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"FUTURE OF WORKER"



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STATEMENT OF THE LABOR POLICY ASSOCIATION

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON THE

FUTURE OF WORKER/MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

BY

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MERCK & COMPANY, INC.**

AUGUST 10, 1994

My name is Steven M. Darien. I am the Vice President of Human Resources for Merck & Company, Inc., the world's largest pharmaceutical company. I am appearing before you this morning as someone deeply involved in the human resource practices and policies of the 47,000 employees who are Merck and as a member of the Board of Directors of the Labor Policy Association, an organization of the senior human resource executives of 215 of the nation's largest corporations. Together, LPA member companies employ over 11 million Americans, 12 percent of the employed private sector, non-farm workforce. Appearing with me is Charles Nielson, Vice President of Human Resources of Texas Instruments and a member of LPA's Board, and Mary Harrington, Director of Corporate Labor Relations of Eastman Kodak Company, also a member of the Association.

The remarks that we are about to present are the consensus views of the LPA membership regarding the findings made by the Commission in Chapter II of its *Fact Finding Report*. Our comments were developed at a one-day membership meeting the Association held on June 15, 1994, and then at an all-day meeting of our Board of Directors on July 15. We would suggest that the actual experience of LPA's diverse membership gives us insights into trends in employment policies and practices at the workplace level that are worthy of your very careful consideration, even though they may differ from several of the studies by academics and consultants on which the Commission seems to be placing heavy reliance. Further, we hope that the Commission will accept our testimony in the spirit in which it is given. The Commission has made it clear that it will be dealing with the record presented to it, and that despite your many collective years in the field of labor and human resource policy, your recommendations will be based solely on information in that record.

In summary, the Association is pleased that the Commission has recognized the revolutionary changes in human resource practice that have taken place during the past two

decades as companies work to replace command-and-control management structures with work systems premised on employee involvement and more cooperative employee-employer relations as a means of achieving competitive advantage. Employee participation and involvement have become critically important elements of work design and organization in both large and small American corporations. Today, five organizations—Aerospace Industries Association, Electronic Industries Association, Labor Policy Association, National Association of Manufacturers, and Organization Resource Counselors—are releasing a study of the use of employee involvement in the American workplace that was prepared at the request of the Chairman of the Commission. We would ask that a copy of our findings be placed in the hearing record.

The study surveyed the practices of 532 companies representing a broad cross-section of the private sector. Among its many findings, it showed that more than 75% of the respondents are currently using employee involvement. Among employers with 5,000 or more employees, the typical LPA member, 96 percent fell into that category. For that reason, LPA is strongly committed to shaping public policy to remove impediments to the continued use and expansion of employee involvement.

There are several findings made by the Commission in its *Fact Finding Report* with which we agree. For example, we agree that there has been a substantial expansion in the number and variety of employee involvement efforts since the 1980's. We agree that workplace innovations are only partially diffused across the economy. We agree that employee involvement is more likely to survive over time if the effort expands beyond the narrow confines of a single program or process and if human resource practices such as compensation, training, employment security and managerial rewards systems are modified to support these efforts.

At the same, however, we are very concerned that after all the hearings, testimony, surveys, focus groups and the like that the Commission has conducted, there still seems to be a lack of understanding of what employee involvement is in the modern American corporation, how it evolves, why it succeeds and why it fails. We are also concerned that the Commission does not understand the importance of teaming in our ability to compete. Our concerns arise in large part from the questions posed by the Commission on pages 56 and 57 of the *Fact Finding Report*.

At the outset, let me stress that the vast majority of LPA member companies believes that the use of employee involvement and cooperative employee-employer relations should be expanded and that the best way to promote that expansion is by reversing NLRB decisions such as *Electromation*¹ and *DuPont*². We believe employment policy is headed entirely in the wrong direction when we see Section 8(a)(2) decisions being handed down by NLRB Administrative Law Judges such as those in *Bremner*³ and *Vons Grocery*⁴ in which employee involvement is considered permissible as long as it has no impact on improving workplace policies. The judge in *Bremner*, for example, ruled that the company's committees were legal because they were "ineffective" and "the recommendations developed were either not forwarded to management or were rejected." In *Vons Grocery*, the judge permitted the continuation of the store's Quality Circle Group because the Teamsters had "coopted" its suggestions and "monitor[ed] the doings of the committee to be certain that [it] did not go into areas which the Union disapproves."

