

AGENTS OF CHANGE: INSTITUTIONALIZING PROGRESSIVE PLANNING IN
MEDELLIN

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AGENTS OF CHANGE: INSTITUTIONALIZING PROGRESSIVE PLANNING IN
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What motivates state, market, and civil society change agents to pursue the institutionalization of progressive planning practices, how do they do so, and why are they more or less effective in their pursuits? This dissertation, structured around three papers, uses interviews, focus groups, observation and documents to analyze how state and non-state actors in Medellin have sought to give progressive planning continuity. The first paper shows how the factors that account for institutionalization in weak institutional contexts must cover a range of eventualities, which I refer to as elements of institutionalization. Relations are needed to socialize a practice, create constituencies, mobilize interest, and provide enforcement. Practices reflect the public administration nature of state planning, thus highlighting the importance of reduced ambiguity, incentives to comply, resource allocation, and informational flows. Concepts help generate mental frameworks to cement the institution by providing justifications, substantiation, expectations, and influencing perception. Lastly, an acknowledgement of the importance of space is needed to target the appropriate scale, to ground concepts, to locate practices, and to situate relations. Identifying these elements provides a first contribution to the literature, and also evidences how fragile institutionalization efforts can be given the myriad of factors agents must attend to.

The second paper shows that both state and non-state agents are aware of such fragility and thus attempt to create both formal and informal institutions. An analysis of the rationale for this pursuit and its mechanisms leads to the second contribution of this dissertation: the concept of institutional compounding. By impacting both formal and informal institutions, agents of change are better able to reduce the weaknesses associated with each; this however requires dynamically networking with individuals from at least one different societal category. As the elements and compounding contributions suggest, effectiveness in the pursuit of institutionalization is not easily assured. The third paper develops the argument that factors that enable experimentation or create critical junctures that allow new practices to emerge, such as decentralization, norm flexibility, and political initiative, can also represent impediments to institutionalization.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Andrea Restrepo-Mieth is a doctoral candidate in the Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell University. Her research combines insights from urban planning and political science to examine the emergence and stabilization of practices that improve the provision of local public goods and services in the global South. Parallel to this she also conducts research on how community-based organizations and civil society organizations get their voices, ideas and knowledge incorporated into planning processes and outcomes. She has consulted for the World Bank, worked as a researcher for the Center for Sustainable Asian Cities and held short-term positions at UN-Habitat and the Asian Development Bank. An economist and political scientist by training, Restrepo-Mieth started her career in the private sector as an analyst for Deutsche Bank. She has worked in the United States, Asia and Latin America. Restrepo-Mieth holds a Master in Public Policy from the Lee Kuan Yew School, National University of Singapore and a Bachelor in Economics and International Relations from the State University of New York at New Paltz.

For Mama, Roland and Nicolas – yesterday, today, and always

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CBO	Community Based Organization
CPMAM	<i>Consejería Presidencial para Medellín y su Área Metropolitana</i> (Presidential Council for Medellín and its Metropolitan Area)
DNP	<i>Departamento Nacional de Planeación</i> (National Planning Agency)
EDU	<i>Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano</i> (Urban Development Enterprise)
EPM	<i>Empresas Públicas de Medellín</i> (Public Enterprises of Medellín)
ISVIMED	<i>Instituto Social de Vivienda y Habitat de Medellín</i>
MCV	<i>Medellin Cómo Vamos</i> (Medellin how are we doing)
MIB	<i>Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios</i> (Integral neighborhood upgrading)
MIDM	<i>Mesa Interbarrial de Desconectados de Medellín</i> (Cross-neighborhood board for people with services turned off)
PD	<i>Plan de Desarrollo</i> (Development Plan)
POT	<i>Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial</i> (Land Use Plan)
PRIMED	<i>Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Subnormales en Medellín</i> (Integral Improvement Program for Subnormal Neighborhoods in Medellín)
PUI	<i>Proyecto Urbano Integral</i> (Integral Urban Project)
UVA	Unidad de Vida Articulada (Articulated Life Unit)

CHAPTER 1
PROGRESSIVE PLANNING, ACTORS, AND THE CHALLENGE OF
CONTINUITY

The twenty-first century is the urban century, particularly for those living in the global South. While Southern cities face challenges like violence, poverty, and natural disasters, the prospects of improving socio-economic conditions and easier access to critical services such as higher education and healthcare continue to attract people from rural areas into urban centers. Rural-urban migration, combined with natural growth rates, have led approximately 54 percent of the world population to be living in cities, a figure expected to increase to 66.4 percent by 2050 (United Nations, 2014). Most of the expected urban growth is to come from Africa and Asia. The rapid growth of cities in the global South stands to further compound existing social, economic, political, and environmental challenges unless interventions are carried out in a timely manner. If experience is anything to go by, a look at the rapid growth of Latin American cities in the 20th century reveals significant informality, poverty and inequality, and high levels of crime and violence, the consequence of which has been further socio-spatial inequality. While colonial legacies, economic structures, development trajectories, and institutional arrangements vary between and within the regions of the global South, the Latin American experience serves as a warning of the perils of untimely interventions to address emerging problems.

While the troubled experience of many cities in the global South is widely documented in the planning literature, there are also (albeit fewer) works that look at progressive outcomes at the local level. I define progressive planning as *a practice*

*within the confines of existing law and initiated by any societal group, characterized by citizen involvement and local government activism, that prioritizes the construction of urban amenities, the creation of social programs, and the implementation of socio-spatial interventions aimed at improving the material wellbeing of individuals in traditionally marginalized neighborhoods while advancing the exercise of active citizenship.*¹ Analyzing the experience of progressive Southern cities is important for several reasons:

1. Progressive cities and progressive planning practices are well documented in the global North (e.g. Clavel, 1989, 2010; Schrock, 2015); however, the theories developed based on such analyses make assumptions about the economy and socio-political factors that are not consistent with the experiences of cities in the global South. We therefore need theories that better reflect the later.
2. Research on progressive practices in the global South focuses on the role of enlightened political leadership (e.g. Berney, 2017; Gilbert, 2006) or the intersection of civil society and the state (e.g. Abers, 2000; Das, 2015), with fewer works incorporating private sector responses (e.g. Rubin & Bennett, 2014). While the role of individual societal segments is documented to be important, downplaying the efforts of the wider national and local state apparatuses, civil society and market actors in pursuing progressive planning

¹ Improvements in material wellbeing can be assessed using a city's Human Development Index (HDI). Active or substantive citizenship refers to the rights, duties, and resources that people actually exercise, not just those conferred by a formal status (Holston, 2008)

severely constricts our ability to form holistic understandings of these multi-agent, multi-level processes.

3. The strategies and actions taken in pursuit of change in the global South are well documented (e.g. Beard & Sarmiento, 2010; Tandler, 1997), however, less is known about how agents involved in the transformation of a city attempt to give their progressive practices continuity once such practices are underway so that they are not subject to stagnation or disappearance with changes in political cycles.

These three factors bring us to the problem motivating this research: *we have inadequate knowledge of how state, market, and civil society change agents pursuing progressive planning in cities of the global South attempt to formally or informally institutionalize their practices to give them continuity, their motivations, and the factors that make their pursuits more or less effective.*

Motivation for the research

In the 1990s and early 2000s some Latin American cities such as Porto Alegre and Bogota offered hope that new approaches to building and managing cities were possible. With good governance strategies ranging from participatory budgeting to innovations in public transportation and public space accessibility, these cities showed that political commitment and civic engagement could lead to social and physical transformations improving life for all, but particularly for those long marginalized from state-sponsored urban transformations. Analysis of these cities today shows a different reality: participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre has been significantly weakened (Melgar, 2014) and the good governance and mobility innovations of Bogota can hardly be lauded today (Gilbert, 2015). Another Latin American city to

experience vertiginous social and physical transformations starting in the early 2000s was Medellin. Should *we expect the city to be destined to a similar fate than Porto Alegre and Bogota? Why or why not? And perhaps most important, could anything be done to prevent Medellin from following the same trajectory of its Latin American peers, and if so, who needed to be involved?* These concerns provided the initial motivation for this research.

In 2016 Medellin was awarded the Lee Kuan Yew World City Prize by the Singaporean government, the latest in a long list of accolades celebrating the city's efforts to transform its built environment and the social dynamics within it. Many changes remain paramount in order to improve the human development indices of marginalized neighborhoods and secure safer conditions for the exercise of citizenship, however, many of the changes achieved in the last fifteen years merit recognition for the positive outcomes achieved and in most cases for the processes involved towards achieving them. Medellin has increasingly seen state agents, civil society and business elites engaging in collaboration, contestation, participation, and negotiation over the knowledge, values and interests that should shape the city. While the objectives pursued by some of these actors, such as more inclusive governance, reduced spatial fragmentation through networked public transportation and improved mobility, and greater access to public spaces have been researched (e.g. Franz, 2016; Sotomayor, 2015), the strategies pursued by change agents to make these practices durable remain unclear. The main purpose of this research is to identify and improve our understanding of how state and non-state change agents in Medellin have attempted to formally and informally institutionalize progressive planning practices in order to achieve their continuity. The emphasis on institutions and their emergence is

due to three factors: institutions are important for continuity, they are not guaranteed to emerge, and is unclear what are the factors that lead to their emergence.

Institutions are commonly defined as shared and enforceable practices with rule-like qualities that structure behaviors and future expectations (Hall, 2010; Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). The succinctness of this definition merits breaking it down to fully appreciate the importance of what it encompasses:

- Shared: there is a process through which institutions are socialized and come to be understood among various actors.
- Enforceable: there are mechanisms to sanction the exercise or implementation of the institution.
- Rule-like: there is a discernable pattern to what the institution entails (for example, how often the institution leads to action such as elections every x number of years).
- Structure behavior and expectations: actions or inertia are generated and anticipated given the existence of the institution.

Institutions are broadly categorized into formal and informal. Formal institutions are defined as those where rules and procedures are established, communicated and enforced through official channels, in contrast with informal institutions, which are “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, p. 5). A key distinction between formal and informal institutions is therefore whether or not enforcement is carried out through official channels.

A commonly cited definition of institutionalization is that it is “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (Huntington, 1968,

p.12). The process of consolidating and embedding formal or informal frameworks, rules, practices, cognitive patterns or norms in an effort to make them resilient to change is therefore what I refer to as institutionalization. Examples of this include the consolidation of progressive planning practices that survive changes to the political party in power and the creation and maintenance of regular channels of participation.

I define progressive planning institutions as formal policies and informal frameworks that generate consistent, rule-bound, and enforced practices and norms. These policies and frameworks guide state action on how to intervene or manage previously neglected city spaces in ways that improve their conditions through quality infrastructure and services. Progressive planning institutions are differentiated from other planning institutions in that they mobilize state and non-state stakeholders, incorporate the input of the citizens meant to be beneficiaries, and are executed in low income, marginalized areas. The importance of these institutions rests in that they represent a radically new approach to planning the city in which process and outcome are geared towards greater equity and inclusion of citizens and interest groups previously excluded from state-sponsored planning efforts.

The primary objective of this research is to identify and understand what change agents do to give continuity to progressive planning practices once these are initiated. To do so I focus on the deliberate and unintended actions, social processes, and strategies taken by these change agents. This presents an opportunity to contribute to the urban planning, urban politics, and public policy literatures by generating new empirical knowledge that can help refine and extend existing theories on institutional change and stability to better account for urban settings. This project also contributes to these fields by improving our understanding of the role of business elites as backers

of progressive planning practices. This conceptualization moves away from dominant assumptions of market players as actors looking to exploit the city (e.g. Brenner, Marcuse, & Mayer, 2012) by reframing businesses as actors cognizant of their symbiotic relation with the urban environment (e.g. Maclean, 2014; Moncada, 2013; Rubin & Bennet, 2014). Given urban planning's focus on transferring knowledge to action (Friedmann, 1987), this dissertation also seeks to make a contribution to practitioners by identifying concrete strategies and actions which could serve as guidance for state and non-state planning practitioners in similar settings. Lastly, this research contributes to the literature that analyzes the emergence and demise of progressive planning experiences in Latin American cities by extending it to reflect the strategic efforts of change agents to give continuity to their practices.

Research Questions

Large segments of the population in Medellin live in precarious, often peripheral areas that have historically been underserved by urban services and infrastructure. That change agents have been able to alter planning practices in a context framed by institutional weakness and corruption; high levels of poverty, violence, and crime; economic inequality; environmental degradation; and legacies of spatial fragmentation is in itself noteworthy; however, being able to give these practices continuity is paramount to achieving long-term urban transformations that address socio-spatial inequality. Given these structure-agent dynamics, I draw on planning and institutionalism theories to formulate a central research question: *What motivates state, market, and civil society change agents to pursue the institutionalization of progressive planning practices, how do they do so, and why are they more or less effective in their pursuits?*

To answer this question I analyzed the actions of state and non-state actors in five areas: general planning, housing, water and sanitation, mobility, and public space. Based on the literature identified in the following section and on my preliminary research, I formulated three research questions to aid in addressing the main research question:

1. What do change agents define as effective institutions for the continuation of progressive planning practices?
2. What factors account for the institutionalization of progressive urban planning practices and how do change agents generate or take advantage of them?
3. What are the main impediments to institutionalizing progressive planning practices and what causes or motivates them?

The rationale for pursuing this research is twofold: from a theoretical perspective, as the review of existing research below shows, there are competing explanations for how agents can give continuity to institutions. The literature is particularly thin when it comes to local-level planning institutions in the global South, presenting an opportunity to make a contribution by generating new empirical knowledge that can help extend existing theories to better account for urban settings. From a practitioner's perspective, the proposed research offers the possibility of identifying a set of strategies and actions that can serve as guidance for state and non-state planners in similar settings.

Theoretical framework

Defining progressive planning

The pursuit of the progressive city has been characterized by an emphasis on democratic processes and greater equity in outcomes. A focus on process or outcome

alone is not enough as a cornerstone of progressive practices is the confrontation of structures of inequality which depending on the context can take the form of economic, racial, or gender structures – to name a few. The urban planning profession and its related scholarly field have deep roots in utopian visions of the city and conceptualizations of desirable urban futures. These visions emphasize the importance of meeting socio-material needs such as mobility (e.g. Jiron, 2012; Levine, 2013), public space provision (e.g. Castro & Echeverri, 2011; Gehl & Gemzøe, 1996) and water and sanitation (e.g. Furlong, 2014; McDonald, 2014). Planning however also focuses on the normative factors that should guide both planning processes and outcomes. These normative considerations call for planners to recognize the diversity of needs found in the city and to identify the potential distributional consequences of their actions (Myers, 1997). Recognizing the potential for planning practices to perpetuate exclusion in accessing urban infrastructure, services, and amenities, planning underscores the importance of being guided by concerns of socio-spatial inequality and power imbalances (e.g. Beard & Sarmiento, 2014; Forester, 1989; Warner, 2008, 2010, 2017), leading planners in many places to redress the problems within existing urban forms by espousing progressive practices. In short, an analysis of the problem and normative considerations must be connected to pragmatic proposals that lead to actual action (Forester, 2014). My definition of progressive planning emphasizes improving the material well-being and substantive citizenship of low-income individuals. This can be thought of as a *spatially-conscious, city-grounded* pursuit of social democracy as conceptualized by Roberts (2008) who argues that the reduction of inequalities and expansion of social citizenship rights within the constraints of market economies and representative democracy is a Latin

American variant of European social democracy.

Progressive planning theorists have highlighted in different combinations the importance of equity, diversity, justice, environmental sustainability, conviviality, democracy, and participation as guiding normative principles. These principles in turn inform the pursuit of “the progressive city” (Clavel, 1986, 2010), “the just city” (Fainstein, 2010), and “the good city” (Friedmann, 2000). Despite the importance that the work by these authors has had in our understanding of progressive practices, their ability to help us better theorize and plan cities in the global South is less clear given the strong emphasis on global North contexts. Conceptualizations of the progressive city within the urban planning literature rest mostly on the analysis of urban centers in Europe and the U.S. starting in the late 19th century. Early conceptualizations sought to imbue urban policies with some of the utopian visions for better urban futures that have characterized the planning profession since its formative period. Influenced by the “city beautiful” movement in the United States and the “garden city” movement in Britain on the socio-spatial front, and progressivism on the politico-administrative front, progressive cities during this period were characterized by citizen initiatives, improvements in urban amenities, and attempts to change urban machine politics (Clavel, 2014). The concept became further refined and gained the characteristics currently associated with it starting in the 1960s; a period marked by significant social mobilization and increased contention in Europe, the U.S. and many parts of the global South.

Current conceptualizations of the progressive city are marked by greater awareness of planners’ obligation and ability to help disadvantaged communities (Clavel, 1986, 2010); the importance of advocacy and politicizing planning (Davidoff,

1965) and the promotion of equity planning by working within the system to serve the interests of the poor (Krumholz, 1994). More recent work on the endurance of progressive policies and practices has emphasized the importance of the presence of active non-governmental organizations and policy networks with access to resources and able to achieve public legitimation of progressive policy goals (Doussard, 2015; Doussard & Lesniewski, 2017; Schrock, 2015).

While highly valuable, the work carried out to conceptualize the progressive city based on global North analyses makes assumptions about the economy and socio-political reality that are not consistent with the experiences of cities in the global South (Shatkin, 2011; Watson, 2012; Yiftachel, 2006). Change agents working in the global South must contend with institutional weakness and corruption (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006; O'Donnell 1996); underdeveloped administrative capabilities and implementation capacities (Mason & Beard, 2008); deficits in political representation and representative institutions (Roberts, 2014, 2016); high levels of informality, poverty, violence, and crime (Doyle, 2018; Fernandez, 1996); economic inequality (Shatkin, 2007); environmental degradation (Carmin, Anguelovski & Roberts, 2012); colonial legacies of spatial and identity relations (Bollens, 2012; Yiftachel, 2006); and spatial fragmentation (Angotti, 2013; Caldeira, 2000; Letelier & Irazabal, 2017). This is not to say that these challenges are necessarily unique to the global South, rather, the degree to which they manifest or intensity with which they are currently experienced are. Cities in the global South – and by extension change agents looking to alter existing dynamics – face significant challenges that impact the pursuit of progressive practices.

Planning theorists interested in progressive cities often emphasize the role of

civil society, collective action and social movements. While the importance of regular citizen's role in the social construction of space as "citizen planners" is well documented (e.g. Beard, 2003, 2012; Mason & Beard, 2008), there is room to further our knowledge by better incorporating contributions of social movements research to planning (Beard & Basolo, 2009; Gualini, 2015). This can allow us to further our understanding of agency, particularly by the poor, and how this agency is inserted into institutions and discourses that frame urban systems (Pieterse, 2008). In addition to civil society, market actors also play an important role in urban contexts. For example, Clavel (2010) looks at the interaction of urban social movements and a 'social base'. Clavel's social base offers a welcome analysis of organizational setups such as community development corporations yet leaves room for further analysis of the positive role that business elites can play in progressive planning. Brenner and Wachsmuth (2012) lament that planning has been unable to redirect private investment to benefit cities given the existing emphasis on competitiveness (see also Harvey, 2006; Brenner, Marcuse & Mayer, 2012). This presents a limited view of businesses, ignoring the positive impact they can have on addressing social problems (Maclean, 2014; Moncada, 2013; Rubin & Bennett, 2014). Lastly, state actors also need to be considered in any conceptualization of progressive planning. Studies of progressive changes originating within the state usually focus on the role of elected leaders and the social dynamics that brought them to power (Castro & Echeverri, 2011; Gilbert, 2015), specific mechanisms such as participation (Abers, 2000) or organizational restructuring (Tendler, 1997). Despite the existence of these seminal works, as global South scholars Parnell and Robinson (2012) argue, "scholarly attention has focused too little on the state as a site for innovation and delivery of a progressive agenda in

the interests of the poor” (p.610), leading the authors to “insist on the importance of theorizing the agency of the local state as potentially developmental, even progressive” (p.594). Coalitions of the local state, citizen and market actors can be progressive, as shown in the work by Warner (2018) and Ospina Peralta and Hollerstein (2015) in Ecuador. Echoing Parnell and Robinson, Warner, and Ospina Peralta and Hollerstein, I argue that a better understanding of the agency of the local state must include greater attention to the emergence and stabilization of institutions.

Insights from new institutionalism: rational choice, sociological, and historical

The definition of what constitutes an institution varies greatly depending on the ontological approximation of each field. I work with Djelic and Quack’s (2003) definition of institutions as having “both a structural dimension, including formal and informal rules and systems and an ideational dimension, including normative and cognitive patterns” (as cited in Djelic, 2010, p.26). In general, institutions are said to be shared and enforceable practices with rule-like qualities that structure behaviors (Hall, 2010; Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). What distinguishes informal institutions from formal ones, according to Helmke and Levitsky (2006) is that they are usually unwritten as well as “created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels” (p. 5). Informal institutions are nonetheless “common knowledge in the relevant context” and prescribe not only action but also omission (O’Donnell, 2006, p.288). Informal institutions can exist to complement formal ones but also to subvert them. As Helmke and Levitsky (2006) appropriately observe, informal institutions are not to be confused (though commonly are) with cultural traditions, weak institutions (which are ineffective and circumvented), or informal behaviors (which are not rule-bound, do not carry shared expectations, and have no

threat of sanction). Furthermore, institutions should also be distinguished from organizations.

While a distinction must be made between informal and weak institutions, both merit particular attention when analyzing the global South. According to Levitsky and Murillo (2014) “institutions in the developing world vary widely, both in terms of their enforcement and in terms of their durability” (p.1). Awareness of the importance of both weak institutions and informal institutions in the global South means that greater attention must be given to change agents’ approximation and interpretation of these challenges if we are to better understand how they attempt to give continuity to progressive planning practices. A review of the main approaches to studying institutions – rational, sociological, and historical – allows us to understand better the origin of assumptions about institutional strength.

Rational choice institutionalism emphasizes formal structures of rules and incentives. Institutions in this perspective place limitations on the behavior of rational actors so that the outcomes of their actions help maintain institutions “in equilibrium” (Davis & Tronstine, 2012). This equilibrium is disrupted when existing arrangements no longer serve the interests or preferences of dominant actors or when changes in power occur, thus leading to institutional change (Levitsky & Murillo, 2014). However, rational choice proponents argue power and preferences are not the only source of equilibrium: arrangements may persist despite lack of fit because bounded rationality and transaction costs discourage seeking alternatives (Shepsle, 1989). This approximation has been well received by planners working with neo-institutional economics concepts such as cost minimization and transaction costs such as Alexander (1992, 2001), Lai (2005), and Moulaert (2005).

According to March and Olsen (1989) the rational choice approach sees behavior as guided by a “logic of consequentiality” where the focus is on rational design through the analysis of options and their likely outcomes; this stands in contrast to sociological institutionalism which sees institutions following a “logic of appropriateness” where the emphasis is on behavior that conforms to shared norms or values. Political institutions therefore shape individuals’ norms, interests, identities, and beliefs, yet do so not as dictates but as instruments that help actors negotiate complexity, thus allowing for ambiguities (Hall, 2010). Institutions are reproduced through socialization with their shared nature a source of stability; however, the norms and cognitive frames that underpin these regularized practices are subject to disaggregated interpretation and re-interpretation thus allowing for sudden or slow change in both overt and subtle ways (ibid). Given its focus on shared norms, interests and identities, it is not surprising that the sociological approach has been embraced by planning scholars, chief among them Gonzalez & Healey (2005), Gualini (2001) and Healey (2003; 2007).

A third perspective, historical institutionalism, views institutions as formal and informal “sets of regularized practices with rule-like quality” (Hall, 2010, p.204). Once established or imposed, these patterns of rules, purposes, and norms are expected to persist as positive feedback mechanisms provide increasing returns for acting in ways that are consistent with past behavior (Campbell, 2010; Pierson, 2000). This persistence generates path dependency, which constrains the range of options available for future changes (North, 1990; Pierson, 2000). Examples of mechanisms that lead to path dependence include fixed costs, procedural strategic obstacles that make changing the institution difficult, vested knowledge, coordination effects, adaptive

expectations, and institutional constituents (Campbell, 2010; North, 1990; Pierson, 2000), as well as infrastructural and physical structure constraints (Davis & Troustine, 2012, p.60). A subset of authors in this tradition pursues a constructivist emphasis focusing on path-shaping logics centered on the ideas and discourses that inform the design of institutions (Hay, 2006). Historical institutionalism, long neglected within planning, has increasingly gained traction in the planning literature as reflected in recent works by Morrison (2017) and Sorensen (2018).

A review of the three main approaches to analyzing institutions reveals that there are competing explanations on the emergence and stabilization of institutions. I combine new institutionalism literatures with insights from social movements on framing and networking² to develop a framework to assist in my analysis of the multiple theoretical approximations to conceptualizing the institutionalization of progressive planning practices in the global South.

Conceptual framework in light of literature review

Table 1 summarizes the competing elements found in current theories that may help us understand the origins of local-level institutionalization:

Key Mechanisms	Institutionalization indicators
Framing	Norms
Networking	Ideas and Symbols
Criticism, gossip, shunning	Decrees, laws, public policies
Constituency creation	Persistence through time
Public opinion, public pressure	

Table 1: Competing elements in the analysis of institutional change and stability

² In the past fifteen years scholars have become more open to combining new institutionalism and social movements theories (e.g. Davis et al, 2005). The multiplicity of competing explanations for institutionalization remains

The first column, *Key Mechanisms*, lists actions used by different agents to initiate institutional change and stabilization. I follow Tilly's (2001) definition of mechanisms as cognitive or relational events that change the relations among specified sets of elements in similar ways. Key mechanisms identified in the social movements literature include framing and networking. Framing refers to the "conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action" (Snow in McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, p.6). Framing is used to alter perceptions regarding norms, interests, and ideas. I use the term networking to refer to creating and maintaining communication channels with other actors, allowing change agents to build additional sources of support and commitment. Given that perception and interpretation can change through interactions, networks and access channels where agents can come in contact with other actors and policy players are highly important. Agents can employ networks to socialize new actors into certain norms, give exposure to ideas, and enter into dialogues to negotiate understandings and actions. Criticism, gossip, and shunning refer to social strategies through which ideas can be socialized or strengthened by appealing to individuals' or organizations' reputation, competence, or reliability. Constituency creation refers to beneficiaries and interested parties who will seek to reinforce a practice that is providing them with benefits (Campbell, 2010). Similar to criticism, gossip, and shunning, public opinion and public pressure allude to reputation, competence, or reliability, however, unlike the former which can be expected to take place among smaller, more intimate groups, public opinion and public pressure will make use of social media or traditional press to offer critiques and oversight.

The mechanisms can act as stand alones or reinforce one another. Returning to Tilly's definition, mechanisms target the relation among elements. I refer to the elements these mechanisms target as *Institutionalization Indicators* (Column 2). These indicators are altered in ways that seek to produce a before and after (e.g. before and after the recognition of socio-spatial inequality as a source of injustice; before and after the passing of the law). Four indicators are expected to have explanatory power:

1. Norms: according to Boin and Christensen (2008) these can be cognitive, regulative, or normative (reflecting ways of doing things, procedures, or appropriateness).
2. Ideas: actors can use ideas and discourse strategically to construct meaning and define pathways of change (Zald, 1996). For instance, changes in value premises, or incompatibility of institutional values with other values, can lead institutions to change (Offe, 1996). Cognitive constructs can also be a source of institutional transformation (North, 2005) as agents use ideas based on professional and technical knowledge to prescribe courses of action (Campbell, 2010). Similar to discourse, symbols can also be critical factors in reshaping urban institutions (Fuller, 2010; Pieterse, 2008).
3. Laws: these constitute state-mandated actions, procedures, rights, etc. Laws are formal institutions (officially sanctioned).
4. Time: the persistence through time of an institution generates continuity expectations making actors more likely to invest in the institution (Levitsky & Murillo, 2014; North, 1990; Pierson, 2000).

Summary

As the preceding discussion shows, existing socio-spatial inequalities in access to urban infrastructure, amenities, and services underscore the importance of engaging in progressive planning practices. Gaps in research suggest there is room for further work on how progressive planning comes to be carried out in the global South and on the role played by state, market, and civil society change agents without privileging one societal actor over the others. The challenges faced by change agents in the global South call for greater attention to the positive work they do and for understating the strategies they employ to make their progressive planning practices resilient to changes in the political environment. While the new institutionalism literature in combination with insights from social movements theories give us solid ground to begin to craft an understanding, the multiplicity of competing explanations of how agents institutionalize practices implies that more empirical research is needed to better understand the importance of framing, networks, power and other mechanisms for different agents shaping the built environment; to link these to different target elements available to change agents; and to identify in what instances and why do actors privilege one institutionalization strategy over others

Research design

This research was designed as a comparative case study with four embedded cases. Medellin was purposively selected as an exemplary case given the presence of active state and non-state planners and the exemplary progressive planning outcomes seen over the past twenty years in general planning, access to water and sanitation, housing, mobility, and the provision of public spaces. These four sectors were selected given their importance in producing or reducing marginalization and their

ability to compound disadvantages. Selection was purposeful rather than random or representative given the need for an information-rich site with the capacity to provide “the greatest possible amount of information on a given problem or phenomenon” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.229).

The decision to pursue four embedded cases (five in total counting general planning) follows Yin’s (2014) observation that multiple cases allow for more robust studies when the case selection follows a theoretical replication logic, thus allowing to uncover important similarities and differences. An embedded design allows for the analysis of subunits within the cases that might present variation in the intensity of the phenomenon under study (Birch, 2012; Yin, 2014). Multiple societal actors were chosen for analysis in an effort to better understand sources of power, of contention, and of stabilization, as well as to move away from existing narratives that focus solely on enlightened leadership, civil society power, or private sector strength. This comparative approach allowed for a more nuanced examination of the links between actors, interests, and narratives on one end, and institutional outcomes on the other. Thus the selection of Medellin, the embedded cases, and multiple actors allowed me identify the causal chain through which institutions emerge and to infer different sources and mechanisms of institutionalization.

Medellin continues to implement increasingly varied progressive approaches to planning the city. A four case comparative research design, analyzing different planning domains, allowed me to uncover the extent to which motivations, actions, and favorable or unfavorable external conditions help explain variation in institutionalization. This variation is represented by deeper institutionalization in water

and sanitation (chapter three), public space (chapter four), and mobility³, and shallower institutionalization in housing (chapter five) and integral planning. These domains provide a good illustration of contestation and collaboration between different state and non-state agents and at different state levels (local and national); the focus nevertheless remains on city-level institutionalization.

Problematizing and hypothesizing institutionalization

The variation in degrees of institutionalization identified in different planning domains in Medellin means there is a need to problematize it in order to explain not only how actors pursue institutionalization, but also why variation emerges in the first place. Based on insights from institutional theories and my preliminary research, I hypothesized the following factors as having greater explanatory power in determining different degrees of institutionalization:

Hypothesis 1: Institutionalization requires the sustained involvement of a diverse set of actors who can give a practice time to stabilize as parties in power change. Economic elites in particular are key veto actors in the pursuit of institutionalization. The more diverse and the larger the number of actors involved, the higher the degree of institutionalization.

Hypothesis 2: Institutionalization requires the development and socialization of a narrative that can be used to alter normative and cognitive patterns. The clearer and better socialized the narrative, the higher the degree of institutionalization.

³ The institutionalization of mobility practices is not thoroughly discussed in this dissertation. The rationale for this is that the dissertation is bound by the idea of institutionalizing progressive practices. Mobility in Medellin can best be described as a local developmental state: top-down and without much room for non-state input.

Hypothesis 3: Institutionalization requires an organizational home. The clearer the assignment, the higher the degree of institutionalization.

As chapters three through six show, the presence, absence, or combination of these factors indeed matter in determining variation in institutionalization.

Research strategy and scope

Case studies are widely employed as a research strategy to analyze urban behavior and physical planning given that they allow urban planning scholars to “provide evidence, depth, and detail about place” (Birch, 2012, p.273). Furthermore, case studies are an important research strategy for the analysis and theorizing of institutional change as cases give insights into power and interests (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) and are conducive to identifying the existence of informal institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Lowndes, 2014). According to Yin (2014) case studies are particularly useful when addressing how and why questions about contemporary events “over which a researcher has little or no control” (p.14), as is the case with this research. While the chosen strategy was best suited for the questions motivating this research, it presents an important limitation, namely, how generalizable can the findings be given that they are context related. I argue that some degree of generalizability is appropriate given the comparative element introduced which allows for what Yin (2014) refers to as “analytic generalization” and Guba and Lincoln (1989) call “transferability”.

Research methods and data collection

I chose to work with ethnographic methods as these can help clarify inductively “the micro-dynamics of institutional formation, maintenance, and change” (Davis & Trounstine, 2012, p.66). Qualitative methods were appropriate given my

interest in the process of institutionalizing a progressive practice as these methods allowed me to understand how change agents interpret the experiences, actions and situations they are involved in, and how this understanding influences their behavior. Furthermore, qualitative methods offer a “systematic, empirical strategy for answering questions about people in a particular social context” allowing the researcher to capture and attempt to understand “what people do or what they report as their experience” (Locke, Spirduso & Silverman, 2000, p.96). Data were collected during three separate visits to Medellin between February 2016 and July 2017. Four methods requiring extended on-site presence were employed: interviews, direct observation, focus groups and document analysis.

In-depth semi-structured interviews were the most important avenue to obtain data. A total of 82 individuals were interviewed, some multiple times, with interviews ranging between 45 and 150 minutes per session. Most interviews were face-to-face (79), with the remaining taking place over the phone (2) and over Skype (1). Interviewees were first presented with consent forms and a brief explanation of the objectives of the interview. I then asked them to confirm basic background information (name and career or activism trajectory). The interview was divided into two parts: the first focused on progressive planning and the second on institutions. I began by asking interviewees about their involvement in a practice (motivation, why they consider the sector or practice important, and how did he or she achieve results), and whether they had ever had concerns about the durability of what they were doing (when did those concerns emerge, why, and actions taken). With this in mind we transitioned to talk about institutions. I asked interviewees to expand on actions taken, why that and not another strategy (so for example, if they talked about formal

institutions, I would mention weakness and probe on why formal institutions were important), why they considered that strategy to lead to continuity, and if they thought they had been effective and why. A next set of questions focused on what interviewees considered where the most important factors to achieving continuity, and what they saw as impediments to the continuity of a progressive practice. The interview ended with two questions: what have you learned not to do and why⁴, and if you had to take an educated guess on what will be the city's approach to the sector under consideration in two years, what would you say (then five, then ten). I used the words continuity and durability since I very quickly learned that when I used the word "institution" actors defaulted to talking about state-sponsored practices (state agencies, legal frameworks), yet continuity and durability elicited a broader set of responses incorporating formal and informal institutions (see interview guide in Appendix 1).

All interviews were conducted in Spanish and recorded. Criteria for selection of suitable respondents was based on two main factors: (1) that the person be involved with one of the areas under study (general planning, housing, public space, mobility, and networked water provision), and (2) that their involvement with the issue span at least two full mayoral terms (in this case, eight years). This criteria was needed in order to ensure that respondents possessed detailed knowledge and were able to provide rich insights on the practices in the sector under analysis, the threats faced by actors attempting progressive practices in the sector, and the challenges of having a practice achieve continuity as a mayoral term expired and they city transitioned into a new administration. Recruitment of respondents was initially done through expert

⁴ I am grateful to John Forester to suggesting this question during an ad-hoc conversation

sampling and was followed by snowball sampling with respondents recruited via email, phone call, WhatsApp, and in person. These sampling strategies allowed me to achieve representativeness of both individuals and activities given the diversity of the change agents under consideration, and to gain an understanding of the reasons behind differences that emerged between individuals or sectors. Interviewees included:

1. Politicians: city councilors, current and former cabinet members including planning directors, and political advisors
2. Bureaucrats: high and mid-level bureaucrats in the following agencies: Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano -EDU (Urban Development Enterprise), Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion (City Planning), ISVIMED (Housing Institute), Metro (multi-modal state-owned public transportation) EPM (state-owned utilities), Fundacion EPM (Foundation setup by EPM), Secretaria de Infraestructura (Infrastructure Secretariat), Botanical Garden, Parque Explora, Teatro Pablo Tobon, Biblioteca España leadership
3. Business elites: Camara de Comercio de Medellin, Proantioquia, Medellin Como Vamos, Comfama, Fundacion Concreto, private consultants
4. Civic groups: La Ciudad Verde, Observatorio de Politicas Publicas, Observatorio de derechos humanos, community leaders (including current and former members of citizen elected local administration councils or Juntas de Accion Comunal)
5. Community-based organizations: Con-Vivamos, Nuestra Gente, Sumapaz, Picacho con Futuro
6. Social movements: movimiento de pobladores, mesa interbarrial de desconectados, Mesa de Vivienda Comuna 8

7. Academia: professors and researchers at EAFIT, Universidad de Antioquia, and the research centers URBAM and MASO.

In addition, over one hundred informal and unstructured interviews were conducted impromptu with residents, developers, planners, civil society leaders, social movement activists, non-government organization leaders, and similar actors when opportunity presented itself at government forums, community and civil society events, social movement meetings, site visits, and similar scenarios.

