TURKISH ISLAMIC CLAIMS MAKING IN GERMANY: MILLI GORUS IN BETWEEN LOCAL AND GLOBAL

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ABSTRACT

Recent academic work on the powers of the nation state has argued that nation state’s position as the predominant unit of social organization is being diminished from outside by forces of globalization and through the shift of power from the national to the supra and transnational levels. It is also argued that the nation state’s legitimacy, authority and integrative capacities are weakened from within by an increasing number of claims for special group rights emphasizing cultural difference. Not surprisingly, migrants and ethnic minorities have been at the forefront of these claims; arguably contributing through their claims making both to the external erosion of sovereignty and to internal cultural differentiation.

Post-nationalists argue that citizenship and welfare rights possessed and otherwise demanded by non-citizens contribute to the erosion and transcending of the frontiers of nation-states while migrant communities increasingly take on the character of transnational communities taking advantage of transnational political opportunities. Multiculturalists, in turn, argue that the liberal nation state is challenged when migrant minorities question the conception of a unified undifferentiated citizenship by putting forward demands for special group rights and for the recognition of cultural difference.

A third strand of thought has emerged in response to these claims from supra-nationalists and multiculturalists emphasizing the continuing importance of the nation-state particularly in shaping migrant experience in general and migrant claims making in particular. Scholars have analyzed the citizenship configurations of nation-states as the explanatory variable in explaining different strategies in dealing with ethnic difference and the different manifestations of these strategies in different countries.
In contrast to the above summarized polemical opposition of nation-state bound approaches on the one hand and an unbounded supra-nationalism on the other, I argue that host/home country influences, extra nation-state influences and group ideological/religious orientations affect migrant claims making through mechanisms like *attribution of opportunity or threat* and *internalization*. To specify the role of these factors in influencing migrant claims making and the inner workings of these mechanisms, I analyzed Milli Gorus Germany claims through content analyses of organizational media and observed changes and trends in the nature of this claims making. I also documented Milli Gorus Germany’s organizational ties and conducted open-ended interviews with organization members to understand what factors have influenced these trends and changes.

My findings show that understanding migrant claims making necessitates long term case study analyses of the claims making strategies of particular migrant groups. While national citizenship models do have an influence on the nature of migrant claims making in a particular country, claims making strategies of migrant groups are also influenced by home country, supra/transnational and intra-group changes.

First, my empirical analysis shows that Milli Gorus Germany claims emerge as an outcome of broad change processes (national or international) which are *attributed as threats and opportunities* depending on the ideological/religious identification of group. Second, I show that extra-nation state pressures and events can unexpectedly lead to a very domesticated claims making due to *internalization* which I claim is dependant on an already emerging host-country orientation within the immigrant group.

I argue that my focus on dynamic processes and mechanisms linking the local and global not only helps us to trace and explain changes in the nature of Milli Gorus
Germany claims making over time, but it also enables us to understand the interaction of the local and the global. The global doesn’t always rule the local and the local doesn’t always rule the global. They interact in previously undetermined ways to affect migrant claims making through processes like attribution of threat and opportunity and internalization and create different claims making strategies over time and between different groups.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Ecehan Koc was born in Zurich, Switzerland in 1979. At the age of four she moved to Adana, Turkey where she went to high school at Tarsus American High School. At the age of 18, she moved to Istanbul to attend Bogazici University. After completing her undergraduate studies in Sociology and International Relations & Political Science, she attended the PhD program at the Department of Sociology at Cornell University. She is currently a PhD candidate at the same department, doing her dissertation research in Istanbul, Turkey.
To Professor Mujde Koc and Professor Namik Kemal Koc.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
DEDICATION
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1: CONTEMPORARY THEORIES ON CONTENTION OVER ETHNIC RELATIONS AND MIGRATION POLITICS
CHAPTER 2: WHY STUDY MILLI GORUS GERMANY?
CHAPTER 3: HOW SHOULD WE STUDY MIGRANT CLAIMS MAKING?
CHAPTER 4: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF MILLI GORUS CLAIMS MAKING BETWEEN 1985 AND 2005
CHAPTER 5: MECHANISMS EXPLAINING THE “HOW” OF MIGRANT CLAIMS MAKING AND SUPPORTING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX A (METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX)
APPENDIX B (TYPES, ADDRESSES AND GRAPHS OF MILLI GORUS GERMANY CLAIMS)
REFERENCES
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: A two dimensional space for situating conceptions of citizenship 6
Figure 2: Factors influencing migrant claims making. 17
Figure 3: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1990 and 1995. (In organizational media) 33
Figure 4: Addressees of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1990 and 1995. (In organizational media) 35
Figure 5: Frames used in Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1990 and 1995. (in organizational media) 36
Figure 6: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims recorded in the mainstream German media. 36
Figure 7: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media) 37
Figure 8: Type of Milli Gorus Germany claims making between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media) 41
Figure 9: Addressees of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media) 42
Figure 10: Frames used by Milli Gorus Germany between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media) 44
Figure 11: A dynamic framework for analyzing the initial stages of migrant claims making. 48
Figure 12: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media) 52
Figure 13: The historical development of Milli Gorus Germany (IGMG) 54
Figure 14: Milli Gorus Germany host country related claims. (In organizational media) 55
Figure 15: Supra/transnational Milli Gorus Germany claims. (In organizational media) 56
Figure 16: Home country related claims of Milli Gorus Germany. (In organizational media) 58
Figure 17: Addressees of Milli Gorus Germany claims. (In organizational media) 59
Figure 18: A dynamic and interactive model of internalization. 63
Figure 19: Addressees of supra/transnational claims by Milli Gorus Germany. (In Organizational media) 66
Figure 20: Frames used in host country claims of Milli Gorus Germany. (In Organizational media) 68
Figure 21: Addresses of host country claims of Milli Gorus Germany. (In Organizational media) 69
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Numbers of supra/transnational Milli Gorus Germany claims in organizational and German mainstream media. 38

Table 2: Supra/transnational and human rights frames of Milli Gorus Germany claims in organizational and German mainstream media. 38

Table 3: Supranational and foreign state addressees of Milli Gorus Germany claims in organizational and German mainstream media. 39
INTRODUCTION

Recent academic work on the powers of the nation state has argued that nation state’s position as the predominant unit of social organization is being diminished from outside by forces of globalization and through the shift of power from the national to the supra and transnational levels. It is also argued that the nation state’s legitimacy, authority and integrative capacities are weakened form within by an increasing number of claims for special group rights emphasizing cultural difference. Not surprisingly, migrants and ethnic minorities have been at the forefront of these claims; arguably contributing through their claims making both to the external erosion of sovereignty and to internal cultural differentiation.

The essential role played by minorities in eroding the powers of the nation state has mainly been stressed by post-nationalist scholars. Post-nationalists argue that the residence and welfare rights given to these non-citizens rest on claims to universal rights of personhood based on international human rights conventions and not any more on traditional definitions of citizenship. These rights possessed and otherwise demanded by non-citizens contribute to the erosion and transcending of the frontiers of nation states while migrant communities increasingly take on the character of transnational communities taking advantage of transnational political opportunities.

Another group of scholars emphasizing the erosion of the powers of the nation state are multiculturalists. Like post-nationalists, multiculturalists argue that international conventions providing for a right to one’s own culture have greatly improved the opportunities for migrants and ethnic minorities to push for the recognition of their cultural difference by the nation state. Second; multiculturalists argue that traditional models for integrating migrants through assimilation into the
majority culture no longer work. (Kymlica, 1995) In this case it is not the nation-state’s external sovereignty that is at stake but its capacity to maintain social cohesion and the liberal conception of individual rights on which it rests. Problems for the liberal nation state arise when migrant minorities challenge the conception of a unified undifferentiated citizenship by increasingly putting forward demands for special group rights and recognition of cultural difference.

A third strand of thought has emerged in response to these claims from supra-nationalists and multiculturalists emphasizing the continuing importance of the nation state particularly in shaping migrant experience in general and migrant claims making in particular. Building on Brubaker’s (1992) work, a number of scholars have analyzed the citizenship configurations of nation states as the explanatory variable in explaining different strategies in dealing with ethnic difference and the different manifestations of these strategies in different countries. (Koopmans and Statham, 1999) According to them; two important dimensions of citizenship regimes determine the degree and form of inclusiveness/ exclusiveness of a national regime with respect to minorities: the criteria for formal access to citizenship and the cultural obligations that this access to citizenship brings. For the first dimension, scholars distinguish between an ethno-cultural and civic territorial basis of criteria for attributing full citizenship, with the ethno-cultural being the more closed and civic-territorial the more open version. For the second dimension, they focus on the distinction between assimilationism and cultural pluralism as the condition which a state places on attributing citizenship; with assimilationism being the more demanding and cultural pluralism the more accepting option.

The above mentioned configurations of citizenship have important consequences both for the incorporation of migrants and for their political mobilization. Resources of access to the political community make a significant difference in the potential of
migrant actors to mobilize and press their claims for social and political change. Therefore, far from losing its powers to transnational institutions and communities, the nation state remains by far the most important factor in shaping migrant claims making.

In contrast to the above summarized polemical opposition of nation-state bound approaches on the one hand and an unbounded supra-nationalism on the other, I argue that host/home country influences, extra nation-state influences and group ideological/religious orientations affect migrant claims making through certain mechanisms like attribution of opportunity or threat and internalization. To specify the role of these factors in influencing migrant claims making and the inner workings of these mechanisms, I analyzed Milli Gorus Germany’s claims through content analyses of organizational media and observed changes and trends in the nature of this claims making. I also documented Milli Gorus Germany’s organizational ties and conducted open-ended interviews with organization members to understand what factors have influenced these trends and changes.

Below, I first present related academic work on ethnic politics and migration, discuss methodological problems haunting the study of migrant claims making and then show how a single handed focus on national citizenship regimes can be insufficient in explaining different types of migrant claims making. Finally, I analyze Milli Gorus Germany claims making over time as a case study of migrant claims making, to show how host/home country and extra nation-state influences and group ideological/religious orientations affect migrant claims making.

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1 Milli Gorus Germany or IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus) is the second biggest Islamic organization and the second biggest Turkish organization in Germany which is not sponsored by the Turkish state.

2 I use IGMG and Milli Gorus Germany interchangeably throughout the paper.
CHAPTER 1
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES ON CONTENTION OVER ETHNIC RELATIONS AND MIGRATION POLITICS

Ethnic relation politics- the contentious politics where a state’s policies deal with resident migrants and minorities and where influential political actors such as parties, interest groups and majority/minority publics dispute the criteria for entry to the national community, and immigration politics have emerged as central issues within European polities since the 1990s. (Koopmans and Statham, 2000) Ethnic relations and migration have been transformed into a central field of political contention as a result of the ethnic pluralization of European societies which has been an outcome of past and present immigration.

In response to the emerging contentiousness of ethnic relations and migration politics, the concept of citizenship- the set of rights, duties, and identities linking citizens to the nation state- has emerged as an essential tool in carrying out comparative research in ethnic relations and migration politics. Following upon the distinction between “ethnic and civic” forms of nationalism, Brubaker (1992), in his ground breaking book, has explained the divergent ways in which France and Germany have dealt with post-war migrants by the different ‘cultural idioms’ of citizenship-based on ethno-cultural belonging in Germany and on civic-cultural and political institutions in France- that have historically guided institutional practices and legal traditions in the two nation states. In Brubaker’s (1992) work, citizenship is seen not only as a form of membership but also as a form of symbolic closure restricting the ability of migrants to join the national community. Thus, the persistently higher naturalization rates in France compared to Germany is explained by the *jus soli* acquisition of citizenship, which is the French model of citizenship, where access is
either automatic by birth or easily available by naturalization, in comparison to *jus sanguinis*, the German basis of citizenship, where access is difficult for those who do not have ethnic cultural ties to the nation.

Although ground-breaking in its time, Brubaker’s distinction between ethno-cultural and civic–cultural forms of citizenship largely ignores the level of cultural difference migrant minorities are allowed to exhibit in particular polities. (Koopmans and Statham, 1999) This leads him to overstate the ‘openness’ of the French citizenship regime which does provide easy formal access to citizenship, but expects new citizens of migrant origin to assimilate to a unitary national political culture.

