a more conservative course than was typical of the ND state. Given that these countries were all invaded during WWII, it is difficult to envision how they would have otherwise evolved in the ensuing years.

Lastly, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo's Chile verged on installing a ND state but fell short due to the destabilizing impact of the Great Depression and the strength of the traditional party system. Indeed, in contrast to studies that suggest that Chile had an unbroken civilian rule until 1973, Chilean junior officers – including figures like Marmaduke Grove and Carlos Ibáñez del Campo – frequently intervened in politics during the 1920s to demand political reforms and greater state involvement in managing the economy. Ibáñez even held the presidency between 1927 and 1931, when he increased taxes on the oligarchy, pushed for public projects, and raised the level of public spending. To his misfortune, his administration came to power just before, rather than after, the Great Depression and failed to stabilize the political arena due to growing opposition from the traditional parties. Ibáñez later made a comeback in the early 1950s, when he was again elected president, and cultivated close ties with Peron, the then President of

[365] Indeed, these leaders are described in the literature as old-fashioned (Hobsbawn, 1994: 113) or traditional authoritarians (Luebbert, 1991).

Argentina. And yet, Ibáñez's term came and ended according to regular party politics and the president did not transform any of the political institutions to establish a ND state.

Rule of Exclusion and Negative Cases

Although many governments followed ISI policies, few regimes built new state structures to reshape society and to harmonize inter-class relations. Why did some regimes build an ND state, while others did not? In particular, under what conditions did the ND state emerge? This section suggests several factors that inhibited the rise of such states. The obvious answer is that the ND state emerged in cases with a large land mass or population size. Both factors could indeed provide political leaders with the resources to build a national market and bankroll state-sponsored industrialization. Though plausible, neither of these two factors was sufficient nor necessary to install the ND state. Many large, populous countries – including the Philippines and Pakistan - lacked this state subtype, while smaller nations like Taiwan, Singapore, Israel, and South Africa were prone to building highly cohesive, strong states.

Another prerequisite is the prior emergence of commercial farming.[366] This element was crucial in weakening the traditional social structure, integrating the country to the world markets, and generating an agricultural surplus that governments could later tap into to finance industrialization. Conversely, reformist actors were not likely to surmount the opposition of landowners and establish modern state structures if subsistence farming was completely dominant. Subsistence farmers have neither the mobilizing structures nor the incentives to engage in collective action, unless faced with dramatic rises in their rents. For the most part, they were sheltered from the negative effects of world markets and remained tied to the "moral economy" (Scott, 1977). Some level of commercial agriculture - and thus exposure to

[366] On the importance of commercial farming for political development, see Moore (1967); Williams (1994); Paige (1998); Mahoney (2002); Boone (2003).

international trade - was necessary but not sufficient to compel national leaders to seek developmentalist institutions. Many former colonies tightly linked to their metropolitan states had sizable agro-export sectors but did not enact ISI policies, let alone establish ND states. Instead, the highly repressive agrarian class relations and complete dependence on the West precluded this option. Meanwhile, the absence of such political and economic reforms left these cases vulnerable to radical peasant movements in the ensuing decades.[367]

Besides these structural factors, several antecedent conditions played an important role behind the rise of the ND state. First, the prior notion of a political entity with fixed borders was necessary to create a sovereign political authority. Obviously, those cases that could look back on a long tradition of governance such as China, Iran, Turkey and Egypt were at an advantage. Where such an entity was absent, by contrast, political leaders were more occupied with settling borders and imposing their control within them than developmental goals. For similar reasons, some semblance of a national culture that would serve as the basis for uniting different parts of the country was necessary. While states frequently construct political identities, they cannot do so from scratch and they need some preexisting material on which to base a national culture. For instance, although their borders were relatively secure, if not completely settled, the Iraqi and Syrian governments encountered tremendous difficulty in generating a national project. The borders of both countries were carved out of disparate territories with no historical basis to suit the imperial designs of major European powers.

Lastly, high levels of religious or ethnic heterogeneity and strong tribal loyalties are likely to forestall the emergence of the ND state. In such heterodox societies, parochial ties trump allegiance in larger collective groups and fuel excessive, distributive conflict that can only

[367] In cases ranging from Vietnam to Cuba, these radical uprisings sparked peasant-based revolutions that promoted a "national-communist agenda" (Wolf, 1969; Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1980).

be satisfied through patron-client ties. These cases tend to generate narrow political coalitions that exclude large parts of society, and even when they build strong state and party institutions, regime leaders use them for surveillance and coercion. In Iraq and Syria, two minority groups - Sunni and Alawite Muslims, respectively - held on to power for decades through the Baath party organization but with limited economic development. Under such conditions, state officials refrain from appealing to the entire nation. Even strong post-colonial states in Africa - including Kenya and Ghana - suffered from ethnic and tribal conflict that destabilized the political arena.

