

# Constructing Transnational Solidarity: The Role of Campaign Governance

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## Abstract

*Our inductive study of two transnational labour solidarity efforts focuses on the role of campaign governance. Specifically, we study contrasting campaign strategies, tactics and coalition structures in campaigns by two global union federations, UNI Global Union and the IUF, contextualized in terms of how these campaigns unfolded in India. Our contribution consists of two arguments. The first is that a degree of internal consistency amongst different campaign elements is important for success, and the second is that a mode of articulation that allows for local concerns in affiliate countries to find voice in global campaigns is more likely to result in concrete gains at the local level.*

## 1. Introduction

Transnational labour solidarity (more commonly referred to as labour transnationalism) has been the subject of scholarly interest for almost a century, even though calls for it originated even earlier (e.g. Marx and Engels 1848). Early research during the first half of the twentieth century, such as that of Fimmen (1924) and Lorwin (1953), highlighted the need and rationale for labour transnationalism. The latter half of the twentieth century evinced a number of important contributions that reprised and extended early literature. Notable contributions include those of Logue (1980), who specified the conditions under which national unions would internationalize, and the early works of Waterman (1998) and Munck (1988), which emphasized the (renewed) need for labour to come together to counteract the power of global capital. In addition, there was the argument of Levinson (1972), advocating the development of transnational collective bargaining as an effective response to the pressures from multinationals on host country workforces, Ramsay's (1997, 2000) suggestion that labour internationalism needs to be variegated since multinational corporations follow different strategies in different industries and are structured differently, and the various writings of Hyman (e.g. 2005) on union internationalization strategies.

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The 2000s produced more *empirical* scholarship rooted in the arguments noted above. The edited works of Harrod and O'Brien (2002), Gordon and Turner (2000) and Bronfenbrenner (2007), for example, provided evidence regarding successful cases of labour transnationalism and identified important barriers in failed cases. The latest wave of research has struck a more positive note, with many scholars highlighting over 115 global framework agreements (GFAs)<sup>1</sup> which have been signed as evidence of successes in labour transnationalism. Yet, notes of pessimism persist, such as Waterman's (2014) critique that European unions are still trapped in an 'iron cage' of nationality, which prevents successful transnational solidarity. And, there has been an increase in nuanced research on cross-border solidarity cases that has shed light upon the conditions under which GFAs signed at the global level may or may not result in specific improvements at the local level, exemplified in the works of Anner *et al.* (2006), Brookes and McCallum (2017), Fichter and McCallum (2015) and Niforou (2012).

To provide some order to this vast literature, Brookes and McCallum (2017) divide it into two strands. The first, more theoretical strand, casts labour transnationalism as a countermovement to reshape global capitalism, while the empirical strand examines individual cases of transnational labour solidarity. As Niforou (2015) suggests, the empirical strand is quite varied, as it is informed by a variety of disciplinary approaches such as geography, sociology, political science, economics and law. It is also varied in terms of its focus on different facets of labour transnationalism, such as why GFAs do not result in meaningful gains at the local level, or the roles of supranational institutions such as European Works Councils. Examples can be seen in the works of Barrientos and Smith (2007), Davies *et al.* (2011), Riisgaard and Hammer (2011) and Williams *et al.* (2013). The units of analysis in this strand are also diverse, including movements, campaigns, bilateral alliances, multilateral alliances, global union federations, global value chains and, of course, GFAs.

Brookes and McCallum (2017: 208) suggest that this cacophony of case studies on labour transnationalism from diverse disciplines offers 'more trees than forest'. They call for researchers to conceptualize more clearly and consistently what labour transnationalism is, develop clear criteria for categorizing the wide range of observed 'types' of labour transnationalism and identify which instances of it are directly comparable (whether small N comparative case studies or large N quantitative analyses), in order to advance our understanding and develop theory. In a similar vein, Anner *et al.* (2006) argue that more systematic and contextualized comparisons are needed between what may seem to be 'apples and oranges' in order to synthesize from diverse industry case studies.

In these studies, the meaning of 'success' in labour transnationalism is also varied. Brookes and McCallum (2017) note the difficulty of comparing more established and stable transnational alliances, which do very little in local contexts, with others that are more ephemeral, yet capture the excitement of a social movement. Brookes (2013) provides a useful definition of success

that has the potential to move the field forward. For her, a successful case of labour transnationalism is one in which at least one partner in the alliance must obtain some material benefits such as higher wages and better working conditions or strategic gains such as collective bargaining rights or GFAs.

This article contributes to the literature by drawing lessons for sustainable labour transnationalism, taking into account the need for more contextualized comparisons. Specifically, ours is an inductive study of two transnational labour solidarity efforts. These are the campaigns by two global union federations, UNI Global Union (UNI) and the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers Associations (IUF), and how they unfolded in India. Both campaigns evidence contrasting successes. The UNI's global campaign against G4S, a British multinational security services company, was a 'top-down' campaign that resulted in the signing of a GFA, which was successfully implemented in South Africa, but did not result in concrete strategic or material gains in India. The IUF's campaign against Nestlé, a Swiss-owned multinational food and beverage company, in contrast, was a 'bottom-up' campaign that did NOT result in the signing of a GFA, and yet resulted in both material and strategic gains via increased wages and plant-level collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) in India.

Our study sheds light on the importance of campaign governance as a key variable in the development of transnational solidarity. We advance two arguments. The first is that successful campaigns must exhibit in their articulation a degree of internal consistency amongst the different campaign elements, including global campaign design, the creation of local coalition structures, campaign strategies, tactics and post-campaign activities. The second is that a mode of articulation that allows for local concerns in affiliate countries to find voice in global campaigns tends to result in concrete gains at the *local* level.

In making this argument, this study contributes to extant literature in several ways. We respond specifically to Niforou's (2015) observation that there is a dearth of studies on micro-level and bottom-up approaches, which are essential because global governance is fundamentally multi-level. We provide some empirical evidence to McCallum's (2013) suggestion that global campaigns are the outcome of *both* top-down and bottom-up approaches. We also respond to calls by Anner *et al.* (2006) and Brookes and McCallum (2017) for more contextualized comparisons. But our key contribution to the labour transnationalism literature is our argument and evidence of the interrelationship between different elements of a campaign, and the type of articulation that leads to local success.