¹ 309 NLRB 990 (1992).

² 311 NLRB 893 (1993).

³ 26-CA-15859 (June 21, 1994).

⁴ 21-CA-28816 *et al.* (June 28, 1994).

When employee involvement does become effective and the NLRB finds out about it, the Board is quick to strike it down. In *Webcor Packaging*⁵ the non-union manufacturer of corrugated boxes was found in violation of Section 8(a)(2) because it committed the sin of establishing a plant council in which hourly employees dealt with employment-related issues. At first the company tried to set up a committee structure to avoid the 8(a)(2) problems. The employees, however, repeatedly brought up such issues as distribution of overtime work, lunch breaks, and reimbursement for tools and safety boots, and it was clear to the management that unless those issues were put on the table, the employee involvement effort would not succeed. Accordingly, the Plant Council was created consisting of five hourly employees and three management representatives and given *carte blanche* on the issues with which it could deal. Sometime later, the Teamsters began a drive to organize Webcor which failed by a vote of 14 to 21. It then filed a charge with the NLRB seeking the elimination of the Council, and the ALJ ruled that despite the lack of any antiunion animus, despite the fact that Webcor's employees were "pleased to have the Council," and despite the fact that management believed that "Webcor would benefit by involving employees in the decisional processes," the Council must be disbanded⁶.

It is cases like *Webcor*, we submit, that illustrate not only the "human face" of employee involvement and its great potential, but also the dismal fact that current federal policy stands in the way of letting EI achieve its promise.

On page 57 of the *Report*, the Commission offers four options regarding Section 8(a)(2). The first is that the section should be retained in its present form. If the NLRB

⁵ 7-CA-31809 *et al.* (October 28, 1993).

⁶ *Webcor*, *supra* at 11.

continues down the path begun by *Electromation* and *DuPont*, we do not see that as a viable alternative. Nor do we find acceptable the third and fourth options. The third suggests relaxing 8(a)(2), but only if certain statutorily prescribed criteria are met regarding "employee selection, access to information, protection against reprisals, and the like." The fourth would mandate that employers set up and maintain cooperative programs. As experienced witness after experienced witness has testified before this Commission, cooperation cannot be mandated nor can cooperative programs be tailored to fit the particular circumstances of individual workplaces by federal regulation writers. If there is a role for government here, it is to provide the soil in which the seed of cooperative relationships can sprout, and to provide the nutriments and conditions in which the plant can flourish. It is not the government's role to prescribe the size of each leaf, the points on the stem at which a branch is permitted, and the acceptable number of flowers, the failure to produce that number being sufficient grounds for ripping up the plant by its roots.

Absent a change of approach at the NLRB that would reverse rulings such as *Electromation*, our choice for improving employee-employer relations would be to explore the second option listed on page 57 of the *Report*, the one suggesting that Section 8(a)(2) "should no longer limit the freedom of nonunion employers to establish procedures by which its employees will 'deal with' (as opposed to 'collectively bargain' about) conditions of employment." Indeed, that option has already been incorporated into federal legislation that our Association strongly supports⁷. As other members of our Association have testified at previous hearings, we also support S. 669 and H.R. 1529, the "Teamwork for Employees and Management Act" (TEAM Act), sponsored by Senator Nancy Kassebaum and Rep. Steve

⁷ H.R. 2937, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.(1993); S. 1950, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess.(1994).

Gunderson. It would amend Section 8(a)(2) to provide an exemption for employee involvement structures from its prohibition against dominating, interfering with or supporting a "labor organization." The problem with Section 8(a)(2) in our opinion is that the term "labor organization" written in 1935 no longer fits the workplace of 1994. The TEAM Act drafters, however, chose not to amend that definition for fear that it would unnecessarily narrow other provisions of the statute, such as those prohibiting unfair labor practices by a "labor organization." Accordingly, the TEAM Act permits employee involvement efforts in which employees participate to discuss "matters of mutual interest (including issues of quality, productivity and efficiency)" as long as those participation efforts do not "have, claim or seek authority" to negotiate, enter into or amend collective bargaining agreements. We believe the proposal succeeds in permitting greater use of employee involvement efforts while retaining the prohibition in Section 8(a)(2) against "sham" company unions which pretend to represent employees in collective bargaining, but are instead a pawn of the employer.

Our hope is that whatever recommendation the Commission finally settles on, it will ensure that the progressive changes in human resource practice that are being made by the employees and managements of companies are protected from legal attack. We would point out that Chapter III of the *Fact Finding Report* expresses great alarm over what the Commission sees as an increase in violations of those provisions of the Labor Act dealing with issues arising out of union organizing campaigns. We hope the Commission will begin to show the same passion for the far greater number of American employers and employees who are potentially in violation of the law because they are pursuing team-based cooperative ventures in non-union environments.

At this point, I would like to begin responding to the questions that the Commission has posed on page 56 of the *Report*.

1. How can the level of trust and quality of the relationships among workers, labor leaders, managers and other groups in our society and at the workplace be enhanced?

As discussed above, a first step would be to ensure that our nation's employment policy no longer treats as illegal those cooperative ventures that touch on wages, hours and working conditions in non-union settings. A cooperative relationship is premised on employees and employers having similar interests, goals and objectives who work in collaboration and free of restraints to develop methods to achieve those objectives. Those discussions should be allowed to proceed regardless of whether they involve terms and conditions of employment. We would stress to the Commission that 88 percent of the employees in the private sector workforce are not represented by a labor union and that employment policy in this area should not be governed by labor laws designed for the 12 percent of the workforce that is, which is the case today. Amending Section 8(a)(2) to permit greater employee involvement for the 88 percent of the workforce not covered by collective bargaining agreements would go far towards enhancing more cooperative relationships.

Regarding improving relationships in the 12 percent sector, the system of labor-management relations prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act is premised on labor and management having differing, competing interests that are best resolved through the adversarial process of collective bargaining. In a large number of represented workplaces around the country including our own at Merck, unions and employers enjoy strong working relationships. In others, however, tensions between employees and employers are often

exacerbated by the presence of a union. If that remains a fact of life, it will be very difficult to enhance the level of trust no matter what changes are made in Section 8(a)(2), or in any other section of the labor law for that matter.

2. Is there a deep unrealized interest in participation in the American workforce?
If so, what keeps these employees from taking the initiative on these matters?
3. Should employees have some voice in initiating employee participation? If so, how might this be done?

These two questions taken together in the context of the findings made in Chapter II seem to imply that employees in some way are kept from taking the initiative in pursuing employee involvement or are barred from doing so. We are not certain what evidence the Commission has to support such a contention. Rather, it has been the experience of LPA member companies who have sought to implement EI that the principal obstacle is resistance by those most directly affected—front-line management, unions, and employees—who prefer the devil they know. Employee involvement is about fundamentally changing a corporation's culture. There are many employees, managers and unions who are comfortable with old-style management which either gives them the power to tell employees what to do or gives them the security to simply do what they are told to do, right or wrong. As the management witnesses have tried repeatedly to communicate to this panel, the reason employee involvement has not grown at a more rapid pace is not because the boards of our corporations are meeting in secret to develop strategies to snuff out the desire of their employees to work smarter and on a more collaborative basis. Just the contrary is the case. The fact of the matter is that persuading people to work together differently, relate to one another differently, treat each other differently is a difficult task. When it is done in large

organizations, those difficulties become monumental. And not making that task any easier is the federal government ruling such efforts illegal just when they really begin to work.

Here, we would direct the Commission's attention to our survey which indicates the extent to which the employer community is concerned with the legality of participative efforts. Three years ago the NLRB announced with great fanfare that it would hold public hearings to take a comprehensive look at the relationship between the expansion of employee involvement in the non-union sector and Section 8(a)(2). For non-attorneys such as myself, this announcement was welcome news for we thought the Board was surely on the way towards making America more competitive by clearing away roadblocks such as those generated by Section 8(a)(2). Much to our surprise, however, the Board went in the opposite direction, and since then employers have become more hesitant to commit substantial resources to broaden employee involvement. According to our survey, more than 40 percent of the respondents felt that the legality of EI was being seriously questioned, and only 5 percent said there were no legal problems. For moderately unionized employers who are likely to be more familiar with the law, 60 percent were concerned about the government's attitude towards EI.

4. Should employees have some voice in determining whether, once started, a given employee participation process should be continued, changed, or terminated? If so, how might this be done?

As the employees at Webcor, Electromation, and Polaroid have discovered, in non-union settings where an employee is involved in an employee participation program that develops a recommendation touching on working conditions to which management responds, their act of working together may be ruled illegal under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. Thus it is difficult for employees to have a voice when the law effectively denies them one.

Employees in non-union situations find themselves in the anomalous situation of knowing that if their work team develops a recommendation that is taken seriously by management and accepted, it will be struck down if the NLRB finds out about it. At the same time, we are not aware of any company that has taken the position either privately or publicly that employees do not have the right to speak to management directly regarding whether an employee participation process should be continued, changed or terminated in a non-union setting. Again, just the opposite is the case. The direction in which we are pushing our employees is to become more active in taking the initiative to improve workplace operations.

In unionized settings, the doctrine of exclusive representation bars employees from speaking directly to management regarding whether an employee participation process should be continued, changed or terminated. Rather, employees must communicate their concerns to their elected bargaining agents. In a truly cooperative environment, everyone should be free to deal with everyone else directly in order to facilitate exchanges of information, ideas, and inspiration. That is not always possible under the NLRA in a unionized setting because all communications must be funneled through the appropriate union officials if the employer is to avoid being found in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.

These are the legal barriers now in place that inhibit a free flow of ideas between employees and employers regarding improvements in the workplace and work practices. We are concerned, however, that this question may reflect a tacit opinion of the Commission that once an employer either agrees or decides to implement employee participation, that for some reason the employees involved have no voice in its future direction. Again, that is not the experience of LPA members. As several witnesses have testified, once the genie is out of the bottle, you can't put it back in. Once a team of employees has been given far greater authority over their work lives than was the case previously, it is very difficult, if not

impossible, to take that authority away and return to a hierarchial system. The employee involvement survey conducted by the five organizations provides information on the likely reaction of employees if employee involvement were to be terminated. Over half of the respondents indicated that their employees would strongly resist termination of the program, and only five percent indicated that their employees would not care or would welcome the termination. At the same time, once organizations do teaming, managers generally learn the benefits and understand better how employee involvement impacts the bottom line.

Finally, the question seems to imply that employees need a statutory voice of some kind to terminate EI. As a practical matter, they already have the power to terminate it because an employee participation process cannot continue if the employees do not want to participate in it. That is the essence of employee participation. Employees must want to participate if it is to be successful. By the same token, if employee participation never takes root because of the lack of employee interest, that does not necessarily mean the employees were denied a voice in the process.

A number of company witnesses have invited members of this Commission repeatedly to visit worksites, meet teams of employees and talk with them on the job, but it is my understanding, unfortunately, that few, if any of you, have had an opportunity to take advantage of those invitations. If you had been able to do so, we would submit that you would understand more fully the point that many of us have tried to make, that once power is pushed to a lower level in an organization, employees will become very upset if management tries to pull that power back.

5. How serious are the economic obstacles such as downsizing pressures for short-term results, high start-up costs, and lack of understanding in the

investment community? What, if anything, can be done to address these issues?

It is not economic pressures that inhibit the growth of employee involvement, it is economic pressures that stimulate it. Not every organization is capable of changing its methods of operation when times are good. In the opinion of the LPA membership, it is the worksites facing the greatest economic challenges that tend to be the ones making the greatest strides in modernizing their organizations. For example, the transformation of a vertical management structure into a horizontal one requires a sweeping culture change, and often institutional resistance can only be overcome by front-line managers and employees recognizing that their jobs are at stake if the old ways continue.

Regarding the phrase in this question, "downsizing pressures for short-term results," we would point out that temporary layoffs are usually done to achieve short-term results; downsizing is done to achieve long-term results by eliminating redundancies in the performance of work.

Regarding the investment community considerations, it does not necessarily follow that an investor will get the best return by investing in a well-run company with stable employee relations practices. The investor may be better off investing in a company that historically has had poor employee relations, but is about to be transformed by the adoption of redesigned work systems into a more profitable enterprise. I would draw the Commission's attention to a report recently released by the Gordon Group in Boston which explains this point in much greater detail⁸.

⁸ Gordon, Lilli A., Pound, John, and Porter, Ted. *High-Performance Workplaces: Implications for Investment Research and Active Investing Strategies*, Waban, MA: Gordon Group (1994).

As discussed above, if the Commission is searching for impediments that could be removed to encourage EI, we would urge the panel to recommend reversing NLRB decisions like *Electromation* to clear away the legal impediments for the 88 percent of the private sector workforce that is non-union.

6. How should the legal uncertainties and limits on employee participation and labor-management cooperation be addressed without discouraging workplace innovations that enhance the competitiveness of the modern workplace and without risking a return to the conditions that motivated passage of these protections?

Again, if the Clinton NLRB continues down the same path on which the Bush Board began with *Electromation*, we believe the Commission should endorse the TEAM Act or something similar to it that provides an exemption from section 8(a)(2)'s ban on collaborative workplace efforts that are not being adopted as a union avoidance technique.

7. What, if any, government strategies can assist the diffusion of employee participation and labor-management cooperation?

In addition to the correction of Section 8(a)(2) called for above, we would encourage this Commission to refrain from recommending programs and policies designed to push employee involvement in a particular direction. Rather, we would call on you to do something radically different and daring for policy makers in this century—seek less rather than more regulation of the workplace.

We would also like to address one of the several unstated "findings" in the *Fact Finding Report*, the implied finding regarding whether union representation is an essential

element of successful employee involvement. On page 34, the *Report* states that while both view employee involvement favorably, labor believes EI requires a union setting while management sees EI effective in union and non-union settings. But the *Report* then goes on at great lengths to draw attention to a series of studies that would lead the uninformed reader to agree with labor's position. These studies show, according to the *Report*, that:

- quality circles survive longer in union establishments than non-union establishments;
- labor-management committees survive longer in union machine shops than non-union shops; and,
- unionized companies with joint committees experience higher productivity than non-union companies with joint committees.

The *Report*, however, fails to make any mention whatsoever of an important study which came to a far different conclusion that was prepared exclusively for the benefit of this Commission by Professors Gary McMahan and Edward Lawler of the University of Southern California. The professors reviewed the existing literature on union status and employee involvement. This included nine major surveys which sampled the Fortune 1000, 700 publicly held firms with more than 100 employees, 30 comparable steel finishing lines, 1100 metal working and machinery plants, 29 studies of participation, and executives of 495 business units. A complete list of these studies may be found in Appendix B. From the literature review, they examined whether the presence of a union affected the likelihood of a company adopting employee involvement, and whether the presence of a union affected the success of such programs. It concluded:

Overall, the existing research does not show that union status has a major effect on the likelihood that an organization will

adopt employee involvement practices The research studies also show no significant relationship between the presence or absence of a union and the effectiveness of employee involvement practices⁹.

Their finding is much more in keeping with the experience of corporate human resource executives than is the one implied in the *Report*. In addition, according to the employee involvement survey conducted by the five groups described above, among companies with committees/teams in unionized settings, 56 percent said they have seen greater success of EI programs in their non-union settings than in their unionized ones. Forty-two percent stated that the success was the same in both unionized and non-unionized settings. Significantly, only 2 percent stated that they had greater success in union settings as compared with non-union ones.

Our final point is that we question the order in which the seven questions were posed on page 56 of the *Report*. The order seems to imply that the Commission is searching for a recommendation that might call for additional government regulation in the area of employee involvement. In our opinion, the last question should have gone first. It is a broad, open-ended question asking what changes are needed to promote the diffusion of employee participation and labor-management cooperation. Because a potential revision of Section 8(a)(2) is the logical answer to that question, then the sixth question should have been the second one. It asks how Section 8(a)(2) could be amended without going so far as to permit the use of sham unions as an avoidance technique. The next question should have been the one that is the central issue in this chapter, but it is not one that has been directly laid on the

⁹ McMahan, Gary C. and Lawler III, Edward E. *Effects of Union Status on Employee Involvement: Diffusion & Effectiveness*, Washington, DC: Employment Policy Foundation (1994).

table—should Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act be amended to permit greater use of employee involvement and other cooperative work systems in non-union settings? Questions one through four are leading questions that carry the strong implication that some form of government regulation of employee involvement is necessary. In our opinion, they miss the key point.

In conclusion, the Commission begins Chapter II with the following paragraph:

Considerable change is underway in many of America's workplaces, driven in part by international and domestic competition, technology, and workforce developments described in Chapter I. These external forces are interacting with a growing recognition that achieving a high productivity/high wage economy requires changing traditional methods of labor-management relations and the organization of work in ways that more fully develop and utilize the skills, knowledge, and motivation of the workforce and that share the gains produced.

We would stress that the change you described in this paragraph is one that is occurring, not because of national labor policy, but in spite of it. We strongly urge this Commission to do everything in its power to make federal labor policy a catalyst for cooperative work environments.

Appendix A

Status of Pending 8(a)(2) Employee Involvement Cases

| Case Name and Cite | Decision | Current Status |
|---|--|--------------------------------|
| <i>Electromation</i> 309 NLRB 990 (1992) | NLRB found Company's Action Committees violated 8(a)(2). Non-union setting. | Pending Before Seventh Circuit |
| <i>E.I. Du Pont</i> 311 NLRB 893 (1993) | NLRB ruled Safety and Fitness Committees violated 8(a)(2). Union setting. | Employer did not appeal |
| <i>Dillon Stores</i> 17-CA-16811 (April 29, 1994) | ALJ ruled that associates committees violated 8(a)(2). Union setting. | On appeal to Board |
| <i>Seaboard Farms of Kentucky</i> 26-CA-15388 et al. (March 3, 1994) | ALJ ruled that transportation safety committees violated 8(a)(2). Union setting. | Employer will not appeal |
| <i>NCR Corporation</i> 9-CA-30467 (May 26, 1994) | ALJ ruled satisfaction committees violated 8(a)(2). Non-union setting. | Employer may appeal |
| <i>Webcor Packaging</i> 7-CA-31809 et al. (Oct. 28, 1993) | ALJ ruled that employee committees violated 8(a)(2). Non-union setting. | Awaiting a Board decision |
| <i>Bremner</i> 26-CA-15859 (June 21, 1994) | ALJ ruled that safety committees did not violate 8(a)(2). Union setting. | Union will not appeal |
| <i>Vons Grocery</i> 21-CA-29084 et al. (June 28, 1994) | ALJ ruled that committee did not violate 8(a)(2). Union setting. | Union may appeal |
| <i>Polaroid</i> 1-CA-29966 | Hearing completed. Non-union setting. | Awaiting an ALJ decision |
| <i>Keeler Brass</i> 7-CA-32185 (Oct. 1, 1992) | ALJ ruled that grievance committee did not violate 8(a)(2). Non-union setting. | Awaiting an NLRB decision |

| Case Name and Cite | Decision | Current Status |
|--|---|---------------------------|
| <i>Stoody Company</i> 26-CA-15425 et al. (Sept. 23, 1993) | ALJ ruled that handbook committee violated 8(a)(2). Non-union setting. | Awaiting an NLRB decision |
| <i>Magan Medical</i> 21-CA-28814 (April 6, 1993) | ALJ ruled that grievance committee violated 8(a)(2). Union setting. | Awaiting an NLRB decision |
| <i>Prime Time Shuttle</i> 31-CA-19392 et al. (March 11, 1993) | ALJ ruled that employee committee violated 8(a)(2). Non-union setting. | Awaiting an NLRB decision |

Appendix B

Research Studies on Union Status and Employee Involvement

| Study | Year | Sample | Focus |
|--|-----------|---|---|
| General Accounting Office Survey of Employee Involvement (Analysis conducted and reported in Lawler, Ledford & Mohrman, 1989) | 1987 | Fortune 1000 HR executives | Employee involvement and total quality management |
| General Accounting Office Survey of Employee Involvement (Analysis conducted and reported in Eaton & Voos, 1992) | 1987 | Fortune 1000 HR executives | Differences in union status on employee involvement activities |
| Huselid Study of Human Resource Management Practices (Huselid, 1993a; 1993b) | 1992 | 700 public held firms with more than 100 employees | HR sophistication and its impact on performance and turnover |
| Ichniowski, Shaw & Prensushi Study of HR Systems (Ichniowski, Shaw & Prensushi, 1993) | 1991-1992 | 30 comparable steel finishing lines in the U.S. | HR management systems |
| Kelley & Harrison Study of U.S. Metal Working and Machinery Sector (Kelley & Harrison, 1992) | 1986-1987 | 1105 metal working and machinery plants | Unions, technology, and labor management cooperation |
| Lawler, Mohrman & Ledford Survey of Employee Involvement and Total Quality Management (Lawler, Mohrman & Ledford, 1992) | 1990 | Fortune 1000 HR executives | Follow-up to 1987 survey on employee involvement and total quality management |
| Levine & Tyson Review of Employee Participation (Levine & Tyson, 1990) | 1990 | 29-studies of participation | Types of participation |
| Osterman Study of Workplace Transformation (Osterman, 1993) | 1992 | Random sample of establishments with 50 or more employees | Work transformation and HR practices |
| U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs (Analysis conducted and reported by Delaney, Lewin & Ichniowski, 1989) | 1986-1987 | Executives from 495 business units | HR management practices |