A second mode of data collection was direct observation at public events and invitation-only forums organized by city hall, the city council, community based organizations, social movements, universities, and the private sector. These included attending three participatory meetings organized in 2016 by the incoming mayor to gather community input into the four year government plan being formulated (attending the sustainable mobility track and urban renewal track); attending city-council open sessions discussing topics relevant to this research; attending meetings, workshops, public and private events organized by community-based organizations, citizen collectives, and social movements; and attending forums organized by the private sector to discuss the state of the city. These spaces provided opportunities to see how different actors framed and communicated information as well as how they advocated for certain practices. Civil society events by invitation only allowed me to gain a better understanding of how actors assessed and negotiated strategic actions to be carried out. In addition, site visits were conducted to observe different projects and neighborhoods where many of the interventions analyzed have taken place.

A third source of data was five focus groups conducted between May and July 2017 with bureaucrats, current and former members of community-based

organizations, a housing social movement, and community leaders. The objective was to hold group discussions on the emergence of progressive practices, the actions taken to give them continuity, and the challenges faced. Bringing together individuals from different groups allowed me to see how each conceptualized practices, how they remembered interacting and addressing challenges at different stages, and allowed the clarification of contradictions in sectorial or societal group accounts that had emerged from individual interviews. The focus groups were organized in collaboration with CBO Con-Vivamos to understand (1) actions taken to transform territories, (2) how different actors attempt to impact public policy and (3) how they pursue continuity of their achievements. The groups had the following themes:

- Group 1: community leadership in Communes 1 and 2 (attended by community leaders, some of who are now bureaucrats)

- Group 2: from Parque Biblioteca España to Parque al Barrio (with the leadership of the library, librarians, members of Con-Vivamos, and members of NGO Raton de biblioteca to talk about how they established partnerships and have continued the library's programs after the building was closed)

- Group 3: CBOs (with CBOs leaders from all over the city, some individuals are now academics or bureaucrats, others continue to be fully engaged in the organizations)

- Group 4: housing and movimiento de pobladores (with individuals advocating for housing equity and members of the social movement, attended also by a few activist academics and activist bureaucrats)

- Group 5: PUI nororiental (with key community leaders and bureaucrats active in the first integral urban project carried out in Medellin).



Image 1: Flyer convening invitees for focus group three on CBOs

A fourth and final source of data were documents and archives. Documents consulted include government, associations, organizations, and press reports; minutes of public hearings and events; project documentation produced by different tiers of government, academics, and international organizations; city plans and project documents obtained from state agencies; press reports by community, local, national, and foreign presses; public perception surveys; pamphlets; and social media communication on Twitter and Facebook by individuals, organizations, and agencies relevant to this study. Documents were sourced online, from public libraries, from the public documentation centers attached to planning agencies, from state agencies and local government secretariats, and from organizations' archives.

Data management, strategy of analysis, and validity of findings

All formal interviews, public forums, and focus groups, as well as some social movement meetings were recorded. Recordings and notes from interviews, observations, focus groups and documents were transcribed and coded for descriptive

and inferential information using ATLAS.ti. Primary codes were developed based on theoretical findings from the literature. Content analysis was carried out to identify patterns such as motivations, actions in pursuit of institutionalization by different actors, perspectives on what was considered a strong institution, and lessons learned. Emerging themes were grouped in order to assess the occurrence of actions in pursuit of institutionalization and to uncover the most common themes expressed by interviewees and focus group attendees, observed at public and private forums, and identified in documents. While coding facilitates comparison in can lead to neglecting contextual relations (Maxwell, 2008), thus I also analyzed my data using narrative analysis as a connecting strategy.

Four strategies were employed to ensure the integrity and credibility of the research results. First, I engaged in research for a long period and repeatedly interacted with many of the agents of change under analysis. Repeated interaction and long-term involvement allow for the collection of detailed and varied data which in turn “can help rule out spurious association and premature theories” (Maxwell, 2008, p.244). Second, I asked interviewees and agents of change under study to provide feedback on my analysis and conclusions of the data they provided. This strategy of “respondent validation” helps reduce the possibility of misinterpreting “what participants say and do and the perspective they have on what is going on” (ibid). Third, I sought to reduce confirmation bias by seeking interviewees, documents, and settings that could provide counterexamples. My strategy for reducing confirmation bias started by looking at extreme cases in (1) the embedded cases selected to illustrate city-level dynamics (with housing added to the research at a later stage in order to analyze a sector that has significantly stagnated from a progressive planning perspective while the others

survive or thrive) and (2) the variety of change agents, documents, and settings analyzed (helping account for strong biases). Fourth and last, triangulation through four methods of data collection helped me reduce systematic bias and limitations due to a unique data source. For example, the information obtained in an interview was often compared with what that individual said and did in a meeting or what documents reflected. Triangulation also took place by seeking multiple individuals working in different planning domains and by conducting research in different sectors. This allowed me to crosscheck emerging explanations and reduced the risk of making fortuitous associations.

Ethical considerations

This research presented no more than minimal risk to human subjects. The Office of Research Integrity and Assurance at Cornell reviewed my research protocol and exempted it from IRB (Committee) review. Research material was sourced from individually identifiable adults through the information and experiences they shared during interviews and focus groups conducted in Spanish. I obtained written consent for all interviews, clearly stated the risks to each participant and informed them of their right to revoke consent, to not have the interview recorded (digital audio), to suspend or end the interview, and to go off record. Group settings being observed produced both identifiable and non-identifiable material, also in Spanish. In addition to material obtained specifically for this research, secondary sources were also consulted, including government, association, organization, and press reports; associations and organizations websites; minutes of public hearings and events; legislation; etc. This material is publicly available through web searches or local archives.

Contribution to the literature and argument developed

This dissertation set out to identify the motivations, actions, and impediments behind institutionalization efforts. I argue that to some extent rational choice, sociological, and historical institutionalism all have a contribution to make toward our understanding of city-level institutionalization, and none alone have the capacity to explain the phenomenon. State and non-state agents are motivated to pursue institutionalization by self-interest (defined as personal or community gain, or perceived notions of correct norms, values, and knowledge that should guide planning). This however tells us little of how institutionalization is achieved, an area where sociological and historical institutionalisms make more robust contributions. The factors that account for institutionalization in weak institutional contexts must cover a range of eventualities, which I refer to as elements of institutionalization. Relations are needed to socialize a practice, create constituencies, mobilize interest, and provide enforcement. Practices reflect the public administration nature of state planning, thus highlighting the importance of reduced ambiguity, incentives to comply, resource allocation, and informational flows. Concepts help generate mental frameworks to cement the institution by providing justifications, substantiation, expectations, and influencing perception. Lastly, an acknowledgement of the importance of space is needed to target the appropriate scale, to ground concepts, to locate practices, and to situate relations. Identifying these elements provides a first contribution to the literature, and also evidences how fragile institutionalization efforts can be given the myriad of factors agents must attend to. Both state and non-state agents are aware of such fragility and thus attempt to create both formal and informal institutions. An analysis of the rationale for this pursuit and its mechanisms leads to

the second contribution of this dissertation: the concept of institutional compounding. By impacting both formal and informal institutions, agents of change are better able to reduce the weaknesses associated with each; this however requires networking with individuals from at least one different societal category. As the elements and compounding contributions suggest, effectiveness in the pursuit of institutionalization is not easily assured. The third argument developed in this dissertation is that factors that enable experimentation or create critical junctures that allow new practices to emerge, such as decentralization, norm flexibility, and political initiative, can also represent impediments to institutionalization.

Dissertation structure

This dissertation is divided into six chapters and follows a three-paper format. Chapter two provides greater background into the case study. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters examine through three different papers the outcome of interest in this dissertation, namely, the actions and strategies taken by state and non-state actors in pursuit of progressive planning institutionalization and its impediments. The first paper identifies the factors that must be targeted by agents attempting to give continuity to inchoate practices. I refer to these four factors – relations, practices, concepts, and space – as elements of institutionalization and highlight the components within each and their importance. The second paper posits the idea of institutional compounding, a strategy that minimizes the shortcomings of formal and informal institutions alone by actively networking with different societal actors in pursuit of both institutional forms. The third paper shows that factors that can enable experimentation with progressive practices, namely decentralization, norm flexibility, and political initiative, also carry within them challenges that can undermine

institutionalization. Chapter six reviews the theoretical and practical implications of the dissertation and describes future avenues for research.

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CHAPTER 2

MEDELLIN: AGENTS OF CHANGE AND NARRATIVES OF MIRACLES

Medellin and the Colombian urban context: 1940s-1980s

Colombia, like many Latin American countries, experienced rapid and unplanned urbanization in the second half of the twentieth century. Many of the problems that Colombian cities experience today, including the inability of residents to secure basic goods and services such as shelter, water and sanitation, to accessing less pressing yet nonetheless important services such as transportation and education, have roots in the mid 1940s. A combination of industrialization policies, rural violence, and demographic growth led to many urban problems that persist to date. Table 2 shows how Medellin, as one of the most important cities in Colombia, was not exempt from rapid urban growth. Today the city is Colombia's second largest and home to 2,376,337 people.

Year	Population
1905	60,000
1951	360,000
1964	791,589
1973	1,163,868
1985	1,480,382
1993	1,834,881
2005	2,216,830
2018	2,376,337

Table 2: Medellin's population over the last century

Data: 1905-1951: Fabregas & Marbella, 2009; 1964-2005: Gobernacion de Antioquia, 2017; 2018: DANE, 2019

The adoption of import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategies and the period of national internal conflict known as *La Violencia* became important structural conditions motivating urbanization between the 1940s and 1950s. ISI prioritized urban centers and industry over rural areas and agricultural production. This in turn meant a growing demand for industry workers in cities, yet little attention was paid to their living conditions. The housing needs of new city workers and those internally displaced due to violence were met through illegal occupations of public and private lands and the burgeoning of new neighborhoods known as *barrios populares* (popular neighborhoods). Isolation from formal channels to address growing needs and the threat of eviction led new urban residents to form cooperation networks among themselves.

The challenges of unplanned urbanization motivated the emergence in the 1950s of a communal movement with a threefold aim: first, to bring grievances from unmet urban socio-spatial needs to the attention of local governments, second and simultaneous to the first objective was the organization of communities to pursue local physical improvements autonomously through collective self-help initiatives, and third, forming leaders at the grassroots level. Groups collectively constructed their own territorial identities around the neighborhood they inhabited giving the movement an aspect of heterogeneity based on identities that highlighted “the self-construction of urban space, exclusion, spatial segregation, political repression, and violent” experiences (Roldan et al, 2004, p. 87). According to McAdam et al (1996, p.4) social movements become a force for social change through the organizations they spawn and this was the case with the communal movement in Medellin where the improvements to the *barrios populares* that emerged in the city between the 1950s and

1960s were mostly carried out through *mingas* (communal work) coordinated by small communal movement organizations. *Mingas* were used for the construction and connection to basic services like water and electricity as well as for building community amenities such as health centers and schools.

As collective action attempts were taking place at the local level, on the national front a bipartisan coalition to alternate government between the Conservative and Liberal parties known as The National Front (1958-1974) was formed to address *La Violencia*. The National Front period and its immediate aftermath saw an explosion in the growth of *barrios populares* (Archila, 2001 p.311). Community leaders would often promise loyalty to more than one politician, taking advantage of clientelistic networks and using them to mobilize resources for both self-gain and to achieve community benefits including the legalization of barrios, extension of public services such as water, sewerage, and electricity, and the construction of roads.

The 1970s and 1980s continued to be marked by high levels of clientelism as well as the decline in the industrial and coffee sectors, two important motors of the local economy. Increasing levels of urban violence in the 1970s and 1980s were fueled by armed conflicts to control financial gains from drug trafficking. Violence in Medellin was perpetrated not only by the state but also by regular citizens who saw in it a tool to achieve economic ends, to circumvent a corrupt and ineffective government, and to solve disputes (Rosenberg, 1991). Violence was also a means to claim the voice and the spaces that political disenfranchisement denied citizens. The city had at this time the unfortunate distinction of being “the most violent city in the world not involved in an international war” (Rosenberg 1991, 9). Continued rural-urban migration in response to rural violence compounded the urban experience of

poverty and exclusion. The thriving drug-related business world was a stark contrast to the economic difficulties faced by the country. Colombia, similar to other countries in the region, experienced high levels of foreign debt in the 1980s, leading to what would later be termed Latin America's lost decade. The national and local governments became increasingly unable to improve economic conditions or exercise power and control over territories, leading to the emergence of new citizen movements pushing for institutional changes that would eventually lead to decentralization.

Decentralization reforms in Colombia

Colombia began experimenting with decentralization in the early 1980s with the passing of fiscal measures that strengthened municipal finances, including giving municipalities increased tax collection powers (Ceballos & Hoyos, 2004 in Faguet, 2008). Another important change came in the mid-1980s as Colombia began to decentralize politically, then fiscally, then administratively, in a way that greatly empowered municipalities (Falleti, 2010). An important mandate during this period was Law 11 of 1986 establishing mayoral elections, with the first election held in 1988. The move from appointing to electing mayors was seen as a solution to addressing localized needs in more efficient ways. Another key legislation came in 1989 with the passing of the Urban Reform Law (Ley 9 de 1989), which included guidance on low-income housing (also known in Colombia as social interest housing) and on avenues for improving living conditions in cities.

In 1991 a Constitutional Assembly was called to draft a new *magna carta* for Colombia. The Constitution was integral to decentralizing power and administrative functions, giving greater autonomy to municipalities. The new constitution "offered the hope that for the first time, government would be open to all Colombians instead

of just the powerful oligarchical ‘barons’” (Rosenberg 1991, 15). Important changes from the 1991 Constitution include promulgating the right to dignified housing, the decentralization of political power (to additional areas such as the election of province governors by popular vote), the devolution of administrative responsibilities and fiscal autonomy to territorial entities, and granting greater importance to citizen participation. The constitution also mandated that city governments come up with a Development Plan (*Plan de Desarrollo*) to ensure the efficient use of resources and the fulfillment of responsibilities assigned by the constitution and national law. This mandate was further clarified in Law 152 from 1994. A crucial piece of legislation came with the espousal in 1997 of Law 388 on Territorial Development, which built on the Urban Reform Law, mandating municipalities create *Planes de Ordenamiento Territorial* (POTs – Land Use Plans) describing a city’s 12 year territorial development goals. POTs regulate the use, occupation, and transformation of a city’s physical space and include guidelines on housing, environmental protection, emergency preparedness, and financial sustainability of urban amenities. Table 3 summarizes these formal national instruments impacting urban planning and management:

Formal instrument	Year	Objective
Law 11	1986	Establishes election of mayors by popular vote
Law 9	1989	Urban reform law providing guidance on city improvements and low-income housing
Colombian Constitution	1991	- Decentralization and devolution to subnational units - Introduces mandates for citizen participation - Mandates creation of Development Plans by each mayor
Law 152	1994	Clarifies required content of mayoral Development Plans

Law 388 on Territorial Development	1997	- Modifies the Urban Reform Law - Mandates cities create POTs (territorial ordering plans)
Law 909	2004	Establishes merit based civil service

Table 3: National formal instruments impacting urban planning and management

Emerging from the lost decade, structural changes to the economy through the so-called *apertura económica* (economic opening) meant a greater commitment to free markets. Colombia took a mixed approach towards neoliberalism. On the one hand it instituted policies giving free markets a greater role in the economy, however, against neoliberal prescriptions, the country began wide-ranging social programs (though parting from a very low base), and rather than shrink the role of government it strengthened state institutions. This liberalization of the economy combined with the expansion of the public sector and a strong social investment policy gave Colombia a distinctive form of neoliberalism (Ocampo, 1999).

In short, the changes instituted in the 1980s and 1990s “assigned increasing responsibility to municipalities for the planning, financing and provision of public services and social investment, and provided additional resources for the same by increasing central government transfers to local governments [...] Automatic transfers to regional governments rose from about 20 per cent to over 40 per cent of total government spending, placing Colombia first in the region amongst unitary countries, and third overall after the two big federal countries, Brazil and Argentina” (Faguet, 2008, pp.10-11). In addition to increased transfers from the central government, municipalities were allowed to raise and spend taxes as well as to issue public debt.

The Presidential Council for Medellin and its Metropolitan Area

As Colombia was adopting and implementing decentralization reforms, Medellin was immersed in a deep crisis marked by the growing presence of drug-trafficking activities, high levels of violence, ongoing deficiencies in the built environment, inequality and unemployment. Medellin had become clearly divided into two cities: one formal, and the other informal, with the later plagued by “high levels of spatial, social, and economic inequality among its inhabitants” (DNP, 1991, p.3). President Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) created in 1990 the *Consejería Presidencial para Medellín y su Área Metropolitana* (CPMAM - Presidential Council for Medellin and its Metropolitan Area), a taskforce charged with bringing together the newly decentralized local state apparatus, the national government, the business sector, local communities, academia, and the media, to identify the roots of the city’s problems and arrive at potential avenues to resolve them.

In a city with historically high socio-spatial inequality where citizens, particularly poor communities, had been marginalized from formal planning processes and outcomes, the introduction of spaces for state and non-state actors to discuss the realities of the city produced highly detailed suggestions of actions to take to improve security, the built environment, and employment opportunities, among others. These suggestions, brought to light and debated over multiple gatherings termed Alternative Future Forums, would lead to the publication of a book that clearly encapsulated the origins and potential solutions to Medellin’s crisis as seen by its citizens: *Medellin Alternativas de Futuro* (1992). Community based actors in particular emerged as legitimate players in the city planning field, however, as documents suggest, it was the private sector that was called to link up to the actions suggested by plan (e.g. DNP,

1991, p.20). This is not to say that civil society and community-based organizations did not emerge fortified from this experience. For example, discussions on the urban design needs of different territories led to the creation of the Northern Atelier at Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, a think tank that would greatly influence the spatial interventions in the city's northern sectors from 2004 onwards. Another example is the emergence and strengthening of community based organizations such as Nuestra Gente, Con-Vivamos, and Picacho con Futuro – all of which survive to date and continue to influence the socio-spatial development of their territories. Nevertheless the private sector heeded the call – both by community groups as well as the government – to do more for the city's spatial and socio-economic development. This is evidenced by the strengthening of corporate social responsibility efforts, mainly through foundations, which provided financial support to community based organizations, helped finance housing for workers, and provided computers and sports equipment for new state built libraries and sports courts.

Medellin today

Medellin covers 380.2 square kilometers, of which 105 are urban land, 270 rural, and a mere 5.2 are peri-urban scheduled for urban expansion. The city's urban area is divided into six sectors: northeast, northwest, center-east, center-west, southeast, and southwest. Dividing the east from the west is the Medellin River, which crosses the city from south to north. The six sectors are further divided for administrative purposes into 16 *comunas* or districts (further divided into a total of 249 official neighborhoods), with the rural areas accounting for an additional five districts called *corregimientos*. Medellin is the seat of its provincial government – the Department of Antioquia – and hosts the headquarters of important state-owned utility

services company Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM) as well as private sector multinationals including Cementos Argos, Grupo Sura, and Grupo Nutresa.

Like other Colombian cities, Medellín classifies residential property according to a spatial socio-economic stratification system, a measure that helps identify the properties that can receive subsidized public utilities tariffs (strata one, two, and three), the properties that do not receive nor contribute to cross-subsidization (stratum four), and the ones that make a contribution (strata five and six). The bulk of Medellín's property is located in the lower strata, with 12% in one, 35% in two, and 30% in three; with the remaining property distributed 11% in stratum four, 8% in stratum five, and 4% in stratum six (MCV, 2016).

Medellín is the core of the ten-city Metropolitan Area of the Aburrá Valley and its 3,725,682 people (DANE, 2019). The metropolitan area authority was officially established in 1980 and tasked with coordinating service provision and planning efforts among the municipalities. Currently its main responsibilities include helping plan the territory under its jurisdiction, environmental oversight, authority over mass and metropolitan transportation, and the implementation of works concerning metropolitan interests (Area Metropolitana, 2017). Decision-making is carried out by the Metropolitan Board, headed by Medellín's mayor, and composed by the provincial governor, the mayors of the other nine municipalities, a councilor in representation of the Medellín Council, and one councilor in representation of the other nine cities (Area Metropolitana, 2017). The GINI coefficient for the metropolitan area in 2015 was 0.489, with 3.3% of its inhabitants living in extreme poverty and 14.3% in poverty (MCV, 2016).

The agents of change: state, civil society, and market actors

The fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization policies of the late 1980s and early 1990s opened new political opportunities for state, civil society, and market actors in Colombia (Falleti, 2010; Gilbert, 2006). As Medellin entered the new millennium there was a sense that the city was in a political and urban crisis. Structural factors shaping grievances included persistent poverty and unmet basic needs including housing and public space; corruption; the strengthening of neoliberal policies instituted in the 1990s which widened the gap between the wealthy and the poor, who found it difficult to integrate into the new economic model; and epidemic levels of violence stemming from conflict over territorial control and business activities by illegal groups known as *combos*, *bacrim*s (*bandas criminales*), and organized crime syndicates known as *oficinas*. This section provides an overview of the state and non-state societal actors that have been instrumental in advocating, piloting, and attempting to institutionalize progressive planning practices in Medellin. Table 4 summarizes the key actors consulted for this research.

State Actors	Civil Society	Business and civic elites
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mayor • Cabinet directors and subdirectors • City council • Technocrats • State-owned enterprises <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EPM (utilities) • EDU (urban development) • Decentralized ascribed agencies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISVIMED (housing) • Mixed state ownership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Metro (public transportation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community based organizations (CBOs) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Con-Vivamos • Nuestra Gente • Picacho con Futuro • Sumapaz • Social movement organizations (SMOs) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mesa interbarrial de desconectados (utilities) • Movimiento de pobladores (housing) • Civic leaders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chamber of commerce • Proantioquia • Medellin Como Vamos • Foundations • Corporations (CSR) • Private non-profit <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comfama • Citizen collectives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La ciudad verde

Table 4: Key state and non-state actors consulted for this research

State actors

The most important political actors in Medellin are the mayor and the 21member city council, all of which are elected by simple majority to serve four-year terms. Mayors cannot be re-elected for consecutive terms (but they can run for other political offices and again for mayor after at least one period away from office), while council members have no term limits. The first local mayoral elections, held in 1988, called for two-year terms, later modified to three year terms, with the period extended to four years from 2004 onwards (Registraduria, 2015). The city's first popular elected mayor, conservative Juan Gomez Martinez, rose to power in 1988 and until December 2003 the city executive was held by the Conservative and the Liberal parties. Similar to national politics, local politics today takes place within a highly fragmented multi-

party system and as such, mayors must work closely with city councilors in order to pass municipal policy and the yearly budget. Mayors are required to formulate and get approved by the city council a *Plan de Desarrollo* (development plan) stating the policies, programs, and projects the mayor intends to carry out during his or her term, and how these take into account the existing POT (land use plan).



Image 2: Public forums to gather citizen input towards the 2016-2019 PD
(February 2016)

The 1991 Constitution changed the political opportunity structure by opening the door for the formation of a multi-party system, thus ending the hegemony of the two traditional parties. In the early 2000s a group of citizens, NGOs, business sector actors, academics, and cultural networks came together to discuss a path to move the city forward and formed the civic movement *Compromiso Ciudadano* (Citizen's Commitment). *Compromiso Ciudadano* seized the opportunity to become a political alternative using its broad base and programmatic differences to gather support as it ran its first candidate for public office in the 2000 mayoral elections. The party's platform was simple: government should be more transparent and governance should

be shared. Underlying this was a commitment to strengthening the social contract between the state and its people, a contract that was almost non-existent given the loss of legitimacy of the state in the eyes of most citizens. The Liberal party candidate, Luis Perez Gutierrez, won the elections and ruled the executive between January 2001 and December 2003.

Compromiso Ciudadano continued holding meetings and developing ideas on new governance mechanisms as well as joining efforts with organizations committed to strengthening citizen's participation such as the *Red de Planeación Local* (Local Planning Network) and the *Red de Organizaciones Comunitarias* (Network of Community Organizations). It once again presented candidates for the mayor's office and City Council in 2003 with Sergio Fajardo (2004-2007) becoming the first mayor of Medellin to be elected outside of the traditional Liberal and Conservative party structure. Alonso Salazar (2008-2011) followed Fajardo's time in office and cemented an eight-year continuous period for *Compromiso Ciudadano*. While many of the ideas of what was needed to transform Medellin had emerged during the presidential taskforce period, it was the Fajardo and Salazar administrations that ushered in the move of ideas into the policy cycle, echoing the notion by Meyer and Tarrow that "movements can pursue system-challenging claims even *within* the institutions of the state," (1998, p. 24, emphasis in original). Power returned to the Liberal party with the election of Anibal Gaviria (2012-2015), and once again moved to a non-traditional party with the election of current mayor Federico Gutierrez (2016-2019) who ran a signatures-based party called *Creemos* (we believe).

Other important political actors in the city scene are the directors and sub-directors of the different secretariats, corporatized government agencies, and

administrative units dependent on city hall. These individuals serve at the pleasure of the mayor and often yield considerable power. The most important of these positions are the director of the planning department, the secretary of the treasury, and the secretary of government. In a city like Medellin, where several important state-owned agencies are corporatized, politics also plays a role in the appointment of individuals as directors or members of the board of directors of entities such as the local utilities company (Empresas Publicas de Medellin - EPM), the urban development agency (Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano - EDU), and the housing institute (Instituto Social de Vivienda y Habitat de Medellin – ISVIMED).

Lastly, it is important to note the role that bureaucrats play in Medellin’s urban development. The most recent attempt to establish a merit-based civil service in Colombia originated in 2004 with the passing of Law 909. While many individuals in local government have entered and remained in civil service based on their academic credentials and professional experience, others have secured their positions through political favors. Bureaucrats in Medellin are charged with helping formulate, implement, maintain, and evaluate de mayor’s Plan de Desarrollo as well as with putting into practice any legislation passed by the city council. Due to their permanence in city hall, these actors play an important role in giving continuity to practices from one mayoral period to the next.

The state actors interviewed for this research were all professionals with approximate ages ranging from mid twenties to seventies. Bureaucrats interviewed for this research belonged to all social classes, while all former cabinet members, except for one (born and raised in Commune 13), seemed to be from middle and upper classes. The stated motivations for becoming involved in progressive planning varied,

but common themes were the desire to change the lived experience of the city, the drive to implement professional knowledge (for example, of lessons learned from Bogota and Barcelona), and to do what was perceived to be right or fair. A former head of planning shared the following when asked what motivated him: “I came from having a private architecture practice, had my office for ten years [...] many of us had been thinking about the city [...] the 1999 (strategic) plan had some of those ideas, and we had the intention of participating and being active. We all knew Barcelona, Bogota, meaning, that there were things going on in other parts of the world that we had all explored, so I think that it is that coming together of people who had studied (how change was happening elsewhere), of questions we were asking ourselves, of seeing the need to generate significant actions given the disaster that the city has been since the 70s and 80s” (cabinet leader, interview by author, 2016).

Progressive planning for state actors is tied to policy, project, or program outcomes, though most actors also mentioned the importance of having a participatory or inclusive process as part of progressive planning. For some people this was a lesson learned and not necessarily something they set out to do as they began pursuing progressive practices. Institutionalization for state actors is conceived as formal institutions, particularly emphasizing the POT given the instrument’s 12-year duration. According to a career bureaucrat, “before POT the administrations were highly personalized, it was whatever the candidate wanted. The POT gives us concrete elements to attend to. So candidates in their proposals take some of those elements” (bureaucrat, interview by author, 2016). These actors however also emphasize networks and individuals as perpetuators of institutions. For example, a former cabinet member suggested the importance of “people within the administration”, and

when asked later on to expand on this shared that “often the incoming mayor and his cabinet do not know the programs and projects that have been developed in the past, and with them their value and impact, hence the importance of people within the administration. A career bureaucrat or technocrat has that knowledge and can impact action by defending them, by not allowing them to be thrown in a garbage can.” (cabinet member, interview by author, 2016 and follow-up interview, 2017). A bureaucrat in the planning department with several years of experience concurred: “In some way we take on and even sustain projects that are taking place. For example, I have participated the last eight years in the strategic housing plan, and put my soul, life and heart in that plan. You carry it through and know it inside-out, and use every opportunity to give it visibility, to make sure it doesn’t stay on the shelves, that it becomes an instrument that impacts the housing system” (bureaucrat, interview by author, 2016). Another way of achieving continuity is constituency creation and alliances. As a former high-level bureaucrat now working in the private sector shared, “alliances generate a greater conscience and that widens interest in projects [...] I think we should get all civil society actors involved more” (bureaucrat, interview by author, 2017).

Civil Society

Three sets of civil society actors merit special attention when considering Medellín’s transformation: community-based organizations (CBOs), social movements, and civic leaders. CBOs suffered greatly in the 1990s and early 2000s as the result of the violence. As a former head of the city’s planning department stated in an interview: “there were community based organizations that survived hell: *Picacho con Futuro*, *Nuestra Gente* [...] these were organizations that joined the Presidential

Council to think about the problems of the city in the early 90s, and together they all created encounters and published a text called *Medellin Alternatives for the Future*, all vital to the changes in the city” (cabinet member, interview by author, 2016). The Presidential Council opened the door for CBOs to gain greater visibility within the city and to access (to a small extent) state resources that were previously limited to the government, such as financial resources and technical expertise. CBOs during the 1990s were mostly limited to mobilizing resources within their communities; it was not until the adoption of participatory planning in the early 2000s that some access to state resources started. Ad hoc collaborations with foundations setup by important city business and international NGOs have also historically provided a source of funding. Today, resources are secured through donations from foundations, philanthropists, NGOs, or international development agencies, as well as through contracts with the local government for service provision and by mobilizing local community resources.

The increased sense of frustration at the weakness of the state served as a catalyst for the emergence and formalization of new organizations from the late 1980s onwards. As shared during a focus group discussion by a Commune 1 leader currently working as a technocrat, “in the 80s young people and organizations (meaning, nascent CBOs) did not believe in traditional politics. Some people created alliances with the liberal and conservative parties because they knew that it was the only way to bring development to the communities, to do urban planning in an area that was never planned [...] but in the 90s, with the new constitution, there is a movement, people start to believe that there are other ways to organize and ways of saying ‘lets create new relations’ [...] it is the beginning of organizations, of groups of organizations and

movements. What we see in the 90s is that we get closer to the state, and in the 2000s it becomes being inside the state, even here (in the communes) it became common to hear ‘without political power there is no development’” (community leader, focus group by author, 2017). An example of this is *Con-Vivamos* which works in Comune 1: it started in 1980s but was not formally constituted until 1990 and immediately joined the growing ranks of those calling for significant changes to take place. Similar to *Con-vivamos* are *Nuestra Gente* in Comune 2, which works on spatial issues using culture and the arts as a lens; *Sumapaz* in Comune 3, which uses a human rights focus in its work on local development (and is the de-facto host of the housing movement *Movimiento de Pobladores*); and *Picacho con Futuro* in Comune 6, which focuses on communication strategies. Image 3 shows the location of these CBO as well as other key civil society groups consulted in the course of this research.




Image 3: Location of key civil society organizations

Map: Alcaldia de Medellín, n.d.

While the training grounds for the members of these organizations have changed over the years, an important starting point came at the hands of priests espousing liberation theology. According to a former cabinet member of two mayoral administrations, "you have to acknowledge the priests that were working with liberation theology which were the first to bring movies to the informal settlements, and the first to do literary events, and the ones that brought books that were prohibited and would lend them to kids in the youth group of their parish. In other words, those priests revolutionized the *barrios*" (cabinet member, interview by author, 2016). As a founding member of a CBO concurred: "we got to know Latin America's reality

through literature [...] we are children of the 60s and 70s, we were activists (in the 80s and 90s) but we did not talk about human rights, or planning, or development. We talked about the need to respect peoples life conditions, to have drinking water, sanitation, a roof over their heads, that was our claim [...] we lived the Sandinista movement very close, even closer than the Cuban Revolution, it was a revolutionary-Christian movement, and all those things get mixed and re-affirm our convictions, our claims” (community leader, interview by author, 2017). Today most CBO members learn political awareness through youth groups in their neighborhoods and increasingly hone their organizational skills through post-secondary education (vocational training centers and college). Most of CBO leaders I met were in their 20s and 30s, and all CBOs had a clear pipeline of leadership formation among their own youth groups. The organizations also had members in their 40s and above, though these were usually just one or two people. An interesting cleavage was tied to age: older members were more likely to advocate protest and contentious tactics to demand solutions for their grievances. While younger leaders also advocated for these tactics, they seemed to have a wider repertoire to exercise claims. For example, two leaders, one from Sumapaz and one from Nuestra Gente, were both pursuing master degrees at EAFIT, a private university closely associated with the city’s elites. They both saw their daily interactions with people at the university as an opportunity to raise awareness of community views of how to carry out development in the *barrios*. A leader at another CBO shared a similar feeling: “a significant alliance has taken place with Urbam (an EAFIT center), which has been interesting [...] we know there are interests on each side, those interests are complementary and the rules of engagement

are clear. That allows us to have them as one of our key allies to discuss the city's development model" (community leader, interview by author, 2016).

Key objectives of CBOs with a territorial focus have been to improve the built environment, to grow and nurture socio-political awareness, and to better the cultural, economic and security conditions of their neighborhoods. Progressive planning for them is closely tied to both process and outcome, with a good deal of emphasis being placed on the ability to shape the interventions that take place in the territory. Networking has been done among CBOs in the city, for instance, with the creation of now defunct ROC or *Red de Organizaciones Comunitarias* (Network of Community Organizations) which brought together 14 CBOs from all over the city. In addition ROC maintained relations with organizations in other cities in the country. This allowed CBOs to share experiences and knowledge. The demise of ROC led to the creation of smaller networks and alliances, among them the *alianza por la zona nor-oriental* (alliance for the north-east zone), which currently hosts four organizations (Con-Vivamos, Nuestra Gente, Sumapaz, and Ciudad Comuna).

Another important strategy employed by CBOs has been framing: organizations bring together actors to discuss what norms and interests should shape their neighborhoods, to build together a shared vision of what the built environment should look like and work to its realization within existing financial and technical capacities. Framing has also been employed to put together a cogent discourse and to organize the community to bring its grievances and proposed solutions to the government. Today, many CBOs count among their staff professionals who grew up in the community and have gone on to get higher education degrees in

communication, political science, arts, social work, and accounting – and put them to the service of their communities.

CBOs place a strong emphasis on formal institutions when it comes to institutionalization. As a CBO leader explained, “there are instances and actors where you cannot proceed with something informal, it has to be with something legitimated and that is why it is important to have public policies that safeguard the strategic interests of the communities [...] you cannot establish an informal agreement with the planning department [...] that is why the debates when there is going to be a new POT mobilize all actors” (community leader, interview by author, 2016). Informal institutions are also valued, for example, changing the norms or understandings guiding intervention in the territory. As a CBO leader shared, “we can speak directly to their ears (EDU’s and Urbam’s), and tell them that here (in the communes) there is something that perhaps they haven’t seen [...] so lets think together how to intervene [...] lets create a collaborative work methodology to understand the problems and formulate proposals [...] but this is two-ways, and we also want to take all the knowledge possible about (how EDU and Urbam conceive) the city model [...] and we have learned things, for example, that they didn’t understand everything they planned, the impacts were not always understood, that they had good intentions are were good people, but did not see things that for people are extremely problematic [...] what is our mission then, to give visibility, get some problems on the agenda before hand, that they are seen before hand, so the relation is a two-way street. We give and we take” (community leader, interview by author, 2016).

Another important set of actors consulted for this project are social movements. Two social movements currently raising territorial grievances in Medellin

are the *Mesa Interbarrial de Desconectados de Medellín* (MIDM) and the Movimiento de Pobladores. MIDM advocates for families who have been disconnected from networked water and electricity. Its tactics include staging protests and seeking legal recourse. Its actions, combined with those of similar organizations in other cities in the country, led the Constitutional Court to prohibit in 2009 the disconnection of water and electricity in homes with minors (Constitutional Court, 2009). The Movimiento de Pobladores can be said to still be in a nascent stage as its origins only go back to 2015 during the formulation of the city's most recent POT. Concerns over the city's approach to locating and developing low-income housing, added to the impact that state-led renewal had on household displacement, brought together community leaders, members of CBOs Sumapaz and Con-Vivamos, academics from Universidad de Antioquia's social work department, as well as members of MIDM, to advocate for changes in housing provision and dweller's protections. Similar to CBOs, social movements understand progressive planning as both process and outcome and emphasize formal institutions while also valuing informal ones. Speaking of the value of formal institutions, a MIDM leader shared, "the fact that the right is acknowledged (water as a fundamental right) is not going to ensure we have access to the service but it becomes a tool we can go to [...] for example, the city implementing a water minimum, even if it's a program and not a public policy is an achievement for us" (social movement leader, interview by author, 2016). What started as a program became public policy in 2011.



Image 4: Logo for the dwellers movement and promotional material for a water-rights event sponsored by MDIM and CBOs

A third segment of civil society researched is civic leaders. By civic leaders I mean those individuals who act as advocates and spokespeople for their neighborhood or community. While some civic leaders are part of officially recognized civic bodies such as *juntas de acción comunal* (neighborhood councils), not all choose to advocate thru these due to their sometimes actual, sometimes perceived relations to clientelism and corruption. Civic leaders advocate for issues ranging from housing to water services, and commonly do so by attending neighborhood council meetings, social movement meetings, being active with CBOs, reaching out to city councilors and bureaucrats, and serving as the first line of interaction for bureaucrats visiting their territories.



