# Exports and Wages: Rent Sharing, Workforce Composition or Returns to Skills?*

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## Abstract

We use linked employer-employee data from Italy to explore the relationship between exports and wages. Our empirical strategy exploits the 1992 devaluation of the Italian Lira, which represented a large and unforeseen shock to Italian firms' incentives to export. The results indicate that the export wage premium is due to exporting firms both (a) paying a wage premium above what their workers would earn in the outside labor market – the "rent-sharing" effect, and (b) employing workers whose skills command a higher price after the devaluation – the "skill composition" effect. The latter effect only emerges once we allow for the value of individual skills to differ in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. In fact, using a fixed measure of skills, as typically done in the literature, we would attribute the wage increase only to rent sharing. We also document that the export wage premium is larger for workers with more export-related experience. This indicates that the devaluation increased the demand for skills more useful for exporting, driving their relative price up.

JEL classification: F16, J31
Key words: Export wage premium, linked employer employee data

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# 1   Introduction

Since the seminal paper of Bernard, Jensen & Lawrence (1995), a growing body of empirical work has shown that exporting firms pay higher wages, even after controlling for firm-level characteristics such as industry and size.[1] The ensuing theoretical literature has proposed two possible mechanisms. On one side, exporting firms might employ workers with higher skills, so that the exporting wage premium is a reflection of observable and unobservable workers' characteristics – the "skill composition" effect (Yeaple 2005, Verhoogen 2008, Bustos 2011, Kugler & Verhoogen 2012). On the other, the presence of frictions in the labor market might lead exporting firms to pay higher wages than non-exporting firms for identical workers, because exporting generates rents that are shared with the employees – the "rent sharing" effect (Cosar, Guner & Tybout 2010, Helpman & Itskhoki 2010, Helpman, Itskhoki & Redding 2010).[2] While these theoretical mechanisms are well understood, identifying their relative importance empirically has proven difficult. Traditional studies using average wages at the firm level cannot fully control for workers' skills and therefore cannot distinguish between composition or rent-sharing factors. In the last few years, the literature has taken advantage of the growing availability of matched employer-employee data to address these issues, but the evidence is still not conclusive.[3]

In this paper, we use a unique matched employer-employee database including *the entire workforce* of a large sample of Italian manufacturing firms to study the effects of exporting on wages at the firm level. We add to the literature along at least three dimensions. First, as done by Frías et al. (2009) for Mexico, we exploit the sudden and large devaluation of the Italian Lira in 1992 as a source of exogenous variation, within industries, in the firms' incentive to export. Second, we propose an empirical framework that allows the market value of individual workers' observable and unobservable skills to vary before and after the devaluation. As we show, this is a crucial step in disentangling rent sharing from skill composition effects. Third, we document the heterogeneous effects of exporting on wages based on a measure of workers' export-specific experience.

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[1] For comprehensive surveys, see Schank, Schnabel & Wagner (2007) and (Frías, Kaplan & Verhoogen 2009).

[2] Besides specificities and frictions, there are at least two other mechanisms that could imply that the firm shares the rents from exporting with their workers: efficiency wages (Frías et al. 2009, Davis & Harrigan 2011) and fair-wage considerations (Egger & Kreickemeier 2009, Amiti & Davis 2011). See Frías et al. (2009) for a more detailed survey of the various theoretical mechanisms behind export wage effects.

[3] See, among others, Frías et al. (2009) and Frias, Kaplan & Verhoogen (2012) for Mexico; Schank et al. (2007) and Baumgarten (2013) for Germany; Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler & Redding (2013) and Krishna, Poole & Senses (2010) for Brazil. We discuss how our results compare with those of the existing literature below.

The linked employer-employee nature of our data allows us to apply the methodology developed by Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis (1999) (AKM, henceforth) to decompose individual wages into a component due to observable, time-varying worker and firm characteristics, a component due to unobservable worker characteristics ("worker effects") and a component due to firm-level, unobservable characteristics ("firm effects"). We take the estimated worker effects to measure the market value of workers' unobservable (to the econometrician) skills, independent of the characteristics of the particular firms where they are employed at a given point in time, and the firm effect as a wage premium paid by a given firm to all of its employees. As in Frías et al. (2009) and Helpman et al. (2013), the firm effect, which we use as a measure of rent sharing, is estimated separately for each firm-year, so that it can be related to changes in the firm's export activity. We estimate worker and firm effects under two alternative assumptions. First, as typically done in the literature, we assume that the worker effects are fixed throughout the entire period. Second, we allow the individual worker effects to vary in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. In fact, the devaluation represented a major shock to the incentives to Italian firms to export. If workers' skills are heterogeneous in terms of their contribution to the export activity, then their market value might be plausibly affected by the devaluation. By estimating separate worker effects pre and post devaluation, we are able to account for any change in the market value of skills at the individual level.

Most of the literature on the effects of exporting on wages has so far treated worker effects as being fixed over time. One exception is Frías et al. (2009). Our approach differs from theirs because we allow each individual worker effect to take different values before and after the devaluation whereas they estimate time-varying returns to unobservable ability that are common across workers. Our approach with estimating worker effects is similar to Card, Heining & Kline (2013), who estimate different AKM models for different periods in their data to study the increase in earnings inequality in West Germany.

The AKM wage decomposition rests on an assumption of exogenous worker mobility conditional on observables. In their paper on workplace heterogeneity and wage inequality in Germany, Card et al. (2013) discuss several possible violations of the exogenous mobility assumption and suggest a series of tests to detect such violations. We performed the Card et al. (2013) tests with our data, and find that the AKM assumption is roughly met. In fact, the tests deliver results that are very similar to those found in Card et al. (2013) for Germany. Specifically, we find that the departures from the exogenous mobility assumption suggested by the AKM residuals are small in magnitude, and that including unrestricted

match effects improves the model's statistical fit only slightly compared to the AKM model. Moreover, no pattern of endogenous mobility emerges from the profiles of wage changes for workers who change firms. Instead, wage changes are entirely consistent with the AKM model. We conclude that AKM's additive separable worker and firm effects are reasonable measures of the unobservable worker and firm components of wages.

Our empirical framework is based on regressing workers' wage, and its components (skill composition and rent sharing), on the share of export at the firm level in the post-devaluation period, accounting for the potential endogeneity of the export share (we discuss this issue in more detail below). Our results indicate that the increased export activity that followed the unexpected and large devaluation of the Italian currency in 1992 led to higher wages. Our estimates imply that, other things equal, wages rose by 1.05-1.30 percent (on average) at a firm recording the median increase in the export share (15 percent). In terms of rent sharing or skill composition, we find that, when skills are assumed to be fixed throughout the period, the whole effect of the increase in exports is due to the rent-sharing component. This indicates that the characteristics of the workforce have not changed systematically in relation to the export activity that firms undertook after the devaluation. In fact, when the worker effects are fixed, only changes in the workforce composition can change the skill composition at the firm level. However, when we allow the worker effects to vary before and after the devaluation, we find that the higher wages are roughly equally due to an increased firm effect, common to the entire firm workforce, and to an increase in the workers' effect. Given that we found no evidence of changes in the skill composition when keeping the worker effects fixed, the increased worker effects in exporting firms must reflect an increase in the the market value of skills of the workers they employ. We conclude that exporting firms do share rents with their workers, which is consistent with recent models that emphasize firm heterogeneity and labor market frictions (Helpman & Itskhoki 2010, Helpman et al. 2010), but also that the market value of the unobservable workers' skills they employ increases after the devaluation. Failure to take this change into account would lead one to overestimate the rent-sharing component.

To corroborate our interpretation of the results, we explore whether the export wage premium associated with the devaluation can be linked to a measure of export-specific workers' skills. We assume that past experience in exporting firms increases the level of a worker's export-specific skill, and find that, indeed, the export effect is significantly stronger for workers with greater past cumulated export experience. This result, which is robust to including an extensive set of tenure controls in the regressions, indicates that there is

heterogeneity across workers in the distribution of skills in terms of how useful they are for the export activity, and that the devaluation increased the demand for export-specific skills, driving their relative price up.

One crucial concern when attempting to estimate the effect of exporting on wages, even in the context of an exogenous change in the incentive to export, is that the most productive firms might also be those that are better equipped to take advantage of the devaluation. If this is the case, then a measured "effect" of increased export activity on wages might simply reflect the underlying heterogeneity, which generated both greater exports and higher wages. We have taken several steps to lessen this concern: First, we argue that in the Italian case the concern that exporters are primarily the most productive firms is much less relevant than in other contexts. In fact, the existing evidence on the exporting activities of Italian firms indicates that the firms that benefited the most from the 1992 devaluation of the Italian Lira were not the most advanced firms (across industries) or the most productive ones (within industries). Crinò & Epifani (2012) document that there is only a weak relationship between exports and TFP across Italian firms. As a matter of fact, in contrast to other developed economies, the bulk of the Italian production structure specializes in medium- and low-tech activities, such as textiles, furniture, and tiles. Bugamelli, Schivardi & Zizza (2010) show that firms engaged in low-tech activities have benefited the most from the 1992 devaluation. In this paper, we test directly whether "better" firms experienced greater increases in the share of sales exported in the devaluation period. We find that the change in the export share of sales was unrelated to firm size (employment), investment intensity (measured as the investment to workers ratio), and domestic sales.[4] Second, in our empirical specification, we explicitly control for pre-determined conditions at the firm level. More specifically, our proposed specification allows for wages in the devaluation period to be correlated with the pre-devaluation export intensity. This allows us to establish whether the changes in wages (or wage components) that took place in the devaluation period were due to the increased export activity or simply to pre-existing heterogeneity. Finally, our results are very robust to inclusion of firm fixed effects, which control for unobservable, time-invariant firm heterogeneity.