To be able to bring the cultural rights dimension of citizenship regimes absent in Brubaker’s analysis into their analysis, many scholars of ethnic relations and migration have tried to combine the formal criteria for access to citizenship central in Brubaker’s analysis with a cultural rights dimension; to come up with three types of citizenship regimes defining a particular institutional and discursive setting for contention over migration and ethnic relations. (Castles & Miller, 1993)

Within this typology, the first type called ethnic or exclusive, denies migrants and their descendants access to the political community or at least makes such access very difficult through high institutional and cultural barriers. The second type, labeled assimilationist or republican, provides for easy access to citizenship but requires from migrants a high degree of assimilation in the public sphere and gives little or no recognition to cultural difference. Finally, multicultural or pluralist regimes provide both an easy formal access to citizenship and recognition of the right of ethnic minorities to maintain their cultural difference.

Although one step ahead of Brubaker’s typology in recognizing the role of cultural rights in shaping migrant experience, this static typological formulation obscures the dynamic aspects of the process (i.e. changes in citizenship over time) and
the important differences within states, both among different actors (i.e. different parties, different government agencies, etc.) and among those applied to different categories of migrants. (i.e. between asylum seekers, guest workers, etc.)

Figure 1: A two dimensional space for situating conceptions of citizenship. The boxes are ideal- typical types. They usually don’t exist in reality. There are four ideal typical configurations of citizenship and migrant incorporation that arise from the combination of the vertical and horizontal axes. Source: Koopmans and Statham, 2000

Koopmans and Statham (1999) claim to have solved these problems by studying citizenship not as static typological models or regimes but as a conceptual and political space in which different actors and policies can be situated and developments can be traced over time. They define the contours of this conceptual space by both formal and cultural dimensions of citizenship (see Diagram 1) and argue that in this conceptual and political space, the stability of citizenship regimes and the uniformity with which
they cover different political actors, policies and immigrant groups are not taken for
granted but become issues for empirical investigation.

MIGRATION AND ETHNIC RELATIONS AS A FIELD OF POLITICAL
CONTENTION: AN OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE APPROACH

In studying migration and ethnic relations as a field of political contention, Koopmans and Statham (1999) take conceptions of citizenship as a subset or as a
specification of the general dimensions of political opportunity structures particular to
the field of contention over migration and ethnic relations. While benefiting from the
theoretical advancement of the ‘political opportunity structure’ approach, their work
also exhibits many of its defects. Below, I first present a brief outline of the political
opportunity structure approach and point to the similarities of Koopmans and
Statham’s approach to the POS approach, discuss my criticisms of the POS approach
and then present my way of overcoming these problems in the study of migrant claims
making.

Political opportunity structures consist of ‘consistent- but not necessarily formal
or permanent dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for
people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or
failure.’ (Tarrow, 1994:85) The opening up of access to participation, shifts in ruling
alignments, the availability of influential allies, cleavages within and among elites
(Tarrow 1994:86), national cleavage structures, formal institutional structures,
informal procedures and prevailing strategies and alliance structures (Kriesi et al,
1995: xiii-xvi) are among the most important, and frequently-referred-to
conceptualizations of the concept of ‘political opportunity structure’.
According to Koopmans and Statham (1999) discussions on citizenship and nationhood can be translated into the language of political opportunities and vice versa. Conceptions of citizenship and nationhood are first of all part of a nation’s cleavage structure. Generally, one may expect greater contestation over issues related to citizenship in countries in which the conception of the nation has historically been a contested issue. Second; citizenship also has a formal institutional dimension which especially affects the opportunities of access of migrants to the political system. For example, migrants and minorities have greater access to the political system where they are officially recognized, their organizations facilitated and where their claims can refer to existing legal frameworks for equal opportunity, anti-discrimination and cultural rights. Third; national configurations of citizenship reflect prevailing strategies for dealing with societal cleavages and conflicts. Finally; controversies over citizenship and nationhood are important determinants of the alliance and conflict structures in the politics of migration and ethnic relations. Elite decisions and changing alignments over these issues might particularly enhance the opportunities for challengers from below if such controversies are not limited to more or less technical discussions of immigration control and minority integration but become framed in terms of the deep cultural idioms of citizenship and nationhood.

TOWARDS A NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EXTENDING THE POS APPROACH

The above summarized concept of political opportunity structure is an essential component of the classical social movement agenda which theorizes that for collective action to take place, social change processes initiate a process of change and trigger changes in the political, cultural and economic environment, creating political
opportunities and constraints for a given challenger. These political opportunities vary over time and these variations shape the nature of a movement’s activity. (Kriesi, 1996) Once these political opportunities are in place, forms of organization offer insurgents sites for initial mobilization and shape their capacity to exploit their new resources. (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) Between political opportunities and action, framing which is defined as a collective process of interpretation, attribution and social construction mediates to make sure that people feel aggrieved at some aspect of their lives and are optimistic that action can redress the problem. (Snow et al, 1986) Finally, repertoires of contention act as another form of resource for activists, by offering the means by which people engage in collective action. (Tilly, 1978)

Such a portrayal of collective action has been criticized and revised by multiple scholars. (Goodwin and Jasper 2004, McAdam et al., 2001). McAdam (2001) et al., for example, who are themselves among the creators of the classical social movement agenda, criticize it for its focus on static relationships, for its lack of attention to broader episodes of contention in comparison to individual social movements, its emphasis on opportunities rather than threats, its focus on the expansion of organizational resources rather than on organizational deficits and its focus only on the origins of contention rather than the whole episode of contention.

Goodwin and Jasper (2004) on the other hand, criticize the classical social movement agenda for its strong structural bias, for its tendency to stretch the concept of political opportunity structure to cover a wide variety of empirical phenomena and causal mechanisms, and for its lack of recognition of the diverse ways that culture and agency, including emotions and strategizing shape collective action. Below I discuss some of these criticisms and show how these problems can be overcome in the study of migrant claims making.
A. Getting Rid of Static Typologies

Even though themselves critics of static typologies theoretically, Koopmans and Statham (1999) remain confined to the static nature of the political opportunity structure approach in their empirical analysis. While studying the nature of migrant claims making in Germany and Britain over a period of 6 years (1990-1995), they seem to forget their own criticism against static typologies and claim that Germany is a country with ethno-cultural exclusionist citizenship where non-ethnic migrants are incorporated into the labor market, but where it is difficult for them to attain access to the political community. In contrast, they argue that Britain’s citizenship model tends toward the multicultural pluralist type where most resident minorities have full equal social and political rights while retaining much of their cultural difference from the majority society.

According to Koopmans and Statham (1999), within the European context, Germany and Britain represent in many respects diametrically opposed incorporation regimes and these regimes have important consequences for the identities, forms of organizations and types of claims of ethnic minorities. Germany sees immigrants as foreigners, and that is exactly the way in which German minorities behave: they organize and identify themselves on the basis of their national origin and are still, in spite of residing in Germany for several decades, preoccupied with the politics of their homelands. By contrast, the British multicultural state treats its immigrants as racial and cultural minorities within British society and that is how British migrants behave. They mobilize as blacks or British Muslims and make claims on the British state for equal opportunity and multicultural rights.

Instead of studying two countries’ citizenship regimes as diametrically opposed static models, I argue for a dynamic process oriented approach in the study of migrant
claims making. My way of getting rid of static typologies and “dynamizing” the analysis of migrant claims making stresses first, a methodological focus on the claims of a single type of group over time, to understand what factors affect the nature of claims making of this particular group. I am not denying that national citizenship regimes have an essential influence on migrant experience but understanding how changes in these regimes and changes in other types of factors affect different kinds of groups in different ways necessitates different methods.

I also argue that there is no predetermined causal relationship between any static variable and domestic or transnational activism. Instead, I focus on mechanisms which are “a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations.” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001:11) What differ are the circumstances in which they occur and their combination or sequence with other mechanisms. Processes are “recurring combinations of such mechanisms that can be observed in a variety of episodes of contentious politics” (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:11)

Therefore, instead of lumping a huge number of “claims making groups” in a single country together, I focus on a single group in a single country to study how changes in for example, conceptions of citizenship affect its claims making over time and through which mechanisms. I argue that such an approach enables us to understand how different factors affect different types of groups and why.

B. Bringing Culture Back In

McAdam et al., (2001) claim that it is possible to dynamize the classical social movement agenda by seeing “opportunities and threats” not as objective structural factors but as subject to attribution. The attribution of opportunity or threat, according
to them, is an activating mechanism that operates between political opportunities and mobilization. No opportunity will invite mobilization unless it is visible to potential challengers, and is perceived as an opportunity.

Koopmans and Statham (2000) also seem to agree with this revision to the classical social movement agenda and claim that only perceived realities can affect collective action and therefore we should focus on the type of political opportunities that are rendered publicly visible. They also claim to have answered criticisms pointing to the lack of culture and strategy in the classical social movement agenda by including the framing perspective in the analysis of success for social movement organizations.

They argue that the likelihood of success for challengers who attempt to mobilize their claims in the public sphere is dependent on their ability to achieve three strategic aims: visibility, resonance, and legitimacy. Firstly; a collective actor and her aims must be rendered publicly visible. Secondly; the mobilized challenge must provoke public reactions from other actors: the claims must resonate and carry the contention to a wider public. Thirdly; no matter how much visibility and resonance a challenge achieves, it will only achieve a level of success when it becomes a legitimate contention. This means that an actor has to legitimate herself and her claims in public by resonating positively in the reactions of a significant number of other actors.

Even though Koopmans and Statham’s (2000) attempt to include culture and strategy in their analysis by using the framing perspective in the study of success for social movement organizations is a step in the right direction, more needs to be done to incorporate culture and strategy into our analysis. I argue that we should move away from analyzing the static effect of either structural or cultural variables on
mobilization and instead focus on how structural and cultural processes unfold and interact within a contentious episode.

To this end, I suggest studying the mechanism of “attribution of opportunity or threat” used by McAdam et al., to dynamize the classical social movement agenda. In addition to dynamizing our agenda, studying the inner workings of this mechanisms and its relation to other types of mechanisms can be the answer to the ‘culture problem’ in the study of contention.

I argue that attribution of opportunity or threat is dependant on certain characteristics of contentious groups. Like Koopmans and Statham (2001) who include collective identities of migrant groups as the third component of the triad of determinants of migrant claims making and like Kuru (1995), I attribute a central role to collective identities and ideologies of groups. I argue that migrant groups’ belonging in a specific ethnic group, their religious and racial identification, and of course their degree of attachment to the country of origin are factors affecting the mechanism: “attribution of opportunity or threat”.

Including the ethnic, religious, racial identification of a specific group and tracing the changes in this identification provides a way to incorporate culture into our analysis, a way to dynamize it and to understand why certain changes in the political or discursive dimensions of institutions ignite mobilization for certain groups and don’t for others or do ignite mobilization for a particular group at a certain period and don’t at another period.

C. Bringing in the Extra Nation-State Influences

Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) emphasis on national citizenship regimes falls within the boundaries of a prevailing argument in recent literature that holds
institutions and the political opportunity structures of host societies as the most consequential factors if not the causal forces shaping and constraining immigrants’ political action.

This overemphasis on institutional explanations encourages a systematic reduction of the various forms of immigrant strategy to a unified causal force defined as the political opportunity structure. Everything happens as if a straightforward causal link could always be established between immigrants’ political mobilization and host country institutions. (Bousetta 2000, Yurdakul, 2006) This begs the question of whether every single ethnic mobilization strategy is POS driven or not.

The problems of an overemphasis on host country POS are made obvious by the inability of POS models to provide parsimonious explanations for the observation that different types and levels of mobilization are generally observed between different ethnic groups and even between different ideologically oriented groups of the same ethnic group who share similar citizenship statuses within the same society. For example as Statham (1999) reports; whereas the strategies of African Caribbeans comply with the racialized identities institutionalized by the British race relations policy framework, this is not the case for minorities from the Indian subcontinent. For the latter group mobilization takes place mainly with reference to the Muslim identity. Yurdakul (2006) also stresses the divergent strategies and goals of two Turkish immigrant associations in Germany showing that immigrant associations are not homogeneous, nor are passive entities in a social vacuum.

As a remedy to this overemphasis on POS, Bousetta (2000) argues in favor of combining a micro (processes within an ethnic community), a median (public articulation of claims and mobilization) and a macro (state action and policies) level of analysis in explaining migrant claim making. Yurdakul (2006) strives for a focus on
the power positions and in-group conflicts within immigrant groups and the interaction of these with the political organizations of the receiving society.

