

# **UNIONS AND THE CITY**

Negotiating Urban Change

**Edited by Ian Thomas MacDonald**

**ILR PRESS**

**AN IMPRINT OF**

**CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON**

Copyright © 2017 by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 2017 by Cornell University Press

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: MacDonald, Ian Thomas, 1980- editor. | Container of (work):

MacDonald, Ian Thomas, 1980- Labor strategy and the politics of elite division.

Title: Unions and the city : negotiating urban change / edited by Ian Thomas MacDonald.

Description: Ithaca : ILR Press, an imprint of Cornell University Press, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016037421 (print) | LCCN 2016045168 (ebook) |

ISBN 9781501706547 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781501706820 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781501712685 (epub/mobi) | ISBN 9781501712692 (pdf)

Subjects: LCSH: Labor unions—New York (State)—New York. | Labor unions—Ontario—Toronto. | Labor movement—New York (State)—New York. | Labor movement—Ontario—Toronto. | Community development, Urban—New York (State)—New York. | Community development, Urban—Ontario—Toronto. | Sociology, Urban—New York (State)—New York. | Sociology, Urban—Ontario—Toronto.

Classification: LCC HD6519.N5 U55 2017 (print) | LCC HD6519.N5 (ebook) | DDC 331.8809713/541—dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2016037421>

Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at [www.cornellpress.cornell.edu](http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu).

# Contents

---

List of Figures	vii
Acknowledgments	ix
List of Acronyms	xi

Introduction. The Urbanization of Union Strategy and Struggle <i>Ian Thomas MacDonald</i>	1
--	---

## Part 1. **LABOR AND THE HOSPITABLE CITY**

<i>Ian Thomas MacDonald</i>	27
-----------------------------	----

<b>1.</b> Labor Strategy and the Politics of Elite Division in Midtown Manhattan <i>Ian Thomas MacDonald</i>	31
--	----

<b>2.</b> Organized Labor and Casino Politics in Toronto <i>Steven Tufts</i>	53
---	----

## Part 2. **LABOR AND THE CREATIVE CITY**

<i>Maria Figueroa, Lois S. Gray, and Thorben Wieditz</i>	75
--	----

<b>3.</b> New York Film Production Unions Enter the Political Arena in Search of Tax Subsidies <i>Maria Figueroa and Lois S. Gray</i>	79
---	----

<b>4.</b> Film Unions' Struggle to Defend Studio Space in Toronto <i>Thorben Wieditz</i>	102
---	-----

## Part 3. **LABOR AND THE SUSTAINABLE CITY**

<i>James Nugent</i>	121
---------------------	-----

<b>5.</b> Building a Green New York: Construction Unions and Community Alliances <i>Maria Figueroa</i>	125
--	-----

<b>6.</b> Struggling for Good Green Jobs in Toronto's Deindustrializing Suburbs <i>James Nugent</i>	146
---	-----

Part 4. **LABOR AND THE CARING CITY**

<i>Simon Black</i>	167
<b>7.</b> Creating a City for Workers: Union Strategies on Child Care in New York City <i>Susanna F. Schaller, K. C. Wagner, and Mildred E. Warner</i>	171
<b>8.</b> In Defense of “Gold-Plated” Child Care: Union Struggles to Preserve Quality Care and Quality Care Work in Toronto <i>Simon Black</i>	189
Conclusion <i>Ian Thomas MacDonald</i>	208
Notes	221
References	227
List of Contributors	243
Index	245

## Figures

---

- Figure 1.1. Union density across hotel formats in New York, 1985–2013 37
- Figure 2.1. Proposed OLG central Ontario locations 61
- Figure 2.2. Local 75 casino campaign leaflet 67
- Figure 3.1. New York State employment in film and TV production  
(number of jobs) 92
- Figure 3.2. Racial and ethnic composition of the film and TV production  
workforce, by selected occupation, New York State, 2000 and 2010 97
- Figure 3.3. Gender composition of the film and TV production workforce,  
by selected occupation, New York State, 2000 and 2010 98
- Figure 4.1. Toronto’s existing and proposed film studio space 106

NBCCC	Northwest Bronx Community Clergy Coalition
NDLON	National Day Laborer Organizing Network
NYPA	New York Production Alliance
NYSERDA	New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
OCBCC	Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care
OLG	Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation
OMB	Ontario Municipal Board
OMERS	Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System
PLA	Project Labor Agreement
REBNY	Real Estate Board of New York
RGGI	Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
RRIF	Residential Retrofit Investment Fund
SAG-AFTRA	Screen Actors Guild–American Federation of Television & Radio Artists
SARS	Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SEIU	Service Employees International Union
TCBCC	Toronto Coalition for Better Child Care
TDRs	Transferable Development Rights
TEDCO	Toronto Economic Development Corporations
TFS	Toronto Film Studios
UNITE HERE	Merger of Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) and Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE)
UPK	Universal Pre-Kindergarten
WAP	Weatherization Assistance Program
WGA	Writers Guild of America

# **THE URBANIZATION OF UNION STRATEGY AND STRUGGLE**

*Ian Thomas MacDonald*

This book is about unions and the city. It was written by a team of researchers who believe that building socially just cities will require the renewal of our labor movements, and that the renewal of labor can be built in the course of the workplace and broader social struggles that are currently taking place in major North American cities. Many in labor studies have come to see our cities and suburbs as great laboratories of labor renewal. The relevance of this perspective can be glimpsed in the importance of resisting the dismantling of public education to the fate of a teacher strike in Chicago, for instance, or in the equally surprising success of citywide minimum wage campaigns across the United States. But these inspiring moments only hint at organized labor's daily engagement with the life of the city, which we have found to be broader, deeper, and more complex than is commonly recognized. If we are right to believe that the future of the labor movement is an urban one, union activists and staffers, urban policymakers, elected officials, and members of the public alike will require a fuller understanding of what impels unions to become involved in urban policy issues, what dilemmas structure the choices unions make, and what impact unions have on the lives of urban residents, beyond their members. This book contributes to that understanding in the hope that it may serve as a roadmap toward both a stronger labor movement and a socially just urbanism.

No contribution to labor studies today can avoid beginning with the question of labor's continued social relevance. Indeed, it may be more relevant to discuss the consequences of organized labor's absence from our economy and politics than to search out the consequences of its activities. Most optimistically, labor

movements in the United States and Canada might be described as being at an impasse. Spirited local struggles have blunted the worst attacks on labor standards while failing to inspire a broader fightback. Innovative union campaigns have succeeded in organizing workers in particular workplaces, but these are not generalized across labor markets. Attempts to fend off legislative assaults on labor rights fall short as often as they prevail. Union representation in the United States now sits close to what is likely a floor of 6.6 percent of private-sector employment and just over 11 percent when the public sector is factored in. The equivalent rates in Canada are 14 percent in the private sector and 27 percent overall, levels which have declined since their high point in the 1980s, and especially so in terms of private-sector employment. Still, unions represent 14.8 million workers in the United States and 4.8 million in Canada. It remains the case that unions continue to act in ways that shape the experience and practices of large numbers of working people and the industries in which they work, as well as the political communities in which they live. It is not now, and has never been, fashionable in the social sciences to recognize that unions have this importance.