Image 5: Community gathering organized by neighborhood council to vote on the local development plan

(December, 2016)

Given their grassroots origins and objectives, the CBOs, social movements, and civic leaders analyzed for this dissertation have been for the most part politically independent, less prone to cooptation, and more likely to engage in local politics in more contentious ways, using protest and pressure tactics such as taking over government building lobbies and the city council. However, they also engage in negotiation with the government through mechanisms such as participatory planning and informal networks. This dual cooperation-contestation nature seen among Medellin's civil society is in line with della Porta and Diani's assessment that "state institutions are on occasion allies of social movements and at the same time they are the arenas within which movements present their claims... in which the state is nonetheless an 'adversary' of protest" (p.209).

Business and civic elites

The development of Medellin into Colombia's industrial city in the 1900s was counterintuitive given the city's geographical location nested between the Andes.

Despite these odds, the city has developed into an important industrial and financial services center, hosting the headquarters of large corporations and multi-latinas including Argos (construction), Exito (retail), Nutresa (food and beverages), Sura (insurance), and Bancolombia (banking). The powerful nature of Medellín's private sector is reflected in the importance of its Chamber of Commerce and Proantioquia, a foundation that brings together some of the city's most powerful businesses. Proantioquia, in existence since 1975, aims to impact local, regional, and national developmental policy and to strengthen institutions to improve public administration.

Important members of the business sector became highly involved in helping address the city's problems under the leadership of the Presidential Council. As an important member of the city's business elite shared in an interview in 2016, "business elites realized many years ago that this (the city's conditions) was unsustainable if they did not get involved in development, in generating equity, in generating wealth (for others)". A CBO leader who has worked closely with some business elites put it more bluntly: "fear made the poor and rich come together in this city" (interview by author, 2016). His feeling was echoed by a former head of planning: "there is a regional identity and love for the city that you don't find in many other places, that helps, but when you have a crisis like ours... let me give you an example: if you are on the titanic and its sinking, and you see the guy that took your girlfriend but he has a life raft and you are drowning, that fool becomes your friend right away, you forget about the girlfriend because you need to save yourself. That happened in Medellín, the city had turned into shit" (interview by author, 2016). For some, personal experiences were important catalysts to get involved: "when I finished high school I had the opportunity to go study abroad. I decided that if I stayed in Medellín it would

be to do something. My father was assassinated in 1992 during the city's violent period, it was an ordinary crime, but it makes things personal, something existential" (business elite, interview by author, 2016). Another business elite shared a similar story: "my father was kidnaped the day he turned 80 years old, they went to his house and took him from there. When he came back a year and half later he said 'I'm staying here' (...) the only way to stay in Medellin was generating development" (interview by author, 2016).

Today, business-backed foundations, associations, and oversight groups play important roles in financing programs and scrutinizing urban management practices. A key example of this is *Medellin Cómo Vamos* (MCV, Medellin how are we doing), a program started by Proantioquia and funded by important local and national businesses including local newspaper El Colombiano, EAFIT University, the Medellin Chamber of Commerce, and Proantioquia. While it is not the only effort of its kind, it is perhaps the most notable due to the number of areas under analysis and its holistic approach. On the habitat front, the program tracks housing, public services, public space, mobility, and the environment. MCV analyzes and publishes each year progress towards achieving the mayor's four year development plan, as well as perception surveys taking the pulse of what ordinary citizens identify as key issues. The publications are highly publicized thanks to the organization's powerful backers. The annual presentation of the report, which can be thought of as a scorecard analyzing progress in different sectors, has institutionalized the practice of having the mayor attend the presentation with his full cabinet to respond to the points raised by the report. The gathering is open to the public, live streamed, and widely covered in the media. MCV is largely seen as interested more in an objective analysis of public

management. Its complement, an institution where politics is clearly at play, is Proantioquia. Its leader, Rafael Aubad, represents important economic interests. He regularly pens editorials in local newspaper El Colombiano and uses the power of his office to influence what the organization believes are good government practices.

Similar to CBOs, business elites also make use of networking and framing: networking takes place mostly with other foundations and with the state. Framing allows them to position their work to shareholders, workers, and society as one based on sustainability, which can be interpreted as both social sustainability and financial sustainability. The bottom line for those companies backing foundations is that urban interventions are good for business in more ways than one. Sectors including hospitality and tourism, construction materials manufacturing, real estate development, and academia have benefited significantly from the city's transformation, and are thus happy to play a part in ensuring its continuity. As a CBO leader observed, "to insert themselves in the global economy makes them think, or recognize, that the entire city has to be on the same wavelength. Changing from an industrial to a service economy model means you have to generate a transformation and that means in some way they intuited that if the city model failed, their economic model would fail, in other words, their businesses. That meant having to formulate development for the whole city. To recognize spaces, absences" (interview by author, 2016). Constituency creation goes beyond work being carried out directly by foundations and includes also helping finance CBOs that are active in promoting local development. A clear example of this is the funding provided by locally headquartered, multi-national business group Sura to CBO *Nuestra Gente*.

In addition to the for profit-sector, Medellin is also home to important private,

non-profit entities for economic redistribution known as family compensation pay offices (*cajas de compensación familiar*), such as Comfama and Comfenalco. Comfama has been particularly progressive, and continues to be under the leadership of David Escobar who came in as director in February 2016. Escobar was mayor Fajardo's chief of staff and the brains behind running social urbanism initiatives under project management offices. Escobar has been able to put together a team of socially conscious, highly skilled professionals, chief among them Francesco Orsini and Sergio Restrepo. Orsini, a former member of the Northern Atelier and key member of the Juan Bobo housing upgrading project, is now working as Comfama's housing and habitat sub-director. Restrepo, who served for six years as director of the city's most venerated theater, *Teatro Pablo Tobon*, was responsible for reactivating the theater as a public space, including giving citizen collective *La Ciudad Verde* physical space for weekly public activities. He was tapped in May 2017 to manage the highest private sector investment project, sponsored by Comfama, which seeks to reactivate a cultural center in the historical buildings of *Claustro San Ignacio*.

Unlike CBOs and social movements, whose members tend to come from low income areas and advocate both individual and collective issues, citizen collectives in Medellin tend to bring together middle and upper class professionals, some very connected to influential political actors, to advocate around issues of collective consumption (air quality, pedestrian mobility, public transportation, bike lanes, public space, etc.). One in particular, *La Ciudad Verde* (the green city) is of interest to this work given its focus on urban planning, public space and mobility. The initially loosely formed group came together in a more organized fashion in 2011 to promote sustainability, create awareness about the role of city planning in city-making, and the

importance of citizen involvement in advocating for a more inclusive and more sustainable Medellin. The collective makes use of tactical urbanism to show people the importance of reclaiming spaces for everyday citizen use. Examples include ‘dias de playa’ (beach days), a yearly weekend event in which La Playa, a key avenue in the downtown area, is closed to traffic and turned into a ‘beach’. Other tactical urbanism activities include reclaiming sidewalks and a newly constructed bike lane along Palace Street that had been taken over for parking through a series of park(ing) days that received wide traditional and social media coverage. In addition to tactical urbanism, every Monday since 2013 the collective hosts open-air talks known as Lunes de Ciudad (city Mondays) in partnership with *Teatro Pablo Tobon*. The talks invite academic leaders, government representatives, progressive actors, and other sectorial leaders to debate, in everyday language, a topic related to planning or managing the city.

Business and civic elites in Medellin are motivated by a combination of self-interest, professional perceptions of what more equitable cities should look like (particularly true for Comfama), and notions of what good urban practices are (particularly true for La Ciudad Verde). Progressive planning for these actors centers more on outcome than on process, but they do not ignore the latter completely. In different ways they all try to empower citizens to understand how local government runs, what it is carrying out, and whether or not it is in each societal segment’s best interest. In doing so they show the value of informal institutionalization, but also of pursuing formal institutions.



Image 6: Promotional material for Lunes de Ciudad to discuss participatory planning and budgeting

Medellin in the global spotlight: narratives of miracles, actual changes from 2000 onwards

Medellin’s transition from ‘most violent city in the world’ to example of progressive planning has often merited the use of the word “miracle” (see for example Fukuyama & Colby, 2011; Maclean, 2014). More than a miracle, these and other authors argue, the transformation of Medellin has been the product of structure and agency. Important structural changes of interest in this dissertation include

decentralization and the changing frameworks shaping urban management (PD) and planning (POT). Agency by civil society, business and professional elites, and local state actors has also played an important role in pushing for broader participation, increased oversight of the local government, and changing approaches to budgetary allocations (away from higher and middle income areas into low income neighborhoods). The structure-agency dynamics that began to change at the national level in the 1980s gained conceptual strength, and began a process of social exchange and state experimentation at the local level in the early 1990s. However, a cogent narrative would not emerge until the mid 2000s with the adoption of ‘social urbanism’, which has cast a long shadow, impacting the two most recent mayors whose agendas do not clearly align with the concept but who have nevertheless kept aspects of it alive as the following discussion, and Chapters 3 and 4 show. Figure 1 presents a timeline of the most important interventions in the past three decades.




Figure 1: Timeline from 1990s - 2017

Re-engaging the city: 1990s to 2003

Urban development efforts in the 1990s lacked a cohesive strategy to bring together the territory and the interventions meant to improve it. Important though scattered interventions took place during this period, notable among them the introduction of the metro and *Metrocable* (cable cars), experimentation with housing upgrading through PRIMED, and the renewal and construction of new public spaces in central areas. The city's first POT, approved in 1999 and which came into effect in 2000, intended to address the shortcomings in fragmentation by putting forth a more holistic vision for the city's territorial development. As part of this effort, Medellin became the first city in Colombia to incorporate into its POT the idea of mandatory cessions for parks and public equipment (though the fund needed to receive payments and thus implement the mandatory cessions policy was not created until 2007) (Garcia Bocanegra, 2010). Mandatory cessions require that developers either provide public space and equipment or pay the city for its provision.

Mobility

Medellin began operation of its over ground metro, the first mass transportation system in Colombia, in November 1995. After having its funding initially rejected, Medellin finally received approval from the national government in 1982 (Echavarria et al, 2002) with construction starting the following year. Multiple issues, ranging from over costs to contracting problems, delayed construction over a 12 year period. The metro's main line links the north and south of the city, while a shorter second line departs from the central area towards the west. Criticisms quickly emerged that the metro did not help address spatial exclusion as many residents on the

hillsides still had a long way to travel to get to it, and would have to walk very long distances or pay two fares – one for a bus, one for the metro. Despite these critiques, the metro represented an important change for the city, not only for the pride that pioneering this type of infrastructure generated, but also because of ‘Metro Culture’ campaigns that encouraged civic behavior, some of which (clean stations and trains, no defacing of the infrastructure, etc.) persists to date.




Image 7: First Metrocable line

To address criticisms of spatial exclusion, mayor Luis Perez (2001-2003) ordered the construction of an innovative public transportation mode in the city’s Northeast: MetroCable, a series of aerial gondolas or cable cars that move people from the metro station in the valley all the way to the top of the hill, with two stations for stops in between. The project was not without controversy: on the one hand, some residents close to the cable’s service line enjoyed the possibility of having rapid access to the city metro and through it to some of Medellín’s central areas. On the other hand, many community groups criticized Perez for not providing spaces for community input. What is undeniable is that this public transportation intervention changed dynamics in the zone (the poorest in the city), an occurrence that became evident when the following mayor, Sergio Fajardo, who inaugurated the system in August 2004,

decided to use the MetroCable as a structuring axis along which to design a broader set of interventions: integral urban projects PUI.

Housing

Another notable undertaking during the period was experimentation with housing upgrading and tenure legalization under the PRIMED program (Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Subnormales en Medellin). The program began operations in 1993 as a joint effort between the city of Medellin, the Colombian and German governments, the United Nations Development Program, and the program's target communities. Its main accomplishments include neighborhood and housing upgrading, geological risk mitigation, legalization of tenure and community development and participation. PRIMED impacted 55,000 people distributed in fifteen neighborhoods, at a cost of US\$15 million. Despite efforts to extend the program, funding and coordination problems among agencies brought it to an end in 2000. Other than PRIMED, the approach towards housing during this period was also scattered and minimal, with quantitative and qualitative problems persisting. Given the shortage of urban land for development, mayor Perez formulated a plan between 2001 and 2002 for housing in a new greenfield commonly called Pajarito. Decree 602 of 2002 approved the expansion of the city boundary into this peri-urban area and the administration began to purchase the portions of land privately owned for future state-financed housing. The plan for Pajarito pioneered a land management instrument allowed by the national government but never before used in Colombia: partial plans. Partial plans allow for public, mixed, or private investment, though in purchasing the parcels Perez made clear he wanted the plan to remain solely under the control of public agents.

Public space

Long neglected parks, plazas, and similar public spaces found in the city's formal areas began to receive attention during this period. Interventions included the construction of a few new public squares, a public library, a music hall, and a convention center. Key projects included the renewal of Parque San Antonio, the construction of Plaza de las Esculturas, Plaza de las Luces (next to the newly build EPM library), and Plaza de los Pies Descalzos. The most transformational new public space was Plaza de los Deseos, which was located near informal settlements and government infrastructures. These and similar interventions, while welcomed by citizens, did not address the shortage of public space and public infrastructures in marginalized neighborhoods.



Image 8: Parque de las esculturas

Social urbanism: 2004-2011

After decades of focusing state efforts on formal and central areas, city officials began to devise strategies to incorporate state-sponsored infrastructure and amenities development into areas characterized by concentrated disadvantages and marginalization. A catalyzing undertaking was the construction of the first MetroCable system serving the northeastern area of the city. Mayor Fajardo decided it would make more sense to intervene territories with a holistic physical and functional strategy, in other words, instead of doing a mobility project here, a park there, and housing somewhere else, the efforts of all city agencies should be focused on intervening in an integral manner, thus the start of *Proyectos Urbanos Integrales* or PUIs (Integral Urban Projects). In addition, city hall decided the projects would be run following a project management office (PMO) strategy: the mayor and his chief of staff held weekly meetings in which all agencies involved in the PUI had to report their progress, and any issues in meeting expected deadlines were confronted with an analysis to understand who was causing the delay, why, and what actions needed to be taken to solve the problem. Other projects were assigned for EDU to serve as PMO. The PMO approach allowed for many interventions to take place in a short period of time by articulating infrastructure, public space, mobility, security, education, health, and other relevant agencies. The northeastern PUI showed that spatial transformations in low-income hillside areas of the city were possible. Interventions included the construction a large public library (Biblioteca España), remodeling and construction of new schools, a center for entrepreneurship and training (CEDEZO), bridges such as Puente Mirador, parks and greenery interventions, improvements in pedestrian

infrastructure, and the revamping of recreational areas such as the soccer field in Granizal.



Image 9: Basketball court in commune 13 and Granizal soccer field in commune 1

Spaces for community participation were included to different degrees in the different interventions, with some merely seeking the communities stamp of approval and others making a more concerted effort to account for the community's needs. CBOs active in the zone such as Con-Vivamos and Nuestra Gente were crucial in organizing and mobilizing residents to participate but also to contest interventions that were perceived to go against the interests of those living in the territories. PUIs considering social, institutional, and spatial factors were carried out in other parts of the city such as the old Moravia landfill and in San Javier.

Even though the city's POT was supposed to be in effect from 2000 to 2009 (extendable to 2011 given that mayoral periods had increased in length), the Fajardo administration took advantage of language in the law which allowed for the revision of certain aspects in the medium term and a new national mandate to include citizen participation in the formulation of city plans. Revisions incorporating the idea of the PUI took effect in 2006, and a year later the city created the fund needed to receive

developers contributions due to the mandatory cessions policy first included in the previous POT.




Image 10: Exterior and activities inside Biblioteca España prior to the building's closure

Mobility

This period sought the expansion of the public transit system with the addition in 2008 of a Metrocable to serve Nuevo Occidente, thus addressing the transportation problems experienced by the people who had been resettled in Pajarito. In addition, the first tourist metrocable was inaugurated in 2010 to connect the end of the Northeastern cable to a nature preserve called *Parque Arví* where portions were adapted for citizen use. Finally, in December 2011 the city began operation of a Bus Rapid Transit system, thus increasing the offer of public transportation and the number of modes operated by the Metro company (metro, metrocable, and BRT).

Housing

Following the experience with PRIMED, and considering the need to add a housing component parallel to the northeastern PUI, the first major city government attempts to implement in-situ upgrading were the interventions designed and implemented during the Fajardo and Salazar administrations in two areas known as Juan Bobo and La Herrera. While government planners carried out the conceptual design behind the interventions, the projects included from their inception inputs from the target communities as their engagement and participation was seen as paramount to the projects' success. Upon completion the projects had achieved legalization of tenure, the improvement of housing conditions through the upgrading of existing housing structures and the construction of new housing units to replace at-risk housing, and risk mitigation efforts such as soil stabilization. Other accomplishments included improvements in the natural environment through efforts to cleanup the water streams running through the areas and the creation of awareness campaigns to make the efforts last, upgrades to habitat infrastructure including sidewalks, and finally, the

conservation of the existing social fabric by avoiding the displacement of area residents thanks to a no evictions and no expropriations approach. The success of the projects was premised on active community engagement in assemblies and the creation of committees, and coordination by a small team hosted within the city's EDU agency that brought together resources from municipal, metropolitan, provincial, and national agencies. While the projects had shortcomings, they proved that in-situ upgrading with active community involvement were possible.

The later stages of the Juan Bobo and La Herrera upgrading efforts came in tandem with the creation of a new housing agency for the city that began operations in 2009: ISVIMED. The agency is tasked with managing affordable housing projects and coordinating housing policy so that public, private, and community actors can all participate in the development of habitats that are conducive towards the improvement of low-income families' quality of life. ISVIMED is still in many ways trying to find its footing: for a long time after its creation some responsibilities assigned to it were still being carried out by EDU, it has had recurrent changes in leadership, it has been unable to create linkages the way EDU was able to, and there has been no systematization of knowledge of lessons learned in housing in order agencies, relying instead on the expertise of those hired. The agency's offices are not as close to the city's seat of power (La Alpujarra) as those of other decentralized agencies such as utilities provider EPM and urban development agency EDU.



Image 11: Juan Bobo in-situ upgrading
(June, 2017)




Image 12: La Herrera in-situ upgrading
(June, 2017)

While Juan Bobo and La Herrera were designed as pilots for in-situ upgrading, Moravia, an informal settlement over a namesake decommissioned landfill in a highly

centric area of the city, was scheduled for resettlement. Due to its location Moravia residents had excellent access to public facilities as well as to the metro and to public buses that took them downtown is just ten minutes. The settlement, started in the 1970s, was slated for relocation starting in 2005. At the time an estimated 2,500 families lived in the area in approximately 3,293 houses of which 600 were in non-viable zones (Mejia-Escalante, 2012). Given the conditions of the terrain and the health threats it presented the city decided the families would have to be relocated, some to ten and eleven story buildings in the north-eastern side of Moravia, others to newly constructed, eleven story apartment buildings in Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente, located in the city's expansion area of Pajarito. Unlike Juan Bobo where the assessments determined that geological risks could be mitigated through retaining walls, the health risks at Moravia were said to make the terrain non-viable. Residents re-located to buildings on the edge of Moravia continued to have good accessibility to urban amenities and transportation. Those relocated to Pajarito had to contend with issues from its inception including breach of promises of providing commercial space for livelihood activities, inadequate transportation, and slow development of urban amenities.

Water and sanitation

Two important initiatives to expand access to water and sanitation started during this period: the water lifeline and prepaid water. The water lifeline initiative emerged from state-sponsored participatory forums. CBOs and social movements protested the lack of access to network water services and unaffordable tariffs. While water tariffs in Medellin are cross-subsidized, many residents are still unable to afford water to meet their demands, and though EPM is owned by the city, as a corporatized

utility it is independent from the municipality and run as an autonomous enterprise. Low-income communities organized mobilizations and protests both locally and nationally advocating for a minimum amount of water to be considered a right. Simultaneously, bureaucrats working with communities as part of the city's participatory planning efforts gained awareness of the realities associated with this plight and advocated within the administration for changes to take place. Given the relation between the city and its water provider, the local administration could not mandate the free provision of water. After some legal analysis and maneuvering between 2008 and 2009, the city was able to pilot in 2009 the plan 'liters of love' aimed at providing 2.5 cubic meters of water and sewerage per person per month to 9,302 households (Alcaldia de Medellin, 2011). This is the amount of water suggested by the World Health Organization in order to meet water needs related to preparation of food, drinking water, clothes washing, personal hygiene, and household cleaning. The program was initially requested by 39,436 people, and as of April 2017 benefited 232,898 under a new name: *Minimo Vital de Agua* (vital water minimum). The program became policy in 2011 with the passing of local ordinance Acuerdo 06, implemented under decree 1889 of 2011, making Medellin the first city in Colombia to establish a water and sewerage minimum.

Another important program that emerged during this period is prepaid water. EPM began to pilot this strategy in March 2011 with 285 regular meter users who had had their services disconnected due to overdue bills (EPM, n.d.). The idea with the program was for EPM to help customers understand how to make better use of water, teach them how to calculate the average consumption of different needs, and learn how to increase water savings while allowing them to receive the same quality service

through networked household connections. People add value to their prepaid card using the internet and in that way control how much they spend on water. Despite initial opposition by social movement MIDM, the program has been very well received among citizens leading the movement to move away from criticizing it.

Public space

One of the most important undertakings of the social urbanism period was the creation and improvement of public space offerings. The period was marked by the construction of library-parks in the most marginalized sectors of the city including Santo Domingo's *Parque Biblioteca España*, *Parque Biblioteca San Javier*, *Parque Biblioteca Belen*, and *Parque Biblioteca Doce de Octubre*. In addition, the city focused efforts on building new playgrounds, linear parks, and building or upgrading sports facilities. Interventions in public spaces in the city benefited from narratives put forward by civil society, politicians, and public officials all of whom saw it as a conduit to creating community and improving equity by giving inhabitants of marginalized neighborhoods spaces conducive to socialization, leisure, culture, health, and learning.

City for life and post social urbanism: 2012-present

The period after the two social urbanism progressive mayors has seen changes in planning and managing the city, though the structure and agency dynamics developed between 2004 and 2011 continue to have significant repercussions. PUIs, while technically still on POTs and considered a planning and management approach, are no longer being carried out comprehensively, and no new integral development strategies have been implemented. PMO is no longer the preferred approach to managing interventions, with subsequent administrations once again atomizing

leadership or weakening the tacit power of the agency tasked with leading a specific project. The new POT, which came into effect in 2014 and goes to 2027, prioritizes compact growth, thus emphasizing developments along the river and the creation of a clear rural-urban border.

Mobility

Improving mobility continues to be an important focus of city leaders. During this period, Metro has added one more BRT, a tram, and another MetroCable. A new MetroCable, intended to serve the area of Picacho in the northwest is currently under construction. This project gave momentum to the nascent *Movimiento de Pobladores* (inhabitants movement) as its construction has faced opposition by local residents being displaced to allow for the expansion of the station. Current mayor Federico Gutierrez has also sought to build an additional tram but the national government has not agreed to shoulder its portion of the infrastructure's cost. The expansion of the city's networked mass transportation has helped improve mobility for many who can make use of a multi-modal system composed of metro, cable cars, BRTs, a tram, and feeder buses. The system however is far from perfect, with issues such as driver extortion persisting, and new ones emerging such as the failure of new routes to link peripheral communities, instead linking people solely to centralities. Other important issues related to transportation are found with the feeder buses linking networked infrastructure to low-income neighborhoods: on a technical side, the buses are much slower than the ones used previously (which were run by private companies); on the social side, these buses operate with a fare-card which must be swiped prior to boarding, a system that prevents previous informal forms of boarding buses where users could haggle with the driver and come onboard through the back door for a

reduced fee. In addition to public transit, this period has seen a significant increase in the quantity and quality of bike lanes, as well as greater attention to sidewalks.

Housing

Housing continued to suffer greatly under past two mayors. While minor projects have taken place throughout the city, no serious efforts have been made for in-situ relocation (despite both administrations promising citizens this would be a priority). Pajarito continues to be the easy answer to all of the city's housing problems, however Pajarito's problems continue to grow. Recent constructions are characterized by quality issues (fissures, humidity, unstable handrails, low quality material), the location is relatively far and excessively dependent on the cablecar for transportation, and with close to 80,000 people, coexistence and co-management of common areas are turbulent – not to mention the impact that the presence of gangs has had on the sense of safety of existing residents and newcomers alike.

Current housing projects by the municipality include subsidies to acquire or improve social-interest housing, plans and projects to improve existing housing and extend basic sanitation connection, acquisition of existing houses, construction in land banks of houses, subsidies to relocate households in high-risk areas, and projects to legalize tenure. Most have had a slow start. Meanwhile, the city continues to struggle with quantitative and qualitative housing shortages. Many of the architects, planners, and social workers that worked for the city's projects in Juan Bobo and La Herrera continue to work for the local government while others have shifted to the private sector, academia, or non-profits. Civil society, including social movements advocating for housing rights such as the Movimiento de Pobladores, and CBOs, continue to advocate for habitat interventions that replicate achievements seen in these projects.

For instance, the Movimiento de Pobladores advocates for interventions that provide affordable housing in the form of social-interest apartments, in-situ relocation, and do not cause urban displacement. Members of the movement are strongly supported by academics from both private and public universities, and usually hold meetings and receive financial support from CBOs. Organizations in the private non-profit sector, such as Comfama, are also committed to seeing more in-situ interventions that successfully replicate – and improve – on the achievements of the past. There is a discourse of equity and social justice that continues to animate housing concerns, though interventions in the sector are not currently able to meet existing and growing needs.

Agents involved with housing efforts over time emphasize that improvements are needed such as the creation of a dwellers protection policy (currently being drafted and highly controversial due to the approach taken for its elaboration) and imbuing local government with norms of articulation that can make housing interventions viable. The absence of a housing dwellers' policy introduces uncertainty to inhabitants of marginalized areas who see with suspicion the arrival in their territories of bureaucrats in charge of neighborhood improvement projects. Without such a policy, dwellers have no way of knowing what an intervention will mean for them and no legal recourse to appeal perceived grievances.



Image 13: Current housing in commune 8 and promotional material for the long promised in-situ upgrading

Water

Both the water lifeline and pre-paid water meters have become successful programs to extend access to networked water and sewerage services to low-income individuals. In recent years the local government has begun addressing some limitations in the water and sanitation sector by working with communities and

utilities to pilot initiatives aimed at expanding water coverage. These initiatives include extending legal networks to provide public faucets which required amending city policies mandating that a housing unit be located in land recognized as suitable for housing in the city's master plan in order for it to be connected to the water network. The program, *Unidos por el Agua* (united for water), has been active since 2016 and been one of the few inter-agency efforts that has managed to bring together key city agencies to effectively work together. The partners in the program are EPM, the city planning agency, the infrastructure department, the territorial control and management department, the citizen participation department, treasury, EDU, and ISVIMED.

Public Space

An important intervention geared at helping redress the city's shortage of public spaces was formally initiated in 2013 when the city's utility, EPM, began the design (in tandem with local communities) and construction of multi-purpose structures known as UVA (Unidad de Vida Articulada or Articulated Life Unit). The initial objective of UVAs was to transform and open up the areas around water tanks so that communities lacking nearby public space options could access them. These were to be completely financed by the utility through its corporate social responsibility area and its foundation, Fundación EPM. The mayor at the time, Anibal Gaviria, had proposed a similar model which became implemented in other areas, building new infrastructure incorporating sports courts, spaces for communities to gather, computer labs, and similar amenities missing in each particular territory.



Image 14: Soccer field atop UVA, children's playground in commune 8

Important infrastructure such as libraries and schools have suffered from lack of adequate maintenance and structural problems due to design (El Colombiano, 2017; El Mundo 2017). The crown jewel of these is the *Biblioteca España* library and park which had to close in 2015 due to structural problems. The infrastructure problems experienced by libraries and other urban amenities have been met with community activism: in the case of *Biblioteca España*, CBOs and librarians, in collaboration with numerous government agencies, have been working together to create alternative ways to continue providing the community with the services previously hosted at the library. Community-based actors have also stepped up as evidenced, for example, by the informal partnerships established between CBO Convivamos and NGO Raton de Biblioteca with the team charged with running programs out of the now maligned library. When the library's building was closed due to structural problems (and it remains closed with no opening date in sight) these organizations offered spaces for the library's team to work out of and patterned with them to ensure the continuity of a vibrant offering of activities and events. Relatedly, a closure of most libraries in early

2017 was met with a great deal of criticism by community leaders and citizens who took to social media, television, and the city's newspaper, El Colombiano, to express their discontent and criticize the city for calling itself cultured while allowing this to happen. The public outcry forced the city to re-open the libraries sooner than scheduled.

This exercise of community voice is something that should not be taken lightly considering that during the same period, libraries all over Antioquia, the province of which Medellin is capital, were permanently shutting their libraries. The province's citizens, who have access to the same communication channels as their Medellin counterparts, were less vocal in demanding the continuity of these services. While Medellin may still lack a clear public policy to maintain libraries operational, there has been enough appropriation of their offerings to create a constituency willing to demand the state's continuity of these services. Arrangements have slowly been made so that there is clarity on which agencies are tasked with running and caring for these spaces, for instance, responsibility for the city's libraries was initially distributed among many groups but in 2012 they were placed under the mandate of then newly created sub secretariat for reading, libraries, and heritage. Furthermore, CBOs and citizen collectives have been active in engaging with government officials to expand the presence of civil society in directing the programs and activities libraries host.

Conclusion

The 1990s created for Medellin a critical juncture where decentralization and the efforts of the Presidential Council set the city on a new institutional path. While critical junctures create opportunities for change, the exact shape the new institutions take is subject to socio-political construction. In the case of Medellin, the changing

political opportunity structures lead to three important path-shaping occurrences: first, the emergence of new ways of state-society interaction which allowed grassroots to gain visibility and invited business elites to join socio-spatial transformation efforts; second, the piloting of policies, practices, and programs aimed at introducing new approaches to urban interventions that could mitigate persisting problems; and third, a recognition of the need to bring state-sponsored planning institutions into contact with the entire city, not only the formal one.

As the chapter illustrates, a new path emerged where community-based organizations worked to have greater visibility and show that some of their approaches to planning and managing the city were viable and desirable. Simultaneously, some business elites have become involved by establishing foundations that carry out a variety of social and spatial interventions in previously marginalized areas and fund think-tanks with the financial and technical capacity to monitor and scrutinize the local public administration in order to pressure the local government on city-wide quality of life policies and good urban management. The local government nevertheless continues to be at the heart of progressive efforts, its support magnifying results and its indifference slowing progress. The shortcomings of Medellín's transformation are clear to all the actors involved, though depending on each one's socio-economic standing the answer to questions of where to go from here varies. What seems improbable is a return to city planning where both top-down and bottom-up initiatives are left without significant elements of participation by non-state actors.

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CHAPTER 3

ELEMENTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION: HOW STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS ATTEMPT TO GIVE PROGRESSIVE URBAN PLANNING PRACTICES CONTINUITY ⁵

Abstract

Scholarship examining the intersection of planning and institutional theory emphasizes the analysis of existing institutions or the importance of institutional design; however, little attention has been given to identifying the factors that must be targeted by agents attempting to give continuity to inchoate practices. This article contributes to planning theory's institutional approach and progressive planning conceptualizations by identifying four elements – relations, practices, concepts, and space – targeted by state and non-state actors pursuing institutionalization. Actions in these four areas directly contribute to the continuity or stagnation of progressive planning practices across different mayoral terms. Planners should focus institutionalization efforts on strengthening the weakest aspects of the elements themselves and through the mobilization of a diverse set of actors.

Keywords: institutions, progressive planning, Latin America, Medellin, water

Introduction

The need to re-frame how scholars and practitioners approach city planning in the global South gains urgency when we examine the impacts of rapid and on-going urbanization in Latin America, as well as the challenges from accelerated urbanization in Asia and Africa. Recent work on the progressive city evidences the need for greater attention to its conceptualization, and highlights the need to further our understanding of the mechanisms that give the approach its potential to improve the quality of life of urban residents and to interrupt dynamics linked to the reproduction of inequalities. Many cities in the global South face socio-spatial inequality and marginalization

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which state and non-state actors attempt to address by piloting policies, practices, and programs that have the potential to solve or mitigate such challenges. Novel progressive attempts to change course have been exemplified in the last decades by cities as diverse as Surabaya, Indonesia (Das, 2015) and Porto Alegre, Brazil (Abers, 2000; Baiocchi, 2005). I define progressive planning as a planning approach characterized by citizen involvement and local government activism that prioritizes the construction of urban amenities, the creation of social programs, and the implementation of socio-spatial interventions aimed at improving the material wellbeing of individuals in traditionally marginalized neighborhoods while advancing the exercise of active citizenship. This conceptualization moves beyond the state-centered approach to achieving such objectives, which can be conceptualized as a local developmental state, and beyond purely citizen-driven interventions that can be categorized as insurgency planning or self-help approaches.

Progressive planning holds enormous potential as an approach to reconceptualize how planning is carried out. However, even if an intervention is deemed successful, its replication or continuity is not guaranteed and we can easily see a reversal to the old practices that failed to address new and persisting socio-spatial problems. In other words, *experimentation and implementation do not guarantee institutionalization*. The study of institutions within planning has emphasized institutional analysis and institutional design, with more recent work addressing the gap between these two areas through a focus on identifying the conditions that enable institutional transformation (e.g. Carmin et al, 2012; Song, 2016). While numerous theoretical and empirical works have advanced our knowledge of planning institutions, a gap persists in our understanding of the strategies used by different societal actors to

formally and informally institutionalize planning practices, particularly progressive ones. In short, institutions are central to continuity; however, our understanding of how agents active in city planning practices attempt their institutionalization requires further research.

I examine the emergence of progressive city planning practices in Medellin, Colombia from 2004 onwards to answer the question: how do state and non-state actors attempt to institutionalize progressive planning? I use insights from politicians, bureaucrats, business elites, community-based organizations, citizen collectives, and social movement members in Medellin to identify the strategic actions they take as they attempt to formally and informally institutionalize progressive planning practices. These actions are analyzed to explain why aspects of these elements can lead to greater effectiveness in the continuity of emerging practices. Ethnographic methods were employed to understand how different agents interpret the experiences and institutional environments they are involved in, and how this understanding influences their behavior. A framework is developed based on empirical findings of actions pursued in networked water provision. This area was chosen due to its importance in generating exclusion and compounding disadvantages when not properly addressed. The framework highlights the role of four elements – relations, practices, concepts, and space - in explaining the degree of institutionalization of progressive planning practices in the context of Medellin's efforts to improve the material wellbeing of its residents and reduce socio-spatial inequality. This work contributes to ongoing efforts to theorize the progressive city as well as to advance our understanding of institutions within planning theory.

The rest of this paper develops the argument that relations, practices, concepts

and space are key elements in the pursuit of institutionalization. Section 2 analyses key literature on progressive planning and institutions, highlighting the gap in our current understanding of what should be privileged when attempting to give an emerging progressive planning practice continuity. Section 3 describes the research design and methods employed to address the research question. The following section provides contextual background and is followed by a presentation of the case study. The framework generated from the empirical evidence and complemented by existing institutional literature is presented in Section 6. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings and examining the contribution to the literature.

Progressive planning and institutions

Progressive planning efforts have emerged in cities throughout the world to challenge pervasive planning systems that benefit the few over the many. Examples can be found in the global North (Cho & Douglass, 2015; Clavel, 2010; Doussard, 2015; Schrock, 2015) as well as the global South (Friendly, 2013; Sanyal, 1996). Citizen involvement in city planning has become more prevalent as opportunities for action or participation are claimed (Irazabal & Neville, 2007). Despite the belief that globalization and neoliberalism have cast governments aside, there is evidence of government activism (Kim & Warner, 2016; Ramesh, 2008;), and local states have shown they can and are well positioned to be innovative, developmental, and progressive in serving the interests of the poor (Parnell & Robinson, 2012). Lastly, while the planning literature is dominated by examples of market players as actors looking to exploit the city (Brenner et al, 2012), business elites have also shown they are cognizant of their symbiotic relation with the urban environment and can act as backers of progressive planning practices (Maclean, 2014; Moncada, 2013).

Progressive planning then brings together civil society, market, and government actors in the pursuit of an approach to planning and managing the city characterized by the active involvement in dynamically changing coalitions of all these groups with the objective of improving the living conditions of society's most vulnerable. Scholars have studied the conditions and processes that give rise to progressive planning practices (e.g. Abers, 2000; Clavel, 1986, 2010), the dilemmas faced by progressive planners (e.g. Kraushaar, 1988), the role of different actors in formulation and implementation (e.g. Sanyal, 1996), and the retrenchment of progressive planning (e.g. Melgar, 2014). While these and other works help advance our understanding of progressive planning, the challenge of institutionalization remains to be explored.

Continuity is a central concern of scholars working with institutional theories. Institutions produce “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” (Huntington, 1968, p.12) which help to reduce uncertainty. The pursuit of these shared and patterned actions can center on formal or informal institutions. The distinction between formal and informal institutions is based on the latter being “created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, p.5) while the former are enforced by the state. A further distinction must be made between institutions and organizations as these terms are in many cases used interchangeably in the planning literature (Moroni, 2010). A helpful analogy is in order: institutions are the rules of the game while organizations are the players (North, 1990). Another factor in the analysis of institutions, and one that is of particular importance though not exclusive to the global South, is the distinction between weak and strong institutions. This distinction must be made because the

frequent alteration of institutions reduces their ability to create expected courses of action rendering the institution irrelevant.