There are also some possible negative cases that should be mentioned. These are cases that fall within the identified conditions but where the outcome of interest - the emergence of a ND state - did not occur.[368] These include the Philippines, Pakistan, Chile, Greece, Iran, and Bangladesh, among others. Although this question remains beyond the scope this study, exploring why some regimes did not establish a ND state could reveal additional information about those that did. One such example is Pakistan, which gained its independence in 1947 but, unlike India, did not develop a national-developmentalist state. Instead, the country was plagued with praetorian politics that oscillated between weak conservative or reformist populist government, on one hand, and military rule, on the other.

Following the Partition, a small, Punjab-based coalition of soldiers, landowners, and bureaucrats seized power but failed to stabilize the political arena in Pakistan.[369] After the 1958 military coup, the new President Ayub Khan accelerated the creation of a network of state-owned enterprises and undertook a rapid industrialization program that turned the 1960s into a "development decade". However, in 1969, a wave of protests by groups excluded from the benefits of this economic growth - farmers, university students, industrial workers, and East

[368] For more on the use of negative cases in qualitative research, see Mahoney and Goertz, 2004.
[369] For more on Pakistan, see Stern, 2001; Frankel, 2005; Naseemullah, 2013; Tudor, 2013.

Pakistanis (later Bangladesh) - drove Ayub Khan from power. After the independence of Bangladesh, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) spawned an eclectic and successful electoral coalition and pushed for an extensive agenda of nationalization and land reform. This populist rhetoric and interventionist agenda triggered yet another coup that was supported by the agrarian and industrial elites. Why did the military regime under Khan collapse? What prevented Bhutto from restraining the military and consolidating power?

Another possible case is the Philippines, which declared its independence from the United States in 1946. As a former Spanish colony, Philippines shared some colonial institutions with Latin American countries and similarly had a large agrarian export sector and high level of land inequality. As in Latin America, its politics were also an elite affair - some called it the "cacique democracy" (Anderson, 1988) - and driven by oligarchic competition between the Nationalist and the Liberal parties. This two-party system was briefly eclipsed by Ferdinand Marcos, who, twice elected president in 1965 and 1969, promoted state-led industrialization and expanded the national infrastructure. Faced with popular protests and a growing communist threat in 1972, Marcos declared martial law in an attempt to break the hold of the oligarchy, albeit under his personalistic, authoritarian rule. In the end, both his personal ambitions and developmentalist goals were blocked, culminating in his fall from power in 1987 amid protests.[370] Why was the cacique power not broken in Philippines as it did in Mexico? Why did Marcos fail to restrain the oligarchy and establish a popular-authoritarian regime as seen in Egypt?

The obvious answer to this conundrum was that agrarian elites blocked the rise of reformist groups and prevented governments from enacted a developmental agenda. International factors also played a role. Military regimes in Pakistan and Philippines, for instance, were both

[370] For more on Philippines, see Hutchcroft, 1998; Kang, 2002; Slater 2010.

supported by the U.S. government, which treated them as bulwarks against Soviet influence. Moreover, dyadic military rivalries with neighboring countries - as also seen in Egypt - increased the level of defense spending, wasting funds that could have been allocated to industrial investment. Third, these cases encountered prolonged resistance from secessionist movements, which drained their resources and prompted the military to take a hardline approach.[371]

There is no single variable that can explain the negative outcome in each case. Landed elites were also quite powerful in Argentina and Egypt, while military regimes in Turkey and Egypt enacted a reformist agenda, rather than serving as a conservative force. Instead, it is more likely that a confluence of these inhibiting factors blocked the rise of a ND state and pushed these countries from their initial developmental paths. It was not military per se but rather armed forces enjoying organic ties with landed elites that opposed the establishment of a ND state. In cases where external support was available for the military, their success in curbing the power of reformist actors was also more likely.[372]

Waves of National Developmentalism

The ND states were clustered temporally along three distinct waves corresponding to major historical events and larger processes that weakened the liberal order in the international arena. They include the two world wars, the Great Depression, and the decolonization process. Due to the prior globalization of the world economy and Western colonialism, regional conflicts in the West had a wider impact on other parts of the world. Scattered over five decades, these

[371] This was a factor that contributed to Sukarno's fall in Indonesia. For more on this case, see Slater 2010.

