

IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL POSITION IN POLAND: THE DETERMINANTS OF
VOTING FOR THE RIGHT, 1991-2005

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ABSTRACT

This study examines voting and ideology among unemployed and low-income groups in Poland from the period of 1991 to 2005. In the years immediately following the Communist overthrow, many Poles believed that market reform would bring social and economic stability to their turbulent country. In parliamentary elections throughout the early period, voters alternated between electing centrists and social democrats, who offered different policy options on domestic socio-economic issues, but supported the neoliberal macro-economic program of privatization and deregulation. However, in the most recent election, a coalition of right-wing parties campaigning on platforms of conservatism and Catholic nationalism easily came to power under economic circumstances of extremely high unemployment which the outgoing Social Democratic administration had been unable to ameliorate; the Right's economic stance is rhetorically more populist but does not challenge the basic market reform program. This study looks at voting behavior of Poles through all of these elections, in order to determine what parties have drawn their support over time, and what political ideologies have accompanied their votes during the same periods. I initially predict that, in the absence of state control over macro-economic conditions, the Right has provided an ideological scapegoat to unemployed and economically marginalized voters: its brand of traditionalism and nationalism directs inchoate anger in a very concrete way towards markers of encroaching cosmopolitan Europeanism. I theorize that these ideological themes have been historically consistent organizers of Polish identities, but only recently have become political-behavioral motivators. Through data analysis, I find my hypothesis to be only partially true. My findings support the idea that the Right's political appeal has become consolidated in recent years around key ideologies (in particular, religious traditionalism, social

conservatism, and anti-Communism). But, contrary to my expectations, I find that the more educated—perhaps, the angry *middle* class—may be the Right's new constituency in Poland, and not the marginalized.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Megan Eileen Gremelspacher grew up in Granby, Connecticut and attended the Loomis Chaffee School in Windsor, Connecticut. She received her Bachelor of Arts degree in June 2002 from Middlebury College in Middlebury, Vermont, with a major concentration in Environmental Studies and a minor concentration in French. Before coming to Cornell University in August 2005, she worked in Vermont with various progressive political and social organizations.

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INTRODUCTION

The recent rise in the political fortunes of conservative Catholic nationalist parties in Poland suggests that this identity has become socially resonant in a new way. In this study, I will consider this development in the context of scholarly discussion about the “rise of the right” in societies that have experienced macro-social change. I will also explore the role that interest and identity play in voting behavior, in order to reflect on the possible motivations of right-wing voters in Poland. In doing so, I seek to shed light on the source of this apparently new rightist construction of the Polish identity.

One of the post-socialist societies of Central Europe, Poland underwent a revolution that unified millions of its citizens in the common goal of developing a free civil society. Poles rebelled against a regime defined by authoritarianism—a paternalistic state which provided basic social welfare for all, but no democracy—and replaced it with a Europeanized system based on market liberalism and civil liberty. Today, it has one of the highest GDPs of any post-socialist state in the region. Yet, contrary to Western expectations of democratic deepening, Poland has not continued to evolve in a linear fashion towards cosmopolitanism and liberalism; in fact, the nation seems to be taking a turn toward nationalism and authoritarianism, if recent elections indicate a burgeoning trend.

Table 1 Voting Over Time: Percentage of Votes for the Right and Left

Year	Right	Left
1991	13	87
1993	40.6	59.4
1997	46.1	53.9
2001	29.9	70.1
2005	[60.7]*	[36.1]*

*Figures from Polish National Electoral Commission. All other figures from Polish General Social Survey.

Note: Fringe parties with less than one percent of the vote have been omitted from calculations.

Polish politics after the collapse of socialism had been marked by a strong adherence to economic liberalism and a relative ambivalence on social policy. Led by an intellectual elite mostly composed of former Solidarity members, the early democratic government pushed for market reform and removal of lingering Communist elements. Capitalism “done right” was supposed to ameliorate the short-term shock of transition and the immediate rise in unemployment and poverty (see Ost 2005). Over time, both moderately conservative and social democratic politicians campaigned and won elections on liberal economic platforms; market reform was presented and accepted as the only economic option in the new Poland, while a broad range of domestic socio-economic policies continued to differentiate the parties for voters. To the gratification of foreign investors and European neighbors, the “Western” values of individualism and privatization seemed to have become part of the Polish national identity.

However, Poland’s 2005 parliamentary elections ushered into power a coalition of conservative right-wing parties advocating traditional family and Catholic values, national sovereignty, and populism. The social democratic party, recently

involved in a corruption scandal, lost all its senators and ended up with barely a quarter of its seats in the House. Importantly, the new leaders have no greater commitment to fundamentally change neoliberal economic policies than did any of their predecessors. Yet under this economic regime, in the space of a few decades, Poland has been transformed from a relatively equal society in terms of educational attainment, income, and job opportunities, into a nation with extremely high levels of unemployment and income inequality. This stark change in material relationships would seem to mobilize voter support for an expanded social safety net that would hold inequalities in check. How, then, has the primary political allegiance of many Poles come to be claimed instead by Catholic nationalism? What forces, economic, social, and political, are associated with the resonance of this ideology?

As an American social scientist, I find this situation compelling for study because it seems to parallel some recent social developments in my own country. The income gap continues to yawn before us, and seems to be widening at an ever-quicker pace, yet the ideology of the far political Right claims more support than ever before. Thatcher's Britain underwent a similarly counterintuitive process of broad cross-class support for liberal management of the economy. Although Poland's historical experience has been much different from these two, its more recent macro-structural changes and the resulting realignment of social identities and values provide a more suitable empirical environment for studying what may be a similar social phenomenon.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Ideological Change During and After Major Social Transformations

Economic disparities are very real in Poland. Yet as the recent elections suggest, we have not seen that economic losers are connecting their political behavior with their economic situation through voting based on material interests. As unemployment and income inequality have risen, so has the share of votes garnered by the Right—reaching nearly 70 percent in 2005. Considering the Right’s successful campaign platform, it seems likely that ideology, not interest, is shaping political behavior; in particular, conservative/authoritarian ideologies. Much has been written about the role of competing ideologies in shaping societies that have recently undergone major social change. Some, such as Goldstone (1991), Moaddel (1991), and Skocpol (1979), argue that dominant ideologies develop during the process and immediate aftermath of revolution, and become structurally located in political programs, further shaping society in a new ideological direction. Others such as Swidler (1986) and Sewell (1986) agree that ideological success is essential in determining the character of post-change society, but propose that its resonance is based on cultural heritage—vague background assumptions and values that inform social action—not consciously articulated political programs.¹

Adherents of both perspectives call for further theorization of the connection between the ideologies operating in these “unsettled periods” with the ideological environments of subsequent “settled periods.” Does revolutionary structural change necessarily provoke ideological change, or does culture act as durable underpinning resistant, in the long term, to macro-social variations? In Swidler’s words, “does

¹ For more on this debate, see Burns (1996) on the Iranian revolution.

culture account for continuities in action independent of structural circumstance” (p. 283)? These are highly simplified scenarios, but they present the broader parameters into which this study will fit.

In the context of an often-vitriolic nationalist ideological construction of the Polish identity, it is important to establish the continuous or discontinuous character of this ideological theme in order to understand the connection between large-scale structural change and apparent cultural shifts. More specifically, this work uses political action as lens to explore why people make choices that *seem* to favor *durable* ideal interests over *evolving* material interests, by shedding light on the interaction between economic circumstance, historical-cultural experience, and ideology. In doing so, this work may contribute to knowledge of the connection between globalization and neoliberalism and the rise of rightist and populist groups worldwide—a connection which, as indicated by Greskovits (2007) and others, lacks a fully understood causal directionality.

The Rise of the Right in Post-Socialist Societies

The rise of right-wing ideologies in the post-socialist societies of Central and Eastern Europe has been well documented. The “Right” is not a universal category: there are many “Rights” because societies have diverse historical and cultural circumstances. Generally, the right in CE Europe is associated with a few ideological themes: nationalism, which can be understood as a defensive tie of identity, through either citizenship or ethnicity, to a geographically defined state where these two characteristics are presumed or forced to correspond (Verdery 1996: 84); and authoritarianism, which is related to nationalism in its assertion of strict boundaries for roles and identities (such as patriarchalism), its rejection of pluralism,

and its subordination of individuals to collectives. Social conservatism and religious traditionalism are often associated with this ideological matrix. Anti-corruption rhetoric may also be used by the right-wing in a symbolic return to values and community. This study of Poland will use many of these terms interchangeably to refer to an ideological matrix that includes aspects of each.

An understanding of the Right must also take into account the economic circumstances of a nation and the material relationships within that nation. In a landmark overview of the Right in Europe, Kitschelt has concluded that contemporary postindustrial democracies generate a demand for ethnocentric, authoritarian, and free market liberal appeals that “is not evenly distributed across the entire population but is more likely to surface among social groups characterized by distinctive experiences and deprivations of life chances” (1995: p. 5); in particular, low-skilled workers and the less educated. Studies by Swyngedouw (1994) and Kreisi (1999) support this finding, which is joined by Swank and Betz’s contention that the right-wing populist parties meeting this political demand “typically embrace neoliberal economic programs, xenophobia, and strident anti-establishment positions” (2002: p. 218).² This study will take these understandings of the “supply” and “demand” as a starting point for an analysis of the Right’s rise in Poland.

Scholars disagree on these ideologies’ origins, as well as their role in the overthrow and aftermath of socialism. One long-dominant line of theory concerning nationalist-type ideologies in CE Europe contends that they are deeply rooted in some or many these societies, and were in effect “frozen” during the socialist period, only to reemerge after democratic and market transitions. In other words, the relative equality fostered by socialism’s policies of redistribution represents an aberration from the

² In Poland, the Right generally embraces a flat tax system and continued privatization, but certain parties (League of Polish Families, Law and Justice) use a more populist rhetoric that calls for a “return of the state” (Rupnik 2007).

more hierarchical and exclusionist tendencies of its subjects. Korbonski's (1993) analysis of the Right in modern Polish history follows this narrative; the Right is seen as a continuous ideological theme constitutive of the Polish identity particularly powerful during times of economic uncertainty but occasionally overshadowed by discrete era-specific rises of the Center and Leftist tides. Greskovits (2007) adds that some Baltic states like Latvia and Estonia were highly exclusionary before economic restructuring's effects played out.

The renewed dominance of this theme in Polish society would here be seen as a "natural" response to the ideological freedom available after the dismantling of repressive socialism. In this understanding of the Polish situation, revolutionary ideology was successful because it cleaved to existing cultural values—thus culture *does* account for continuities in action independent of structural circumstance; reorganization of society's "base" does not fundamentally alter its "superstructure". If this analysis of nationalism/ authoritarianism in Poland were correct ("Scenario A"), we would expect polling data after the socialist period (when data became available) to show consistent strong support for nationalist-type responses to questions of identity and politics (support for traditionalist/religious values, distrust of minorities within and without Poland, distrust of the EU or EU accession, etc.), regardless of economic or employment status, and corresponding votes for political candidates who espouse these values.