Interest in the institutional turn seen in the social sciences in recent decades has not escaped planning theorists⁶. Recognition of the importance of institutions for planning theory and practice can be identified starting in the 1990s with scholars such as Alexander (1992), Bolan (1991), and Healey (1997, 1998, 1999). Reflections on the topic gained continued interest in the twenty-first century with notable contributions emerging from Gualini (2001), Verma (2007), and Moroni (2010) among others. The paths taken by these scholars varied as well: exponents of new-institutional economics as well as the rational choice approach, which emphasizes that rules, preferences and incentives influence the calculation and behavior of rational actors, include Alexander (1992, 2001), Moulaert (2005), and Lai (2005). On the other hand, proponents of the sociological approach, which emphasizes the importance of shared norms, interests and identities, include Gonzalez & Healey (2005), Gualini (2001) and Healey (2003). Lastly, advocates of historical institutionalism, which emphasizes the role of past institutions in shaping existing and future institutions through path dependency include Morrison (2017) and Sorensen (2018). As this article will show, in the context of the global South, change agents seeking to create a strong institution are influenced by self-interest as emphasized by rational choice institutionalists, but also seek shared norms, interests and identities, as sociological

⁶ For more in-depth looks at the new institutionalisms and their intersection with planning see the chapters in part 1: planning perspectives on institutions, penned by Teitz, Alexander, and Healey, in the book edited by Verma (2007), and the introduction by the editor. See also Kim (2011)

institutionalists suggest, as well as to create path-shaping rules and constituencies, as highlighted by historical institutionalists.

Beyond the initial emphasis on analysis started in the 1990s, planning theory has highlighted institutions through the study of institutional transformation and institutional design. Institutional transformation is a continuation of planning's utopian tradition and spirit of reform with the aim of better managing and designing institutions (Beauregard, 2005). Innovation in existing institutional arrangements requires a design dimension incorporating intentionality and a process dimension reflected in institution building (Gualini, 2001). A key contributor on institutional design in planning theory has been Alexander who defines it as "the devising and realization of rules, procedures, and organizational structures that will enable and constrain behavior and action so as to accord with held values, achieve desired objectives, or execute given tasks" (Alexander, 2005, p. 213). An important critique to the institutional design approach and to planning literature on institutional frameworks comes from Moroni (2010) who identifies a prevalence of instrumentalist attitudes. Formal institutions according to the author must be seen as "complex and largely unintentional emerging realities" (p.282) that can be reformed rather than redesigned. The author acknowledges intentionality in decisions and actions, however as the outcome cannot be guaranteed, he prefers to distinguish between 'organizational design' and 'institutional intervention', with the former being more amenable to design⁷. In short, according to Moroni, the intentionality of decisions and actions to

⁷ Moroni's critique of the muddling of institution and organization by many planning theorists is justified. For example Alexander reiterated in a recent reflection his view on institutional design expressed earlier in his career: "Planning often involves institutional design: of the planning process itself, when existing planning systems are

modify an institution does not translate into intentional results. Alexander's argument however can be interpreted to be not that the emerging institution is fully intentional or anticipated, but that the *process* that gives rise to an institution's modification is. In other words, institutional change is the result of intentional action *regardless* of whether the outcome faithfully reflects the initial objective.⁸ By targeting specific areas deemed crucial for the new institution to achieve its intended objectives they can at least get closer to meeting them. The areas to be targeted by such processes remain to be elucidated and are the focus of this work.

Current literature examining planning and institutions leads to the framework shown in Figure 2. The framework places actors – understood as individuals, organizations, and other collectives - at the top as these would be our main source of continuity and change. Individual and collective actors both replicate institutions through their day-to-day actions by abiding by them as well as attempt to influence changes. What is targeted for change, how, and why depends on the tradition being followed: rational choice, sociological, or historical. Actors would then design strategies and mobilize actions around self-interest, shared norms, or existing paths when attempting to institutionalize a practice. The directionality here is also reciprocal, as each of these areas would impact actors' strategic actions. Lastly, actions are intended to institutionalize a practice, however, as institutions can be

inadequate, or when policy or plan implementation demands new organization or reorganization, legislation, regulation, or new routines and procedures” (Alexander, 2017, p.96-97)

⁸ There is an element of intentionality in change that is not necessarily present in the way an existing institution is carried out as the later by definition is routinized and thus not subject to questioning action on a day to day basis

resistant to change, there are often feedback effects that impact the self-interest, shared norms, or path creation.




Figure 2: Institutionalization framework

As this discussion suggests, current approximations to institutionalization within planning theory are insufficient in helping us explain the actions that progressive actors would privilege as they attempt to give their practices continuity. This article seeks to contribute to planning theory’s institutional approach and to progressive planning conceptualizations by showing that processes behind institutional transformations can be intentional and that the actions undertaken under these processes can be broadly categorized into four elements. Despite the work advanced by scholars, the institutional turn remains under-theorized within planning. While planning acknowledges the fundamental importance of institutions, it has “largely ceded leadership of the writing on the ‘new institutionalism’ to other fields” (Verma,

2007, p. 1). Shortcomings in the theorizing of institutions at the urban or municipal scale are also found in closely related fields such as urban politics (Davis & Troustine, 2012; Lowndes, 2001). Planning theorists must attend to institutionalization as it holds the promise to “profoundly change the nature of planning as practice” (Bolan, 1996, p. 510).

Research Design and Methodology

This research was designed as a case study employing qualitative methods given the purpose of understanding the common elements found in different societal actors’ pursuit of progressive planning institutionalization, a goal requiring detailed insights from those involved in advocating for a practice and attempting its continuity. Medellin was purposively selected as a research site given its notoriety as a progressive city over the past fifteen years. According to Greenwood and Hinings (1996) case studies as a research strategy allow insights into power and interests, both of which are important for the analysis and theorizing of institutional change. Ethnographic methods “have the potential to cast new light inductively on the micro-dynamics of institutional formation, maintenance, and change” (Davis & Troustine, 2012, p.66). According to Lowndes (2014, p. 688) when researching informal institutions “the best way is to ask actors about rules (via interviews, focus groups, or diary keeping) and study behavior on the ground (via observation, ethnographies, or action research)”.

Data was collected between February 2016 and July 2017 through in-depth semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, direct observation, and document analysis. A total of 82 individuals were interviewed, some multiple times, with interviews ranging between 45 and 150 minutes per session. Interviewees included

politicians, bureaucrats, business elites, and members of community-based organizations, citizen collectives, and social movements. A criterion for selection was having been involved in planning for at least two full mayoral terms (in this case, eight years). This was needed in order to ensure that respondents possessed detailed knowledge and were able to provide rich insights on the practices in the sector under analysis, the threats faced by actors attempting progressive practices in the sector, and the challenges of having a practice achieve continuity as a mayoral term expired and they city transitioned to a new administration. Expert sampling was used at the beginning and was followed by snowball sampling with respondents recruited via email, phone call, WhatsApp, and in person. In addition, over one hundred informal and unstructured interviews were conducted impromptu with residents, planners, civil society leaders, social movement activists, academics and similar actors when the opportunity presented itself at government forums, community events, movement meetings, and similar scenarios.

Four focus groups with bureaucrats and current and former members of community-based organizations were conducted between May and July 2017. The objective of these sessions was to hold group discussions on the emergence of progressive practices, the actions taken to given them continuity, and the challenges faced. This allowed me to see how each conceptualized practices, how they remembered interacting and addressing challenges at different stages, and allowed for the clarification of contradictions in accounts that had emerged from individual interviews. Direct observation was conducted at public events and invitation-only forums organized by city hall, the city council, community based organizations, social movements, universities, and the private sector. These spaces provided opportunities

to see how different actors framed and communicated information as well as how they advocated for certain practices. Invitations to closed-door civil society events allowed me to gain a better understanding of how actors assessed and negotiated strategic actions to be carried out. Site visits were conducted to observe different projects and neighborhoods where many of the interventions analyzed have taken place.

Documents analyzed include city plans and project documents obtained from state agencies; minutes of public hearings and events; documentation of projects produced by different levels of government, academics, and international organizations; archival research at two community-based organizations' documentation centers; press reports by local, national, and foreign press; public perception surveys; pamphlets; and social media communication on Twitter and Facebook by individuals, organizations, and agencies relevant to this study.

Data analysis focused on individuals and their decision-making processes and actions in pursuit of institutionalizing progressive planning practices. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and fully reviewed to develop codes. Emerging themes were grouped in order to assess the occurrence of actions in pursuit of institutionalization and to uncover the most common themes expressed by interviewees and focus group attendees, observed at public and private forums, and identified in documents. Integrity and credibility of the results was sought through long-term involvement at the research site, repeated interactions with informants, and the collection of detailed and varied data from multiple sources.

Contextual background

Medellin, the second largest city in Colombia, had become clearly divided by the end of the 20th century into two cities: one formal, and the other informal, with the

later plagued by “high levels of spatial, social, and economic inequality among its inhabitants” (DNP, 1991, p.3). In light of this realization, a Presidential Council for Medellin and its Metropolitan Area was created in 1990 as an effort to bring together the newly decentralized local state apparatus, the national government, the business sector, local communities, academia, and the media, to identify the roots of the city’s problems and arrive at potential avenues to resolve them. In a city with historically high socio-spatial inequality where citizens, particularly poor communities, had been marginalized from formal planning processes and outcomes, the introduction of spaces for state and non-state actors to discuss the realities of the city produced highly detailed suggestions of actions to take to improve the built environment.

The forms of engagement and suggestions for action of the 1990s were attractive to progressive mayors Sergio Fajardo (2004-2007) and Alonso Salazar (2008-2011). As mayors they led the espousal of ‘social urbanism’, a policy of holistic urban interventions that combined high levels of public investment in the poorest areas of the city with improvements in public participation to formally re-engage the government with communities. Social urbanism centered on narratives of paying back a historical debt owed by the city towards its poorer inhabitants. The narrative was paired with ideas of the need to change ‘the city’s skin’ by intervening in the built environment. By creating these narratives the administrations legitimized moves to shift resources from upper and middle class neighborhoods (historically the recipients of state sponsored interventions) to the city’s most marginalized communities.

The social urbanism period, by far the most progressive in the city’s recent history, has been followed by less progressive approaches to city planning. Anibal

Gaviria (2012-2015) emphasized redirecting the city to its downtown and limiting expansion through the adoption of a greenbelt, with less attention paid to neighborhood upgrading, participatory planning, and the articulation among government agencies. Current mayor Federico Gutierrez (2016- 2019) has formulated a four-year plan where sustainable mobility and security stand out as key focus areas, and while an improvement in agency articulation has taken place, it continues to be for the most part weak. Today, Medellin is a city of approximately 2.4 million people (3.2 million in its ten-cities metropolitan area) divided for administrative purposes into five *corregimientos* (districts) and 16 communes.

Institutionalizing progressive water services in Medellin

Despite being home to well-known and much lauded state-owned, corporatized water utility company EPM (*Empresas Publicas de Medellin*), not all citizens in Medellin have access to safe drinking water. Moreover, not all city residents are served by EPM as the city is also home to 22 small, mostly communal, water service providers. Independent of which provider commercializes networked potable water, the inability to pay the water utility bill often leaves many families in Medellin's poorest areas unable to access these services after being disconnected for missed payments. In addition many city residents have been stuck for decades in a no-man's land when it came to accessing water. Policies mandated that a housing unit be located in land zoned as suitable for housing before networked water services could be extended to it, leaving many poor residents inhabiting constructions not abiding by the policy unable to legally access the much needed public service.

State and non-state actors agree that changes in water service provision policy have been largely the result of long fought battles headed by civil society, particularly

social movements and community-based organizations advocating for water as a fundamental right. Typical of social movements, imagery and discourse have been important tools to frame and mobilize interest. The issue of disconnected users has been framed as a human rights violation - appealing to the moral conscience of the public at large, a violation of treaties - appealing to the law, and a violation of understandings of fairness - portraying utilities in cartoons as rats in order to mobilize low-income communities. An important organization mobilizing interest since 1999 was the now defunct *Red de Organizaciones Comunitarias* (ROC - network of community organizations). ROC was key in making the problem visible through different strategies. On the political front they brought attention to the issue and presented possible solutions to aspiring politicians such as Alonso Salazar (a strategy of communication) but also held marches and pacific takeovers of government events (a strategy of contention). On the community front, they nurtured leaderships and transferred knowledge through certified trainings, but also made sure to involve regular citizens through community festivals with water as a theme. On the legal front, starting in 2006, ROC began to support individuals to file lawsuits against the city for a water lifeline through a legal mechanism known as *tutela*. The demands did not prosper as the courts stated that access to water was not a constitutionally protected right. Membership in ROC dispersed in 2009 but many of the actors active within the network continued pressing for water services, with two emerging as crucial players: the *Alianza por la Zona Nororiental* (an alliance of four community-based organizations), and the movement *Mesa Interbarrial de Desconectados*.

Around the same period, the local government started to experiment with participatory budgeting (PB). Initially conceived as an exercise in citizenship

formation, it quickly morphed due to citizens' demands into a more genuine, albeit limited way to prioritize resources. One of the key issues to emerge in PB gatherings was the need for a water lifeline. Direct contact by members of the city's planning agency and the social inclusion secretariat with communities allowed the voicing of water grievances at a new government level, and brought the issue to the attention of mid-level bureaucrats and appointed officials.

In 2008 incoming mayor Salazar recognized the severity of the problem and tasked his team with identifying ways to address it. Since the national courts had already filed judgments, the city had to ensure that guaranteeing access to a water lifeline did not break any laws. This required getting authorizations, creating guidelines on who could access the subsidies, and how would a program be managed to ensure it did not become a financial burden on the city. The first important change in the sector was the piloting of the program *Plan Litros de Amor* (liters of love plan). In April 2009 an agreement was signed between city hall and EPM and applications by families began to be accepted. The program officially launched in June. The objective of the program was to provide 2.5 cubic meters of water per person per month, ensuring that low-income families could meet their basic water and sanitation needs. The amount is based on World Health Organization calculations. Salazar introduced the initiative stating, "we invite you to be part of this transformation for a Medellin with more solidarity, inclusiveness, and equity". Medellin became the first city in the country to provide a free water lifeline, adding to its then nascent image as an innovative city. Initially authorized for 9,320 households, it was requested by 7,179, which represented a total of 39,436 people. Additional measures were instituted such as holding sessions where families could finance their outstanding debt

in order to gain reconnection to the network, and sessions to teach families how to make responsible use of water services.

In 2011 the program went from pilot to city policy officially recognized under Agreement 06 and Decree 1889. Between 2012 and 2013 three small water services providers signed contracts with the city to provide water through the program. Decree 0013 modified the program in 2014 and moved it from city hall initiative, *Medellin Solidaria*, to the Secretariat for Citizenry Quality and Service which further expanded the number of families that could apply to become beneficiaries. The move represented an important win for bureaucrats associated with the practice who advocated that the program be decoupled from *Medellin Solidaria*. By expanding the number of government programs to which recipients could belong to it was easier to ensure the membership continuity for beneficiaries as their access to the lifeline was lost after a certain period of time due to *Medellin Solidaria* requirements. The secretariat was dissolved in 2015 and replaced by the Territorial Management and Control Secretariat which is the one in charge to date of running the water lifeline, now known as *Minimo Vital de Agua Potable*, through its sub-secretariat for public services.

As of 2017, 26 employees (non-career civil servants) and 2 career civil servants ran the program. The program leader, who coordinates the process, has been affiliated continuously with it since 2011 (providing herself a source of continuity through institutional memory), and the administrative team has not experienced much turnover either. Field technicians, who work under contracts, do experience higher turnover. Personnel from the sub-secretariat of citizen services provide support at 20 government offices dispersed throughout the city. Between 2014 and 2017 an

additional 19 small water services providers were added, bringing the total to 22 plus EPM. The costs associated with the lifeline are credited directly by city hall to the utilities that have signed contracts with the local government to be part of the program. As of 2017, the smallest annual contract between the city and the providers was with Corporacion de Acueducto San Jose for \$1,944, while the largest was with EPM for \$3,435,677.⁹ The annual cost of maintaining the policy is approximately \$3.7 million.

The program has been active for three mayoral terms with mayors coming from three different political parties and as of 2017 was benefiting 243,890 people comprising 46,694 households. From its inception great care has been taken to clarify who qualifies for the program and document application guidelines. Today, the program is available to households that receive a score below 47.99 (based on version 3 of a survey instrument called SISBEN designed by the national government that goes from 0.1 to 100). Recipients must be legally connected to water and sanitation services and enrolled in one of the programs offered by city hall to help families improve their socio-economic conditions. In addition, qualifying individuals cannot have past-due water and sanitation bills (a controversial requirement still contested by social movements and community organizations but which government officials defend with arguments of moral hazard and appeals to programs designed to help families restructure their existing utilities debt). Technicians affiliated with the program visit the families frequently to answer questions, ensure they understand the requirements needed to continue to qualify for the program (for example, if they are moving to a new house, they must notify the program to ensure their allowance is

⁹ Using the average US dollar to Colombian peso exchange rate for 2017 of 1 USD= 2,962.26 COP

credited at the new location), and to provide water saving tips.

Narratives associated with the program include the importance of access to water as a human right, the importance it has as a source of environmental, social, and economic benefits for families and society, its role in improving quality of life, and its ability to help create social inclusion. For example, the government has expressed in its social benefits narrative that the program decreases the risks of contracting illnesses associated with the absence or poor quality of water (which has both an individual benefit but also positive social externalities) and that it improves social inclusion by making citizens the direct beneficiaries of a government program that covers the entire family. These types of narratives, which are tied to concrete outcomes, help socialize the practice to actors indirectly linked to it such as the health secretariat and the social inclusion secretariat. Other more marketable narratives in line with the city's image of 'model city' have also emerged such as framing the program in relation to the country: "Medellin is Colombia's pioneer city on *Minimo Vital de Agua Potable*". Bureaucrats working within the program also mobilize narratives tied to formal institutions. For example, national Law 142, article 5, states that cities should ensure the efficient provision of public services with quality, coverage, and continuity. However, the law does not mandate the free provision of a water lifeline, as such, it can only be mobilized as an inducement and great care is taken by mid-level bureaucrats to highlight the benefits (social, environmental, and reputational) of continuing the program.

Despite all these steps concerns for the continuity of the lifeline program remain. As a state employee stated, "continuity depends on what a new mayor wants, as he has the power to terminate the program, but socially it is difficult to suspend this

program, people speak very highly of it. The social benefits are too high, and access to water is a fundamental right”. Another state employee added, “we show new mayors the benefits [...] we know that it has repercussions in the most vulnerable populations, and it garners attention because we were the pioneers in Colombia in this type of program. We have had visits from other mayors’ offices to learn how we implemented the program – Bogota, Pasto, Manizales – and this attention is positive”.

An important restriction of the lifeline program is that it is limited to households with legal connections. Civil society continues to exercise pressure on the local and national government in search of more and better guarantees of access to safe drinking water. Community groups continue working with bureaucrats to identify steps to help individuals connect or reconnect to water services. In recent years the local government has begun addressing some limitations in the sector by working with communities and utilities to pilot initiatives aimed at expanding water coverage, and the currently ongoing *United for Water* is showing promising results. These initiatives include extending legal networks to increase household connections and providing public faucets. Both required amending the planning guidelines mandating that a housing unit be located in land recognized as suitable for housing in the city’s master plan. This was done through a program called *Reconocimiento de Edificaciones* (recognizing buildings) which helps legalize constructions initially carried out without a building permit if the land does not present mayor geological risks.

The elements of institutionalization

New approaches to planning and managing the city began to be proposed and piloted in Medellin starting in the early 2000s. These practices can be said to be progressive as they involved a combination of an activist local state and an active

citizenry working towards improving the material well being of low-income individuals. A review of the intentional strategic actions to give continuity to access to water services outlined above leads me to amend the framework proposed in Figure 1. The revised framework is shown in Figure 3:




Figure 3: Revised institutionalization framework

The framework divides the elements that emerged during fieldwork into four categories: relations, practices, concepts, and space. These elements build on earlier remarks of the importance of self-interest, shared norms, and path creation; however, they incorporate two important observations:

1. Space is a distinct element in institutionalization both in itself and in grounding the other elements.
2. A single element by itself cannot lead to strong institutionalization. Continuity requires continuous and ongoing action on all four fronts.

Institutions are then the product of the interaction between these elements, and individual and collective actors mobilize the elements dynamically. Note that the actors do not have to remain the same: in the case of Medellin, the mayor is long gone, ROC has ceased to exist, and many of the bureaucrats involved in getting the water lifeline started have moved on. Their role in keeping the practice alive has been taken over by other actors – new mayors, community based organizations and social movements, other bureaucrats, regular citizens, and utilities. What is important is the ongoing collective support for the continuity of the practice.

As the benefits of increased government activism and citizen involvement became clear the actors interested in the continuity of these approaches took steps to attempt their continuity¹⁰. Table 5 draws on empirical evidence from Medellin to expand on key components of each element. The elements are analyzed below to explain their importance and ability to lead to greater effectiveness in the continuity of emerging progressive practices. Existing literature on institutions complements this analysis.

¹⁰ Of all the individuals interviewed for this research, only two former high-level government officials said they took steps to attempt to institutionalize progressive practices but were not concerned that said continuity would be threatened. Probed on the reason for their optimism, they both seemed to have a high degree of naiveté at the moment they were in power. As one person expressed “what we were doing was clearly so beneficial to the communities, clearly so good, that why would the next administration want to mess with it?”

Relations	Water	Practices	Water	Concepts	Water	Space	Water
Constituency creation	Benefit 243,890 people; 23 water providers; 28 directly linked bureaucrats	Reduce ambiguity in interpretation	Agreement 06 and Decree 1889 in 2011; Decree 0013 in 2014	Justify resource allocation	Environmental, social, and economic benefits	Scale is tied to effectiveness	Small providers and EPM
Socialization leads to appropriation	New mayors value practice, as do health and social inclusion secretariats	Create incentives to comply, disincentives to stray	Good reputation with public, aids model city discourse	Frameworks substantiate existence of practice	Social (reduce inequality, improve health); environmental (sustainability)	Ground concepts	Benefits accrued by residents in zona nororiental, other low-income areas
Partnerships, coalitions, networking to mobilize interest	Community based organizations and bureaucrats	Make known resources needed	USD 3.7 million annually	Generate expectations for action	Rational use of water, lower rates of waterborne illness	Locate practices	Agency, providers, households
Enforcement	Sub-secretariat for public services; civil society	Facilitate the flow of information	With health, social inclusion secretariats; with potential beneficiaries	Influence perception	First city in the country to guarantee right to water	Situate relations	City hall, community

Table 5: Elements of institutionalization and their illustration

Relations

One of the elements targeted for continuity centers around engaging people and building relations. The importance of *relations* for institutionalization stems from multiple sources. First, by having people from different societal groups become interested in the progressive practice, agents seeking its continuity can have more people putting pressure on existing or changing administrations to keep the inchoate practice. This gives weight to the worthiness of the cause and helps cement its legitimacy. It is important to note that this constituency creation includes not only individuals or organizations benefiting directly from the institution say, through subsidies, programs, or infrastructure provision, but also others who stand to benefit from its continuity such as service providers, bureaucrats in charge of its implementation, and politicians seeking to capitalize on the ‘model city’ narrative. Change agents perceive the continuing involvement of individuals as an important source of positive feedback effects (Pierson, 2000; Sorensen, 2018). Constituency creation in Medellin is evidenced in the growth in the number of beneficiaries the water lifeline has had since its inception, which from 2009 to April 2017 was a 615% household increase. As a state employee shared “I do not know if socially it would benefit a mayor to take away a social program like this one” (interview by author, 2017). The program is also important for EPM and the other 22 small water providers who are guaranteed payment for up to 2.5 cubic meters of water per person per month.

Second, by creating opportunities for individuals to interact, change agents are able to open avenues for the socialization of the new progressive approach – something actors referred to as the importance of having wider “appropriation” of the

new planning approach. The importance of socialization is well documented in the social institutionalism literature (e.g. March & Olsen, 1989). Furthermore, as Boin and Chistensen (2008) have shown, escalating commitment to institutions can take place as the number of individuals involved in the practice increases, nudging others to conform. The importance of socialization was key to get the issue on the state's agenda: "participatory planning showed us that people did not have water which is a vital element. So that is how we started talking about a lifeline" (cabinet official, interview by author, 2016). MIDM pressed the issue hard socializing its importance with communities and the state: "we worked with communities to position the issue in the city's agenda and were able to get the administration from 2008-2011 to include the lifeline concept [...] but that was something we were fighting for since 2005-2006" (social movement leader, interview by author, 2016). As a bureaucrat working closely with the issue shared, "social movements around disconnected users were key. That phenomena was growing so much that it made the incoming mayor think about a solution to the problem, which is a really hard one" (bureaucrat, interview by author, 2017). Bureaucrats working with the lifeline also socialize others to its benefits, for example, by sharing its value with incoming mayors and actively working with other state agencies, mainly health, ISVIMED, (housing) and social inclusion, to ensure the program has wide appropriation.

A third rationale comes from the importance of partnerships, coalitions, and networking. These represent opportunities for actors to mobilize individuals, for example, to vote for candidates espousing the continuity of practices, to bring to the attention of street and mid-level bureaucrats the importance of an issue, or to eventually protest the policy's stagnation or abandonment. Networks create openings

to socialize individual and collective actors, give exposure to ideas, and negotiate understandings and actions. Work by Baumgartner and Jones (2009) shows that networks that include diverse actors such as experts, bureaucrats, or the media can highlight how a new avenue addresses problems, with the attention to the issue and its public discussion attracting even more participants. Social movements and community-based organizations continue to press water issues and mobilize community interest as evidenced by annual water festivals and the continuing existence of MIDM. Networking to mobilize interest extends to efforts between CBOs and state representatives. As a CBO leader shared, “we had a lunch meeting between us and EPM, it was organized by a friend and neither them nor us knew who was attending the lunch. All I knew was that it was a group a people I would be interested in speaking with. There were reservations on both sides. Through time, I built a relation with (an EPM foundation leader), and we exchanged perspectives on these topics [...] this has helped create more knowledge among EPM employees of our territories and necessities. When you see a map, there are people there, and those people have to go to their territories centrality to get water if they don’t have direct service” (community leader, interview by author, 2016).

Finally, the engagement of people, from key actors to large numbers of individuals, is perceived by progressive agents as key for the enforcement of the practice, as it means more people will keep track of its continuing implementation and raise alarms, denounce, or shame government officials deviating from its execution. Failure to enforce is often identified as a potential source of institutional change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Medellin continues to see CBOs, MIDM, water services

users, bureaucrats, and utility members engaged in the continuation of the service and the enforcement of the practice.

Practices

When it comes to pursuing the continuity of a progressive practice, one thing change agents identify as seemingly mundane and tedious but extremely important to address is who will be in charge and how, in other words, there is a need to articulate procedural clarity and through it make the institutionalization feasible. This is crucial for reducing ambiguity in interpretation of how practices are to be carried out by establishing procedures, guidelines and routines, who will carry them out (in terms of a department in charge, the individuals affiliated to the organization, and the clear delimitation of responsibilities), where the resources to finance it will come from, who has authority to enforce and regulate, what is the recourse for arbitration, and what mechanisms will be used to coordinate implementation. Formalization of the rules is considered to be a way to resolve ambiguity (Knight, 1992). The lifeline achieved this by clearly stating who is responsible for running the program, who qualifies to access it, etc. in Agreement 06 and Decree 1889 in 2011. Decree 0013 in 2014 amended some aspects that citizens and bureaucrats had highlighted were problematic. For example, initially beneficiaries had to be part of one of two social programs to meet state-sponsored guidance requirements: Medellín Solidaria or Mas Familias en Accion. In 2014 this was expanded so that now any mayor city-hall social program counts towards the requirement of receiving state-sponsored guidance, allowing more citizens to qualify or stay in the program.

The formalization of a practice includes within it the need to create incentives for those in charge of its implementation to comply, for example, by creating

budgetary allocations that cannot be assigned to other projects or programs. Alternatively, disincentives to stray can be incorporated for instance through the threat of lawsuits when the practice is tied to national guidance on issue (e.g. right to drinking water), or through reminders of the potential loss of benefits from straying (e.g. recognition as pioneers in the area). Clarifying procedures for practices is important when we consider that structures do not necessarily produce behavior but they do impact it through incentives (Ostrom, 1986). An important incentive to comply in Medellin is the good reputation the program has among different sectors. While not instrumental to its continuity, another incentive that adds to the program's allure is that it contributes to the model-city narrative.

Another factor highlighted by progressive actors is the importance of making known the resources needed and potential sources to secure them. This is key in order to design procedures with reduced ambiguity, but also in their own right, as a miscommunication of human, financial, or political resources can lead to stagnation or demise. For example, a program for which only 50 percent of the required financial resources to implement, monitor, and evaluate are requested will eventually experience cuts in one or all areas. A further interrogation of potential sources of funding can help with continuity, for example, by identifying where in the municipal budget can the resources come from or what type of partnerships can be established to help alleviate pressure from a single agency acting as funder. In Medellin it is clear that legislation does not allow the funds to come from areas such as the city's Solidarity Fund (which pays for services such as public lights) and must instead come from the general budget. The agency tasked with the program must therefore ensure

that the approximate USD 3.7 million it costs to run the program annually are part of the city's budget.

Finally, the articulation of procedures helps facilitate information flows between members of the agency in charge of the practices, but also inter-agency, with the public, and with other stakeholders. Information is an important resource and it therefore requires clarity on how long individuals have to make it available when requested, what are the proper channels for transmitting it from one agency to another or to other stakeholders, and how information can be stored in order to preserve organizational memory. Information flow is crucial to the programs functioning and its reputation: a key reason it has been well received by society at large is that the guidelines for who qualifies to receive the aid are very clear. The team in charge of running the program must communicate monthly with each of the 23 service providers to update them on who qualifies to receive the subsidy and how much (since it varies given the number of people in each household). Field technicians also have to make sure that recipients are aware of the conditions tied to the lifeline.

Concepts

While articulating the procedural clarity of a practice is important, and relations help socialize it, a missing element to tie them is the creation and communication of an institution conceptually. The concepts developed by change agents to help a practice achieve continuity include narratives, symbols, ideas, values, and interests. Constructivist institutionalism, which originates from historical institutionalism, has demonstrated the importance of ideas and discourses in institutional change (Blyth, 2003; Hay, 2008; Neuman, 2012), as have sociological institutionalists such as Healey (1999, 2003). Concepts help agents justify the

allocation of human, political, and financial resources. Resources are limited, and whoever controls them controls an important tool for exerting power, as such, a concept to sway the powerful must provide a good return on investment. In Medellin, words associated with the water lifeline include health, environmental sustainability, economic benefits, and social justice as evidenced in presentations on the subject by the public services sub-secretariat. Similar concepts were raised during interviews: the program “generates *social benefits* by guaranteeing for *the most vulnerable* access to a *vital liquid* which is a *fundamental right*” (state employee, interview by author, 2017).

Second, the articulation of concepts allows actors to develop normative and cognitive frameworks to substantiate the value or logic of the emerging practice, helping clarify its objective (e.g. to reduce inequality, to improve health) and through this mobilize interest and ease its socialization. Through discourses, agents can construct ideas and norms that in turn create and maintain institutions (Schmidt, 2008). An important normative framework in Medellin has been the idea of the lifeline as a source of dignity and equity. A key cognitive framework has been developed around the notion of environmental benefits generated by the program: “the program also promotes the efficient use of water through campaigns carried out with the beneficiaries to motivate its rational use, with most households reducing their water consumption” (Alcaldia de Medellin, 2015, p. 96).

Concepts can also help actors create expectations for action. Their framing is used to instruct bureaucrats, citizens and other stakeholders on why action is needed and justified, and not simply on why an idea is important. In line with Friedmann’s (1987) well-known words, they help move from knowledge to action. Finally,

concepts are important to influence perceptions (of what was feasible, desirable, legitimate, etc.). Perceptions can produce preferences and strategies that guide actors' action by creating or recreating for them context and material interests (Fuller, 2010). In Medellin, expectations for action are tied to the program's importance in creating "efficient and rational water use" which is tied to sustainability, but also the fact that the local government "must comply with law 142, article 5, which is very clear in stating that we must ensure the efficient provision of public services with quality, access, and continuity" (state employee, interview by author, 2017). Narratives of sustainability and equity create a perception of its desirability and feasibility. Furthermore, they feed other narratives such as the one that sees Medellin as a pioneering city.

Space

City actors are well aware of the importance of space and this awareness comes into play when the continuity of a practice is being pursued. Spatial awareness is particularly important when it comes to institutionalizing a practice and creating the conditions for it to meet the needs of its target audience or location. As Pieterse (2008) notes, the spatial scale is paramount to the effective delivery of service. In addition, change agents consider it paramount to effective continuity. The recognition of scale and its relation to effectiveness is evidenced in the move between 2009 and 2017 to incorporate the 22 small-scale providers in addition to EPM, ensuring that the program reaches a larger population.

Lefebvre (1991) suggests that space is a social product, lived through images and symbols. Spatial awareness allows change agents to bind the concepts they develop to a place, to locate practices by illustrating where procedures are to be

displayed, and to mobilize relations towards the creation and modification of spaces. In other words, progressive planning institutionalization requires not just actions and strategies to address relations, practices, and concepts, but the addition of a spatial component in their development. Analyzing the role of sociological institutionalism in planning, Gonzalez and Healey (2005, p.2059) note, “the sense of belonging to a place might be a powerful mobilizing force which could lead to social innovative initiatives with transformative potentials.” The grounding of concepts in Medellin is evidenced in how these are spatially referred to, for example, a text by the local government states that “the distribution of benefited households in the territory evidences an equitable city in regards to the prioritizing and assigning of resources to populations in situations of poverty, social vulnerability, and precariousness. Thirty-five percent of the subsidies benefit the inhabitants of the northeastern zone, furthermore communes Popular (1), San Javier (13), and Villa Hermosa (8) account for more than 4,700 households, meaning they have the highest proportion of benefited households (14%, 13% and 12.6% respectively)” (Alcaldia de Medellin, 2015, p. 96).

Thinking of space allows situating relations, practices, and concepts not just in the city but also in the organization(s) tasked with implementing the progressive practice. Space then is co-constructed through relations and conceptualizations, and is where practices are carried out. Likewise, institutions are not immutable but rather lived and practiced socially which makes them subject to periodic reconstruction. How we think about space shapes the political questions we formulate (Massey, 2005), its political use (Lefebvre, 1991), and by extension, as change agents in Medellin show, how we think about space shapes the planning institutions we pursue as we attempt to give continuity to progressive practices. Practices have been clearly

located by tasking the public services sub-secretariat with responsibilities and by making clear who qualifies for the benefits, which in a socio-spatially segregated city like Medellin quickly translates into key city areas. Lastly, a spatial consideration situates relations, as these do not necessarily take place randomly throughout the city. Instead, the relations that account for constituency creation, socialization, networks, and enforcement take place within city hall, in CBO offices, and in the areas of the city where field technicians and beneficiary households come into contact.

Discussion

The actions taken by state and non-state individual and collective actors in Medellin show the importance of continuous support from different fronts and on different target areas. This support has been key in turning the water lifeline from pilot into policy and in keeping the policy alive across the terms of three mayors from different political parties. Institutionalization is a dynamic and ongoing process and not something that gets ‘done’ with a clear completion date. Rather, actors pursue various strategies such as building on previous successes to improve the practice and its continuity (as the efforts around the changing legal framework through decrees shows), and capitalizing on initially unintended actions (such as taking advantage of pioneering a practice in order to grow their narrative portfolio). Clear constituencies to advocate for the continuity of the practice were formed (beneficiaries, water providers, bureaucrats, and politicians). Government workers in the public services agency have socialized the importance of the practice to other agencies such as health services and social inclusion. Community based organizations have also socialized the practice, encouraging people who qualify to request access to the lifeline and using it as a springboard to expand claims addressing the need for increased network availability.

Interest has been mobilized within the government and within non-state actors, as well as between these in the form of networks, which have also played an important role in the enforcement of the practice.

The changes initiated by government and non-government actors included articulating different government agencies to achieve greater synergies in the execution of projects and the running of programs, prioritizing public investment and involvement in areas traditionally underserved by the local government, and active civil society involvement. Citizen involvement has varied from highly contentious, as in the case of social movements advocating for water rights, to more negotiated and participatory engagements as seen in interactions between community-based organizations and city agencies.

Practices and concepts were also targeted, including both formal institutions – legislation, regulations, and other officially enforced rules and standards – and informal institutions – norms and other rules enforced outside official channels. The lifeline water program illustrates the potential of taking the articulation of practices seriously: it has had very clear guidelines on who can be enrolled, how they become beneficiaries, which government agency is in charge and what responsibility each member of the team has in making the program possible, where in the city budget will the funds come from, etc. Steps have been taken to facilitate the flow of resources and information with other government agencies and with the public. Organizational strategies are thus key to achieving institutionalization, but as noted earlier, organizations and institutions are not the same, and cognizant of this, change agents focus beyond practices.