Our paper contributes to a small but growing empirical literature that uses matched employer-employee data to study the relationship between exporting activity and workers'

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[4]This contrasts with the Mexican experience as described in Verhoogen (2008) and Frías et al. (2009). In Mexico, better, larger firms took more advantage of the peso devaluation of 1993. This is because the Mexican exports were directed to a large extent towards the US, so that exported goods were on average of a higher quality than domestically sold ones.

wages. The paper that is most closely related to ours is Frías et al. (2009), who use matched employer-employee data from Mexico and exploit the 1994 devaluation of the Peso as an exogenous shock to the incentive Mexican firms' incentives to export. Combining this shock with a theoretical framework that predicts that more productive, larger firms take better advantage of the devaluation, they contrast outcomes of firms of different sizes during the devaluation period and afterwards, finding that most of the effect of exporting on wages comes from rent sharing. Our paper, too, uses matched employer-employee data and a large and unexpected devaluation as a source of identification. In contrast to Frías et al. (2009), however, we do not focus on differences based on firm size or other indicators of productivity; rather, we look directly at how wages relate to changes in export shares in the devaluation period compared to the earlier years. For the reasons explained above, we argue that in the Italian context this provides a more appropriate estimation strategy. Most important, our paper differs from theirs in the way we allow for the devaluation to affect workers' effects. While they account for potentially time-varying effects by interacting the worker individual effects with a time effect, we estimate separate workers effects for the pre and post devaluation period. In fact, when we constrain the worker effects to be fixed over time, we also obtain that rent sharing explains the bulk of the export wage premium. Krishna et al. (2010) use matched employer-employee data from Brazil, and find that when firm-worker match controls are included in the regressions, the effect of trade openness on wages at exporting firms compared to domestic firms vanishes. In their paper, however, the firm-worker match is also fixed over time, and it is not allowed to vary with export activity. Helpman et al. (2013) also use linked employer-employee data from Brazil. They estimate firm-occupation-year effects which include both wage premia and unobserved worker heterogeneity. This paper builds a structural model of trade with heterogeneous firms to estimate the role of trade in determining wage dispersion within occupation; by contrast, in our paper we focus on disentangling skill composition from rent sharing effects. Another paper related to our approach is that of Park, Yang, Shi & Jiang (2010), which exploits the Asian financial crisis of 1997 as an exogenous shock to the incentive to Chinese firms to export. Compared to our paper, they do not focus on wages specifically but, rather, on a large set of performance indicators at the firm level. As far as (firm-level average) wages are concerned, they find that firms that increase exports also pay higher wages.

Finally, our work includes a novel exploration of the heterogeneous effects of trade. Much of the existing literature has focused on the differential effects of trade across groups of workers, typically defined by education, occupation (blue collar, white collar, managers),

and industry. However, these traditional categories are very broad, and potentially mask substantial within-group heterogeneity. A recent exception is represented by Hummels, Jorgensen, Munch, & Xiang (2011), who document the heterogeneous effects of trade on workers who perform different sets of tasks (e.g., creative vs. routine tasks), or whose occupations employ different sets of knowledge (e.g., mathematics, social science, engineering, etc.). Frias et al. (2012) also contribute to the analysis of the heterogeneous effects of trade by looking at different percentiles of the within-firm wage distribution. In our paper, we document heterogeneous wage effects of exporting based on an explicit measure of export-related skills rather than using occupational categories or wage levels. To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper that considers workers' export experience explicitly is Mion & Opromolla (2011), who find that managers with previous export experience receive a wage premium and increase the likelihood that a firm engages in export activity.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data, perform the estimation of worker and firm effects and test the exogenous mobility assumption. In section 3 we present our main econometric analysis of the effect of exporting on wages, workforce composition, and firm-level wage premia. In Section 4 we explore the heterogeneity of the export wage premia across workers, emphasizing the role of workers' past export experience. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and offer directions for future research.

## 2    Data, wage decomposition, and descriptive evidence

### 2.1    Data description

The data used in this paper were constructed from the Bank of Italy's INVIND survey of manufacturing firms. INVIND is an open panel of around 1,200 firms per year, representative of manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees. It contains detailed information on firms' characteristics, including industrial sector, year of creation, average number of employees during the year, sales, investment, and, most important for our purposes, exports. The Italian Social Security Institute (Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale, INPS) provided the complete work histories of all workers who ever transited in an INVIND firm in the period 1980-1997, including spells of employment in which they were employed in firms not listed in the INVIND survey. Overall, we have information on about one million workers per year, more than half of whom are employed in INVIND firms in any given year. The rest are employed in about 500,000 other firms of which we only know the unit

identifier.[5]

The information on workers includes age, gender, the province where the employee works, occupational status (production, non-production, manager), annual gross earnings (including irregular payments such as overtime, shift work, and bonuses), number of weeks worked, and the firm identifier. We have deleted records with missing entries on either the firm or the worker identifier, those corresponding to workers younger than 15 and older than 65, those who have worked less than 4 weeks in a year, and those in the first and last percentiles of the weekly earnings distribution.

In Table 1 we report summary statistics on workers' characteristics for the entire sample (column [1]), which, as explained in Section 2.2 below, we use to estimate worker and firm effects, as well as for workers employed in INVIND firms (columns [2] and [3]), on which we base our main analysis. Because precise information on exporting behavior for a representative sample of firms is available only for INVIND firms after 1987, we will restrict our attention to INVIND firms in the period 1987-1997. For the entire sample, average gross weekly earnings at 1995 constant prices are about 378 euros, and the average age of workers is 37 years. Almost 80% of the observations pertain to males, 66% to production workers, and 33% to non-production workers. The INVIND sample in years 1987 through 1997 consists of about 4.1 million observations. The descriptive statistics for the INVIND sample are quite similar to those of the total sample; this was expected, because this sample includes the same workers but only observations of those who were employed by an INVIND firm in the period 1987-1997.

Table 2 reports statistics on the firm-year level data used in our main regression analyses. A total of 1,218 unique firms are included in the INVIND sample in the period considered. The sample is unbalanced. The median INVIND firm employs about 230 workers, and it reports sales of over 31 million euros. Eighty-nine percent of the firms in the sample were exporters in the period considered. Conditional on exporting, the median firm exports 31 percent of their sales. These figures are in line with those reported in other studies on Italian firms (Crinò & Epifani 2012, Castellani, Serti & Tomasi 2010) and are substantially higher than those found in other countries. In the United States (Bernard et al. 1995) or Mexico (Frías et al. 2009), for instance, only a small proportion of firms do export. This difference is explained by at least two factors. First, Italy's main commercial partners are countries within the European Union (EU), which are located in relative geographic proximity. Second, the INVIND sample excludes firms with fewer than 50 employees, and

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[5]This is the same database used by Iranzo, Schivardi & Tosetti (2008), to which the reader is referred to for further details.

Figure 1: Real exchange rate and export share



(a) Real exchange rate (Jan. 1992=1). Source: Finicelli at al, 2005.

(b) Mean and median export share. Source: IN-VIND.

it is a well-known fact that small firms have a much lower propensity to export compared to larger firms. In fact, comparison of columns [2] and [3] in Table 2 confirms that, even within the 50+ employee firms, exporters are substantially larger than non-exporters, both in terms of employment and sales volume.

The devaluation of 1992 was substantial and had a strong impact on exports. Figure 1, Panel (a) reports the multilateral real exchange rate of the lira (Finicelli, Liccardi & Sbracia 2005). This is the best indicator for our purposes, because it represents a measure of competitiveness of manufacturing goods. After the initial sharp drop, the exchange rate kept devaluating (with the exception of an appreciation in the second quarter of 1993) until mid-1995, when the depreciation compared to January 1992 was of the order of 30 percent. After that, the currency recorded a stable appreciation, which by the end of the decade brought the multilateral exchange rate back to around 85 percent of the January 1992 level. Figure 1, Panel (b) shows that the exporting behavior of the INVIND firms changed after 1992–the year of the Lira devaluation. The median (mean) share of sales exported increased sharply from around 18 percent (26 percent) in the 1987-1991 period to 30 percent (34 percent) in 1997. Interestingly, the share starts decreasing in 1997, arguably indicating the fading away of the competitive advantage. Indeed, this decrease further supports the view that the sharp rise in exports was linked to the devaluation itself and not to some other concomitant factor, such as the European single market, whose effects should have been permanent.

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## 2.2 Decomposing wages into "skills component" and "rent sharing"

### 2.2.1 Wage decomposition

Our goal is to establish whether export intensity leads to higher wages, and, if this is the case, if the higher wages simply reflect the skill composition of the workforce, including unobservable skills, or also rent sharing, defined as the excess wage that a worker obtains from working in a given firm compared to the market value of her skills. We exploit the matched employer-employee nature of our data to perform a decomposition of wages into two terms that capture the two potential sources of the positive correlation between exports and wages. Following Abowd et al. (1999) (AKM henceforth), we decompose wages into a component due to time-variant observable individual characteristics, a "pure" worker effect, a "pure" firm effect and a statistical residual, using the following equation:

$$w_{it} = X'_{it}\beta + \theta_i^{\text{F}} + \sum_j d_{ijt}\psi_{jt}^{\text{F}} + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where the subscript $i$ denotes the worker, $j$ denotes the firm, $t$ denotes time, $X'_{it}$ is a vector of individual time-varying controls, $\theta_i^{\text{F}}$ is the worker effect, $d_{ijt}$ is a dummy equal to 1 if worker $i$ is in firm $j$ at time $t$, and $\psi_{jt}^{\text{F}}$ is the firm-year effect. We use the superscript F to indicate that the worker effect is fixed over time, to distinguish this from the case in which we allow it to vary between the pre and post devaluation period (see below). Abowd et al. (1999) show that, under the assumption of random workers' mobility across firms (conditional on the observables), equation (1) can be estimated and firm and worker effects separately identified. The identification of firm effects and worker effects is guaranteed by the substantial mobility of workers in the sample: 63 percent of the workers in the sample have been employed by at least two different firms in the period 1982-1997, and between 8.4 and 20 percent of workers change employer from one year to the next.