Alternatively, Verdery (1996) argues that socialism enhanced a nationalist consciousness that had been inculcated during 19th-century movements by encouraging ethnic solidarity, a collectivist discourse, and dependency on a patriarchal state. In maintaining organized shortage, the state caused sharing of resources to be restricted to close personal networks, thus tightening ethnic boundaries and social homogeneity. In a study of Polish nationalism, Hann (1998) follows Verdery in

agreeing that the nationalist potential was fortified under socialism by both the Church and the political elite who wanted to focus loyalties in appropriate directions: the “us vs. them” rhetoric. Although both scholars reject as Western stereotyping and determinism the idea that post-socialist nationalism results from “ancient hatreds,” their approaches also imply that there is some ideological continuity from the pre- to post-transformation period.

History of nationalism/traditionalism	Pre-socialism	During socialism	Early reform period	Late reform period	Current support for Right (votes)
Continuous: socialist period is aberration (<i>Scenario A</i>)	Nationalism present; constitutive of Polish identity	Nationalism “frozen;” discouraged by socialist ideology	Resumption of nationalist construction of identity	Strengthening of nationalism as primary Polish identity	Employed: strong Unemployed: strong
Continuous: reform period is aberration (<i>Scenario B</i>)	Nationalism present; constitutive of Polish identity	Nationalism present; encouraged by socialist ideology	Nationalist ideology coexistent with liberal voting	Convergence of rightist ideology and voting patterns	Employed: moderate Unemployed: strong
Discontinuous: nationalist heritage is imagined (<i>Scenario C</i>)	Nationalism not present or limited aspect of Polish identity	Nationalism not present or limited aspect of Polish identity	Nationalism not present or limited aspect of Polish identity	Nationalist construction of identity: continuity is imagined	Employed: weak Unemployed: strong

Figure 1 Predicted History of Nationalist Ideology: Continuous and Discontinuous Scenarios

This view might see the openness to foreign influence associated with liberalism as incongruent with the nationalist idea. Europeanization and

cosmopolitanism may represent a disruption of traditional religious, family, and ethnic values. Market reforms represent a dismantling of the social protections afforded the unified national “family,” and supplant affective ties with economic competition. The initially successful political programs articulated by Solidarity—anti-Communism/pro-capitalism—resonated with social ideals of unity and mapped onto the understood rhetoric of “us vs. them.” Yet once full comprehension of liberalism’s effects took hold, nationalist/populist values became politically resonant once again. “Winning” revolutionary ideologies did not persist because they were less socially powerful than deep-rooted cultural values.

If this analysis (“Scenario B”) were correct, we would expect strong voting for liberal candidates along with a high proportion of conservative-type responses to questions of identity and values, during and immediately after the reform period. A congruence between nationalistic ideologies and right-wing votes, particularly among the economically insecure (who benefit less from neoliberalism), would be expected by the “settled period” of late reform to the present time. As in Scenario A, culture is only superficially, not fundamentally, affected by structural circumstance; causal directionality (nationalism persisting throughout macro-social changes like market reform) remains the same under theories of ideological continuity.

A third, more nuanced understanding of the rise in nationalist constructions of identity contradicts this “persistence theorizing” altogether, and perceives this ideology—or, to be more precise, its dominance in society—as essentially new, provoked by the jarring experience of post-socialism itself. Revolutionary ideology appealed to some aspects of Polish culture, but other values have since been called upon in a reinterpretation of revolution’s meaning. Politicians and religious authorities capable of shaping the social field deploy symbols—such as an ethnic ideal or a shared history—that culturally resonate with people, in order to justify a discourse

of exclusion and blaming that helps the economically marginalized make sense of their circumstances. Culture is not a monolith; while certain values can be seen as deep-rooted, they do not constitute an all-encompassing system that consistently directs action throughout changing circumstances. This more “discontinuous” understanding of ideology sees the Right’s recent organization of certain values into a coherent basis for voting action as highly contingent on circumstance. The erosions of security and certainty that have accompanied macro-structural change have made some culturally-based responses particularly attractive right now. This explanation creates a theoretical causal chain between neoliberalism and conservative nationalism: the latter is an effect of the former.

If this explanation (“Scenario C”) were correct, early reform-period ideological preferences and voting would be relatively patternless, at least through the lenses used by this study. But we would see a sharp rise among the economically insecure in nationalist-type responses and votes from the late reform period through the present. The well-off would be less attracted to these new defensive right-wing ideologies because they would feel less threatened by the structural changes brought by liberalism. Scholarly analyses of this approach will be explored in more detail below.

Growing Income Inequality Under Marketization

How and why have ideological constructions of identity taken hold of Polish people in the post-socialist period? As noted above, many scholars believe that economic uncertainty is deeply implicated in this process. Income inequality has risen in many of the post-socialist societies of Central and Eastern Europe, but is particularly marked in Poland. The country exhibits the highest level of income inequality in CEE Europe: from 1987 to 1990, its Gini coefficient stood at 0.28; from

1996 to 1999 that figure had risen to 0.33 (World Bank 2000). Macro-structural changes in the Polish economy, such as the lifting of price controls, the cutting of subsidies for basic commodities, and the deregulation of state-run enterprises were expected to quickly transition the country into a Western-style market economy. Poland's rapid implementation of reforms did increase GDP and foreign investment quite markedly, but at the same time, poverty and unemployment rates grew unabated. Today, Poland has the highest rate of unemployment in the EU, at 19.4% in 2005 (Paczynska 2005).

Table 2 The Unemployment Rate in Percentages

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Unemployment rate	0.3	6.6	12.1	14.2	16.7	16.1	15.4	13.1
Year	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Unemployment rate	10.7	11.4	13.7	15.7	18.1/ 20.1	18.6/ 20.6	20.6	19.4

Source: Data from the Central Statistical Office (GUS), <http://www.stat.gov.pl/>.

Note: Numbers in bold reflect the new method of calculating unemployment by GUS that began in 2001.

Scholars debate the manner in which these structural changes have caused inequality and social stratification. One explanation attributes the growth of inequality to economic takeover (particularly in post-Communist Russia) by a dominant social class made up of former Party managers and technocratic elites, who have used the market system to siphon large amounts of money into their own pockets in sometimes dubious ways (Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley 1998). This view singles out a definite mechanism by which market reform has allowed some to prosper and others to struggle. While this phenomenon may indeed be widespread, it allows political parties to continue using a familiar line about the need for lustration—weeding out the

corruption that is the continued legacy of Communism. In this view, individual-level fixes can be made without substantial changes to the economic system itself.

In a well-known debate, Burawoy (2001) criticizes Eyal et al. for overlooking the possibility of alternatives to neoliberal capitalism in their diagnosis of the economic troubles facing post-socialist societies. An “end of history”-type scholarly analysis of post-socialism contains its own self-fulfilling prophecy, in constraining the range of ideological alternatives that people are presented with by leaders. When market liberalism is presented as the only successful economic program, social problems that arise will merely be attributed to its inadequate application, or as we will see, to other “scapegoat” sources. In Poland, various political parties throughout the 1990s adhered to the former explanation with success, but most have seen their political fortunes wane in the most recent elections as Poles preferred candidates proposing primarily *social* remedies to these problems. It would seem that the initially resonant explanation for inequality—market distortion—no longer carries the same weight.

A simpler and more reasonable explanation is that certain actors entered the post-socialist period with more resources than others, and were able to reproduce these resources for themselves and their children, creating the system of material relationships we would expect in a bourgeois capitalist society. As the money economy became more entrenched, the skills required to succeed in the new economy were less available and became more expensive; in addition, job creation became concentrated in the cities. This process has resulted in a society essentially bifurcated along the lines of a well-off educated urban population and a poor less-educated population of small towns and rural areas (Paczynska 2005). Analyses of inequality in Poland would also be remiss in ignoring its strongly gendered aspect: Brown and Schafft (2003) find that throughout Central and Eastern Europe (but in Poland and

Hungary especially), women are one of the most marginalized groups, and especially rural women; they are increasingly concentrated in the unemployed or low wage/low skill sectors of the economy. Not just a temporary phenomenon, the rise in inequality has resulted in long-term poverty that is not decreasing with the progress in reforms.

If an ideological construction of Polish identity is a new development, why has it arisen now and what is its link with the current economic environment? One of the foremost scholars to analyze the relationship between economic liberalism and political illiberalism in Poland is David Ost (2005), who argues that nationalist parties have been successful in the “organization of anger.” The post-socialist economy has produced a society where inequality, rather than unity and common circumstance, is the new norm, yet politically, neither the right nor the left have been able to address the anger and frustration caused by neoliberalism. And, even those politicians who have presented domestic policy solutions have sometimes been tainted by corruption, rendering voters suspicious of their motives and effectiveness. Anti-Communism and anti-corruption have been useful strategies through which to displace anger for quite a while; the momentous event of joining the EU probably also stayed Polish uncertainties about the new direction. The bare fact has remained, however, that unemployment and income inequality persist under the new system. In absolute terms, Poles may be better or worse off than they were under socialism—but under that system their struggles issued from a well-understood and universally vilified “enemy.” They did not have control over their economic well-being, but at least they knew *why*.

Arjun Appadurai (2006) believes this political phenomenon is not limited to the former socialist countries, and although transnational generalization is beyond the scope of this paper, his work may help make sense of the Polish situation. Appadurai sees globalization as the most pertinent macro-social force motivating universalism

and inclusion/exclusion: the modern state exists in extreme social uncertainty as a result of destabilizing global flows of people and capital. At no other time in history have these flows been so completely out of the realm of domestic control, and so utterly lacking figures of accountability. This historically irregular (yet geographically widespread) development leads Appadurai to conclude that “the virtual loss of even the fiction of a national economy leaves the cultural field as the main one in which fantasies of purity, authenticity, borders, and security can be enacted” (23). Cultural tradition is seen as the last bulwark against the disintegration of national pride, dignity, and sovereignty.

Pockets of nationalism will arise in even the most cosmopolitan societies that can exercise at least some control over the macro-economic terms of globalization. In places where economic control seems farthest from reach—underdeveloped or struggling economies—these ideological tendencies resonate among greater portions of the citizenry. This understanding of globalization’s effects seems to suggest a fatalistic view, on the part of disadvantaged citizens, of the voter’s right and responsibility to push for policy solutions to socio-economic problems.