Narratives and discourses are important strategic actions that can lead to greater effectiveness in continuity by justifying resource allocation, providing frameworks for action, generating expectations, and influencing perception. However important, they are not enough: who mobilizes equity or sustainability, how do they do so, and where? Ideas alone do not create a strong institution as the discussion on relations, practices, and space shows, but they are an important element.

Spatial considerations were also center stage. Rather than working solely with EPM, the lifeline program sought to bring scalar considerations into play from the start, working with small providers that were better positioned to provide effective services in certain parts. Space is also closely tied to discourse (Richardson & Jensen, 2003), a fact evidenced on where social, economic, political and environmental narratives were targeted. Actors understand that practices and relations are not aspatial, and this gets taken into account when mobilizing and socializing others, as well as in the creation of unambiguous policies.

Conclusion

Planning literature has explored different aspects of the progressive city including the conditions conducive to its emergence, the challenges faced by its actors, and its demise. The avenues explored by progressive actors to give practices continuity are less clear, and an exploration of the intersection of planning and institutionalism theories reveals a gap. Healey (2005) has advocated for more case studies of contextualized planning efforts that can help planners learn how planning activities get institutionalized. Results from this study of the inchoate progressive planning practices emerging in Medellin and the actors behind them demonstrate that four elements of institutionalization prioritized by state and non-state agents can be

identified: relations, practices, concepts, and space. These elements are part of the process of turning a nascent practice into a regularly enforced practice that shapes behavior recurrently in predictable ways; in other words, these are key elements that group strategic actions pursued by agents as they attempt to create durability through institutionalization.

This article supports and builds on the existing literature highlighting the institutional turn in planning theory by demonstrating that actors perceive formal and informal institutions as being important channels for the continuation of progressive practices. Attempting to change institutions is an iterative dynamic process and actors are painfully aware of the limitations that the existing politico-administrative institutions place upon them. Actors seek to change institutions, but institutions in turn constrain the range of options available for action. As such, the framework is not static but dynamic, with actors adapting to existing institutions and accommodating changes as feedback loops from the pursuit of the elements emerge.

The case of water service provision in Medellin illustrates how actors sought to embed the practices by making them enforceable, patterned, shared, and space-conscious. This work contributes to ongoing efforts to theorize the progressive city and further the development of urban institutional theory. While the research focused on a city in the global South, the framework and the elements it highlights can likely be extended to other contexts. Attempts to replicate its use analyzing institutionalization successes and failures in other cities are needed and could provide valuable insights to expand or further clarify the framework.

This paper argues that relations, practices, concepts and space are key in the pursuit of institutionalization. The application of these elements notes the importance

of bringing together different strands of institutional theory: relations alone cannot institutionalize, neither can practices, concepts, or awareness of space. Instead, this paper shows that sociological institutionalism's emphasis on the social reproduction of institutions, historical institutionalism's focus on the limitations that existing institutions impose, constructivist institutionalism's emphasis on ideas and discourse, and rational choice's focus on self-interest all have important pieces of the puzzle, while none are able to solve it by themselves. Effectiveness in institutionalization is then, if not guaranteed, better positioned to take place when actors are cognizant of the four elements and actively and dynamically target them in pursuit of their goals.

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CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONAL COMPOUNDING AND THE CONTINUITY OF
PROGRESSIVE PLANNING ¹¹

Abstract

What explains the institutionalization of progressive city planning practices? Using Medellin as a case study, this article analyses the targeting by state and non-state actors of both formal and informal institutions in efforts to maintain the continuity of progressive public space provision practices. The article introduces the idea of institutional compounding, defined as the quest by networks of individuals and organizations to create and sustain both formal and informal institutions, where each maintains its particular defining features but together they provide continuity and legitimacy to an existing practice. I draw on in-depth semi-structured interviews, direct observation, and document analysis to demonstrate that continuity efforts are more likely to have effect when actors engage in institutional compounding as the strategy minimizes the shortcomings of formal and informal institutions alone. Findings contribute towards refining our understanding of institutionalization at the local level by conceptualizing how nascent institutions become effective through compounding, highlighting how actors strengthen the redistributive practices they manage to set in place and how they seek to embed them through networked efforts.

Key words: institutions, progressive planning, local government, networks, complementary institutions, public space

Examining the dynamics between formal and informal institutions in progressive city planning

Medellin has suffered from a dearth of public space for decades. In the 1990s the city began attempts to renew existing public spaces and create new ones downtown and near government buildings. The 2000s brought a shift in the approach to public space provision by recognizing that interventions needed to be carried out in the most marginalized neighborhoods as these had the highest need. The result was the creation

¹¹ Target journal: Urban Studies

of lineal parks along creeks, integrating public space to public infrastructure systems like the metro, building library-parks and children's playgrounds, and creating and upgrading sports facilities. Interventions were carried out with community input and changed considerably the landscape of hillside neighborhoods. Progressive approaches to public space provision continue to take place despite their less than enthusiastic embrace by the current mayor. What explains this, how do different actors embed progressive public space practices in new or existing institutions, and how do they strengthen the practices they manage to set in place?

The pursuit of the progressive city is characterized by an emphasis on democracy as process, local government activism as practice, and increased equity as outcome. Changes in cities in the global South brought about through democratization, decentralization and devolution have created real opportunities for municipal leadership to be contested and for progressive leaders to come into power (Abers, 2000; Berney, 2017). Furthermore, openings in political opportunity structures have allowed community-based organizations, collectives, and other civil society groups to access new avenues to impact public policy (Baiocchi, Heller, & Silva, 2011; Beard, Miraftab, & Silver, 2008; Goldfrank, 2011). Traditional powerbrokers such as local economic elites have had to re-formulate approaches to engaging state and non-state actors alike (Rubin & Bennett, 2014). While the changes seen in some cities are promising and encouraging, their institutional realities should give pause regarding the possibility of sustained implementation of progressive planning practices. This concern for continuity leads to the question motivating this article: what explains the institutionalization of some progressive city planning practices?

A common point of departure among new institutionalism literatures is that institutions impact individuals and organizations, and these, in turn, actively influence the maintenance or transformation of institutions. The dominant approaches to planning the city are likewise influenced by the prevailing social, economic, and political institutions that constrain and enable state and non-state actors by creating both formal and informal contingencies. However, actors can transform planning institutions by taking advantage of conducive political structures and challenging those formations aimed at constraining their preferred approach to planning or managing the city. Institutional design and change are increasingly gaining relevance within planning theory as evidenced by recent works including Carmin, Anguelovski and Roberts (2012), Kim (2011), Morrison (2017), Neuman (2012), and Sorensen (2018). Despite this renewed attention, most of the planning literature analyzing institutions focuses on how they impact planning processes and outcomes, with less attention paid to the strategies individuals use to give continuity to formal and informal institutions once they emerge.

The purpose of this article is to introduce the idea of institutional compounding and to examine the mechanisms and processes that give rise to it in order to highlight its importance in the pursuit of progressive planning institutionalization. I define institutional compounding as the quest by networks of individuals and organizations to create and sustain both formal and informal institutions where each institutional form maintains its particular defining features yet together they provide continuity and legitimacy to an existing practice. Individually each institutional form is susceptible to weakness, yet combined these institutions are more likely to achieve persistence through time. I build on theoretical developments by Lauth (2000) and Helmke and

Levitsky (2006) on complementary institutions and apply this expanded theoretical framework to the analysis of nascent progressive public space institutions in Medellin, Colombia. This article contributes to institutional planning theory by conceptualizing how nascent institutions become effective through compounding, highlighting how state and non-state actors strengthen the redistributive practices they manage to set in place and how they seek to embed them through networked efforts.

Methodology

Using the city of Medellin, Colombia as a case study, this article analyses the actions taken by politicians, bureaucrats, community-based organizations, civil society leaders and business elites, in an effort to institutionalize progressive planning practices. Medellin was purposive selected as an exemplary case given the active efforts of state and non-state actors and the progressive planning outcomes achieved over the past fifteen years. Selection was purposeful given the need for an information- rich site with the capacity to provide “the greatest possible amount of information on a given problem or phenomenon” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.229). Case-oriented ethnographic research is highly conducive for the analysis and theorizing of institutional change as it provides insights into power and interests (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Cases and ethnographic methods help also to uncover informal institutions as embeddedness can ingrain these in actors leading to a lack of awareness of their existence (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006).

To identify institutions and analyze the actions leading to institutionalization I relied on interviews, direct observation and archival research carried out between February 2016 and July 2017. In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 82 individuals recruited through expert and snowball sampling based on active

and public involvement, past or present, in progressive planning practices. Over one hundred informal and unstructured interviews with community residents, community leaders, planners, and government officials were conducted impromptu at government forums, community based organization events, and similar scenarios of interest to this study. Direct observation of community based organizations and associations meetings, as well as state and non-state sponsored public events, forums, and workshops allowed a glimpse into how strategic actions are negotiated, carried out, and assessed in group settings, as well as into how information gets framed and communicated. Site visits allowed me to observe the quality and use of the public spaces under discussion. Finally, documents consulted included government, associations, organizations, and press reports; minutes of public hearings and events; city plans and project documents obtained from government offices; public perception surveys; pamphlets; news articles and social media communication on Twitter and Facebook.

Data analysis focused on actors and their decision-making processes and actions; the formation, maintenance, and demise of networks; and the persistence, transformation, or disappearance of progressive planning practices in order to assess their institutionalization. Four strategies were employed to ensure the integrity and credibility of the research results. First, long-term involvement allowed for repeated interactions with interviewees and recurring observations. Second, interviewees were asked to provide feedback on the researcher's analysis and conclusions drawn from the data they provided. Third, interviewees, documents, and settings that could provide counterexamples were sought to reduce confirmation bias. Lastly, triangulation

through three methods of data collection was employed to reduce limitations due to a unique data source.

This article is divided in two parts with the first providing an overview of the relevant literature on progressive planning in the global South, institutions, and the importance of networks for institutionalization. In the second part, I analyze the efforts of state and non-state actors in Medellin to give continuity to progressive practices in the provision of public space. Findings reveal that effectiveness in the pursuit of continuity is linked to what I term institutional compounding which itself is the product of (1) actively pursuing strategies impacting both formal and informal institutions, while (2) networking with individuals from at least one different societal category. I conclude reflecting on the importance of institutional compounding as a strategy to create shared expectations on the continuity of rule-bound and enforceable practices related to progressive planning in the global South.

Progressive planning, institutions, and networks

Progressive planning in the Global South

Cities in the Global South witnessed extraordinary changes in the past three decades as democratization, decentralization, and devolution altered national-local dynamics, giving local actors greater autonomy over planning and managing cities (Beard, Miraftab, & Silver, 2008; Falleti, 2010). In Latin America, new approaches to urban administration have ranged from municipal neoliberalism to municipal socialism (Goldfrank & Schrank, 2009). Progressive cities have emerged as part of these changes. Characterized by citizen involvement and local government activism, I define progressive cities as those that prioritize the construction of urban amenities, the creation of social programs, and the implementation of socio-spatial interventions

aimed at improving the material wellbeing of individuals in traditionally marginalized neighborhoods while advancing the exercise of active citizenship. Similar to progressive cities in the U.S. where innovations “had roots in a social movement that found a common cause in neighborhood issues” (Clavel, 2010, p.7), Southern progressive practices have emerged from community mobilization to give visibility to neighborhood problems with the ultimate goal of engaging the local administration to meet its long neglected responsibilities. Recent work on the endurance of progressive policies and practices in the global North has emphasized the importance of the presence of active non-governmental organizations and policy networks with access to resources and able to achieve public legitimation of progressive policy goals (Schrock, 2015).

The challenge with work carried out to conceptualize the progressive city based on Global North analyses is that these make assumptions about political and administrative institutions that are not consistent with the experiences of cities in the Global South. Scholars looking at urban realities in the later have pointed out the need to re-conceptualize urban planning theories to account for the “stubborn realities” of cities in the global South (Watson, 2012; Yiftachel, 2006), to cope with the “actually existing urbanisms” of these complex and heterogeneous regions (Robinson & Roy, 2016; Shatkin, 2011) and to “see from the South” in order to refocus our attention (Watson, 2009). These calls seek to engage pragmatically with the contexts of southern cities in order to explore avenues for a more equitable improvement in material wellbeing and citizen experience.

One such important challenge faced by change agents in the global South is institutional weakness, defined as institutions that are ineffective and easily

circumvented (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). Institutional strength, commonly assumed in the global North, is something that cannot be assumed for all institutions in the Global South (O'Donnell, 1994; Watson, 2009). Moreover, “institutions in the developing world vary widely, both in terms of their enforcement and in terms of their durability” (Levitsky & Murillo, 2014, p.1). These weak institutions lead to ambiguity, uncertainty, and unclear expectations – precisely the opposite of what institutions are meant to accomplish. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue that in weak institutional environments actors often choose when and how to enforce rules. According to Watson (2009), weak local governments in the Global South mean that practices that could play a stronger role in addressing socio-spatial exclusion such as planning are themselves broken, leading to the promotion of anti-poor behaviors. Roy (2009) echoes this sentiment, arguing that formal planning regimes have entrenched ambiguities and exceptions that challenge development, governance, and justice. It is important then not only to have a dynamic civil society advocating for the needs of the poor but to work towards creating city governments with the capacity to deliver (Devas, 2001).

Studies of progressive cities in the Global South have the potential to contribute to the planning and urban studies literature by giving greater emphasis to the analysis of how actors strengthen the redistributive practices they manage to set in place and how they seek to embed them in new or existing institutions. There is a reciprocal dynamic at play in such considerations: on the one hand, strengthening local institutions, according to Pieterse (2008), empowers poor communities and improves their material wellbeing. On the other hand, as the emphasis on participation and social mobilization shows, progressive changes cannot be assumed to be gifted by the

state but require instead the active and coordinated approach by multiple societal agents interested in more just and equitable cities. As Pieterse points out, transformative urban change cannot be bestowed by the state nor be a consequence of good public policy and political will; transformative change requires agency by the poor, agency inserted into institutions and discourses that frame urban systems (p.7).

Less prominent but just as important as a potential source of support for progressive initiatives and their continuity is the private sector. Often thought of as exploitive and obstructionist (Brenner et al, 2012; Harvey, 2006), authors have recently shown that this segment of society is a lot more complex and does actually play an important role in the emergence and continuity of progressive practices (Rubin and Bennett, 2014). The focus of attention in this paper is not corporate social responsibility or philanthropy, important, as they are, but rather undertakings by private actors to hold the state accountable for the implementation of progressive practices. In sum, the pursuit of the progressive city in the global South requires not only government leadership and societal mobilization, but also recognizing the role of the private sector and a focus on building and strengthening progressive institutions.

Institutions as continuity

Institutions are defined as shared and enforceable practices with rule-like qualities that structure behaviors and constrains (Hall, 2010; Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). Two institutional forms are widely recognized across the social sciences: formal and informal. Formal institutions are defined as those where rules and procedures are established, communicated and enforced through official channels, in contrast with informal institutions, which are “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels”

(Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, p. 5). Informal institutions “cannot be implemented by means of formal coercion, but are instead based on agreements that are enforced by sanctions on the basis of unwritten normative behavioral expectations (Brie & Stolting, 2012, p.22). Informal institutions are nonetheless “common knowledge in the relevant context” and prescribe not only action but also omission (O’Donnell, 2006, p.288). While much of the literature has focused on their negative effects, including for example corruption and clientelism, recent work highlights the positive effects informal institutions can have, particularly at the local level. For instance, analyzing local government accountability in Argentina, Stokes (2006) shows that informal institutions create shared expectations that can reinforce formal institutions. Likewise, Tsai (2007) finds that social groups with shared moral obligations and ethical standards informally pressure local officials in China to invest in the provision of public goods through gossip, large group monitoring, and the creation of transparency through threats of exposure.

Both formal and informal institutions are important in structuring behavior, an understanding that has led to typologies of the interactions among them (Lauth, 2000; Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). Of interest for this article are complementary institutions¹², defined by Lauth (2000, p.25) as coexisting side-by-side and mutually reinforcing and supporting each other. Building on this Helmke and Levitsky define them as shaping behavior “in ways that neither violate the overarching formal rules nor produce substantially different outcomes. Often, they are seen to enhance the efficiency or effectiveness of formal institutions [...] *These informal norms create*

¹² For instances in which informal institutions undercut formal ones see discussions on accommodating and competing informal institutions in Helmke and Levitsky (2006)

incentives to comply with formal rules that might otherwise exist merely as pieces of parchment. Thus, compliance with formal rules is rooted not in the formal rules per se, but rather in shared expectations created by underlying (and often preexisting) informal norms” (p.13-14, italics added).

Building on the idea of complementarity, this paper argues that institutional compounding is an important source of institutional strength in the global South (Figure 4). I depart from Lauth’s conceptualization around coexistence, arguing that the formal and informal institutions do not merely coexist, reinforce, and support each other but rather that the existence of the complementary institution is integral to the actual exercise of the institution. In other words, while the formal institution may exist on paper, and the informal be widely accepted, neither alone has enough critical mass that can be mobilized for enforcement. The paper also departs from Helmke and Levitsky’s observations in three ways. First, while the authors state that informal institutions reinforce formal ones, I argue that in the cases where we see compounding they actually do more, as the enforcement of the formal institution is predicated on the existence of the informal institution. In other words, it is not merely a matter of ‘enhanced efficiency or effectiveness’; compounding takes complementarity further by making the difference between strength and weakness. Second, complementarity for the authors is grounded on an ‘effective’ formal institution (pg. 14), while I argue that the effectiveness of the formal is dependent on the existence of the informal as it is the latter that serves as a source of enforcement. Finally, while the authors consider that informal institutions can create incentives to comply with the formal rules, the mechanisms through which this takes place are not described. I argue that the incentives to exercise the institution are the product of compounding formal and

informal institutions, which itself is premised on the importance of networking across societal categories.

Compounding therefore means more than complementarity: it is about formal and informal institutions being aligned and working in the same direction, with informal institutions not just complementing formal ones but strengthening, reinforcing, or expanding them. Furthermore, compounding does not seek to qualify or label an informal institution the way complementary informal institutions do but rather to describe a relation among formal and informal institutions. An analogy helps illustrate the power of compounding: corn and butter complement each other, but compounding is analogous to making buttered popcorn¹³. The intervening mechanism for popcorn is heat, while for compounding it is networking.




Figure 4: Distinguishing complementarity and compounding

¹³ I am grateful to Charles Hoch for suggesting this analogy

In short, it is not enough to seek legally institutionalized progressive practices or socially shared norms alone; true and durable impact requires the support and commitment of state and non-state agents to take these policies from paper to practice through institutional compounding. Similar to mixed delivery systems that combine public and private sectors to achieve market complementarities at the local level (Hefetz, Warner & Vigoda-Gadot, 2014; Bel, Hebdon & Warner, 2018), the idea behind institutional compounding is that pursuing both formal and informal institutions leverages the defining features of each while simultaneously reducing their susceptibility to weakness, thus making the persistence through time of the progressive practice more likely. The nature and enforcement possibilities of each type of institution are what make the idea of institutional compounding appealing.

Networking to compound institutions

An important requirement for institutional compounding is the ability to network with individuals from another societal category. This follows closely findings from network institutionalism that suggest “that precise patterns of connection matter for explaining political outcomes” (Ansell, 2006, p.76). Networks are relationships such as friendships or cooperative exchanges between individuals, groups, or organizations that connect and create patterned interactions built on mutual obligation, affection, trust, and reciprocity (ibid). Particular importance is given in this text to what Chalmers et al. (1997) have called associative networks, “non-hierarchical structures formed through decisions by multiple actors who come together to shape public policy” (p.567), where the reference to decisions is meant to signify that these are created to serve a purpose.

Examining work by different authors on cohesion and collective action by informal actors, Radnitz (2011) highlights that a shared goal is more important than “shared identity, longstanding ties, and repeated interaction” as the later “are neither necessary nor sufficient to produce cooperation in and around the state” (p.359). While their motivations and strategies might differ, Radnitz’s observations help explain why dissimilar actors such as community-based organizations and business elites might work through informal institutions in search for a common objective such as the continuity of progressive planning practices.

The distinction between networks and coalitions must be highlighted to understand why this paper emphasizes the former. Comparing these structures in relation to social mobilization Van Stekelenburg and Boekkooi (2013) note that because they require formal organizations rather than informal and virtual networks, present a greater need to commit resources, and the pressure for ideological conformity, “building a formal enduring coalition will be most difficult to achieve and maintain [...] and using informal social networks without any form of formalized cooperation, obligation, or commitment will be easiest” (pp.224-225). Networks allow for flexible “forms and contents of interactions” and “may imply the exchange of information, resources, solidarity, and so on” (Diani, 2013, p. 157). Another important distinction is between goals and actions. As Fox (2010) notes, “while many networks involve shared goals among their participants, they do not necessarily involve joint action” (p.487). While networks formed by state and non-state actors in Medellin agree on progressive public space provision as a shared goal, they do not necessarily agree on the activities to pursue such goal (as coalitions would do). Furthermore, coalitions tend to pursue their goal actively, while in the case of Medellin we see that

the individuals and organizations involved in networking fluctuate between being active, being dormant, and re-activating when threats to the progressive practice seem to emerge.

In the following sections, I analyze approaches to public space provision in Medellin across different administrations starting in the late 1980s. The analysis shows that institutional compounding has been key in the continuity of progressive planning practices that emerged at the turn of the century given that: (1) the institutionalization of inchoate practices needs to be conceptualized as the product of both formal and informal institutions due to intrinsic weaknesses in each; (2) compounding goes beyond complementarity in the pursuit of effective continuity by creating sufficient critical mass for enforcement thus providing a source of institutional strength; and (3) given the multi-stakeholder nature of emerging progressive practices, institutionalization intrinsically demands the involvement of multiple actors, while the formal/informal dynamics of compounding demand that networks bring together actors from different societal categories to ensure legitimacy and enforcement. Two formal institutions are of relevance to this case: *Plan de Desarrollo* (PD), a development plan incoming mayors must create to guide the duration of their four year administration, and *Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial* (POT), a comprehensive spatial plan expected to cover three mayoral administrations (12 years). The informal institution of relevance to this case is the new norm on public space equity that emerged in the early 2000s which has been pursued through societal appropriation, non-state oversight of state actions, and the use of reputation and shaming to punish non-compliance.

Medellin and the progressive provision of public space

The importance of public space in urban areas is well documented (Bodnar, 2015). On one hand, it provides citizens with places of encounter, ranging from day to day social interactions – a conversation with a friend, exchanging pleasantries with a neighbor – to civic engagement with the state or the manifestation of cultural expressions. Public space can also serve commercial ends, particularly for informal vendors. On the environmental and health fronts, green spaces help reduce heat island effect and improve air quality, and the proximity to parks and squares can stimulate physical activities. Because of the social, economic, and environmental opportunities it affords, public space is considered to improve quality of life.

A challenge in cities with growing populations, little land for expansion due to geographical or administrative boundaries and tight land markets is the conservation and creation of public space. Furthermore, and particularly in cities with multiple and pressing demands on public budgets, it is easy to bypass investments in the creation or upgrade of public space infrastructure, prioritizing instead transportation and infrastructures more clearly associated with economic growth objectives. Medellin, like many cities in Colombia and the Global South in general, is no stranger to these realities and faces serious public space deficits that persist to date. According to the Colombian government, challenges to the improvement of public space in cities include lack of articulation between entities responsible for its provision, a shortage of financial resources for public space maintenance, and the weak application of planning and management instruments meant to help address the problem (DNP, 2012).

At 3.64 square meters of public space per person, Medellin is barely above the Colombian average of 3.3 square meters in urban centers (DNP, 2012). The worst

indicators are found in the city's historically marginalized northeastern zone: its four communes averaged just 2.39 square meters per person in 2016; however, this reflects an improvement compared to the 1.79 square meters per person just thirteen years earlier¹⁴. The city has set the goal of providing 15.6 square meters by 2030. The following paragraphs analyze the importance and weaknesses of formal and informal institutions in addressing past and existing public space needs and the potential of compounding to help recent initiatives maintain continuity.

1988-2003: election of mayors and key national laws

The end of the twentieth century represented a problematic time for Medellín. The city had become plagued by social, economic, and spatial inequality, and a resulting wave of violence forced people from all economic conditions to retreat into the safety of their fenced homes. Writing at the time, local author Viviescas (1992, p.277) notes, “we have to accept that one of the elements that has nourished the deterioration of collective life in Medellín is the systematic denial of the concept of public space and its physical destruction”. Reflecting on the challenges of the late 1980s and 1990s, the city government identified the origins of such destruction and denial to be based “in some cases, in the lack of political will and of continuity in plans and programs, plus the lack of financing in other cases, frustrating opportunities and the materialization of [public space] works” (Alcaldia de Medellín, 2011, p.125). A bureaucrat in the infrastructure department concurred: “this city was destroyed, in social and cultural terms we had negated public spaces, moving around the city, participating, expressing opinions. In reality the situation (of the late 80s and early

¹⁴ Calculations for 2016 based on data from Medellín Como Vamos <https://www.medellincomovamos.org/movilidad-y-espacio-p-blico/>
Calculations for 2003 based on data from Pelaez Bedoya

90s) made us antisocial, we refused everything public” (bureaucrat, interview by author, 2016).

An important launching point to address these challenges came with the implementation of decentralization and the formal institutions it created. Changes included the election of mayors, mandates for city executives to draft a *Plan de Desarrollo* (PD) or development plan for the duration of their term (to be approved by the city council) and the passing in 1997 of Law 388 on Territorial Development, mandating that cities create comprehensive spatial plans known as Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial (POT). Law 388 was particularly important as it highlighted the need for POTs to structure a public space system in cities. PDs and POTs became the only two legal instruments to conceptualize, plan, and set forth guidelines on the use and management of public space, and were “greatly significant in achieving some conversion of citizens’ aspirations into a plan” (city planner, interview by author, 2016). Medellín’s first POT, formulated between 1998 and 1999, highlighted the importance of recovering existing public space and of taking advantage of waterways as natural structuring elements of the city and its public space by constructing linear parks next to the creeks.

The initial generation of elected mayors (six in total) rose to power between 1988 and 2003. After decades of minimal intervention to improve public space, some minor though important public works began to take place including the construction of a few new public squares, a public library, a music hall, and a convention center. Key state-financed interventions included the renewal of Parque San Antonio in the city center, the construction of Plaza de las Esculturas (better known as Plaza Botero in honor of the 23 sculptures donated by artist Fernando Botero), Plaza de las Luces

(next to the newly built EPM library and across from city hall), and Plaza de los Pies Descalzos. Perhaps the most influential new public space was Plaza de los Deseos: located relatively close to informal settlements and near government infrastructures, the plaza was designed to host open air movies and concerts, and included water features for people to play with.

Despite being welcomed by many citizens, the new interventions faced serious shortcomings. One critique was that these were territorially scattered and isolated interventions without linkages among them, nor did they make a clear contribution to consolidating the existing urban structure. A second critique was that the projects had taken place in the formal city, while the informal city continued to be neglected. As an interviewee noted “people enjoyed going to Parque de los Deseos or Parque de los Pies Descalzos, but they had to spend money on transportation to get there” (EPM manager, interview by author, 2016). A community leader concurred: “people liked the new parks, used them when they could, and wanted those spaces, but they were not conveniently located” (community leader, interview by author, 2016).

Medellin’s marginalized settlements were accustomed to the state’s neglect. Many of these areas had come to exist through land invasion processes with families building shacks, and then if and when financial conditions permitted, houses. As these processes took place, communities made efforts to “set aside land for three things: a school, a church, and a playing field” (two community leaders, interview by author, 2017). Another leader from commune one concurred, “we would leave room for a church and a park and a commercial area, so in each plot it was (neighbors saying) don’t build here because this is for the park or the soccer field, don’t build here because it is for the church nor here because it is a road, but anywhere else it is up to

you where you want to build” (community leader, focus group, 2017). However, pressure on these few open spaces would mount as time progressed and more people attempted to move into the settlements. The result was, as community leaders who took part in the presidential council of the 1990s noted, “the depletion of physical spaces, both for the practice of sports and recreation, as well as those allocated to infrastructure, which impedes the availability of places for integration and the development of creative activities” (Ortiz et al, 1992, p.95). Community leaders suggested the creation of libraries, cultural centers, recreation and sports fields, and the treatment of polluted creeks in order to intervene their borders and generate new public space (ibid).

New legislation on POTs and PDs was integral for city planners: as practitioners of a state-based practice, formal institutions were needed to provide guidance and constrains through codified rules, generate expectations and standards of conduct, and ideally carry within them mechanisms for enforcement. Together POTs and PDs are meant to create an integral system that addresses the economic, social, and spatial development of cities. These two instruments were nationally mandated to become part of policymaking by setting the agenda and standards against which local administrations could be evaluated, and in the case of POTs, for giving much needed continuity to a socially agreed upon spatial vision. Given the wider institutional context, actions did not completely meet expectations. PDs are supposed to be evaluated every year by the provincial government to ensure that the objectives are being met and this information is to be communicated to the community, however, there are no legal mechanisms to force the executive to produce the necessary data or to force an improvement in meeting targets. The only recourse available to citizens,

which is not part of PD legislation, is found in the 1991 constitution, which allows for a mayor's term to be cut short, a procedure that has produced only one result in Colombia.¹⁵ POTs face similar enforcement difficulties. The plans are meant to cover spatial visions across three administrations, however, they have more power constraining rather than encouraging certain actions, ultimately leaving a great deal of discretion for mayors to choose what they wish to see implemented. Another important weakness of POTs is instrument development: many initiatives require that the city develop norms and guidelines, and as their creation stagnates, so does the ability to carry out the actions the instrument was meant to address.

While some informal arrangements to put pressure on elected leaders to improve public space can be identified during the period, they do not meet the definition of institutions as these were not patterned nor carried sanctions. Informal arrangements at the time included oversight and criticism by the local press and the start of changing social norms towards the importance of public space. An important factor in the later was the coming together early in the 1990s of reform oriented business elites, community-based organizations, academic research centers, and the media towards identifying the root of the problems facing the city and potential solutions to address them. Reflecting on this period, a former planning director for Medellin stated “you cannot move forward just with the will of an individual [a champion]. What gives a complex strategy support, sustainability, and the possibility of moving forward is for it to be a project shared by many interest sectors, different power sectors, people with different capacities. What got done in Medellin in the

¹⁵ In July 2018 the mayor of Tasco, Boyaca became the first to lose his position through this legal instrument (El Espectador, 2018)

2000s is born from the processes of the 1990s.” (planning director, interview by author, 2016). The loose networks created during this time were to play a key role in the institutional compounding taking place during the Social Urbanism period and thereafter.

2004-2011: Social Urbanism

Between 2004 and 2012 Medellín saw a steady set of investments towards the creation and improvement of public spaces. To redress previous approaches, public space interventions were designed to meet multiple goals. First, they needed to be holistic and integrated into a larger strategy that reconstituted the urban fabric while considering mobility and other urban needs. Second, they had to take place where they were needed most: in the long neglected marginalized neighborhoods on the city’s slopes. Finally, they were to take into account the context and community needs of each area as expressed by its inhabitants. The administration of mayor Sergio Fajardo (2004-2007) used the PD and POT legal frameworks to create an action plan that would allow his administration to meet these three goals.

The PD made clear that public space was a priority as evidenced by its allocation as the fourth largest item in the administration’s four year budget¹⁶. The document signaled the administration would be looking to adjust the POT in accordance with the law, and stated that the city had a social debt with its people and some territories, particularly in the northern zone, and that public space needed “to be dignified as a site for citizen encounters” (Alcaldia de Medellín, 2004, no page, section 3.1). Strategies to tackle the problem included the formulation of

¹⁶ Public space was to receive 8.1% of the budget, surpassed only by education (36.9%), health (12.25%), and mobility (10.5%) (Plan de Desarrollo de Medellín, 2004)

complementary norms and instruments needed to take the POT from paper to action, interventions along creeks to create lineal parks, building an integrated public space and public infrastructure system, and the purchase of land for this end.

The city's first POT was to go from 2000 to 2009 (extendable to 2011), however, the law allowed for the revision of certain aspects of the POT in the medium term including its interventions, basic norms, some land uses (but not their classification), and strategic projects to be prioritized. A further national mandate to include citizen participation in its elaboration opened the door for a significant revision. In light of this the local government began a process of revision and adjustment in 2005, with changes taking effect in 2006. These changes allowed the administration to attempt to give continuity through a longer-term instrument to many of its goals of intervening the poorest areas of the city.

With the PD in place, and while working on the new POT, city agencies began the process of revitalizing public spaces as a strategy for citizenship. Input from the community was sought and quickly translated into high quality architecture and designs as a means of dignifying spaces and creating citizen ownership (appropriation, as many government interviewees called it). Reflecting on his time at EDU, an architect stated "the decisions on high quality architecture, high quality public space, city planning, those have been a vehicle. Architecture and urbanism became a platform for politicians to get closer to their ideas and citizens closer to their dreams. There will always be difficulties, but we increasingly find ourselves with a better formed citizenry. These social processes have created marvelous people. Today Medellin demands, it is at a critical point to rethink itself, to evolve" (bureaucrat, interview by author, 2017). Community participation meant no two interventions were

alike in process or outcome. Given the institutional context, the mayor and his team sought a quick turnaround to move designs into construction with two ends: first, to show communities that the government was serious in its commitment to take their input into account and actually intervene the territory; second, to tie financial resources in an attempt to prevent their reassignment to other areas by the city council. The election of Alonso Salazar (2008-2011), a member of the Fajardo's team, gave social urbanists four more years to develop the 'Medellin model'. Public works developed during the eight year period included the construction of library-parks, children's playgrounds, and linear parks, as well as the upgrading of sports facilities to meet formal competition standards.

While the POT reform represented an opportunity for social urbanists to attempt to give continuity to their progressive city vision, and they had six years to implement some of its contents creating sunk costs and some path dependence, they were well aware of the instrument's fragility. Cabinet members of both administrations emphasized in interviews the importance of developing bottom-up accountability as a form of sanctioning. As one person explained, "the mechanisms that we believed firmly would help give continuity to our approach to public space were empowering citizens and having them take ownership of the spaces [...] There is no legal norm that can force a mayor to continue the processes started by the previous mayor [...] but if you have a citizenry that has appropriated the new approach then the new mayor is not going to want to antagonize those citizens and will try, at the very least, to keep a minimum of the approach, but will not destroy it" (cabinet leader, interview by author, 2016). This period saw the emergence of public pressure as an enforcement mechanism for the POT.

Another important source of sanctioning developed by the non-state sector during this period relates to social networks as sites to mobilize reputation as a mechanism for institutional enforcement. The most visible example of this is Medellín Como Vamos (MCV), a program started in 2006 and funded by important local and national businesses including among others local newspaper El Colombiano, elite university EAFIT, the Medellín Chamber of Commerce, and Proantioquia (a foundation that groups some of the city's and incidentally the country's most powerful businesses). Reflecting on the foundation of MCV, one of its members stated, "Fajardo was mayor, had high approval levels, there was a positive feeling about the path the city was taking, there was optimism, there was hope [...] But we know that our democracies are very fragile, and so it is important to strengthen institutions, and the founding members considered that a program such as this could help with institutional strengthening through the promotion of a more transparent, more effective government [...] The local government is legally required to update citizens on its progress, but this is biased to what it has accomplished and not what it has not, so a program like ours balances it out by making the update more objective because we are doing a judicious follow-up so we are able to identify things and say 'you have accomplished this, perfect, but you have not accomplished this other thing. What is going on?'" (business elite, interview by author, 2016). MCV holds a yearly public forum where the mayor and his team are made to answer for their progress in achieving the objectives stated in the PD, thus providing an informal mechanisms to address in an effective manner what provincial governments alone are unable to ensure.

The social urbanism period sees the emergence of institutional compounding as a strategy for continuity. State actors value and work on formal institutions, but are cognizant of their weaknesses in providing continuity and thus attempt to mobilize non-state sources of sanctioning in order to achieve consistent enforcement of the action the institution is meant to achieve (in this case, the continuing creation and maintenance of quality public space). Non-state actors for their part value and maintain informal institutions, but likewise are well aware of their weaknesses, therefore attempting to influence formal policy as a source of legitimacy. Networks strengthened considerably during this period due to two main reasons: first, the local government's genuine emphasis on community participation and mobilization opened opportunities for CBOs to forge closer ties to mid and upper level bureaucrats. Second, academic research centers such as URBAM at Universidad Eafit and MASO at Universidad de Antioquia, NGOs such as Region, and entrepreneurial efforts such as MCV established relations (with different strength levels) among themselves, with communities, and with the state. The networks established during this period served both as informal channels to work out concerns as well as sources of continuity as can be seen in the following period.

2012-present: What happens if we open the water tank areas?

The continuity of some of the work started by Fajardo and Salazar's administrations was expected when Anibal Gaviria (2012-2015) was elected mayor. While the new executive shared the enthusiasm for public space provision, and had an existing POT to guide his actions, the PD he put forward emphasized a different vision. The new PD acknowledged the need to create new public space contemplated in the POT such as parks and integrated sport and cultural facilities by introducing the

creation of Integrated Sports and Cultural Units, which later became known as UVAs. In addition to including neighborhood level facilities the mayor had two large-scale projects in mind traceable to comprehensive plans: the design and construction of an initial phase of Parques del Rio, a park along the Medellin river, and the creation of Jardin Circunvalar as part of a greenbelt to limit the city's expansion on the uppermost hillside areas.