We use the estimated worker effect $\hat{\theta}_i^{\text{F}}$ as our measure of the unobserved (to the econometrician) "skill component" of wages. Under the AKM assumptions (see Section 2.2.3 for a discussion), the worker effect represents the component of wages that reflects the market value of the workers' unobservable skills, independent of the characteristics of the particular firm that the individual works for, and net of the workers' personal time-varying characteristics included in the controls. The firm-year effect $\psi_{jt}^{\text{F}}$ represents the firm-specific contribution to wages, after controlling for individual workers' characteristics. As such, it can be interpreted in terms of rent sharing. Because we are interested in relating rent sharing to the firm's export behavior, which changes over time (specifically, after the devaluation), we modified the original Abowd et al. (1999) procedure, which imposes a time-invariant firm

effect, and estimate a time-varying firm effect $\hat{\psi}_{jt}^{\text{F}}$. Note that, thanks to the 50-employee minimum restriction, and because we observe the complete workforce of all INVIND firms, for each firm-year we have at least 50 observations (the average is 672 and the median 228 – see Table 2), which guarantees a reasonably high precision of the estimates of the firm-year effects.[6]

The above procedure allows for the firm effect to vary over time while keeping the worker effect fixed. Although assuming that the individual worker effects do not vary over time is the standard approach in the literature (Abowd et al. 1999, Frías et al. 2009, Krishna, Poole & Senses 2011), it might be too restrictive for the question that we are addressing. As shown in Figure 1, the average increase in the export share of Italian manufacturing firms was very large. Such a shift might have induced a change in the market value of different skills. Indeed, there is evidence that the devaluation has impacted the demand for observable skills. In Figure 2, we plot the time series evolution of the share of production workers in the INVIND firms. It decreases regularly from .71 in 1986 to .67 in 1993, following the secular decline common to all advanced economies. When the devaluation hits, the fall stops and the share of production workers remains stable until 1998, after which it starts falling again. This is exactly the period in which the devaluation has boosted the export activity (see Figure 1) and, possibly, the demand for production workers. More in general, some workers might be endowed with skills that are more valuable in export markets: for example, human capital specific to products that were particularly favored by the devaluation. It is indeed possible that the returns to such skills have increased after the devaluation. If a firm employs workers with export-valuable skills, it might export more and pay higher wages because the market value of such skills has increased. By keeping the worker effects fixed, however, one would exclude this possibility a priori, forcing the higher wages to be picked up by the firm-year effect, thus attributing the higher wages to rent sharing. To account for changes in the market value of skills, we therefore allow the worker effects to take different values before and after the devaluation, estimating an extended version of equation (1) as

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[6]We estimate equations (1) and (2) using all available observations, and not only those of INVIND firms because this improves the precision of the estimate of the workers' effects. However, for non-INVIND firms, for which we have on average 2.5 workers per year, we impose that the firm effect is fixed throughout the period. Note that these firms do not enter the subsequent analysis because for non INVIND firms we have no export information, so there is no advantage in recovering a time-varying measure that can be interpreted in terms of rent sharing for these firms.

Figure 2: Share of blue collar workers



Source: INVIND.

follows:

$$w_{it} = X'_{it}\beta + \theta^{\text{V}}_{it} + \sum_j d_{jit}\psi^{\text{V}}_{jt} + \varepsilon_{it} \qquad (2)$$

$$\theta^{\text{V}}_{it} = (1 - DV_t)\theta^{\text{PRE}}_i + DV_t\theta^{\text{POST}}_i$$

where $DV_t = 1$ for $t > 1992$ and 0 otherwise, and $\theta^{\text{PRE}}_i$ and $\theta^{\text{POST}}_i$ are worker $i$'s effects computed separately for the pre and post 1992 periods. Given that we have data up to 1997, $\theta^{\text{POST}}_i$ is estimated on a maximum of 5 observations per individual. The average number of individual-year observations in the post-devaluation period is 4.1 and the median is 5.

### 2.2.2   AKM Estimates

Prior to the estimation, we identified the groups of "connected" workers and firms. A connected group includes all of the workers ever employed by any firm in the group, and all the firms that any worker in the group has ever worked for. It is only within connected groups that worker- and firm-effects can be identified (Abowd, Creecy & Kramarz 2002). By design, our sample consists of essentially one large, connected group, with 99.6% of the sample forming a single connected group.[7] Thus, in our estimation, we focus on the largest

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[7]Note that the this conclusion holds despite the fact that we allow for firm-year effects and, in equation (2), for different worker effects in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. In fact, even if we treat each firm-year as a separate effect, a firm in year $t$ employs to a large extent the same workers it was employing at $t - 1$, which makes the year-firm observations automatically connected over time. When we estimate the

connected group and disregard the remaining observations. In Table 3, we present the results from estimation of equations (1) and (2).[8] The dependent variable $w_{it}$ is the natural logarithm of weekly wages. The vector $X_{it}$ includes age and age squared (proxying for labor market experience), tenure and tenure squared,[9] a dummy variable for non-production workers, a dummy for managers (occupational status changes over time for a considerable number of workers), as well as interactions of al of these terms with a female dummy variable.

The estimated coefficients on the workers' observable characteristics, shown in Panel A of Table 3, deliver unsurprising results: wages appear to exhibit concave age and tenure profiles, and a substantial wage premium is associated with white collar jobs and, especially, with managerial positions. Panel B of Table 3 presents the standard deviations of and the correlations between log wages ($w_{it}$) and the different components of wages ($\theta_i^{\mathrm{F}}$, $\theta_{it}^{\mathrm{V}}$, $\psi_{jt}^{\mathrm{F}}$, $\psi_{jt}^{\mathrm{V}}$). Similar to Abowd et al. (1999) and Iranzo et al. (2008), a substantial portion of the variation in earnings is due to heterogeneity in worker effects (the correlation between wages and worker effects is 0.46 when the worker effects are time-invariant and 0.39 when they are allowed to vary before and after the devaluation). Firm effects also play an important role (the correlation between wages and $\psi_{jt}^{\mathrm{F}}$ is equal to 0.45 and that with $\psi_{jt}^{\mathrm{V}}$ is 0.44). The two measures of worker effects ($\theta_i^{\mathrm{F}}$ and $\theta_{it}^{\mathrm{V}}$) are strongly positively correlated with each other (the correlation between $\theta_i^{\mathrm{F}}$ and $\theta_i^{\mathrm{PRE}}$ is 0.96 and that between $\theta_i^{\mathrm{F}}$ and $\theta_i^{\mathrm{POST}}$ is 0.91), and so are the two measures of firm-year effects (correlation = 0.93). The correlation between the worker and the firm effects is zero when the worker effects are time-invariant, and turns negative when the worker effects are time-variant. Finally, the pre- and post-devaluation worker effects ($\theta_i^{\mathrm{PRE}}$ and $\theta_i^{\mathrm{POST}}$) are positively correlated with each other (correlation = 0.83), which was expected; in fact, even though the devaluation might have changed the returns to skills, workers who commanded a high wage before the devaluation on average

workers' effects separately for the pre-post devaluation periods, connectiveness is guaranteed by the fact that, for non INVIND firms, we estimate non-time-varying firm effects. Such effects supply the connection between the pre and post devaluation periods. We have also repeated all of the regressions below estimating the $\theta_{it}^{\mathrm{V}}$ and $\psi_{jt}^{\mathrm{V}}$ effects running two separate regressions for the pre and post devaluation period, and the results, available upon request, are qualitatively similar.

[8]The estimation was carried out using the conjugate gradient algorithm proposed by Abowd et al. (2002) and implemented by the Stata routine "a2reg" developed by Ouazad (2008).

[9]Our data on tenure is right-censored because we do not have information on workers prior to 1980. To partly account for this censoring, for the affected workers we included age group-specific trends (based on these workers' age in 1980) in the AKM regressions. Specifically, we start these workers' tenure as if they were joining their employer in 1980, and we interact this tenure variable with dummy variables reflecting the workers' age in 1980 (age groups: 16-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-65). The results are robust to the exclusion of these additional controls. In fact, the correlation between the worker (firm) effects with and without the tenure controls is 0.99 (0.98).

do the same after it. Still, the correlation is substantially below 1, indicating that returns to (unobservable) skills have changed in the two periods.

### 2.2.3 Tests of the AKM exogenous mobility assumption

The AKM wage decomposition rests on an assumption of exogenous worker mobility conditional on observables. Following Card et al. (2013, CHK henceforth), we considered various possible violations of the exogenous mobility assumptions and performed a series of checks. We describe them below.

**Mobility based on the value of worker-firm match**  In AKM, the firm effects are wage premia paid to all workers in a given firm, irrespective of the characteristics of the specific workers. However, if the exogenous mobility assumption is violated due to sorting based on the value of a worker-firm match component, and workers change jobs to join firms to which they are better matched, then the wage premium would include a match component that would be specific to each worker-firm pair, and no longer common across all workers in the firm. To test for such sorting, we perform two analyses: first, we look at wage changes for job movers, and second, we compare the AKM regression with a regression including match (worker-firm) fixed effects.

**Wage changes for job movers**  Following CHK, we considered all job changers in the years 1980-1997 with at least two consecutive years in the old and new firm. We then classified the origin and destination jobs based on the quartiles of the estimated firm effects; we formed sixteen cells based on quartiles of origin and destination, and computed average wages of movers in each cell in the two years before the change and the two years after the change. Under the exogenous mobility assumption, workers who move from a "low firm-effect" firm to a "high firm-effect" firm should experience a wage increase and workers who move in the opposite direction a wage reduction. Moreover, the wage gain for the former group and the wage loss for the latter should be roughly symmetrical – the "firm effect" gained by one group should be roughly equal to that lost by the other group. Also, workers who transition between firms that pay similar wages should not experience any wage change. If, instead, the exogenous mobility assumption is violated because workers change firms based on the value of the idiosyncratic match component, then job changes will be associated with wage increases even for moves between firms with similar estimated firm effects, and possibly (if the match component is sufficiently important) even for moves from high- to low-estimated-firm-effect firms. We report the results of our exercise in Table

4, together with the number of movers in each of the sixteen cells. Similar to what found by CHK for the German labor market, we report two main findings: First, workers who move from a low-firm-effect quartile to a high-firm-effect quartile experience wage increases that are monotonically increasing with the gap between origin and destination quartiles, and workers who move in the opposite direction experience similar wage declines; Figure 3, Panel (a) shows the wage profiles for workers leaving the first and fourth quartiles, and illustrates the (approximate) symmetry of the wage gains and losses of those who move from the first quartile up and from the fourth quartile down, respectively. Second, the wages of job changers who stay within the same quartile group are essentially flat between the two years before and the two years after the move (see Figure 3, Panel (b)). The lack of a mobility premium for the job changers who stay in the same firm-effect quartile suggests that idiosyncratic worker-firm match effects are not the primary driver of job mobility, and the symmetry between wage increases for movers from low to high quartiles and the wage decreases for movers in the opposite direction are as predicted by the AKM model.

**Comparison of AKM and match fixed effects regression** If match effects are important, a model with worker-firm fixed effects should out-perform the AKM model in terms of statistical fit. We run regressions with match fixed effects (the results are reported in Table 3, columns [1] and [2]), and compare it with the AKM regression. We find that the match effects model has an adjusted $R^2$ that is only slightly higher, and a Root MSE only slightly lower than those from the AKM regression. Thus, although these results indicate that a match component in wages is present, the improvement in fit relatively to the AKM model is extremely modest.