Ost suggests that, in the absence of state control over macro-economic conditions, what the Right has provided to directionless voters is an ideological scapegoat: its brand of nationalism and populism directs inchoate anger in a very concrete way towards homosexuals, non-Catholics, nontraditional women, and other markers of cosmopolitan Europeanism and divergence from a Polish ethnic ideal that had some pre-existing cultural value. This approach goes a long way toward explaining the appeal of authoritarian political ideologies in a nation that struggled violently against authoritarianism in the form of Communism. Without a clear economic target for their frustrations, Poles have latched on to social targets. This view maps onto the idea put forth above, that the ideological deployment of nationalist

and traditionalist sentiments is fairly new—a worldview that was not *unearthed* by the dismantling of socialism, but was *provoked* by events and powerful symbol-shapers like cultural and political leaders (Church figures, politicians, etc.). And, it has shaped Polish political behavior—voting—around issues of identity, rather than issues of interest. This study will use data to engage specifically with this explanation for the rise of the Right in Poland, first presenting existing theory to explore why it might make more sense than the other explanations presented above.

Economic Interests and Political Choice

Political leaders may be unable to control macro-economic policy in a globalized world; as we have seen, Poland’s unemployment level has persisted throughout social democratic and centrist regimes. Certainly, though, domestic economic policies can affect the welfare of disadvantaged groups like the unemployed. The far-right wing parties that were recently elected campaigned primarily on identity issues—traditional family values, anti-Semitism and anti-homosexuality, etc.—while asserting a variety of micro-economic policies that are not much different from those offered by the more liberal parties. Why would Polish voters choose parties that spoke first and foremost to issues of identity, then? And, if the unemployed are stronger supporters of the Right, as Kitschelt (1995) and my predictions suggest, why might this be so?

Before exploring why voters might choose platforms that appeal primarily to identity and cultural values, it is worth noting that scholars are still trying to understand interest-based voting. Much has been written about the declining connection between material interests and voter choice, beginning with Lipset’s seminal study (1981). Lipset’s “decline of class” theory was followed throughout the

'90s and '00s with similar conclusions by Inglehart (1997), Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1999), and Rueschemeyer and Mahoney (2000). On the other hand, studies by Evans et al. (1991, 1996), Hout et al. (1995), Goldthorpe (1996), and Brooks and Manza (1997) have painted a more complex picture, finding either “trendless fluctuation” or a continued polarization of voting patterns by social class coupled with a changing mixture of preferences associated with each particular class. These scholars cast doubt onto the familiar image of leftist voting by the disadvantaged.

However, some scholars continue to interpret vote choice as a relatively simple function of the economic interests of “rational actors.” In a 1997 study, Bell finds a strong relationship between unemployment rates and voting in the period from 1992-1995 in Poland, in that the rise in support for the Democratic Left Alliance is closely related to the rise in joblessness across time and its variation across regions (Bell reminds us that in the Polish political system the parliament and the cabinet are main loci of policy making). Bell follows Evans’ and Whitefield’s 1994 study of Russian voting behavior among economic winners and losers, where they asked

whether the loss of electoral support for the most pro-reform parties should be understood as a protest vote or as part of an iterative progression towards interest-led voting. A protest vote would indicate that the electorate has accepted democratic and market principles but nevertheless votes to express a general dissatisfaction with the manner in which reforms have been enacted. On the other hand, if democratization involves a learning process on the part of both voters and politicians, a greater diversification of the vote may indicate that voters who were initially ignorant of the implications of radical economic reform have gained experience and gradually come to identify their interests and learn how to vote accordingly (Bell, p. 1263).

This approach assumes that post-socialist voters who are initially unclear as to which political platforms support their economic interests will grow more savvy over time, as policy effects pan out, and will abandon the temporary guidance of cultural

rhetoric. Evans and Whitefield's "iterative voting," which Bell also claims to find in Poland through 1995, proposes that interest-based political behavior persists despite a powerful line of scholarly argument that announces the replacement of interest-motivators with identity- or cultural-motivators. Iterative voting theory presumes that voting behavior is similar to market behavior, with actors seeking to maximize their material benefit (taking into account both their individual self-interest and a certain lesser amount of public interest, particularly among one's social strata) (Bell, p. 1263). If Bell's iterative voting analysis were correct, we would expect to see support for the left-wing party rise among the economically disadvantaged in tandem with social stratification and unabated joblessness, as these voters increasingly understand how their interests are tied to particular domestic economic platforms; identity issues would be of *secondary* concern here. In keeping with Scenario C, I hypothesize that this is *not* the case, because the Right's influence is growing in tandem with joblessness.

Material and Ideal Interests

Besides this apparent lack of empirical support for the iterative voting explanation, it is also somewhat unsatisfactory in its seeming implication of "false consciousness" on the part of Polish economic losers. Beginning with Althusser, social scientists have come to reject the phenomenon of false consciousness as overly simplistic and deterministic. They have suggested instead that voters' preferences are shaped by culturally-created ideologies that are set by the parameters of their economic situation. An exploration of this theoretical line of thinking, beginning with Marx, will be instructive here in showing how theorists can understand the complexity of interest-based action (namely, voting behavior), without implying that "people don't know what's good for them."

Ideology gives actors the tools to understand their circumstances and their relation to the rest of society. Marx and postmarxists of all stripes have struggled to understand the connection between ideology and material social relationships. Marx himself presents contradictory formulations in two of his most influential works, “The German Ideology” and “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.” In the former, he proposes that consciousness is determined, in a neutral and empirical fashion, by social relationships based on material conditions. Thus, society’s “ruling ideas are nothing more than the expression of the dominant material relationships” (1978 [1932]: 172): the ruling class dominates ideological production, presenting its own interests as the “common interest,” and distorts workers’ perceptions of their circumstances. As long as these actors remain unorganized as a class, they will remain trapped by false consciousness. In this sense, one should expect, as Evans and Whitefield and Bell do, a progressively greater understanding of true material interests among the working class and the poor as Central and Eastern European countries move from Communism’s bureaucratic collectivization and statism to class-based capitalist organization and a diminished degree of state control. Policy demands corresponding to economic interests would bifurcate along class lines: economic elites would be expected to elect officials encouraging privatization, the free market, tax cuts; the working class and the poor would elect officials standing for domestic policies of redistribution, progressive taxation, and social service provisions. Insofar as members of a class are cognizant of their interests as-a-class, they will rationally act in their own benefit and formulate corresponding worldviews.

However, historical events unfolded in Marx’s time which spurred him to rethink his understanding of the social bases of ideology. As Marx came to realize through Louis Bonaparte’s election to power, which he relates in “The Eighteenth Brumaire,” ideologies are composed of more than objective material interests;

contingent and unexpected factors are also implicated in class-based behavior. During the Revolution, Bonaparte was politically allied with the economic interests of the bourgeoisie—although he tried to portray himself as “the patriarchal benefactor of all classes” (1978 [1932]: 616)—and the peasants voted overwhelmingly for him without any assurance that he would improve their lot. This upended Marx’s strictly deterministic view of history, whereby the proletariat would assert class interests in revolutionary action. Rather, the peasants seemed to have voted on the basis of closely-held symbolic values articulated by a powerful voice in the political sphere. Louis had presented himself as the successor to the Napoleonic tradition, an important source of French national pride shared by both bourgeoisie and proletariat. In the absence of any clear counter-motivator, the peasants voted *against* economic interest on the basis of ideology, on the basis of the *idée napoléonienne*. Here, we see that ideology is not merely a neutral matter of “true” versus “false” material interests; people hold other, less tangible values that motivate their behavior too and can contradict objective class interests.

How, then, are we to reconcile the connection between ideology, false consciousness, and material social relationships? This question is particularly apt since the contemporary literature has been dominated by those who doubt that instrumental class interests form the basis of political behavior. A number of postmarxist thinkers will be instructive in furthering an understanding of this issue. Althusser (1984), for one, dismissed the idea of false consciousness in favor of a more discursive understanding of ideologies; the discourses we are involved in and subjected to create certain ideological frameworks from which we cannot escape through education or willed consciousness. In other words, there is no complete demystification or removing of veils because ideologies always-already interpellate every subject. While Althusser’s approach removes the intellectual elitism underlying

the false consciousness theory, it does not prove satisfactory in forging a conceptual relationship between ideology and social class. Laclau's (1977) work builds on Althusser, but goes further in its suggestion that non-class ideologies could be *articulated with* class but not *reducible to* class (see Barrett 1991), as with popular political discourses that appeal to the working class but not only or necessarily to the working class.

Stuart Hall's reading of Gramsci sheds perhaps even more light on this relationship. Applied initially to working-class support for conservative/nationalist Thatcherism in Britain, Hall looked at the intersection of power, culture, and economic situation in ideological formation. Gramsci had previously theorized the process of hegemony, whereby dominant actors employ both coercion and the organization of consent in order to consolidate ideologies that mostly, but not exclusively, serve dominant interests. Hall explored "the ways in which popular consent can be so constructed...as to harness to its support some popular discontents, neutralize the opposing forces, disaggregate the opposition and really incorporate some strategic elements of popular opinion into its own hegemonic project" (1985: 118). Thatcherist ideology drew on truly resonant themes for many Britons—nation, family, race, duty, authority, traditionalism, patriarchalism—managing to "stitch up or 'unify'" these themes with the contradictory neoliberal elements of its discourse (1985: 122). In this way, Hall showed how power is central in ideological construction, but people are consenting too; although their class-based interests may not be served, other compelling interests are addressed and come to appear equally valuable.

Thatcher's Conservative Party reshaped the entire cultural understanding of British society, in sidestepping class and creating political constructions of other central aspects of the British national identity—family, race, ethnicity. Identity ceased to be specifically *organized* around class, to use Ost's (2005) phrasing, although class

distinctions did not cease to have validity for social action and perspective. In this sense, Gramscian hegemony continues to structure ideology, but on broader fronts than a purely class-based hegemony would be able to infiltrate. Hall endorses a connection between class and ideas, but refutes determinism: the economic cannot provide the contents of the thoughts of particular social classes, nor can it fix certain ideas to certain classes. “The determinacy of the economic for the ideological can, therefore, be only in terms of the former setting the limits for the terrain of operations,” the terrain of thought (1996 [1986]: 44).

Through this perspective, we may understand ideology in a more complex way: individuals who act against their apparent class interests, or who abandon favorable policy solutions for rhetoric that appeals to identity issues, are not merely victims of false consciousness; rather, they are influenced by the politically and culturally powerful, and they are also complicit in the creation and legitimation of these discourses drawing upon cultural values and meaningful aspects of identity. Their particular “communicative experiences and capabilities” (Kitschelt 1995: p. 7) provide more or less fertile ground for certain ideological explanations of their circumstances. Seen this way, an analysis pointing to the political “organization of anger” presents much more nuance and richness than false consciousness explanations can attain.