An important intervention geared at helping redress the city's shortage of public spaces was formally initiated in 2013 when the city's utility, EPM, began the design (in tandem with local communities) and construction in hillside neighborhoods of multi-purpose structures known as UVA (Unidad de Vida Articulada or Articulated Life Unit)¹⁷. Aerial photos and satellite images showed unlit, seemingly unused areas in some of the most densely built and disadvantaged neighborhoods. Inspection revealed that these were EPM's water tanks with a fenced area surrounding them for security. Communities, according to a leader of the initiative, had been approaching EPM for over 25 years expressing interest in exploring ways to have access to the green fields surrounding the tanks: "We started noticing that the city needed deeper linkages beyond public service provision, it was a city-development perspective [...] we would go through some parts of the city were EPM had infrastructure - a substation, a distribution tank - and that infrastructure was in a very beautiful site in an area of the city with many limitations. So next to an EPM tank you would have kids playing soccer on the street and every 40 seconds a bus would go by so the kids played

¹⁷ EPM UVAS are considered "light" while city UVAs are considered "robust". The difference is that the city was able to acquire plots where sports infrastructure such as pools and soccer fields could be built, while none of EPM's UVAs have such amenities due to the size of the plots. All UVAs have social, cultural, and sport offerings.

soccer 35 seconds, would move, the bus would go by, and they would place their soccer arch and play another 35 seconds. [...] The point is that the EPM tank was next to them, and it had a green field around it sometimes designed for potential future expansions, others because it was the size of the original plot so that is what we had to buy. So there is a tank, a green field, but kids cannot enter the space. And the community would ask us, ‘allow us to use that tank space’” (EPM leader, interview by author, 2016).

The aerial photos, combined with community interests, met a third catalyst for the project: the local development plan of Commune 1. The commune had carried out a well-structured local development plan in which community visions for better neighborhoods were included, with public space provision being an important objective. This grassroots effort was summarized in a booklet which had in its front cover the rendering of a water tank with the fencing removed and a small park next to it. While the water tanks were initially outside the city, rapid urban sprawl brought people to the areas over the years. According to the EPM leader, “We saw that rendering and it shook us. We knew of the interest of the community [of having access], that the space would be of use to the community, the idea of a city closer to its people, safer, the hope people had of opening those spaces, so with that in mind, some people at EPM, not really a team [but individuals], started asking: hey, what happens if we open up the water tank areas? Initially it was about removing fences, we did not think about UVAs, it was unsafe, a risk. But then we started asking ourselves, why don’t we bet on culturally transforming the surroundings so that people go and help us take care of plots, so that is where the logic [of UVAs] was born”. A team within EPM began to question what would happen if the area around the water tanks was

opened to the public and the infrastructure adapted so that they could continue to serve their original purpose while simultaneously providing much needed access to green areas.

The initial objective of UVAs was to transform and open up the areas around water tanks so that communities lacking nearby public space options could access them: “we started thinking, can we place playgrounds, and let people come in and walk around the field, bring their kids there without fear that a bus is going to run them over” (EPM leader, 2016). The infrastructure was to be completely financed (built, maintained, and managed) by the utility through its corporate social responsibility area and its foundation, Fundación EPM. To decide which of the existing 144 water tanks to intervene, the EPM team considered those located in neighborhoods where there was no other important public space infrastructure such as library-parks (so as to not compete with existing infrastructure), the size of the plot, and together with other variables they reduced the number of selected sites to 37 which was further narrowed to 18 (EPM leader, 2016). These tanks were then prioritized for UVAs. Architects and social workers from EPM visited the communities to gauge interest in the proposed projects and to gather their input on features they would want to see included. Once alternative designs were set in place they visited the communities again to gather more input, and committees were created to keep the community up to date on the progress of the works. The city also built UVAs in other areas as a way to meet its POT objectives, building new infrastructure designed to host a different range of spaces and activities including playrooms, sports courts, designated events areas, computer labs, gyms, and outdoor areas. Offerings vary depending on community interests and recreation, sports, and culture amenities

missing in each territory, though all EPM UVAs have water features. The spaces are designed to encourage citizen interaction and create new public space while conserving the water storage purpose of the infrastructure.

While UVAs have won international sustainable architecture awards, the main objective is not aesthetic change but to aid the social and cultural objectives of the community. UVAs offer spaces and programs to learn how to use a computer and provide free access to internet, but also offer spaces to sit down to chat with a neighbor, to have community meetings to make decisions, and offer safe playing spaces for children. From EPM and the city's perspective, they offer an opportunity to strengthen the social fabric and state-society relations. EPM has also used the UVAs as spaces to teach citizens about responsible water use appealing to citizens' economic self-interest and environmental concerns.

Parallel to implementing his government plan, Gaviria's responsibilities included coordinating the creation of the city's new POT for 2014-2017. True to his public space vision, it emphasized the river and the hillsides' upper borders. The weaknesses associated with formal instruments was in full display after the election of Federico Gutierrez (2016-2019) whose PD did not seek to continue with the construction of Parques del Rio beyond what was already contracted¹⁸ and placed little emphasis on new public spaces. To his credit, the mayor highlighted the need to focus on repairing and maintaining existing infrastructure.

¹⁸ Gaviria initiated construction of the first half of the initial stage of the parks (part 1A inaugurated in 2016), and contracted in 2015 the second half of the initial stage (part 1B) which as of September 2019 is still under construction. The project has been criticized for its high costs: parts 1A and 1B, initially projected at 2 billion Colombian Pesos, are now estimated to cost 4.4 billion. The costs have led to debates on whether this was the best use for city funds given persistent needs such as housing, a public hospital in the northern zone, and quality education

The significance of informal institutions and networking were in full display as Gaviria and Gutierrez were formulating their PDs. As a MCV member shared, “our highest influence is in the definition of the development plan and we have evidence of it. We have accompanied the definition of three of these plans [...] We know we have influenced them because we have documents with observations about the [draft] development plans for those three, and precise points we brought up were included in the final version” (business elite 1, interview by author, 2016). A former head of city planning echoed a similar sentiment. Reflecting on MCV’s scrutinizing of Gutierrez’s initial draft and the highly visible critique published in a local newspaper, he stated “[when they say] this is fragile, incomplete, it causes an ‘oops’ moment for the mayor, it makes them [the mayor and his team] say ‘this has to be perfect’”. When probed on whether this was just moral sanction or if it actually impacted how institutions developed in the city, the same person mentioned “yes [...] but I think that [shaming] is one of the few things that works in our society so it is very important” (cabinet member, interview by author, 2016). Given reputation concerns, an expected review at the hands of these networks of a mayor’s PD is thus an important source of continuity thanks to compounding.

Besides the yearly public forum hosted by MCV to keep city hall accountable for meeting its PD, citizen collectives, NGOs, and community-based organizations also play an important public role throughout the year in doing the same with both the PD and POT. As a leader of a citizen collective shared, “a lot of it is lobbying the government directly, but it is also about putting pressure and focusing public opinion on certain topics. If public attention is centered on something it influences what the government discusses for action” (citizen collective, interview by author, 2016).

Traditional and social media are important mechanisms for these groups to call attention to failures to address public space commitments. As the citizen collective leader shared, “when a topic is trending the government pays attention because that means that something is being talked about in the city that can affect them and their image in a positive or negative way. [...] But when we start a conversation we have to find a way to maintain it. Even if the topic was trending at some point once it stops people might forget and so you did not accomplish anything. You have to persist.” (civil society leader, interview by author, 2016).

The importance of these groups, the networks among them, and their oversight function is well understood by members of the state. According to an interviewee, “There was a rumor that MCV was coming to an end, and a member of the government went to Proantioquia, which is one of the members, and told them ‘be careful with letting MCV end’ - this was coming from the government itself – ‘because for us it has been essential to have an entity that *permanently* [stresses the word] asks for information’. They felt that they needed an external entity saying ‘here, you do not have an up to date indicator on public space’” (business elite, interview by author, 2016). Formal institutions are nevertheless considered important as no actor interviewed for this research thought that a progressive approach to public space provision could be maintained through informal institutions alone. As a community leader stated, “even if it just symbolic, it [the formal policy] can be activated for negotiation” (interview by author, 2016). Other community leaders echoed the importance of formal institutions as sources of legitimacy for raising claims against the state.

Interventions in public spaces in Medellin have benefited from narratives put forward by civil society, politicians, and public officials all of whom see it as a conduit to creating community and improving equity by giving inhabitants of marginalized neighborhoods spaces conducive to socialization, leisure, culture, health, and learning. While important progress has been made there is room for improvement. Important infrastructure such as libraries and parks suffer from lack of adequate maintenance and structural problems due to design (El Colombiano, 2017). The crown jewel of these limitations is the *Biblioteca España* library. The importance of networks across sectors was evident when CBO Convivamos and NGO Raton de Biblioteca established an informal partnership with the team charged with running programs out of the library. When the library's building was closed in 2015 due to structural problems (and it remains closed with no opening date in sight) these organizations offered spaces for the library's team to work out of and patterned with them to ensure the continuity of a vibrant offering of activities and events. The arrangement, while not formally sanctioned by the state, has continued over the past three years and under two different library team leaders.

Conclusion: Institutional Compounding in an effort to achieve continuity

The introduction of progressive planning practices in cities of the global South is reason for scholars and practitioners alike to feel hopeful about the possibility of planning and managing cities in more equitable, sustainable, and just ways. However, any optimism must be accompanied by a good deal of caution, as continuity cannot be assumed given Southern contexts of institutional weakness. Noting progressive planning as both process and outcome, I sought in this article to identify what explains the institutionalization of progressive city planning practices. To address this

question, I introduce the idea of institutional compounding and demonstrate its importance in the pursuit of progressive planning institutionalization. An analysis of the actions taken by state and non-state agents in Medellin, as they attempt to give continuity to progressive planning practices as political winds change, reveals that durability is tied to: (1) the active pursuit of strategies impacting both formal and informal institutions, and (2) networking with individuals from at least one different societal category. Institutional compounding creates shared expectations on the continuity of rule-bound and enforceable practices. As an active strategy, it helps minimize the shortcomings associated with formal or informal institutions alone. The mention of the word active is intentional: given existing tendencies towards institutional weakness, it is imperative that actors engage purposefully.

Formal institutions are created by the state; however, enforcement through the state is not always possible. Common channels of enforcement are the judiciary and police, but as the case of public space in Medellin shows, mandating the construction or maintenance of public space is unlikely. Why then, has the progressive approach to public space provision in Medellin continued despite lacking a viable source of formal enforcement? I argue that it is because the source of enforcement is informal. In this case, state actors establish the formal institution, PD or POT, which is important in providing official guidance and establishing rules, but its enforcement is established outside of official channels through constituency creation, oversight, and appropriation. The actors who establish the formal rule do not have the powers to change formal enforcement mechanism and as such, pursue informal ones. While non-state actors value informal institutions too, they see formal institutions as a requirement to widely legitimize pursuits. Given these formal-informal dynamics, it

comes as no surprise that state and non-state agents in Medellin identify networking as an important element in achieving progressive planning continuity. The networking however appears to be related to institutionalization only when it is carried out with members of their own societal group (so among politicians, among CBOs, etc.) and with individuals from at least one other societal category (state-actors, bureaucrats, with non-state actors, business elites). None of the data suggested networking among the same societal category alone yielded continuity.

Relationship building and maintenance has been paramount in the search for institutionalization in Medellin. One of the approaches to this has been involving multiple stakeholders: actors find that relations with peers are crucial, but so are relations with other societal actors. These may not always be friendly or collaborative, as contention is sometimes needed, but what is important is to make the other acquainted with their points even if they do not agree with the ideas he or she espouses. This leads to another point identified by different actors: the importance of creating spaces of encounter where information can be generated or disseminated, and which can help keep attention on the practice. Different actors generate this attention in different ways: CBOs and collectives are more likely to mobilize to hold peaceful takeovers of public space, hold protests, focus resources on leadership formation, lobby, and make use of social media platforms to disseminate information or publicly ridicule state-sponsored efforts that go against a progressive practice. A key distinction from findings in the global North is that these networks go beyond public legitimation and access to resources given their role in nudging enforcement. Bureaucrats are able to keep attention on a practice by serving as its advocates within government as administrations or politicians in power change. Politicians see bringing

bureaucrats truly onboard as a means to keep a practice going, thus recognizing the power of their embeddedness.

Business elites often keep attention on a practice through public opinion, particularly through traditional media, and by a subtle form of lobbying: they know sooner or later in any given term the mayor will need the city's powerful business elite to work with the administration on something. As a business elite shared, "I have been here [for almost two decades], the mayor changes every four years. So a new one comes into power, but in our organizations there is permanence [...] there comes a moment when they understand that they are no longer campaigning, that they have to manage a city and they need plans, partners, resources, impact, follow-up... it is a process. So what is the hardest part for our organizations? Maintaining the continuity of public policies." (business elite, interview by author, 2016). In other instances, they make use of public shaming by calling attention to shortcomings. Politicians, given their positions, have a wider set of resources to keep focus on a practice, including budgetary assignments and prioritization of implementation. A final approach to networking is oversight, a practice that is carried out by CBOs and other members of civil society through formal channels, but also in both direct and indirect ways by business elites through business backed oversight groups. These keep meticulous record of practice implementation and carry out perception surveys, actions that allow them to keep a pulse on the development and maintenance of different efforts.

Institutional compounding builds on theories of institutional complementarity but highlights the need to move away from ideas of coexistence, assumed effectiveness of the formal institution, or enhanced effectiveness through contact with the informal. Instead, compounding moves beyond complementarity by

acknowledging that critical mass for viable enforcement is achieved through institutional interaction, that more than enhancing it signifies the difference between strength and weakness, and that the effectiveness of the formal is at time dependent on the existence of the informal as it is the latter that provides a source of enforcement. In sum, compounding addresses the intrinsic weaknesses in formal and informal institutions by creating sources of legitimacy and enforcement. The existence of a compounding institution is dependent on the active involvement of multiple actors.

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CHAPTER 5

OPENING THE DOOR TO EXPERIMENTATION: PROGRESSIVE HOUSING INTERVENTIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION ¹⁹

Abstract

New approaches to housing upgrading or production often fail to scale up from a singular intervention to a more comprehensive public policy; in other words, progressive housing interventions fail to institutionalize. This article examines three housing upgrading cases in Medellin, Colombia - PRIMED, Juan Bobo, and Comuna 8 - to assess the question: what prevents the institutionalization of progressive housing interventions into permanent public policies? Building on decentralization and institutional theories, this study employs document analysis, site visits and semi-structured interviews to address this question. The evidence from Medellin suggests that three factors enabled experimentation with progressive housing interventions: decentralization, norm flexibility, and political initiative. However, the institutionalization of the lessons learned through these experiments is undermined by the challenges at play within each enabling factor. First, new administrative structures stemming from decentralization can lead to fragmentation, impacting policy coordination and financing. Second, technical considerations often lead to normative rigidity which progressive actors address through the use of exceptionality measures that are difficult to scale in the short term into new policies. Finally, power dynamics lead to the politicization of projects giving them an unspoken expiration date that is often associated with a mayor's term coming to an end. In-situ housing upgrading failed to develop the wide involvement of diverse actors and clear organizational setup that helped overcome similar challenges in other sectors ultimately leading to failed institutionalization. Rather than institutionalizing, housing policy in Medellin exhibits a serial-replacement pattern marked by periods of interest in upgrading, interest in other housing strategies, and indifference to housing.

Keywords: institutional change, serial replacement, path dependence, settlement upgrading, decentralization

Experimenting with housing interventions

Latin American national and local governments have experimented with a

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wide range of interventions in hope of addressing chronic housing shortages and improving persistent quality problems. The region has been the source of a multiplicity of responses to housing issues over time including strategies validating and improving self-help housing, large-scale multi-story government-directed housing, housing subsidies, direct funding of community groups, and citywide informal settlement upgrading (UN-Habitat, 2011). The housing challenges still present in the region are particularly troublesome for low-income individuals who cannot afford market solutions and see a lack of compromise and consistency in public approaches to addressing housing sector deficiencies. Assessments of housing shortages in the region based on data from the 1990s estimate that 51 million households live in deficient conditions, with qualitative deficits accounting for 61 percent of the shortages and quantitative deficits for 39 percent (UN-Habitat, 2011). More recent analysis suggests that of the 130 million families living in urban centers in the region, 34 million live in houses that lack either title, adequate flooring, sufficient space, water or sewage, 5 million rely on other families for shelter and 3 million live in houses beyond repair (Bouillon, 2012, p.1). Latin America is not the only region experiencing housing issues: according to the United Nations, in 2010, nearly 980 million urban households lacked decent housing (UN-Habitat, 2016).

While the under-supply of adequate housing persists, many cities actively attempt to address these challenges. Strategies include alternating between the adoption of state-built or subsidized housing production, legalization of tenure, and improvement of existing housing stock, among other forms of interventions that can improve housing conditions. Cities like Medellin, Colombia have piloted state-sponsored in-situ housing and neighborhood upgrading initiatives with significant

community participation and input; these types of practices are referred to in this text as progressive housing interventions. Despite these attempts, new approaches to housing upgrading or production often fail to scale up from a singular intervention to a more comprehensive public policy; in other words, progressive housing practices fail to institutionalize. The inability to scale up successful pilot projects or promising upgrading strategies has been noted by multi-lateral agencies and scholars alike (Das & Takahashi, 2009). Using Medellin as a case study, this article examines the interaction between national and municipal housing policies and political-administrative structures to assess a question of interest to urban planners and local governments: what prevents the conversion of progressive housing interventions into permanent public policies? Findings are based on document analysis, site visits, and semi-structured interviews with current and past government officials, community leaders, community based organizations, academics, and private actors.

The analysis of three housing interventions in Medellin conducted between 1993 and 2017 reveals that three factors enabled experimentation with progressive housing policies: decentralization, norm flexibility, and political initiative. However, the institutionalization of these experiments is undermined by the challenges at play within each of these factors. First, new administrative structures stemming from decentralization can lead to fragmentation, impacting policy coordination and financing. Overcoming this fragmentation requires a clear mandate and organizational setup for housing which have not taken place in Medellin. Second, technical considerations often lead to normative rigidity which progressive actors address through the use of exceptionality measures that are difficult to scale in the short term into new policies. Finally, power dynamics lead to the politicization of projects giving

them an unspoken expiration date that is often associated with a mayor's term coming to an end. While in Medellin this challenge has been overcome in other sectors through the creation of networks of state and non-state actors who advocate the continuation of a practice, such networks have failed to emerge for housing.

An important implication stems from these findings: while the piloting of new strategies provides much needed housing and shows potential avenues to address existing deficits, the inability to move these into public policy undermines the large amount of social, financial, administrative, technical, and political resources that go into experimenting with housing provision and adapting practices to local contexts. This research contributes to the literature on institutionalization by adding to our understanding of the factors that make experimentation in pursuit of more progressive agendas possible and the role of social and political-administrative structures in hindering the conversion of experiments into more permanent public policies.

This article is organized as follows: the first section presents a brief overview of relevant literature on decentralization, housing upgrading and institutionalization. Section two outlines the research methodology. Sections three and four present an overview of Medellin and relevant background factors needed to understand the city's housing policy dynamics in relation to national considerations; this is followed by the presentation of three case studies in section five focusing on the importance of decentralization, norm flexibility, and political initiative. Section six presents an analysis of how these same factors have impacted the scaling up of the pilots into public policy and concluding remarks.

Decentralization, Housing and Institutionalization

The main argument advanced in this article is that the factors that open the

door for experimentation with progressive practices are also the source of challenges for their institutionalization. Decentralization creates a critical juncture for institutional change at the local level and as such merits a brief review. The following subsection also provides an overview of housing upgrading, particularly the literature on challenges to scaling up. Finally, a third portion summarizes relevant literature on institutionalization.

Decentralization

There has been extensive discussion in the literature of the impacts of decentralization reforms from the 1980s onwards on local government and city planning in Latin America (Campbell, 2003; Chavez & Goldfrank 2004; Falleti, 2010; Grindle, 2007; Goldfrank, 2011). Proponents of decentralization argued it would bring efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness to different levels of government and most importantly to local levels, particularly when combined with democratization efforts. Decentralization created new rules for political elites and activists, particularly when administrative, fiscal, and political powers were transferred to subnational units (Falleti, 2010; Grindle, 2007) as was the case in Colombian cities. One such intended change was access to the formal structure of public policy by bringing the arena of policy discussion and decision-making closer to the local level – sometimes all the way to the neighborhood (Chavez & Goldfrank 2004; Goldfrank, 2011). Another area where decentralization has played a key role is public officials' agency. When channeled towards positive endings, these agency changes have allowed the emergence of state entrepreneurs: elected and appointed leaders who develop ideas, mobilize coalitions, and make strategic agenda choices so that progressive organizational and policy issues are given greater consideration (Grindle,

2007). As subsequent sections show this was key in Medellín's experimentation with progressive approaches to settlement upgrading particularly as it related to norm flexibility (the ability of state representatives to secure exceptions to existing norms through technical arguments) and political initiative (the willingness to improve the way state-sponsored activities are undertaken without fear of breaking with existing ways of doing). An important display of such agency was the establishment throughout many Latin American cities of participatory institutions aimed at increasing local government responsiveness (Abers, 2000). Decentralization was key for improving the quality of urban governance through greater autonomy and accountability (Campbell, 2003; Gilbert, 2014) and in order for participatory institutions to succeed (Goldfrank, 2011).

While decentralization and democratization transformed local governance in Latin America by creating power-sharing opportunities and revenue transfers (giving lower tier government officials access to spending decisions), the changes have also brought challenges related to political control, intergovernmental coordination, public policy formulation, and program implementation (Campbell, 2003). Grindle's (2007) study of Mexican municipalities showed that weak institutions allowed for significant and quick changes in local governance, though that same weakness left them open to reversals every electoral season. For these leaders to be effective, they had to acquire additional resources, which meant falling back on clientelism, party connections and personal networks. Networks however can also provide a progressive and stabilizing direction as Chapters 3 and 4 in this dissertation show. According to Roberts and Portes (2006, p.77) decentralization has been carried out with 'the manifest argument that this would help bring government "closer to the people" and

the more latent goal of fragmenting class solidarity and avoiding universalistic concessions'. A further challenge emanating from decentralization is the potential for fragmentation, which creates the need to devise mechanisms to coordinate among different government levels for the provision of services (Prud'homme, 1995). Despite the challenges associated with decentralization, the scale at which problems are targeted matters, as does having the abilities and resources to target them. As such, local government has an important role to play in the diagnosis of habitat, social, and economic problems, the design of solutions, and the coordination of programs to improve the habitat and socio-economic integration of the affected population (Rojas & Fretes Cibilis, 2010, p.19).

Scaling up housing upgrading strategies

Housing and settlement upgrading strategies have had to contend with the rise of the enabling approach promoted as part of the Washington Consensus. The approach, which called for a shift in the role of the state from active provider to facilitator, is admittedly said to have 'failed to promote adequate and affordable housing' (UN-Habitat, 2016). Nevertheless, 'poor residents cannot count on their governments alone for housing. The involvement of the private sector – e.g. building companies, financial institutions, and banks – and resident participation is essential for large-scale house production in developing countries.' (Bredenoord, Van Lindert, & Smets, 2014, p.15). While upgrading approaches are subject to criticisms, authors have argued that what is needed are more integrated and comprehensive housing policies adopting better coordination of multiple forms of low-income housing provision (Keivani & Werna, 2001). A significant challenge is how to make low-

income housing attractive for private developers, particularly when said housing is intended to be in brownfields as is the case with housing upgrading.

Others have been less apologetic about the potential of upgrading efforts and the state's role in them (Betancur, 2007; Werlin, 1999). Settlement upgrading in Latin America is taking place in 'recognition of the political, social, and economic costs of failed policies that uprooted slums and relocated or eventually displaced residents in the past' (Fay, 2015 in UN-Habitat, 2016, p.66). Furthermore, the strategy is considered the most effective contemporary intervention for dealing with squatter settlements (UN-Habitat, 2003). Given its potential, it is no surprise that authors have called for the need to scale upgrading strategies to entire cities (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007; Imperato & Ruster, 2003). Challenges to achieving this include political will to implement the necessary frameworks and secure funding, a citywide upgrading strategy, policy environment, legal and regulatory framework, clear subsidy structures, cost-recovery strategies, ensuring land availability and security of land tenure, strategic alliances, among others (Imperato & Ruster, 2003). Others have identified titling and the bundling of services to be impediments towards scaling up (Davis, 2004). Analyzing upgrading strategies where NGOs have taken a pivotal role, Das & Takahashi (2009, p.228) find that 'reliance on just a few NGOs, the gradually receding attention to community development objectives, and the absence of land tenure' are challenging successful program's ability to scale up. What all these authors refer to is a deeper issue at play within the political economy of upgrading, including the persistence of clientelism and corruption where politicians exploit illegality through patron-client networks (Fox, 2014), quarreling between national and local

governments tied to the protection of special interests (Goodfellow, 2012), and informality as a state of exception characterized by ambiguity (Roy, 2009).

Institutionalization

Valuable attempts have been made in recent years to link approaches to housing policy with institutional theories. Authors working at this intersection analyzing policies in the global North have identified institutional changes in housing policy as incremental and path dependent (e.g. Bengtsson & Ruonavaara, 2011; Malpass, 2011), while recent work highlights path dependency as an important factor in informal settlements in the global South (e.g. Morrison, 2017). Examples of mechanisms that lead to path dependency include fixed costs, procedural strategic obstacles that make changing the institution difficult, vested knowledge, coordination effects, adaptive expectations, and institutional constituents (Campbell, 2010; North, 1990; Pierson, 2000), as well as infrastructural and physical structure constraints (Davis & Troustine, 2012).

Punctuated equilibrium and gradual change models are argued to be less effective in explaining institutional change in Latin America; instead, change in the region is said to be frequent and radical thus taking the form of ‘serial replacement’ (Levitsky & Murillo, 2014). Levitsky and Murillo (2014) contend that in places like Latin America ‘where power distributions are uncertain or rapidly shifting and there is greater incongruence between the formal rule-writing process and underlying power structures’ (p.18) we are instead more likely to see serial replacement. As this paper shows, in cities with one-term periods to elected office, or in places with a highly fragmented party system, serial replacement might prove to be a better way of understanding institutional changes in housing policy. The following case study

analysis of housing in Medellin helps illustrate the importance of decentralization, norm flexibility, and political initiative in the initiation of an internationally recognized comprehensive settlement upgrading initiative, as well as how these same factors have impeded its institutionalization into public policy.

Research Approach

This article examines the conditions that create opportunities for local governments to experiment with new forms of housing provision and the reasons that prevent such initiatives from turning into permanent public policy; in other words, why these experiments fail to institutionalize. The article followed a case study research strategy and relied on qualitative methods to obtain data. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) identify case studies as an important research strategy for the analysis and theorizing of institutional change as cases give insights into power and interests. The upgrading at Juan Bobo in Medellin was purposively selected as an exemplary case given the recognition the intervention has received and its initial potential implications as a new approach to tackling housing issues. PRIMED, a housing upgrading experiment preceding Juan Bobo, is analyzed given its contribution of valuable building blocks later used by government officials. Finally, the case of Comuna 8 is presented to illustrate the failure to institutionalize lessons learned at Juan Bobo.

Field research using interviews, direct observation, and document analysis was conducted between February and December 2016, with a second phase between April and July 2017. Ethnographic methods were chosen given their ability to help clarify inductively ‘the micro-dynamics of institutional formation, maintenance, and change’ (Davis & Trounstone, 2012, p.66). Sixty-two in-depth, semi-structured interviews were

conducted face to face with current and past government officials (including politicians, career bureaucrats and political appointees), project consultants, community leaders, community based organizations, local academics, and private actors. Interviews with community residents were unstructured. Recruitment of interview respondents was based on expert and snowball sampling. The initial list of key informants was identified from public sources such as project records. Interviewees were recruited by phone, email, and in person (e.g. at public meetings). Observation activities consisted mainly of multiple visits to sites of intervention and sites of intended but not yet executed upgrading projects. The researcher also attended meetings by a nascent social movement focused on dwellers' rights. Archival and secondary data analyzed for this research included public documents, newspapers, magazines, cyber-media (including websites, institutional YouTube videos and tweets), and research by local and international academics.

To ensure integrity of the results, the researcher was actively engaged for a prolonged period in Medellin allowing for repeated interactions and sustained observations. Key interviewees were asked to provide feedback on the initial analysis and conclusions of the data they provided, helping reduce the possibility of misinterpretation. Interviewees, documents, and settings that might provide counterexamples were sought in order to reduce confirmation bias. Lastly, systematic bias was reduced through triangulation by using three methods of data collection, reducing limitations due to a unique method.

An overview of Medellin

Medellin, Colombia's second largest city after Bogota, is home today to approximately 2.5 million people (DANE, 2010). It covers 380.2 square kilometers

and is divided for political and administrative purposes into 16 *comunas* or districts with rural areas accounting for an additional five districts. The city is led by a mayor elected by simple majority who serves a four-year term (without the possibility of re-election) and a 21-member city council (with no term limits). Similar to national politics, local politics takes place within a highly fragmented multi-party system and as such, mayors must work closely with city councilors in order to pass municipal policy and the yearly budget.

During the first half of the twentieth century Medellin developed into the bifurcated city we see today, with one portion characterized by planned land uses for economic, government, and upper, middle, and working class housing, and another portion, usually located in the city's steep slopes, housing the poor and subsequently also many from the working class. The unplanned city had both informal and formal origins, with some settlements started through the illegal occupation of state land and others from the purchase (without proper titling) of portions of what used to be large farms. As of the end of 2016 the city's quantitative housing shortage was 32,481 units, with most properties being required for the poorest citizens. Qualitative deficiencies are estimated to affect 43,266 people (ISVIMED, 2016). The most common qualitative deficits are lacking connection to the aqueduct or sewerage systems (or both), houses with walls or floors made of inadequate or non-durable materials, no domestic waste collection, no electricity, and an insufficient living area (MCV, 2017).

Housing: national and local dynamics

Structural changes at the national level between the late 1970s and 1990s impacted how Medellin would approach and tackle its housing challenges. The first change came in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the passing of fiscal measures that

strengthened municipal finances. A second important change came in the mid-1980s as Colombia began to decentralize politically, then fiscally, then administratively, in a way that greatly empowered municipalities (Falleti, 2010). Changes included the popular election of mayors, the promotion of citizen participation in local decision-making, the promulgation of the right to dignified housing, increased transfers from the central government, and allowing municipalities to raise and spend taxes as well as to issue public debt.

An important setback to national intervention in urban planning, including housing policy, came in 2010 when the Colombian constitutional court ruled that in accordance with national law, municipal authorities were in charge of city planning and the national government had no authority to overrule local decisions on these matters. This decision was to some extent problematic for Colombia's then president Juan Manuel Santos who made housing a key driver of his economic plan, announcing in 2012 that the national government would be building 100,000 'completely free houses for the poorest in the country' ('Casa Gratis', 2012). A work around the constitutional court decree was quickly found: the nation would approach local governments offering the financial resources to finance the construction of new houses, however, local governments would take responsibility for securing land as well as for contracting the construction of the houses.

Financing housing has been a challenge for municipalities. As of 2009 local governments receiving national subsidies had to pre-finance the construction, as initial reimbursement of 80% of the subsidies was given after 20% of the dwelling was built, with the remaining 20% paid upon completion (Gomez Ochoa, 2009). Medellin created in 2008 the Social Institute for Housing and Habitat (ISVIMED), tasking the

agency with a broad range of housing responsibilities as it began operations in 2009. Current housing projects by the municipality include subsidies to acquire or improve social-interest housing, plans and projects to improve existing housing and extend basic sanitation connections, acquisition of existing houses, construction in-situ or in land banks of houses, subsidies to relocate households in high-risk areas, and projects to legalize tenure.

Experimenting with Housing: Three Case Studies

The following case studies illustrate the changing approaches to addressing the housing deficit in Medellin, Colombia. While several strategies were implemented simultaneously, the article focuses on two upgrading projects that have received wide attention: PRIMED, implemented in the 1990s, and Juan Bobo, implemented in the early 2000s. A third case is presented to illustrate the failure to institutionalize the lessons learnt: the continuously postponed interventions in Comuna 8.

PRIMED: piloting a new mode of intervention

PRIMED (Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Subnormales en Medellin) was created as a program to pilot slum upgrading through the joining of forces of the city of Medellin, the Colombian and German governments, the United Nations Development Program, and the program's target communities. The program's objectives included neighborhood and housing upgrading, geological risk mitigation, legalization of tenure and community development and participation. Improvements in housing were carried out with a high degree of citizen participation given that a prerequisite to obtain state subsidies was that beneficiary families contribute with 25 percent of the improvement's value (PRIMED, 1996). Tenure legalization would reduce uncertainty for settlers and allow families to access mortgage credit; it would

also allow the city to collect taxes and charge for public services, facilitating recovery of a portion of the investments in the long term.

The program began preparations in 1992 and was initially scheduled to run from 1993 to 1997, with a second phase from 1998-2001. Only phase one was implemented, running until 2000, after facing delays due to funding and coordination problems. PRIMED was the first upgrading project to take place under decentralization and benefited from having national support from the Gaviria and Samper presidencies. This combined with community contributions and German financial aid, incentivized three successive mayors (Ramos, Naranjo, and Gomez) to keep the program alive. Pastrana's presidency (1998-2002) shifted away from upgrading efforts, and the loss of national support coincided with the German government's financial aid coming to an end. Then mayor Gomez decided not to take the loans that were being offered to continue the project, spelling its end. Changing mayoral agendas complemented the funding limitations. The abrupt end of the program caught many by surprise. As one of its bureaucrats shared, "it was a surprise, when they said you are working until December 20 and only the coordinators are staying to close it. I helped to close PRIMED for commune 8 by carrying out small interventions, but its end caught us by surprise" (bureaucrat, interview by author, 2017).

PRIMED impacted 55,000 people distributed in fifteen neighborhoods, at a cost of US\$15 million. An impact survey conducted by PRIMED revealed highly positive results which were aligned with the evidence provided by new or improved city streets, open spaces and public facilities, provision of public services, as well as the improvements in houses and (to a lesser degree) legalization of land tenure

(Betancur, 2007). However, the quality and standards of the interventions has been called into question (Montoya, 2010 in Echeverri & Orsini, 2011). An important objective of PRIMED was to develop a methodology to guide future interventions in the city's numerous informal settlements. The methodology that emerged illustrated a willingness to change existing norms around settlement upgrading in mainly three ways. First, there was a break with the traditional way of developing sectoral plans, shifting instead to location-based plans allowing consolidated project management by a single agency. An office in charge of PRIMED was tasked with coordinating inter-agency efforts, replacing for this program the old model of having utilities, risk mitigation, legalization of tenure, infrastructure development, and other project related agencies create and implement their own plans. Second, there were efforts through the creation of committees to have the community appropriate the public works (though most interviewees agreed the result was not achieved). Nonetheless this represented an important change as it showed the state's realization that the sustainability of the public works could be aided by community ownership, a strategy later improved in Juan Bobo but still not completely effective. Finally, there was a concerted effort to have local residents participate in the planning and execution of the works. This served the dual purpose of reducing costs (through some labor as in-kind contribution) but most importantly by helping the state understand better the needs and wants of the community prior to intervening the territory. While the methodology was constructed, and lessons to improve it subsequently were noted, the program failed to achieve continuity.

According to Betancur (2007) 'PRIMED is a proven testament that physical slum upgrading works [...] Its discontinuance, however, points also to the major

challenges of political will, institutional coordination, corruption and political clientelism, true community participation, and comprehensiveness' (p.11). Despite PRIMED's failure to institutionalize formally, lessons learned in the implementation of the interventions stayed with state and citizen planners who realized the potential of more holistic state-led actions in marginalized territories. These lessons would be put in play in the in-situ upgrading of Juan Bobo.

In situ upgrading: from Juan Bobo to Nuevo Sol de Oriente

The period between 2004 and 2011 saw an interesting development in Medellin: the election, for the first time in the city's history, of two consecutive politically independent progressive mayors. Made up mostly of professional elites, the party they created had strong ties to community-based organizations and other grassroots, and was perceived by many citizens as an alternative to the traditional clientelistic parties dominating local politics. The first mayor originating from this movement was Sergio Fajardo (2004-2007) a mathematics professor with a strong interest in architecture and its power to transform how space is perceived and lived.

Fajardo and his team, taking advantage of the state-society-private sector engagement initiated in the 1990s and recalling the lessons learned during PRIMED, used the city's Urban Development Enterprise (EDU) as project developer to establish in 2004 a new intervention methodology to be implemented in territories characterized by low human development indices, high levels of socio-spatial inequality, and a general absence of the state. The initiative focusing on housing was termed Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios (Integral Neighborhood Upgrading), was to be closely related to PUIs (which did not have a housing component) and made clear that urban interventions needed to be holistic with responses to qualitative and quantitative

housing deficits taking into account habitat improvements. The first intervention of this type targeted the city's first cable-car system traversing Comuna 1 and Comuna 2. The cable-car, located in the city's poor and difficult to access north-eastern sector, was used as the structuring axis around which to concentrate the urban upgrading of this steeply sloping terrain. The EDU team charged with housing upgrading setup to collect information in different settlements around the area. Juan Bobo's socio-economic numbers made it the most precarious according to different interviewees – these were 'unparalleled in environmental, demographic, and urban development terms'. In the words of an architect who participated in the project, "after taking 6,000-7,000 socio-economic readings around the city (Juan Bobo) had the lowest indicators. They were the most precarious in water and sanitation, in legal tenure, public services, everything. The type of families, land speculation, construction type, materials, the condition of the creek (...)" (bureaucrat, interview by author, 2017).