Ogelman (2003) develops a theory with multiple levels of analysis in explaining the persistence of homeland focused politics among Turks in Germany. He argues that just like host country national citizenship models, analysis of the sending country political opportunity structure and other homeland developments provide some information on the nature of migrant claims making. As the sending country’s political opportunity structure fluctuates dramatically, migrant associations respond to this by making claims. Particularly in Germany, migrant associations take their mobilizing cues also from developments in Turkish politics where deep ethnic, religious, economic and political conflicts have continuously emerged (Yapp, 1991: 155-163).

Ogelman (2003) focuses on the role of a transnational political opportunity structure which links the home country with the host country. His TPOS concept integrates the attitude of the government of the immigration country towards migrants’ political participation and how it attempts to incorporate migrants through integration models. (i.e. the types of citizenship countries use for politically including or excluding immigrants and emigrants.) with the attitude of the government of the country of origin towards its nationals abroad and their descendents as embodied in emigration models and remigration policies. And finally, Ogelman (2003) sees TPOS also as including the past and present international relations between these two countries. These relations may be important when state actors create international norms that affect transnational network formation in addition to relations concerning immigrants such as guest worker treaties and post colonial relations.

I argue that the role of external influences to migrant claims making can not be reduced to Ogelman’s combination of political opportunity structures in the country
of residence, the country of origin and the historically evolved international relations between them. Today, as nations and organizations become more interconnected, new political opportunities are emerging across the transnational, national and subnational arenas. (Tarrow 2002) With these three levels of opportunity more closely linked, the internal dynamics shaping movement development are increasingly supplemented and at times altered by external events and influences. (Carming and Hicks, 2002) Unfortunately, the influence of external factors on domestic activism remains to be under-theorized.

In an attempt to solve the dilemma of incorporating external influences into the theoretical model, one turns to Soysal (1997) who argues that a single handed emphasis on the role of the nation state in shaping migrant experience is inadequate. Soysal (1997) argues that political communities take shape independently of nationally delimited collectives and the social and political stages of claims making grow within and beyond the nation state. In her research, she shows that Islamic groups appeal to universalistic principles of human rights; draw upon host country and world level repertoires for making claims and cross and bridge a diverse set of public places.

Studies like Soysal’s (1997) show us that certain groups make claims by appealing to universal rights, set up trans/supranational organizational structures and target trans/supranational institutions, but these studies fail to explain how. They also fail to study the influence of factors spanning nationally bounded spaces other than supranational institutions and norms. Understanding which nationally unbound factors and how affect migrant claims making necessitates a more through investigation of factors underlying both globalization and internationalization.

According to Tarrow (2005) even though globalization is a source of claims and a frame for mobilizations, it is internationalism and particularly the complex form of
internationalism that provides opportunities for activism. If globalization consists of increased flows of trade, finance and people across borders, internationalism provides an opportunity structure within which transnational and local activism can emerge. Internationalization involves an increasing horizontal density of relations across states, governmental officials and non-state actors; increasing vertical links among the sub-national, national and international levels and an enhanced formal and informal structure that invites transnational activism and facilitates the formation of networks of non-state, state and international actors. (Tarrow 2005)

I argue that these developments make it less and less helpful for us to employ the nation-state as our unit of analysis and lump the claims making of different communities together only because they reside or originate in a specific nation state. Therefore, the central role of the nation state should not be taken a priori but should be open to empirical analysis. Moreover, understanding the role of internationalization and globalization in affecting migrant claims making necessitates an understanding of mechanisms linking the changes brought by internationalization and globalization to migrant activism.

Figure 2: Factors influencing migrant claims making.
I will try to accomplish these tasks by studying migrant claims making as an episode of contention where certain dynamic mechanisms produce mobilization as a result of their interaction. Below I present a dynamic analysis of migrant claims making where political opportunity structures and certain developments in the host and home countries, collective identities of the migrant group and changes brought by internationalization and globalization interact through certain mechanisms (attribution of threat and opportunity, internalization) to create certain mobilization outcomes. The diagram below (Diagram 2) displays the main factors affecting migrant claims making. The dynamic analysis of migrant claims making through mechanisms will explain what happens within these arrows and the nature of the resulting mobilization; therefore, explaining “how” and “why” certain types of mobilization (in this case claims) emerge.
CHAPTER 2

WHY STUDY MILLI GORUS GERMANY?

Milli Gorus Germany, with 87,000 members and perhaps another 300,000 sympathizers is and has always been one of the most controversial migrant organizations in Germany\(^3\). It is the biggest Turkish and the biggest Islamic organization in Germany which is not sponsored by the Turkish state.\(^4\) I argue that understanding the nature of and the factors affecting Milli Gorus Germany claims making will not only help us understand Turkish Islamic claims making in Germany, but will also enhance our understanding of migrant claims making in general.

The name Milli Gorus refers to the Islamic political ideology created by Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey during the 1970s, aiming to win back for Islam the central role it played before it was pushed into the private sphere through the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Milli Gorus literally translates as “National View”. However, the “national” in the “National View” refers to the Islamic nation made up of believers who believe in Allah as the one and only god. (IGMG Perspective, May 2001) Today, Milli Gorus leaders in Germany prefer to use the abbreviation IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus) instead of the name Milli Gorus and define their aim as defending the rights of Germany’s Muslim population by giving them a

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\(^3\) I chose Milli Gorus Germany as my case because it is the most vocal, the longest enduring and the biggest Turkish AND Islamic organization in Germany which is not sponsored by the Turkish state. To be able to determine the biggest and the most vocal Turkish AND Islamic organization in Germany, I conducted interviews with members of Turkish immigrant organizations (regardless of their importance and size) in Baden Wuerttemberg and Hessen. Following up on information collected through these interviews, I conducted internet based research on organizations that were regularly mentioned in my interviews. My analysis showed that Milli Gorus is the most vocal, the longest enduring, the biggest and the most controversial Turkish and the most active, the longest enduring, the biggest and the most controversial Islamic organization in Germany which is not sponsored by the Turkish state

\(^4\) DITIB (Turkish Islamische Union der Anstalt fuer Religion e.V), the biggest Turkish organization in Germany, is a Turkish state sponsored institution functioning like the Diyanet Isleri (Department of Religious Affairs) in Turkey, regulating the religious affairs of the Turkish population in Germany. It functions like an official state institution, adheres to the official state view of Islam and works with imams sent by the Turkish government. (Jessen, 2006)
voice in the democratic political arena while at the same time preserving their Islamic identity. As I will show below, in recent years, IGMG has publicly rejected Erbakan’s anti-Semitic and Islamist statements, but according to some scholars, continues to adhere to the ideology of Milli Gorus Turkey.

Schiffauer (2004) defines Milli Gorus Germany as a transnational guest-worker organization whose complex nature has been shaped by its relationships with the German society, its home country (Turkey) and the Turkish immigrant population in Germany. Its roots can be traced to multiple migrant organizations which were established in Germany in the early 1970s, to provide prayer locations to Turkish immigrants. One of the most important characteristics of these small-scale organizations was their complete isolation from their German surroundings. For these organizations and their members, Germany was “gurbet”, a foreign land, which didn’t deserve attention and which didn’t pay attention to their needs. This attitude against Germany, which was later transferred to Milli Gorus Germany, contributed to the strong Turkey dependency and the belief in the eventual return to the mother country among these organizations.

Under these circumstances, many organizations practically became the outposts of certain villages or regions in Turkey and a very strong religiosity, even stronger than among their counterparts in Turkey, developed among these immigrants. Some influential members of these migrant organizations had, even before the migration, religious or ideological ties to certain religious or ideological groups in Turkey. These members made sure that the immigrant associations in Germany built strong structural connections to certain religious or ideological groups in Turkey, Milli Gorus being one of them.
The origins of the Milli Gorus movement in Turkey can be traced to the Naqshbandi⁵ leader of one of the most influential religious groups in Turkey, the Iskenderpasa congregation, Mehmet Zahid Kotku, who enabled Necmettin Erbakan to be elected as an MP from Konya in 1969 and who decided to build a political party out of this influential religious group. (Yavuz, 2005) After the short lived National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi), the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) was founded in 1972 and participated in multiple coalitions between 1972 and 1978. The Milli Gorus movement and its representative party advocated an Islamic version of Third Worldism which saw Turkey’s progress in its cultural and spiritual roots in the Ottoman-Islamic tradition and in the establishment of an autonomous heavy industry.

For many immigrants who blamed the economic strategies of the Turkish elite for their presence in Germany, Milli Gorus ideology was very attractive with its economic promises and its anti-Western discourse. This interest contributed to the double-natured development of Milli Gorus: A party in Turkey AND religious associations in Germany. In those early years, ministers from the party in Turkey made fundraising trips to Germany and the first president of the associations were designated by Erbakan. However, the connections between the party in Turkey and the associations in Germany and the ties of the German associations with each other were not as rigid as they would later become in the 1980s.

The second half of the 1970s saw a civil-war-like conflict in Turkish universities between the left and the right from which Milli Gorus tried to distance itself. However, it still felt itself closer to the right wing due to the belief that the Turkish socialists’, social democrats’ and communists’ links with important German state institutions contributed to the anti-Islam sentiment in Germany. Due to this belief, the outside connections of German Milli Gorus associations in these early years

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⁵ Nakshbandi is one of the major Sufi orders of Islam.
couldn’t escape to be organized along the contours of the left-right conflict prevalent in Turkey.

1979 and 1980 were important years for Milli Gorus. 1979 saw the revolution in Iran and 1980, the occupation of Afghanistan and the military coup in Turkey. On the one hand, the Islamic development in Turkey seemed to have come to an end with the closure of the party and the imprisonment of Erbakan, but on the other hand the global Islamic movement was in full swing with the revolution in Iran. These were the times when an orientation towards the universal Islamic umma developed and when Milli Gorus started taking part in Islamic world politics.

The departure of Cemalletin Kaplan, an extremist preacher within the movement, with his many supporters in 1983 caused big troubles for Milli Gorus in Germany. After Kaplan’s departure, the party in Turkey took the initiative to organize the reconstruction of Milli Gorus Germany, connecting the small mosque associations to the center in Cologne and the center in Cologne, to the center in Turkey. The loosely connected mosque associations of the 1970s were now connected to a single center in Germany which was connected to the center in Turkey. Despite all this binding, the local mosque associations still maintained a certain amount of autonomy from the center in Cologne and the center in Cologne still preserved a certain amount of independence from Erbakan’s rule.

The more the center in Germany started taking part in the administration of local mosques all over Germany in the 1980s, the more Milli Gorus Germany acquired the characteristics of a religious association, differing substantially from the political party in Turkey. As the left-right conflict started to lose its relevance, the 1980s also saw an
increase in intra-Islamic differentiation within Germany with the departure of Cemaleddin Kaplan and the arrival of DITIB (Directorate of Religious Affairs)\textsuperscript{6}.

In 1990s, the belief in the eventual establishment of the “JUST ORDER”\textsuperscript{7} in Turkey which promised immigrants a chance to return to Turkey with Turkey’s eventual industrialization by Islamic entrepreneurs, left its mark on Milli Gorus Germany. Therefore; when the Islamic holdings in Turkey went bankrupt in 2000 taking many immigrants’ investments with them, the belief in the eventual return to the homeland was weakened significantly. This had a big boosting effect on the positive orientation of Milli Gorus Germany towards the host country. (Schiffauer, 2004)

The orientation towards Germany was consolidated with the demographic change within the organization through which the second generation seeing Germany as their home came to power. It was at this moment in Milli Gorus Germany history that September 11 changed the opportunity structure for the organization completely. The changes brought by September 11 made sure that nothing and no one in the organization went unnoticed by German authorities, further weakening the hold of the conservatives within the organization and consolidating Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, Oguz Ucuncu and Mustafa Yeneroglu’s Troika.

Unfortunately, the reform politics of the second generation was not well received by the German public or the state. Milli Gorus Germany is still at the forefront of the discussions on migrant integration and Islam in Germany. German Bundesverfassungsschutz (Agency for the Protection of the Constitution) Germany's domestic intelligence agency, has repeatedly warned about Milli Gorus's activities,

\textsuperscript{6} DITIB (Diyanet Isleri Turk Islam Birligi) is an organization established by the Turkish state for the religious needs of Turkish immigrants in Germany. It represents the state sponsored version of Islam in Turkey and employs \textit{imams} sent from Turkey.