## **2. Germane literature**

Given our relatively narrow focus on campaign governance in labour transnationalism, our review of relevant literature will necessarily be more

narrowly focused. For those interested in the broader *conceptual* labour transnationalism literature, we refer readers to key earlier works (e.g. Fimmen 1924; Levinson 1972; Logue 1980; Lorwin 1953) and the more recent writings of Hyman (2005, 2007) and Waterman (1998, 2014). For recent reviews of the *empirical* labour transnationalism literature, we refer readers to Brookes and McCallum (2017), Ford and Gillan (2015) and Niforou (2014, 2015). Our objective in this brief review of germane literature is to focus on what we know, theoretically and empirically, about 'governance' in labour transnationalism.

As far as governance in labour transnationalism is concerned, scholars seem to agree that there has been a general shift from an older form to a newer one. The *old* form, summarized in Burawoy (2010), is 'typically run by career bureaucrats, in a central hierarchical organization, with restricted debate, a diplomatic orientation, focusing only on unions that are established by Northern male white workers'. This is similar to Hyman's (2005) 'bureaucrat model' of international unionism. Examples of scholarship in this vein can be seen in the works of Gordon and Turner (2000), Stevis and Boswell (2008) and Bronfenbrenner (2007). The *new* form of governance in labour transnationalism is characterized by features such as leadership by a new generation of activists, linkages between decentralized networks, more open debate within the transnational movement, a mobilizational and campaign orientation including coalition building with social movements, a central focus on solidarity, and with more participation by workers from the Global South. This new form is similar to Hyman's (2005) 'agitator' model of unionism.

There is debate about the impact of this new form however. On the one hand, there are sceptics like Burawoy (2010), Niforou (2012, 2014) and Brookes (2013), who question whether unions have truly been able to build transnational solidarity, whether global campaigns improve working conditions in the Global South, and whether GFAs signed at the global level can be implemented at local levels. On the other hand, there are some who see promise in GFAs signed with multinationals, such as Egels-Zandén and Hyllman (2007) and Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick (2012). McCallum (2013) argues that 'workers who have the support of a global campaign behind them are necessarily more powerful in facing down global corporations'. Some empirical studies have addressed the extent to which this promise is actually realized, focusing on the relative importance of global versus local factors, and questioning whether 'one-size-fits-all' approaches are realistic for the successful implementation of GFAs. But, as these studies do not necessarily focus on the *governance* of labour transnationalism, we do not review them here. Examples can be found in Anner *et al.* (2006), Brookes (2013), Cumbers *et al.* (2008), Egels-Zanden (2007), Fichter *et al.* (2011), Lillie (2005), Niforou (2012, 2014), Riisgaard (2005) and Wills (2002).

Regarding governance specifically, there is debate regarding top-down and bottom-up approaches. One question concerns local involvement in global campaigns to sign GFAs. Fichter and McCallum (2015: 67–69) pointed to 'the inherent shortcomings of a negotiation process dominated by social partnership' in the headquarters of MNCs generally based in

Europe where institutional structures facilitate such agreements. They suggest that social dialogue at the European level ‘is less useful for implementing GFAs’, and, hence, GFAs arising from a social partnership approach tend to be ‘top-down’ and remain ‘still-born’, whereas GFAs arising out of a broader mobilization of workers will *likely* have a better record of implementation. Whether such a top-down approach is effective or not echoes a much older debate about the trade-offs between oligarchy and democracy (Michels 1911). As Hyman (2007) suggests, global strategies tend to be determined by structures at a central level, which is generally the case in the GUFs, which are generally situated primarily in Europe. However, GUFs are also federations of their global affiliates, and ‘union democracy requires adequate scope for different categories of members to shape the priorities of their organisations’ (p. 199), which in turn calls for wider participation. Yet, to go too far down the democracy route poses risks to global strategy formulation and implementation. Hyman cites Streeck’s (1988: 312) observation that ‘a ‘pluralist’ multitude of small, narrowly based collective action units, competing with each other for organizational resources and political influence’, lack ‘a capacity to deliberate and control the macro-level outcomes of their action’. Thus, the only solution then is the proper articulation between the local, national and international levels, which requires ‘authoritative leadership’ (Hyman 2007: 199).

McCallum (2013) emphasizes that linking global labour campaigns and local union revitalization argues for a shift away from a top-down perspective without completely surrendering to a totally bottom-up angle. This essentially is the (unresolved) tension that GUFs face in articulating and implementing a global strategy. An outcome of the above debate is that it may result in ‘governance struggles’ (McCallum 2013), that is, there are ways for global unionism to empower workers locally, but these generally occur at a level far removed from the local workplace, and often through activities of GUFs.

One factor that determines the ability of GUFs to successfully *manage* this tension concerns the degree of affiliate involvement in global alliances and affiliates’ integration into GUFs’ governance structures — often measured by the national composition of GUF staff and functionaries, evidenced in the works of Croucher and Cotton (2009), Lecher *et al.* (2001), Pulignano (2006) and Anner *et al.* (2006). Hyman’s ideas highlight the need for GUFs to strike a balance between global priorities and local goals in strategy formulation, advocating structures that permit coordination to achieve *global* goals. Fichter and McCallum (2015) argue that where local workers and their unions are actively involved in a campaign, they are far more able to enhance their bargaining power in a *local* setting. This debate would suggest that the ability of the GUF’s to effectively execute their strategic plans requires them ‘to play a facilitation and coordination role’ rather than directing the implementation of strategy from ‘above’ (Ford and Gillan 2015: 458). Thus, while the above literature highlights the need for GUFs to strike a balance between global priorities and local goals in strategy formulation, it equivocates

on striking a similar balance in implementation, which is contingent on local institutional employment relations configurations. Clearly, then, from a governance perspective, how global campaigns are articulated locally is a key element which requires further investigation.