There are a number of causes, both external and internal, to explain why labor has been so weakened. But the obsolescence of conflict is not one of them. It is rather the case that a great many of the social struggles we see today—and are sure to see more of in the future—do not express themselves primarily in the workplace. They are sparked by cuts to public services and the privatization of public education, racist policing and immigration policies, gentrification, precarious work lives and degraded labor markets, a rise in university fees, and crushing levels of consumer debt. These struggles express themselves in the public sphere, and they are typically initiated and led by young people and racialized and immigrant workers who find themselves excluded from stable, decently paid employment in the firms, industries, and occupations most likely to be associated with union representation. No one familiar with labor history would doubt that the fate of the labor movement is linked to struggles which, born of dispossession, are struggles of the working class (Fletcher and Gapasin 2009). Geographers would add to this that organized labor and the new urban movements are now more likely to be struggling in the same places over the same issues.

Consider the economic location of unionized workers in the United States. A quick survey of U.S. union membership shows that the majority are located in branches of the economy at one or more remove from domestic industrial production, formerly the profit center of the U.S. economy. In the private sector, the highest union density rates are not in manufacturing (10 percent), but in transportation (20 percent), utilities (25 percent), and construction (14 percent)—industries in which workers “build the city where they trade.” Furthermore, the

labor movement is overwhelmingly composed of members in service-sector occupations rather than materials extraction and processing. Education, health care, sales and office, transportation, and even private security occupations are all more important sources of union employment than production occupations. As of 2009, half of all union members were located in the public sector, with two-thirds working for local governments providing front-line services necessary for the reproduction of urban society. Without them, the cities which, we are told, are the engines of the new economy would not function. To characterize this as a “postindustrial” rather than an “urban” labor movement puts the emphasis on what labor used to produce and fails to identify what it is concretely that union members produce today.

One consequence of this shift in economic location is that labor unions remain, by a significant margin, the largest membership-based organizations in major North American cities, and often very powerful local political actors. Another is that unionized workers are likely to work in sectors that are regulated or operated by the city governments that find themselves the targets of urban social movements making claims for public services, employment standards, and civil rights. It is this geographical overlap that gives rise to the hope in labor studies that labor’s impasse might be broken by developing creative strategies that connect existing labor union organization and resources to the spark of urban social movements and the regulatory powers of local government (Turner and Cornfield 2007; Dean and Reynolds 2009).

The union strategies discussed in this book represent a creative response within the labor movement to the unraveling of an employment relations system inherited from past labor struggles, Fordist production, and Keynesian macroeconomic management. This system had sought to create a contained field of labor relations, separate and insulated to a degree from the extra-workplace economic, social, and political relations that an earlier trade unionism had at times challenged. If in 1948 Arthur Ross could confidently state that “the union at work is the union negotiating the contract” (1948, 9), this was in large measure because union activity could thrive when protected within that defined field. For decades now, these institutional supports have been eroded to the point where unions can no longer take for granted a protected sphere of contract negotiation and enforcement. These institutional supports must be re-created by the unions themselves in a piecemeal fashion. The union at work today is the union attempting to reproduce the bargaining relationship and even the continued employment of its members—the employment contract itself—as a condition of collective bargaining. As unions have declined in terms of their labor market coverage, they have expanded the scope of their activities to take on roles previously assumed by governments and even corporations.

Labor unions are organizations formed by workers to accomplish a common purpose. They were formed in the workplace where workers' power is at its greatest potential extent. Existing labor laws in North America so constrain the right to use this power, however, that workers, as a collective, enjoy fewer rights in the workplace than they may claim as citizens of a democratic society (Geoghegan 2014). The reorganization of the firm and the degradation of labor markets have further weakened labor's workplace capacities (Weil 2014). The recognition that organized labor can no longer be successful when action is confined to the workplace encourages unions to pursue strategies that link workplace organization to extra-workplace relations where they may find additional sources of power and greater liberty of action. This more political form of labor action—the union member mobilized as a democratic citizen (Murray and Verge 1994)—opens up a variety of possible strategies.

In linking other spheres of social life to the workplace, unions transgress the boundaries that defined the postwar employment relations system and begin charting an arena of labor struggle and strategy that is specifically *urban*. We commonly use the term urban as a shorthand for a kind of life that cities make possible. More usefully, the urban can refer to the concentration of the separate spheres of social life and ways of being in one place. The labor strategies discussed in this book are urban in this sense. They are urban because they take place in cities and suburbs. But they are also urban in that they link together the separate spheres of the everyday lives of the people they seek to organize (the workplace, the community, the home, the streets, and the public sphere) and the different ways in which people experience their class position (gendered, raced, citizenship status, high skill/low skill, producer, and consumer). In pursuing these strategies, unions are behaving in ways that have been championed by the “social unionism” strand in the labor renewal literature: they are extending their representative function both to nonunionized workers and to the many ways in which their members are not just workers but social actors with a plurality of needs and identities (Frege and Kelly 2004). At the same time, unions are negotiating how cities evolve and how they are governed and lived by their residents, including, of course, not only union members but also the growing ranks of unorganized and precarious workers. Working-class formation in the United States has been urban, not just workplace-based, as Ira Katznelson (1981) and others have argued persuasively. The importance of this perspective has only been confirmed by recent transformations in capitalism, as we discuss below. The implication is that when unions challenge and negotiate urban change, they are intervening in the formation of a new urban working class.

Labor's urban strategies discussed in this book assume a common form. They seek to forge alliances with local employers and community organizations around

public policy issues, mobilize union members as democratic citizens to move these issues forward with local elected officials, and finally bring this leverage to bear on the reregulation of the workplace. Within this prevailing form, we have noted a number of recurring elements that are combined in creative ways that are specific to each case. These elements are: (1) the political mobilization of union members as worker-citizens and residents with a plurality of needs and identities not simply reducible to the workplace; (2) the formation of complex labor-inclusive coalitions that cross class divisions, including not only community organizations but also local firms and even real estate developers; (3) the exploitation of divisions between dominant economic and political actors, including between developers and wealthy and middle-class residents; and (4) the creative use of the regulatory powers of local government to defend labor standards and sustain organizing campaigns. Urban space concentrates these actors and encourages both conflict and forms of cooperation between them. The unions we are studying have learned to navigate on this terrain with varying degrees of effectiveness.

We are not primarily interested in looking at how labor strategies evolve in a particular city, defined by its labor history, economic structure, and culturally specific way of doing politics. We are interested in the possibilities for labor renewal in the roles unions have carved out for themselves in the transformation of the city. Framing the research this way is useful because it generates questions that lead to new understandings and gets us thinking about the strategic possibilities for labor, hopefully in productive ways. It was to address some of these questions that a team of labor studies researchers and labor geographers formed in early 2012. Our first task was to build a common research agenda on “labor’s urban strategies” informed by the different ways labor studies, geographers, and urban studies scholars have approached the question.

## **Labor in the City**

A number of books published in labor studies over the past decade have made a strong case that when organizing workers, unions should consider the city or metropolitan region, and not just the workplace, as the appropriate terrain. Other contributions on new forms of labor organizing and policy advocacy concern labor in the city even if they are framed as national studies. A variety of factors have been advanced in support of this perspective.