**Drift in worker-specific ability or fluctuations in the transitory component of wages predicting firm-to-firm transitions** As illustrated in CHK, if workers' ability is revealed slowly over time and certain talents are valued differently at different firms, then workers who turn out to be more productive than expected will receive wage increases at their original employer, and will also be more likely to move to a firm where their talents will receive higher compensation. This too would be a violation of the exogenous mobility assumption and bias the estimates of the firm effects. Similarly, if the idiosyncratic component of wages is systematically associated with transitions between high-wage and low-wage firms, that would also violate the exogenous mobility assumption. If that is the case, the wages of movers will show an upward trend in the years before the move.

Figure 3: Mean wages of job changers classified by quartile of the AKM firm effect - all transition, all years (1980-1997).

Figure 4: Mean Residuals by Person/Firm Effect Deciles



Note: The figure shows mean residuals from the AKM regression (Table 3, column [2]) by cells defined by decile of the estimated worker effect x decile of the estimated firm effect.

**Trends in wages of movers prior to the move** Inspection of columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 reveals that wages of movers show no systematic trend in the years prior to their move. In other words, similar to CHK, we find no evidence that transitory wage fluctuations predict mobility patterns.

**Examination of the residuals from AKM** We have also examined the residuals from the AKM regression. Specifically, we again followed CHK and formed deciles based on the estimated worker effects and firm effects, and computed average residuals in each of the 100 worker x firm decile cell, to explore whether there are any notable systematic patterns in the distribution of residuals for particular types of matches. The mean residuals by cell, shown in Figure 4, generally very small. In 99 cases out of 100, the mean residual is smaller than 0.01 in magnitude. The largest deviations appear among the lowest-decile workers and the lowest-decile firms (again, similar to what found by CHK in Germany).

The tests that we performed indicate that the exogenous mobility assumption is substantially met in our data. There is some evidence that worker-firm match effects are

present, but a model including unrestricted match effects delivers only a slightly improved statistical fit compared to the AKM model, and the departures from the exogenous mobility assumption suggested by the AKM residuals are very small in magnitude. On the other hand, the symmetry of wage gains upon moving from a low-firm-effect to a high-firm-effect firm and the wage losses from moving in the opposite direction, and the absence of wage gains for workers who move between firms with similar estimated firm effects suggest that match effects are not a primary driver of mobility. Moreover, our data supply a picture that is surprisingly similar to the German one analyzed by CHK, arguably because the labor markets of the two countries share many institutional features. We therefore conclude that, in the Italian manufacturing sector context, the additively separable firm and worker effects obtained from the AKM model can be taken as reasonable measures of the unobservable worker and firm components of wages.

## 2.3 Exports and wages: Descriptive evidence

Before moving to the effects of the devaluation, we first analyze the correlation between wages and export activity and offer some suggestive evidence on the association between skill composition and rent sharing and the export wage premium. Of course, at this stage we cannot interpret this in any causal sense. As a measure of export activity, we use the share of export sales in total sales. Indeed, most firms in our sample are exporters, but they do differ considerably in their export intensity (see Table 2).

In Panel A of Table 5, we report the wage regressions. Column [1] uses as dependent variable the log of the individual workers' weekly earnings (which we will be referring to as "log wage" for brevity), and controls for worker-level characteristics (gender, age, age squared, white collar dummy, manager dummy), firm characteristics (employment categories [<100, 100-300, 300-500, and 500+ employees], log of domestic sales, fourteen industry dummies), as well as four geographic area dummies (South, Center, North-East and North-West) and ten year dummies (1987-1997). We find a strong, positive association between the export share ($EXSH$) and log wages, with a coefficient of 0.093 ($s.e. = 0.010$). Other things equal, a one-standard-deviation higher export share is associated with 2.5% higher wages. In column [2], we repeat the same regression using the average log wage at the firm-year level as the dependent variable, controlling for firm-year-level workforce characteristics (average age, average tenure, percentage of females in the firm's workforce, percentage of white collar employees), time-varying firm characteristics (employment categories, log of domestic sales) as well as industry and year dummies. Because the firm-year components, used as our key

dependent variables below, are measured at the firm-year level, we will use averages at the firm-year level as our preferred regressions in all of the analyses that follow. We find that the results are similar, although the coefficient increases slightly to 0.108 ($s.e. = 0.006$) arguably because the workers' controls aggregated at the firm level are less precise than those at the individual level. Finally, in column [3] we include firm fixed effects in the regression, to control for unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity. The estimated coefficient is equal to 0.065 ($s.e. = 0.010$) which indicates that a robust association exists between *within-firm* changes in exports and changes in wages.

To disentangle the effect of the skill composition from that of rent sharing, we resort to the wage decomposition described in Section 2.2 (similar to Frías et al. (2009)). We define a skill composition (SC) term as the average worker effect at the firm-year level,

$$SC_{jt} \equiv \frac{1}{n_{jt}} \sum_i d_{ijt} \theta_{it} \tag{3}$$

where, as before, $d_{ijt}$ is a dummy equal to 1 if worker $i$ is in firm $j$ at time $t$ and $n_{jt}$ is the number of workers in firm $j$ at time $t$. We measure rent sharing (RS) as the firm-year effect:

$$RS_{jt} = \psi_{jt} \tag{4}$$

As before, the superscripts $F$ and $V$ will be used to denote the case in which the worker and firm effects were obtained from specification (1) (with time-invariant worker effects), and specification (2) (when the worker effects are allowed to vary before and after the devaluation), respectively.

Next, we explore the relationship between export intensity and $SC$ and $RS$, and report the results in Panels B and C, respectively, of Table 5. Specifically, in the first two columns, the dependent variables are $SC^F$ and $RS^F$ (i.e., the measures of skills and rent sharing obtained with time-invariant worker effects, respectively) and the last two $SC^V$ and $RS^V$ (i.e., the measures of skills and rent sharing obtained with time-varying worker effects). The OLS results reported in column [1] of the two panels indicate that the wage premium is explained by both workforce composition and rent sharing: the coefficient on the export share is positive and significant in both panels. However, the elasticity of $RS^F$ is almost three times larger than that of $SC^F$ (0.075 vs. 0.027). This finding is reinforced in the firm fixed effects (FE) specifications of column [2], in which case the coefficient is essentially zero for $SC^F$ and remains positive and significant, albeit slightly smaller, for $RS^F$. These results suggest that some firms employ higher-skilled workers and export more (OLS results), but that changes of the export share over time are not reflected, on average, in changes in the

skill composition. On the contrary, the fixed effects results indicate that there is a positive correlation between export intensity and $RS^F$ within firms over time.

The picture changes somewhat when we use $SC^V$ and $RS^V$ (column [3], OLS and column [4], FE). The coefficient in the $SC^V$ regression increases considerably while that for $RS^V$ decreases, compared to when $SC^F$ and $RS^F$ were used. Also, the coefficient on the export share in the $SC^V$ regression remains marginally significant also when we control for firm fixed effects. The fact that we do find a positive association between within-firm changes in export shares $SC^V$ (i.e., worker effects that were allowed to differ before and after the devaluation) is consistent with the idea that changes in export intensity associated with the devaluation might have changed the market values of workers' skills. Once this is taken into account, the correlation between export intensity and the skill composition component of wages increases, and that with rent sharing decreases. We thus hypothesize that imposing a fixed skill level pre- and post-devaluation might be too restrictive, and might lead one to attribute to $RS$ part of the effect that is instead due to a change in the market value of workers' unobserved skills. Of course, at this stage no claims of causality can be made. We will return to this point in the next section, after describing our identification strategy.

## 3   Evidence from the 1992 Devaluation Episode

In this section we tackle the issue of causality in the relationship between exporting and wages. As mentioned above, we exploit the sudden and substantial devaluation of the Italian lira that occurred in September 1992 as an exogenous shock to the incentives of Italian firms to export.

### 3.1   An unexpected shock to the exchange rate

The currency devaluation of September 1992 was largely unpredicted. The speculative attacks that led to the devaluation started after the Danish referendum of June 2, 1992 that, quite unexpectedly, rejected the Maastricht Treaty by a small margin (0.7 percent). The Danish referendum represented a big blow to the process of European integration. One consequence was diminished credibility of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM), which immediately led to speculative attacks against the weak currencies. The monetary authorities resisted the attacks until the end of the summer. The Italian lira devaluated by 7 percent during the weekend of September 12-13. On September 16, the British pound left the ERM; the lira and the Spanish peseta suspended their exchange rate agreements immediately after. Italy rejoined the ERM only on November 25, 1996. During the four ensuing years,

the exchange rate of the lira fluctuated substantially.

Even though the depreciation was unexpected, one might argue that its effects were differentiated according to some firm characteristics, which in turn might be correlated with subsequent wage changes. For Mexico, Verhoogen (2008) shows that larger, more productive firms took greater advantage of the peso devaluation of 1993. This is because the Mexican exports were directed to a large extent towards the US, so that exported goods were on average of a higher quality than domestically sold ones. Firms that increased exports to the US were therefore those already producing high-quality goods before the devaluation. They undertook further quality upgrading, which led to an increased gap with respect to non-exporting firms.

It is not clear, however, whether the same patterns characterize the Italian case. In terms of classical indicators of development, such as income per capita or labor costs, Italy is a developed economy. However, its production structure was (and still is) specialized in medium and low-tech activities, such as textiles, furniture, and tiles. Bugamelli et al. (2010) argue that firms in these sectors were those that benefitted most from the devaluation. Their argument is based on the assumption that pure price competition is relatively more important in low-tech activities. The price advantage of a devaluation should have been therefore more pronounced for firms not at the top of the quality or technology ladder. The same type of reasoning applies within industries. For example, in the textiles sector, firms that produce low-quality shirts co-exist with luxury fashion producers. The argument is that the former might have benefited more from the devaluation because the demand elasticity for such goods is higher, given the production of close substitutes in low-wage countries. It is therefore unclear ex-ante which type of firms benefited most from the lira devaluation. In fact, such benefits might have depended on a series of factors, such as export destination, relative importance of price competition, product composition, etc., that are not easily linked to any specific firm characteristic.