Like most of the sector, the housing around the Juan Bobo stream had developed through informal settlements located in high-risk areas, in this case, susceptible to landslides due to the proximity to the waterway.

Diagnostic walks by state and community members and initial surveys indicated that (Garcia Bocanegra, 2010, p. 176):

- Eighty percent of the houses had structural and functional issues
- Overcrowding was an issue, as houses on average measured twenty-nine square meters and housed 4.2 people, coming to less than seven square meters per person
- Public space was merely 0.5 square meters per person
- Ninety four percent of the houses lacked legal tenure

- Fifty percent had fraudulent connection to aqueduct services
- One hundred percent lacked sewerage connection (and ninety percent of the stream flow was composed of sewerage)
- Thirty-five percent had fraudulent connection to electricity services
- Accessibility within the neighborhood was deficient

The first step in the upgrading process was to get input from the community on what they wanted to see in the project, to hold community assemblies and setup committees (these were important as they allowed the community to participate and to monitor the process, ensuring that agreements were met by both sides). The EDU team promised to upgrade the area without any evictions or expropriation (meaning all resettlements had to be voluntary) and in exchange the community agreed to ensure no new people moved into the area (ensuring the data collected about the families would continue to be valid). There was clear political will to support the efforts: as a member of the EDU team stated ‘it was two years of negotiations, of creating agreements with the community... it was very complex but we knew that would be the case’.

An important second step was work carried out between Medellin’s planning department and the Metropolitan Area Authority (given the latter’s environmental management mandate) to gain exceptions to decrees mandating a distance of at least ten meters between streams and buildings. The existing norms would have made housing upgrading unviable; there would not have been enough land to resettle all members of the community. According to an interviewee, ‘we showed the planning department that we have to acknowledge what has been built and then change the norms to integrate that acknowledgement’. To this end they proposed carrying out geological and engineering studies to determine if reducing riparian edges was viable.

Positive results indicated the terrain was viable for construction and the project was allowed to reduce the buffer zone to three meters – thus the norm flexibility was not just political expediency.

With the findings from the initial surveys and the changed requirement in mind, municipal authorities were able to determine which families could remain in their existing location if additional works were carried out to help mitigate geological risks to their houses, and which families needed to be relocated. Resettled families were to be located just a few meters away from where their existing houses were standing, though this approach inevitably generated relocation requirements for the families occupying the land targeted for densification. The community decided how the units would be allocated, with the most accessible apartments going to the elderly, chronically ill, disabled, and people who already had a productive business based in their home. Eight sites were selected for the construction of multi-story buildings to rehouse the 115 families impacted by the upgrading, and their new apartments setup with legal connections to all public services. By the end, 1,260 people benefited directly, 115 houses had their tenure legalized, 1,500 square meters on the sides of the stream were adapted for pedestrian access, 4,500 square meters were adapted for mobility and public space, 72 square meters of pedestrian bridges linking neighborhoods were built, and 1,000 meters of retaining walls were erected to mitigate the structural risk of houses and for soil stabilization (Garcia Bocanegra, 2010).

Phase 1 of the project cost US\$ 5.463 million with contributions coming from the national, provincial, metropolitan, and local government, as well as from the community. The fact that the planning department, infrastructure department, EDU, utilities, Metropolitan area, and national housing programs had to work in tandem and

did so was an important accomplishment for local political actors looking to prove the benefits of proper project management combined with political will.

Not everything merits praise: several community and EDU members spoke in interviews of shortcomings ‘in creating more sense of community’ and ‘generating a sense of appropriation by the community of the public works’. These concerns were evidenced in misuse, stealing or destruction of public property, as well as lack of maintenance (something that the community could prioritize through participatory budgeting efforts existing in the city). Furthermore, the intervention revealed deeply entrenched challenges related to land titling; gaps in policy at different administrative levels related to the valuation of existing housing structures, licensing processes and subsidy disbursements; and non-compliance of standards. It is troubling that many of these shortcomings had already been identified with PRIMED. In the words of an interviewee, ‘all the studies and legal processes were completed, and not all properties were titled, that is unbelievable’. Problems with titling and failure to put all public spaces to use could be attributed to the change of mayors: the project was continued under Salazar, whose administration created ISVIMED and tasked it with taking over from EDU during the final stages.

Upon its completion, the area of the intervention was renamed Nuevo Sol de Oriente (New Eastern Sun), and the project methodology extended to the implementation of phase two further upstream as well as to the settlements along nearby stream La Herrera (2008-2013). The autonomy in resource allocation gained by mayors through decentralization is key to the Juan Bobo pilot. The upgrading of Juan Bobo created an important sense of accomplishment for city leaders, bureaucrats, and community members, a feeling that was confirmed when the project, entered into

the 2008 Dubai International Award for Best Practices to Improve the Living Environment under the label Heartfelt Houses (Viviendas con Corazon), and was one of the winners of the bi-annual award.

Comuna 8: the upgrading that was... was not... and was again

The settlements on the upper portion of the hills of Comuna 8 began forming over 35 years ago with a mix of local residents, new arrivals, and individuals displaced by the country's violent conflict. The area is characterized by a high risk of landslides, high levels of poverty, and the prevalence of precarious housing conditions; features that make it an ideal candidate for comprehensive upgrading. The city government under mayor Anibal Gaviria (2012-2015) started in 2014 an evaluation of the conditions of these settlements with the objective of incorporating them into a new upgrading program termed *Barrios Sostenibles* (sustainable neighborhoods). Four components were under analysis: housing, public space, amenities, and mobility.

Water provision was identified as a significant challenge during the diagnostic phase. Part of the community aqueduct Isaac Gaviria was in a rather precarious state, impacting potential upgrades to the housing stock. According to a project consultant, the implications of such a realization were that any project to replace existing houses would have to deal also with water provision, a challenge from a financial standpoint: if the planned budget was meant to also cover housing, public space, and public amenities, water networks would take a significant amount of the intended resources. This was echoed by a member of EDU: 'there are significant problems with the water network, there was no capacity to satisfy increased demand'. Another challenge was similar to one faced at Juan Bobo: legal requirements called for a significant buffer

between streams and constructions, a problem magnified in portions of this area considered rural in land use plans and where the existing requirements called for a distance of thirty meters. An exception was secured under the city's 2015 comprehensive plan, where advocates obtained a change from 30 meters to 10 meters so long as special technical analysis green lighted the decrease. According to individuals involved in the project, the teams mapping the areas would request further exceptions to the rules under special circumstances: for instance, if a house built from durable materials was half in the no-construction area, half in the green lighted area, the team would enter the house into a process as a special case. Another source of norm flexibility was parking requirements, which were impossible to meet if financial resources were not increased. An exception was granted given that many of the projects were located less than 500 meters away from a cable car. Lastly, density limitations under the new land use plan meant the projected number of units could not be built, making the buildings financially unfeasible.

Given the challenges and requests for special consideration emanating from the territory, and the many agencies involved, months would pass between one agency giving the go ahead or requesting additional information, tests, or analysis in order to make a decision, and the following agency doing its part. PRIMED and Juan Bobo had had a clear project manager and members in the local government pushing to streamline the process; there was no one doing the same for Comuna 8. Gaviria's term in office came to an end and the new mayor, Federico Gutierrez (2016-2019), placed a moratorium on the project as he decided its viability. For example, the initial understanding with the planning department that the 10 meter buffer in urban areas could be reduced to 8 meters when accompanied by risk mitigation works was

challenged for revision by the incoming government. From a community perspective, the delays were not well received: people were tired of being asked year after year to take part in analyses (which by the third round were seen by residents as a waste of public funds); properties on plots that could be densified had already been purchased and demolished; and citizens, while appreciative of the amenities and public works carried out in the neighborhood, were eager to get a solution to their housing needs. Architects and social workers consulted for this research also expressed concerns about the delays. As a project consultant shared, ‘the studies are ready. The new mayor wants to improve them, assign more funds, make them cooler, that is great, but he should not discard the work we did, just do some additional evaluation and he will find our work was not done carelessly’. An academic who has also consulted on the project concurred: ‘projects like these require political will, without it they do not take off’.

The administration announced in 2017 that it would go ahead with the interventions, eliminating the *barrios sostenibles* label and re-naming them under the old *mejoramiento integral barrial*. The initial phase, slated to begin in the second half of 2017, is expected to cost COP\$ 18.000 million for the construction of seven five-story buildings which will directly impact 68 families (Ospina Zapata, 2017). As of December 2017, the initial phase had not yet broken ground, however, *Unidos por el Agua*, a new program to improve water networks and ensure that demand can be met, has been started under the leadership of the water utility, EPM²⁰, and the infrastructure department, in conjunction with the planning department, EDU, ISVIMED, and the

²⁰ EPM (Empresas Publicas de Medellin) is the city’s utilities provider. It is setup as corporatized agency, in other words, it is a state-owned company but run independently by a Board of Directors

territorial management department, citizen participation department, and the finance department. A projected second phase would see the construction of five more buildings. Social workers and community members consulted for this research are hopeful the new water program will lead to the housing upgrading finally taking place. As if the past problems were not enough, there is already evidence of potential turf problems: the president of the city council stated that while EDU is working on the project designs, ISVIMED and EPM should lead the project given that these agencies have better financial leverage (Ospina Zapata, 2017). This is a problem for several reasons: projects such as Juan Bobo benefited from the inter-institutional and inter-sectorial coordination by EDU, with problems in later stages associated with the transfer of responsibilities to ISVIMED. The agency quite simply has not been able to establish itself. In the words of a private sector developer, “EDU was a catalyzer of resources, ideas, and projects, but it no longer is given the means to function that way’. Another problem is that while EPM certainly has the financial leverage, it is not in its mission statement to be an urban development agency. While EPM has a highly competent team of architects and its own architectural design studio, stretching its competencies into this arena is unwarranted. Medellin is seeing an impact of decentralization: agencies within the city vying for resources, information, and power.

Housing Experimentation and the Challenges of Institutionalization

The cases presented above highlight the importance of three avenues – decentralization, flexibility, and political initiative - in the experimentation with in-situ housing interventions that allow state-sponsored settlement upgrades with large community participation components. An analysis of the failure to institutionalize of

these experiments into policy evidences that these avenues contain within themselves challenges.

Decentralization

Decentralization has been a key factor in allowing public officials in Medellin to experiment with different forms of housing provision that go beyond the usually preferred construction of new housing. The decentralization of administrative, political, and fiscal powers created the conditions for Juan Bobo to be undertaken. The leading role of the city government evidences that it was the result of local agents having the authority, ability, interest, and resources to engage. From an administrative perspective, the mayor had the power to reorganize the local bureaucracy in a way that would be conducive to clarifying that EDU would be the agency leading the project and had the mayor's backing when it came to coordinating with municipal, metropolitan, and national agencies to make upgrading a reality. From a political perspective, both mayors Fajardo and Salazar were elected to the executive running on platforms that emphasized in-situ quality housing and neighborhood upgrading with strong community participation components, giving their initiatives legitimacy. Lastly, from a resources perspective, decentralization allowed the municipality to dictate how financing would be distributed, allowing it to put resources into upgrading projects rather than forcing it to go with the changing national winds that preferred new housing.

Despite its benefits, decentralization is not without challenges, and its ability to expand affordable housing should not be assumed (Das, 2018). Decentralization can lead to fragmentation impacting policy coordination and financing. In the case of Medellin, this is evidenced in the misalignment between national and municipal

approaches to housing: while the country's highest court mandated that national government could not impose housing policies on subnational units, central government politicians found a work around by using subsidy allocation as a means to promote their preferred housing agenda. The Colombian government does not differentiate among subsidies, giving cities the same amount for upgrading and new housing. Municipalities such as Medellin, facing multiple claims on limited fiscal resources, can go at it alone with housing upgrading, putting into action what is widely considered to be a socially successful approach. Only two mayors since the 1990s have been willing to do this, with the others caving to national inducements to build new housing. A government planner explained it this way: 'the national government doesn't like Juan Bobo style upgrading because they are time consuming projects which they don't get to cut the ribbon on. National policy privileges new housing with private developers to create more employment. They want to see volume, 5,000 houses, imagine that, give me a greenfield and I give you the houses'. Another planner concurred: "there is no agency doing habitat, they only think about housing. What good are housing projects like the free houses from the national government which land buildings in the middle of nowhere, with the nearest school kilometers away, that do not have the possibility of urban services?" (bureaucrat, interview by author, 2017). Another planner put it succinctly, "we no longer do neighborhoods and upgrading, we do housing" (bureaucrat, interview by author, 2017). Murray and Clapham (2015) note that in the late 1990s countries in Latin America began to favor the construction of new homes and reduction of subsidies towards alternatives such as slum upgrading. This was also the case in Medellin: while Juan Bobo showed that the in-situ upgrading communities prefer could be successfully done, the interaction of

national preferences and local needs meant mayors were more likely to embrace a housing agenda of new construction in greenfields.

New constructions in Colombia allow local governments to share the costs of housing provision with the national government which lately has been willing to cover the costs of building a large number of new housing so long as municipal governments provided serviced land and overviewed the contracting and execution of the buildings. Mayors falling behind on their housing targets often feel the need to produce units ‘no matter how’ as a former EDU member shared: ‘We had a representative from the national government who said “you have to give out subsidies, just go to the creeks, to the slums, and give them away”. As a planner I said no, that is not how you intervene a city, you need to have other criteria [...] You have to go to the territory, because if you isolate yourself, you don’t see a community, you see numbers in an excel spreadsheet’. National preferences for new housing given the economic implications of construction as an economic engine, when combined with the expedience of building new structures (which do not have to undertake active community involvement through negotiation, participation, etc.), make the proposition of abandoning upgrading in favor of new housing attractive to local governments.

While decentralization gave municipalities greater independence over their resources, policies still allow the national government to influence sectors such as housing. A counterweight to this could come from the administrative and political powers secured under decentralization. Politically, there are more expedient ways to meet housing targets such as greenfield development. Administrative structures could to some extent balance the resource and political incentives to move away from in-situ upgrading. For example, the creation of a housing agency with a clear mandate to

incorporate upgrading and a strong organizational setup and know-how conducive to implementation could make the practice more attractive for incoming mayors. In Medellin, the know-how and lessons acquired by Corvide and EDU have not successfully transferred to ISVIMED and so decentralization, while allowing for upgrading experimentation, has not translated into an aid for its institutionalization. This sentiment is well illustrated in the back and forth between two planners I interviewed:

Planner 1: “ISVIMED is a very young agency, it was formed around 2009”

Planner 2 interrupts: “yes, but it should bring all the experience of Corvide (the housing agency that predated it) and the experience of Social Development (the government department that took over responsibilities in between). All the experience, they just kept things in boxes²¹, nothing to see”

Planner 1: “that’s what I was getting to, ISVIMED portrays itself today as if it was just getting started so when you go there looking for inputs they just answer with things from the current mayor, they have not accumulated knowledge”

Planner 2: “there is a loss of institutional and collective memory in that agency”

Norm Flexibility

Administrative decentralization gave greater discretion to local public officials, allowing in turn the use of exceptions in order to achieve norm flexibility. Exceptions take care of norms that require a lengthy debate to be changed. Technical requirements such as the definition of what constitutes a high-risk area and how far structures should be from bodies of water can make projects unviable. While the use of

²¹ I found references to this loss of institutional memory and files in other places. An architect in private practice who has worked as a consultant shared a similar experience: “I witnessed the ending of Corvide... the files were distributed, even my office received boxes, it’s a scary thing” (interview by author, 2016)

exceptions has turned around otherwise unviable projects, it also creates a sense of an uneven playing field where what gets the go ahead and what gets red lighted can be perceived as being subject to who is pushing what. As a community leader mentioned in an interview, norms that gained exception at Juan Bobo were the same that disallowed, around the same time, and in the same territory, the construction of a community center in legally owned land. These exceptions however were not without basis: they were the result of expensive hydrological, geological, and engineering studies that confirmed the buffer could be smaller if risk mitigation works were carried out.

PRIMED and Juan Bobo, together with initiatives undertaken in Bogota, trail blazed upgrading methodologies in Colombia. Local leaders, recognizing its potential, incorporated it into the 2006 revision and subsequent 2014 creation of the city's new land use plan. This step was meant to turn the practice into public policy, however, as the case of Comuna 8 shows, taking the methodology from paper to reality has been unsuccessful. The team of engineers working at Juan Bobo forced a revision of municipal policies regarding riparian edges, after showing that through case-by-case analysis these could be reduced (though not eliminated) in order to make in-situ housing upgrading possible. The most recent comprehensive plan supports a decrease of buffers through studies. This flexibility is crucial for the materialization of housing projects, but it also creates state-sponsored informality, as Roy (2009, p.81) rightly points out: 'the state, as the sovereign keeper of the law, is able to place itself outside the law in order to practice development. What then is planning? Is it that which remains bounded by the law and upholds formal regulations? Or is it the relationship between the published plan and unmapped territory?'

The challenge at play within cities of the global South is that often the law and formal regulations have been conceived without taking into account the realities (economic, geographical, etc.) of poor, low-income, and informal settlements. The initial flexibility places the state within the realm of the informal in order to ‘practice development’. This can nonetheless be formalized, as was the case in Medellin where what was initially norm flexibility became institutionalized when it came time for the legally-mandated revision and renewal of the comprehensive plan. Planning then is not bounded by a static set of laws and regulations, but rather a dynamic practice that must take into account the lived reality of the city and technical-based measures designed to ensure safety and incorporate these into new laws and regulations that are sure to morph through time. Shortcomings remain as new projects and new regulations demand more flexibility. In the case of the Comuna 8 projects in Medellin, requirements introduced in the 2014 comprehensive plan such as parking and building height limitations demanded the revision of the previously approved housing upgrading plans and the consideration, once again, of norm flexibility. While political expediency may help some projects materialize through norm flexibility, the institutionalization of changes to the norm that can positively impact other developments must often wait.

Political Initiative

The political decentralization that allowed progressive actors to come to power in Medellin, combined with the administrative and financial resources at their disposal, meant that political initiative could travel far when government officials decided to pursue upgrading initiatives. Juan Bobo, like many projects during the Fajardo administration, was assessed for progress on a weekly basis. The mayor and

his chief of staff would identify bottlenecks and contact the head of the department causing them, keeping everyone committed to advance implementation. This level of political will and commitment are key to undertaking and seeing through upgrading programs. A city planner reflecting on the challenges facing upgrading highlighted the importance of a project management strategy: “we have suggested that MIB (neighborhood upgrading) needs a manager. It cannot be done by each agency because it becomes their intervention and that’s it. This needs a head, someone to take it on as was done with the PUI in 2004, someone to call all secretaries, to have someone responsible so the communities know that there is a visible head (...) every week, two weeks, he would ask about the project and its progress, and you couldn’t just tell him the same thing as the previous meeting” (interview by author, 2016).

As a former member of EDU now working in the private sector stated, ‘you can have the best technicians, exceptional architects, great thinkers and grand policies, but political will and continuity are fundamental’. With new administrations elected every four years, and in a fragmented political party system, the distribution of financial resources and agency support towards upgrading is likely to be discontinued as new players with different agendas and priorities come into power. A city-planner said it best: “all development plans (the PDs) are going to have a housing component, but the focus to meet it is where the difference lays. One might be just about subsidies, another upgrading, and that makes other agencies work around that focus, but that has to do with political will” (interview by author, 2016). To sum, as Payne (2014) argues, urban planning and land use management are ultimately politically driven.

Initiative however goes beyond elected and appointed leaders. Mid-level bureaucrats were identified through interviews as a stabilizing force when it comes to in-situ housing and neighborhood upgrading. These actors combine technical know-how with knowledge on how to navigate the extensive body of formal and informal institutions regulating housing. Interviews suggest that these actors attempt to follow-through by highlighting the benefits of in-situ upgrading to new bureaucrats and administrators, however, their ability to impact future action is undermined by the politization of departments (seen for example with often, sometimes annual changes of department heads and their immediate team), lack of mechanisms in place to create organizational memory of lessons learned, an emphasis on meeting objectives without regard for outcomes, and lack of articulation among different entities. As an interviewee who worked for EDU and is now at another agency stated, ‘a bureaucrat’s hands are tied if the mayor’s four year development plan does not include large investments in the most deteriorated parts of the city’. A member of EDU involved in the three cases echoed this sentiment: ‘we have professionals with experience in the methodology that are passionate about it, but more than anything we require political will from the mayor’.

Political initiative is an impediment to institutionalization that has been moderated in other sectors through the involvement of diverse actors. While communities, social movements, and community-based organizations call for upgrading, and academia and bureaucrats recognize its merits, the practice has not developed a broad enough network to put pressure on elected officials. Pressure tactics by a broad set of actors could help persuade those in power to the merits of upgrading and create incentives to offset the political expediency of meeting housing

targets. This support for the practice could also potentially help stabilize it within an agency and create a more conducive organizational environment for its institutionalization.

Conclusion

The piloting of housing upgrading interventions PRIMED and Juan Bobo created a set of lessons learned and positive social impacts that showed the merits of institutionalizing the practice. Despite promising results and interest by communities and bureaucrats in its continuation, upgrading failed to institutionalize and impact ongoing housing creation. The methodology has been incorporated into the most recent land use plan but has not been activated.

Medellin, like many other Latin American cities, has a chronic qualitative and quantitative housing deficit. Decades of state neglect and individual inability to further improve housing conditions due to economic, geographical, political, or tenure conditions have created settlements where residents have developed strong ties to the space they inhabit. In-situ upgrading has been identified as a strategy that allows community bonds, existing livelihoods and ties to space to remain, while bringing about more dignified housing solutions. An analysis of interventions carried out in Medellin allows us to identify three aspects that make experimentation with this form of housing provision possible: decentralization, norm flexibility, and political initiative.

Decentralization created opportunities for new, city-led approaches to intervene in informal settlements, however, the conversion of the progressive interventions identified in this text into implemented public policies is hampered by the strength of the path shaping logic created by the national government. While

events such as decentralization create critical junctures where new paths in housing provision are possible, the creation of new housing in greenfields remains more attractive and politically expedient. In-situ upgrading demands more time, has greater participation requirements, and costs more. In this sense, the path dependence of housing identified by authors analyzing global North settings is seen also in the global South at the national scale, which, as shown, has swaying power over municipalities. However, this article shows that at the local level serial replacement is a better way to understand the development of housing. Approaches to housing in Medellin were both frequent (in tandem with mayoral changes every four years), and radical (with some mayors prioritizing upgrading, others prioritizing new housing, and others giving low priority to housing). Serial replacement is a better way of understanding the failure to institutionalize progressive upgrading pilots into permanent and actionable public policy.

While decentralization, norm flexibility, and political initiative are conducive to experimentation, the institutionalization of in-situ upgrading into public policy is not guaranteed. Factors that may have contributed to institutionalize the practice such as the emergence of a broad set of diverse actors advocating for its continuity or the creation of a clear organizational setup to channel lessons learned have not come about either. As an interviewee stated, ‘we have not been able to give continuity to successful pilots, we are full of great, even excellent pilots, but they continue to be just that’. The positive side of this reality is that a successful intervention, even if it does not institutionalize in short order, does have the potential to transform planning by evidencing what is possible, as was the case with PRIMED influencing Juan Bobo with regard to riparian protection. This can have powerful repercussions. However,

until broader formal and informal institutions are changed, progressive interventions remain subject to electoral successes. The initiative displayed by mid-level bureaucrats can be aided by requirements to incorporate lessons learned from successful upgrading projects into new and existing institutions, as was the case with changes in creek buffer zone norms. The move from paper to practice requires political initiative of elected officials and high ranking bureaucrats able to recognize that these practices will initially incur much higher costs, which can only be reduced in future projects through the efficiencies created by streamlined processes that incorporate lessons learned and reduce transaction costs. Only this way can the social, financial, administrative, technical, and political costs that go into experimenting with upgrading be lowered through time.

This article contributes to the literature on institutions and on scaling up successful upgrading programs by highlighting the factors that make experimentation possible and their role incentivizing or hindering the conversion of experiments into more permanent public policies. What leads to experimentation may not lead to institutionalization. Further research on path dependency and serial replacement in housing policy at different levels of government, and in different contexts, can help clarify potential avenues to facilitate the institutionalization at local and national levels of upgrading policies. Such research may help policymakers practitioners finally turn successful experiments into permanent public policy.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUITY OF PROGRESSIVE PLANNING

In this dissertation I show that both state and non-state actors in Medellín have actively pursued the institutionalization of progressive planning practices. Actors are aware that continuity past the four years of any given mayor is not guaranteed, and this realization motivates them to take action through both formal and informal institutions. The source of this motivation is usually self-interest in the form of personal or community gain, but also strong normative beliefs that there are certain values or knowledges that should guide city planning and management such as equity and sustainability. Effectiveness in the institutionalization of a practice is hard to achieve, as it is the product of institutions being constantly and consciously pursued, of working with others to ensure continued implementation of the practice, and of balancing the objectives of the institution with political expedience. In light of this, effective institutions take both formal and informal forms.

Agents of change: state and non-state actors in pursuit of continuity

Institutionalization is a multi-actor effort. State agents, who have the power to change formal institutions, are well aware that the next administration has the same powers and as such attempt to get non-state actors involved through constituency creation as illustrated in chapters three and four. Non-state actors, on the other hand, are well positioned to frame new narratives and mobilize them in pursuit of new norms or ideas, but see the state and formal institutions as the ultimate site of legitimacy for the continuity of socio-spatial endeavors. This appreciation of the power of the other calls for networking across societal groups. Politicians play an

important role by setting agendas around progressive issues as was the case with Fajardo and Salazar and their actions in the different sectors of interest in this dissertation. Bureaucrats constitute a form of institutional and organizational memory and are strategically positioned to advocate for certain practices as illustrated by EPM's UVAs initiative for public space and housing efforts in Juan Bobo and Commune 8. CBOs, SMOs, and civic leaders are crucial in bringing an organized message of the needs and preferences of communities to state actors and powerful business elites, as well as in helping organize communities to resist or participate in state-sponsored efforts as chapters three and five, and to a lesser extent chapter four illustrate. Finally, business and civic elites, given their ability to mobilize economic and social power, are important actors in the continuity of practices by pushing for issues to remain in the agenda and get implemented as illustrated by the provision of public space in Medellin.

New institutions in Medellin

Today Medellin is known among planners and urbanists as a paradigmatic showcase of the power of city planning. Such status was hard to predict considering the state of the city in the late 1980s and 1990s. As the city was immersed in a social crisis marked by high levels of violence, a broad and diverse set of actors emerged to attempt to reverse its continuing decline. The seeds of the city's transformation were there all along: the public services companies constituted in the twentieth century, the creation of business alliances advocating for the city, the growth from the 1970s onwards of community based efforts, the public and private universities forming professionals and thinking about the city, and the coming together of unlikely partners under the mediation of the presidential council. All these factors served as building

blocks for the city's resurgence from the late 1990s onwards.

New institutions have emerged in Medellin impacting both the overall socio-political environment in which planning and city management take place, as well as particular sectors. Three main institutions have emerged over the last twenty years: holistic state-sponsored planning, changed state-society interactions, and integrated planning. I will refer to these respectively as principle, process, and policy outcome.

A new *principle* to emerge in the cases analyzed in this dissertation is that planning should be a citywide state-sponsored effort. There is a shift from state actors focusing only on the formal city. State intervention through planning in the informal city, the informal neighborhoods in the comunas, is no longer subject to question or debate. A new *process* to emerge sees changed state society interaction. It is no longer just the state, civil society, or business elites 'making the city' on their own but rather there is a change in how these actors interact and how they approach planning the city. Lastly, a new *policy outcome* emerges, one that considers multi-sectoral integral approaches to be paramount to achieving significant impact in the most needed neighborhoods.

These institutions can be found formally in the POT, the development plans of different mayors, and at the national level in the constitutional mandate for greater citizen participation. In practice, the degree of emphasis on implementation varies by administration. The holistic city principle is the most institutionalized change. Medellin's planning and administrative agencies are pushed both internally by bureaucrats and externally by elites and civil society into sponsoring efforts throughout the city. The high degree of institutionalization is found in all sectors, though a sign of weakness does emerge when it comes to housing. While housing

reflects the new citywide state-sponsored nature of the principle, there is a bias towards new developments rather than in-situ upgrading.

The process of state-society interaction now allows for greater grassroots and elites participation, input, and oversight. These actors in turn engage with the state through existing spaces and push for the opening of new ones. The level of institutionalization in this case is medium: state and non-state actors continue to mobilize and make use of spaces where more inclusive results incorporating the input of beneficiaries can be achieved. However, technocratic approaches better consistent with the developmental state are increasingly found, particularly in general planning and mobility, while patron-client dynamics continue to impact housing. Public space and water and sanitation continue to experience a high level of state-society interaction. Both principle and process institutions benefit from constituency creation and from the mobilization of narratives on democratization (related to the right to participate and to benefit from the state), and equity (everyone has the right to participate and to benefit from the state, not just those with power). The push by different actors towards maintaining these institutions means that the institutions in turn shape state behavior (by ensuring openings for participation and implementing programs and projects in marginalized areas), as well as government policy as seen, for example, in the continuation of public space works in marginalized areas with citizen input to ensure interventions meet local wants and needs.

Policy outcome is the least institutionalized of the new approaches to emerge. While the institution exists formally, it is not impacting action as intended. Efforts to bring together different state agencies in one geographical location under methodologies such as PUI or MIB have come to a halt. In other words, while

interventions continue taking place, they are no longer the highly coordinated, multi-sectoral efforts seen in the first decade where public space, mobility, services, housing, and other urban amenities were all tackled at once within select territories. While the integral planning policy outcome is intended to be multi-sectoral I believe we can transfer a more modest version to each planning domain and assess whether it has had continuation there. In the case of mobility, the sector itself has become multi-modal in order to integrate the city and adapt to its varying slopes. In addition, concerted efforts have been made to situate urban amenities such as schools, libraries or parks near public transportation routes. Water and sanitation has also been able to preserve a more integral approach. This is evidenced in the multiple approaches taken to extend service throughout the city through regular billing, prepaid meters, communal faucets, the water lifeline, and more recently, united for water. Furthermore, efforts such as EPM's UVAs show attempts to integrate water infrastructure into other services such as the provision of much needed public space. Public space has also tried to integrate a variety of services as evidenced by EPM and the city's UVAs, which include fields or sports courts, training centers, and community centers. Other public spaces such as library-parks also integrate multiple services including vocational training centers Cedezos. Mobility, public space, and water and sanitation can therefore be said to be meeting some integral policy outcomes despite the clear limitations built into each sectoral silo. Housing once again proves less apt at delivering integral outcomes in a timely manner.

Water and sanitation, public space, and mobility have seen the emergence and implementation of new institutions, though a caveat is in order. I argue that mobility is not a progressive sector; instead, while its interventions have no doubt benefited the

most marginalized, these have been the product of a top-down approach closer conceptually to the developmental state than to the progressive city. Mobility has seen an emphasis on bringing different modes of transportation to all corners of the city using technologies that adapt to the terrain such as cable-cars. This has not always worked out, as feeder buses for example are too heavy and slow for steeper slopes. Water and sanitation, and public space, have become characterized by progressive objectives, evidenced in the networks of state and non-state actors ensuring progressive interventions continue to take place, the constituencies demanding the continuation of existing trajectories, the formalization through agreements and decrees of policies, the elaboration of normative frameworks around equality and sustainability, and the emphasis on spatial distribution of actions in both sectors.

Progressive institutions have been the weakest in housing and general planning. Both have formal mandates that can be found in the books, but their implementation does not have a strong impetus. Housing interventions continue to take place in the city, but rather than following in-situ relocation (as preferred by citizens in need for new housing), the strategy has been to provide temporary solutions through the rental market or permanent solutions in less desirable locations such as Pajarito. National agendas have played an important role in this, as the central government wants to meet short-term housing targets rather than long-term successful housing outcomes. Financial incentives to cities mean these gladly take the central government's offer. Holistic planning has also seen a deceleration in recent years. While interventions in transportation, public space, water and sanitation, and housing continue to take place in marginalized areas, there is no longer strong coordination

among agencies, instead, coordination is loose at the detriment of the communities that must contend with longer timelines and mixed communication from the state.

Explaining variability in institutionalization

What then are the factors that matter and help explain the variations in institutionalization described in the previous paragraphs? An analysis of the sectors and general planning in Medellin, in relation to the hypotheses initially developed, lead me to argue that individuals and organizational arrangements are core to developing institutions that are more likely to continue impacting action.

The importance of diverse actors

Institutionalization does indeed require the sustained involvement of a diverse set of actors who can give a practice time to stabilize. This sustained presence continues to be important. Elites play an important role given their access to power, but organized communities also have a key role as evidenced by the water lifeline. Diversity and numbers matter. A point to note is that the importance of diverse actors goes beyond constituency creation: actors need to network in order to put pressure from different points. Taking it back to the discussion about elements, relations are imperative to the continuation of progressive practices. Furthermore, as argued in chapter four, the engagement of actors in networks that pursue formal and informal institutions is a key stabilizing force.

The importance of organizational arrangements

An important factor explaining the variation in institutionalization is the existence of clear organizational arrangements. While I had initially hypothesized that this meant the existence of a unique organizational home for each practice, the

evidence shows this is not the case. What is needed is an organization or agency that has ultimate responsibility for a practice and tops the hierarchy of different entities that might be pursuing implementation. This can translate into an agency being alone in its pursuits or coordinating efforts among agencies but with the power to have the last word. Irrespective of this a practice within an organization requires very clear arrangements (budget, clear guidelines, etc.) as discussed under practices within the elements chapter. But that is not the same as saying that the progressive practice needs a unique organizational home. As water and public space show, adaptability in meeting the objective has helped progressive practices in these sectors maintain continuity in Medellin. For example, public space being pursued not only by city hall but also by EPM, access to water being pursued under different programs some initiated by EPM and others by city-hall. But what both sectors have in common is that there is clarity on who is assigned ultimate responsibility over the sector. This has not been the case with housing: while ISVIMED is the city's housing agency, due to its poor performance, EDU is still being assigned housing responsibilities without clear mandates. Integral planning, while done by the planning department, is not meant to be implemented by it: planning 'plans', while EDU, infrastructure, and other city agencies are charged with executing. The absence of political or organizational arrangements to coordinate integral planning has hampered its institutionalization.

The role of narratives and formal institutions

Narratives, discourse, and symbols play an important role in institutionalization, but they do not help explain variation in institutionalization in this case. While housing has not developed a strong narrative, multi-sectoral planning has,

as have the other sectors. I believe then that narratives play a role as mechanisms to mobilize actors and create organizational stories, both of which as already discussed are important factors. Considering how often formal institutions are ignored, I had not expected them to be important in institutionalization. Indeed their existence does not help account for variation. Similar to narratives, formal institutions are nevertheless important as mechanisms to mobilize actors.

Theoretical contribution and policy implications

I argue that understanding institutionalization in urban settings requires that we acknowledge that it is the product of relations, practices, concepts and space, and that failure to act on all four fronts decreases the probability of achieving continuity. Action on all fronts does not guarantee continuity, but it better positions the nascent institution through both formal and informal mechanisms that can be activated by different agents for action. Furthermore, given the vulnerability of new institutions, actors attempt to impact their continuity by combining formal and informal mechanisms in order to reduce the weaknesses associated with each. This combination seeks to create a product that is more than the sum of its parts; in other words, by compounding the institution actors amplify its effects. The third argument developed in this dissertation is that factors that enable experimentation with new progressive practices such as decentralization, norm flexibility, and political initiative, can also represent impediments to institutionalization. Challenges of institutional weakness are therefore important for our conceptualization of progressive cities from a Southern perspective, but so is the importance of networking in pushing for the emergence and continuity of progressive practices.

I argue that practitioners looking to give continuity to a progressive planning practice must pay careful attention to the elements of institutionalization, ensuring that all are covered. In addition, strategies such as compounding can help strengthen an emerging institution, this however calls for planners to establish or facilitate communication and collaboration through networks.

Future directions for research

One topic for further research that emerges from the work presented in this dissertation is the need to further analyze the politics of changing institutions where a strong national component can become an impediment for local institutionalization as was the case with housing. This would require the analysis of tactics that have been or could be employed to impact other levels of government, as well as understanding the pushback such action would generate from developers as well as across government levels and sectors.

Given the finding that adaptability matters when it comes to continuity, further research needs to consider how flexibility deals with the potential for duplication or rivalries that can actually become impediments to the continuity of a practice. Another important area of research that does not get problematized to a large extent in this dissertation is power, and how its manifestations impact institutionalization. One such source of power to further analyze are illegal groups, and how these impact progressive action in underprivileged territories. Another source of power is the financial flexibility afforded to Medellín from its ownership of EPM. The transfers from the utility to the municipality have contributed to bankrolling interventions, but the role this source of resources plays in continuity or potential collapse merits greater attention.