*Unlike the heartlands of industrial labor, undone by globalization and the threat of capital flight, the new service economy is place-bound and cannot easily avoid unionization and regulation by local labor.* When Colin Clark and other Keynesian economists devised the standard industrial classification system in the immediate

postwar period, the point was to classify labor by its geographical location to better coordinate national economic development. Primary industries were located close to raw materials, while manufacturing was thought to exhibit a more dispersed locational pattern. Services were urban, the delivery of services being increasingly the “principal function of cities” (Clark 1945, 97). Services now make up approximately 80 percent of Canadian and U.S. GDP and a similar proportion of employment. Because services rely on face-to-face interaction in the production process and in delivery, product markets tend to overlap in scale with labor markets. It is common in labor studies for service-sector industries to be referred to as “place-bound,” with the implication that wages can be taken out of competition in metropolitan areas without triggering capital flight or employer threats of relocation (Cornfield 2007; Alberti, Holgate, and Turner 2014). The old industrial unions, including the autoworkers and steelworkers, have for some time been moving into the city to organize “everything that doesn’t move.” Because service industries are characterized by high levels of subcontracting, particularly at the bottom of the value chain, service-sector organizing must take a sectoral approach, targeting employers through strategic campaigns, and might rely on regulation of local labor markets alongside workplace-based organizing.

*Cities concentrate actors that either facilitate or form a base for innovative labor organizing.* Historically in North America, earlier waves of union organizing relied on forms of solidarity and organizational resources that immigrant workers had built in the ethnic enclave neighborhoods of the major industrial cities. Ruth Milkman argues in *LA Story: Immigrant Workers and the Future of Labor* (2006) that recent immigrants, who have settled in the major gateway cities and found employment in degraded labor markets, are open to unionization and benefit from the kinds of networks and community resources that are necessary to sustain labor campaigns in a tough environment. The form of labor organizing that she identifies with Los Angeles, the “LA model,” relies on the repertoires of both immigrant worker centers and the old AFL craft unions, which had long ago learned how to organize outside the framework of the National Labor Relations Board. While Los Angeles might lead the United States in low-wage employment growth, and the city counts the highest proportion of immigrant residents, these labor market shifts are found to some extent across large North American cities. Grassroots strategic organizing among immigrant workers along the lines of the LA model has spread as well. A cross-national comparison of immigrant worker organizing in major cities finds that “a geographical approach to union organizing appears more effective for immigrant workers than campaigns targeted at one company, allowing for greater pressure on employers within certain market segments—despite workers’ high mobility and dispersion across work sites” (Alberti, Holgate, and Turner 2014, 117).

*Labor in the New Urban Battlegrounds: Local Solidarity in a Global Economy* (Turner and Cornfield 2007) was pioneering in arguing that the city has become the “chief arena in which contemporary initiatives to revitalize the labor movement in the service economy occur” (250). For these authors, this is because the city allows unions to act more like social movements by facilitating the formation of labor-inclusive coalitions. Associating community with non-class identity, Cornfield argues that labor-inclusive coalitions allow unions to advocate and mobilize an increasingly diverse membership in a political era defined by the ascendance of identity politics (2007, 243). In their city cases, “urban labor revitalization” is most likely to emerge in the “frontier cities,” where progressive local labor leaderships form equal partnerships with community organizations based largely in immigrant communities. Others have emphasized the class nature of community struggles in arguing that labor revitalization must be urban and place-based (Dean and Reynolds 2009; Fletcher and Gapasin 2009). The case studies in *New Labor in New York: Precarious Workers and the Future of the Labor Movement* (Milkman and Ott 2014) explore how worker centers, freed from the constraints of Wagner Act trade unionism, might be better suited to overcome these dichotomies of class and identity that labor–community coalitions often seem to reinforce as much as dissolve. Worker centers are an urban phenomenon, concentrated in large cities in proximity to the immigrant workers they seek to organize (Fine 2006).

*Wage stagnation and labor market polarization in the new service economy drive income inequality, potentially turning large cities into crucibles of labor revitalization.* Increasing income inequality is a feature of current capitalism, and income inequality is increasing most rapidly in large cities. Labor studies has been heavily influenced by the global city hypothesis, which relates labor market polarization to the rise of finance and producer services (finance, law, accounting, insurance) in the centers of the world economy. Polarization occurs as the consumption of highly paid employees in producer services drives employment demand for low-skill/low-wage consumer services (Sassen 2001). The labor-in-the-city books have argued that these shifts may drive urban labor revitalization, if in different ways. Kim Moody (2007) highlights the extractive and speculative nature of finance and real estate and their contradictory relation to workers in the public sector and low-wage services, both struggling to survive rampant gentrification on stagnating wages. Class conflicts that are building up “below the skyline” may lead to a broader challenge to the new capitalism. Amy Dean and David Reynolds (2009) underline how growing income inequality may be driving labor activism in the U.S. West Coast centers of the knowledge economy, beyond global cities. In emphasizing the contribution of public and social infrastructure to the success of new economy sectors, they argue that there is still a potential for

labor to bargain for a progressive equity component to business-led regional policymaking.

## **Unions as Urban Actors**

These contributions help us understand how cities contextualize and facilitate forms of labor organizing and policy advocacy, and they provide explanations for why unions are drawn toward urban strategies. They tend to be optimistic about the prospects for labor renewal through the kinds of social movement strategies that urban space makes possible. However, in order to appreciate both the potential and the limitations of urban strategies for labor revitalization, we need to place unions within a broader understanding of how cities are shaped by economic logics and actors that are considerably more powerful than labor organizations and their allies. Labor studies must reckon with the city not only as a container that makes certain actions possible, but also as a space that reflects and reproduces forms of exclusion and domination that labor must challenge if it is to shift the distribution of power in our society toward working people.

Major North American cities, for example, are largely organized to provide the social and physical infrastructures required for firms to compete in the world economy, to ensure the reproduction of a labor force of various qualities, to provide consumption-oriented environments for the realization of profit, and to police those who are excluded from these environments. These policies remain dominant even when they lead to the dispossession, disenfranchisement, and resistance of working-class communities. Both employment and urban space in North America are highly segregated by race, and the separation between “work” and “home” remains a gendered one, with work performed by women in either space being undervalued. And so when organized labor engages in urban politics and struggles, the choices that it makes matter greatly to workers’ abilities to live and raise families in place, and, crucially for labor renewal, to form the kinds of communities that can sustain collective action.

Here we are following in the footsteps of labor geographers who have insisted that economic landscapes are shaped not only by business investment decisions, but that workers also have an interest in shaping the landscape of capitalism in order to secure employment in particular places or ensure that neighborhoods remain viable and affordable (Herod 1997). This insight is valuable because it is empowering: the decisions and actions of working people and their institutions matter to how society is organized. It is also important to recognize that labor’s agency is still present in cases where it is exercised in support of local employers or urban policies promoted by probusiness political elites. This can entail defending

standards in one location at the expense of trade unionists in other locations, or unorganized workers in the same location. These “geographical dilemmas” haunt a labor movement that was built by folding particular interests into a conception of the common good, and which represents, if nothing else, solidarity between workers over space (Castree et al. 2004).

There is some irony that labor’s agency was being reasserted in theory while in actuality labor continued to suffer defeat and marginalization. What could it possibly mean today to insist that workers play an important role in shaping how cities change and are experienced by their residents? How could labor’s role as urban actors be evaluated in a meaningful way when unions are so heavily conditioned and constrained, when the very right of workers to associate is under attack? As labor researchers, we understand that to study labor strategy without coming to terms with these constraints would be a pointless task. Recent contributions to labor geography agree, and call for reintegrating the analysis of labor activity within larger social structures, including the economic landscapes over which workers have very little control (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011; Mitchell 2011).

How do these insights inform our perspective on labor in the city? Consider three axes of research that follow from a more geographical perspective on unions as urban actors.

## Unions and Sector-Based Economic Development

Urban economies are less place-bound than is sometimes assumed. Cities compete for capital investment and high-skilled workers, especially in new-economy sectors, by mobilizing the regulatory and policy capacities of local government around an urban growth strategy (Jessop 1997). These strategies generally promote the interests of one sector against another in urban policy and planning conflicts. These growth strategies will be familiar through buzzwords that may originate as more or less critical concepts in urban studies but, as with “the creative city,” gain notoriety when used in the rhetoric of urban boosters, from entrepreneurial intellectuals and journalists to elected officials. We use these concepts advisedly, not because we accept the claims that are made in their favor—that reorienting cities to support privileged economic sectors will lead to balanced economic growth and more livable cities—but because of their importance to urban politics and discourse.

Urban growth strategies are typically championed by real estate developers, who anticipate the needs of the most profitable sectors of the local economy and can be relied on to represent these sectors’ interests through the city building agendas of local governments. High-skill/high-wage sectors like finance, information technology, biotechnology, and the creative industries are especially prized due

to their positive effects on local consumption, the tax base, and property values. Profitable low-wage sectors that are export-oriented, such as hospitality, are promoted for the same reasons. At their core, these strategies are about extracting rent from urban land. Often, they pit development capital against residential communities that may not want their communities to be shaped in the interests of business.

It is too often said that we live in a period of “deregulated capitalism,” where “regulation” refers implicitly to government interventions in the market intended to restrain the power of business, protect workers and consumers, and legitimize the role of unions. Revisionist economic historians have argued to the contrary that economic regulation in North America has principally been concerned with fostering corporate capitalism (Kolko 1967; Naylor 1975). Urban historians have traced the origins of land use zoning in the United States to attempts by property owners to defend the value of their holdings from the consequences of their own individual, profit-maximizing behavior (Reps 1965). The wealthiest districts of a city are invariably the most regulated, while poorer areas are left to the vagaries of the market (Angotti 2008). Public health, housing regulation, and policing powers of local government are historically rooted in the social consequences of highly unequal urban spaces produced by industrialization (Boyer 1983). The same local powers are used to manage the inequalities that are produced today in postindustrial cities. The inevitable entwining of regulation and the market economy is paradoxical only if one assumes a conflict- and contradiction-free capitalism. Urban and labor scholars know this to be a warrantless assumption.

While urban planning can have antimarket connotations, urban planning in the current context of North American urbanism largely refers to project financing and site-specific amendments to land use regulations and the tax code to attract the kinds of firms, visitors, and high-income workers that promise the highest financial return to powerful local actors. As Susan Fainstein has written, this “new definition of planning as the process by which the government enables the private sector to invest profitably in urban space undermines an earlier, conservative perspective wherein government was viewed as antagonistic to business. The earlier construction of urban problems as defined by poverty and inner city decline has been reconstituted in terms of competitiveness and fiscal solvency” (1991, 25). Planning for profit is still planning, an intentional act that reveals state power. “Surely the ingenious devices by which city planners attract funds and leverage development indicate their capability to affect the course of events” (31).

It is important to insist on this point because the dominant free-market rhetoric hides from view both the planning and policy options that are available in managing urban economies, and the essentially political dynamics that select which options will be pursued. There are trade-offs here with implications for

those who are not involved in making the decisions. For example, a dominant approach to local economic development in North American cities relies on tax incentives and subsidies to attract inward investment by reducing business costs relative to other locations. Property, payroll, and corporate income tax incentive programs devised in the 1970s to retain industrial employment in rust-belt cities have been generalized across different sectors to now include highly profitable firms and industries, including banking, high tech, and entertainment. These business tax incentives are in addition to the common use of tax abatement urban development policies employed across North America.

A strategy of competing for business investment by cutting locational costs may offer initial “first-mover” advantages to a city, but as these tools become generalized across jurisdictions and are incorporated within firm investment decision making, locational advantages fall back on stronger forms of competition such as deep labor markets, quality infrastructure, and public services—all of which require social coordination, public spending, and taxation (Storper and Walker 1989). Instead of a necessary cost to be minimized as much as possible, urban space can be envisioned as an investment platform for higher value-added activities. New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg was criticized for arguing in favor of what he coined the “luxury city” strategy—a higher-cost city that “competes” for business investment by facilitating high value-added production, rather than by offering a low-cost location for generic production (Brash 2011). The reference was politically tone deaf, coming from a billionaire mayor in a city facing a housing affordability crisis, and the term was never repeated by Bloomberg or any other elected official. But it should be recognized that this strategy holds significant appeal for producer interests in the city beyond the real estate industry and its obvious desire to rationalize high rents. It could also appeal to public-sector unions as a means of securing alliances with local firms in favor of a selective re-investment in physical and social infrastructure, for instance, or private-sector unions representing workers in high-skill/high-wage industries where a “strong” form of competition prevails.

Even within the terms of these competitiveness-oriented strategies, there are opportunities to shift the distribution of public services, taxation, and employment from one sector or location to another in ways that align with union goals. Private-sector unions with large urban memberships have sought new sources of organizing and bargaining leverage in the regulatory functions of local government, especially land use regulation, and the importance of tax abatements and productive state investments in local economic development strategies (Tufts 2007). In the public sector, unions seek to build competitive-corporatist coalitions by promoting “high-road” practices that overlap with the shared concerns of local government and locally dependent firms in workforce development and

increased inward investment. These are viable strategies because government regulation of urban economies remains pervasive, and because this regulation is subject to the ways in which liberal democracy elicits consent from the governed. Unions are able to push these strategies forward politically by turning their organizational capacities toward electoral mobilization in get-out-the-vote campaigns and lobbying activities; in championing the demands of community, resident, or advocate organizations; and in sponsoring policy-oriented research.

A sector-based framing of union strategy focuses our attention on the expanded scope of union action under current capitalism. Just as corporations step forward in the public discourse as “job creators,” they have largely adopted zero employment-growth strategies, relying instead on part-time contracts, consultants, subcontracting, and employment agencies to expand production. Now it is unions that are demanding, negotiating, and mobilizing for employment as intently as they used to bargain for better wages and benefit standards. In a world turned upside down, unions have stepped into the role of good job creators, a role that is both more social and more entrepreneurial than traditional business unionism. This role calls for a greater effectiveness in mobilizing allies and non-union workers, while it also has the potential to trigger a number of “geographical dilemmas”—favoring one group of workers over another in all of the ways in which workers are segregated and sorted in urban space. The class content of these strategies will depend greatly on the sector and the decisions that unions and other urban actors make. It should not be assumed that a strategy conceived to defend or create good jobs and reproduce bargaining relations between unions and employers will also unite a fragmented working class or that it expresses a working-class agenda that bridges the “city trenches” that Katznelson identified over thirty years ago, and which remain very relevant today.

## Unions and Urban Politics

If urban politics is the politics of coalition formation, “community” organizations (whether understood in identity or class terms) are not necessarily the most relevant urban actors with which unions may find common ground. Urban politics is also a growth politics that favors actors and policies promising greater investment and employment—typically large employers and real estate developers who form a stable “growth regime” beyond the vicissitudes of electoral politics (Molotch 1976; Stone 1989). Middle-class homeowners form an effective electoral base for these regimes because they are susceptible to thinking of their interests, for the purposes of municipal politics, insofar as they are property owners and taxpayers. “Urban” does bring to mind a progressive space for political action, especially perhaps in the United States, where the political right is well entrenched

in rural districts and statehouses, while pro-urban federal policies were sustained for decades under the New Deal state. A decline in federal support for cities has made them more “entrepreneurial” (Harvey 1989), strengthening the political power of the growth interests and encouraging other urban actors, including labor, to frame their preferred policies in terms of economic competitiveness. Unions act on an urban political terrain defined by the conflicts and compromises that arise among residents, popular movements, and growth interests. They could seek to resolve these conflicts along class lines, but for a variety of reasons do not necessarily do so.

The place of unions in urban politics has received scant attention until relatively recently (Sites 2007; Savage 2014). This is curious given the pride of place given to critical political economy and the generally progressive political bent of scholars who are interested in local politics. An influential account of urban political economy briefly notes the building trades’ notorious support for “value-free” urban development and argues that labor’s inability to control the distribution of investment makes of them “little more than one more instrument to be used by elites in competing growth machines” (Logan and Molotch 2007, 82). There is a widely held assumption—exploited by the populist right—that labor politics are particularist, determined by a concern to promote and protect employment for their own members. There is a kernel of truth to this perspective, which is partly grounded in the reality that unions are representative workplace institutions that articulate the concerns of their members and that lack the political and economic power to advance an agenda that is inclusive of all workers (Ness 2001, 21). Unions in project-based economic sectors like construction and entertainment have always been concerned to maintain employment levels.

This is nevertheless a partial, one-sided view. There are circumstances in which employment-seeking, union-backed public policy aligns rather well with a broader working-class agenda. Unions in the public sector in particular are concerned with improving the quality and quantity of work in ways that can align with the needs of public service recipients, who may not have the political clout to defend services on which they depend. Public-sector unions are “state builders” (Johnston 1994), perhaps even the last effective defenders of welfare, public health, and education services (Piven and Cloward 1979). Renewal strategies for public-sector labor would find ways of expanding access to these services in tandem with union membership roles and a burnished social legitimacy. Public-sector union involvement in politics is controversial, and the scope of public-sector collective bargaining has been very narrowly defined, precisely to block public-sector labor strategies of this sort. Public-sector unions may work around these limits by providing community and advocacy organizations with the political, financial, and organizational resources to advance a public sector–led social justice agenda. They

may advance union employment goals in the policymaking process while choosing to remain unacknowledged legislators.

Labor-backed job growth policies in the private sector involve a more complex process of urban alliance formation. Labor coalitions with equity-seeking community organizations and marginalized workers are vital since urban policymaking is likely to impose a legitimacy test on public support for job creation in gendered and racially segregated labor markets. Nonunionized and/or marginalized workers may have their own employment or neighborhood priorities that conflict with labor's high-road vision for their community. Public opposition to unwanted development can arise from different class positions in urban space, and this opposition may or may not be consistent with the kind of employment growth favored by unions. Project- and policy-specific alliances may involve, in addition, mobilizing industrial fractions of capital against commercial and financial fractions, or making even finer political distinctions among local firms or between local firms and multinational corporations. For labor, the politically effective coalition in any one instance is likely to be cross-class in nature, and may or may not promote an urban social justice agenda that has been linked to labor renewal.

Logan and Molotch were too dismissive of private-sector labor in assigning it such a passive role in the growth regime. There is no question that labor is a subordinate actor, weakened by its inability to control investment. But individual unions can leverage their limited resources by exploiting conflicts within growth regimes, if not between them. Large corporations and real estate developers may be united on the big questions of urban governance, but they compete at a more local level to secure the conditions of profitability in their respective sectors, or to gain narrower firm advantages at particular sites. In this context, public decisions are crucial in determining both the aggregate level of rent, as well as which plots of land will command the highest prices. This often leads to conflict over the regulation of land and the direction of public investment or subsidies. This economic competition precipitates political conflict as a result of the broader alliances that form, drawing in subordinate actors and noneconomic elites, to push policy through the legislative or regulatory process. With their capacity to mobilize large urban memberships and grant social legitimacy to elite-led projects, unions can place themselves in a swing-vote or veto position in certain urban policy and planning decisions.

Finally, it would be shortsighted to reduce labor's political role in urban space to questions of employment. Unions have institutional goals that are distinct from their representative function. They compete to become the dominant worker organization in their sector, and may make political calculations that further this goal. They also have long-standing relations with particular community organ-

izations, advocates, public servants, and local councillors that must be maintained in the face of more short-term calculations. Unions may also act politically to represent their members as workers beyond the workplace or to address gendered needs they have at work in ways that lead to urban policy innovation. As any union staffer can attest, workers still look to their unions to represent their interests and resolve problems, whether these are subject to collective bargaining or not. Unions can play a role in socializing and politicizing any number of issues that are not directly related to employment. Only the narrowest of trade union politics can ignore everyday life beyond the workplace, and then at some cost to its relevance as a working-class institution.

## Unions and Spatial Justice

Urban political economy directs our attention to how the political role of real estate and the economic importance of rent relate to urban labor strategies. The rise of inequality in large cities is not driven solely by labor market polarization associated with postindustrial capitalism, although that is a very important dynamic. Inequality is also being driven by public policy decisions that make large cities less affordable and less welcoming places for poor and working-class residents, or drive out the industries that employ blue-collar workers. The new union activism in major urban centers is driven both by wage stagnation in the service economy and by rising urban cost structures. In cities where organized labor has achieved some measure of political power and policy influence, unions may find themselves in the role of effectively contesting urban inequality. At other times, they may find themselves in a more contradictory or mediating role. How union actors position their organizations with respect to rising urban inequalities will greatly depend on how they choose to advance workplace goals through urban policy and planning, which coalitions they judge to be the most politically effective in advancing those goals, and how they decide to balance immediate with longer-term positional goals.

Economic development in North American cities is largely concerned with promoting high-skill/high-wage sectors. This involves incentivizing business investment and attracting the kinds of workers these sectors employ by attending to their quality-of-life concerns. Land use planning is a key tool, used to transform neighborhoods to suit the imputed tastes, fears, and prejudices of the “creative class.” Density limits and use restrictions are liberalized in deindustrializing, poorer, and more racially diverse areas of the city, channeling development pressures to these areas. The cultures and institutions of poor and working-class populations—the highly segregated public housing and public schools in particular—are barriers to be overcome. State-led gentrification redistributes wealth upward and expels

workers outward, only to then selectively reintegrate them “depending on the needs of production and consumption” (Debord 2000 [1968]). Real estate-led policies are thought to undermine economic competitiveness only when they begin to make it difficult for local employers to find qualified workers at competitive wages.

This constant churning and upward drift of urban land prices plays havoc with employment stability and may, in some sectors, be just as damaging to union employment levels as an appreciation of the exchange rate or the signing of a new international trade agreement. Industrial and public-sector unions in major urban centers are often in the position of having to intervene in planning disputes to save their factory or hospital from condo conversion or another more profitable use that a developer has identified. Other unions may be drawn to such “site fights” as a means of embedding union goals in the land use planning process (Tufts 2010). Service-sector unions have learned how to secure complex restrictions on the business models and labor relations practices of firms that will eventually occupy the space developers wish to build. The range of concessions available to labor and community groups is shaped by how much land value is likely to be unlocked by the rezoning process. The amount of value released is determined by the rent gap, the difference between current ground rent and the potential ground rent under a changed use or zoning (Smith 1984). The wider the rent gap, the greater the leverage labor–community coalitions bring to bear against developers, and the higher the value of concessions they are likely to extract. The union’s leverage is greater if its members are residentially located along the advancing edge of the development frontier, and the rent gap is widest when neighborhoods that have undergone long periods of disinvestment are transformed into luxury-oriented spaces. While the value of concessions extracted from developers can vary according to the political leverage of the coalition, and the distribution of this value can be shifted among coalition partners in the form of subsidized housing or higher wages, any strategy that seeks to maximize developer concessions cannot at the same time seek to prevent gentrification. There are choices and trade-offs involved in these strategies, and the result in some cases may be a form of “negotiated gentrification” (MacDonald 2011).

We know from labor history that unions are formed not only in the workplace but from working-class communities in which social networks and forms of solidarity create a capacity and a willingness to engage in risky collective action. Organizing requires time and energy that are not spent commuting to far-flung employment or in domestic labor, and social unionism requires that workers and community allies share local space in which to assemble, that they continue to demand the right to shape that space, and that they have an effective political right to do so. It becomes highly relevant for the future of the labor movement to in-

quire whether labor strategies produce urban spaces that foster these cultures and capacities.

## Research Design

This more geographical perspective on unions as urban actors defined our research program in distinct ways.

First, labor strategies have been contextualized within a sectoral framing. This focus on sector allows for a more realistic way of evaluating the importance of labor relative to more powerful actors. It captures how union strategies are shaped and limited by competitive pressures and logics that are beyond the control of individual unions. This approach also helps to avoid a normative bias toward an analytical focus on labor strategies that are associated with labor revitalization. We share the normative bias of much of the labor renewal literature, but our concern in this book is with capturing what unions are doing in urban space, not with what we think they should be doing. The sectoral approach identifies a relevant sector in which labor is a consequential actor and asks what role unions are playing in shaping policies and planning decisions intended to promote that sector. We inquire into what impels unions to play this role, whether it be firm, labor market, or urban restructuring, or institutional factors that are internal to unions.

Sectors were selected on the basis of the following criteria: the sector is the subject of a development strategy through which claims are made on public resources and regulation and are justified by increased employment, balanced economic growth, ecological sustainability, or some other social good; unions represent a significant proportion of the workforce employed and take an active role in the regulation of their sector; and a focus on private for-profit sectors is balanced by a public-sector case. These criteria suggested the following four sectors: the hospitality industry, the film industry, green building and manufacturing, and child care. In an urban public policy context, these sectors are discursively represented in terms of promoting the “hospitable city,” the “creative city,” the “sustainable city,” and the “caring city.” The case studies are organized within sections, each headed by a brief discussion of the sector growth strategy and how dominant unions position themselves within the regulation of their sector. We begin with sectors that are profit-led and move to sectors in which social considerations, such as ecology and racial and gender equality, take on greater importance. Labor becomes more central in these latter sectors, and labor strategy becomes correspondingly more ambitious in terms of pushing up against the limits of urban growth strategies.

Second, we have evaluated labor strategy on two levels. On one level, we are concerned to know if labor has achieved its institutional goals, defined as organizing new workers, defending wage and benefit standards, employment levels, or increased political power and social legitimacy. Do labor's urban strategies work in their own terms to reproduce the union and the bargaining relationship? If so, this can well be counted as a success in countries in which the future of unions is very much in question.

At the same time, it is increasingly difficult to see how the pursuit of such goals by individual unions could lead to a revitalization of the labor movement. The gap between the capacities of the existing unions and the scale of resources that would be required has simply become too large (Clawson 2003; Dubofsky 2013). We can, however, expect unions to build working-class capacities and promote urban agendas and social justice movements that have the potential to shift power in our societies toward working people. This leads us to evaluate labor strategy by the effect unions have on urban change. Are the labor strategies we identify through our sectoral framework building working-class capacities out of the fragmented ways in which class is experienced in urban space? Are they helping to create the kinds of neighborhoods, employment opportunities, and public services that benefit an urban working class regardless of union membership? Do they help to build the social and political capacity of working-class residents to have a say in how their cities and neighborhoods change?

Separating the institutional from the social outcomes of union action opens up the possibility that labor strategy may succeed on one level and not on another. Indeed, there may be trade-offs here between institutional goals and the kinds of class-wide strategies that are required for labor renewal, and our analysis remains open to recognizing and exploring the reasons for this. Given that support for sector development will place unions in sometimes conciliatory and at other times conflictual positions vis-à-vis other urban actors, tensions and contradictions will appear at various moments. For instance, how do unions reconcile the interests of their members as urban producers with the plural and potentially conflicting interests and identities they hold as urban residents? How do unions advance public policies designed to further the collective workplace interests of their members in ways that converge with those of nonunionized workers and members of working-class communities? And what happens if they diverge? Most importantly for the future of the labor movement, how can unions form alliances with local firms and growth-oriented urban regimes without confronting the geographical dilemmas that pit workers in one place or scale against those in another, often with zero-sum outcomes? Is it even possible to do so?

Third, we have narrowed our focus to the dominant global cities of the United States and Canada, both important centers of labor strength, in order to bring

out the relationships that we are interested in studying. No two cities are alike, and it will be said that New York City in particular is exceptional, from a national U.S. perspective, as a citadel of labor strength. Nevertheless, we see the same urban labor strategies at work in Toronto as in New York, with similar outcomes, and we expect that direct comparisons can be made from our findings to labor in other large North American cities. Some of the strategies that we are concerned with will be less relevant to smaller urban centers and not relevant to organizing in rural areas. Some will only work at the top of the urban hierarchy, and will work better in the urban center and less well on the urban periphery.

New York City and Toronto can be placed in the same urban category for purposes of comparison. They are comparable to each other in terms of their economic structure as postindustrial, global cities, in terms of their primacy within each nation's urban system, and in the significance of organized labor in local politics and urban life. They have similar union density rates—around 20 percent—and may be classified as “union towns,” in which labor maintains insider political relationships with officeholders. In New York, service-sector unions with memberships in the tens of thousands dwarf community organizations, and the central labor council plays a less effective coordinating role than in Toronto, where labor is somewhat more reliant on community alliances and the labor council is often involved in local union campaigns.

Although there are differences in the nature of our urban spaces, Canadian urbanism is not of a different type than American urbanism. Canadian cities receive even less in the way of federal support than their U.S. counterparts. Nearly absent from the constitution, they are “creatures of the provinces,” with weak mayors and little in the way of taxation powers. Toronto enjoys more autonomy and fiscal capacity than other Canadian cities, but less than New York and other large U.S. cities. Most significantly for our research, the province retains ultimate authority over local land use decisions and funds a broader array of public services than what is available in U.S. cities, including New York. As is true in the United States, policy options in Canadian cities are constrained by the bond market, the bond rating agencies, and the investment decisions of private corporations (Hackworth 2007). Now in the fourth gentrification decade, the cores of both cities are higher income and predominantly white. This high-income residential core is surrounded by deindustrializing, lower income and racially mixed inner suburbs, and a suburban periphery sprouting new downtowns which is less exclusive and more ethnically diverse in Toronto's case (Hulchanski 2010 ; Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2009).

In terms of their political cultures, New York and Toronto are more alike than many other possible U.S.–Canadian city comparisons, and are perhaps more similar now than they have been historically. New York City's labor movement was

impressively unique in the richness and breadth of its political, cultural, and education institutions, in the close if conflictive ties between city unions and the political left, and in the influence it exerted in municipal politics, first through a series of third-party formations and subsequently in the postwar era through liberal-labor coalitions within the local Democratic Party (Freeman 2001). The labor movement left its mark in a city welfare state verging on a social-democratic model, one that was exceptional in the country to the extent that it performed “non-common” municipal government functions such as health care, mass transit, free higher education, and public housing (Fuchs 1992; Abu-Lughod 1999).

From a national Canadian perspective, Toronto does not rise above the rest as a union town or social-democratic exception. Historically, it has been a more conservative place. On visiting the city in 1858, Charles Dickens wrote home that “the wild and rabid Toryism of Toronto is, I speak frankly, appalling.” Social democracy was built at the provincial level in Ontario on the strength of powerful industrial, resource-based, and public-sector unions. Toronto has become an important center of labor power based in the public sector, broadly in the private services sector, and in a diverse industrial sector, which, unlike in New York, retains a toehold in the inner suburbs. The dominant public culture in Toronto is social liberalism, and the political and economic elites remain largely white Anglo-Saxon Protestant, even as it has become the world’s most multicultural of cities. Ours is not a study of the difference social democracy makes. In some sectors, such as film and green jobs, the urban context of our study is similar enough for the individual chapters to complement one another by focusing on different dimensions of labor strategy, encompassing urban planning and economic development policy. In child care, differences in national political culture and institutions do come to the fore and become key factors explaining why unions select some strategies over others.

Previous research has associated labor renewal with “frontier cities” rather than the “union towns,” with their well-entrenched union leaderships and powerful insider relationships (Hauptmeier and Turner 2007). The literature is divided on whether differences in urban structure and size matter to urban labor revitalization. Turner and Cornfield (2007, 11–12) find no explanatory relevance in the global city or the economic makeup of cities to labor innovation in their study, while Adler, Tapia, and Turner (2014) and Milkman and Ott (2014) emphasize how global cities sharpen class divisions and therefore also the prospects for labor activism.

We find that the size and urban density of cities matters significantly to the success of urban labor strategy. This is due to the way in which labor has come to rely on a multiplicity of different actors and plays off contradictions or forms of

coordination that are more present in dense urban space. For example, labor's rent gap strategies are only possible in large cities, and they work best in downtown locations, which are more heavily regulated and where the largest profits are to be made, as is revealed in our hospitable city cases. Tax-incentive employment strategies are weak forms of competition that succeed best in defending employment levels in the context of deep labor pools and the kinds of public investments that rely on the tax base of large cities, as revealed in our creative city cases. Labor-community coalitions rely on a diversity of community and advocacy organizations that are better organized in central cities than in suburban and inner-suburban locations, as revealed in our caring city cases.

Our study is of union towns and global cities. This unique pairing is designed to reveal the forms of conflict and compromise that occur between strong labor unions and dominant economic actors and logics. These conflicts and compromises also occur in smaller urban centers and in larger cities where labor is weaker, but they may be less in evidence in these places. Evaluating the difference that labor makes in the transformation of neighborhoods and cities is an inherently difficult task, largely because labor is almost always acting as a part of large and complex coalitions that involve different class actors. Narrowing our study to union towns where it is possible to trace decisions back to politically powerful unions makes this task easier.

Our findings will be relevant beyond our cases because of the way New York and Toronto accentuate relationships between labor and other dominant urban actors and logics that must be better understood if we are to evaluate the prospects for labor renewal in large North American cities. If we are more cautious about these prospects, it is partly because we are looking at cities in which labor is strong enough to make the compromises and alliances with dominant class actors and logics that are stronger still. These strategies may succeed in achieving trade union goals and stabilizing the existing organizations, without leading to any breakthroughs in rebuilding or expanding labor strength. They may be labors of Sisyphus. In this respect, our cases speak to the much more general phenomenon of the impasse of labor strategy across North America.

## **Case Studies**

We begin the volume with labor in the hospitable city, a city that aggressively promotes itself to attract high-spending visitors, and especially the "high rollers" among them. UNITE HERE, the major union in the hospitality and gaming sector, has pioneered urban strategies involving labor-community coalitions and innovative use of local land use and zoning policies to defend bargaining regimes

in the context of a rapid expansion of hotel capacity in major urban markets. The union is representative of labor's turn to more entrepreneurial strategies that seek to define a place for the union in workforce development, the promotion of tourism-related infrastructure, and place-promotion strategies in furtherance of high-road employment practices (Tufts 2010). In this section, labor innovation flows north, with Canadian locals borrowing from the strategic repertoire of the U.S.-based International. The chapters discuss the union's role in two urban planning decisions. Ian MacDonald's chapter discusses a campaign by the New York hotel workers to ensure new hotels built in East Midtown will employ unionized labor and continue to offer decent wages and benefits. This case shows how the union was successful in defending high-road employment standards by playing off a territorial conflict within the "1 percent" and in making innovative use of the city's land use review regulations. Steven Tufts' chapter discusses labor's role in a public battle over the siting of a casino in Toronto, which played out among different levels of government, real estate developers, casino corporations, and anti-casino community groups. The pro-casino position adopted by UNITE HERE Local 75, the largest union representing hotel workers in the city, was complicated by tensions this position created with community allies and was constrained by the union's role in sector regulation across North America. Both chapters show how these unions have developed sophisticated ways of navigating elite divisions in urban space. Although we see a greater reliance on community coalitions in this sector, with hospitality workers often sharing local space and experiences of workplace gender and racial segmentation with lower-income city residents, these chapters also reveal geographical dilemmas at work between sectional and general interests at the local scale, between labor and community, and between various scales of union organization.

Our creative city section reveals urban labor strategy at its most aggressive and successful in immediate trade union terms. In the film industry, union innovation flows from north to south. The payroll tax incentives that have now been generalized across North America were pioneered in Vancouver, British Columbia, in the 1990s as part of a larger sector development strategy of drawing "runaway" productions from Los Angeles. Seeking to maximize employment, Vancouver-based film union lobbying for provincial film production tax concessions was paired with concessions on continental wage schedules and work rules to reinforce other locational advantages, including an advantageous exchange rate (Coe 2001). The strategy was initially successful in raising the local level of inward investment and employment. But of course the Californian unions responded in kind with their own tax inducement strategy in Sacramento, other states followed suit, and in 2002 film unions in New York began lobbying at both the state and city levels of government for their own tax credits, escalating from

a 10 to 30 percent rebate on payroll taxes. Upping the stakes in what is now a global battle for Hollywood big-budget productions, with the studios playing unions and governments against each other, Toronto has subsidized the construction of massive state-of-the-art studio infrastructure. This high-cost investment has renewed the city's prior attractiveness based on a developed labor pool, generous payroll tax incentives already in place at the provincial level, and streetscapes that might stand in for any North American city.

Maria Figueroa and Lois Gray's chapter explains how labor's preference for tax incentives is conditioned by the highly concentrated ownership structure, flexible production system, and fragmented bargaining relations that characterize the film industry. Labor's preference for a tax incentive-based approach in New York encouraged greater coordination between local film unions, policymakers, employers, and local studios, and was successful in generating employment in the specific context of the city's deep talent and qualified labor pool. Figueroa and Gray also show how the strategy induced tensions among local film unions over the distribution of tax benefits within the sector, and between film unions and representatives of low-income urban residents, who find themselves subsidizing a high-skill/high-wage industry from which they are largely excluded. A similar tension emerged in Toronto, where film workers sharing local space with lower-income residents found themselves positioned as gentrifiers in their campaign to save studio space from being redeveloped for big-box retail. Thorben Wieditz's chapter considers the urban planning dimension of labor strategy in a case in which local film unions mobilized to defend low-cost studio space at risk of being lost as an unintended consequence of the city's real estate-led policies. Here we see the contradictions of the luxury city strategy for labor in a high-skill/high-wage sector. While labor's campaign has so far proven successful in securing employment in this particular case, the campaign reinforced a competitive creative city discourse that is at odds with industrial employment retention efforts in a rapidly gentrifying city. In both New York and Toronto, short-term employment goals were secured and new political capacities were forged. But this was accomplished at the expense of broader class alliances that will become more important as the big studios consolidate bargaining power over film workers, in part as a result of proliferating local competitiveness strategies.

Our third section, labor in the sustainable city, discusses union strategy at its most ambitiously entrepreneurial and, to date, least successful in narrow trade union terms. Attempts to ground capital in "green" sectors that are unionized and pay decent wages, all while remediating ecological damage, push up against the limits of labor's agency. These are typically very complex "market-making" strategies that seek to organize workers by midwifing the industries that will employ them. They require working in urban coalitions with low-income communities to

oversee worker training programs; the use of land use policy to retain industrial employment land or strengthen commercial and residential building codes, sometimes in the teeth of real estate opposition; securing financing from higher levels of government; organizing a local customer base or securing export markets; and, finally, finding an investor who is willing to be an urban industrial employer, or creating an organization that will act as one for the purposes of collective bargaining. Unions thus take on much, if not all, of the responsibility for bringing the different moments of the production process together in a given space.

James Nugent's chapter discusses the difficulties of attempting this in a deindustrialized low-income neighborhood in Toronto's inner suburbs. Here, a resident organization backed by the Communication, Energy and Paperworkers Union (now UNIFOR), the Steelworkers, and the local labor council sought revitalization through green manufacturing, rather than a future of gentrification and big-box retail employment envisioned by developers and the city. Nugent traces the evolution of the campaign from a focus on industrial heritage preservation to green jobs, and ultimately a broader antipoverty campaign that incorporated gender, race, and ecology. Although the campaign failed to attract a private-sector firm to invest in the site, the coalition managed to overcome some of the dilemmas that labor has faced in similar site fights in the city, such as a trade-off between employment retention and gentrification, and between low-wage versus high-wage sector development. Maria Figueroa's chapter on labor's green jobs strategy in New York shifts to a public policy focus, with a discussion of two energy retrofit initiatives: the city- and real estate-led PlaNYC policy for retrofitting Manhattan's commercial office space, and the Laborers (LIUNA)-sponsored Green Jobs/Green New York weatherization initiative covering residential property in the city and the state. Figueroa discusses how the entrepreneurial orientation and reliance on local political power that characterize construction union strategy relate to the market-segmented and contract-based production system in the industry. In the highly competitive and mostly nonunion residential property sector, a familiar tension between affordability for working-class consumers and union concerns with labor standards emerged as the federal stimulus funds used to finance retrofitting work were scaled back. Retrofitting the commercial real estate sector would have overcome this dilemma and resulted in a much greater generation of employment, but for the opposition of building owners to a provision mandating that problems identified in energy audits be addressed. Despite the enormous potential of a green jobs strategy to address employment disparities, revive neighborhoods without gentrification, and launch economic recovery while mitigating ecological damage, labor's vision of a sustainable city seemingly cannot prevail when it confronts the entrenched power of real estate and finance in the global city.

Our final section on child care and labor in the caring city pushes our use of the sector growth strategy concept to its breaking point. Child care is not in itself a profitable endeavor, and often not even a paid one. But the provision of affordable, quality child care does increase female labor market participation rates, and has been related to better educational outcomes and workplace productivity, both of which are determinant of inward investment and economic growth (Warner 2006). Unions, advocates, and working-class families have other reasons to support better child care policy, including the promotion of gender equality, improvement in the quality of home and work life, and the narrowing of education achievement gaps that appear in early childhood development. If government behaved like the private businesses we are told they must emulate, Toronto and New York, along with higher levels of government, would surely invest in universally accessible, high-quality child care. Moving child care policy toward this goal has in fact been a hard struggle that relies heavily on the strategies both of unions representing child care workers and of unions acting to address the child care needs of their members. In an era of permanent austerity, child care policies that are labor market-enhancing represent a rare opening for an expansion of the social wage.

The chapter by Susanna Schaller, K. C. Wagner, and Mildred Warner addresses the duality of labor strategy in this sector with one case study of unions campaigning to expand their members' access to child care benefits, paired with a second case study of a union organizing campaign that combined direct organizing of child care providers with public policy development. The chapter tells the story of how a highly feminized union representing health care workers won child care benefits in collective bargaining, subsequently campaigned as part of a multiunion coalition to reframe public subsidies for child care as a worker rather than a welfare benefit, and expanded access to child care for low- and middle-income wage earners. The second case follows a United Federation of Teachers (UFT)-driven labor-community campaign to organize home-based child care providers, which represent a low-wage segment of the child care workforce that has emerged in the context of privatization and voucherization. Public policy supports, including recognition of the bargaining unit by executive order, relied on the union's political muscle upstate, as well as an urban public policy focus on closing an educational achievement gap facing children from marginalized and low-income families.

The child care sector in Toronto is similarly segmented between home-based, private care and a relatively larger public center-based system that is nevertheless facing budget cuts and privatization. In Canada, public-sector unions have strongly opposed the neoliberal agenda of shifting care work to private, for-profit centers and the home, and have not sought to organize this latter segment of the child care workforce, as the UFT has done in New York, for fear of "formalizing