To probe the hypothesis that changes in the export share following the devaluation were to a large extent exogenous with respect to pre-devaluation firm characteristics, we run a set of regressions similar to those of Verhoogen (2008):

$$\Delta EXSH_{i,t_1 t_0} = \alpha + \rho X_{i,t_0} + \text{Dummies} + \eta_i \tag{5}$$

where $\Delta EXSH_{i,t_1 t_0}$ is the change in the firm level share of export over total sales between $t_0$ and $t_1$, $X_{i,t_0}$ is a firm characteristic measured at $t_0$ and Dummies are sector and area dummies. In the Mexican case, Verhoogen (2008) and Frías et al. (2009) use employment, sales per worker, and TFP as proxies for plant heterogeneity , and find that the estimate of $\rho$

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for the devaluation period are substantially larger than in other periods. This is interpreted as showing that "better" firms took greater advantage of the devaluation. We run the same type of regressions and report the results in Table 6. We consider three periods, the devaluation period (1991-1995), and pre (1987-1991) and post (1995-1999) periods. Following Frías et al. (2009), we regress the change in the share of exports on the log of domestic sales, the log of employment, and on the ratio between investment and employment measured in the initial year. We find no significant differences in the coefficients between the devaluation period and the other two periods for any of the indicators. We conclude that there is no evidence that "better" firms disproportionately took advantage of the 1992 Lira devaluation.

## 3.2   Empirical Strategy

We are interested in singling out the effects of a change in the export share on wages and on its components, following the 1992 devaluation. For the dependent variable, we consider the wage, the firm-year average worker effect (which measures the skill composition), and the year-specific firm component (which measures rent sharing). The identifying assumption is that changes in export shares in the devaluation period are indeed attributable to the unforseen devaluation episode and were uncorrelated (as showed in the previous section) to pre-existing firm attributes commonly used in the literature as proxies for firm "quality." We take the years 1987-91 as the base period, before the devaluation occurred,[10] and define $DV$ as a dummy for the years from 1992 onward. We specify our main regression as:

$$y_{jt} = \alpha + \beta EXSH_{jt}*(1-\text{DV}) + \gamma EXSH_{jPRE}*\text{DV} + \delta EXSH_{jt}*\text{DV} + \mathbf{X'_{jt}}\boldsymbol{\theta} + \mu_j + \epsilon_{jt} \quad (6)$$

where $j$ denotes firms and $t$ years, $y_{jt}$ is alternatively the wage $w$, $SC$ and $RS$ as defined in equations (3) and (4), respectively, $EXSH_{jt}$ is the current export share, $EXSH_{jPRE}$ is the average share in the pre-devaluation (1987-91) period, $\mathbf{X_{jt}}$ is a vector of additional controls of firm and workforce characteristics, and $\mu_j$ are firm fixed effects. In this specification, $\beta$ measures the correlation between export share and the dependent variable in the pre-devaluation period, in the same way as in the basic OLS regressions that were described in the previous section. For the devaluation period ($DV = 1$), we control for pre-existing effects of export on worker compensation by including the share of export in the pre-devaluation period interacted with the $DV$ dummy. By doing so, we control for the

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[10]Figure 2 shows that the average and median export share in the INVIND sample was very stable during the pre-devaluation period. We have also run regressions for which we picked 1990 or 1991 as base years, obtaining very similar results.

possibility that firms that were exporting more in the pre-devaluation period might have also been paying higher wages, which could persist in the post-devaluation period; moreover, this also accounts for the possibility that a higher initial export share might be correlated with higher wages in the devaluation period, if, as in Frías et al. (2009), "good firms" take greater advantage of the devaluation. The coefficient $\gamma$ will therefore capture any of these effects, if indeed present. Thus, controlling for the pre-devaluation export propensity, the coefficient $\delta$ measures the effect of the current export share on wages. Despite its simplicity, this specification encompasses many different regimes, according to the values of the estimated parameters. We discuss the most interesting ones next.

$\delta = 0, \gamma > 0$ In this case, the relation between wages and export activity is a fixed firm attribute. The pre-devaluation export share captures this attribute and constitutes a sufficient statistic to predict the effects of the devaluation on wages, while the actual share has no effect.

$\delta > 0, \gamma = 0$ This configuration would indicate that export propensity is not a fixed firm attribute: a devaluation might entail changes in export that cannot be predicted on the basis of pre-existing conditions. Moreover, controlling for the current propensity, pre-existing conditions play no role in determining the impact of export propensity on wages.

$\delta > 0, \gamma > 0$ In this case, there is a role for both a pre-determined, fixed component and for current conditions.

## 3.3 Main Results

We estimate equation (6) using log wages, $SC$ and $RS$ as dependent variables, and report the results in Table 7. In panel A we present OLS results, while in panel B we adopt a fixed effects specification, with the fixed effects defined at the level of the firm.

### 3.3.1 Assuming time-invariant worker skills

We begin by describing the OLS results. All regressions include firm-year-level workforce characteristics (average age, average tenure, percentage of females in the workforce, percentage of white collar employees), time-varying firm characteristics (employment size categories, log of domestic sales) as well as region, industry and year dummies. For wages, we find in column [1] that $\delta = 0.085$, statistically significant at the 1% level, and $\gamma = .037$, statistically significant at the 5% level. This implies that, controlling for the pre-devaluation

export share, a higher post-devaluation share is associated with higher wages. Moreover, given that $\gamma$ is less than half $\delta$ in magnitude, the current export share is what matters the most for wage determination, contrary to the idea that some pre-determined condition, captured by the pre-devaluation share, is the main driver of the post-devaluation outcomes. In terms of magnitude, the effect is not negligible: given that the median export share has increased by approximately 15 percentage points during the devaluation episode, workers in the median firm recorded a wage 1.3 percent higher following the devaluation. Finally, the coefficient on the export share in the pre-devaluation period, $\beta$, is 0.1, highly significant, not too dissimilar to what we found in the OLS regressions of Table 5. Columns [2] and [3] report the results for $SC^F$ and $RS^F$ (that is, the worker and firm effects estimated while assuming the worker effects are constant over time) as the dependent variables. For $SC^F$, we obtain an estimated $\delta$ essentially equal to zero (0.005, not statistically significant). The coefficient on the pre-share value $\gamma$ is instead positive (0.026) and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the workforce composition is indeed a quasi-fixed attribute, so that, controlling for the pre-devaluation export share, changes in the share after the devaluation do not affect the firms' skill composition. Stated differently, the higher post-devaluation wages do not seem to be due to a workforce composition effect. The relationship between export intensity and workers' skills is confirmed by the estimate of $\beta$ (0.027, statistically significant at the 1% level): "normal" (pre-devaluation) export activity is associated with higher skills. For $RS^F$, our measure of firm-year wage premia, the estimated $\delta$ is positive, statistically significant at the 1% level, and large in magnitude (0.080), while the estimated $\gamma$ is small (0.007) and not statistically significant. This indicates that the higher wages related to increases in the export shares are mostly due to a time-varying firm effect, which is common to all workers in the firm. This is consistent with the idea that the firm and the workers share the surplus deriving from the increase in export following the devaluation. Moreover, the rent-sharing component does not seem to be a fixed firm attribute in that it is not related to the average export share in the pre-devaluation period. The coefficient estimate on the export share in the pre-devaluation period, $\beta$, is instead sizable (0.047) and statistically significant; the fact that its magnitude is smaller than that of $\delta$ suggests that a larger share of the surplus is enjoyed by workers after the devaluation compared to "normal" times.

We now turn to the fixed effects specifications (Panel B of Table 7). This exploits only within-firm variation, and it ensures that we are controlling for any firm-specific, time-invariant unobservable characteristics. In fact, one could argue that controlling for

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the pre-devaluation average export share and other firm-level controls such as employment and domestic sales is not sufficient to account for potential firm heterogeneity. Once we do that, we obtain a slightly smaller estimate of $\delta$ for wages (0.070) in column [1], still highly statistically significant, which indicates that the effects of export on wages do not simply reflect a fixed firm attribute. We also still obtain that when we constrain the worker effects to be time-invariant, all of the wage effect is attributable to changes in wage premia rather than changes in workforce composition. In fact, when the dependent variable is $SC^F$ (column [2]), the coefficient estimate of $\delta$ is negative (-0.014), in line with the idea that the devaluation might have favored more low-skill firms, and the estimated $\gamma$ and $\beta$ are small and not statistically significant. This is consistent with the view that the skill composition is a rather fixed attribute so that, once we control for firm fixed effects, the within-firm variation in exports has very little effect on the skill composition. Instead, when the dependent variable is the rent-sharing component $RS^F$ (column [3]), the estimated coefficient $\delta$ remains positive and strongly significant, and essentially unchanged in magnitude (0.083). This indicates that within-firm variations in the share of exports over time are strongly reflected in the rent-sharing component of wages.

### 3.3.2 Allowing worker skills to vary pre- and post-devaluation

The picture that emerged from columns [1], [2], and [3] of Table 7 Panels A and B is that the export activity stimulated by the devaluation of the Lira led to higher wages, and the increased wages were entirely due to rent sharing with little evidence of changes in skill composition. $SC^F$ and $RS^F$, however, were estimated under the assumption that the worker effect is fixed over time. Such an effect captures the combination of two elements in the wage determination: the worker's unobservable skills and the price that the labor market assigns to such skills. Although it seems plausible that there is a fixed component of workers' skills, such as education and other cognitive skills, and non-cognitive ability, it is less obvious that the market value of these skills is unchanged following such a strong shock as the devaluation that we are analyzing. Specifically, workers might be heterogeneous in terms of export-specific skills. For example, the devaluation might have been particularly advantageous for some products, more traded on international markets. Then, if part of the human capital is product-specific, workers with the skills that are more useful for the exporting activity might observe an increase in the market value of their skills. Consider now the case of a firm with abundant export-specific skills that, after the devaluation, increases its export share substantially. If the market value of its workers' skills has increased, the

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firm will increase compensation accordingly, not to share rents but, rather, to meet the higher market value of its workers' skills. Failure to allow the worker effects to change over time would imply that the increased market value of those skills would be absorbed by the time-varying firm component of wages ($RS^F$), thus overestimating the rent sharing component of the correlation between export and wages.