Lastly, it must be recognized that Medellin sits within a highly conurbated area. Future research should explore how these territorial dynamics impact institutionalization both within the core city as well as its metropolitan area. This is particularly important for sectors such as water, electricity, waste disposal, and food security where the city depends on ecosystem services from outside its territorial boundary. This later area is one I have recently begun to explore and where I look forward to uncovering the factors that lead to the creation of successful metropolitan institutions.

Final thoughts

On February 27, 2016, I found myself in Pinares de Oriente, a neighborhood high on the mountain in Commune 8. I had only recently begun fieldwork and was in the parlance of ethnography working on gaining ‘entry’ with different communities and actors. Caroline Doyle, a researcher I had met during preliminary fieldwork had introduced me to an Australian expatriate who in turn had recently introduced me to a social worker. After meeting one day for coffee the social worker had agreed to accompany me to walk around informal settlements in this commune and so there we were, on a hot and sunny day, walking through dirt paths and greeting people left and right. The social worker had clearly built a good relation with the community, and while she had not worked in the area for a few months, she clearly cared about their plight and they appreciated her. I had not intended to research Comune 8. But that is how entry works, you take what you can get and work on growing options, and I figured for sure there was something to learn there. We stopped by Casa Vivero which today serves as a community center. Just a few years earlier the house was a command center for a paramilitary group that extorted and tortured from this now

vibrant place. There we ran into a well-known leader of the MIDM movement and that started a new relation that was to be important for my research. From there we went to visit a community leader actively involved in the area's informal housing committee, and later visited the house of a woman named doña Silva. She offered us the best curuba juice I have had in my life, and as we drank we talked about how her informal house had come to exist, her opinions on the interventions carried out in the area and the interventions that had not taken place. She spoke fondly of 'paseos de olla', what I can best describe as picnic-style family gatherings, in Jardín Circunvalar, how her husband had actually found work at the park as a groundskeeper, why she liked the UVA Sol de Oriente, how her daughter was actively involved in a dance group from the area, and their fear that their house would spell their expulsion of the territory if the long promised in-situ upgrading did not take place soon. Her self-built house was most likely than not destined for demolition given that it was in very precarious ground. But the Gaviria administration had purchased 'opportunity plots', houses in the neighborhood that stood on solid ground and which could be demolished and re-built at higher densities. The houses had been demolished just before his term ended, but the new mayor, Gutiérrez, was now in power and he had ordered a halt to the project while he figured out if was going to move forward with existing plans for the area. After walking and talking for most of the afternoon, we ended my visit in a still new looking playground in the 13 de Noviembre neighborhood. High up in the mountain, I could see most of the city from there: the new cable car being built going to La Sierra, a neighborhood with a violent history, and the plots of land waiting for a decision. In other words the interventions that continue to make Medellín a darling of

the global South and the challenges that many of its citizens continue to live with day after day.

Looking back at the years of research carried out for this dissertation it is hard not to think of the faces, the places, and the stories I encountered. But I only sought them because of the questions that motivated this research: *should we expect the city to be destined to a similar fate than Porto Alegre and Bogota? Why or why not? And perhaps most important, could anything be done to prevent Medellin from following the same trajectory of its Latin American peers, and if so, who needed to be involved?* The short answer: a hesitant no, Medellin will likely not follow the fate of Porto Alegre and Bogota, at least not in the near future. And yes, actions can be taken, or rather must be taken to prevent their fate, and these actions require the involvement of many, many actors.

I believe Medellin is special – in both good and not so good ways. The continuity of progressive practices in Medellin has a motor missing in many other cities in the world: EPM. Revenues from the services company account for approximately twenty percent of the city's budget. In other words, Medellin literally has a way to bankroll many interventions. While great care is taken to preserve and protect the company, mistakes have been made. The most recent are problems with hydroelectric plant Hidroituango which caused the company to sell some of its interests in other companies in order to cushion the financial costs. Assuming the plant is an outlier and EPM continues to have good management, we can count on EPM to be an incentive in the continuation of progressive interventions. But EPM has existed since the 1950s, so it certainly does not account for the changes seen in recent decades.

A common narrative raised in interviews was that ‘paisas’ (as the people from Medellin are known) are special. Associated with this narrative are words such as hard working, entrepreneurial, crafty, with a profound love for their land and a strong sense of family. It would be hard to quantify if paisas love their city more than residents in other parts love theirs, but it is true that paisas have a sense of pride. Their ‘specialness’ comes at a cost: the entrepreneurial spirit that has made Medellin the home of some of Colombia’s most important business and financial groups is also the spirit that made it headquarters to the Medellin cartel and the most widespread urban paramilitary presence of any major Colombian city. This gives place to an important factor, and one that at least for the next few decades (while memory is still somewhat fresh) should matter towards maintaining continuity: the profound scar left by violence. CBOs, business elites, planning professionals, regular citizens... everyone in Medellin was touched in one way or another by the violence of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Linking that violence to lack of educational opportunities, to socio-spatial segregation, and to economic decline have been crucial to changing the city. Medellin continues to have a violence-problem, and no amount of urban planning will change that. But urban planning and its associated programs do help people today have a better life than the one they had prior to the interventions. It is not the kind of life that a society should be content with providing, more needs to be done, but compared with what was there before, it is better.

The scar left by violence mobilized many and in different ways this has morphed into a commitment to continue taking action. Actors from different walks of life are cognizant that what has been built to date is fragile, that the progress while significant is far from enough. The continuity of their progressive endeavors is

closely tied to their commitment to keep them alive as much of this dissertation has tried to show. People are the city, people are the institutions, people make up the organizations, and people, particularly those in powerful positions, have a key role to play in institutionalization. There is a dangerous element to this: if people are so important, can the city's progressive approach survive a series of non-progressive mayors like the one currently in power? I believe mayors can slow down and impact the extent to which the city is progressive, but so far other societal actors, from CBOs to business elites to academia to think tanks have been able to push back and cushion the impact. How long can they do that for? Only time will tell. Elections for a new mayor are scheduled for the end of this month; it will be interesting to study what happens in the next four years.

For now, Medellin continues to accumulate international awards. The most recent ones have been awarded for its public space efforts: Parques del Rio along the Medellin River and lineal parks increasing the number of green corridors through the city. I doubt doña Silvia cares much about these awards. In 2017 she was evicted from her high-risk house and moved to what the city has decided is the answer to all housing questions: Pajarito. A housing development aligned with the recent Latin American trend of mass-produced buildings in peripheries, Pajarito is far from the in-situ upgrading doña Silvia and I had talked about. Her experience was a good reminder of why I decided to study the institutionalization of progressive practices. So much progress has been achieved and continues taking place in mobility, public space, and water and sanitation. So much is still to be done in sectors like housing which with its in-situ upgrading have showed promise at different points.

Institutions are important to maintaining continuity and the work required to build them is commensurate with their potential. They require oversight and persistence by diverse groups of people. They require organizational arrangements that are conducive to their continuity by creating incentives to comply and disincentives to stray. They require technical and financial resources to meet their mandate. They require narratives to mobilize people and resources. The city and regional planning field is good at theorizing and taking knowledge to action on these fronts. We must do more to bring them together and theorize the institutional turn in planning. I hope that this dissertation, and the articles and future work that come from it, make a positive contribution to that end.

APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDES

Updated interview guide

Andrea Restrepo-Mieth
City and Regional Planning
Cornell University

Agentes de Cambio: Institucionalizando la planificación progresista en Medellín

Guía de entrevista

Antecedentes básicos

1. ¿Cual es su nombre completo?
2. ¿Cual es su ocupación pasada/actual?
3. ¿Cómo se entreno para esta ocupación?

Parte A: Planificación progresista

Quiero comenzar discutiendo su involucramiento en esta practica de (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado, vivienda).

1. Cuénteme como se involucro inicialmente en (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado).

- ¿Qué lo motivó a involucrarse?
- ¿Por qué era eso importante para usted?
- ¿Cómo logra(ba) resultados?

2. ¿Preocupación por durabilidad de la practica?

- ¿Cuándo?
- ¿Por qué?
- ¿Acciones tomadas?

Parte B: Instituciones

Quiero que pasemos ahora a discutir las implicaciones a largo plazo del trabajo que usted ha hecho o esta haciendo en (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado, vivienda).

1. ¿Cómo buscó o busca darle continuidad a la practica?

- ¿Por qué esta y no otra acción/estrategia?
- ¿Es estable/lleva verdaderamente a continuidad? ¿Por qué?
- ¿Cree que fue efectivo? ¿Qué lo explica?

2. ¿Qué diría usted son los factores mas importantes que llevan a que haya continuidad?

¿Por qué estos y no otros factores?

¿Quiere esto decir que la practica en realidad continuara siendo efectiva?

3. ¿Qué ve como impedimentos a la continuidad? ¿Causa?

4. ¿Qué ha aprendido a NO hacer?

5. Si tuviera que adivinar cual va a ser la aproximación hacia (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado, vivienda) en a ciudad en dos años, que diría? (mejor, peor, igual) Cinco? Diez?

Conclusión

Puede recomendarme a otras personas para entrevistar?

Por favor recuerde que el formulario de consentimiento que le voy a enviar tiene mis datos de contacto. Si tiene alguna pregunta o si se le ocurre algo mas que quiere compartir por favor déjemelo saber.

**Original Interview Guide
(English version follows)**

**Los Agentes de Cambio: Institucionalizando la planificación progresiva en
Medellín y Bogotá, Colombia**

Guía de entrevista

Trazado de líneas de investigación:

Parte A: Planificación Progresiva

1. Como se involucraron en la practica de planificación?
2. Que los motiva a comprometerse?
3. Que a contribuido a su involucramiento?
4. Que es valioso de la practica en la manera en que ellos la abogan?
5. Cual a sido su rol en la búsqueda de la practica?

Parte B: Instituciones

1. Que constituye una institución estable?
2. Como llegaron a ver una institución en particular como estable o efectiva?
Experiencia? Investigación?
3. Cuales son sus objetivos de institucionalización?
4. Como están persiguiendo esos objetivos?
5. Por que creen que las instituciones ayudaran a que la practica tenga
continuidad?
6. Como saben si están progresando?

Introducción y consentimiento

Gracias por acceder a ser entrevistado. Tengo dos formularios de consentimiento: uno es para usted y el otro le agradecería si me lo firma para mis archivos.

Quiero que sepa que agradezco enormemente su disposición para ayudarme con mi investigación.

Antecedentes básicos

4. ¿Cual es su nombre completo?
5. ¿Cual es su ocupación actual?
6. ¿Cómo se entreno para esta ocupación? (universidad, escuela vocacional, talleres comunitarios, entrenamiento activista/organizacional, desarrollo profesional)

Parte A: Planificación progresiva

Quiero comenzar discutiendo su involucramiento en esta practica de (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado).

1. Cuénteme como se involucro inicialmente en (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado).
 - a. Sondear cuando se involucro en la práctica si no lo menciona
 - i. ¿Cuándo fue eso?
 - b. Sondear donde se involucro en la práctica si no lo menciona
 - i. ¿En qué (ciudad o barrio) fue eso?
2. ¿Qué lo motivó a involucrarse?
 - a. Sondear valores, conocimiento, intereses, ideas, leyes, procedimientos, símbolos
 - i. Cuando usted dice [x], ¿qué quiere decir? ¿Puede decirme más al respecto?
 - b. Sondear redes, enmarcación, poder, coyunturas críticas
 - i. Cuando usted dice [x], ¿qué quiere decir? ¿Puede decirme mas al respecto?
3. ¿Por qué era eso importante para usted?
 - a. Sondear razones, sentimientos, o pensamientos
 - i. ¿Puede darme un ejemplo?
4. Cuénteme un poco sobre como usted llevo a ver (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado) como (factores mencionados en respuesta 3)
 - a. Sondear:
 - i. ¿Por qué es eso importante o valioso?
5. Cuénteme sobre su involucramiento desde que inicio hasta hoy
 - a. Sondear que ha cambiado, que ha sido agregado o sustraído en la practica
 - i. ¿Puede decirme mas sobre eso?
 - b. Sondear que ha cambiado, , que ha sido agregado o sustraído en el rol de la persona
 - i. ¿Puede decirme mas sobre eso?
6. ¿Cuales diría usted que son los tres roles mas importantes que juega ver (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado) en la ciudad?
 - a. Sondear valores, intereses, ideas, leyes, símbolos

Parte B: Instituciones

Quiero que pasemos ahora a discutir las implicaciones a largo plazo del trabajo que usted esta haciendo en (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado).

1. Si tuviera que adivinar cual va a ser la aproximación hacia (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado) en a ciudad en dos años, que diría?
 - i. Y en cinco años?
 - ii. Y en diez años?

Opción 1: el actor espera que la practica de planificación progresiva tenga continuidad:

1. Cuénteme que lo hace tener confianza en la continuidad de la aproximación actual a (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado)

- a. Sondear enmarcación, recursos, redes, poder
 - i. ¿Cómo funciona eso? ¿Cómo lo genera o moviliza?
 - ii. ¿Puede darme un ejemplo de cómo usted (moviliza recursos, enmarca, usa redes, desplegar poder)?
 - iii. ¿Por qué decidió (moviliza recursos, enmarca, usa redes, desplegar poder)?
 - iv. ¿Consideró otras alternativas? Por que/por que no las siguió?
 - v. ¿Cómo se traduce esto a su expectativa de continuidad?
 - vi. ¿Qué podría retar eso?
 - vii. ¿Está usted haciendo algo para prevenir (el factor mencionado como un reto)?

- b. Sondear conocimiento, interés, identidades, valores, ideas, leyes, procedimientos, símbolos
 - i. Usted mencionó (elementos mencionados). ¿Por qué es eso importante?
 - ii. ¿Cómo se traduce esto a su expectativa de continuidad?
 - iii. ¿Cómo lo busca?
 1. Sondear: ¿Puede darme un ejemplo?
 - iv. ¿Que podría retar eso?
 - v. ¿Está usted haciendo algo para prevenir (el factor mencionado como un reto)?

- c. Sondear estrategia de institucionalización
 - i. Lo que lo estoy oyendo decir es (decir con otras palabras lo que esta diciendo sobre instituciones). ¿Es eso correcto?
 - ii. Veo. ¿Puede darme un ejemplo de cómo se da eso concretamente?
 - iii. ¿Por qué fue eso seguido?
 1. ¿Fueron consideradas otras estrategias?
 2. ¿Por qué o por qué no fueron seguidas?
 - iv. ¿Cómo ha (el grupo, la organización, la agencia, la empresa) contribuido a esta estrategia de institucionalización?
 - v. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con esa aproximación o le gustaría estar haciendo algo diferente?
 1. Sondear: ¿Puede darme un ejemplo?

2. Para resumir, ¿qué diría usted son los factores mas importantes para hacer que la aproximación actual hacia (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado) tenga continuidad?

- a. Sondear

- i. ¿Por qué estos y no otros factores?
 - ii. ¿Quiere esto decir que la practica en realidad continuara siendo efectiva?
 - 1. ¿Qué conecta la existencia de la practica con su efectividad?
3. La semana pasada entreviste (un empleado del gobierno, un político, un líder empresarial, un líder social) quien me dijo que el/ella pensaba (mencionar una institución contrapunto a la institución que el entrevistado esta diciendo) es la mejor manera de conseguir continuidad. Que piensa de esa aproximación?
- a. Sondear tipo de institución
 - i. ¿Y que hay de las instituciones formales? ¿Son las leyes importante para darle a una practica continuidad? Son los procedimientos formales importantes?
 - ii. ¿Y que de las instituciones informales?
 - b. Sondear otros factores
 - i. ¿Qué diría usted es lo mas importante para darle a una practica continuidad? (repetida para ver si se dice algo nuevo).
 - 1. ¿Por que?
 - ii. ¿Está una practica condenada a estancarse si esos (recursos, marcos, etc.) no pueden ser generados o movilizados?
 - 1. ¿Por qué?
 - iii. ¿Y qué diría usted es la mejor manera de darle continuidad a una practica?
 - 1. ¿Por qué?
 - 2. Si esa opción no esta disponible, ¿qué otras estrategias consideraría?
4. Una última pregunta: dígame sobre cosas relacionadas que tal vez so quiera saber sobre como darle a estas practicas continuidad y que no le haya preguntado o no haya surgido en nuestra conversación.

Opción 2: el actor no espera que la practica de planificación progresiva tenga continuidad:

- 1. Cuénteme que lo hace desconfiar en la continuidad de la aproximación actual a (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado)
 - a. Sondear enmarcación, recursos, redes, poder
 - i. ¿Cómo funciona eso?
 - ii. ¿Cómo esta intentando generar o movilizar factores para cambiarlo?
 - iii. ¿Puede darme un ejemplo de cómo usted (moviliza recursos, enmarca, usa redes, despliega poder)?
 - iv. ¿Por que decidió (moviliza recursos, enmarca, usa redes, despliega poder)?
 - v. ¿Considero otras alternativas? ¿Por que/por que no las siguió?

- vi. ¿Como se traduce esto a su expectativa de continuidad?
 - b. Sondear conocimiento, interés, identidades, valores, ideas, leyes, procedimientos, símbolos
 - i. Usted menciona (elementos mencionados). ¿Por qué es eso importante?
 - ii. ¿Cómo se traduce esto en prevenir que la practica tenga continuidad?
 - iii. ¿Cómo es buscado ese elemento?
 - 1. Sondear: ¿Puede darme un ejemplo?
 - iv. ¿Qué podría retar eso?
 - v. ¿Esta usted haciendo algo para contrarrestar (el factor mencionado como un reto)?
 - c. Sondear estrategia de institucionalización
 - i. Lo que lo estoy oyendo decir es (decir con otras palabras lo que esta diciendo sobre instituciones). ¿Es eso correcto?
 - ii. Veo. ¿Puede darme un ejemplo de cómo se da eso concretamente?
 - iii. ¿Por qué fue eso seguido?
 - 1. ¿Fueron consideradas otras estrategias?
 - 2. ¿Por qué o por que no fueron seguidas?
 - iv. ¿Cómo ha (el grupo, la organización, la agencia, la empresa) respondido a eso?
 - v. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con esa aproximación o le gustaría estar haciendo algo diferente?
 - 1. Sondear: ¿Puede darme un ejemplo?
 - d. Sondear mecanismos de retroalimentación:
 - i. Usted menciona que espera que la practica no tenga continuidad porque (resumir brevemente). ¿Cómo monitorea y hace seguimiento a eso?
 - ii. Asumamos que en el curso de estar monitoreando usted se da cuenta que las cosas están cambiando en formas que benefician su aproximación a la práctica y podrían ayudar a darle continuidad. ¿Que hace usted?
2. Para resumir, ¿qué diría usted son los factores mas importantes que previenen que la aproximación actual hacia (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado) tenga continuidad?
3. Si yo le dijera que puede cambiar cualquier cosa para ayudarle a la practica a tener continuidad, que diría usted que son los factores mas importantes a tratar en (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado)?
- a. Sondear
 - i. ¿Por qué estos y no otros factores?
 - ii. ¿Quiere esto decir que la practica en realidad continuara siendo efectiva?

4. La semana pasada entrevistaste (un empleado del gobierno, un político, un líder empresarial, un líder social) quien me dijo que el/ella pensaba (mencionar una institución contrapunto a la institución que el entrevistado esta diciendo) es la mejor manera de conseguir continuidad. Que piensa de esa aproximación?

a. Sondar tipo de institución

i. ¿Y que hay de las instituciones formales? Son las leyes importante para darle a una practica continuidad? Son los procedimientos formales importantes?

ii. ¿Y qué de las instituciones informales?

b. Sondar otros factores

i. ¿Qué diría usted es lo mas importante para darle a una practica continuidad? (repetida para ver si se dice algo nuevo).

1. ¿Por qué?

ii. Esta una practica condenada a estancarse si esos (recursos, marcos, etc.) no pueden ser generados o movilizadas?

1. ¿Por que?

iii . Y que diría usted es la mejor manera de darle continuidad a una practica?

1. ¿Por qué?

2. ¿Si esa opción no esta disponible, que otras estrategias consideraría?

5. Una última pregunta: dígame sobre cosas relacionadas que tal vez so quiera saber sobre como darle a estas practicas continuidad y que no le haya preguntado o no haya surgido en nuestra conversación.

Opción 3: el actor espera que una practica de planificación progresiva estancada tenga un cambio:

1. Cuénteme sobre (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado) antes de su estancamiento. ¿Qué cree usted que sucedió para cambiar el impulso de la práctica?

a. Sondar estrategia de institucionalización

i. Antes de (las cosas, los eventos) que usted menciona, ¿se estaba haciendo algo para asegurar la continuidad de la práctica? ¿Qué?

2. Cuénteme que lo hace desconfiar en la continuidad de la aproximación actual a (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado)

a. Sondar enmarcación, recursos, redes, poder

i. ¿Cómo funciona eso?

ii. ¿Cómo esta intentando (generar o movilizar) factores para contribuir a esto?

- iii. ¿Puede darme un ejemplo de cómo usted (moviliza recursos, enmarca, usa redes, despliega poder)?
 - iv. ¿Por qué decidió (moviliza recursos, enmarca, usa redes, despliega poder)?
 - v. ¿Considero otras alternativas? ¿Por que/por que no las siguió?
 - vi. ¿Como se traduce esto a darle impulso a la practica nuevamente?
 - vii. ¿Qué lo hace pensar que esta vez si tendrá continuidad?
- b. Sondear conocimiento, interés, identidades, valores, ideas, leyes, procedimientos, símbolos
- i. Usted menciona (elementos mencionados). ¿Por qué es eso importante?
 - ii. ¿Cómo se traduce esto en prevenir que la practica tenga continuidad/darle impulso a la practica?
 - iii. ¿Cómo es buscado ese elemento?
 - 1. Sondear: ¿Puede darme un ejemplo?
 - iv. ¿Qué podría retar eso?
 - v. ¿Está usted haciendo algo para contrarrestar (el factor mencionado como un reto)?
- c. Sondear estrategia de institucionalización
- i. Lo que lo estoy oyendo decir es (decir con otras palabras lo que esta diciendo sobre instituciones). ¿Es eso correcto?
 - ii. Veo. ¿Puede darme un ejemplo de cómo se da eso concretamente?
 - iii. ¿Por qué fue eso seguido?
 - 3. ¿Fueron consideradas otras estrategias?
 - 4. ¿Por qué o por que no fueron seguidas?
 - iv. ¿Cómo ha (el grupo, la organización, la agencia, la empresa) respondido a eso?
 - v. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con esa aproximación o le gustaría estar haciendo algo diferente?
 - 1. Sondear: ¿Puede darme un ejemplo?
- d. Sondear mecanismos de retroalimentación:
- i. Usted menciona que espera que la practica cambie porque (resumir brevemente). ¿Cómo monitorea y hace seguimiento a eso?
 - ii. Asumamos que en el curso de estar monitoreando usted se da cuenta que las cosas están cambiando en formas que benefician su aproximación a la práctica y podrían ayudar a darle continuidad. ¿Qué hace usted?
3. Para resumir, ¿qué diría usted son los factores mas importantes que previenen que la aproximación actual hacia (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado) tenga continuidad?

4. Si yo le dijera que puede cambiar cualquier cosa para re-energizar la practica, ¿qué diría usted que son los factores mas importantes a tratar en (movilidad, espacio público, agua y alcantarillado) para que la practica tenga continuidad?

a. Sondear

i. ¿Por qué estos y no otros factores?

ii. ¿Quiere esto decir que la practica en realidad continuará siendo efectiva?

5. La semana pasada entrevisté (un empleado del gobierno, un político, un líder empresarial, un líder social) quien me dijo que el/ella pensaba (mencionar una institución contrapunto a la institución que el entrevistado esta diciendo) es la mejor manera de reintegrar una práctica progresiva. ¿Qué piensa de esa aproximación?

a. Sondear tipo de institución

i. ¿Y qué hay de las instituciones formales? ¿Son las leyes importante para darle a una practica continuidad? ¿Son los procedimientos formales importantes?

ii. ¿Y qué de las instituciones informales?

a. Sondear otros factores

ii. ¿qué diría usted es lo más importante para darle a una practica continuidad? (repetida para ver si se dice algo nuevo).

1. ¿Por qué?

ii. ¿Esta una practica condenada a estancarse si esos (recursos, marcos, etc.) no pueden ser generados o movilizandos?

1. ¿Por que?

iii . ¿Y que diría usted es la mejor manera de darle continuidad a una practica?

3. ¿Por qué?

4. ¿Si esa opción no esta disponible, que otras estrategias consideraría?

5. Una última pregunta: dígame sobre cosas relacionadas que tal vez so quiera saber sobre como darle a estas practicas continuidad y que no le haya preguntado o no haya surgido en nuestra conversación.

Conclusión

Gracias nuevamente por sacar el tiempo para reunirnos y por responder mis preguntas. Sus respuestas son muy valiosas para mi trabajo. Estaré transcribiendo mis notas y la grabación de la entrevista pronto. Puede recomendarme a otras personas para entrevistar?

Por favor recuerde que el formulario de consentimiento que firmo tiene mis datos de contacto. Si tiene alguna pregunta o si se le ocurre algo mas que quiere compartir por favor déjemelo saber.

Original Interview guide

Outline of lines of inquiry:

Part A: Progressive planning

1. How did they become involved with that planning practice?
2. What motivated them to become engaged?
3. What has contributed to their involvement?
4. What is valuable about the practice as they advocate it?
5. What has been their role in pursuing the practice?

Part B: Institutions

1. What constitutes a stable institution?
2. How did they arrive at viewing a particular institution as stable or effective?
Experience? Research?
3. What are their institutionalization objectives?
4. How are they pursuing those objectives? [[mediating factors, targets, strategies]
5. Why do they think the institutions will help the practice have continuity?
6. How do they know if they are making progress?

Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed. I have two consent forms: one is for you to keep, the other one I would appreciate if you could sign so that I can keep it for my records.

I want you to know that your willingness to help me with this research is truly appreciated.

Basic background

1. What is your full name?
2. What is your current occupation?
3. How did you train for this occupation? (College, vocational school, community workshops, activist/organizational training, professional development)

Part A: Progressive planning

I want to begin by discussing your involvement in this [mobility, public space, water and sanitation] practice.

1. Walk me through how you got initially involved in [mobility, public space, water and sanitation]

- a. Probe for when the person got involved in the practice if it is not mentioned
 - i. When was that?
 - b. Probe for where the person got involved in the practice if it is not mentioned
 - i. What [city or neighborhood] was that in?
2. What motivated you to become involved?
 - a. Probe for values, knowledge, interests, ideas, laws, procedures, symbols
 - i. When you say [x], what do you mean? Can you tell me more about that?
 - b. Probe for networks, framing, power, critical juncture
 - i. When you say [x], what do you mean? Can you tell me more about that?
3. Why was that important to you?
 - a. Probe for rationale, feelings, or thoughts
 - i. Can you give me an example?
4. Tell me a little bit about how you got to view [mobility, public space, water and sanitation] as [factors mentioned in answer 3]
 - a. Probe:
 - i. Why is that important or valuable?
5. Tell me about your involvement from the time you got involved to today
 - a. Probe for what has changed, what has been added or subtracted in the practice
 - i. Can you tell me more about that?
 - b. Probe for what has changed, what has been added or subtracted in the person's role
 - i. Can you tell me more about that?
6. What would you say are the three most important roles that [mobility, public space, water and sanitation] play in the city?
 - a. Probe for values, interests, ideas, laws, symbols

Part B: Institutions

I want to move on to discuss the long-term implications of the work you are doing in [mobility, public space, water and sanitation].

1. If you had to guess what the approach towards [mobility, public space, water and sanitation] in the city is going to be in two years, what would you say?
 - a. Probe for other lengths
 - i. And in five years?

- ii. What about in ten years?

Option 1: actor expects progressive practice to have continuity:

1. Tell me about what makes you confident in the continuity of the current approach to [mobility, public space, water and sanitation].
 - a. Probe for framing, resources, networks, power
 - i. How does that work? How is it that you [generate or mobilize] that?
 - ii. Can you give me an example of how you [mobilize resources, frame, use networks, deploy power]?
 - iii. Why did you decide to [mobilize resources, frame, use networks, deploy power]?
 - iv. Were other alternatives considered? Why/why not were they pursued?
 - v. How does that translate into your expectation for continuity?
 - vi. What could challenge that?
 - vii. Are you doing anything to prevent [factor mentioned as challenge]?
 - b. Probe for knowledge, interest, identities, values, ideas, laws, procedures, symbols
 - i. You mentioned [elements mentioned]. Why is that important?
 - ii. How does that translate into your expectation for continuity?
 - iii. How do you pursue that?
 1. Probe: Can you give me an example?
 - iv. What could challenge that?
 - v. Are you doing anything to prevent [factor mentioned as challenge]?
 - c. Probe for institutionalization strategy:
 - i. So what I am hearing from you is [rephrase what they are saying about the institutions]. Is that correct?
 - ii. I see. Can you give me an example of what that looks like concretely?
 - iii. Why was that pursued?
 1. Were other strategies considered?
 2. Why or why not were they pursued?
 - iv. How has [the group, the organization, the agency, the company] contributed to that institutionalization strategy?
 - v. Do you agree with that approach or would you like to be doing something differently?
 1. Probe: Can you give me an example?
 - d. Probe for feedback mechanisms:

- i. You mentioned you expect the practice to have continuity because of [brief summary]. How do you monitor or follow-up on that?
 - ii. Lets say in the course of monitoring you realize that things are not going according to plan. What do you do?
- 2. So to summarize, what would you say are the most important factors in making the current approach to [mobility, public space, water and sanitation] have continuity?
 - a. Probe
 - i. Why these and not other factors?
 - ii. Does this actually mean that the practice will continue to be effective?
 - 1. What connects the existence of the practice with its effectiveness?
- 3. Last week I interviewed [a government worker, a politician, a business leader, a civil society leader] who said s/he thought [mention a counterfactual institution of what the person is saying] was the best way to achieve continuity. What do you think about that approach?
 - a. Probe for institutional type
 - i. What about formal institutions? Are laws important to give a practice continuity? Are formal procedures important?
 - ii. What about informal institutions?
 - b. Probe for other factors
 - i. What would you say is more important if you want to give a practice continuity? (repeated to see if anything new comes up)
 - 1. Why?
 - ii. Is a practice doomed to stagnate if those [resources, frames, etc.] cannot be generated or mobilized?
 - 1. Why?
 - iii. And what would you say is the best way to give a practice continuity?
 - 1. Why?
 - 2. If that option is not available, what other strategies would you consider?
- 4. A final question: Tell me about things I might want to know about regarding how to give these practices continuity that I have not asked or that has not come up

Option 2: actor does not expect progressive practice to have continuity:

- 1. Tell me about what makes you hesitant about the continuity of the current approach to [mobility, public space, water and sanitation].

- a. Probe for factors: framing, resources, networks, power
 - i. How does that work?
 - ii. How are you trying to [generate or mobilize mediating factors] to change that?
 - iii. Can you give me an example of how you [mobilize resources, frame, use networks, deploy power]?
 - iv. Why did you decide to [mobilize resources, frame, use networks, deploy power]?
 - v. Were other alternatives considered? Why/why not were they pursued?
 - vi. How does that translate into giving a practice continuity?

- b. Probe for elements: knowledge, interest, identities, values, ideas, laws, procedures, symbols
 - i. You mentioned [elements mentioned]. Why is that important?
 - ii. How does that translate into preventing the practice from having continuity?
 - iii. How is that element pursued?
 - 1. Probe: Can you give me an example?
 - iv. What could challenge that?
 - v. Are you doing anything to reverse the [factor mentioned as challenge]?

- c. Probe for institutionalization strategy:
 - i. So what I am hearing from you is [rephrase what they are saying about the institutions]. Is that correct?
 - ii. I see. Can you give me an example of what that looks like concretely?
 - iii. Why was that pursued?
 - 1. Were other strategies considered?
 - 2. Why or why not were they pursued?
 - iv. How has [the group, the organization, the agency, the company] responded to that?
 - v. Do you agree with that approach or would you like to be doing something differently?
 - 1. Probe: Can you give me an example?

- d. Probe for feedback mechanisms:
 - i. You mentioned you expect the practice to not have continuity because of [brief summary]. How do you monitor or follow-up on that?
 - ii. Lets say in the course of monitoring you realize that things are changing in ways that benefit your approach to the practice and could help to make it have continuity. What do you do?

2. So to summarize, what would you say are the most important factors preventing the current approach to [mobility, public space, water and sanitation] from having continuity?
3. If I told you can change anything to help give the practice continuity, what would you say are the most important factors to tackle so that the [mobility, public space, water and sanitation] practice has continuity?
 - a. Probe
 - i. Why these and not other factors?
 - ii. Does this actually mean that the practice will continue to be effective?
4. Last week I interviewed [a government worker, a politician, a business leader, a civil society leader] who said s/he thought [mention a counterfactual institution of what the person is saying] was the best way to achieve continuity. What do you think about that approach?
 - a. Probe for institutional type
 - i. What about formal institutions? Are laws important to give a practice continuity? Are formal procedures important?
 - ii. What about informal institutions?
 - b. Probe for mediating factors
 - i. What would you say is more important if you want to give a practice continuity? (repeated to see if anything new comes up)
 1. Why?
 - ii. Is a practice doomed to stagnate if those [resources, frames, etc.] cannot be generated or mobilized?
 1. Why?
 - iii. And what would you say is the best way to give a practice continuity?
 1. Why?
 2. If that option is not available, what other strategies would you consider?
5. A final question: Tell me about things I might want to know about regarding how to give these practices continuity that I have not asked or that has not come up

Option 3: actor expects a progressive practice that has stagnated to change:

1. Tell me about [public space, mobility, water and sanitation] prior to its stagnation. What do you think happened to change the momentum of the practice?
 - a. Probe for institutionalization strategies:
 - i. Prior to the [things, events] you just mentioned, was anything being done to ensure the continuity of the practice? What?

2. Tell me about what makes you hesitant about the continuity of the current approach to [mobility, public space, water and sanitation].
 - a. Probe for factors: framing, resources, networks, power
 - i. How does that work?
 - ii. How are you trying to [generate or mobilize mediating factors] to contribute to that?
 - iii. Can you give me an example of how you [mobilize resources, frame, use networks, deploy power]?
 - iv. Why did you decide to [mobilize resources, frame, use networks, deploy power]?
 - v. Were other alternatives considered? Why/why not were they pursued?
 - vi. How does that translate into giving the practice momentum once again?
 - vii. What makes you think that it will have continuity this time around?
 - b. Probe for elements: knowledge, interest, identities, values, ideas, laws, procedures, symbols
 - i. You mentioned [target elements mentioned]. Why is that important?
 - ii. How does that translate into preventing the practice from having continuity/giving the practice momentum?
 - iii. How is that element pursued?
 1. Probe: Can you give me an example?
 - iv. What could challenge that?
 - v. Are you doing anything to reverse the [factor mentioned as challenge]?
 - c. Probe for institutionalization strategy:
 - i. So what I am hearing from you is [rephrase what they are saying about the institutions]. Is that correct?
 - ii. I see. Can you give me an example of what that looks like concretely?
 - iii. Why was that pursued?
 1. Were other strategies considered?
 2. Why or why not were they pursued?
 - iv. How has [the group, the organization, the agency, the company] responded to that?
 - v. Do you agree with that approach or would you like to be doing something differently?
 1. Probe: Can you give me an example?
 - d. Probe for feedback mechanisms:
 - i. You mentioned you expect the practice to change because of [brief summary]. How do you monitor or follow-up on that?

- ii. Lets say in the course of monitoring you realize that things are changing in ways that benefit your approach to the practice and could help to make it have continuity. What do you do?
- 3. So to summarize, what would you say are the most important factors preventing the current approach to [mobility, public space, water and sanitation] from having continuity?
- 4. If I told you can change anything to help reenergize [the previous progressive practice], what would you say are the most important factors to tackle so that the [mobility, public space, water and sanitation] practice has continuity?
 - a. Probe
 - i. Why these and not other factors?
 - ii. Does this actually mean that the practice will continue to be effective?
- 5. Last week I interviewed [a government worker, a politician, a business leader, a civil society leader] who said s/he thought [mention a counterfactual institution of what the person is saying] was the best way to reinstate a progressive practice. What do you think about that approach?
 - a. Probe for institutional type
 - i. What about formal institutions? Are laws important to give a practice continuity? Are formal procedures important?
 - ii. What about informal institutions?
 - b. Probe for mediating factors
 - i. What would you say is more important if you want to give a practice continuity? (repeated to see if anything new comes up)
 - 1. Why?
 - ii. Is a practice doomed to stagnate if those [resources, frames, etc.] cannot be generated or mobilized?
 - 1. Why?
 - iii. And what would you say is the best way to give a practice continuity?
 - 1. Why?
 - 2. If that option is not available, what other strategies would you consider?
- 6. A final question: Tell me about things I might want to know about regarding how to give these practices continuity that I have not asked or that has not come up

Conclusion

Thank you once again for making time to meet with me and for answering my questions. Your answers are very valuable for my work. I will be transcribing my

notes and the interview recording shortly. Would you be willing to provide feedback on my analysis and conclusions of the material collected in this interview? Also, if any additional questions come up during my analysis, would you be willing to have a follow up interview or to exchange emails to clarify some of the information or to answer additional questions? Finally, can you recommend other people for me to interview?

Please remember that the consent form you signed has all my contact information. If you have any questions or if you think of something you want to share please let me know