\textsuperscript{7} Adil Duzen (Just Order) is the name of Milli Gorus Turkey’s program which aims to bring a just order to Turkey based on autonomous industrialization and Islamic tradition and identity.
describing the group in its annual reports as a "foreign extremist organization." The reports also emphasize that “The IGMG and several other Islamist groups also try to establish a society based on the Quran and the Sharia for their sympathizers in Germany”. (Verfassungsschutzbericht, 2004) Responding to these criticisms, IGMG leaders have stressed their wish to live in a multicultural society, and have argued that their goal of retaining cultural distinctiveness and a Muslim way of life does not violate the German constitution or German laws. Members of IGMG do accept that they seek to follow the Quran and Sharia but emphasize that they do this within the confines of the democratic order in Germany.

Despite these pro-democracy and pro-German constitution statements from Milli Gorus members, and its recent attempts to open up its doors to the German public, the Bundesverfassungsschutz continues to argue that while in recent times Milli Görüş has increasingly emphasized the readiness of its members to be integrated into German society and asserted its adherence to German basic law, such statements stem from tactical calculation rather than from any inner change. Repeated statements by IGMG that they do adhere to the democratic order are at least implicitly dismissed by Verfassungsschutz reports. The agency claims that "although Milli Görüş, in public statements, pretends to adhere to the basic principles of Western democracies, abolition of the secular government system in Turkey and the establishment of an Islamic state and social system are, as before, among its goals.” (Verfassungsschutzbericht, 2004)

With its controversial stance, IGMG is not only active in Germany with 323 mosque associations but also has 514 mosque associations throughout Europe. The organizational structure of IGMG consists of both centralized and decentralized/federative elements. Mosque associations make up the smallest unit of IGMG. These small mosque associations respond to the regional associations of
IGMG. IGMG has regional associations in three countries: France, Belgium and Germany. Mosque associations in Norway, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy and Great Britain are advised and overseen by the regional associations in these three countries. The regional level associations constitute the link between the mosque associations and the center in Cologne. The center in Cologne prepares yearly work plans, organization strategies and provides the coordination between regional associations. It also takes part in organizing large scale social undertakings like the yearly gatherings, the pilgrimages, etc. The organization uses its monthly magazine (*Perspektive*), its website (www.igmg.de) and the daily newspaper *Milli Gazete* to spread its ideas to the public and its supporters.

I argue that understanding the nature of and the factors influencing the most vocal transnational Turkish AND Islamic immigrant organization’s, IGMG’ s, claims making will enhance our understanding of migrant claims making and the interaction of the national and transnational in shaping this claims making.

To this end, I studied Milli Gorus Germany claims by doing content analyses of this organizational media. (See more on this method in Methodological Appendix) This method gave me valuable information about the characteristics of Milli Gorus Germany claims making. To understand what shapes the nature of this claims making, I conducted 15 open-ended, 1 to 3 hour long interviews with high-ranking organization members in organization offices/mosques in Hessen, Baden-Wuerttemberg and Nordrhein-Westfalen.8 These interviews and organizational documents also provided me information on Milli Gorus Germany’s external connections which helped me understand the nature of the relationship between Milli Gorus Turkey and Milli Gorus Germany and the influence of this relationship on Milli Gorus Germany claims making.

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8 To protect their privacy, the exact rank and name of the interviewee is kept secret.
CHAPTER 3
HOW SHOULD WE STUDY MIGRANT CLAIMS MAKING?

THE STATE OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON MIGRANT CLAIMS MAKING

Disproportional to the amount of theoretical debate on factors influencing migrant claims making, systematic empirical research continues to be rare. Post-nationalist scholars try to bridge this gap between theoretical progress and empirical research by pointing to cases where migrants frame their claims in globally dominant discourses and appeal to non-nation state institutions to fight against national incursions on their rights. (Soysal, 1997) Their empirical research however, receives many criticisms, particularly concerning the representativeness of the cases they study. One of the harshest criticisms comes from Koopmans & Statham (1999) who argue that the post-nationalist empirical evidence remains unsystematic and often does not go much beyond the discussion of a few and supposedly representative examples.

Empirical evidence on the relevance and nature of claims for cultural group rights is also in scarce supply. Like empirical research by post-nationalist scholars, empirical research on claims for cultural rights is criticized for problems of representativeness. For example, Koopmans and Statham (1999) claim that the usual references to ethnic strife in Bosnia, Rwanda, or the former Soviet Union are quite irrelevant to the context of immigration in Western societies and examples drawn from more relevant contexts are usually anecdotal and extremely repetitive between studies. They argue that to what extent these examples are representative for the claims making of migrants and ethnic minorities in general, remains unclear.

Aiming to overcome the lack of systematic evidence and problems of representativeness, Koopmans and Statham (1999) conducted a cross-national empirical analysis of migrant claims making in Germany and Britain. They collected
data from daily newspapers in the two countries and conducted content analyses on every second issue (Monday, Wednesday, and Friday) of the *Guardian* for Britain and *the Frankfurter Rundschau* for Germany over a 6 year period between 1990 and 1995.

Koopmans and Statham (1999) included individual instances of claims making in the data set if it involved demands, criticisms, or proposals related to the regulation or evaluation of immigration, minority integration or xenophobia. Due to a special interest in minority claims making, they also recorded acts by resident ethnic minorities even if they were not related to these issues.

The results of Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) representative comparative analysis provide strong empirical evidence for the central role of the national citizenship model in explaining migrant activism. According to their findings, the nation state continues to be by far the most important frame of reference for the identities, organizations and claims of ethnic minorities, and national authorities remain the almost exclusive addressees of the demands of these minorities. They do find some migrant claims making, especially in Germany, that do transcend national borders, but this claims making occurs in ways that are not post-national. They simply take another nation state- the migrants’ homeland- as the frame of reference. Other than this, little evidence is found which would support the post-national argument; like migrants addressing supranational institutions, transnational migrant organizations intervening in national politics and minorities making demands on national governments in the name of international legal conventions and rights.

I argue that for the sake of being representative, Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) systematic empirical analysis overlooks many particularities of migrant claims making. In their analysis, they lump together all kinds of demands, criticisms, or proposals related to the regulation or evaluation of immigration, minority integration or xenophobia and all kinds of acts by different groups of resident ethnic minorities
between 1990 and 1995, overlooking any changes in claims making of particular groups over time and any essential differences in the nature of claims making among different immigrant groups. They also fail to recognize the possibility of media bias being the underlying cause of cross-national differences they find between Germany and Britain.

I don’t reject the value of cross-national representative comparative work on migrant claims making, but I encourage an approach where cross-national representative data are collected through the compilation of claims making data from different claims making groups in a specific country. In the following section, by focusing on the only systemic cross-national empirical analysis on migrant claims making in Europe, I will first point to problems that might arise in a large scale cross-national study and try to show that case study analyses of claims making immigrant organizations with a focus on the immigrant organizations’ media could provide us a better understanding of migrant claims making. I will then, present the answers such an approach provides to the question: “Is migrant claims making still created in the image of a particular nation state and if not, what shapes the nature of immigrant claims making?”

**INSIGHT LOST IN THE NAME OF REPRESENTATIVENESS: IS RELIGIOUS BASED MINORITY CLAIMS MAKING REALLY ABSENT IN GERMANY?**

Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) first major finding in their representative cross-national analysis concerns the type of actors involved in minority claims making. Their data show that British minorities predominantly identify as racial or religious groups while their German counterparts identify on the basis of their homeland national or ethnic origin. The underlying reason for this focus on homeland national and ethnic identities is the exclusive German model of ethnic citizenship and
the labeling of migrants minorities by the state as foreigners. According to Koopmans and Statham (1999), this shows that mobilization of religious identities is not a general consequence of the presence of culturally different minorities but is dependant on a facilitating political context. Where such a facilitating context is lacking and immigrants are officially seen as citizens of another state, as in Germany, national origin and not religion becomes the overriding form in which migrants are identified and identify themselves.

In line with their theoretical expectations, apart from some claims making by Jewish groups, Koopmans and Statham (1999) find almost no claims making on a religious basis in Germany. As a researcher familiar with the controversial stance of Islamic migrant associations in Germany, I was intrigued to see 113 claims made by groups identified as Turks and only 3 claims by groups identified as Muslim/Islamic in Koopmans and Statham’s results. Do minorities in Germany really identify on the basis of homeland identities only; for example as Turks or Kurds? Are claims made by religiously identifying minority groups really absent in Germany with its approximately 2.6 million Muslims, who make up the 3.2% of the population? Is it minority associations who predominantly identify on the basis of their homeland national or ethnic origins or is it the media which display a selection bias by only reporting claims made by groups identifying on the basis of homeland national or ethnic origins?

If it’s really the migrants identifying predominantly on the basis of homeland identities and an unbiased mainstream media reporting it, one would be able to find a similar or at least a comparable number of claims actually made by a religiously identifying minority organization (i.e. an Islamic organization) and published in the mainstream media. To be able to test this hypothesis, I focus on the most vocal Turkish Islamic immigrant organization in Germany, IGMG, and compare the number
of claims actually made by it and published by the mainstream media. I focus on an Islamic organization to challenge the finding that religious based minority claims making is absent in Germany and I focus on the most vocal Islamic organization to decrease the likelihood that the mainstream media overlook claims made by this organization.9

No one can prove if IGMG is genuine in its adherence to democracy and the German basic law or not, but with its controversial stance and its contentious claims making, it definitely is unlikely to be absent from the arena of public claims making in Germany. Due to its controversial nature, one expects to come across many claims by Milli Gorus in Germany. However, according to Koopmans & Statham’s (1999) findings there were only 3 claims made by Muslim/Islamic religious organizations between 1990 and 1995 in Germany.

Is religious claims making really absent in Germany? Does the problem lie in the selection of a particular newspaper “Frankfurter Rundschau” as the source newspaper among many mainstream newspapers? Or do the German media exhibit a bias against claims making that contradicts an identification of Germany’s non-German residents as citizens of another state who only make claims based on their homeland based identities?

B. 1: IS FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU THE PROBLEM?

To be able to answer these questions on media bias, I searched for and recorded claims made by Milli Gorus in mainstream (non-immigrant) German media

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9 To be able to determine the biggest and the most vocal Islamic organization in Germany, I conducted interviews with members of Turkish immigrant organizations (regardless of their importance and size) in Baden Wuerttemberg and Hessen. Following up on information collected through these interviews I conducted internet based research on organizations that were regularly mentioned in my interviews. My analysis showed that Milli Gorus is the most vocal, the longest enduring, the biggest and the most controversial Turkish and the most active, the longest enduring, the biggest and the most controversial Islamic organization in Germany which is not sponsored by the Turkish state.
through Lexis Nexis by using Koopmans and Statham’s method of data collection.\textsuperscript{10} Lexis Nexis provides access to several important mainstream German newspapers and magazines including, Associated Press World Stream (starting from April 1995), Berliner Morgenpost (since 1999), Der Spiegel (since 1999), Focus Magazine (since 1993), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (since 1993), General-Anzeiger (since 2000), Stern (since 1998), Stuttgarter Nachrichten (since 2004), Stuttgarter Zeitung (since 2003), Süddeutsche Zeitung (since 1991), Die Tageszeitung (since 1994), and Die Welt (since 2003).

Even though Lexis Nexis does provide access to Süddeutsche Zeitung\textsuperscript{11}, which is one of the finest newspapers in Germany with an encompassing national and international focus, beginning as early as 1991, a search between 1990 and 1995 that uses certain keywords related to Milli Gorus (Milli Gorus, AMGT, IGMG, relevant high ranking Milli Gorus member names) gives only a single claim by Milli Gorus in 1995 which a host country claim.\textsuperscript{12}

Claims made by Milli Gorus are virtually absent in German mainstream media between 1991 and 1995. These results show that the finding (only 3 religious based claims) by Koopmans and Statham (1999) that religious based claims making is absent in Germany, is not only valid for a single newspaper (Frankfurter Rundschau). Milli

\textsuperscript{10} Acts by Milli Gorus Germany are considered to be claims and therefore are included in the data if they involve demands, criticisms, or proposals of any kind.