The Resonance of Right-Wing Ideology Among the Economically Insecure

Ideological constructions of identity must intuitively resonate with actors’ understandings of their situations. As noted by Hall, above, ideological developments speak to real conditions and experiences, and then recast them in new terms. The general social mood in Poland is fairly gloomy, and the opinion that the country is

heading in a wrong direction has visibly prevailed for the past seven years. The Right has newly cast this problem as a social issue, and has drawn upon some constant threads in Polish cultural heritage to construct the Polish identity as a long-standing totality that has recently come under attack from outside forces who threaten to undermine the nation's unity and seize economic advantages at the expense of "real" Poles. Although this view certainly does not resonate with all Poles, it has caught on with enough of the population for a majority to vote the Right into power; the question is, who constitutes that majority—is it the economically marginalized, as suggested by Kitschelt (1995) and predicted by this study?

In reality, there has never been "one Poland," nor one unified Polish culture, but certain historical factors make plausible this explanation of the current situation. Poland has one of the most complicated histories in Europe: the land area was occupied by multiple nationalities until the conclusion of World War II, when its borders were moved inward, decreasing the size of the country and forcing the migration of millions of formerly coexistent groups, primarily Poles, Germans, Ukrainians, and Jews. For the first time in its history, national borders mapped more or less directly onto "ethnic" Polish borders. The idea of a unified ethnic nation is often the source of nationalist identity construction, but the strength of this identity is dependent on the presence of outsiders to reinforce group boundaries. A relative lack of ethnic minorities has not reduced anti-Semitic sentiment; nationalist Poles have also singled out other marginalized groups, such as homosexuals, to fill the role of "Other" and have demonized them to a great extent.

National sovereignty is another aspect of the new ideology that draws on historical experiences and recasts them in new terms that can make sense of contemporary circumstances. The country has always had a tempestuous relationship with its neighbors, such as Germany and Russia, who constituted real threats during

the 20th century. A Romantic consciousness of Poland as a “heroic victim of tsarist tyranny” (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001: 136)—a unified moral community striving toward self-determination despite partitioning attempts by Prussia and Austria—had already emerged by the mid-19th century. Russification and Germanization policies imposed on the peasantry through the early 20th century only intensified sentiments of traditional Polishness. Although Poland voted to join the EU, suspicion of its neighbors remains high, and the protection of national sovereignty is a powerful theme in the nationalist ideology. Some observers believe that EU accession has increased the political leverage of euroskepticism because the danger of its “overeffectiveness” is gone (Sprinz 2007). Most of the political parties that won representation in the Polish parliament in the 2005 elections espouse some degree of protectionism against perceived enemies outside their borders (Germany and Russia are the most-often cited enemies, but the EU in general is believed to have interests contrary to that of Poland), and criticism of the Social Democrats who agreed to unfavorable accession conditions.

Anti-Communism is another powerful cultural theme that has more recent roots in the Polish people’s history. Its complex ideological resonance will not be fully explored here, but it must be noted that a key aspect of right-wing anti-Communist rhetoric today has to do with anti-corruption and political legitimacy. Communism created an environment where bribery and position-wielding were the norm, resulting in lasting suspicion of political elites. Persistent corruption scandals in many of the Central and Eastern European countries reinforced these sentiments and provided fuel for populist and conservative movements. As Culik (2000) notes, “kicking the Communist corpse” became an expedient source of political legitimacy among leaders in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Although the initial fear that Communism would return if reforms were not quickly undertaken has lost political steam, emotions toward Communism continue to be manipulated as a

substitute for governing administrations' economic legitimacy. As noted above, Eyal et al. (1998) have produced convincing and influential studies specifically connecting the legacy of Communism to contemporary circumstances of economic inequality, by giving credence to the idea that former Russian Communist elites have translated their political power into economic power. But it does not seem that the Polish right-wing has yet made such an explicit causal connection between Communism and economic inequality; rather the former is used as an emotional displacement for anger and confusion over the latter. This cultural theme does not penetrate as deeply into Polish heritage, so it cannot be understood as "frozen" under the socialist system (as Scenario A proposes), but it can be regarded through the analytic lens of ideological continuity.

The most significant cultural/historical theme to consider in light of this question of ideological continuity however, is the role of the Catholic Church. Like ethnic homogeneity and protection from outside enemies, the Church has always been one of the more central aspects of Polishness, although an *ideological* construction of the national identity has not been politically deployed until recently. How has this particular cultural theme been utilized in this project?

Again, the Church does have long-standing historical roots in Poland, so its use as a defining element of the nation resonates quite strongly. As early as the 19th century, the Church was able to create a symbolic role for itself as the main agent of Polish national identity. Because partitioning prevented political unity at this point, a coherent identity became tied to ethnic culture and mythologized history (Mach 2000), of which the Church was the focal point. Its role was somewhat repressed during the socialist era, but it was never banned and provided a sort of emotional haven from the omnipresent state for many Poles. In this sense, it was actually highly inclusive in membership, and represented a sense of belonging to European civilization, as opposed to Soviet, atheist "foreignness." Today, 96% of Poles identify themselves as

Catholic, and religion is by far the most respected and trusted institution in Polish life, considered more important than education, patriotism, friendship, freedom of speech or wealth (CBOS May 2006). This role in society means that conservative cultural values—on such questions as abortion, women’s role in society, religious education, homosexuality, etc.—have deep roots in the Polish identity.

Yet the Solidarity movement during democratization fostered openness, civic freedom, and pluralist democracy, without negating the Catholic element of Polishness. It seems that only recently have these social values become the basis for decidedly illiberal political behavior, after the liberalism initially espoused during the reform period. After Solidarity overthrew the socialist government, maintaining power throughout the democratically formative years of the next decade, it began to strengthen heretofore latent political links with the Church. As Ost (2005) notes, this right-wing alliance was easily able to turn “‘Communists’ as the enemy...into ‘others’ as the enemy, meaning ‘non-Catholics’ or ‘non-believers’” (72). During the drafting of the Constitution in 1996, the right-wing parties that were the progeny of Solidarity fought to base the document on Christian values and Catholic traditions, and to abolish the separation of church and state. Polish perceptions of their country’s entry into the EU were also shaped by a powerful religious influence that warned against both the decadence and secularism of European culture, and the threat to sovereign Polish decision-making.

More recently, the Catholic radio network Radio Maryja, considered intolerant “hate radio” by many observers in the EU, played a central role in advocating for the right-wing parties that won control of the parliament. It seems that the Church has taken advantage of its entrenched cultural role to insert itself into political matters. It can offer no solutions to the economic problems that many Poles face today (although it does express unease about the moral looseness associated with a market economy),

but it does provide a means for right-wing political leaders to organize anger on a social or ideological basis. Although the vast majority of Poles share the religious perspective of the Church, certain members of society may vote on the basis of these perspectives even when doing so is unlikely or uncertain to improve their material circumstances. These are not actions of a falsely conscious society; rather, people are responding to the only voices organizing their deep uncertainty and anger “productively,” since market liberalism has become both domestically and globally inviolable. Thus, the recurrent and rising connection between economic liberalism and political illiberalism.

The Unemployed Vote in Poland

This study will look at the vote behavior of the unemployed in Poland, asserting that they exemplify the situation of those who have lost out in the post-socialist transformation. The unemployed and the poor are not necessarily congruent categories, because many of the poorest members of post-socialist societies are those who have withdrawn from active job-seeking, such as elderly pensioners and women who have removed themselves from the workforce to rear children or adhere to domesticity ideals (see Schafft and Brown 2003). For the purposes of this study, unemployed survey respondents will be broken down into 2 categories: those who have been unemployed and looking for a job for 1 to 12 months, and those who have been unemployed and looking for 12 to 60 months. Of course, people falling into either unemployed category also tend to experience poverty at higher rates than their employed counterparts. They are more likely to be deprived of other life chances as well, such as higher education and job-skills training. They may also be concentrated in certain regions of the country that have lost industry and investment- rural areas and

eastern parts of Poland, for example (Ost 2005). While my hypothesis makes specific predictions about unemployed voters, other structural factors—income, education, and region—will also be included as independent variables. These will be considered as separate by not unrelated measures of relative economic success under macro-social change. Thus, if unemployment proves to be a poor predictor of voting while significant effects are associated with income, for example, I may be able to modify my hypothesis without abandoning its more fundamental premise that economic losers have become more likely to vote for the Right in the late reform period.

Ost observes that even by the early '90s, “political solidarities built around interest had taken a back seat to solidarities built around identity” (1993: p. 3): because of culture’s profound role in political meaning-making, votes do not cohere around class consciousness. Yet conditions of inequality are not absent from ideological constructions of identity and the political programs that precipitate. From this perspective, the economically insecure are more likely to turn to nationalist identity constructions because this a more resonant way of processing their material circumstances. Nationalist rhetoric in Polish politics taps deeply felt veins of “Polishness” along the lines of ethnicity, shared history, and religious values, and Poles who have lost out in the transition to neoliberal capitalism may be more receptive to such appeals because they speak more effectively to their frustrations than piecemeal policy solutions offered by sometimes-corrupt parties. However, it is the skillful manipulation of right-wing leaders that translates these issues of identity and purity into the primary basis for political action. As stated above, this explanation of the situation in Poland will be supported by a sharp rise in right-type votes and values after the initial reform period through the present, particularly among the unemployed or other groups of economically insecure voters. No matter the data output, this study clearly cannot conclusively determine which scenario is operating in Poland, yet

findings buttressing this explanation would support my hypothesis and contribute to a useful theoretical mapping of the operation of ideology in Polish society.

DATA AND METHODS

I use data from the Polish General Social Survey (PGSS), which has been administered through random multistage area sampling each year from 1992 to 2005. This data is accessible in English through 1999, from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, and in Polish through 2005, through the University of Warsaw. I use SPSS statistical software to analyze the PGSS data.

I identify six variables that indicate support for aspects of a right-wing ideological matrix: nationalism, religious traditionalism, social conservatism, patriarchal values, anti-communism, and free market support. I then recode these 5-scale Likert-type variables categorically to condense them into more simple 3-scale measures, such that those expressing agreement or strong agreement with an ideological statement were recoded as “More [ideological],” those expressing disagreement or strong disagreement were recoded as “Less [ideological],” with a third category of “Not sure.” For Nationalism, respondents expressed agreement or disagreement with the statement, “The world threatens the independence of Poland.” For Religious Traditionalism, respondents agreed or disagreed with the statement, “Churches in Poland have too much authority.” For Social Conservatism, respondents were asked whether they felt homosexual relations were right or wrong. For Patriarchalism, the question was whether it was better for men to work and women to stay at home. For Anti-Communism, they were asked to characterize their feelings on communism as a socio-economic system, and for Free Market Support, they were asked to agree or disagree with the statement “Government should reduce income differentials.” I then track support for each of them over the time span of 5 parliamentary elections, using simple frequency analysis. This will help me explore ideological continuity in Polish society immediately after structural change and as

these changes become “settled,” allowing me to propose broader conclusions on whether structural change fundamentally affects culture, or culture endures despite structural change.