So, what do we know about governance in the *local* articulation of global campaigns? A limited number of empirical studies address the issue, albeit not quite directly. Cotton and Royle (2014) study the relationship between the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers Unions (ICEM) and one of its affiliates (Sintracarbon) in Columbia in their campaign against a mine owned by Anglo-American. Their study of the ICEM and Sintracarbon relationship shows a deliberative stage-wise process. This process began with collaborative projects on mining safety, followed by educational programmes to build affiliate capacity, training of a new generation of union leaders and integrating those leaders into GUF structures. Thereafter, networking events with other unions in the region was necessary before Sintracarbon was able to begin a formal process of dialogue with employers that resulted in the successful organization of contract workers in the Colombian mining industry. Niforou (2014), adopting a global governance perspective in her study of the implementation of GFAs in two cases (Endesa and Telefonica), highlights the difficulties in successfully using GFA provisions for local union organization and recognition for collective bargaining purposes. She suggests that, had local actors been involved, the representation problems noted in the Endesa GFA would have been addressed. In the Telefonica case as well, the lack of collective ownership of the GFA, especially by managements and unions in the affiliate countries, accounted for local union inertia in proactively using the GFA to enforce compliance locally. In a different arena, observing the low level of compliance of suppliers with retailers' codes of conduct, Egels-Zandén (2007) suggests that increasing the role of affiliates with strong local presence in the monitoring process can improve the situation.

Anner *et al.* (2006) point to the importance of developing *structures* for effective transnationalism. In the maritime industry, the unions had built industry-level structures for transnational solidarity, but in the auto sector, the insularity of national unions prevented the achievement of the transnational objective. This is akin to Logue's (1980: 21) thesis highlighting the inverse relationship between trade union control over its national environment and its involvement in international activity. Anner *et al.*'s study is important in that it highlights the need to effectively structure campaigns in ways that encompass local actors.

Apart from structures, the 'identity work' of union leaders can help sustain labour transnationalism at different local levels. In a case of transnational collective action in the auto industry under the aegis of a European Works Council, Greer and Hauptmeier (2008) show that the way in which top union leaders framed problems and interests had a substantial effect on the development of shared norms, which resulted in the building of social ties and trust that facilitated the mobilization of workers in different countries. Such

ties were instrumental in overcoming the situation where workers in different European countries faced conflicting material interests.

It is possible to encompass the lessons from these limited empirical studies into more recent *conceptual* views. Levesque and Murray (2010) argue that successful transnationalism requires the right mix of *power resources* and *strategic capabilities*. They suggest that a key *power resource* concerns how unions create internal solidarity. This refers broadly to the building of collective identities to create cohesion. More specifically, Levesque and Murray (2010) allude to the notion of ‘deliberative vitality’, which involves the degree and quality of participation of members and affiliates in decision-making through governance structures and participative mechanisms. A second *power resource* involves the building of vertical solidarity, involving linkages between local, industrial, national and international levels, and horizontal solidarity involving linkages with other organizations and social movements. In a similar vein, Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2013) highlight the need for unions to build *discursive, coalitional and strategic* power to counter the decline in traditional sources of power due to globalization. Levesque and Murray’s ‘*strategic capabilities*’ include the notion of *framing*, which is the development of an ‘overarching narrative as a frame of reference for action’ (2010: 343), similar to Greer and Hauptmeier’s (2008) ‘identity work’ or Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman’s ‘discursive power’. It also includes *articulating*, which concerns how unions arbitrate between actions across different levels, time and space. This might require, for example, the development of ‘glocal’ actions (actions that are simultaneously global and local), or involve scaling up local issues to a larger context (Tarrow 2005).

Niforou (2014) argues, in her study of labour leverage in global value chains, that successful labour transnationalism must recognize that governance is inherently multi-level, and that interdependencies across levels shape labour’s leverage. This requires the need for more horizontal and vertical linkages and a greater focus on understanding local micro-level bottom-up responses. Overall, she suggests that transnational union networks have been characterized by a democratic deficit, evidenced by their weakness in incorporating and accommodating different local members’ interests, which detracted from their ability to generate a sense of collective identity. And both De Neve (2008) and Niforou (2012) suggest that an understanding of local interests is crucial, especially given that differences in political trajectories and ideologies can affect organizing at the local level.

The empirical and conceptual studies mentioned above commonly highlight global–local relations in a way that serves as a useful ‘point of departure’ for our investigation. We unearth through our inductive approach an articulation, that is, how global strategies, intermediate structures and local strategies interact in two global campaigns in India by two different GUFs. In so doing, we attempt to answer Brooke’s and McCallum’s call for drawing more comparisons to generate middle-range theories relevant to labour transnationalism.

### 3. Context and methodology

#### *Context*

In order to engage in a contextualized comparison, we compare global campaigns in India by the IUF and UNI, two GUFs that have been engaged in several global campaigns. In India, their affiliates have grown from 9 and 4 in the late 1990s, respectively, to 36 and 15 by 2015. The two campaigns studied here are the IUF's global campaign against the multinational Nestlé and the UNI's global campaign against G4S Plc, the world's largest security services company.

The two global campaigns differed in their origins. The IUF's 'Stop Nespressure' campaign originated after Nestlé's refusal of the IUF's demand to extend recognition of unions beyond Europe, in order to counter labour rights violations by Nestlé in the developing world. In India, the campaign focused primarily on Nestlé's refusal to recognize unions and bargain collectively in its Indian operations. Space limitations in this article militate against detailed descriptions of this global campaign. However, detailed coverage can be found in Croucher and Cotton (2009), Gallin (2008), Garver *et al.* (2007), Rutters (2003) and White (2006).

The UNI's global campaign had its origins in the 'Justice for Janitors' campaign in the USA by the US-based Service Employees International Union (SEIU), one of UNI's largest affiliates. The consolidation of the global security industry led SEIU and UNI to launch a global campaign to organize security workers. In the developing world, this campaign focused heavily after 2006 in South Africa, Indonesia and India. The goal of the campaign was to sign a GFA with G4S, while making local efforts to organize security guards in India. More detailed descriptions and analyses of this campaign can be found in the works of Evans (2014) and McCallum (2013).