\textsuperscript{11} Lexis Nexis doesn’t provide access to any German language newspaper before 1991, therefore I don’t have any data on year 1990 to compare to Koopmans and Statham (1999)’s findings. However; Süddeutsche Zeitung which is one of the finest newspapers in Germany, is available through Lexis Nexis beginning with 1991. My findings in 1991 and 1992 are single-handedly based on Süddeutsche Zeitung and could reflect a selection bias against Milli Gorus claims by this particular newspaper. However; my findings (see below) show that even if there is a selection bias, it is representative of the general trend in the German media and therefore should not change the direction of my arguments.

\textsuperscript{12} I categorized Milli Gorus claims according to what the claim was related to. I used three categories: “host”, “home” and “supra/transnational”. If the claim is about Germany, it was coded as “host”. If the claim was about Turkey, it was coded as “home” and if the claim concerned an issue outside these two countries, it was coded as “supra/transnational”. To be specific, the category “supra/transnational” includes claims related to the situation of Muslims/Islam in the world, any claim concerning a country other than Turkey or Germany, any claims about the situation of the humanity/world in general and any claims about a supra/transnational institution.
Gorus claims; claims of the most controversial and active religious based migrant organization in Germany, are absent not only in Frankfurter Rundschau but in all mainstream German media between 1991 and 1995.

B.2: MAINSTREAM MEDIA BIAS OR MIGRANTS NOT IDENTIFYING ON THE BASIS OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES?

Koopmans and Statham (1999) recognize but downplay the problem of a probable selection bias in the mainstream media. They argue that since their interest is in publicly visible claims making, the problem of selection bias is less aggravating than in other contexts because acts of claims making become relevant and potentially controversial only when they reach the public sphere. However, their research question is not about the relevancy or the controversial nature of migrant claims making. Their research question concerns the quantity and types of claims migrants make, the frames they use, the institutions they direct their claims to and the identities they adopt. Therefore, if one finds no religious based or supranational claims addressed to supranational institutions using supranational frames due to a media bias, the conclusions drawn from these findings stressing the role of the ubiquitous nation state in affecting migrant claims making also become problematic.

By focusing on the claims of the most contentious Islamic AND Turkish association in Germany which is most likely to be present in the German mainstream media with its claims, my next findings are going to show that religious migrant associations, particularly Islamic ones, do make claims and try to reach the mainstream public sphere with their claims but are unfortunately left out by the German media.
In search for claims by Milli Gorus, I adopted Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) content analysis method to record demands, criticisms and proposals by Milli Gorus. Unlike Koopmans and Statham, I searched for these claims not in mainstream German media but in the target organization’s own bilingual media. Content analyses of Milli Gorus’s own newspaper which is published and distributed in Germany (*Milli Gazete*), their monthly magazine (*Perspektive*) and the organization website (www.igmg.de) showed me that I wasn’t wrong about the contentious nature of Milli Gorus. My analysis starts with the official founding date of IGMG (1985) and ends at the end of 2005. However, I first focus on the period between 1990 and 1995 to compare my findings with Koopmans and Statham’s and then see if my findings remain to be relevant for the period between 1995 and 2005.

![Figure 3: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1990 and 1995. (In organizational media)](image)

Contrary to Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) finding that religious based claims making is absent in Germany, as seen in graph 1, with 270 claims, Milli Gorus is by no means absent from claims making in Germany between 1990 and 1995. Even if we

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13 Acts by Milli Gorus Germany are considered to be claims and therefore are included in the data if they involve demands, criticisms, or proposals of any kind.
consider all of the 3 claims made by Muslim associations in Frankurter Rundschau to be Milli Gorus claims, the discrepancy still remains to be enormous. Not even one third of Milli Gorus claims have been published by the mainstream German media in general, or by Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) focus newspaper in particular.

My finding not only contradicts Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) results on the number of religious based claims making in Germany but also contradicts their finding on claims making by European level migrant organizations. Koopmans and Statham (1999) find no claims by such organizations at all in Britain and just two cases with PKK and the Iranian People’s Mujahedin being the cases in Germany. For them, this finding confirms the view that migrant organizations on the European level have remained relatively impotent actors mainly because migrant groups from different European countries have widely diverging opinions about the aims and strategies of integration and antiracism. However, I argue that with 270 claims, Milli Gorus as an organization active in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, England, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, would definitely change the direction of Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) findings on the absence/presence of European level migrant organizations.

Not only is there a huge discrepancy between the number of claims made by Milli Gorus and published in the German media, there is also discrepancy in the types of claims made by Milli Gorus and actually published by the media. According to Koopmans and Statham (1999), the most important field of claims making for German minorities between 1990 and 1995 refers to the political situation in migrants’ homelands. My findings on Milli Gorus claims making reveals that claims related to the migrants’ homeland is never the most important field of claims making in this period. To the contrary as seen in Graph 1, in all 6 years except in 1990, homeland based claims make up the smallest category. Surprisingly, it is claims related to
supra/transnational issues that make up the most important category of claims between 1992 and 1995, and it is host country related claims making that take the center stage in 1990 and 1991. Therefore, one can in no way claim that Milli Gorus acts according to the way the German national citizenship model would lead us to expect.

In terms of the authorities and institutions that claims were directed to, Koopmans and Statham (1999) find that the nation state (the German state) is the target of 73% of claims making in Germany. In my data on Milli Gorus, this is hardly the case. While Koopmans and Statham (1999) find that only 1% of these claims were addressed to supranational authorities, in my data supra/transnational addressees make up the largest group of addressees except for 2 years (1990 and 1995) where the host or the home nation state were the addressee of claims.¹⁴ (See Graph 2)

Figure 4: Addressees of IGMG claims in organizational media.

Finally, Koopmans and Statham (1999) ask to what extent these claims are framed with reference to supranational, transnational or national institutions, rights and conventions. They find that as much as 99 percent of claims in Germany are

¹⁴ In my content analysis, I also documented the addressees of MG claims, categorizing these addressees into four groups: “Home”, “host”, “supra/transnational” and “foreign country”. “Home” and “host” categories refer to claims addressed to Turkey and Germany, respectively. The category “supra/transnational” refers to claims addressed to supra or transnational institutions like the UN and the EU, or designations like “westerners”, “Muslims”, etc. The “foreign state” category involves states other than Turkey and Germany as addressees.
firmly locked within a national frame of reference. My findings suggest that supra/transnational frames and “human rights” frames have been utilized by Milli Gorus extensively between 1990 and 1995. They have become so common that they together make up the biggest category of claims making in all years between 1990 and 1995. (See Graph 3)

Figure 5: Frames used in Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1990 and 1995. (in organizational media)

B.3. Does the Media Bias Continue?

Figure 6: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims recorded in the mainstream German media.
Figure 7: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media)

Unfortunately, this media bias is not confined to the period between 1990 and 1995. A comparison between the numbers of Milli Gorus claims recorded by mainstream German media (Graph 4) and actually made by Milli Gorus (Graph 5) between 1985 and 2005 shows that except for 2004 and 2005 there has been a real discrepancy in the number of claims made by Milli Gorus and actually published by the German mainstream media.

In terms of the discrepancy in the types of claims published in the mainstream media and actually made by Milli Gorus, a comparison of the type of Milli Gorus claims published in mainstream German media and in Milli Gorus’s own media shows that the German media fail to publish Milli Gorus claims related to supra/transnational issues till 2001 and records these types of claims in significantly less amounts after 2001. (Table ….) The only year that the German media come close to publishing the supra/transnational Milli Gorus claims, is 2004. It remains to be seen if 2004 stays as an outlier or if the German media becomes more representative in publishing the types of claims Milli Gorus makes.
Table 1: Numbers of supra/transnational Milli Gorus Germany claims in organizational and German mainstream media.

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In the German media, not only is there a selection bias against claims related to supra/transnational issues, but as table 2 shows that frames using references to supranational ideologies and rights (e.g. human rights) don’t get published in the German media. However, for types of frames published, the German media seem to have become more representative beginning in 2004 and 2005, but again it remains to be seen if this is going to be a permanent trend.

Table 2: Supra/transnational and human rights frames of Milli Gorus Germany claims in organizational and German mainstream media.

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Unfortunately, the same positive development can not be observed in the types of addressees published by the German media. In this category, the emphasis in the German media continues to be single-handedly on host country institutions while in reality Milli Gorus does address many supra/transnational institutions and foreign states. (Table 3) These results show that the German media not only records a
significantly lower number of claims by Milli Gorus but they also record a significantly lower number of supra/transnational claims, frames and addressees.

Table 3: Supranational and foreign state addressees of Milli Gorus Germany claims in organizational and German mainstream media.

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An analysis of Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) focus newspaper (Frankfurter Rundschau) between 2003 and 2005, in search for claims by Milli Gorus also shows that this selection bias endures. A search for Milli Gorus claims only returns one homeland related claim in 2003, 5 homeland related claims in 2004 and 1 homeland and 1 supra/transnational related claim in 2005. Not only are Milli Gorus’s claims on host country issues and supra/transnational issues are ignored, supranational frames and addresses are not taken notice of, with 7 host country addresses and 4 host country frames but no supranational frames or addressees published by Frankfurter Rundschau.

These findings make Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) conclusions stressing the lack of transnational migrant organizations making claims on nation states, migrant organizations addressing supranational organizations/institutions and framing their claims by referring to international rights and conventions, at least questionable. Even if Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) data is reliable and representative, putting claims from different organizations over a long period of time together makes researchers overlook important differences in the nature of claims making between different groups and the non-nation state bound factors leading to these differences. I argue that understanding migrant claims making necessitates individual case study analyses of
migrant organizations over a period of time and a focus on organization documents and media for these analyses.

As seen above, relying on mainstream media to retrieve data on migrant claims making can, first, lead to the exclusion of very important players from our analysis and this exclusion can distort our findings. Second, combining claims made by different organizations over a long period of time runs the risk of failing to see changes over time in claims making of a particular organization and differences in the claims making strategies of different groups, preventing us from understanding the mechanisms and processes leading to particular claims making strategies for different types of groups. Below, I first present a descriptive analysis of Milli Gorus claims making between 1985 and 2005 and then discuss the mechanisms that have shaped the nature of Milli Gorus claims making.
CHAPTER 4
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF MILLI GORUS CLAIMS MAKING
BETWEEN 1985 AND 2005

Figure 8: Type of Milli Gorus Germany claims making between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media)

In Graph 6, Milli Gorus claims have been categorized depending on whether they are related to the host country (in this case Germany), the home country (in this case Turkey) or transnational/supranational issues. My findings are quite surprising for an organization that Koopmans and Statham (1999) would expect to behave according to the parameters of the national citizenship model in Germany.

For example, Koopmans and Statham (1999) theorize that in line with the national citizenship model, the most important field of claims making for German minorities should refer to the political situation in migrants’ homelands. Contrary to Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) expectations, we see that claims making referring to migrants’ homeland make up the lowest category in most of the years. The only relevant exception where Koopmans and Statham’s hypothesis comes true is the year 1987 where 15 homeland related claims were made. In line with theories on
supranationalism, emphasizing migrant associations making claims on supra/transnational issues, in 12 out of 21 years, Milli Gorus claims referring to supra or transnational issues make up the most numerous category of claims.

In addition to the high amount of supra/transnational claims, Milli Gorus claims concerned with some aspect of the host country make up the most numerous category in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1997, 1999 and 2004. This shows that even if supranationalism is prevalent in Milli Gorus claims making, host country related claims continue to be essential in certain periods, contrary to Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) claims that German minorities are preoccupied with the politics of their homelands due to the influence of the particular national citizenship regime in Germany.

![Figure 9](image_url)

Figure 9: Addressees of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media)

Another form in which migrant transnationalism takes place is when collective actors, whether themselves transnational or not, bypass national authorities and directly address institutions and authorities outside the nation state. In contrast, the national citizenship model leads us to expect political authorities within the national polity to be the most important addressees of claims. In addition to the hypotheses
above, in Germany, the national citizenship model leads us to expect a significant number of claims addressed at the authorities of migrants’ homelands.

In line with the national citizenship model, Koopmans and Statham (1999) find that the nation state is the target of 73 percent of claims making in Germany and the only significant form of claims making transcending national borders are claims addressed at the governments of migrants’ homelands. Moreover, such cases are not of the type asking homeland governments to intervene with the German government on behalf of migrant rights which would still fit the post-national model. Almost exclusively they are all related to political conflicts in the homeland.