This conjecture is confirmed by the results reported in columns [4] and [5] of Table 7, where we report the results for $SC^V$ and $RS^V$: that is, the average firm-year worker effect and rent-sharing component estimated while allowing the individual worker effects to take different values in the pre- and post-devaluation periods (model (2)). In fact, when $SC^V$ is the dependent variable, the estimated $\delta$ is positive and statistically significant, in both the OLS (column [4] of Panel A) and fixed effects (column [4] of Panel B) specifications (0.032 and 0.031, respectively, compared to 0.005 and $-0.014$ when using $SC^F$). The estimated $\delta$ remains large and significant also for $RS^V$ (column [5] of Panels A and B) although its magnitude is reduced compared to when $RS^F$ was used (0.054 vs. 0.085 in the OLS specification and 0.041 vs. 0.083 in the fixed effects specification). Thus, it appears that the increased wage associated with exporting is due to both a firm-level component, plausibly related to rent sharing, and a component attributable to a change in the market value of workers' unobservable skills. Specifically, the results from the specifications with firm fixed effects (Panel B, columns [4] and[5]) indicate that the two components contribute roughly equally to explaining the effect of export intensity on wages. Not allowing the worker effects to vary over time would have led to incorrectly concluding that the wage premium was entirely explained by rent sharing, with workers' skills not playing any role. We will provide further corroboration to this interpretation in section 5.3 below, where we will relate the export wage premium to a measure of export-specific worker experience.

## 3.4 Accounting for effort and productivity

We address two potential concerns that one might have with the analysis above and our interpretation of the results: the estimated coefficient $\delta$ might be reflecting increased worker effort in response to the extra demand, or it might reflect increased productivity that is related both to higher wages and to higher exports.

The first concern arises because our wage measure is total weekly earnings and we have no information on hours worked at the individual level in the social security data. If employees in firms that increase the export share after the devaluation are working more hours per week to meet the extra demand, we would be capturing an effect on hours and not

directly on the wage rate. Fortunately, the INVIND firm survey does report the total hours worked at the firm-year level, from which we can recover a measure of average per capita hours. The results from including this additional control in the regressions are reported in Panel A of Table 8.[11] The table presents results from fixed effects specifications, for which the fixed effects are defined at the level of the firm. As can be seen in columns [1], [3] and [5], hours worked are positively and significantly correlated with wages as well as with the firm effects (both $RS^F$ and $RS^V$). However, our main coefficient of interest, $\delta$, is still positive, sizable, and statistically significant, and its magnitude is only slightly reduced with respect to the results reported in Table 7. The estimates for the worker effects (both $SC^F$ and $SC^V$) are essentially unaffected. This indicates that the effects on the total compensation is not just due to an increase in the number of hours worked.

The second possible issue is that the firm might become more productive as a consequence of expanding its export activities due to "learning by exporting" (De Loecker 2011). Indeed, evidence from other contexts does suggest that labor productivity and TFP increase when firms begin exporting or when they expand their exports (Park et al. 2010). Thus, this would be a different mechanism for export to affect wages other than skill composition and rent sharing. To account for this possibility, we include TFP in the regression, computed using the Olley & Pakes (1996) procedure (see Iranzo et al. (2008) for the details). Because computing TFP requires further data, available only for a subset of firms, when we include TFP in the regressions (Panel B of Table 8), our sample size is reduced to 3,858 firm-year observations. In spite of this, our results are robust to the inclusion of TFP in the controls. The estimated coefficient $\delta$ remains sizable and statistically significant (at the 1% or 5% level in all cases, except in the $RS^V$ regression, where the estimated is significant at the 10% level), and both workers' skills and rent sharing contribute to the export wage premium. TFP shows a strong positive correlation with wages.

## 4 Export wage premium and workers' past export experience

Our results imply that workers enjoy higher wages when their firm increases its exports. The export wage premium is explained both by a firm-year factor, $RS$, which we interpret as rent sharing, and by a skill composition effect, $SC$, that emerges only if we allow the returns to (unobservable) skills to differ in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. The latter result can be explained if: a) there is heterogeneity in the distribution of skills in terms of

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[11]Note that because of some missing values in hours worked, our estimation sample is reduced from 6,328 to 6,219 observations.

usefulness for the export activity; and b) the devaluation increases the demand for those skills, driving their relative price up. In this section, we corroborate this interpretation by testing whether the export wage premium associated with the devaluation can be linked to a measure of export-specific workers' skills. Measures of such skills are typically unobservable in administrative data or labor force surveys. Our data, however, allow us to construct a measure of export-related skills: workers' past experience in exporting activities. If producing for foreign markets requires a certain degree of specificity, then it seems plausible that a worker employed by an exporting firm can actually accumulate export-specific human capital.[12] We therefore construct a cumulated export experience variable as follows:

$$EXPER5Y_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^{5} EXSH_{j(i,t-k)} \qquad (7)$$

where $i$ denotes workers, $t$ denotes time, $j(i,t)$ denotes the firm where worker $i$ was employed at time $t$, and $EXSH_{j(i,t)}$ is firm $j$'s export share at time $t$. The index $EXPER5Y_{it}$ can take values between 0 (if a worker was employed in firms that produced only for the domestic market in the previous five years) and 5 i(f the worker was employed in firms that exported its entire output in the previous five years). Given that we are interested in the effects of an individual characteristic (export experience) on wages, we perform this analysis on the individual workers' data rather than on firm-year averages. Because we have information on exports for INVIND firms only, the export experience index can be computed only for workers who have been employed at INVIND firms throughout the 1987-1997 period. This subsample consists of 58 percent of the total INVIND workers' sample. As shown in column [4] of Table 1, the characteristics of these workers are very similar to those in the full sample. Because export data are available only starting in 1984, a five-year export experience index can be computed only starting in 1989. Thus, the sample is reduced to slightly less than 1,200,000 person-year observations. In 1991, the year before the devaluation, the mean (standard deviation) $EXPER5Y$ was equal to 1.21 (1.06).[13]

In Table 9 we present results from estimating the following equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
w_{it} &= \alpha + \beta EXSH_{j(i,t)} * (1 - DV) + \gamma EXSH_{j(i,t)PRE} * \mathrm{DV} \\
&+ \delta_0 EXSH_{j(i,t)} * DV + \zeta EXPER5Y_{it} + \xi EXPER5Y_{it} * DV \qquad (8) \\
&+ \delta_1 EXSH_{j(i,t)} * EXPER5Y_{it} * DV + \boldsymbol{\theta}' \mathbf{X_{ij(i,t)}} + \mu_j + \epsilon_{it}
\end{aligned}
$$

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[12] Mion & Opromolla (2011) find evidence of this mechanism for managers in Portuguese firms.

[13] We have also performed all the regressions with $EXPER3Y_{it}$, defined in an analogous way but considering only the previous 3 years of employment, which allows us to use the entire 1987-1997 period. We obtained very similar results (available upon request). In 1991, the mean (median) $EXPER3Y$ was equal to 0.81 (0.68).

which is a version of equation (6) augmented with $EXPER5Y_{it}$ and its interaction with $DV$ and $EXSH_{j(i,t)}*DV$ . In equation (8), the coefficient $\delta_0$ captures the baseline effect of post-devaluation contemporaneous export on wages for workers with no past cumulated export experience, and $\delta_1$ measures whether the effect is related to past export experience. By interacting past experience with the export share, we allow for exports to have heterogeneous effects across workers according to their export experience: in the post-devaluation period, $\partial w_{it}/\partial EXSH_{j(i,t)} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 * EXPER5Y_{it}$.

In Panel A of Table 9, we present OLS results, and in Panel B results from fixed effects regressions, with the fixed effects defined at the firm level. In all cases, the control vector $\mathbf{X_{ij(i,t)}}$ includes worker characteristics (gender, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, white collar dummy, manager dummy), firm characteristics (four employment categories [<100, 100-300, 300-500, 500+ employees], log of domestic sales, fourteen industry dummies), as well as a set of four geographic area dummies and eight year dummies; we cluster the standard errors at the firm-year level. Column [1] in both Panels A (OLS) and B (firm fixed effects) shows that our main coefficient of interest, $\delta_1$, is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the export wage premium increases with a worker's past export experience. Using the estimates from column [1], Panel A, we obtain that a one-standard deviation increase in $EXPER5Y_{it}$ increases the wage by 1.1 percent for a worker in a firm with an export share equal to the sample mean. The direct effect of export experience and its interaction with the devaluation dummy are instead slightly negative (marginally significant), which indicates that having export experience bears no premium in a firm that does not export.

Within firms, $EXPER5Y_{it}$ varies both cross-sectionally (because workers vary in their tenure at the firm) and longitudinally for workers with the same tenure but who were hired in different years. Even thogh our regressions do include a quadratic tenure term, it is possible that $EXPER5Y_{it}$ is picking up a tenure effect if the quadratic term does not fully capture workers' tenure profiles. In particular, for workers at their first job, $EXPER5Y_{it}$ will grow with tenure (unless the firm has zero export). Thus, it might then be the case that workers with longer tenure receive a larger share of the extra rent generated by the increased exports during the devaluation period. To account for this possibility, in column [2], we include a full set of tenure dummies, and interactions of each of these dummies with $EXSH_{j(i,t)} * DV$; that is, we allow for the post-devaluation export share to affect workers with different tenure at the firm differently. Comparing columns [1] and [2], we see that the estimates of $\delta_1$ are virtually unchanged in both the OLS and firm fixed effects regressions.

In the INPS-INVIND data, tenure is measured precisely for workers who joined their firm in 1981 or subsequent years, but it is censored for those who were in the firm's workforce as of 1980, the first year in the data set.[14] In column [3], we report results from the same specification as in column [2] but limiting the sample to the cohorts of workers who joined their current employer after 1980, for whom tenure is precisely measured, and we obtain very similar results - the estimated $\delta_1$ (both OLS and firm fixed effects) is still strongly statistically significant and actually larger in magnitude.

Thus, we find that the export wage premium is larger for workers with higher cumulated past export experience. This finding, and its robustness to controlling for tenure, corroborates our interpretation of the previous results that part of the export wage premium is due to an increase in the market value of workers' skills specifically related to export activity.