[372] External intervention should not, however, be treated as a uniform factor. Unlike the U.S., the Soviet involvement helped sustain some national developmentalist regimes. During the initial decades of Cold War, Soviet support for Nehru and Nasser was crucial. The existence of an alternative power bloc in this period also created a safe zone for nationalist-revolutionary regimes with redistributive agendas, ranging from Vietnam and China to Yugoslavia and Romania. After the early 1960s, these cases also broke with the Soviet Union, minimized their economic dependence on the Soviet bloc, and charted their own course.

developments not only ended the Western hegemony but also provided an impetus for the rise of anti-liberal, nationalist actors who seized state power to establish national developmentalist regimes in the global south: from Mexico to Turkey through constitutional revolutions, from Brazil to Thailand via the collapse of oligarchical regimes, from Argentina to Egypt with military-populist coups, and from India to Indonesia after national-liberation struggles.

This is not to suggest that domestic factors played no role in precipitating regime change. Rather, I argue that such international events triggered a profound crisis for the old order in non-Western countries. Nationalist leaders reacted to these changes in the international arena. Notably, oligarchical elites experienced major erosion in their economic power and ability to alleviate social unrest in cities, while declining prices ruined farmers dependent on the market. During such periods, the growing conflict in the international arena also occupied Western powers militarily so as to mitigate their ability to prevent the rise of nationalist movements in other parts of the world. In the end, the impetus for change came from domestic actors who chose political strategies based on the institutional and social structures of their countries. Each wave was subsequently followed by a counter-wave during which the ND state came under growing challenges in the world economy as well as military threats from rising powers, leading in some cases to and being dismantled. For instance, the rise of expansionist military powers amid WWII disrupted nationalist regimes in Eastern Europe (German invasion of Poland and Metaxas' Greece) and Asia (Japanese invasion of China). Moreover, the rapid growth in global trade after the mid-1950s and the globalization of the world economy since the late 1970s forced many ND states to reorient their economic course and lower their tariff barriers. In some cases, such as Mexico and Egypt, these developments occurred within the same regime, albeit after

government turnovers, whereas in others – including Turkey in 1950, Brazil in 1954, Argentina in 1955, and Indonesia in 1965 – it led to regime change.

The first wave originated from growing military conflict in the international area and economic destabilization across peripheral parts of the world economy at the turn of the 20th century. The "first globalization", manifested through imperialism and increased capital flows, generated large income inequalities and economic divergence among as well as across countries (Williamson, 1996 and 2002; Arrighi, 1998; O'Rourke and Williamson, 2001; Nayyar, 2006). Rapid advances in transportation, along with abundant land available for farming in the United States, Canada, and Argentina, among others, plunged smaller and less efficient agricultural producers into economic crisis (Rosenberg, 1943; Gourevitch, 1977). After a long period of integration to world markets, high taxes and social unrest sparked a wave of nationalist, "constitutionalist revolutions" (Sohrabi, 2011) from Russia (1905) and Iran (1906) to the Ottoman Empire (1908), Mexico (1910), and China (1911). Major disruptions in international trade during WWI also pushed agricultural economies to rely more heavily on the domestic production of some basic industrial goods. Lastly, US President Woodrow Wilson's self-determination principle in the aftermath of WWI, though sidelined by the British and French government officials at the Paris Peace Conference, emboldened anti-colonial nationalists in a number of countries, including Egypt, China, and India (Grimal, 1978: 17-18; Manela, 2001, 2006, and 2007).

Hobsbawn (1992) noted that the notion of a national economy had gained such popularity in this period that it would have been highly difficult, if not impossible, to return in later years to a liberal regime based on free trade. And yet, the 1920s symbolized a return, if partial, to liberal policies across the Western world and even beyond via the Allied-imposed mandate system. This

backlash proved short-lived, as the Great Depression stopped the advance of integration in the world economy (Kindleberger, 1975; Eichengreen, 1995) and thus triggered a second wave of national developmentalism. Since the prices of primary products fell - even more than that of manufactured goods - the economic interests of industrialized and agrarian societies began to clash, while the ensuing social unrest sparked mass political movements in the latter for the first time (Carr, 1964; Hobsbawn, 1996: ch. 7). Just as Wilson's ideas generated goodwill among colonial nations, the then U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal programs - as well as his Good Neighbor Policy - created a favorable environment for anti-liberal governments to emerge across Latin America, including in Brazil.

This was followed by a third wave in the immediate aftermath of WWII, when the old colonial system first broke in Asia and the European economic and military dominance was irreversibly shaken throughout the world. Accordingly, the metropolitan states were no longer able to sustain their colonial presence and consume imports from the global south. While the emergence of the United States as a superpower would partially fill this void within a decade (Ruggie, 1982), nationalist movements seized the opportunity to challenge Western hegemony. In 1943, the GOU came to power (though Peron's election was in 1946), followed by the independence of Syria from France (1945), India (1947), Pakistan (1947), Burma (1948), Sri Lanka (1948), and Palestine (1948) from Britain; Philippines from the United States in 1946; and Indonesia from The Netherlands in 1948. Meanwhile, decolonization efforts proved more complicated and prolonged in Kenya, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Moreover, the nationalist forces came to power in Iran (1951) under Mohammad Mosaddegh, who spearheaded a highly popular nationalization campaign against British oil companies; in Bolivia (1952) through a popular military revolution; and in Egypt via a military coup led by Gamal Abdul Nasser (1952).

The fourth wave started in the late 1950s (with the independence of Ghana in 1957) and continued through the early 1970s, during which numerous African, Caribbean, and Asian colonies gained their independence from the European countries. It was in this period that the political map changed quite drastically around the globe. With dozens of new post-colonial states on the horizon, the term "Third World" - first coined in early 1950s - came into wide use (Harris, 1987: 18). Despite the initial hope and faith in social revolution (Hobsbawn, 1996: chap's. 12 and 15), these new regimes faced far stronger challenges than those that had emerged in the first two waves. Most importantly, the international timing was no longer favorable for autarky. In sharp contrast to the interwar period, international capital was growing fast along with the re-integration of the world economy. As multinational corporations grew in size and sought new markets, the pressure on indigenous governments to lower their tariff barriers became acute. The newly independent states also became the battlegrounds of Cold War rivalry, which pushed nationalist leaders like Nasser, Nehru, and Sukarno to create and participate in the non-aligned movement. Not surprisingly, this wave includes some of the lowest performing ND states such as Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana, Habib Bourguiba's Tunusia, and Juan Velasco's Peru. As late-comers, they faced tremendous constraints - lack of skilled experts and administrators - and were compelled to take drastic measures, including the promotion of grand public projects that failed to bear positive results. By the early 1980s, rapid advances in transportation and communication, along with the debt crisis, brought these regimes back under the control of world markets.

The four cases analyzed in the preceding pages were all affected by these global waves. As already noted, constitutional revolutions swept patrimonial regimes in the Ottoman Empire and Mexico in 1908 and 1910, respectively. After decades of conservative rule, Argentina also experienced a major government turnover in 1912, when the leader of the reformist UCR,

Hipolito Yrigoyen, won the presidential elections. Meanwhile, Egypt witnessed unprecedentedly large protests directed at colonial rule in 1919, when the British authorities refused to allow a local delegation seeking self-determination to represent the country at the Paris Peace Conference. During the same year, Turkish nationalists organized local resistance associations across Anatolia to defend their communities against the Allied forces on the pretext of self-determination. These groups, as discussed at length in Chapter 3, became the basis for the Kemalist movement later that year. Not incidentally, the British authorities forced leaders of both the Egyptian and Turkish nationalist movements into exile in Malta in 1920.

The nationalist elites were already in power in Turkey and Mexico amid the Great Depression. The ensuing economic crisis, however, pushed the two governments to deepen their economic reforms and accelerate their industrialization efforts. Both regimes adopted their first Five-Year Plans in the 1930s and noticeably shifted to anti-market economic policies. In contrast, Egypt and Argentina were still economically and politically tied to the United Kingdom and experienced a traditional backlash to counter the social unrest and economic instability of the Depression years. In turn, this eroded the two regimes' legitimacy in the eyes of the masses and paved the way for junior officers to challenge the ruling establishment and reorient their countries' economic course in the post-war period. Having established a ND state over the previous decades, the Turkish and Mexican regimes experienced pressures from the West for their reintegration into world markets after the end of WWII. Due to the postwar recession, both governments shifted their policy courses to the right and liberalized their trade regimes, though only in Turkey did this led to the demise of the regime. Conversely, junior officers came to power in Egypt and Argentina during the third wave and subsequently established the ND state.

By the time of the fourth wave, the regimes linked to the ND state had already collapsed in Turkey and Argentina and pro-U.S. governments were common in the ensuing years. Although neither case experienced a major reversal back to the national developmentalist policies, it is important to note that leftist Kemalists and leftist Peronists increased their political influence substantially in this period. Meanwhile, Nasser emerged in this period as one of the foremost leaders of the non-aligned movement and countered the rising U.S. influence in the Middle East by increasing diplomatic ties with the USSR in the 1960s. Not incidentally, Mexico was one of the Latin American governments - surely, the first one - to develop closer ties with Castro's Cuba and challenge the U.S. hegemony in the region.

If the first wave of ND states emerged in the aftermath of the first "globalization boom" during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there could be a similar nationalist backlash against the recent burst of globalization. Should we then anticipate a fifth wave? The sudden and drastic neoliberal reforms - what Stokes (2001) referred to as "neoliberalism by surprise" - have triggered the resurgence of the Latin American left over the past decade, not to mention the rise of ultra-right parties in the West and neo-populist and religious movements in Asia. In Latin America, some of these parties have already claimed the tradition of Peron and Cardenas. Boosted by the recent commodity boom and increased economic ties with China, leftist governments from Venezuela and Bolivia to Ecuador, and to a certain extent Argentina, adopted an interventionist agenda that rolled back market reforms, increased subsidies to popular classes, and protected national industries (Chibber, 2005; Weyland, 2013; Wylde, 2014). Through such policies, these governments have weakened their ties to the world markets and strengthened the economic power of national actors.

At the same time, not all leftist governments followed these heterodox and anti-capitalist policies. In reality, there has been great diversity among the Latin American leftist parties that came to power over the past two decades. Scholars have accordingly bifurcated these governments into radical and moderate variants in terms of their policy choices and institutional strength (for a good summary, see Castaneda and Morales, 2009; Weyland, 2009; Weyland et. al. 2010; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011; Mazzuca, 2013). In contrast to the aforementioned radical populist cases, leftist governments in Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil showed fiscal restraint and did not focus as much on redistribution as they did on innovation and internationalization. Consequently, some scholars have suggested these cases are following "liberal neo-developmentalism", or in the process of building a "developmental state" (Negoita and Block, 2012; Wylde, 2012; Hochstetler and Montero, 2013). This huge variation in just one region is a testament to the fact that economic conflict is no longer primarily north-south and diversity within the developing world is greater than initially anticipated.

Economic Policy

Another important area that needs scrutiny is the economic performance of the ND states over the long haul. The first point is that the internal contradictions of national developmentalism prevented these cases from engaging in industrial upgrading and shifting to the production of high-end products. Elite fragmentation and popular incorporation inhibited coherent economic management and spurred overspending, excessive public bank lending, and clientelist policies. While it remained autonomous from the economic classes, the public bureaucracy was not embedded in social classes in any of the four cases and, moreover, there was no bifurcation of economic and political authorities that was so critical to rapid industrialization in the developmental states of East Asia. The ND states also had planning agencies designed to

promote an industrial policy but unlike East Asia, these organizations were captured by rent-seeking coalitions and did not have strong influence over the national bourgeoisie.

Therefore, while they promoted industrialization, limited the relative size of the agrarian sector, and funneled resources to popular classes, the ND states still fell short of their social and developmentalist goals in the end. Their industrial growth was not impressive and began to regress after the initial boom years, while poverty and dependence to foreign markets persisted, albeit with some improvements. More importantly, due to their failure to shift to an export-oriented industrialization, these four cases were similarly plagued with the economic bottlenecks affecting countries that have employed state-led ISI and economic crises erupted in the ensuing decades. These problems created political pressures on governments to change their policy courses and led to major shifts that have been analyzed by scholars.

I will therefore briefly discuss how these changes transformed the ND states. First, the insufficiency of national resources to promote heavy industrialization led governments to invite foreign capital back to their countries and leave more room for private investment. There was a shift from an emphasis on national entrepreneurs to partnerships between the state, foreign and national capital (Evans, 1979). Second, real wages for industrial workers began to decline, while redistributive policies were cut amid calls for fiscal discipline and austerity measures. Even if the corporatist institutions remained intact, governments used them to keep tight control over the popular classes, rather than subsidize them as in the past. Moreover, these cases reversed their initial economic reforms (land reforms and nationalization) in an attempt to boost the private sector and re-integrate into the world markets. At the same time, they began to appeal to international organizations such as the IMF for loans and in turn accepted its requirements. Over time, this created strong external and even domestic pressures on governments to adopt neo-

liberal reforms, privatize most, if not all, state-owned enterprises, and lower the tariff barriers. They were compelled to shift from a model of import substitution to export oriented industrialization. It is difficult not to observe that countries which have established the ND states have come full circle in less than five decades.

This transformation process was not uniform but differed across the four cases in accordance with their specific institutional pathways. While these shifts occurred as part of leadership changes but under the same regime in the two durable cases (Mexico and Egypt), they were accompanied by government turnover and even regime change in the two fragile cases (Turkey and Argentina). For instance, even though the Turkish and Mexican governments both liberalized their trade systems and appealed to the U.S. market in the aftermath of the post-WWII economic slump, only the Kemalist regime collapsed amid a wave of elite opposition and popular dissatisfaction. The same contrast can be seen in the Argentine and the Egyptian regimes. In the latter case, Anwar Sadat reconciled with the U.S. government in the 1970s and subsequently promoted liberal statist policies that largely benefited national entrepreneurs, managerial elites, and foreign investors. In Argentina, by contrast, this shift began under Peron but was accelerated only after the 1955 military coup that toppled him.

Furthermore, political retrenchment in Argentina and Turkey spurred ideological polarization, popular backlash, and labor unrest that could not be managed by the existing institutions. As a result, every major transformation was preceded by a military coup that brought to power a new generation of technocrats determined to shift the country's policy course and excluded masses from the political arena: in Argentina and Turkey, respectively, developmentalism came after the 1955 and 1960 coups; the bureaucratic authoritarian state was introduced after the 1966 and 1971 coups; and neoliberal reforms were enacted after the 1976

and 1980 coups (O'Donnell, 1973; Sikkink, 1991). On the other hand, the corporatist regimes in Mexico and Egypt pushed for similar economic reforms while maintaining stability and co-opting the popular classes. Due to its robust ruling party, Mexico privatized much of its public sector and liberalized the economy in contrast with Egypt, where governments could not overcome labor resistance to enact such drastic reforms and ended up with a mafioso economy controlled by the regime's clients, including the military (Aidi, 2008).

National Developmentalism and Authoritarian Rule: An Elective Affinity?

This discussion on economic reform, popular unrest, and institutional control remains incomplete without an emphasis on democratization. Can a ND state be democratic? The easy response is that it is not very likely. Among the four cases, the ND state emerged under relatively democratic conditions only in Argentina, and even there the regime soon evolved into competitive authoritarianism. It is no surprise that political liberalization occurred smoothly in late 1940s Turkey, since both the state and party institutions were weak. On the other hand, the ND state was accompanied by two highly durable and bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Mexico. If we were to take a cursory look at the entire universe of cases, India and Brazil (possibly the late 1940s and the early 1950s) were the only countries in which the ND state institutions did not block democratization. In fact, countries that had ND states were generally democratic under-performers based on their level of economic development. Exploring this previously unidentified link could thus identify one of the causal mechanisms for authoritarian resilience in these cases.

Of course, this begs another question. What accounts for this alleged link between autocracy and national developmentalism? Much of the answer lies in the national developmentalist agenda. Its potential policy items - such as land reform and nationalization - are

extremely difficult to undertake under a democratic regime with rule of law and thus create strong resentment that cannot be suppressed in a free political environment. There are few examples of radical economic change that was propelled and maintained by a democratic system.[373] In their attempts to reorganize society and create a new nation, moreover, rulers chose to exclude particular groups like large landowners, ethnic minorities, and religious leaders. Unless their power base is completely broken, regime leaders may understandably fear the prospect of their return to power in a democratic context. Conversely, those who benefit from these policies turn into vested interests that champion an authoritarian system to advance their material interests and to prevent a return to the status quo ante (Bellin, 2002). This is exactly how many anti-Peronists (including socialists) saw labor unions linked to the Peronist movement in the late 1940s and early 1950s Argentina. Lastly, the corporatist system allows rulers to co-opt their opponents and maintain popular support - both of which lower the push for democratization.

Contributions

Based on these empirical chapters, the dissertation offers a new analytical framework to study four cases – Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt – which have mostly been analyzed as outliers in their respective regions. Aside from shedding light on political development in these countries, this study contributes to four distinct fields of scholarship: state formation, authoritarian durability, political economy of development, and political parties. First, it shifts focus away from inter-state subtypes – including predatory, intermediate, and developmental states – in the global south (Evans, 1995; Waldner, 1999; Kohli, 2004; Smith, 2007) toward more nuanced, but equally interesting, differences within the same category of states. The dissertation contributes to the literature on late development (Hewlett and Weinert, 1982;

[373] On the link between redistributive pressures and democratic breakdown, see Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006 and 2012). Elite backlash is not, however, the only path to an authoritarian outcome. Reformist leaders themselves may prefer this option to strengthen their policy and prevent future reversals.

Waldner, 1999; Bellin, 2002; Smith, 2007) by creating a new subtype to categorize states that have emerged in response to problems associated with an earlier stage of delayed development. It identifies the ND as a distinct political model in the global south and demonstrated critical institutional and policy differences among its four variants.

The dissertation treats national developmentalism as a pathway to modernity distinct from categories recognized in the literature, such as fascism, social democracy, communism, liberalism, democratic corporatism, and bureaucratic-authoritarianism (Moore, 1966; O'Donnell 1973; Katzenstein, 1983 and 1985; Luebbert, 1991; Berman, 1998 and 2006). Moreover, this classification can extend Lipset and Rokkan's cleavage thesis (1966) into the global south. The agenda of national development produced a new cleavage around which existing political groups re-organized and this political cleavage remained salient well into the contemporary period. Similar to the "state in society" literature (Migdal, 1988 and 2001; Migdal et. al. 1994), the dissertation looks at the role political institutions play in linking state and society. These studies have analyzed how the introduction of commercial agriculture and the existing agrarian relations conditioned the ensuing conflict around the question of state-building in the global south but neglected the variation in the strength and long-term impact of political parties. Furthermore, the dissertation demonstrates that the national developmentalist state can coexist with a variety of political regimes. Most studies do not make clear the distinction between states, political regimes, and ruling parties, hence using them almost interchangeably (Cardoso, 1979: 38-39).

Meanwhile, though this study took inspiration from dependency theory's focus on the relative positioning of a country in the world capitalist system (Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, and 2011), the world-historical school failed to appreciate the dissimilar state and party structures in

the global south, due to their structural analysis and meta-narrative. [374] Contrary to their claims, my findings show that regime leaders enjoyed autonomy from the economic elites, frequently clashed with propertied classes, and used the state to address their countries' structural problems, albeit with varied success. In the absence of a separate category to classify the ND states (for an earlier example but without the explicit classification, see Waterbury, 1993), scholars have experienced great difficulty in capturing the real nature of these regimes and, in some cases, referred to them as traditional autocracies. [375]

Recent work on authoritarianism has focused on the classification of regimes – including personalistic, military, and single party regimes – to account for the variation in their durability. Others look at nominal institutions such as the existence of ruling parties and legislatures. These studies made great strides in increasing our knowledge on the internal workings of authoritarian regimes. My case selection allowed me to control for regime type and nominal institutions within each paired comparison that had different political outcomes. Both Mexico and Turkey had single-party regimes with a weak legislature, while the ND states in Egypt and Argentina originated from military coups led by young colonels. Instead, this dissertation shifted attention to the type and strength of the institutional arrangements forged by leaders during the early stages of their rule. Although, for instance, the Mexican and Turkish regimes had single-party rule, the Turkish elites preferred to not invest further in the ruling party and rely heavily on state coercion that weakened the regime's capacity for political incorporation and popular mobilization.

[374] Dependency theorists have extensively studied the Middle East and Latin America. For some examples, see Cardoso and Faletto (1979), Keyder (1987), Kasaba (1988).
[375] For some examples, see Luebbert's (1991) analysis of the interwar Balkan states and Slater's and Ziblatt's (2013: 18) treatment of post-1932 Thailand.

This approach can be employed to study other cases that shared the same regime type but experienced widely differing political outcomes. As Smith (2005) astutely noted, not all single-party regimes had long durability. This study offers new evidence to validate the argument that links durability of authoritarian regimes to robust ruling parties (Huntington, 1968; Geddes, 1999; Slater, 2003; Brownlee, 2007; Smith, 2007; Svolik, 2010), albeit with one caveat. The Egyptian case illustrates that strong state corporatist institutions can make up for a weak ruling party and generate regime durability. Conversely, political regimes that are not embedded on strong institutional arrangements prove fragile. In the Turkish case, for instance, the absence of a corporatist system to accompany the ND state partly accounts for the rapid transition to multiparty rule in the 1940s and the Kemalist regime's electoral demise. This focus on institutional strength also enabled me to complicate the literature that explains policy choices through ruling coalitions. The study demonstrates that the influence enjoyed by regime coalitions vary from case to case. To what extent coalitions shape government policies depend on the institutional linkages between the regime and its political base.

Unlike scholars who tend to group together all regimes that pursue ISI policies, my findings demonstrate that the ISI policies did not produce "broadly similar coalitions of interests, patterns of rent-seeking and neglected sectors" (Waterbury, 1999: 324). In the four studied cases, the ISI agenda generated dissimilar economic and political outcomes. By moving away from such economic reductionism, this study addresses Chibber's call (2003: 241) for "a carefully controlled comparative analysis of cases within the ISI development model and away from comparison between models". My findings also suggest that both developmental outcomes and regime durability, though usually studied separately, are strongly interrelated via the intermediation of political institutions. This can bridge the literature on political economy of

development and regime durability, two growing research projects in comparative politics. The dissertation's theoretical framework addresses these two topics by demonstrating how initial elite choices on institutional design later shaped both economic policies and political trajectories of the four regimes. While the number of institutionalist studies has arisen in recent years, few scholars account for the origins of political institutions. This study offers a novel theory to explain why nationalist leaders with similar political goals chose to build their regimes on remarkably different political institutions.

Lastly, the dissertation also contributes to the empirical literature on critical junctures and path dependency (Collier and Collier, 1991; Mahoney, 2000, 2001a, 2003, and 2010; Lange et. al. 2006; Pierson, 1994 and 2000; Smith, 2007; Slater, 2010; Kurtz, 2013). The rise of the ND state was a critical juncture for these four cases and later shaped their trajectories in the following decades. Even in cases - Argentina and Turkey - where the founding regimes did not prove durable, the ND movements remained influential over the long haul. Moreover, in both countries, the highly unstable politics during the latter half of the 20th century can be traced back to the weak political institutions that accompanied the founding of the ND state under Juan Peron and Mustafa Kemal. By pairing two cases from each from Latin America and Middle East, this study weaves together two important regions in the developing world for scholarly inquiry. This approach opens up academic space to conduct similar cross-regional studies using the ND model specified in the dissertation.

There are several possible avenues for further research. First, there is a need for the analysis to be extended into the quantitative side. This includes an effort to seek new ways of measuring and operationalizing state capacity and party strength in order to more systematically illustrate how these cases evolved over the decades. Second, sub-national studies on political

parties would be useful to discern the "political topography" of these cases.[376] While this dissertation focused on differences among cases, there was also intra-country variation in terms of party strength that lends credence to the theoretical framework of this study.[377] Third, it is possible to extend the dissertation's analytical framework to study in depth how these cases fared in particular policy areas, such as welfare systems, education, agriculture, and pensions.

Finally, while I have briefly touched upon the topic in this section, there is a need to further analyze the dismantling process of the ND state in recent decades. Were these countries outliers in their regions? How has the legacy of the ND states shaped the efforts to institute neo-liberal reforms? In particular, did the different type and scope of popular incorporation during the formation of the ND states affect their later disintegration process? Addressing these questions would provide a historical dimension to recent studies that have addressed how the critical juncture of market liberalization has shaped party system development over the last decade (Roberts, 2013 and 2014). Indeed, hardcore advocates of national developmentalism - left Peronists, left Kemalists, left Nasserites, and left faction of the PRI - ferociously opposed neo-liberal reforms in the 1980s and fought to preserve the traditional political structures, albeit with little success. Due to the weakness of the ruling party, leftist Kemalists and Nasserites easily lost against rightist members and Cuauhtémoc Cardenas defected from the PRI to form his own party but fell short of his goal to capture the presidency. As for the left Peronists, they had little luck under the presidency of Menem but then managed to stage an impressive electoral comeback in

[376] I borrow this phrase from Boone (2003). For more on territorial politics, see Herbst (2000), Snyder (2001b), Caramani (2004), Gibson (2005). For more on the subnational method, see Snyder (2001b). These could include a closer look into the behavior of local elites under the ND states and their relationship to central authority.

[377] Even if ruling parties pursued a mobilizational strategy at the national level, parochial elites prevailed in underdeveloped provinces - such as Oaxaca in Mexico and Santiago del Estero in Argentina – where there was little mobilization from below and low-level of intra-elite conflict.

2003, when Nestor Kirchner - a leftist Peronist student activist in the 1970s and former governor of Santa Cruz province - won the presidency and reversed many of his predecessor's policies.

These incidents are a testament to the continued relevance of national developmentalism. This dissertation focuses on state-building and regime durability in the global south. In so doing, it highlights a particular state subtype - the national developmentalist state - that emerged in a wide array of cases. These states followed a diverse agenda for societal development, radically shaped political systems and regulated societies. This world historical moment came to an end by the late 1970s. After this period, the globalization of financial markets and technological advances dismantled the ND state around the world. Even in cases in which the founding regimes survived - such as Mexico – governments shifted their course in the 1980s. And yet, this topic remains highly relevant. The recent shift in the global balance of power - due largely to the rapid development of China and India - highlights the continued importance of anti-liberal systems. Moreover, national populist leaders have again become fashionable across parts of Latin America - including in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia - in recent years. Furthermore, current governments in Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt trace their origins to the regimes that had initially established the ND state in these countries. Even in Turkey, where this is not the case, the Kemalists constitute the main opposition party. Although these groups do not necessarily subscribe to their predecessors' economic agendas during the middle third of the 20th century, it is possible to see some overlaps. Hence, a better account of the ND state is vital to understanding both the past and contemporary politics in these countries and beyond.

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