Koopmans and Statham (1999) do come across several examples of claims making that would support the supranational thesis. For example in 1994 a group of 200 German Kurds drove to French Strasbourg to offer a petition to the European parliament against the persecution of Kurds in Turkey. In another example, German Roma and Sinti groups appealed to the UNHRC to move against the German government’s plan to deport refugees from this ethnic group back to Romania. However, Koopmans and Statham (1999) find little else and these examples are highly exceptional. It remains a mystery as to how their results would change if Milli Gorus’s 120 supra/transnational addressees were recorded.

As seen in the graph 7, supra/transnational addressees are by no means absent in Milli Gorus claims making. To the contrary, in years 1985, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2003 (11 out of 21 years), when combined together supra/transnational and foreign state category have the highest number of entries. 1987 and 1995 are years where the home country (Turkey) was addressed the most and 1990, 1996, 1997, 2002, and 2004 are years when authorities in Germany were addressed more than any other category. These results show that addressees of Milli
Gorus claims are not overwhelmed by a single handed emphasis on a single type of addressee but change in ways that need to be explained.

Figure 10: Frames used by Milli Gorus Germany between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media)

Another important aspect of migrant activism emphasized by postnationalists is claims being framed with reference to supranational and transnational institutions, rights, ideas, norms and conventions. In turn, references to multiculturalism in frames are important for the multicultural citizenship thesis which sees demands for special group rights related to the recognition and protection of cultural differences-cultural rights- as a central characteristic of minority claims making.

Not surprisingly, Koopmans and Statham find little support for the postnational and multiculturalist theories with 99% of claims made in Germany being firmly locked within a national frame. Even though they find little evidence for the types of claims making claimed to be typical for the modern migrant experience by the postnational or multiculturalist scholars, my research shows otherwise. As seen in graph 8, Milli Gorus makes references to supra/transnational institutions, norms, conventions and rights continuously and overwhelmingly and homeland related frames.
stay as the lowest category throughout the years. However, this overwhelming use of supranational frames by Milli Gorus should not lead us to start celebrating migrant transnationalism before we analyze changes in the use of supranational claims and understand the factors leading to this supranationalism. This finding should also not prevent us from studying the changes in the nature of host country frames throughout the years in response to factors that need to be specified.

I argue that even though my results are not representative, the 82 supra/transnational, human rights or multiculturalism related frames used by Milli Gorus would at least remove the “few” in the “Few examples of claims making beyond national boundaries exist”. Even though I have not examined claims making by all minority groups in Germany like Koopmans and Statham (1999) have, the complete absence of the biggest, most vocal, controversial and longest enduring Turkish Islamic organization’s claims from the mainstream German media is one of the main factors that have made Koopmans and Statham’s results deceiving. I argue that it’s not German minorities who conform to Germany’s view of them as citizens of another state, but it’s the German media which overwhelmingly record claims that conform to the standards set by Germany’s national citizenship model. Germany sees immigrants as foreigners but that is not always, as we see in the case of Milli Gorus, the way in which minorities behave. They don’t always organize and identify themselves on the basis of their national origin and are not, always, preoccupied with the politics of their homeland. This is exactly why, migrant claims making should not be studied as the outcome of a single static variable but should be studied as an outcome of multiple home/host country, extra nation state and within group factors that work together through certain mechanisms.
CHAPTER 5
MECHANISMS EXPLAINING THE “HOW” OF MIGRANT CLAIMS
MAKING & SUPPORTING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

AN ACTIVATING MECHANISM: ATTRIBUTION OF THREAT AND OPPORTUNITY

The much criticized “political opportunity structure” is essential to the classical social movement paradigm. This paradigm focuses on consistent dimensions of the political environment that either encourage or discourage people from using collective action. (Tarrow: 1998) The opening up of institutional access, shifts in political alignment, the presence or absence of influential allies and the prospect of repression or facilitation have been among variables used by the social movement paradigm in successfully explaining social movement mobilization. However, as Tarrow (2005) points out, the social movement paradigm exhibits three major problems: a single minded focus on single-actor movements, an indifference to the broader field of contentious politics, a focus on static variables and a single handed focus on movements at the domestic level.

Trying to reform the paradigm they themselves took part in creating; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) aim to identify dynamic mechanisms that bring the variables of the classical social movement paradigm into relations with one another and with other significant actors, as a result putting each of the constituent parts of the classical agenda into motion. In this new dynamic and interactive framework, the first impulse for an episode of contention comes from “broad change processes”. These broad change processes can come from within a nation state (both host and home) or could be supranational, transnational or international. They ignite other sets of mechanisms which interact and culminate in a contentious episode and create collective action.
Rather than looking at “opportunities and threats” as objective structural factors, I see them as subject to attribution and like McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) believe that threats and opportunities cannot automatically be read from objective structural changes. No opportunity, however objectively open, will invite mobilization unless it is visible to potential challengers and is perceived as an opportunity. The same holds for threats. Therefore, attribution of opportunity or threat should be studied as an activating mechanism igniting contentious claims making.

Attribution of opportunity or threat as a mechanism is however, dependant on certain characteristics of contentious groups. As Koopmans and Statham (2001) who include collective identities of migrant groups as the third component of the triad of determinants of migrant claims making and like Kuru (1995), I attribute a central role to collective identities and ideologies of groups. I argue that migrant groups’ belonging in a specific ethnic group, their religious and racial identification, and of course their degree of attachment to the country of origin are factors affecting the “attribution of opportunity or threat”. In the case of Milli Gorus which claims to be an organization defending the basic rights of Muslims, certain change processes are more likely to induce mobilization than a secular Kemalist Turkish immigrant organization like the AADD (Ataturkist Thought Association). As a comparison of claims making of AADD and Milli Gorus in Germany between 2000 and 2005 shows, while the war in Iraq has been a very contentious issue for Milli Gorus Germany, AADD has not even made a single claim about it even though it claims to strive for “Peace at home and peace at world.” (www.ataturk.de) A comparison of Milli Gorus Germany and staunchly secular AADD claims making show that adherence to a global Muslim identity based on common beliefs, rituals and social practices and to the common brotherhood of Muslims (the umma) makes issues like the position of Muslim minorities in Europe or the conflicts involving Muslims in Afghanistan, Palestine,
Bosnia Chechnya and elsewhere mobilization inducing for Milli Gorus Germany while these issues are not perceived as threats or opportunities by AADD. Moreover, as will be discussed below, changes in Milli Gorus Germany ideological/religious identification over the years explain why same types of issues induce mobilization at certain times and don’t at other times.

Figure 11: A dynamic framework for analyzing the initial stages of migrant claims making.

In support of my theoretical arguments, I first present changes in the nature of Milli Gorus claim making in Germany throughout the years focusing on the type (what issues these claims are made in reference to) of these claims since the mid-1980s. Even though Milli Gorus’s claims making in Germany before 1985 will not be studied systematically due to the informal nature of Milli Gorus Germany’s organizational structure and lack of any media reporting these claims, a history of Milli Gorus in Germany and political Islam in Turkey before 1985 need to be discussed. Developments after 1985 will be discussed within the theoretical analysis of Milli Gorus Germany claims making.
Among Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s first moves as the leader of the new Republic of Turkey in the 1920s was the recasting of Islam. During this period Kemalist intellectuals sought to rearticulate a sort of humanistic-nationalistic Islam that would be compatible with Western Enlightenment values and cultural practices. Although the Kemalists ideologically advocated an Islam with no institutional mediation between God and the believer, and ordered the closing of Sharia courts and the Sufi brotherhoods, they did not simply eliminate all religious institutional structures. Rather, they replaced the Ottoman Ministry of Religious Affairs with Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) which was established as a branch of the new government. The Diyanet was and continues to be responsible for administering mosques and providing them with imams.

The Islamist movement emerged soon after the founding of the secular republic in 1923. It was led by tarikat (religious order) sheikhs and professional men of religion who had lost their status and economic power when secular reforms abolished religious institutions. However, this movement failed to gain widespread support and was crushed by the authorities throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In general, Islamist groups stayed underground during the era of the one-party rule between 1923 and 1946.

With the transition to a multi-party system in 1946, Islamist groups formed covert and overt alliances with the ruling center right Democratic Party (1950-1960). Until Necmettin Erbakan established the National Order Party, Islamists either continued forming conservative factions in a center right party or remained underground. With the NOP (Milli Nizam Partisi), for the first time, the Islamists had an autonomous party organization through which they could campaign for their agenda. Since the

The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) was shut down by the Constitutional Court on May 20, 1971 due to military pressure on the grounds that it violated the principles of laicism laid down in the Constitution and in the Law of Political Parties. Its leader, Necmettin Erbakan had to fell to Switzerland to escape persecution and stayed there till 1972. (Yavuz, 2005) Following NOP’s closure, the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) was founded in October 1972 to succeed the NOP. With support from provincial merchants, artisans and the covert network of two leading informally organized religious groups- the Nakshibandis and Nurcus, the NSP achieved a surprising electoral success in the 1973 general elections, obtaining 11.8 percent of the total vote.

These developments with Necmettin Erbakan in the center stage had also a transnational dimension because of the large flow of Turkish guest workers into Germany and other European countries beginning in the late 1960s. As a result of this labor immigration from Turkey to Western Europe, migrants with a rural background which had grown up in societies with high social control, found themselves in the anonymous big cities of Western Europe. Milli Gorus Germany came into being in the niches of big cities to provide for the needs of these Turkish immigrants with mainly rural backgrounds. It provided more than prayer locations; it provided a second home far away from home. For these immigrants, belonging to an organization meant a sense of security and meaning in life. (Schiffauer, 2004) To these functions were later added a function of protecting the off-springs from becoming foreign. It was, of course, no surprise that Erbakan’s years of flight in Western Europe in the beginning of the 70s corresponded to the foundational years of Milli Gorus in Europe.
In these early years, ties between the party in Turkey and the associations in Germany were loose. The head of the party in Turkey visited Germany a couple of times but the ties were never as strict as they later became in the 80s. Even if organizational ties were not that rigid, Milli Gorus in Germany followed the program of the party in Turkey and remained completely isolated from its German surroundings due mainly to the idea of an eventual return to the home country.

In the meantime, after its solid showing in the 1973 general elections, the NSP became a coalition partner in successive governments. First, it formed a government with the staunchly secularist People’s Republican Party (CHP) led by Bulent Ecevit. During the 1970s when the NSP took part in many government coalitions, it managed to place its members in the bureaucracy, particularly in the ministries that it controlled. It also succeeded in passing a bill that made theological high schools equal to secondary schools and enabled these schools’ often pro-Islamic students to attend universities. Many graduates of these schools have gone on to politics as Islamists in the 1980s and 1990s. (E.g. the current prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan)

In the late 1970s, as successive governments failed to solve the country’s serious economic and political problems the antagonism between the radical left and radical rights escalated into violent clashes bordering on civil war. In 1980, the armed forces led by General Kenan Evren, seized power in a coup and restructured the political system with a new military drafted constitution. The leading parties, including the NSP, were banned from political activity and many important movement members had to flee to Europe and mainly to Germany to escape from persecution.

1979 and 1980 were also change years in the Islamic world. 1979 saw the revolution in Iran and 1980 the invasion of Afghanistan. While in Turkey it looked like the Islamic movement had come to a halt, an Islamic revolution had succeeded in Iran. These were the years when an orientation towards umma started gaining a
stronghold within Milli Gorus. Milli Gorus started taking part in Islamic world politics and built strong network ties particularly with Afghan reactionaries in Afghanistan. 15

Milli Gorus Germany claims making throughout the years manifests this orientation towards the universal Islamic community of umma and the aim of being involved in Islamic world politics. For example, as seen in graph 9, 13 out of 15 claims I recorded in 1985 fell into the category of supra/transnational. In particular, these claims were related to the situation in Afghanistan, calls for the unity of Islamic umma, the problems of Muslims in Bulgaria and Palestine. My data on Milli Gorus Germany claims making shows that this identification with the global Islamic community and an engagement in Islamic world politics have been continuously present till today with countless supra/transnational, home or host claims made in response to perceived threats and opportunities emerging due to the problems of Muslims in multiple places. (e.g. Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, etc)

Figure 12: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media)

The informal network of Milli Gorus in Germany experienced problems in 1983, as the reestablishment of the party in Turkey was in process, when one of the

15 In these years, the organizational media documents many visits to Milli Gorus Germany offices by leaders of Afghan reactionaries.
most radical preachers of the organization, Cemaleddin Kaplan broke away from Milli Gorus taking numerous supporters, mosques and associations with him. Kaplan questioned the legitimacy of the leadership of Erbakan as an engineer and stressed his own legitimacy as a cleric. He emphasized a strategy based on victory through an Islamic revolution in contrast to parliamentarian means as preferred by Erbakan and his followers.