I also create a right/left voting matrix for each election year. As a parliamentary democracy, Poland’s national election ballot includes many more parties than the simple Republican/Democrat/Independent ballot that we are familiar with in the US. Many, especially “fringe” or single-issue parties that tend to garner less than 1% of the total vote, do not fit easily into a dichotomous right/left schema. However, the main vote-getters can generally be categorized as right or left based on stated political platforms and my consultation with an expert on Polish politics (David Ost, professor, Hobart and William Smith Colleges). I create a separate right-left index for each election year to account for changing party names and coalitions: for example, I consider Solidarity left-wing in 1991 when it was the workers’ party, and I consider its descendent Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right right-wing in 2001 because it has abandoned its labor associations and become more closely affiliated with the conservative Catholic Church. Using these discrete indices, I then recode voters’ self-reported party choices for each election year into the appropriate right/left category.

I compare the share of right-wing votes cast by level of adherence to the six different measures of right-wing ideology. This part of my data analysis will help me understand the specific ideological bases for right-wing voting in Poland. I cross-tabulate each ideological position with vote choice for each election, then create odds ratios for each ideological variable to show the odds of voting for the Right based on ideological position. I compute odds using base-2 log figures, which are symmetric about zero for ease of visual inspection; negative odds indicate a greater likelihood of voting for the Left, while positive odds indicate a greater likelihood of voting for the

Right. I display odds over time to show changes in the effect of ideological preference on voting over time. This will allow me to compare changing ideologies with changing voting behavior. If the relationship between a particular ideology and a political platform remains consistent over time from the early through late reform period, this would provide support for Scenario B. If an early relationship quickly dissolved as voters became more aware of the effects of their vote choices, this would provide evidence for Scenario A. But if an ideological preference became associated with a political platform only in the most recent elections, this would indicate the creation of a new ideological theme in Polish society—a rupture with cultural arrangements of the past that no longer resonate in new structural circumstances.

Bivariate tests like cross-tabulations suggest an association which may or may not persist in the more complete test for multivariate correlation; in part, this is because correlation coefficients are uncontrolled while regression coefficients are partial coefficients that control for other variables in the model (Garson 2007). Thus I further refine my understanding of these relationships through multivariate analysis, which helps me build models of the predictor variables and the strength of their effects. Because the dependent variable, Right to Left (Year) is dichotomous, I use binary logistic regression to demonstrate these effects because, unlike other multivariate methods like ordinary least squares regression, logistic regression calculates the odds of being in one response category rather than another. Along with the six ideological predictor variables, I regress on survey respondents' age group, region of residence, education level, employment status, and income, for 4 elections (voting data for the most recent election of 2005 is not available). Using these control variables, I can establish whether right-wing voting is related to one's structural position in society. I build models with all variables, structural and ideological, that are significant at the 0.05 alpha-level for Pearson's chi-square test.

These models aim to capture all of the significant factors that have influenced right-wing voting in Polish parliamentary elections. A comparison of these factors over time may reveal permanence or change in the basis for right-wing support. The effort to understand the changing relationship between values and political behavior, and to track them over a time period when Poland underwent major transformation and experienced its ongoing effects, can contribute to a broader understanding of social change in the era of globalization. As stated above, I expect to see that the ideological basis of right-wing voting has shifted from liberal, free market principles to conservative social values, with religious traditionalism remaining fairly constant throughout, and that the most ardently right-wing Poles today are the unemployed or poor. While I have no expectations about the effect of any other demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, it will be interesting to see if they come into play here.

It is clear that there are quite a few limitations on the strength of any conclusions I may draw from this data analysis. First and foremost, self-reported political behavior can often be less accurate than desired. Questions purporting to measure ideological quotients may also be unreliable since they lack context: voters may express high levels of support for the Church, which may suggest submission to authority, but they may also strongly support anti-authoritarianism in other ways, such as anti-Communism. It may be best to take each measure of ideology on face value and resist the urge to construct from these measures a full characterization of Polish society. Besides for problems with the data, there is the matter of variable choice. I can't know that the variables I have chosen will actually measure anything *real* about Polish society—whether the PGSS questions I have chosen to operationalize each ideological theme will objectively capture any of them: ideologies like nationalism, patriarchalism, and so forth are complex and cannot be quantified by response to one survey question. Yet the researcher must do the best she can with the data available,

providing justification for what may seem slightly arbitrary choices. These questions used to operationalize each ideology were deemed the best options from the available PGSS data.

Perhaps most importantly, I have never lived in Poland and do not speak the language, so I cannot hope to understand the cultural nuances that may give me an inaccurate perception of the country and the changes through which it has gone. However, I should clearly state that my intention in this study is not to provide in-depth analysis of Polish culture but to provide statistical data that may support a general understanding of voting behavior in a particular setting. I can *hope* that this study will provide a new theoretical map of Poland which may be of use to others who have a deeper understanding of that culture and its experience through time.

RESULTS

The study tracked support for various aspects of a right-wing ideology over time; it also determined correlations between these support levels and voting behavior. As stated, independent variables were designated as appropriate measures of ideological sentiment. Before reporting on any results, it must be noted that voter turnout in Polish parliamentary elections has been quite low throughout the entire post-socialist period, only reaching the 50% level once, in 1993. Of those who did vote, they elected left-wing coalitions to power in 1991 and 1993, a right-wing coalition to power in 1997, then the left again in 2001, and most recently, the right in 2005. At the same time, the share of votes garnered by the Right has continued to rise throughout the period. The drastic turnaround in 2005 (when the party of the Social Democrats achieved only 11.3% of votes) could be read as the disruption of a trend of left-wing voting, or it may be the resumption of a growing right-wing constituency briefly checked by the Left's 2001 victory. My study, as explained above, takes the latter perspective as its guiding assumption, since each election year since Communism has seen a new decline in the Left's margin of victory.

Tracking aspects of right-wing ideology over time, we note that, on the whole, Poland remains a conservative, religious country as compared with what we might expect for the Western European states and even the US. This finding provides initial support for the "ideological continuity" hypothesis presented in earlier sections—the Right as a continuous ideological theme constitutive of the Polish identity. Yet there are some changes over time, as Table 3 shows. Nationalist sentiment has actually been falling since its peak in 1993, with a sizable decline in the share of Poles who felt that the world threatened Poland to some degree. Thus, the use of the "nationalist" moniker to describe extreme-right parties may be less accurate than habitual, and

Table 3 Trends in Ideology Over Time: Percentage of Respondents by Category

	1991	1993	1997	2001	2005
Nationalism					N/A
More nationalist	63.3	67.1	54.1	53.6	
Less nationalist	26	24.5	34.9	37.8	
Not sure	10.7	8.4	11	8.6	
Patriarchalism					
More patriarchal	85.5	81.9	77.2	70.7	69
Less patriarchal	11.7	15.3	19.7	24.8	27.7
Not sure	2.9	2.8	3.1	4.5	3.3
Anti-Communism					
More anti-communist	69.3	64.2	60.7	48.9	62.5
Less anti-communist	15.6	22.1	18.9	24.9	21.2
Not sure	15.1	13.7	20.4	26.2	16.3
Social Conservatism					
More socially conservative	70.8	73.9	75.6	73.1	75.6
Less socially conservative	17.4	16.1	14.1	15.6	15.4
Not sure	11.8	10	10.3	11.4	9
Free Market Support					
More free market support	13.5	14.5	14.5	8.8	6.7
Less free market support	79.9	81.3	81.7	88.2	90.7
Not sure	6.6	4.2	3.9	3	2.6
Religious Traditionalism					N/A
More religious	28.7	33.1	38.9	40	
Less religious	63.8	59.7	51.9	50.5	
Not sure	7.5	7.2	9.2	9.5	

Source: Polish General Social Survey.

should probably be reconsidered. Patriarchal sentiment has remained quite strong over time, although it has also declined from a 1991 high of 85% agreeing or strongly agreeing that it's better for a man to work and a woman to tend the home, to a level of about 70% in 2005. Social conservatism remains high, with very little change over time in feelings about homosexuality. About 75% continue to consider homosexuality

always or almost always wrong. Free market values, never high in Poland, continue to decline, especially since 1997; by 2005, 90% of Poles preferred that the government undertake income redistribution. Anti-Communism has remained high—around 70%-over time, reaching its nadir in 2001 and then sharply increasing in 2005. This fluctuation is probably due to a post-2001 corruption scandal involving then-ruling Social Democrats; the Right has been particularly effective at portraying the Left as fraudulent former Communist nomenklatura. Finally, religious traditionalism has been on the rise, as more and more people feel that churches need more authority in society. This has accompanied an actual rise in the power of the Church (as explained above), which emphasizes the growing strength of this ideology.

Yet these findings would also support my hypothesis of “ideological discontinuity,” which acknowledges that some conservative, exclusionary, or authoritarian tendencies may historically form part of the Polish social identity, but makes a distinction in the newness of their symbolic deployment by politicians and religious authorities to create a discourse of exclusion and blaming that directly motivates political behavior. The sharp rise in anti-Communist sentiment in 2005 is one indication of support for this hypothesis. The way to determine whether these ideological themes are a continuous or discontinuous basis for political behavior is to analyze their correlation over time with votes for the Right. Since 2005 voting information is unavailable in the PGSS, I must make predictions on the basis of trends. Table 5 presents bivariate correlations between ideological preference and the odds of voting for the Right. We find that, in the early reform period (characterized by the 1991 and 1993 elections), the Right does not attract significantly greater numbers of those who express more conservative/nationalist viewpoints. In fact, in 1991 the Right receives about an equal proportion of votes from respondents expressing opposite perspectives on free market support, social conservatism, patriarchalism,

anti-Communism, and nationalism! In this election, many voters were still unsure as to what their beliefs were, yet they also choose Right and Left in proportions similar to the more opinionated respondents. This indicates that ideological constructions of the Polish identity had not yet begun to motivate political behavior, despite the strong presence of conservative values. In 1993, we know that the Right begins to claim a greater percentage of the overall vote: about 40% versus the previous election's low 13%. Polish voters are still more likely to support the Left in every ideological category, but those likelihoods go down markedly for those expressing more religious and patriarchal views, as indicated by chi-tests for significance. However, those who were more supportive of the free market actually appear to have grown more likely to vote for the Left in that year, although this finding is not significant in bivariate analysis. At this point, Poles' views have begun to diverge, as very few respondents fall into the "not sure" categories.