Both global campaigns ended during 2008–2009. By Brookes' (2013) definition of success, both were successful, but in different ways. The UNI's campaign resulted in the signing of a global framework agreement in 2008, and a partial organization of security guards in India, although as McCallum has demonstrated, which our investigations confirm, none of the security workers' unions formed by UNI's affiliate in India had been recognized by G4S India management and no CBAs had been signed when we collected data for this article in 2015. The IUF's campaign, which stopped in 2008, did not result in a global framework agreement, but in India, the campaign resulted in the successful organization of unions at five of Nestlé's Indian factories that are now covered by CBAs. Thus, there is global success in one case and local success in the other.

Both campaigns occur in a context where union organizing is not easy. On the one hand, India is a democracy with established labour institutions, well-developed labour legislation in the formal sector and relatively simple union formation processes, all of which create conditions favourable to new union organizing. On the other hand, the absence of laws regarding

union recognition, lax enforcement of legislation and a neoliberal tilt after liberalization in 1990 has legitimized employer opposition to unions, providing for a difficult terrain for organizing. In addition, the multiplicity of unions, each affiliated to a different political party, creates unhealthy inter-union competition, which Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) term 'involved pluralism'. The industrial context also imposes differing challenges. It is arguably much easier to organize regular manufacturing workers in Nestlé factories since industrial establishments provide a degree of social cohesion amongst workers that facilitates collective action. In contrast, the highly dispersed nature of work in the security industry, where security guards are contract workers farmed out to different employers and establishments, makes union organizing far more difficult. Besides, there are significant differences in protective legislation. Contract workers such as security guards are covered under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, which is less protective compared with the Trade Unions Act, 1926, and Industrial Disputes Act, 1948, applicable to factory workers. Thus, such contextual issues could explain the different outcomes in these two cases. Nevertheless, we argue in this article that there is also a role for campaign governance in explaining outcomes, specifically the processes involved in how global campaigns are articulated locally.

### *Methods*

Our methods involved the detailed analysis of information from the archives of GUFs, information published on their websites regarding campaigns, prior literature, and a series of interviews between 2012 and 2015. Our sampling strategy regarding who to interview was purposeful and opportunistic. We decided to interview union officials involved in strategic global campaign decisions at the GUF level, union officials at the intermediate coalition structures level who mediate between global and local strategies, and local union representatives and activists who implemented strategy on the ground.

Accordingly, the first author interviewed one senior official at each GUF to understand their global strategies. Within each GUF, he interviewed three officers at the intermediate campaign structures created by the GUFs in India, responsible for campaign rollout. Further, 29 in-depth unstructured interviews were conducted with six union activists (three from each GUF), four and two worker representatives from Nestlé and G4S, respectively, three affiliate union representatives belonging to each GUF, four officers each from country outreach offices and liaison councils, and three country experts. Appendix 1 provides a complete list of key interviewees. In addition, discussions were held with a variety of international academics who work in this domain. Each interview took about three hours, and most were audiotaped. The interview data were analysed using MAXQDA software.

Our investigation is necessarily one-sided, given that both G4S-India and Nestlé-India managements refused to meet with us. However, a plethora of literature suggests that in the Global South, both companies have a

history of resisting unionization efforts. In the case of G4S, McCallum (2013) and Fichter and McCallum (2015) document this claim based on detailed interviews in the field as well as on archival reports. In the case of the Nestlé, Phillip Mattera (2010), the research director of Good Jobs First (a watchdog group), documents Nestlé's union resistance primarily based on archival research, especially on research reports about Nestlé published by the Fair Labor Association, Greenpeace, Facing Finance and in several other publications. White (2006: 102), an investigative journalist, provides evidence of Nestlé's union avoidance activities in the Global South, which included the use of contingent labour, and the 'artificial promotion of workers into managerial positions and thereby excluding them from union membership'. And Mattera (2010) concluded in his study that 'though the company has good relations with unions representing its relatively small domestic workforce, its foreign labour record is less harmonious especially in the Global South'. Two quotes sum up these strategies for both companies. McCallum (2013: 7) suggests 'Per its corporate southern strategy to achieve higher profit margins, G4S lay extra emphasis on its non-union operations in the Global South', while Mattera (2010) argues 'where weak legislation sanctions union busting, Nestle is not averse to busting unions'.

#### **4. Results**

The major themes that emerged from the data analysis are GUF expansion strategies generally, their history in India, the design of campaign structures, global–local relations, local organizing strategies, tactics and post-campaign activities. We organization our presentation of results accordingly.

##### *GUF Global Expansion Strategies*

The two GUFs differed in terms of the relative importance of a regional focus in their global expansion strategies. The IUF states on its website that their focus is on 'strengthening affiliates through building solidarity in the global supply-chain with the help of cross-border campaigns in order to exert influence on multinationals for international recognition and collective bargaining' (IUF website 2013). As Croucher and Cotton (2009: 65) note, IUF has been focused more closely in 'securing union recognition and bargaining rights'. Realizing that membership growth is likely to come from developing countries, IUF felt it necessary to bond with affiliates along the forward and backward linkages in local supply chains in these countries. Rutters (2003) of the Freidrich Ebert Stiftung (a German Foundation) suggests that in developing countries, IUF has achieved a high measure of mobilization by improving the representation of trade union interests at the national level and asserting influence at the local level. Hence, the goal of the IUF campaign was primarily local (improving union density and collective bargaining in India) and secondarily (viewed from India) to enter into a GFA. This focus on using a global campaign to emphasize local gains differs from that of the UNI.

Formed in 2000 as a merger of four major global unions of service sector workers, UNI's strategy focuses on global organizing by forming sector-based global unions that seek to protect core labour standards internationally through negotiating GFAs (Hammer 2005). As Fichter *et al.* (2011) suggest, UNI's primary goal was to sign a GFA, expecting that a change in the 'rules', as McCallum (2013) suggests, would then trickle down into collective bargaining successes locally. The differing foci, that is, one on local collective bargaining and the other on GFA's, likely account for the differences noted below in how the campaigns were carried out.

### *History in India*

The IUF first engaged in India when it was called to assist unionized employees of Unilever's Indian subsidiary Hindustan Lever to fight the company's unfair labour practices beginning in 1990. The issue was settled successfully in 2004, via a CBA. This 15-year effort resulted in the formation of an IUF-India outreach office (IUF-IOO) led by experienced organizers of the Hindustan Lever Employees Union (HLEU). IUF-IOO then expanded its focus to the entire supply chain of Hindustan Lever, including firms in plantation, agriculture and the dairy sector. IUF-IOO's National Officer of Supply Chain explained that, '*a campaign engaging with a beer manufacturing firm like SABMiller in India involves contract farmers producing barley, the raw material (upstream), as well as salespersons selling beer in retail outlets (downstream), alongside the factory workers producing beer*' (Interview IUF-2). A flexible affiliation structure allowed IUF to pull together apolitical NGOs alongside politically affiliated and independent unions. This naturally required a bottom-up incorporation of multiple stakeholders' concerns into their strategy. IUF-IOO was led by the then General Secretary of HLEU, a company union not affiliated to political parties. Thus, IUF had a well-established strategy and structure in India before its Nestlé campaign.

In contrast, UNI by itself did not have any experience in India. Because UNI was a merger of four global unions,<sup>2</sup> it incorporated each of the four unions' affiliates in India (13 in total) into a UNI India Liaison Council (UNI-ILC) in 2001. UNI-ILC was an 'instant alliance' formed without any prior experience of working together. Our interviews suggest that UNI struggled with building cohesiveness amongst the 13 Indian affiliates who automatically became part of UNI-ILC. The affiliates differed in terms of their representation (blue- versus white-collar workers), their strategy (business versus political unionism) and their political affiliations. Hence, we have a case of a GUF with no prior experience in India, trying to pull together a plethora of different local organizations with varying experience into a cohesive whole. UNI-ILC's president illustrated this problem in the following way: '*To consolidate the power of a dozen affiliates representing diverse sectors and political ideologies,*<sup>3</sup> *we at UNI-ILC chose not to meddle with others' work*' (Interview UNI-3). Thus, we see that IUF's relationship with its affiliates at the national space was emblematic of a high degree of 'deliberative vitality'

suggested by Levesque and Murray (2010), while the UNI attempted to generate a degree of vertical solidarity.

### *India Campaign Strategies*

In 2007, the IUF-IOO alliance focused on three factories where the unions had not been recognized by Nestlé-India.<sup>4</sup> IUF-IOO formed the 'Federation of All India Nestlé Employees' (FAINE) in 2008 with the 'right to negotiation' as its primary agenda. With IUF-IOO support, a fourth Nestlé factory in Bicholim and a fifth factory in Pantnagar formed unions, but Nestlé did not recognize them. FAINE then launched a coordinated campaign to win recognition and bargaining rights in these five factories. Following a programme to educate workers about their rights and to train them in negotiations, FAINE drafted a charter of demands, including a demand for 25 per cent rise in wages for 2009–2010, which Nestlé rejected citing its policy of no negotiation with unions. Ground-level organizing commenced thereafter. At first, FAINE drafted a six-month action plan under the IUF-IOO's guidance. *'As per the action plan, every factory union representative was required to visit each factory where a campaign is on, participate in gate-meetings, and keep each other informed of the development at their own factories'*, noted the IUF-IOO's TNC-Coordinator (Interview IUF-1). A worker in the Pantnagar factory who remained very close to workplace action throughout noted: *'IUF-IOO ensured that three to four union representatives from every factory appear in all meetings. Unions from coastal Goa though found it challenging, gathered at 5 am and 9 pm to meet the first- and night-shift workers in January in our plant located in the Northern hilly terrains that witness very harsh winter'* (Interview IUF-3). Finally, on 25 May 2009, approximately 400 workers from four factories assembled for a six-hour-long demonstration in Nestlé-India's headquarters. These local activities were linked by FAINE to the IUF's global 'Stop Nespressure' campaign. IUF lodged an OECD guidelines complaint<sup>5</sup> against Nestlé Inc. on 11 May 2009 in Vevey in which the right to association in the Pantnagar factory and right to negotiation in four other factories were dominant issues. Eventually, in the presence of the UK-National Contact Person<sup>6</sup> (UK-NCP), Nestlé agreed to negotiate with its Indian unions. Thus, both intense ground-level organizing combined with pressure at the international level forced management to change their view. Nestlé-India agreed to respect the right of association of Pantnagar factory workers where the union was recognized in September 2009. They then signed five separate CBAs with unions in five factories.

In the *UNI case*, the campaign in India started with UNI-Global's Property Service (UNI-PS) division establishing the Indian Security Workers Organising Initiative (ISWOI). This was done in partnership with two national union federations. These were the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU), affiliated to the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Congress party-affiliated Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC). Interestingly, both federations did not have prior experience in organizing security workers. Given the sector's size, ISWOI focused its efforts on organizing G4S workers in multiple cities in India.

The initial focus of the campaign in India was to solicit the Indian government's intervention, but realizing that *'the law enforcement machinery was not prepared to bring any regulatory changes immediately'* (Interview UNI-Global Officer, UNI-1), ISWOI launched the 'Security for Security Workers' campaign in India in November 2007. ISWOI met with the G4S India management in January 2008, to present their charter of eight demands. When the management refused to negotiate, ISWOI focused on building grassroots support for eight key issues of importance to security workers. Meanwhile, at the global level, UNI-PS continued to focus on building solidarity that was an integral part of the global campaign. Although G4S India agreed to act favourably on the demands by April 2008, it did not do so. Meanwhile, close to 5,000 guards who brought an action claiming unpaid overtime-wage were dismissed by G4S. The company threatened workers and ordered them to *'stay away from trade union activities'* (Interview UNI-5). This UNI-ILC's state-level organizer recalls, *'The impact of our campaign was many guards started expressing their voice against the injustice. However, G4S threatened the union leaders. Many workers lost their jobs'*. ISWOI appealed to court. The court decided in favour of the security workers. Because G4S India management did not attend the conciliation process initiated by the labour department with regard to the charter of eight demands, ISWOI switched the focus of their campaign to pressurizing G4S's clients in India, such as Axis Bank, Indian Premier League (IPL), and several foreign embassies, who were, as per the law, the principal employers of G4S guards. *'The focus was on pressuring G4S's clients by leafleting, protesting at important events such as cricket matches in which the clients, such as IPL, was a sponsor, and otherwise targeting places where security guards worked to taint the reputation of "brand G4S"'*, shared the general secretary of a UNI-ILC affiliate (Interview UNI-4).

Yet, none of these tactics yielded results. The state-level UNI-ILC organizer noted, *'The company did not honor its promise, made by G4S India management in earlier discussions with ISWOI in January 2008, to conciliate on the eight outstanding issues by April 2008'* (Interview UNI-5). A G4S security guard from Kochi said, *'In Kerala, after seven years of struggle we could not make the local G4S management to abide by the state government notification on payment of minimum wage to us'* (Interview UNI-8). This sentiment was widely shared by most of the security guards that we interviewed. We learned from our conversations with security guards that, in some cities, the G4S management had promised to issue letters of appointment to the guards and return their education certificates, as they had demanded, but the management delayed and later added these issues also to the matters pending conciliation. The UNI negotiated a GFA on 11 December 2008 with G4S as a result of the intervention of the OECD's appointed mediator,<sup>7</sup> which brought the global campaign to an end (Fichter *et al.* 2011: 71) and left the task of overseeing implementation of GFA with the country affiliates. However, local country affiliates have not been successful, since G4S India had not settled these issues at the time of our data collection.

*Campaign Coalition Structures*

The intermediary structures created by the two campaigns differed quite systematically. The importance of making gains locally in different regions can be seen in IUF's regional structure, where there is a disproportionate representation of developing-country regions, permitting the country outreach offices to voice the importance of local priorities in engaging with the country's multinational management (Garver *et al.* 2007). Local actors have considerable freedom under the IUF's national outreach offices to launch local campaigns, which then feed into the IUF's global campaigns. FAINE focused on weaving together disparate local organizations (unions, NGOs and social movements). In this particular case, the autonomy enjoyed by FAINE appears completely consistent with the ICEM-Sintracarbon case described before, and with McCullum's notion that change must come from the global grassroots.

In contrast, UNI's local coalition structures did not enjoy the same autonomy as those of the IUF's. ISWOI was composed of CITU and INTUC, two federations with opposing political philosophies, who could not work together. 'Fierce inter-union competition has guarded against solidarity in this camp' (Fichter and McCallum 2015: 79). Thus, a significant amount of time was spent, bringing the two ideologically different unions to create a cohesive identity. Although considerable autonomy was given to CITU and INTUC in their attempt to organize security guards in different cities, both inter-union rivalry and the focus on a global framework agreement resulted in some degree of centralization of decisions at the campaign coordinator level. A G4S security guard who was part of the campaign under the INTUC suggested that '*Distributing flyers with CITU logo was sufficient to offend the accord and CITU tried to interfere with our organizing work in Bangalore*' (Interview UNI-6). Other security guards also highlighted the problem of inter-union rivalry, which, as Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) have noted, is a common characteristic in Indian industrial relations. The campaign coordinators in India were from New Zealand, with limited understanding of the local context, reporting to SEIU's officer overseeing the Indian campaign. Every move by ISWOI needed to be approved by UNI-PS.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, unlike the IUF case, local affiliates' concerns did not take centre stage in UNI's global campaign strategy, which hewed closer to the top-down perspective highlighted by McCallum (2013). Although UNI's global sectoral structure does incorporate subregional centres and national unions, their input into global campaigns appears to be limited. A senior UNI-Global officer (Interview UNI-1) held that '*local affiliates decide their priorities, but that does not necessarily mean that the priorities are what UNI will support*'. According to her, UNI would launch a regional campaign that meets affiliates' interests, only when its analyses regarding available staffing and resources indicate the possibility of winning, and when affiliates have a proven track record. In contrast to IUF, where 'horizontal embeddedness' (Levesque and Murray 2010) was the norm, the UNI showed a much greater focus on 'vertical embeddedness', in part due

to the inability of local unions to voice and implement local strategies that meet local needs.

### *Campaign Tactics*

FAINE harnessed local campaigning methods, tools and tactics. *‘As you have noticed, the action plan was drawn by affiliate factory unions with only the technical support provided by IUF-IOO ... whether it was organizing gate meetings or holding demonstration in front of head office, these ideas have originated from the coordination committee meetings of FAINE’*, noted IUF-IOO’s TNC-Coordinator (Interview IUF-1). Techniques such as the canteen boycott alongside running community kitchens (Sanjha Chulha) in multiple factories by workers’ spouses show how IUF-IOO and FAINE acclimatized themselves with the local culture of collectivism in North India (where such tactics have been tried before). For example, a worker from Nestlé’s Moga factory suggested, *‘In canteen boycott the day when food was ready to be served we boycotted and on the other day, when food was unprepared as management supposed that boycott is on, we demanded food. We were taking management by shock’* (Interview IUF-4).

In contrast, UNI’s G4S campaign in India was not based on prior learning or experiences in India, but based on its learning in the USA. UNI’s coalition mostly applied campaign techniques proposed by UNI-PS or used methods that were employed in similar campaigns in the services sector by UNI-Global. This centralization was in part due to UNI’s goal of signing a GFA with G4S. As UNI-ILC’s president suggested, *‘sine qua non of bringing G4S within an ambit of dialogue and compel G4S to sign GFA at the end of the campaign, which UNI has tried with a dozen similar corporations in past’* (Interview UNI-3). McCallum (2013: 133–34) points out, that *‘The unions such as PGSU began to shift its organizing process under the influence of UNI to focus on strategic mapping, one-to-one meetings with guards, and data collection, which are all elements of the North American ‘organizing model’*. Even the ground-level organizing by CITU and INTUC federations hewed to this model. Workplace interviews confirmed that the guards gradually realized that *‘their’* campaign was headed not by their own leaders, but by SEIU organizers and the two campaign coordinators from New Zealand. Although ISWOI leaders had bought into the SEIU campaign governance structure, some security guards told us that they were reluctant to engage in campaigns under the guidance of foreigners. Other guards indicated difficulty in following campaign rules set by UNI and SEIU without their own input into campaign decisions. A security guard campaigning under the CITU banner in Kolkata suggested, *‘The organizers were almost teaching us how to run a campaign, as if we are campaigning for the first time in our life’* (Interview UNI-7).

### *Post-Campaign Activities*

The IUF stopped its campaign and withdrew its OECD complaint once Nestlé signed CBAs with its workers in various factories in India, but FAINE

continues to organize new factories, and the IUF continues to expand its activities in India, including in Nestlé. The ISWOI was dismantled after the GFA was signed in 2008 in the UNI case, leaving local unions, who had faced numerous barriers in organizing G4S guards, to fend for themselves using the GFA as leverage. UNI's chosen affiliates in India did not have the organizational strength, experience and capability to organize in the security industry, adequate local autonomy and enough voice in the global campaign structure to effectively organize security guards. This may be due to UNI's strategy of focusing on a GFA and constructing a 'Lilliputians vs. Gulliver strategy in which unions from multiple countries, none of them particularly powerful in their own national contexts, converged to force the corporate Gulliver to negotiate' (Evans 2014: 270).

## 5. Discussion and conclusions

What do we learn from this contextualized comparison regarding the role of campaign governance in the two cases in this article? First, the cases illustrate the debates and conjectures identified in prior literature regarding the tensions between centralization and decentralization in global campaigns. We find that the two campaigns strike different balances between global and local goals. The UNI campaign instituted strategies and structures that permitted it to achieve global goals. The IUF case suggests that campaigns have to be *locally* inspired, because when local workers and their unions are actively involved in campaign decisions, they are far more able to enhance their bargaining power in a *local* setting. As our description of the two campaigns indicates, the IUF's campaign in India comports more with the ideals of the 'new labour transnationalism' identified in the literature.

Second, these cases permit us to make two contributions to extant theory regarding the role of campaign governance. The first of these contributions is that there is a need for internal consistency across different campaign elements for success. As our cases demonstrate, both campaigns illustrate such a consistency. The UNI's campaign focused on the global goal of signing a GFA. It exhibited centrally determined strategies to achieve that goal. UNI created campaign coalition structures where decisions were taken by global rather than local officers, embraced campaign and organizing tactics that were based on global (US) experiences, despite the uneasiness of local workers with that model. And the campaign was concluded when the global goal was achieved. Their campaign thus exhibits a degree of 'vertical embeddedness'. In contrast, the IUF's campaign was based on a conception that transnational labour solidarity would be best served by making local improvements. It adopted strategies based on the local terrain, created more coordinated coalition structures that permitted the local voices to dominate in the global campaign, followed home-grown and local tactics and was ultimately more enduring locally. Even after the campaign was over, the coalition structures IUF created, such as FAINE, continued to work to organize and improve collective bargaining throughout the dairy supply chain locally. IUF's campaign exhibits

characteristics of 'horizontal embeddedness' alluded to by Levesque and Murray (2010). But both campaigns demonstrate an internal consistency amongst the different elements in a campaign that is a likely prerequisite to constructing transnational solidarity.

Our second contribution concerns notions of success in labour transnationalism. Although success was conceptualized by Brookes (2013) as at least one party in the coalition making material or strategic gains, we ask the question of what the purpose of transnational solidarity might be, especially between workers in the Global North and South. Transnationalism between labour actors in developed countries where labour is firmly institutionalized is a necessary issue, to be sure, but hardly sufficient in creating a global labour movement. If success in transnational labour alliances were to be reconceptualized as the need to strengthen workers and unions in the Global South, there is a clear imperative for local participation in global decisions, in ways that overcome the democratic deficit in global labour governance that Niforou (2014) highlights. This deficit is more apparent in the UNI campaign relative to the IUF's where local interests, strategies and tactics assumed centre stage. Thus, we argue that campaigns, whether 'born global' or 'born local', must be articulated at the local level in ways that meet the interests of local workers, not just the strategic interests of the GUF, if we are to see sustainable improvements in union power and collective bargaining at the local level in the Global South.

While we have presented a plausible argument that campaign governance matters, and that local participation in global campaigns is key to local success, we cannot ignore alternate explanations that could account for the different local results we see in these two campaigns. The two industries in which the campaigns were conducted produce different challenges for union organizing. It is generally easier to organize factory workers working in an industrially bounded location, relative to security guards who work in dispersed locations. Furthermore, labour law protections for factory workers are generally stronger in India than for contracted workers. Inter-union rivalry amongst UNI affiliates was also a problem. All these could have precluded the UNI from obtaining local organizing successes. But, on the other hand, it is clear that the UNI's goals were to obtain a GFA, and the way that UNI organized its global campaign, with limited involvement of local actors in campaign strategies, structures and tactics, was partially responsible for the lack of positive local outcomes. Thus, we have made the case for a plausible argument regarding the role of campaign governance in local success of labour transnationalism, but call for more research on the *relative* impacts of contextual variables and campaign governance variables. We hope future research will take up this challenge.

To conclude, we studied two global campaigns and how they were articulated locally in India, adding to the limited empirical stock of literature on the local effects of global campaigns. We argue that there is a need for internal consistency across the campaigns for campaign success, but we also argue that constructing global labour solidarity requires campaign

governance efforts that meet the interests of workers in the Global South. A more democratic local articulation is key to this effort.

Final version accepted on 12 February 2019

## Notes

1. The article uses a number of abbreviations (such as GFAs), and we provide in Appendix 2 a complete list of those used.
2. These are International Federation of Employees, technicians and managers (FIET), Communications International (CI), Media and Entertainment International (MEI) and International Graphical Federation (IGF).
3. CI and IGF brought politically affiliated federations. A majority with FIET and MEI were non-affiliated.
4. Union recognition in India is not a subject of law, but by convention, under the Code of Discipline in Industry (1956).
5. The OECD Guidelines possess a unique complaint procedure (Specific Instance Procedure) that provides the means to actively attend to and potentially resolve conflicts between aggrieved communities and companies (<http://oecdwatch.org/filing-complaints>, accessed on 27 August 2015).
6. UK-NCP for the OECD guidelines is an independent body responsible for raising awareness of the guidelines and implementing the OECD guidelines' complaint mechanism.
7. Signing of the GFA resulted in G4S agreeing to 'Ethical-Employment Partnership Agreement' that provided G4S's workers around the globe the right to organize.
8. Although UNI-APRO's Regional Secretary argues that if UNI in Asia targets a multinational in a given sector, the GUF will launch a regional campaign by giving in to the local workers' assessments (UNI-2).

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## **Appendix 1: Interviews**

### *Key Interviews Cited in the Article*

1. UNI-1: UNI Global Union's Senior Official
2. IUF-1: Transnational Corporation Coordinator of IUF-IOO
3. IUF-2: IUF-IOO's National Officer of Supply Chain
4. UNI-2: UNI-APRO Regional Secretary
5. UNI-3: UNI-ILC President
6. UNI-4: UNITES Professional Secretary (UNITES is one of the oldest affiliates of UNI in India)
7. UNI-5: State-level UNI-ILC Organizer
8. UNI-6: G4S Security Guard from Bangalore
9. UNI-7: G4S Security Guard from Kolkata
10. UNI-8: G4S Security Guard from Kochi
11. IUF-3: Local worker from Nestlé's Pantnagar plant
12. IUF-4: Local worker from Nestlé's Moga plant

*Details of All Interviewees*

<i>Interviewees</i>	<i>IUF</i>	<i>UNI</i>
Senior officials of GUF	Former IUF Global Officer (for dairy, plantation and beverage sectors in the Global South)	Deputy General Secretary, UNI Global Union
Officers at the intermediate campaign structures created by GUFs in India	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Officer, Asia-Pacific Regional Office, IUF</li> <li>2. Former General Secretary, Hindustan Lever Employees' Union (IUF affiliate)</li> <li>3. Asia-Pacific Coordinator, IUF</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Officer, SEIU (responsible for 'security for security' campaign rollout in India)</li> <li>2. Regional Secretary, UNI-APRO</li> <li>3. Director, UNIDOC</li> </ol>
Union activists	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. FAINE representative (national-level working with IUF-IOO and DEFOI)</li> <li>2. Key campaigners at Pantnagar and Moga factories of Nestlé</li> <li>3. Organizer studying conditions of contract farmers producing barley for SABMiller</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Member, FDI-Watch</li> <li>2. Organizer, ISWOI</li> <li>3. Office bearer, INTUC and CITU</li> </ol>
Worker representatives	Two representatives of FAINE from the Pantnagar and Moga factories of Nestlé	Representative of ISWOI from Bangalore and Kerala
Affiliate union representatives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Secretary, PBKMS (IUF affiliate)</li> <li>2. Associate, IUF-IOO (organizing informal sector women workers in collaboration with WEIGO)</li> <li>3. Senior official, Hotel Employees Federation of India</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Deputy General Secretary, National Postal Organization</li> <li>2. Secretary, UNITES Professional</li> <li>3. Officer, FNT0</li> </ol>
Officers from country outreach offices and liaison councils	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Transnational Corporation Coordinator, IUF-IOO</li> <li>2. Senior official, Dairy Employees Federation of India</li> <li>3. IUF-IOO's National Officer for Supply Chain</li> <li>4. IUF-IOO's National Officer for Hotel and Restaurant</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. President, UNI-ILC</li> <li>2. Vice President, UNI-ILC</li> <li>3. National Coordinator, ISWOI</li> <li>4. State-level organizer, UNI-ILC</li> </ol>
Country experts	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Two officials of Solidarity Centre, AFL-CIO, Washington</li> <li>2. A veteran trade unionist attempting to consolidate union power by bringing independent unions that are not affiliated to political parties together</li> <li>3. A veteran trade unionist, a member of the India's tripartite body, The Indian Labour Conference, and with expertise in organizing informal sector workers</li> </ol>	

## **Appendix 2: Abbreviations**

CBA: Collective Bargaining Agreement  
CI: Communications International  
CITU: Centre of Indian Trade Unions  
ER: Employee Relations  
EWC: European Works Council  
FAINE: Federation of All India Nestlé Employees  
FIET: International Federation of Employees, Technicians and Managers  
G4S: Group Four Securicor Plc  
GFA: Global Framework Agreement  
GUF: Global Union Federations  
HLEU: Hindustan Lever Employees Union  
ICEM: International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions  
IFA: International Framework Agreement  
IGF: International Graphical Federation  
INTUC: Indian National Trade Union Congress  
IPL: Indian Premier League  
ISWOI: Indian Security Workers Organising Initiative  
IUF: International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations  
IUF-IOO: IUF-India Outreach Office  
MEI: Media and Entertainment International  
MNC: Multinational Corporation  
NGO: Non-governmental organization  
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
PBKMS: Paschim Banga Khet Mazoor Samiti (IUF affiliate from the agriculture sector in India)  
PGSU: Private Security Guard Union (Bangalore-based affiliate of ISWOI)  
SEIU: Service Employees International Union  
TNC: Transnational Corporation  
UK-NCP: United Kingdom National Contact Person  
UNI: Union Global Union formerly known as Union Network International  
UNI-ILC: UNI Global Union India Liaison Council  
UNI-PS: UNI Global Union's Property Service