On July 19, 1983, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) was formed under the leadership of Ali Turkmen instead of the politically banned Erbakan. (However, Erbakan was eventually reinstated into Turkish politics and became the Welfare Party’s leader.) One of the first things the leaders of the Welfare Party did was to take the initiative in Germany and send Sevki Yılmaz, a cleric and a charismatic speaker and Osman Yumakogulları a major player in Milli Gorus, to Germany to organize the reconstruction of Milli Gorus in Germany.

During the of reconstruction, the loosely organized Milli Gorus structure in Germany became strongly connected to the center in Ankara and at the top of this rigid organizational structure sat Necmettin Erbakan. A centralized organizational structure and a mostly anti-democratic organizational culture developed during these years. In 1985, all Milli Gorus associations in Germany became formally connected to the center in Cologne. The now centralized organization took the name AMGT (Avrupa Milli Gorus Teskilatları, National View Associations in Europe) which was later changed to IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus, Islamic Society of National View) in 1994. Figure 13 depicts the historical development of Milli Gorus Germany.

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16 AMGT is an abbreviation from the Turkish name “Avrupa Milli Gorus Teskilatları”, but IGMG is an abbreviation from the German “Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus”. 


Beginning in 1983, the relationship between Milli Gorus associations in Germany and the party in Turkey became so intertwined that the success of either came to be dependent on the other. The associations were supported by the party in Turkey through competent preachers sent from Turkey and the associations financially supported the election campaign of the Refah Party. At the end, the success of the Welfare Party at the end of 80s and the beginning of 90s worked for the attractiveness of the associations in Germany. My analysis of Milli Gorus Germany documents this interconnectedness. It shows that leaders of the movement in Turkey were present not only during yearly meetings, but were present in Germany giving speeches, attending meetings, formal dinners and paying visits to Milli Gorus associations on a daily basis.
In the meantime, a single handed orientation of Milli Gorus Germany towards Turkey due to the myth of return and the central role played by the first generation within the organization was starting to ease. While previously, host country related changes were not interpreted as threats or opportunities, the proposed foreigner’s law in Germany was appropriated as a “threat to the members of the Turkish community who intend to stay here permanently.” (Milli Gazete, October 30th, 1989, March 9th, 1990) Milli Gorus responded to this potential threat against their “basic human rights” (May 5th, 1990) with active public protests in 1989 and 1990 as seen in increase in the number of host country related claims. (See graph 10) Another major host country related development in the beginning of the 90s was the rise in Neo-Nazi violence against foreigners and particularly Turks in Germany. In response to this, not only the Turkish state which was seen as the inherent protector of Turks in Germany but also the German authorities and institutions were called to action. Milli Gorus leaders threatened the host country authorities with democratic protests and a total withdrawal of the Turkish money from German banks unless proper precautions were taken. (Milli Gazete, June 11th 1993)

Figure 14: Milli Gorus Germany host country related claims. (In organizational media)
Even with a rise in interest in host country developments, interest in the Islamic umma was never lost. This interest became apparent during the war in Bosnia in 1992 and 1993 when supra/transnational claims making more than quadrupled. Not only the content of claims making but also the addressees reveal an emphasis on the importance of supporting “Muslim brothers” all over the world. Between 1991 and 1994, the addressees of Milli Gorus were overwhelmingly supra/transnational calling for supranational institutions, Muslim countries and other foreign states to action on the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and etc. During these years, while an orientation towards the host country was taking root slowly, claims making on particularly Muslim related supranational issues never disappeared. (See graph 11)

Figure 15: Supra/transnational Milli Gorus Germany claims. (In organizational media)

In the meantime, in line with growing electoral ambitions of the Welfare Party, claims were made asking for arrangements allowing Turkish citizens residing in Germany to vote for Turkish elections in Germany and against the repressive policies of the Kemalist establishment against pious Muslims. (e.g. the headscarf issue)

With financial and electoral help from Milli Gorus supporters in Germany, the Welfare Party achieved a big success in March 1994 Turkish local elections. It won 28
mayorships, 6 major metropolitan centers and leadership of 327 local governments. Nationwide, it received 19 percent of the total vote. In the 1995 general elections, it obtained 21.4 percent of the vote, gaining seats in the parliament and formed a coalition government with Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party in July 1996.

Not surprisingly, disputes between the two partners over legislation were intensified by a crisis created by Welfare Party mayors and deputies, whose anti-secular rhetoric and activities agitated secular public opinion. During these years, Milli Gorus Germany supported its Turkish counterparts with claims on policies of the Kemalist establishment trying to counter anti-secular tendencies of the Welfare Party. For Milli Gorus, which saw a solution to the Kurdish problem in Southeastern Turkey in Islamic brotherhood between the Turkish majority and the Kurdish minority, proposals and demands related to the Kurdish ignited terror in Southeastern Turkey were also common.

However, the Welfare’s Party’s days in power were about to come to an end. The tensions between the military and the Welfare Party and the antagonism between the Islamists and secular public opinion escalated. These tensions culminated in the National Security Council’s February 28, 1997 decisions that called for an end to Islamist activities. This so-called postmodern coup is usually designated as a turning point in the strategies of the Islamist movement in Turkey (Dagi, 2004). The coup and the following developments led to Necmettin Erbakan’s banning from politics and the Welfare Party’s closing down in January 1998 by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it violated the principles of secularism and the Law of Political Parties.

17 In 1997, the Turkish army has intervened to force Turkey’s first Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, from power. This intervention has been called a soft coup or a post-modern coup by many scholars, academics and intellectuals.
These important developments were of course interpreted as threats by Milli Gorus Germany. Milli Gorus Germany claims making on home country issues doubled in 1998 (See Graph 12) as a response to policy initiatives taken by the secular establishment in an effort to curb Islamic activism. (i.e. the closing down of the Welfare Party, the headscarf issue, the prisonment of Tayyip Erdogan, proposals on educational reform) However, as manifest in the content of Milli Gorus claims between 1997 and 1999, such important threats which can be identified as developments strong enough to change the trajectory of political Islam in Turkey were not seen as more important than threats and opportunities emerging due to developments in the host country. Instead of single handed fight against the secular establishment in Turkey, IGMG chose to direct more power and resources to activities against the proposed “child visa” law of the German government in 1997, for achieving voting rights in 1998 and for the right to give religious classes in public schools in 1999. The addressees of Milli Gorus claims between 1996 and 1998 also point to an increasing host country orientation as the proportion of host country institutions and authorities as addressees more than tripled. (See Graph 13)
According to Schiffauer (2004), the coup in Turkey, the end of the myth of return and the failure of Islamic holdings in Turkey have all contributed to a change in the ideological orientation of Milli Gorus which in turn has contributed to a decrease in the relative importance of claims making in response to threats and opportunities arising in Turkey.

According to my interviews, another major cause of this reorientation towards Germany is the demographic change within Milli Gorus through which the second generation has come to power, believing that Germany is their home and that they as Muslims are more privileged in Germany than in Turkey, enjoying many freedoms that their counterparts in Turkey lack. For this new generation of IGMG\textsuperscript{18} leaders, a total identification between Turkishness and Muslimness is broken. Supporters are instead encouraged to take German citizenship and engage themselves in the Muslim world society. A world oriented global politics instead of a Turkey oriented party politics is being played out by the second generation IGMG leaders since the end of the 90s.

\textsuperscript{18} I use IGMG and Milli Gorus Germany interchangeably.

Figure 17: Addressees of Milli Gorus Germany claims. (In organizational media)
This orientation towards the global Islamic community of umma makes the Chechen war beginning at the end of 1999 and continuing full force in 2000 an important mobilization igniting development for Milli Gorus. While supra/transnational claims and supra/transnational addressees are high in these years due to the Chechen war, host country related claims never lose their importance while homeland country related claims show a declining trend after this date with the declining identification of IGMG with the Milli Gorus movement in Turkey. As I will discuss later, with a reorientation towards the host country, even the repercussions of a global phenomenon, September 11, start playing itself out in the national public sphere in Germany. As a result of the internalized effects of September 11 in Germany, IGMG comes under increasing attack by the German media and by German state agencies and responds to these attacks by addressing national authorities, using nationally bound frames.

In the meantime, a major power struggle was playing itself out in Turkey. A new party, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) was founded by 33 former Welfare Party deputies under the leadership of Recai Kutan on December 17, 1997. However, the ban imposed on Erbakan enabled some party members to break free from his direct influence and enabled the reformists to publicize their discontent with the policies of the traditionalists. Soon after the founding of the party, the power struggle led to the resignation of the party’s young reformists (Cemil Cicek, Ali Coskun, Abdullah Gul and Abdulkadir Aksu) on July 26, 1999. The movement was eventually divided into two parties after the closure of the Virtue Party: the traditionalists’ Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, founded on July 20, 2001) and the reformist Justice and Development Party(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, founded on August 14, 2001.

The traditional wing that opted for staying with Erbakan tried to de-Islamize its discourse, emphasizing a discourse that avoided any societal tensions, and taking a
low profile, non-confrontational and moderate stance. Recai Kutan, the party leader went as far as declaring that “They will not be a party to any conflict and they will not bring up the issue of the headscarf even though it is the right thing to do so.” (Milliyet, September 22, 2001) The party claims to endorse democracy and the idea of a “non-ideological state” as the basic principles of the modern world. “We know what it is like to be threatened, blackmailed and silenced and therefore no one could value democracy better than us.” said Recai Kutan. (Milliyet, October 11, 2001) However, their understanding of democracy remains self-servingly restrictive to legal and constitutional amendments that would make the closure of the parties difficult and remove the ban on Erbakan’s political activities. (Dagi, 2004)

In the meantime, the reformist Justice and Development Party which has been in the government since 2002 elections persistently rejects being Islamist, defines itself as a conservative democratic party, emphasizes the democratic character of the party organization, and the importance of consensus-seeking in politics. During all this turmoil within the Milli Gorus movement in Turkey, IGMG has totally distanced itself from Turkish politics and Milli Gorus Turkey by formally breaking its ties with the official Milli Gorus newspaper, Milli Gazete. With a decreasing ideological orientation towards Turkey, the response of IGMG to important developments in Turkey has been a negligible number of claims related to Turkey. The remaining limited number of claims on Turkey have been related to Turkey’s membership in the EU only, as IGMG shies away from making claims related only to Turkish internal politics as they believe:

“Our homeland is here, we live here, why should we make claims on Turkey? If we have problems, it’s in Germany and if we are going to have solutions to those problems, it’s going to be here in our homeland.” (Interview with an IGMG member in Walldorf, July, 2006)
A CASE OF INTERNALIZATION: EFFECTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 ON MILLIGORUS CLAIMS MAKING

I have shown above how certain objective change processes and not others are interpreted as threats and opportunities by contentious groups due to the influence of the ideological orientations and identifications of these groups. Below, I show how ideological orientations and identifications of contentious groups take part in another mechanism: the internalization of international pressures.

In his book *The New Transnational Activism*, Tarrow (2005) discusses the conflict over the wearing of the headscarf in France as a case of internalization of the conflicts that have risen in response to global political Islamism. As in the case of political Islamism, when international pressures and conflicts penetrate into domestic politics, Tarrow (2005) calls this a case of internalization. He argues that international pressures leading to internalization can take a variety of forms; including international events like the kidnapping of the French journalists in Iraq or the imposition of common standards and rules of behavior by international institutions like the European Union.

I argue that in Germany, internalization plays itself out not as an outcome of pressures from an institution but as an outcome of an event affecting world politics in general and the German government in particular. September 11 and its repercussions in Germany show us how deeply penetrated domestic contention and international events have become. September 11 has not only changed the parameters of world politics completely, but has also changed the parameters of IGMG claims making through internalization.

In his book Tarrow (2005) shows that internalization creates triangular relationships among ordinary people, their governments and international institutions.
The particular mechanisms found in it are: *external pressures*, governments responding to these pressures through *implementation* of certain policies, and domestic group protests which target the government that responds to external pressures through certain policies. The process can end in repression by local governments against the protesting groups, concessions offered to them or brokerage on the part of governments between the citizens and international pressures/institutions.

Figure 18: A dynamic and interactive model of internalization.

Source: Adapted from Tarrow, 2005.

These mechanisms discussed by Tarrow (2005) can be observed in the changes in Milli Gorus Germany claims making after September 11. After September 11, 2001, responding to the perceived global security threat from Islamism, German state
authorities and the German mass media began looking more closely at Islam and Muslim communities. The gathering places of Muslims, such as mosques and religious associations, became targets of state inspections and the subject of flashy newspaper articles depicting them as shelters for terrorists. IGMG in particular, came under intense suspicion from the German government. The increased interrogation from the German media can be seen in the increased number of references made to Milli Gorus in the media. While between 1990 and 2001 a Lexis Nexis search on the keyword Milli Gorus gives 448 results, a search between 2002 and 2005 produces 726 references to Milli Gorus.

In December 2001, conservative Christian Democratic Union chair Angela Merkel publicly stated to the newspaper Bild that “foreigners who adopted German citizenship only in order to camouflage their membership in fundamentalist groups should have their German passport taken away.” (Bild, December 15th 2001) By 2002, the IGMG citizenship campaign urging immigrants to take on German citizenship had been recognized by the Interior Ministry and the Verfassunsschutz (Agency for the Protection of the Constitution) and it had been given a sinister significance: IGMG seeks to control German politics by establishing an Islamist political party. Given the size of the Muslim population in Germany (approximately 2.6 million) and the fact that IGMG is only one of several Turkish Muslim organizations, each of which has a very different membership base and different political or religious allegiances, agendas, and orientations often with no sympathy for IGMG and its agenda, the threat of an Islamist political party to the German state is hardly a credible one. (Pratt Ewing, 2003)

The treatment of Muslim associations by both the German state authorities and the German media following September 11 has affected their claims making. Yurdakul (2006) argues that there have been different responses to this intense
surveillance. Some Muslim organizations, feeling threatened by the police raids and the journalistic hype, have minimized their interactions with the host society. (For example, VIKZ: Verband Der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V (Union of Islamic Cultural Centers) Many others, Milli Gorus being the most important one, have instead opened their doors to the members of Germany’s non-Muslim majority to demonstrate their innocence.

I argue that an already emerging host country orientation within Milli Gorus Germany has made internalization, where international pressures/events play themselves out in the domestic arena, possible in Germany. As a result, not only has Milli Gorus Germany opened up its doors to non-Muslims through “Open Door” days in the mosques; it has also reaffirmed its host country orientation as manifest in changes in its claims making which increasingly present a host country orientation.

Migrant minorities addressing claims at authorities and institutions transcending national borders is one of the most cherished signs of migrant transnationalism. Whether these addressees are international (the UNHCR), European (the European parliament) or represent a foreign state (e.g. the US government), one can find plenty of them in Milli Gorus claims especially before 2000. As seen in graph 14 below, before 2000, the majority of IGMG claims making in Germany can be considered SUPRA/TRANSNATIONAL CLAIMS MAKING PAR EXCELLENCE with supra/transnational related claims also being addressed to supra/transnational authorities. However, beginning with 2000 and increasing in magnitude in 2003 this supra/transnational claims making par excellence has been on the decline, with the host country replacing supra/transnational institutions/authorities as the addressee of even supra/transnational claims. After 2000, Milli Gorus has chosen to domesticate supra/transnational issues by increasingly addressing these claims to the host country.
Figure 19: Addressees of supra/transnational claims by Milli Gorus Germany. (In organizational media)
Another manifestation of migrant transnationalism is immigrant organizations making demands on national governments in the name of international legal conventions, ideologies and rights. As seen in graph 15, between 1990 and 2000, Milli Gorus has framed its host country related claims in supra/transnational terms with as many as 80% of frames used in host country related claims in 1998 referring to supranational rights/ideologies and to human rights. The percentage of human rights framed claims in this period has been particularly high (Between 13 to 50 % of all frames). However, beginning with 2001, the role of the human rights frame and supra/transnational frames has decreased significantly while a focus on host country frames have taken a stronghold in Milli Gorus host country related claims.

Host country related claims addressed to supranational/ transnational institutions, organizations and authorities are also a manifestation of migrant transnationalism. In the beginning of the 90s, claims made in response to the Nazi violence in Germany have been addresses to human rights organizations, to the world public and to the Western democratic world multiple times (41% of addressees in 1991). The end of 90s (1997, 98, 99) has, in addition to the Nazi Violence, witnessed claims related to the proposed child visa for the children of Turkish residents being addressed to human rights organizations. (Between 9 to 19 %) Although never substantial, this supra/transnational addressing of host country related claims has completely disappeared in 2000 and beginning with 2001 host country related claims have become predominantly (96 to 100 %) addressed to host country authorities or institutions. (See Graph 16)

\[19\] See Appendix B for data on Milli Gorus Germany frames.
Figure 20: Frames used in host country related claims of IGMG between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media)
Figure 21: Addressees of host country claims of IGMG between 1985 and 2005. (In organizational media)
To summarize, supra/transnational claims by Milli Gorus after 2001 (Graph 14), the majority of which are in response to the anti-Islam feeling emerging after September 11, are increasingly addressed to host country authorities and institutions. Host country related Milli Gorus claims after 2001, the majority of which are direct or indirect responses to the effects of September 11, are also predominantly addressed to host country authorities using host country frames while the proportion of supra/transnational frames and addressees decrease. (Graph 15 and 16)

These trends in Milli Gorus claims making show that international pressures might not only play themselves out in the domestic arena but can also lead to a reaffirmation of an emerging host country orientation in immigrant groups. National governments respond to international pressures by certain policies and migrant groups respond to these threats or opportunities by addressing host country authorities and institutions and framing their claims in host country terms. However, internalization is only possible if a host country ideological orientation has emerged or is emerging for that particular group. If this orientation is lacking in a certain group, the outcome of these pressures can be, as Yurdakul(2006) shows, a total withdrawal from host country politics.
CONCLUSION

My discussion above shows that understanding migrant claims making necessitates long term case study analyses of the addressees, frames and type of claims of certain migrant groups. While national citizenship models do have an influence on the nature of migrant claims making in a particular country, claims making strategies of particular groups are also influenced by home country, supra/transnational and intra-group changes.

My theoretical point of view differs from other claims making scholars in the way I treat these influences coming from different levels. I don’t treat them as static variables that lead to mobilization but I put them into motion and track and study the way they interact with each other. My empirical analysis shows that Milli Gorus Germany claims emerge as an outcome of broad change processes (national or international, local or global) which are attributed as threats and opportunities depending on the ideological/religious identification of group. Second, I show that extra-nation state pressures and events can unexpectedly lead to a very domesticated claims making due to internalization which I claim is dependant on an already emerging host-country orientation within the immigrant group.

I argue that my focus on dynamic processes and mechanisms linking the local and global not only helps us to trace and explain changes in the nature of Milli Gorus Germany claims making over time, it also enables us to understand the interaction of the local and the global. The global doesn’t always rule the local and the local doesn’t always rule the global. They interact in previously undetermined ways to affect migrant claims making through certain processes like attribution of threat and opportunity and internalization. These interactions between the local and the global create different claims making strategies over time and between different groups. Our
job should be to explain these dynamic interactions and to show in what ways they affect migrant claims making. In this way, our findings will be able to explain why different migrant groups in the same nation-state exhibit different migrant claims making strategies and the claims making strategies of the same migrant group do sometimes differ over time.
Appendix A (Methodological Appendix)

I considered acts by Milli Gorus Germany as claims and included them in the data set if they involved demands, criticisms, or proposals of any kind. Once the data set was ready, I categorized Milli Gorus claims according to what the claim was related to. I used three categories: “host”, “home” and “supra/transnational”. If the claim was about Germany it was coded as “host”. If the claim was about Turkey it was coded as “home” and if the claim concerned an issue outside these two countries, it was coded as “supra/transnational”. To be specific, the category “supra/transnational” includes claims related to the situation of Muslims/Islam in the world, any claim concerning a country other than Turkey or Germany, any claims about the situation of the humanity/world in general and any claims about a supra/transnational institution.

I also documented the addressees of these claims, categorizing them into four groups: “Home”, “host”, “supra/transnational” and “foreign country”. “Home” and “host” categories refer to claims addressed to Turkey and Germany, respectively. The category “supra/transnational” refers to claims addressed to supra or transnational institutions like the UN and the EU, or entities like “westerners”, “Muslims”, etc. The “foreign state” category involves states other than Turkey or Germany as addressees.

I also documented the frames used by IGMG in their claims. Snow and Benford define a frame as “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the world out there by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.” (Snow and Benford, 1992) Frames are used “to underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable” (Snow and Benford 1992: 137). They also make diagnostic and prognostic attributions by identifying someone to
blame and by pointing out a general line of action to correct the problem. Finally, in addition to their punctuational and attributional functions, frames enable activists to articulate and align events and experiences in a unified and meaningful way. (Snow and Benford, 1992)

I came across six categories of frames used by IGMG in their claims. These categories were: “home”, “host”, “supra/transnational”, “human rights”, “multicultural” and “Islam”. A frame was coded as “human rights” only if it involved direct references to human rights as a supra/transnational right based on transnational conventions/institutions. If the frame made references to human rights protected by the Turkish or German constitution, this frame was coded as “home” or “host”, respectively.

A frame was coded as “Supra/transnational” if it made references to international institutions, treaties, rights and discourses like: “EU’s anti-racism decisions”, “international law”, “Council of Europe Human Rights Report”, “International Declaration of Human Rights 2001”.

Like references to human rights, references to democratic rights, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, etc., were coded as supra/transnational only if the claim particularly mentioned their supra/transnational origins. If these frames involved references to national laws or rights they were coded as “host” or “home”.

Therefore; the claim: “Disregarding the international standards of democracy and secularism by closing down a political party due to an interpretation of secularism particular to Turkey is wrong. This act has enforced the beliefs of European countries about Turkey’s problems with democracy and human rights.” (www.igmg.de, 1998), has been coded as a host country claim with a supra/transnational frame.

However; “According to our constitution, it’s a crime to criminalize freedom of religion and thought. Freedom of religion and thought comes before one’s right to live.
The reason for the nation-state’s and the constitution’s existence is the protection of basic rights and freedoms. Criminalizing the freedom of religion and thought means questioning the existence of these very institutions.

Frames were coded as “host” if they involved discourses specific to Germany (e.g.: “We are not foreigners”, “Integration not assimilation”, “Inter-religious dialogue”), or involved direct references to German laws or the German constitution.

Frames were coded as “home” if they involved discourses specific to Turkey (e.g.: “secularism, not laicism”, “militant secularism”) or references to Turkish laws or the Turkish constitution.

A frame was coded as “Multicultural” if it made references to multicultural discourses and rights like: “right to one’s own culture and religion.”, and frames were coded as “Islam” if they made references to the rules and orders of Islam.

For example, the claim: “We want institutions like the UN and the NATO which have condemned the Russian attacks, to intervene in Chechnya immediately and ensure the smooth operation of international help organizations.” (Milli Gorus Perspektive, 1993), was coded as a supra/transnational claim, having a supra/transnational addressee.

The claim: “We condemn the anti-democratic behavior of the Turkish government in disregarding the right of parents to choose their children’s education at a time when “human rights” has become so prevalent all over the world.” (Milli Gazete, 1998), was coded as a home country claim having a home country addressee with a human rights frame.

The claim: “We condemn the raid to the Darmstadt Turkish Islamic Culture Association’s mosque by the German police and we believe that the German police are going to change their behavior in the future. This event is a violation of religious
belief and practice rights present in Germany. We request an inquiry on the behavior of the police and call the German authorities to immediate action.” (Milli Gorus Perspective, 1995), was coded as a host country claim, having a host country addressee and a host country frame.

The claim: “We demand a world where everyone can live justly and where respect for human rights prevails.” (www.igmg.de, 2003), was coded as a supra/transnational claim with a supra/transnational frame.
Appendix B

Graph 1: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims. (In organizational media)

Graph 2: Addressees of Milli Gorus Germany claims. (In organizational media)
Graph 3: Frames used in Milli Gorus Germany claims. (In organizational media)
REFERENCES