By 1997, what I will characterize as the first election of the late reform period, things seem have shifted quite a bit, which may indicate that the Right has begun to appeal to its predicted ideological constituency. Religious traditionalists, free markets supporters, and anti-Communists are all more likely to vote for the Right than for the Left, for the first time in Polish election history. Most respondents are still polarized; only anti-Communism seems to draw any significant number of "not sure" responses; these fall between the more and less anti-Communist in terms of Right-voting likelihood. In 2001, the Left claims a strong victory, garnering more of the votes in every ideological category. Yet, interestingly, the trends that we have begun to see in 1997 seem to hold up. Those who express more religious, socially conservative, nationalist, and anti-Communist views, as well as those who are more supportive of free market ideology, are much more likely to vote for the Right than those holding opposite perspectives. Again, very few are "not sure" except as regards anti-

Table 4 Ideological Preference and Voting Over Time: Cell Counts and Base 2 Log Odds of Voting for the Right

		1991		1993		1997		2001	
		N	Odds	N	Odds	N	Odds	N	Odds
Relig. Traditional.		**		**		***		***	
More religious	Right	337	-1.05	144	-0.14	308	0.64	245	-0.35
	Left	697		159		197		312	
Less religious	Right	333	-1.63	144	-0.89	225	-0.99	115	-2.23
	Left	1,031		267		447		541	
Not sure	Right	19	-1.58	9	-0.53	57	0.44	27	-1.03
	Left	57		13		42		55	
Free Market Supp.						***		***	
More free market support	Right	21	-3.10	38	-1.06	98	0.68	86	-0.22
	Left	180		79		61		100	
Less free market support	Right	164	-2.64	231	-0.37	427	-0.42	518	-1.10
	Left	1021		298		571		1108	
Not sure	Right	12	-2.84	6	-0.58	6	-0.74	9	-1.00
	Left	86		9		10		18	
Social Conservatism								*	
More socially conservative	Right	154	-2.92	238	-0.46	227	-0.15	339	-0.78
	Left	1165		327		252		583	
Less socially conservative	Right	34	-2.89	37	-1.11	44	-0.56	63	-1.30
	Left	252		80		65		155	
Not sure	Right	26	-2.69	25	-0.36	20	-0.54	30	-1.42
	Left	168		32		29		80	
Patriarchalism				*					
More patriarchal	Right	186	-2.71	250	-0.43	224	-0.24	292	-0.94
	Left	1219		337		265		560	
Less patriarchal	Right	24	-2.81	44	-1.14	65	-0.15	126	-0.81
	Left	168		97		72		221	
Not sure	Right	4	-3.43	6	0.26	5	-1.26	12	-1.54
	Left	43		5		12		35	
Anti-Communism						***		***	
More anti-communist	Right	141	-2.82	217	-0.58	436	0.26	482	-0.48
	Left	999		324		363		672	
Less anti-communist	Right	36	-2.62	60	-0.66	64	-1.51	69	-2.38
	Left	221		95		182		358	
Not sure	Right	37	-2.52	22	0.14	92	-0.66	72	-1.62
	Left	212		20		145		221	
Nationalism								*	
More nationalist	Right	133	-2.77	220	-0.51	132	-0.36	114	-1.16
	Left	906		314		170		255	
Less nationalist	Right	50	-2.91	72	-0.66	148	-0.09	78	-1.27
	Left	377		114		157		188	
Not sure	Right	31	-2.23	8	-0.46	14	-0.58	4	-3.00
	Left	145		11		21		32	

* Relationship between ideology and voting is statistically significant at the .05 level for Pearson's chi-square test.

** Relationship between ideology and voting is statistically significant at the .01 level.

*** Relationship between ideology and voting is statistically significant at the .001 level.

anti-Communism, where the same pattern holds as in 1997. The only insignificant ideological predictor of right-wing voting is patriarchalism.

PGSS voting data for the most recent election in 2005, when the Right claimed a landslide victory, are unavailable. But in the previous 2 elections, ideological trends appeared and held up despite changes in overall parliamentary outcome. This suggests that the Right has begun to appeal reliably to certain ideological perspectives within the population. These trends seem to support the hypothesis of “ideological discontinuity” put forth by this study. Strong feelings of support for religious traditionalism, social conservatism, and other viewpoints understood by scholars of the Right to be constitutive of this identity (i.e., Kitschelt, Verdery, Ost, Swank and Betz, etc.) hold important and stable places in the Polish value spectrum, but they do not become correlated with right-wing voting until the late reform period. This suggests that political leaders and other opinion-makers began, in the middle to late 90s, to deploy culturally resonant themes for political purposes. They drew upon known, long-standing Polish values to create an ideology intimately connected with parties of the Right. For the first time, they connected these ideologies to political action, making them a motivator for political choices.

As noted above, bivariate tests suggest an association which may or may not persist in the more complete test for multivariate correlation. Not all of the ideological factors have proven significant in the latter test; some factors that were not associated in a bivariate context are significant in the final multivariate analysis. In addition, certain control factors have been added into the regressions, allowing me to create a model for each election year of independent variables that predict right-wing voting. Table 5 displays these four models.

Table 5 Fitted Regression Models for Each Election Year: Factors Affecting Right-Wing Voting

Year	Variables in Model	Parameters	N	-2LL	Pseudo R ²
1991	Religious Traditionalism, Nationalism, Social Conservatism, Anti-Communism, Education and Age	32	1467	374.02	0.412
1993	Religious Traditionalism, Education, Income, and Region	32	657	840.21	0.074
1997	Religious Traditionalism, Unemployment, Anti-Communism, Free Market Values, Region, and Age	32	570	686.74	0.157
2001	Religious Traditionalism, Anti-Communism, Social Conservatism, and Education	32	616	627.62	0.160

In 1991, religious traditionalism, nationalism, social conservatism, anti-Communism, education, and age are significant predictors of right-wing voting. In 1993, religious traditionalism, education, income, and region are the significant predictors. In 1997, the start of what I consider the late reform period, religious traditionalism, unemployment, anti-Communism, free market values, region, and age are the associated variables; and in 2001, the model includes religious traditionalism, anti-Communism, social conservatism, and education.³ Table 6 elaborates on these models with odds ratios for voting (the dependent variable) based on ideological preference and control factors (the predictor variables).

³ Pseudo R² values are reported, although it should be noted that in logistic regression, these do not indicate actual percent of variance explained by the model as do R² values in OLS regression (where 0 indicates that the model explains none of the variance and 1 indicates that the model explains all variance). Pseudo R² values are not goodness-of-fit tests, but measure strength of association (Garson 2007).

Table 6 Ideological, Socioeconomic, and Demographic Effects on the Odds of Voting for the Right

	1991		1993		1997		2001	
	Exp. (B)	95% C.I.	Exp. (B)	95% C.I.	Exp. (B)	95% C.I.	Exp. (B)	95% C.I.
Religious Traditionalism								
Less religious	2.57	1.44 - 4.59	0.65	0.47 - 0.92	0.40	0.27 - 0.58	0.28	0.19 - 0.43
Not sure (More religious)								
Nationalism								
Less nationalist								
Not sure (More nationalist)	17.33	3.26 - 92.13						
Anti-Communism								
Less anti- Communist	2.40	1.10 - 5.26			0.36	0.22 - 0.60	0.32	0.18 - 0.55
Not sure (More anti- Communist)	7.11	2.56 - 19.71			0.45	0.23 - 0.85		
Patriarchalism								
Less patriarchal								
Not sure (More patriarchal)								
Free Market Support								
Less free market support					0.54	0.31 - 0.96		
Not sure (More free market support)								
Social Conservatism								
Less socially conservative								
Not sure (More socially conservative)	0.32	0.14 - 0.75					0.43	0.19 - 0.98
Unemployment								
1-12 months								
13-60 months (Not unemployed)					0.19	0.04 - 0.92		

Table 6 (Continued)

Education								
0-4 years								
(8-10 years)								
12-17 years	0.32	0.18 - 0.54	0.62	0.43 - 0.89			1.72	1.09 - 2.71
Income Quartile								
Q1 (poorest)			1.87	1.07 - 3.28				
Q2								
Q3								
(Q4 (wealthiest))								
East/Central Region			1.70	1.21 - 2.37	1.70	1.17 - 2.47		
Age								
Aged 18-30	5.11	2.06 - 12.67			1.78	1.02 - 3.09		
Aged 31-50	1.98	1.08 - 3.63			1.75	1.14 - 2.70		
(Age 51 +)								

Source: Polish General Social Survey.

These data support my hypothesis that ideological factors did not become associated with right-wing voting until the late reform period, although a close look is necessary to bear this statement out. Odds ratios, which are a measure of effect size, are reported for each category of ideological preference or structural situation, with a base category (in parentheses) given for each, against which the others are compared. Unlike the base 2 log odds reported in Table 4, the odds ratios reported in Table 6 are based on 1: if the value of the odds ratio [labeled Exp(b)] for a categorical variable is significant and greater than 1, this indicates a positive effect on the likelihood of voting for the Right compared to the base category. If the value of the odds ratio is significant and less than 1, this indicates a negative effect on the likelihood of voting for the Right compared to the base category. For example, for the variable Religious Traditionalism, the base is “more religious,” and it encompasses those survey

respondents who expressed comparatively strongest religious values. Thus, in 1991, being less religious than the base group had a positive effect of 2.57 of voting for the Right. By contrast, in 2001, being less religious had a negative effect of 0.28 of voting for the Right. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are also reported.

The model for 1991 specifies religious traditionalism, nationalism, anti-Communism, and social conservatism as ideological predictors—*but*, paradoxically, those who feel less strongly or not sure about these values are more likely to vote for the Right. For example, being less religious or less anti-Communist than fellow survey respondents increases the odds of right-wing voting. In terms of control variables, being more educated (12-17 years of education) than the base category of voters (8-10 years of education) decreases the odds of voting for the Right in this earliest election. There are age effects as well; younger and middle-aged voters were more likely to vote for the Right than those above age 50. In 1993, an interesting ideological turnaround has occurred: it appears that less-religious voters have abruptly switched their political affiliations, becoming less likely to vote for the Right than the more religious. Structurally, the more educated are again less likely to vote for the Right, while living in the depressed East/Central region or falling into the poorest quartile of voters increases the likelihood of right-wing voting.