## 5    Conclusions

We exploited the large and unexpected devaluation of the Italian lira in 1992 to study the effect of firms' exporting activity on wages. We documented that because of the structure of Italian exports, there was no systematic relationship between pre-determined measures of firm "quality" (employment, sales, investment) and the extent to which firms benefited from the devaluation in terms of increased exports, which considerably lessens endogeneity concerns that are paramount in other contexts (see, e.g., Verhoogen (2008), Frías et al. (2009) and Park et al. (2010)). Our matched employer-employee data allowed us to distinguish between workforce composition effects, changes in the market value of workers' unobservable skills, and an actual export wage premium enjoyed by workers above and beyond what they would get in non-exporting firms. The results indicate that the increase in the export share of sales induced by the 1992 devaluation did cause wages to be higher, and that this effect was due to both exporting firms paying a wage premium and to changes in the market value of workers' unobservable skills. A novel contribution of this paper is to show that this result depends crucially on whether one allows the returns to individual workers' unobservable skills to vary over time. We argued that it is plausible to expect that a large shock such as the 1992 lira devaluation would have an impact on the market value of workers' unobservable skills, especially if these are export-specific. In fact, we have shown that imposing that the market value of workers' unobservable skills is fixed over time

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[14][1] and [2] included a dummy variable for workers who were already employed as of 1980, as well as trends based on these workers' age in 1980 as described in footnote 9.

(as typically done in the literature) would have led one to erroneously attribute all of the export premium to a firm-year component, common to all workers in the firm.

The "rent-sharing" effect is consistent with theoretical models that emphasize the role of firm heterogeneity and frictions, and that predict an effect of trade on wage dispersion across occupations, industries, and firms (Helpman & Itskhoki 2010). The "skill composition" effect, together with our finding that the workers who benefited the most were those with more export-related past experience, documents the importance of export-specific skills, which are typically not observed in traditional datasets. This is in fact another novel contribution of this paper, and the result that the change in the export share in the devaluation period had a significantly stronger effect on workers with more past cumulated export experience further supports a causal interpretation of the effects of export on wages.

In addition to providing new evidence on the relationship between exporting and wages, our paper has implications for both future empirical and theoretical analysis. On the empirical front, researchers have only recently started exploring the heterogeneous effects of export shocks within industries and occupations and within firms (Helpman et al. 2013, Frias et al. 2012, Hummels et al. 2011); future research should aim at obtaining more precise measures of export-specific skills. On the theoretical side, our findings suggest that labor market frictions and export-specific skills should be essential ingredients in models of the effects of international trade on wages.

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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, workers

| | [1] Entire sample 1980-1997 mean (st.dev.) | [2] Entire sample 1987-1997 mean (st.dev.) | [3] INVIND sample 1987-1997 mean (st.dev.) | [4] INVIND stayers 1987-1997 mean (st.dev.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Weekly wage | 377.6 (160.2) | 401.1 (182.0) | 404.2 (168.5) | 397.4 (165.5) |
| Age | 36.9 (10.0) | 37.6 (10.1) | 38.8 (9.9) | 40.0 (10.3) |
| Tenure | 5.11 (4.12) | 6.5 (4.6) | 8.1 (4.7) | 10.1 (4.5) |
| Males | 0.79 | 0.79 | 0.78 | 0.74 |
| Production workers | 0.66 | 0.64 | 0.67 | 0.68 |
| Non-prod. workers | 0.34 | 0.36 | 0.33 | 0.31 |
| N. Observations | 18,635,710 | 11,042,916 | 4,074,074 | 2,772,321 |

Notes: Entire sample refers to all workers in the data set; INVIND sample only includes workers who are currently employed by a firm that belongs to the Bank of Italy-INVIND survey and with non-missing information on export activity. See Section 2.1 for a description of the data.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics, firms

|  | [1] All | [2] Exporters | [3] Non-Exporters |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Employment** |  |  |  |
| Mean | 672.3 | 720.9 | 287.4 |
| (st.dev.) | (3,207.9) | (3,397.4) | (473.9) |
| Median | 228 | 245 | 147 |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Sales** |  |  |  |
| Mean | 112,846.0 | 120,801.8 | 49,891.3 |
| (st.dev.) | (539,967.5) | (570,717.2) | (130,019.8) |
| Median | 31,240.6 | 33,712.8 | 16,500.3 |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Export (0/1)** | 0.89 | 1 | 0 |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Export Share of Sales** |  |  |  |
| Mean | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0 |
| (st.dev.) | (0.27) | (0.27) | 0 |
| Median | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0 |
|  |  |  |  |
| **N. Obs.** | 7,585 | 6,734 | 851 |

Notes: The sample includes firms in the INVIND sample in the period 1987-1997 and with non-missing information on export activity. Sales are expressed in thousands of euros (in constant 1995 prices).

Table 3: Estimating worker effects and firm effects: Two-way fixed effects regressions

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">Panel A: AKM Regressions Results</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>[1]<br>$\theta_i^{\text{F}}, \psi_{it}^{\text{F}}$</td><td>[2]<br>$\theta_{it}^{\text{V}}, \psi_{it}^{\text{V}}$</td></tr>
<tr><td>Number of Observations</td><td>18,552,601</td><td>18,552,601</td></tr>
<tr><td>Number of Worker/Worker-Period FEs</td><td>1,711,542</td><td>2,757,402</td></tr>
<tr><td>Number of Firm-Year FEs[(*)]</td><td>459,563</td><td>459,563</td></tr>
<tr><td>F (Prob > F)</td><td>49.99 (0.000)</td><td>40.72 (0.000)</td></tr>
<tr><td>R-squared; Adj. R-squared</td><td>0.87; 0.85</td><td>0.90; 0.87</td></tr>
<tr><td>Root MSE</td><td>0.124</td><td>0.111</td></tr>
<tr><td>Coeffs. on worker characteristics:</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Age</td><td>0.0333</td><td>0.0394</td></tr>
<tr><td>Age squared</td><td>-0.0002</td><td>-0.0002</td></tr>
<tr><td>Age * Female</td><td>-0.0153</td><td>-0.0169</td></tr>
<tr><td>Age squared * Female</td><td>0.0001</td><td>0.0001</td></tr>
<tr><td>Tenure[(**)]</td><td>0.0094</td><td>0.0059</td></tr>
<tr><td>Tenure squared</td><td>-0.0004</td><td>-0.0003</td></tr>
<tr><td>Tenure * Female</td><td>-0.0025</td><td>-0.0002</td></tr>
<tr><td>Tenure squared * Female</td><td>0.0001</td><td>-0.00001</td></tr>
<tr><td>White collar</td><td>0.0699</td><td>0.0533</td></tr>
<tr><td>Executive</td><td>0.5136</td><td>0.4252</td></tr>
<tr><td>White collar * Female</td><td>-0.0073</td><td>-0.0024</td></tr>
<tr><td>Executives * Female</td><td>0.0191</td><td>-0.0010</td></tr>
<tr><td>Comparison with Match Effects Model[(***)]</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Match Effects Model R-Squared; Adjusted R-Sq.</td><td>0.90; 0.87</td><td>0.92; 0.89</td></tr>
<tr><td>Root MSE</td><td>0.122</td><td>0.115</td></tr>
</table>

Notes: The sample includes all firms and all workers in the largest connected group. The estimation was performed using the conjugate gradient algorithm proposed by Abowd et al. (2002) and implemented by the Stata code "a2reg" written by Ouazad (2008). See Section 2.2 for more details. (*) Year-specific firm effects are estimated for INVIND firms whereas the estimated firm effects are time-invariant for non-INVIND firms. (**) To partly account for the censoring of the tenure variable for workers who appear in the data set prior to 1981, we included age group-specific trends based on these workers' age in 1980. Specifically, we start these workers' tenure as if they were joining their employer in 1980, and we interacted this tenure variable with dummy variables based on the workers' age in 1980 (age groups: 16-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-65). These coefficients are not reported to save space. (***) Column [1] includes worker-firm match fixed effects, and column [2] includes pre- and post-devaluation worker-firm match effects.

Panel B: Variance-covariance matrix of workers' and firms' effects

| | $w_{it}$ | $\theta_i^{\text{F}}$ | $\theta_{it}^{\text{V}}$ | $\psi_{it}^{\text{F}}$ | $\psi_{it}^{\text{V}}$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $w_{it}$ | 0.34 | | | | |
| $\theta_i^{\text{F}}$ | 0.46 | 0.24 | | | |
| $\theta_{it}^{\text{V}}$ | 0.39 | 0.95 | 0.28 | | |
| $\psi_{it}^{\text{F}}$ | 0.45 | -0.02 | 0.01 | 0.13 | |
| $\psi_{it}^{\text{V}}$ | 0.44 | 0.01 | -0.04 | 0.93 | 0.13 |

Notes: The diagonal entry reports the standard deviation and the other entries are correlations.

Table 4: Mean Log Wages Before and After Job Change, by Quartile of AKM Firm Effect at Origin and Destination Firms

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | Change from |
| Origin/ | | Mean log wage of movers | | | | 2 years |
| destination | N. of | 2 years | 1 year | 1 year | 2 years | before to 2 |
| quartile(*) | obs. | before | before | after | after | years after |
| 1 to 1 | 1,529 | 5.51 | 5.52 | 5.54 | 5.56 | 0.05 |
| 1 to 2 | 1,920 | 5.44 | 5.45 | 5.62 | 5.65 | 0.20 |
| 1 to 3 | 3,062 | 5.42 | 5.42 | 5.72 | 5.77 | 0.36 |
| 1 to 4 | 2,479 | 5.43 | 5.46 | 5.87 | 5.94 | 0.51 |
| | | | | | | |
| 2 to 1 | 1,481 | 5.60 | 5.62 | 5.49 | 5.51 | -0,10 |
| 2 to 2 | 5,334 | 5.60 | 5.60 | 5.62 | 5.64 | 0,05 |
| 2 to 3 | 23,419 | 5.86 | 5.85 | 5.90 | 5.93 | 0,08 |
| 2 to 4 | 5,769 | 5.66 | 5.67 | 5.92 | 5.95 | 0,28 |
| | | | | | | |
| 3 to 1 | 2,133 | 5.78 | 5.78 | 5.53 | 5.49 | -0,29 |
| 3 to 2 | 12,171 | 5.75 | 5.76 | 5.73 | 5.74 | -0,01 |
| 3 to 3 | 53,004 | 5.81 | 5.80 | 5.83 | 5.85 | 0,03 |
| 3 to 4 | 23,102 | 5.84 | 5.83 | 5.97 | 5.98 | 0,14 |
| | | | | | | |
| 4 to 1 | 1,419 | 5.89 | 5.94 | 5.50 | 5.53 | -0,36 |
| 4 to 2 | 3,648 | 5.85 | 5.86 | 5.69 | 5.71 | -0,13 |
| 4 to 3 | 21,826 | 5.86 | 5.88 | 5.85 | 5.87 | 0,01 |
| 4 to 4 | 76,975 | 6.03 | 6.03 | 6.07 | 6.08 | 0,05 |

Notes: Entries are average log real weekly earnings for job changers observed for at least 2 years prior to a job change and 2 years after, and with only one transition in the period considered. (*) Quartiles are based on firm effects estimated with the Abowd-Kramarz-Margolis method (Equation (2) in the text).