I consider 1997 the beginning of the late reform period, when voters should be expected to become reasonably aware of the effects of their vote choices. If we expect that voters are “rational actors,” iterative voting theory predicts that material interests have begun to be connected to particular political platforms and voters have begun to choose based on what parties will meet their material needs. This study has rejected such an explanation as overly simplistic in its failure to account for the power of ideological and ideal interests, although I do predict that the ideological bases for voting will change over time. I hypothesized that the economically insecure—

particularly the unemployed, but also the less educated and those living in marginalized regions—would be more likely to vote for the Right in the more recent elections, as rightist parties became skillful at deploying ideological appeals that would resonate most with those who had lost out in the market transition and were receptive to scapegoating.

What do the data say about the bases for right-wing voting in the late reform period? Referring again to Table 6, in 1997 the trend toward decreased likelihood of right-wing voting among the less religious continues. Those who are less anti-Communist, or not sure how they feel about Communism, are also less likely to vote for the Right than their more anti-Communist counterparts. Those who are less supportive of free market values are less likely to vote for the Right as well. Structurally, living in the East/Central region of Poland continues to increase Right-voting likelihood, and being 50 or younger (which did not affect voting in 1993) again exhibits the same effects it did in 1991. Educational attainment has ceased to significantly affect voting odds in 1997, but employment status for the first time affects voting odds: those who have been unemployed for 13 to 60 months are *less* likely to vote for the Right. In 2001, the associations between right-wing voting and religion, anti-Communism, and social conservatism hold up, and indeed the odds of voting for the Right if a respondent is less religious or less anti-Communist are at their lowest ever. The only structural predictor effect in 2001 is that of education. In the early reform period of the first two elections, the less educated vote for the Right significantly more often. But most interestingly, by 2001 it is the most educated (12 to 17-plus years) who form the Right's constituency.

The ideological and structural bases for right-wing voting have changed significantly by the late reform period. In 1991, the Right was supported by less religious, less anti-Communist, less educated Poles who were also younger and less

sure in their beliefs about nationalism and social conservatism. Together, this group made up only 13% of voters; we may see them as somewhat marginal—they certainly didn't constitute a movement. While nationalism, patriarchalism, social conservatism, and anti-Communism were extremely influential cultural values in this period, they were not associated with the Right for voters. Most Poles were voting for the victorious Solidarity party, which would give them their first president, the workers' rights activist Lech Walensa. By 2001, the picture is much changed; the Right claims less support than it did in 1997 or will in 2005, and its constituency has coalesced into a very different group than it was in the first election. The more religious and more anti-Communist voters strongly prefer the Right; social conservatism and free market values are also associated with right-wing voting, although these relationships are not as strong. And, the more educated—society's "winners"—are the Right's structural basis; these are certainly not the marginalized, and may actually be the more powerful members of society. The next section will interpret these results in terms of my hypotheses and the relevant literature already presented above.

DISCUSSION

Looking backwards in time from the 2005 parliamentary elections in Poland, where a coalition of right-wing parties campaigning on platforms of religious and social conservatism, nationalist/populist rhetoric, and anti-Communism resoundingly defeated the incumbent Social Democrats, this study initially presented three possible explanations for the Right's seemingly sudden rise in popularity. The first two proposed that the ideologies that had recently attracted most voters to the Right were deeply rooted in Polish culture; macrostructural change had not fundamentally altered people's ways of understanding the world. "Scenario A" proposed that the capitalist transition had been initially successful because it resonated with these ideologies and values, and that today's Right has been successful because it appeals to both conservative values and free market ideologies. "Scenario B" proposed that the initial support for the reforms brought by capitalism ultimately clashed with more fundamental cultural values of traditionalism and social homogeneity, and that today's Right has been successful because it does not engage any more meaningfully with economic questions than the Left, but it does speak to these cultural values. "Scenario C" is similar to Scenario B, but proposed that structural change has brought social realignment, and that the resonance of the ideologies presented by right-wing platforms today can only be understood as products of this experience, and of the differential social locations people now occupy. None of the scenarios is fully supported or discredited by the data. Yet exploring the data with these explanations in mind may help categorize the effects of structural change from socialism to neoliberal capitalism.

Scenario A proposed that ideologies associated today with the Right are in fact deeply rooted in Polish culture and have motivated political behavior since the first

free election. This explanation would be supported by the ongoing strength of conservative and free market ideologies, and their direct causal connection to right-wing voting. Sociologically, this explanation strongly references culture and ideal interests as central motivators for action. Structural transformation would alter these interests, since cultural preferences would actually be reinforced through capitalism's realignment of relationships between social groups, manifested through inequality and social exclusion. Though material circumstances change considerably—from relative equality in life chances among most social groups under socialism, to levels of unemployment and inequality high even under neoliberal expectations—political behavior remains the same because a stable ideological underpinning motivates it.

Empirically, we have seen little support for this scenario—after the initial unsettled period when voting was not strongly patterned, the Left continued to claim most votes through 2001 despite high, stable levels of support for Catholic religious traditionalism and social conservatism. Also, other conservative values like patriarchalism have declined in Polish culture, and support for the free market was *never* high and has also declined markedly. Furthermore, although most control-factor associations with voting are not consistent enough to indicate trends, the most and least educated switch party preference by the late reform period. These results do not provide strong support for the claim that culture motivates people's action in similar ways regardless of structural change.

Scenario B also proposed that conservative ideologies were deeply rooted in Polish culture and motivated voting behavior, but interpreted post-Communist social organization as incongruent with these values. Capitalism and free market values were extremely attractive to people who had lived with restriction and shortage for so long, but more durable religious, family, and ethnic values became the primary basis for right-wing support once voters became aware of the “consequences” of choosing

the Left—thus reasserting the tendency toward polarization and suppression of differences that was strengthened by communist political culture (Rupnik 2007). Empirically, this scenario would be buttressed by consistent, cross-social support for conservative values, early support for the free market and high initial rates of left-wing voting. By the late reform period, right-wing voting would increase especially among economic losers, and would be motivated by social values but not free market ideology. By this point, economic losers such as the unemployed or less educated would not see any greater material benefit from choosing either political platform, but would find expression of their ideal interests in the Right's ideological platform.

This interpretation finds partial support in the data. The liberal Left is strongly preferred in the early reform period, but the Right's share of votes grows steadily over time through 2005, except for the 2001 election. As noted, most conservative ideologies are strongly preferred by respondents throughout the time span, but a closer look has shown that some are on the decline and some have markedly risen. Feelings about a woman's place in the home, the threats that other countries represent to Poland, and the unfettered working of the free market seem to have lessened with time and greater Europeanization. Feelings about the evils of homosexuality and Communism, and the proper role of the Catholic Church in society, have increased, especially by 2005.⁴ The fact that right-wing voting has become associated primarily with social ideologies that have always been fairly strong, and is less motivated by economic ideology, gives some credence to Scenario B's explanation of the Right's rise in Poland.

But the changing bases of ideological support from 1991 to 2001 bolster Scenario C's dialectical understanding of the relationship between cultural antecedents

⁴ Poles can be strongly anti-Communist yet resoundingly reject the ideals of the free market because Communism today represents something different than an economic system; it represents political illegitimacy and corruption.

and politically-constructed ideal interests. Religious traditionalism was actually quite low in Poland in 1991 (28.7% expressed “more religious” sentiment), but by 2001, it was at 40%, and we might assume that in 2005, with the Right’s huge electoral victory, this figure would be even higher. And as it grew, it became more and more closely associated with the right-wing; the same goes for social conservatism. Anti-Communism was actually declining through 2001 but in 2005, there is a marked increase in this sentiment, and its association with right-wing voting is at an all-time high. It seems the Right has staked out certain cultural values, cultivating and fomenting them, despite Western expectations that Europeanization and liberalism would slowly dissolve them as it has with nationalism and patriarchalism. Thus cultural preferences and values are not static; they change and motivate different behaviors according to historical and structural transformations.

This may seem an intuitive point, but the scholarly debate over the rise of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe has often discounted the idea that these post-Communist societies could ever experience a “return to democracy” because deep-rooted religious, authoritarian, and conservative preferences have more or less continually motivated political behavior even through the switch to capitalism (i.e., Korbonski 1993; Verdery 1996). Scenario C, based on a theory associated with David Ost and others, inverts this causal direction, pointing to politicians’ manipulation of certain values into an ideological defense against liberalism and social upheaval. A quote from the Polish minister of education is revealing: “Asked about his intention to repudiate Darwinism from school curricula the Polish minister of education answered, “We’ve managed without tolerance for long enough. And we shall manage without it even now” (Rupnik 2007). This construction of a symbolic “Polishness,” claimed to have withstood the test of time and macrosocial change, allows leaders to consolidate people’s voting behaviors around their ideal interests rather than their material needs.

Scenario C predicts changes in why people vote for the Right; it also predicts changes in *who* votes for the Right, which theories of ideological continuity do not adequately address. The economic inequality accompanying the transition from socialism to capitalism is expected to primarily provoke *disadvantaged* Poles to flock to this platform's organization of economic anger into resonant ideological channels. Protest against liberal, permissive, corrupt *elites*, as well as ethnic and religious outsiders is a mainstay of right-wing platforms in Poland and across Europe. However, the results of regression on control factors reveal this to be the main weakness of Scenario C's explanation of the Right's rise: there is no support for the contention that economic losers are more attracted to the Right after the effects of market reform have played out; in fact a trend in the opposite direction may have begun.

Looking back to Table 6, through the 1997 election, being in the poorest income quartile, ceasing education after 4 years, maintaining unemployment for more than a year, or living in the depressed East/Central region of the country might increase one's likelihood of right-wing preference. But in 2001, none of these effects is exerted; the only structural determinant of right-wing voting is being the *most* educated. Why might those who have benefited from neoliberal reform be more likely to symbolically protest against it with their votes? One might speculate that the Right, in openly embracing the free market and rejecting wealth redistribution relative to the Left's rhetorical position, may be attracting the more educated because they are better equipped to succeed in a market-based economy. Yet, although supporters of the free market become more likely to vote for the Right in the late reform period, this effect is not significant in multivariate regression modeling—so voting does seem based on ideal rather than material interests even for those whose economic interests do coincide with the priorities of the Right. Indeed, my hypothesis had not predicted the

emergence of free market values as an ideological basis for right-wing voting even under the assumption that the unemployed or the poor were the groups more attracted to the Right. I had theorized that right-wing voters were unsure as to which party supported their economic interests, so they had come to rely on social values, which provided “scapegoats” (“deviants” or disrupters of the desired social order) for the frustrations of 21st century capitalist life. This theory retains some support from the data, since the Right seems to be more relevant to ideal interests than to material interests.

How do these findings fit into similar studies on the structural bases of the Right’s rise? As noted, neoliberalism and globalization, by increasing volume and instability of capital and migration flows, have been thought to trigger defensive exclusionary sentiment among those most acutely affected by changing labor markets and decreasing wages (see Swank and Betz 2003: p. 220-221). Yet, some scholars have been surprised to find that, contrary to their hypotheses, the disadvantaged may not be the source of the Right’s new power. Knigge (1998), for example, has found that her initial expectation of a positive correlation between unemployment and right-wing voting is unsupported by evidence from six Western European countries. She had hypothesized that “electorates lend their support to extreme right-wing parties as a function of crises in the economic, social, and political realms,” but, she found that only social and political crises—rising levels of immigration and dissatisfaction with incumbent political parties—facilitated right-wing voting (p. 272); unemployment exerted no discernible macro-level influence on right-wing extremism. Although it appears initially that her findings are inapplicable to this study because of the absence of major structural change in Western Europe, note that the late reform period in Poland, when the material effects of structural change and vote choice are presumed to

be well understood by voters, also lacks any correlation between unemployment and right-wing voting.

Greskovits (2007) has been prominently opposed to theories connecting the disadvantaged to the right-wing. Not only does he believe that the marginalized are more politically apathetic and inactive (pointing, for example, to low overall voter turnout in CEE countries such as Poland and Hungary as evidence), to the extent that the large number of out-migrant work-seekers may have stopped from participating completely, but he goes a step further in suggesting that the middle class and elites are the true drivers of the Right's rise. Rather than the less skilled and less successful using extremist ideologies to scapegoat immigrants who compete for jobs, or corrupt former Communist elements who set aside the country's resources for themselves, Greskovits believes that the Right's support is located among "vocal middle class groups—including higher education students and young professionals—[who] tend to identify the utmost obstacle to their own upward mobility not at the 'top' in rival elite groups but at the bottom: in the masses of losers...untaxable pensioners, abusers of health care, welfare-parasites, or excess armies of public service providers" (p. 22). He is thus not surprised that right-wing parties campaigning on platforms of radical neoliberalism (lowered flat taxes, welfare retrenchment, etc.) have done well.

Yet, as I have noted, I did not find consistent economic bases for rightist voting (i.e., free market support), so Greskovits' explanation can be only partially supported by my study. I believe that the middle class is voting for the Right primarily for ideological reasons; material interests may be implicated but are not statistically significant. I acknowledge that my findings do not directly shed light on voting patterns in the most recent election of 2005, which was the high-water mark of support for the right-wing. It may be that free market values become decisively correlated with right-wing voting at this point (as they are, briefly, in 1997). But, as

Table 4 shows, free market values are at an all-time low among all Polish GSS respondents in 2005, so this development seems unlikely. This does not rule out an economic dimension to the rise of the Right among middle-class voters. Market reforms have tended to favor the more educated and skilled; those who have been successful under reform may be exhibiting classically liberal views in defense of earnings won under conditions of “equal opportunity.” The threat of Communist elements and “outsiders”—those who do not fit into the moral or ethnic ideal of Polishness—claiming a piece of economic pie that they do not deserve pushes the winners toward a defensive ideological position recently encapsulated by the political platform of the Right.

It is also possible that education is a less significant marker of structural position than Greskovits assumes. Perrucci and Wyson (2007)’s theory of “the new class society” proposes that higher education is no longer a “backbone” of socioeconomic stratification, dividing the haves from the have-nots. As education has become more generally accessible in advanced industrialized societies, other determinants of social location have become more prominent; occupational status (achieved through family resources, social ties, education, etc.) is one of these. Perhaps attaining more than 12 years of education in Poland has become common enough that it exerts a marginal effect on social position and material interests, and the association seen between the most educated and right-wing voting is concealing a parallel occupation-based structural division. In order to test this, I regressed all the same predictor variables on the voting index but replaced the categorical variables for education with categorical variables for occupation. In keeping with the variable structure for education, I created three categories approximating working-class (skilled agricultural workers, element occupations, machine operators), middle-class (service, crafts and tradespeople, clerks) and upper class (managers, professionals, technicians),

with the middle category as the base against which the others would be compared to determine differentials in voting odds.

Tables 5b and 6b (see Appendix) show that occupation is not a significant predictor of voting in any year. Replacing the education variable with occupational status does change overall models slightly for each year: patriarchy becomes associated with voting in 1991, and unemployment for 13-60 months ceases to be associated with voting in 1997. Most notably, no structural factors are associated with voting in 2001! Those respondents in elite jobs are no more likely to vote for the Right than those in middle class or working class positions. Occupation (under capitalism) is more directly related to income than education is, and thus a stronger indicator of one's status as an economic "winner" or "loser" in post-socialist Poland. So, in keeping with Perrucci and Wysong's theory, I interpret this as evidence that educational attainment is not an extremely reliable determinant of structural location in this context. Yet the correlation between right-wing voting and more education remains quite noteworthy for this study, because it provides evidence against my hypothesis that social disadvantage increases the likelihood of voting for parties that speak to ideal interests rather than material interests.

I had predicted that those who had benefited least from the structural changes accompanying socialism's revolutionary replacement with capitalism would be most likely to shape their political behavior around ideologies that displaced confused economic anger onto clear social targets. To theoretically ground this prediction, I used the power/ideology connection put forth by Stuart Hall and others who explored hegemony and the political manipulation of interests. I found that right-wing voting is indeed motivated by ideal and not material factors, but I discovered that this process seems to occur regardless of social location, and actually seems to be more strongly associated with those who might have less cause for economic anger. I believe that

the theory connecting actors' economic circumstances with their receptivity to ideological explanations of those circumstances is still applicable to the rise of the Right in Poland; because this line of theory clearly rejects determinism between particular ideas and particular social classes/locations, ideological constructions of identity can be just as likely to appeal to more advantaged groups as I had predicted they would for the less advantaged. It's possible that the more educated are more defensive of their gains, or more confident of their values' moral correctness.

The connection between certain ideologies and support for the Right, and its relatively recent construction, is the strongest finding of this study. Because it has been difficult to establish reliable trends based on structural location, I can only speculate on the connection between material interests and right-wing voting. While I had suggested that Poland's disadvantaged were becoming fatalistic in their abandonment of the voter's right and responsibility to push for policy solutions to socio-economic problems, my findings offer a more encouraging understanding of these citizens' political choices. Neoliberalism's losers may not be turning to ideological politics, as Ost suggests, nor are they simply apathetic, as Greskovits claims. As globalization and neoliberalism have become more entrenched and less reversible in Poland, those who stand to benefit least have turned relatively more to the Left, increasingly rejecting free market values and anti-Communism. They seem quite able to connect their declining economic and social fortunes to an increasing distance from socialism's relative equality, even though they may continue to reject socialism as a coherent system. They, more than the most educated Poles, are trying to hold their government accountable for their economic welfare.

Looking back on the debate over revolutionary ideology, it seems that neither specific political programs (i.e., neoliberal market reform) nor cultural heritage (i.e., conservative nationalism) are the fundamental determinants of which direction a post-

transformation society will ultimately go in. No society is a closed system, and changing global conditions, resulting in new structural locations for groups and nations, will continually modify or alter actors' prioritizing of values. Sociologists expect that "after the fall of [an] old regime struggles emerge over what the revolution was really about, and over how to interpret the society's cultural heritage" (Burns 1996: p. 374). While Poles were united in prioritizing anti-Communism and democracy during their "unsettled" revolutionary period, the long-term outcome has revealed a decidedly polarized set of values that may be differently resonant across social locations. The Right in Poland has been successful at reinterpreting that long-ago revolution as part of an ongoing dismantling of corruption, theft, and moral crime against the "true" Polish people. The Left has no powerful counter-interpretation, because it presents the new globalized organization of society as-is, offering nothing symbolic to fight against and "channel anger productively."

These findings may contribute to the ongoing debate over conservatism's relationship to the macro-social changes that people in every country are today experiencing; only a few shape these changes while most must merely react. I remain interested in the implications this study may provide vis-à-vis the Right's place in US politics. Will the growing income gap create more right-wing adherents among those towards the bottom, as I would have expected before undertaking this study, or among those towards the top, as I have come to anticipate now? Prolonged analysis is certainly justified, as findings continue to topple expectations and received wisdom.

APPENDIX

Table 5b Fitted Regression Models for Each Election Year (Occupation Replacing Education)

Year	Variables in Model	Parameters	N	-2LL	Pseudo R²
1991	Religious Traditionalism, Nationalism, Social Conservatism, Patriarchalism, Anti-Communism, Occupation, Age	32	1372	355.38	0.411
1993	Religious Traditionalism, Occupation, Income, and Region	32	616	783.11	0.077
1997	Religious Traditionalism, Anti-Communism, Free Market Values, Region, Age	32	527	624.23	0.174
2001	Religious Traditionalism, Anti-Communism, Social Conservatism	32	616	629.62	0.158

Table 6b Ideological, Socioeconomic, and Demographic Effects on the Odds of Voting for the Right (Occupation Replacing Education)

	1991		1993		1997		2001	
	Exp. (B)	95% C.I.	Exp. (B)	95% C.I.	Exp. (B)	95% C.I.	Exp. (B)	95% C.I.
Religious Traditionalism								
Less religious	2.88	1.57 - 5.28	0.65	0.46 - 0.92	0.40	0.27 - 0.60	0.28	0.18 - 0.53
Not sure								
(More religious)								
Nationalism								
Less nationalist								
Not sure	17.91	3.30 - 97.22						
(More nationalist)								
Anti-Communism								
Less anti-Communist	2.38	1.07 - 5.27			0.33	0.20 - 0.56	0.31	0.18 - 0.53
Not sure	5.65	2.02 - 15.84			0.42	0.22 - 0.81		
(More anti-Communist)								
Patriarchalism								
Less patriarchal	2.50	1.01 - 6.20						
Not sure								
(More patriarchal)								
Free Market Support								
Less free market support					0.45	0.24 - 0.83		
Not sure								
(More free market support)								
Social Conservatism								
Less socially conservative								
Not sure	0.36	0.15 - 0.87					0.44	0.19 - 0.99
(More socially conservative)								

Table 6b (Continued)

Unemployment								
1-12 months								
13-60 months					Not sig.			
(Not unemployed)								
Occupation								
Working class	3.49	1.97 - 6.17	2.02	1.37 - 2.98				
(Middle class)								
Upper class								
Income Quartile								
Q1 (poorest)			1.96	1.10 - 3.48				
Q2								
Q3								
(Q4 (wealthiest))								
East/Central Region			1.62	1.15 - 2.30	1.74	1.18 - 2.45		
Age								
Aged 18-30	4.47	1.75 - 11.39			2.02	1.08 - 3.78		
Aged 31-50	1.85	1.02 - 3.36			1.58	1.02 - 2.45		
(Age 51 +)								

Source: Polish General Social Survey.

Bold lettering indicates where directionality or presence of association is different from Table 6.

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