Table 5: Export Intensity and Wages, Skill composition and Rent sharing: Cross-Sectional and Within-Firm Patterns

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Panel A: Wages** | | | |
| | Log wage | | | |
| EXSH | 0.093*** | 0.108*** | 0.065*** | |
| | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.010) | |
| | | | | |
| Specification | OLS | OLS | FE | |
| Observations | 4,074,074 | 7,579 | 7,579 | |
| R-squared | 0.59 | 0.77 | 0.96 | |
| | | | | |
| | **Panel B: Skill Composition** | | | |
| | $SC^F$ | | $SC^V$ | |
| Export share of sales | 0.027*** | -0.007 | 0.042*** | 0.016* |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.010) |
| | | | | |
| Specification | OLS | FE | OLS | FE |
| Observations | 7,579 | 7,579 | 7,579 | 7,579 |
| R-squared | 0.67 | 0.96 | 0.64 | 0.89 |
| | | | | |
| | **Panel C: Rent Sharing** | | | |
| | $RS^F$ | | $RS^V$ | |
| EXSH | 0.075*** | 0.069*** | 0.061*** | 0.048*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.012) |
| | | | | |
| Specification | OLS | FE | OLS | FE |
| Observations | 7,579 | 7,579 | 7,579 | 7,579 |
| R-squared | 0.55 | 0.89 | 0.47 | 0.84 |

*Notes*: The sample includes INVIND firms, years 1987-1997. OLS denotes Ordinary Least Squares and FE firm fixed effects specifications. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively. **Panel A.** An observation is a worker-year in [1] and a firm-year in [2] and [3]. The dependent variable is the log of individual weekly earnings in [1] and the average of log weekly earnings in the firm-year in [2] and [3]. All regressions include controls for worker gender, age, tenure, white collar, manager, employment categories (<100, 100-300, 300-500, 500+ employees), log of domestic sales, industry dummies (14), geographic area dummies (4) and year dummies (10). **Panel B.** $SC^F$ are firm-year averages of the time-invariant worker effects (AKM regression of Table 3, column [1]), and $SC^V$ are firm-year averages of the worker effects that were allowed to vary before and after the devaluation (Table 3, column [2]). See section 3.2 and Table 3 for details. **Panel C.** $RS^F$ are firm-year effects obtained from AKM regressions where the worker effects were time-invariant (Table 3, column [1]), and $RS^V$ are firm-year effects obtained from AKM regressions where the worker effects were allowed to vary before and after the devaluation (Table 3, column [2]). See section 3.2 and Table 3 for details.

Table 6: Changes in export and initial conditions

|  | [1] | [2] | [3] |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Dependent variable: Δ EXSH |  |  |
| | **Periods** | | |
| | 91-87 | 95-91 | 99-95 |
| Dom. sales | 0.011** | 0.016*** | 0.011* |
| | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.006) |
| | [ 0.45] | | [0.46] |
| Employment | -0.004 | 0.005 | 0.002 |
| | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| | [0.16] | | [0.71] |
| Inv./workers | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.003 |
| | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| | [0.95] | | [0.67] |

*Notes* : Each coefficient comes from a separate regression. The dependent variable is the change in the share of export over total sales over the relevant interval. Dom. sales is the log of real domestic sales, employment the log of the number of employees, and Inv/workers the log of real investment over the number of employees. The regressors are measured at the initial year of the relevant interval (i.e., Dom. Sales in column [1] is the log of real domestic sales in 1987, in columns [2] in 1991 and so on). Standard errors in round brackets. In square brackets, we report the $p$-value of a test of equality of the coefficient with the corresponding coefficient for the 95-91 regression. All regressions include 17 sector and 4 area dummies. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively.

Table 7: Devaluation Regressions

| Dependent variable: | [1]<br>Log W | [2]<br>$SC^F$ | [3]<br>$RS^F$ | [4]<br>$SC^V$ | [5]<br>$RS^V$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: OLS** | | | | | |
| $\delta : EXSH * DV$ | 0.085*** | 0.005 | 0.080*** | 0.032*** | 0.054*** |
| | (0.015) | (0.008) | (0.014) | (0.012) | (0.015) |
| $\gamma : EXSH_{PRE} * DV$ | 0.037** | 0.026*** | 0.007 | 0.028** | 0.006 |
| | (0.015) | (0.008) | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.016) |
| $\beta : EXSH * (1 - DV)$ | 0.100*** | 0.041*** | 0.047*** | 0.033*** | 0.057*** |
| | (0.008) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.005) | (0.007) |
| Observations | 6,328 | 6,328 | 6,328 | 6,328 | 6,328 |
| R-squared | 0.77 | 0.68 | 0.55 | 0.66 | 0.48 |
| **Panel B: Firm F.E.** | | | | | |
| $\delta : EXSH * DV$ | 0.070*** | -0.014** | 0.083*** | 0.031*** | 0.041*** |
| | (0.011) | (0.006) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.014) |
| $\gamma : EXSH_{PRE} * DV$ | 0.034** | 0.008 | 0.025 | 0.005 | 0.025 |
| | (0.017) | (0.007) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.019) |
| $\beta : EXSH * (1 - DV)$ | 0.082*** | 0.007 | 0.071*** | 0.013 | 0.066*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.006) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.018) |
| Observations | 6,328 | 6,328 | 6,328 | 6,328 | 6,328 |
| R-squared | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.87 | 0.88 | 0.82 |

*Notes* : The sample includes INVIND firms, years 1987-1997. One observation is a firm-year. $EXSH$ is the share of sales that is exported. $EXSH_{PRE}$ is the average export share in the pre-devaluation period. $DV$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 after 1992 (devaluation period). Controls include firm-year-level workforce characteristics (average age, percentage of females in the workforce, percentage of white collar employees), time-varying firm characteristics (employment categories, log of domestic sales) as well as year, industry, and region dummies. $SK^F$ and $RS^F$ are firm-year level worker effects and firm effects obtained from the AKM regressions described in Table 3, Column [1] where the worker effect is time-invariant, and $SK^V$ and $RS^V$ were obtained from the AKM regressions described in Table 3, Column [2] where the worker effects were allowed to take different values in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. See Section 3.2 and Table 3 for more details. OLS results are reported in Panel A and firm fixed effects results in Panel B. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively.

Table 8: Robustness tests

| Dependent variable: | [1]<br>Log W | [2]<br>$SC^F$ | [3]<br>$RS^F$ | [4]<br>$SC^V$ | [5]<br>$RS^V$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Controlling for hours worked** | | | | | |
| $\delta : EXSH * DV$ | 0.058*** | -0.015*** | 0.071*** | 0.029** | 0.029** |
| | (0.011) | (0.006) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.014) |
| Hours worked | 0.062*** | 0.002 | 0.065*** | 0.005 | 0.061*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.003) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.011) |
| Observations | 6,219 | 6,219 | 6,219 | 6,219 | 6,219 |
| R-squared | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.82 |
| | | | | | |
| **Panel B: Controlling for hours worked and TFP** | | | | | |
| $\delta : EXSH * DV$ | 0.058*** | -0.030*** | 0.089*** | 0.032** | 0.031* |
| | (0.014) | (0.006) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.017) |
| Hours worked | 0.069*** | 0.000 | 0.073*** | 0.002 | 0.071*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.003) | (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.010) |
| TFP | 0.032*** | 0.002 | 0.031*** | 0.003 | 0.029*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.002) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) |
| Observations | 3,858 | 3,858 | 3,858 | 3,858 | 3,858 |
| R-squared | 0.96 | 0.98 | 0.91 | 0.89 | 0.86 |

*Notes* : The sample includes INVIND firms, years 1987-1997. One observation is a firm-year. All results are from fixed effects regressions, where the fixed effect is defined at the level of the firm. See the Notes to Table 6 for the definitions of the dependent variables, the explanatory variables, and the list of control variables. **Panel A**: The controls include average hours worked (total house/employees) at the firm-year level. **Panel B**: The controls include average hours worked and TFP. See section 4.4.1 for details. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively.

Table 9: Export wage premium and workers' export experience

|  | [1] | [2] | [3] |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Dependent variable: Log W | | |
| | **Panel A: OLS** | | |
| $\delta_0 : EXSH * DV$ | 0.061** | 0.073*** | -0.052 |
| | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.036) |
| $\delta_1 : EXSH * DV * EXPER5Y$ | 0.034*** | 0.033*** | 0.052*** |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.010) |
| $EXPER5Y$ | -0.013** | -0.013** | -0.005 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| $EXPER5Y * DV$ | -0.015* | -0.020* | -0.018* |
| | (0.009) | (0.011) | (0.009) |
| Tenure Dummies & Interactions | No | Yes | Yes |
| | | | |
| Observations | 1,176,688 | 1,176,688 | 267,301 |
| R-squared | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.62 |
| | **Panel B: Firm F.E.** | | |
| $\delta_0 : EXSH * DV$ | 0.152*** | 0.154*** | 0.063*** |
| | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.021) |
| $\delta_1 : EXSH * DV * EXPER5Y$ | 0.013** | 0.013** | 0.022*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.007) |
| $EXPER5Y$ | -0.003 | -0.005 | -0.008*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| $EXPER5Y * DV$ | -0.001 | 0.000 | 0.007 |
| | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Tenure Dummies & Interactions | No | Yes | Yes |
| | | | |
| Observations | 1,176,688 | 1,176,688 | 267,301 |
| R-squared | 0.65 | 0.65 | 0.67 |

*Notes*: INVIND panel, years 1989-1997. One observation is a worker-year. $EXPER5Y_{it}$ measures five-year cumulated past export experience for worker $i$ in year $t$. See section 4.5 for details. Additional controls include age and age squared, gender, white collar indicator, manager indicator, log employment, log of domestic sales, and indicators for year, industry, and region. Standard errors, clustered by firm-year, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively.